

The West Indies

The British Documents on
the End of Empire Project
gratefully acknowledges
the generous assistance of
the Leverhulme Trust.

The Project has
been undertaken
under the auspices
of the British Academy.

BRITISH DOCUMENTS ON THE END OF EMPIRE

General Editor S R Ashton
Project Chairman A N Porter

Series B Volume 6

The West Indies

Editors
S R ASHTON AND DAVID KILLINGRAY

Published for the Institute of Commonwealth Studies
in the University of London

London: The Stationery Office

First published 1999

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Applications for reproduction of any other part of this work should be addressed to the publisher: The Stationery Office, St Crispins, Duke Street, Norwich, NR3 1PD

ISBN 0 11 290577 3

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

A CIP catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

If you wish to receive future volumes from the British Documents on the End of Empire project, please write to The Stationery Office, Standing Order Department, PO Box 29, St Crispins, Duke Street, NORWICH NR3 1GN, or telephone on 0870 600 5522, quoting classification reference number 040 30 017



Published by The Stationery Office and available from:

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
Printed in the UK for the Stationery Office by

Antony Rowe Ltd, Reading

J80077 11/99 C5

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Foreword

The main purpose of the British Documents on the End of Empire Project (BDEEP) is to publish documents from British official archives on the ending of colonial and associated rule and on the context in which this took place. In 1945, aside from the countries of present-day India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Burma, Britain had over fifty formal dependencies; by the end of 1965 the total had been almost halved and by 1985 only a handful remained. The ending of Britain's position in these formal dependencies was paralleled by changes in relations with states in an informal empire. The end of empire in the period at least since 1945 involved a change also in the empire as something that was more than the sum of its parts and as such formed an integral part of Britain's domestic affairs and international relations. In publishing official British documents on the end of empire this project is, to a degree, the successor to the two earlier series of published documents concerning the end of British rule in India and Burma which were edited by Professors Mansergh and Tinker respectively. The successful completion of *The transfer of power* and *The struggle for independence*,¹ both of which were based on British records, emphasised the need for similar published collections of documents important to the history of the final stages of Britain's association with other dependencies in Africa, the Middle East, the Caribbean, South-East Asia and the Pacific. These documents are crucial research tools for scholars both from sovereign independent states which emerged from colonial rule as well as those from Britain itself. BDEEP is also set in the much wider context of the efforts made by successive British governments to locate Britain's position in an international order. Here the empire, both in its formal and informal senses, is viewed as an instrument of the domestic, foreign and defence policies of successive British governments. The project is therefore concerned with the ending of colonial rule in individual territories as seen from the British side at one level, and the broader political, economic and strategic considerations involved in that at another.

Despite the similarities, however, BDEEP differs in significant ways from its predecessors in terms both of presentation and content. The project is of greater magnitude than that undertaken by Professor Mansergh for India. Four major differences can be identified. First, the ending of colonial rule within a dependent empire took place over a much longer period of time, extending into the final years of the twentieth century while having its roots in the Second World War and before. Secondly, the empire consisted of a large number of territories, varying in area, population, wealth and in many other ways, each with its own individual problems but often with their futures linked to those of neighbouring territories and the

¹ Nicholas Mansergh *et al*, eds, *Constitutional relations between Britain and India: the transfer of power 1942–47*, 12 vols, (London, 1970–1983); Hugh Tinker, ed, *Constitutional relations between Britain and Burma: the struggle for independence 1944–1948*, 2 vols, (London, 1983–1984).

growing complexity surrounding the colonial empire. Thirdly, while for India the documentary record for certain matters of high policy could be encapsulated within a relatively straightforward 'country' study, in the case of the colonial empire the documentary record is more diffuse because of the plethora of territories and their scattered location. Finally, the documents relating to the ending of colonial rule are not conveniently located within one leading department of state but rather are to be found in several of them. As the purpose of the project is to publish documents relating to the end of empire from the extensive range and quantity of official British records, private collections and other categories of non-official material are not regarded as principal documentary sources. In BDEEP, selections from non-official material will be used only in exceptional cases to fill gaps where they exist in the available official record.

In recognition of these differences and also of the fact that the end of empire involves consideration of a range of issues which operated at a much wider level than that normally associated with the ending of colonial rule in a single country, BDEEP is structured in two main series along with a third support series. Series A represents the general volumes in which, for successive British governments, documents relating to the empire as a whole will be published. Series B represents the country or territory volumes and provides territorial studies of how, from a British government perspective, former colonies and dependencies achieved their independence and countries which were part of an informal empire regained their autonomy. In addition to the two main documentary series, a third series—series C—has been published in the form of handbooks to the records of the former colonial empire which are deposited at the Public Record Office (PRO). Series C consists of two volumes which form an integral part of BDEEP and also serve as PRO guides to the records. Together they enable scholars and others wishing to follow the record of the ending of colonial rule and empire to pursue their inquiries beyond the published record provided by the general studies in series A and the country studies in series B. Volume one of the handbooks, a revised and updated version of *The records of the Colonial and Dominions Offices* by R B Pugh which was first published in 1964, is entitled *Records of the Colonial Office, Dominions Office, Commonwealth Relations Office and Commonwealth Office* (1995). It covers over two hundred years of activity down to 1968 when the Commonwealth Office merged with the Foreign Office to form the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Volume two, entitled *Records of the Cabinet, Foreign Office, Treasury and other records* (1998), focuses more specifically on twentieth-century departmental records and also includes references to the records of inter-departmental committees, commissions of inquiry and international organisations. The two volumes were prepared under the direction and supervision of Dr Anne Thurston, at the time honorary research fellow at the Institute of Commonwealth Studies in the University of London, and now executive director of the International Records Management Trust.

In the two main series the research is organised in stages. Stage one, covering the years 1925–1957, is now complete and consists of three general volumes and five country volumes, collectively published in twenty-one individual parts. In series A there are volumes on *Imperial policy and colonial practice 1925–1945* in two parts (1996), *The Labour government and the end of empire 1945–1951* in four parts (1992), and *The Conservative government and the end of empire 1951–1957* in three parts (1994). In series B there are volumes on *Ghana* in two parts (1992), *Sri Lanka*

in two parts (1997), *Malaya* in three parts (1995), *Egypt and the defence of the Middle East* in three parts (1998) and the *Sudan* in two parts (1998). Starting in 1999, the project began publishing volumes in a second stage which covers the period 1957–1964. Here there are five volumes, a general volume on the *Conservative government and the end of empire 1957–1964*, and country volumes on *The West Indies*, *Nigeria*, *Kenya* and *Malaysia*.

The criteria which have been used in selecting documents for inclusion in individual volumes are explained in the introductions written by the specialist editors. These introductions are more substantial and contextual than those in previous series. Each volume also lists the PRO sources which have been searched. However, it may be helpful to outline the more general guiding principles which have been employed. BDEEP editors pursue several lines of inquiry. There is first the end of empire in a broad high policy sense in which the empire is viewed in terms of Britain's position as a world power and of the inter-relationship between what derives from this position and developments within the colonial dependencies. Here Britain's relations with the dependencies of the empire are set in the wider defence, economic and foreign policy contexts of Britain's relations with the United States, with Europe, and with the Commonwealth and United Nations. Secondly, there is investigation into colonial policy in its strict sense. Here the emphasis is on those areas which were specifically—but not exclusively—the concern of the leading department. In the period before the administrative amalgamations of the 1960s,² the leading department of the British government for most of the dependencies was the Colonial Office; for a minority it was either the Dominions Office and its successor, the Commonwealth Relations Office, or the Foreign Office. Colonial policy included questions of economic and social development, questions of governmental institutions and constitutional structures, and administrative questions concerning the future of the civil and public services and of the defence forces in a period of transition from European to indigenous control. Finally there is inquiry into the development of political and social forces within colonies, the response to these and the transfer of governmental authority and of legal sovereignty from Britain to its colonial dependencies as these processes were understood and interpreted by the British government. Here it should be emphasised that the purpose of BDEEP is not to document the history of colony politics or nationalist movements in any particular territory. Given the purpose of the project and the nature of much of the source material, the place of colony politics in BDEEP is conditioned by the extent to which an awareness of local political situations played an overt part in influencing major policy decisions made in Britain.

Although in varying degrees and from different perspectives, elements of these various lines of inquiry appear in both the general and the country series. The aim in both is to concentrate on the British record by selecting documents which illustrate those policy issues which were deemed important by ministers and officials at the time. General volumes do not normally treat in any detail of matters which will be fully documented in the country volumes but some especially significant documents do appear in both series. The process of selection involves an inevitable degree of

² The Colonial Office merged with the Commonwealth Relations Office in 1966 to form the Commonwealth Office. The Commonwealth Office merged with the Foreign Office in 1968 to form the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

sifting and subtraction. Issues which in retrospect appear to be of lesser significance or to be ephemeral have been omitted. The main example concerns the extensive quantity of material devoted to appointments and terms of service—salaries, gradings, allowances, pension rights and compensation—within the colonial and related services. It is equally important to stress certain negative aspects of the official documentary record. Officials in London were sometimes not in a position to address potentially significant issues because the information was not available. Much in this respect depended on the extent of the documentation sent to London by the different colonial administrations. Once the stage of internal self-government had been reached, or where there was a dyarchy, the flow of detailed local information to London began to diminish.

Selection policy has been influenced by one further factor, namely access to the records at the PRO. Unlike the India and Burma series and the current Foreign and Commonwealth Office series of Documents on British Policy Overseas (DBPO), BDEEP is not an official project. In practice this means that while editors have privileged access (in the form of research facilities and requisitioning procedures) to the records at the PRO, they do not have unrestricted access. For files which at the time a volume is in preparation are either subject to extended closures beyond the statutory thirty years or retained in the originating department under section 3(4) of the Public Records Act of 1958, editors are subject to the same restrictions as all other researchers. Apart from cases where files or series of files are withheld, official weeding processes now tend to remove sentences or paragraphs from public view, rather than the whole document; such omissions are indicated in footnotes. To date access has not impeded the research undertaken by the project to any significant degree, and the project has been successful in securing the release of a number of hitherto withheld documents from the Historical Section of the Cabinet Office and the Records Department of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

A thematic arrangement of the documents has been adopted for the general volumes in series A. The country volumes in series B follow a chronological arrangement; in this respect they adopt the same approach as was used in the India and Burma series. For each volume in both series A and B a summary list of the documents included is provided. The headings to BDEEP documents, which have been editorially standardised, present the essential information. Together with the sequence number, the file reference (in the form of the PRO call-up number and any internal pagination or numeration) and the date of the document appear on the first line.³ The second and subsequent lines record the subject of the document, the type of document (letter, memorandum, telegram etc), the originator (person or persons, committee, department) and the recipient (if any). A subject entry in a heading in single quotation marks denotes the title of a document as it appears in the original. An entry in square brackets denotes a subject indicator composed by the editor. This latter device has been employed in cases where no title is given in the original or where the original title is too unwieldy to reproduce in its entirety. Security classifications and, in the case of telegrams, times of despatch and receipt, have generally been omitted. In the headings to documents and the contents lists,

³ The PRO call-up number precedes the comma in the references cited. In the case of documents from FO 371, the major Foreign Office political class, the internal numeration refers to the jacket number of the file.

ministers are identified by the name of the office-holder, not the title of the office (ie, Mr Macleod, not secretary of state for the colonies).⁴ In the same contexts, officials are identified by their initials and surname. In a general volumes, ambassadors, governors, high commissioners and other embassy or high commission staff are cited in the form Sir H Foot (Cyprus). Footnotes to documents appearing below the rule are editorial; those above the rule, or where no rule is printed, are part of the original document. Each volume provides an initial summary list of which principal offices were held by whom, and a separate series of biographical notes (at the end) for major figures who appear in the documents. Other figures are identified in editorial footnotes on the occasion of first appearance. Link-notes, written by the volume editor and indented in square brackets between the heading and the beginning of a document, are often used to explain the context of a document. Technical detail or extraneous material has been extracted from a number of documents. In such cases omission dots have been inserted in the text and the document is identified in the heading as an extract. Occasional omission dots have also been used to excise purely mechanical chain-of-command executive instructions and some redundant internal referencing has been removed, though much of it remains in place, for the benefit of researchers. No substantive material relating to policy-making has been excised from the documents. In general the aim has been to reproduce documents in their entirety but where available space is a major constraint on editors, a consideration which applies particularly in the case of general volumes, where the documentation is voluminous, this is not always possible, and some purely factual information may be omitted. It must also be emphasised in this context that the BDEEP volumes do not remove the necessity for researchers to study the original records themselves. The footnote reference 'not printed' is used only in cases where a specified enclosure or an annex to a document has not been included. Unless a specific cross-reference or note of explanation is provided, however, it can be assumed that other documents referred to in the text of the documents included have not been reproduced. Obvious typing errors in the original are in the main silently corrected, but abbreviations and contractions stand. Each volume has a list of abbreviations together with a consolidated index, and country volumes include a chronology of principal events.

One radical innovation, compared with previous Foreign Office or India and Burma series, is that BDEEP reproduces many more minutes by ministers and officials.

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* * * *

Formally launched in 1987, BDEEP has been based since its inception at the Institute of Commonwealth Studies. The work of the project is supervised by a Project Committee chaired by Professor Andrew Porter, Rhodes professor of imperial history in the University of London. Professor Porter succeeded Professor Anthony

⁴ This is an editorial convention, following DBPO practice. Very few memoranda issued in their name were actually written by ministers themselves, but normally drafted by officials.

Low, formerly Smuts professor of the history of the Commonwealth in the University of Cambridge, who retired in November 1994. Professor Michael Crowder became the first general editor while holding a visiting professorship in the University of London and a part-time position at Amherst College, Massachusetts. Following his untimely death in 1988, Professor Crowder was replaced as general editor by Professor David Murray, pro vice-chancellor and professor of government at the Open University, who played a critical role in establishing a secure financial base for the project and in negotiating contracts with the volume editors and the publisher. His invaluable advice and expertise in dealing with the early manuscripts are acknowledged with particular gratitude. Mrs Anita Burdett was appointed as project secretary and research assistant. She was succeeded in September 1989 by Dr Stephen Ashton who had previously worked with Professors Mansergh and Tinker during the final stages of the India and Burma series. Dr Ashton replaced Professor Murray as project director and general editor in 1993.

The project benefited from an initial pump-priming grant from the British Academy. Thanks are due to the secretary and Board of the Academy for this grant and for the decision of the British Academy to adopt BDEEP as one of its major projects. The Academy made a further award in 1996 which enabled the project to employ a research assistant on a fixed term contract. The Managers of the Smuts Memorial Fund in the University of Cambridge are also to be acknowledged. They made possible the workshop from which the project developed and they have since provided a further grant for work on two of the stage two volumes. The principal funding for the project has been provided by the Leverhulme Trust and the volumes are a tribute to the support provided by the Trustees. A major debt of gratitude is owed to the Trustees. In addition to their generous grants to cover the major costs of both stages, the Trustees agreed to a subsequent request to extend the duration of the first grant, and also provided a supplementary grant which enabled the project to secure Dr Ashton's appointment. It is thanks largely to the Leverhulme Trust that BDEEP has developed into one of the country's most successful historical research projects.

Members of the Project Committee, who meet annually at the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, have provided valuable advice and much needed encouragement. Professor Low, the first chairman of the Committee, made a singular contribution, initiating the first exploratory meeting at Cambridge in 1985 and presiding over subsequent developments in his customary constructive but unobtrusive manner. Professor Porter continues in a similar vein and his leadership and experience are much appreciated by the general editor. The director and the staff of the Institute of Commonwealth Studies have provided administrative support and the congenial surroundings within which the general editor works. The editors of volumes in both stages one have benefited considerably from the researches undertaken by Dr Anne Thurston and her assistants which resulted in the publication of the two handbooks. Although BDEEP is not an official project, the general editor wishes to acknowledge the support and co-operation received from the Historical Section of the Cabinet Office and the Records Department of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. He wishes also to record his appreciation of the spirit of friendly co-operation received from the editors of DBPO. Dr Ronald Hyam, editor in stage one of the general volume on the post-war Labour government and co-editor of the stage two volume on the Conservative government, played an important role in

the compilation of the house-style adopted by BDEEP and his contribution is acknowledged with gratitude. Thanks also are due to The Stationery Office for assuming publishing responsibility and for their expert advice on matters of design and production. Last, but by no means least, the contribution of the chief executive and keeper of the records and the staff, both curatorial and administrative, at the PRO must be emphasised. Without the facilities and privileges afforded to BDEEP editors at the PRO, the project would not be viable.

S R Ashton
Institute of Commonwealth Studies
February 1999

The West Indies

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Abbreviations

AOT	Associated Overseas Territory
AID	(US) Agency for International Development
BAOR	British Army of the Rhine
BCF	British Caribbean Federation
BDEEP	British Documents on the End of Empire Project
BG	British Guiana
BGR	British Government Representative
BGSPA	British Guiana Sugar Producers' Association
BGVF	British Guiana Volunteer Force
BH	British Honduras
BIS	British Information Services
BOAC	British Overseas Airways Corporation
BWI	British West Indies
BWIA	British West Indian Airways
CARE	Co-operative for American Relief Everywhere
CARIFTA	Caribbean Free Trade Area
CDC	Colonial Development Corporation
CD&W	Colonial Development and Welfare
CECC	Commonwealth Economic Consultative Council
CEI	Committee on European Integration
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CIF	cost in freight
c-in-c	commander-in-chief
CMEA	Canadian Ministry of External Affairs
CMG	Companion of the Order of St Michael and St George
CMN	Common Market Negotiations
cmr/cmrs	commissioner(s)

CO	Colonial Office
COI	Central Office of Information
CON	Conservative (Party)
COS	Chiefs of Staff
CPC	Colonial Policy Committee (Cabinet, UK)
CRO	Commonwealth Relations Office
CSA	Commonwealth Sugar Agreement
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
Dept	Department
DLP	Democratic Labour Party (of the West Indies Federation)
EACSO	East African Common Services Organisation
ECGD	Export Credit Guarantee Department
ECLA	Economic Committee on Latin America
ECM	European Common Market
EEC	European Economic Community
EFTA	European Free Trade Association
FDLP	Federal Democratic Labour Party
FLP	Federal Labour Party
FO	Foreign Office
FOB	free on board
GAWU	Guiana Agricultural Workers' Union
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GCMG	Knight of the Grand Cross of St Michael and St George
GIWU	Guiana Industrial Workers' Union
gov	governor
gov-gen	governor-general
govt/govts	government(s)
HEO	higher executive officer
HMG	His/Her Majesty's Government
HMOCS	Her Majesty's Oversea Civil Service
HO	Home Office
<i>H of C Debs</i>	House of Commons Debates (Hansard)

IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ICA	International Co-operation Administration (US)
IGC	Inter-Governmental Conference
IF	Imperial and Foreign (Division, Treasury)
IMF	International Monetary Fund
JIC	Joint Intelligence Committee
JLP	Jamaica Labour Party
KCMG	Knight Commander of the Order of St Michael and St George
KLM	Royal Dutch Airlines
Kt	Knighthood
LAB	Labour (Party)
LIB	Liberal (Party)
LRPG	Long Range Proving Ground
LSE	London School of Economics
MBE	Member of the Order of the British Empire
MEDD	Middle East Development Division
memo	memorandum
MLF	Multi-lateral Force
MLNS	Ministry of Labour and National Service (UK)
MOD	Ministry of Defence
MP	member of parliament
MRT	medium range transport (aircraft)
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NCO	non-commissioned officer
NDP	National Democratic Party (British Guiana)
NIP	National Independence Party (British Honduras)
OAS	Organisation of American States
ODM	Ministry of Overseas Development
OEEC	Organisation for European Economic Co-operation
OF	Overseas Finance (Division, Treasury)
OPD	Oversea Policy and Defence (Cabinet Committee, UK)
OPEC	Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries

ORS	Oceanographic Research Station(s)
PAC	Public Accounts Committee (UK)
PM	prime minister
PNC	People's National Congress (British Guiana)
PNM	People's National Movement (Trinidad)
PNP	People's National Party (British Guiana)
PNP	People's National Party (Jamaica)
PPP	People's Progressive Party (British Guiana)
PPS	parliamentary private secretary
PSC	Public Service Commission
PUP	People's United Party (British Honduras)
PWD	Public Works Department
PYO	People's Youth Organisation (British Guiana)
QC	Queen's Counsel
QR	quota restriction
S & P	Secret and Personal
SCAC	Standing Closer Association Committee
sec	secretary
SEO	senior executive officer
SFC	Standing Federation Committee
SLO	senior law officer
SNOWI	senior naval officer, West Indies
S of S	secretary of state
TA	technical assistance
tel	telegram
TUC	Trades Union Congress
UCWI	University College of the West Indies
UDP	United Democratic Party (British Guiana)
UF	United Force (British Guiana)
UGP	United Guianese Party
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations

US(A)	United States (of America)
UWI	University of the West Indies
VIP	very important person
VSO	Voluntary Service Overseas
WIR	West India Regiment
WISA	West Indian Sugar Association
WFTU	World Federation of Trade Unions
WO	War Office
YMCA	Young Men's Christian Association

Principal Holders of Offices 1948–1966

UNITED KINGDOM

1. *Ministers*

(a) *Labour governments 1945–1951 (details from 1948 when the volume begins)*

Prime minister	Mr C R Attlee (26 July 1945)
S of S foreign affairs	Mr E Bevin (27 July 1945) Mr H S Morrison (9 Mar 1951)
S of S colonies	Mr A Creech Jones (4 Oct 1946) Mr J Griffiths (28 Feb 1950)
S of S Commonwealth relations	Mr P J Noel-Baker (7 Oct 1947) Mr P C Gordon Walker (28 Feb 1950)
Minister of state, CO (junior minister)	Earl of Listowel (4 Jan 1948) Mr J Dugdale (28 Feb 1950)
Parliamentary under-secretary of state, CO (junior minister)	Mr D R Rees-Williams (7 Oct 1947) Mr T F Cook (2 Mar 1950)

(b) *Conservative governments 1951–1964*

Prime minister	(Sir) W L S Churchill (26 Oct 1951) (KG 24 Apr 1953) Sir Anthony Eden (6 Apr 1955) Mr M H Macmillan (13 Jan 1957) Sir A Douglas-Home (18 Oct 1963)
S of S foreign affairs	Mr R A Eden (28 Oct 1951) (KG 20 Oct 1954) Mr M H Macmillan (7 Apr 1955) Mr J Selwyn Lloyd (20 Dec 1955) Earl of Home (27 July 1960) Mr R A Butler (18 Oct 1963)
S of S colonies	Mr O Lyttelton (28 Oct 1951) Mr A T Lennox-Boyd (28 July 1954)

	Mr I Macleod (19 Oct 1959) Mr R Maudling (16 Oct 1961) Mr Duncan Sandys (17 July 1962)
S of S Commonwealth relations	Lord Ismay (28 Oct 1951) Marquess of Salisbury (12 Mar 1952) Viscount Swinton (24 Nov 1952) Earl of Home (7 Apr 1955) Mr Duncan Sandys (28 July 1960)
S of S Commonwealth relations and colonies	Mr Duncan Sandys (20 Oct 1963)
Minister of state, CO (junior minister)	Mr A T Lennox-Boyd (2 Nov 1951) Mr H L D'A Hopkinson (7 May 1952) Mr J H Hare (20 Dec 1955) Mr J S Maclay (19 Oct 1956) Earl of Perth (17 Jan 1957) Marquess of Lansdowne (19 Apr 1962)
Minister of state for Commonwealth relations and colonies (junior ministers)	Duke of Devonshire (20 Oct 1963) Marquess of Lansdowne (20 Oct 1963)
Parliamentary under-secretary of state, CO (junior minister)	Earl of Munster (5 Nov 1951) Lord Lloyd (18 Oct 1954) Mr J D Profumo (19 Jan 1957) Mr J Amery (1 Dec 1958) Mr H C P J Fraser (31 Oct 1960) Mr N T L Fisher (17 July 1962)
Parliamentary under-secretary of state for Commonwealth relations and colonies (junior minister)	Mr J D R T Tilney (20 Oct 1963) Mr N T L Fisher (20 Oct 1963) Mr R Hornby (24 Oct 1963)
(c) <i>Labour governments 1964–1970 (details to 1966)</i>	
Prime minister	Mr H Wilson (16 Oct 1964)
S of S foreign affairs	Mr P C Gordon Walker (16 Oct 1964) Mr M Stewart (22 Jan 1965) Mr G Brown (11 Aug 1966)
S of S colonies (combined with Department of Commonwealth Affairs, 1 Aug 1966; office discontinued, 7 Jan 1967)	Mr A Greenwood (17 Oct 1964) Earl of Longford (23 Dec 1965) Mr F Lee (6 Apr 1966)

S of S Commonwealth relations (Commonwealth affairs from 1 Aug 1966)	Mr A Bottomley (18 Oct 1964) Mr H Bowden (11 Aug 1966)
Parliamentary under-secretary of state for colonies (junior minister)	Mrs E White (21 Oct 1964) Mr J Stonehouse (6 Apr 1966)
Parliamentary under-secretary of state for Commonwealth relations and colonies (junior minister)	Lord Taylor (Oct 1964) Lord Beswick (Oct 1965)
<i>2. Civil servants</i>	
(a) <i>Secretary to the Cabinet</i>	Sir Norman Brook (1947–1962) Sir Burke Trend (1963–1973)
(b) <i>Colonial Office</i>	
Permanent under-secretary of state	Sir Thomas Lloyd (1947–1956) Sir John Macpherson (1956–1959) Sir Hilton Poynton (1959–1966)
Deputy permanent under-secretary of state (joint)	Sir Charles Jeffries (1947–1956) } Sir Hilton Poynton (1948–1959) } Sir John Martin (1956–1959) } (Sir) William Gorell Barnes (1959–1963) } Sir John Martin (1963–1965) } A N Galsworthy (1965–1966) }
Assistant under-secretary of state, with superintending responsibility for the West Indies	(Sir) G F Seel (1948–1951) (Sir) S E Luke (1951–1953) P Rogers (1953–1960) A R Thomas (1960–1964) W I J Wallace (1964–1966)
Assistant secretary, head of West Indian Dept	H Beckett (1948)
Assistant secretary, head of West Indian Dept 'A'	H Beckett (1949–1953) W I J Wallace (1953–1958) J E Marnham (1958–1961) D Williams (1961–1966)
Assistant secretary, head of West Indian Dept 'B'	J E Marnham (1949–1951) N L Mayle (1951–1956) F Kennedy (1956–1960) A M Mackintosh (1960–1962) R W Piper (1962–1966)

WEST INDIES**(1) *Governors***

Barbados	Sir Hilary Blood (1947–1949) Sir Alfred Savage (1949–1953) Sir Robert Arundell (1953–1959) Sir John Stow (1959–1966)
British Guiana	Sir Charles Woolley (1947–1953) Sir Alfred Savage (1953–1955) Sir Patrick Renison (1955–1959) Sir Ralph Grey (1959–1964) Sir Richard Luyt (1964–1966)
British Honduras	Sir Ronald Garvey (1948–1952) Sir Patrick Renison (1952–1955) Sir Colin Thornley (1955–1961) Sir Peter Stallard (1961–1966)
Jamaica	Sir John Huggins (1943–1951) Sir Hugh Foot (1951–1957) Sir Kenneth Blackburne (1957–1962)
Leeward Islands *	Earl Baldwin of Bewdley (1948–1950)
Antigua	Sir Kenneth Blackburne (1950–1957)
St Christopher-Nevis-Anguilla	Sir Alexander Williams (1957–1959)
Montserrat	
British Virgin Islands	
Trinidad	Sir John Shaw (1947–1950) Sir Hubert Rance (1950–1955) Sir Edward Beetham (1955–1960) Sir Solomon Hochoy (1960–1962)
Windward Islands *	Sir Robert Arundell (1948–1953)
Dominica	Sir Edward Beetham (1953–1955)
Grenada	Sir Colville Deverell (1955–1959)
St Lucia	
St Vincent	

(2) *Federation of the West Indies Jan 1958–May 1962***(i) *Civil establishment***

Governor-general	Lord Hailes
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* Post abolished 31 Dec 1959.

Secretary to governor-general	J S Staveley
Federal secretary	(Sir) J S Mordecai (Kt 1962)
(ii) <i>Council of State</i>	
Prime minister	Sir Grantley Adams (Barbados)
Deputy prime minister and minister of trade and industry	Dr C G D La Corbiniere (St Lucia)
Minister of finance	Mr R L Bradshaw (St Kitts)
Minister of natural resources and agriculture	Mr F B Ricketts (Jamaica)
Minister of communications and works	Mr W A Rose (Trinidad)
Minister of labour and social affairs	Mrs P Allfrey (Dominica)
Minister without portfolio	Mr V B Vaughan (Barbados)
Minister without portfolio	Mr N H Richards (Antigua)
Minister without portfolio	Senator A G Byfield (Jamaica)
Minister without portfolio	Senator J W Liburd (St Kitts)
Minister without portfolio	Senator J L Charles (St Lucia)

(3) *West Indian governments*

Antigua	
Chief minister	V C Bird (1960–1967)
Barbados	
Premier	Sir Grantley Adams (1954–1958) Dr H G H Cummins (1958–1961) Mr E W Barrow (1961–1966)
British Guiana	
Premier	Dr C B Jagan (1961–1964) Mr L F S Burnham (1964–1966)
British Honduras	
First minister	Mr G C Price (1961–1964)
Premier	Mr G C Price (from 1964)
Dominica	
Chief minister	Mr E O Le Blanc (1960–1967)
Grenada	
Chief minister	Mr H A Blaize (1960–1961) Mr G E D Clyne (1961) Mr E M Gairy (1961–1962) Mr H A Blaize (1962–1967)

Jamaica	
Chief minister	Mr W A Bustamante (1944–1955) Mr N W Manley (1955–1959)
Prime minister	Mr N W Manley (1959–1962) Sir A Bustamante (1962–1967)
Montserrat	
Chief minister	Mr W H Bramble (from 1960)
St Christopher-Nevis-Anguilla	
Chief minister	Mr C A P Southwell (1960–1967)
St Lucia	
Chief minister	Mr G F L Charles (1960–1964) Mr J G M Compton (1964–1967)
St Vincent	
Chief minister	Mr E T Joshua (1960–1967)
Trinidad	
Chief minister	Dr E Williams (1956–1961)
Premier	Dr E Williams (from 1961)

Chronological Table of Principal Events

1940

July	Sir Frank Stockdale appointed comptroller for development and welfare in West Indies
Sept	Exchange of notes between UK and US: US to acquire 99-year leases of areas in British West Indies and Newfoundland for military and naval bases; US to transfer to UK fifty US navy destroyers

1941

Mar	Formal conclusion of Leased Bases Agreement
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1942

Mar	Establishment of Anglo-American Caribbean Commission (becomes Caribbean Commission in 1946 when France and Netherlands participate)
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1945

Mar	Despatch from Oliver Stanley, S of S colonies, discussing federation as a means to self-government and suggesting that West Indian legislatures debate idea
Oct	Publication of Report of West India Royal Commission (Moyne Report)

1947

Feb	Despatch from Arthur Creech Jones, S of S colonies, proposing a conference at Montego Bay, Jamaica, to consider formulation of proposals for closer association
Sept	Montego Bay conference agrees to appoint Standing Closer Association Committee (SCAC)

1948

Sept	Publication of Report of British Guiana and British Honduras Settlement Commission (Evans Commission)
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1950

Mar	Publication of SCAC Report
Mar	Publication of Report of Public Services Commission (Holmes Commission)

1951

- Feb Publication of Report of Customs Union Commission (McLagan Commission)
- May Establishment of Regional Economic Committee of West Indies

1952

- Dec US Immigration and Nationality Act (McCarran-Walter Act) comes into force

1953

- Apr London conference on West Indian Federation
- Apr Elections in British Guiana; PPP form government
- Oct British troops arrive in British Guiana; emergency declared and constitution suspended; PPP leaders detained

1954

- Nov Robertson Commission recommends period of 'marking time' in British Guiana's progress towards self-government

1955

- Jan PNP wins elections in Jamaica; Norman Manley chief minister
- Mar Conference in Trinidad on freedom of movement
- Nov Appointment of Cabinet Committee on Colonial Immigrants

1956

- Jan Report of fiscal commissioner (Sir Sydney Caine)
- Feb London conference on West Indian Federation; key issues Manley's 'seven propositions', sources of federal revenue and UK financial assistance
- May First meeting of Standing Federation Committee under Sir Stephen Luke, pre-federal commissioner
- Sept Report of British Caribbean Federal Capital Commission (Mudie Commission)
- Sept PNM wins elections in Trinidad; Eric Williams chief minister

1957

- Apr Announcement of Lord Hailes's appointment as governor-general of West Indies Federation
- Apr Regional Economic Committee of West Indies advises against participation of British West Indies in EFTA
- May Standing Federation Committee decides that site of federal capital should be North-West peninsula of Trinidad and requests release of US naval base at Chaguaramas
- June Conference on West India Regiment at Barbados

- July UK becomes aware of highly secret US defence installation at Chaguaramas
- July Discussions in London with US and West Indian representatives on US bases, Chaguaramas and the site for the federal capital; agreement to establish a joint commission
- Aug PPP wins elections in British Guiana and Cheddi Jagan returns to government as minister of trade and industry

1958

- Jan Hailes sworn in as governor-general and West Indies Federation established
- Mar Chaguaramas Joint Commission concludes that release of base is not practicable
- Mar Federal elections in the West Indies
- June Federal government requests conference to review 1941 base agreement
- Aug–Sept Outbreak of racial disturbances in UK at Nottingham and Notting Hill in London
- Nov Clash between Manley and Sir Grantley Adams, federal prime minister, over authority of federal government to impose income tax

1959

- Feb–Mar CO rejects proposal from Sir Colin Thornley (British Honduras) that statement should be made to effect that the colony is free to decide if it wishes to form a relationship with Guatemala
- May Publication of Jamaican Ministry Paper No 5 to effect that federal constitution is 'colonial' in character and proposing amendments to limit authority of federal government on issues of industrial development, income tax and excise duties
- June Conference in London agrees changes to constitutions of Leeward and Windward Islands to bring them more in line with those of other federal units
- Aug Discussions in London with Hailes on the timing of independence for the federation
- Sept Inter-governmental conference in Trinidad reveals serious differences in West Indies over federation and breaks down on issue of Jamaica's representation in federal legislature
- Oct–Nov CO proposes but Hailes rejects discreet campaign of lobbying to rally support for federation
- Dec Adams moves resolution in Federal House of Representatives calling for introduction of Cabinet government and the inauguration of dominion status in the West Indies as early as possible in 1960; Manley repudiates on behalf of Jamaica

1960

- Jan Discussions in London with Jamaican delegation led by Manley on essential attributes of sovereignty, financial and economic implications of independence and consequences of Jamaican secession

Mar	Public demonstration in Trinidad to demand release of Chaguaramas
Mar	Constitutional conference on British Guiana in London reveals significant differences between PPP and opposition on voting system, number of chambers and control of police
May	Statement by Iain Macleod, S of S colonies, on Cabinet government and financial assistance to West Indies Federation over transitional period
May	Sir Alexander Bustamante announces resignation as president of FDLP and his 'irrevocable decision' to take Jamaica out of federation; Manley announces intention to hold a referendum in Jamaica
June	Macleod visits West Indies
July	UK circulates paper to US and Canadian governments on financial and economic implications of independence for The West Indies
Aug	Antigua discussions between Manley and Williams on creation of reserve list
Nov	Stage I of bases talks held in London
Nov	Discussions with West Indian ministers in London on UK financial assistance
Dec	Stage II of bases talks in Tobago

1961

Feb	Stage III of bases talks conclude with Chaguaramas agreement signed in Port of Spain
Mar	Prime Minister Harold Macmillan visits West Indies
May	Resumed inter-governmental conference in Trinidad
May-June	Lancaster House Conference; West Indian ministers continue to express reservations about aspects of the federal constitution but 31 May 1962 envisaged as independence date
June	Leeward and Windward Islands constitutional conference in London
July	Lord Perth discusses EEC with West Indian ministers in Trinidad and Jamaica
Aug	PPP win elections in British Guiana
Aug	Joint Economic Mission (UK, US, Canada) to Leeward and Windward Islands submits proposals on interim aid
Sept	Referendum in Jamaica; State Dept expresses surprise at result and US offer of financial aid to federation is withdrawn
Oct	Separate discussions in London with Manley (on secession and independence) and Adams and federal ministers (on the continuation of federation)
Nov	Prof Arthur Lewis submits proposals for a unitary state in the Caribbean

1962

Jan	Lewis submits revised proposals for an independent Trinidad and a Federation of the Eight based on Barbados
Jan	Reginald Maudling, S of S colonies, visits West Indies (arrives 13 Jan)
Jan	General Council of PNM rejects Trinidad's participation in a new federation in the East Caribbean and resolves that Trinidad should proceed to separate independence (14 Jan)

Jan	PM of Barbados and chief ministers of Leeward and Windward Islands present proposals to Maudling for a new Federation of the Eight (19 Jan)
Feb	Maudling announces in House of Commons intention to dissolve existing federation
Feb	Jamaica independence conference in London
Feb	Disturbances in Georgetown (British Guiana) following austerity budget introduced by PPP government
Feb	Discussions between Williams and Eric Gairy on Grenada joining Trinidad in a unitary state
Feb–Mar	Exchange of letters between Lord Home, foreign secretary, and Dean Rusk, US S of S, over British Guiana
Mar	Hugh Fraser, parliamentary under-secretary of state, CO, discusses British Guiana with President Kennedy and US officials in Washington
Apr	Colonial Policy Committee agrees negotiating position with Guatemala over British Honduras
Apr	JLP wins elections in Jamaica; Bustamante prime minister
Apr	Commonwealth Immigrants Act receives Royal Assent
Apr	The West Indies Act to dissolve existing federation receives Royal Assent (Order-in-Council providing for dissolution takes effect from 31 May)
May	Marlborough House conference on proposals to establish a Federation of the Eight in the East Caribbean
May	Trinidad independence conference in London
May	Commission of Inquiry on maladministration in Grenada submits findings
June	CO asks Dr Carleen O'Loughlin, UCWI, to conduct economic survey of East Caribbean
July	Financial settlement with Jamaica negotiated in London with delegation led by Bustamante
Aug	Jamaica becomes independent (6 Aug)
Aug	Trinidad becomes independent (31 Aug)
Nov	Williams rejects UK offer of a financial settlement with Trinidad (issue not resolved until Dec 1963)
Nov	British Guiana independence conference in London breaks down on issues of voting system, voting age and whether there should be new elections before independence

1963

Apr	Robert Lightbourne, Jamaican trade and industry minister, raises question of Jamaica joining EFTA
Apr	General strike in British Guiana in response to government's Labour Relations Bill
May	Preparatory conference on East Caribbean Federation at Barbados; Antigua seeks looser form of federation than that envisaged at 1962 conference
June	Anglo–American talks in London on British Guiana
July	London constitutional conference on British Honduras
Aug–Sept	O'Loughlin survey reports that East Caribbean will require in region of £59 million in assistance over a ten-year period

- Oct British Guiana conference in London; Duncan Sandys, S of S colonies, imposes settlement based on new elections under proportional representation and a further conference before a date can be fixed for independence

1964

- Jan New constitution for internal self-government in British Honduras
 June State of emergency declared in British Guiana after six months of unprecedented violence
 Oct Discussions in London between Prime Minister Harold Wilson and Jagan on conditions under which UK would be prepared to grant independence to British Guiana
 Oct US government suggests a new approach to aid policy for the Caribbean
 Dec At a meeting in London US officials advocate a new economic survey on aid
 Dec Elections under proportional representation in British Guiana; Jagan dismissed and Forbes Burnham forms new PNC-UF coalition government

1965

- Feb–Mar Arthur Greenwood, S of S colonies, visits East Caribbean; recommends that strong federation is still the best of four possible constitutional futures for the territories
 Mar Greenwood visits British Guiana; reports favourably on Burnham government and suggests that independence might be granted in 1966
 Apr–May Luke visits East Caribbean and reports that prospects of achieving federation are remote
 May Greenwood circulates minute on liquidation of colonialism
 June Conference of Commonwealth Prime Ministers discusses future of remaining UK colonial territories
 July Conference at Lady Margaret Hall, Oxford, on future of remaining UK colonial territories
 Aug Draft white paper on remaining UK colonial territories circulated by CO; objections raised by FO, CRO, MOD, Treasury and ODM
 Sept CO abandons attempts to put in place an East Caribbean Federation and circulates proposals for associated status for all except Montserrat
 Oct Discussions between Greenwood and Rusk in Washington on future of colonial territories
 Oct Publication of Report of International Commission of Jurists on Racial Imbalance in British Guiana
 Oct–Nov Senior ministers in Wilson government consider whether UK troops should remain in British Guiana for short period after independence
 Nov London conference on independence for British Guiana; Jagan and PPP decline to attend

1966

- Jan British Development Commission in Caribbean established at Barbados
 Feb–Mar Antigua constitutional conference in London on associated status

Apr	Report of Tripartite Economic Survey of East Caribbean completed (published Jan 1967)
Apr–May	Windward Islands constitutional conference in London on associated status
May	British Guiana become independent as Guyana (26 May)
May	St Kitts/Nevis/Anguilla constitutional conference in London on associated status
June–July	Barbados independence conference in London
Nov	Barbados becomes independent (30 Nov)

1967

Feb	The West Indies Act on associated status receives Royal Assent
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Introduction

The primary focus of this volume of documents is the short lived West Indies Federation which was slowly created in the decade before 1958 and which collapsed four years later. The documents come from the British Public Record Office and thus offer the official view of West Indian affairs as observed from London. There is another perspective, that of the individual politicians and governments in each Caribbean territory but, with a handful of exceptions, that is only included here when it occurs in the British correspondence on the making and shaping of British official policy towards the West Indies. Federation, of course, is only part of the story of the process of decolonisation in the many islands and territories that made up the British empire in the Caribbean, but it is a central one that touched most colonies and peoples in the region. It was the commonly recognised goal of British policy makers who did not even begin to contemplate separate independence for any of the individual islands until as late as 1959. Also, the Caribbean is a large and diverse region, and to do justice to each story of the transfer of power in the many individual islands and territories would be far beyond the capacity of a single volume. Thus the events included in this volume are less about individual territories and islands and more about the process of creating and sustaining the federation. The major islands, particularly Jamaica and Trinidad, were prominent players in the drama of federation, and aspects of their domestic politics, and their gaining independence, are inevitably included as they had a direct bearing on the progress and the collapse of the attempted union. Certain islands did not join the federation, most notably the peripheral Bahamas, while Bermuda was not considered as belonging to the Caribbean. From the early discussions about federation, British Guiana indicated that it would not join, a position later adopted by British Honduras. Some consideration is given to their separate histories of decolonisation, with considerably more coverage of the successive crises in British Guiana which exercised the minds of British officials and politicians and engaged West Indian passions.

While the focus is primarily on federation, other aspects of end of empire in the Caribbean have not been neglected. The volume includes coverage of defence issues, in terms both of local defence requirements in the West Indies as a whole (as distinct from UK defence interests which were negligible) and negotiations with the US over the future and disposal of American bases located in a number of the islands. Significant attention is devoted to the question of immigration to the UK from the Caribbean. Here the reasoning behind the Commonwealth Immigrants Act, 1962 is revealed. The Colonial Office especially came reluctantly to the view that legislation was necessary but departmental ministers and officials viewed with considerable distaste the measures adopted in the legislation to control immigration. Also covered is the place of the Caribbean in UK foreign policy in the context especially of relations with the United States. The UK was always sensitive towards US security concerns in the region but this did not always entail deference to the views or wishes of Washington. On occasion, notably over the future of British Guiana, there were

significant differences of opinion and sharp exchanges between UK and US politicians and officials. Above all there is considerable coverage throughout the volume of those economic and financial issues which so dominated the contemporary debates about development programmes in the Caribbean. It is impossible to separate the question of federation from the wider questions of finance and economic development. Although political factors were important, finance and economics provided the essential rationale for federation. Subsumed within the broad economic and financial themes, there are a number of related issues, notably the implications for the West Indies of Britain's negotiations with the European Economic Community and the place of the Caribbean in the aid programmes of Canada and the US. Two issues are not covered in any detail, namely the territorial claims of Guatemala and Venezuela against British Honduras and British Guiana respectively. These are subjects which the editors consider beyond the scope of the present undertaking and they are also those areas of Caribbean affairs which are subject to restricted access at the PRO. Several files on the border disputes concerning the two British colonies remain withheld under extended closures.

The range of issues is reflected in the sources from which the documents have been selected. Inevitably the majority of documents have been drawn from the West Indian Department of the Colonial Office, with smaller numbers originating in the subject departments of the CO. These are supplemented by material from the Commonwealth Relations Office where the departmental perspective on the Caribbean was often different from that of the Colonial Office. Foreign Office records provide material on American bases and relations more generally with the US. The Treasury input is limited but significant while the records of the Home Office and the Ministry of Labour in its various guises are important in recording the evolution of attitudes throughout Whitehall on the question of immigration. Files from the Office of the Prime Minister have proved rather more useful than the conclusions and memoranda of the full Cabinet and the research uncovered an unexpectedly large number of Cabinet committees involved with Caribbean issues. The details of these, and all other references consulted, are compiled in the first of the two bibliographies at the end of the volume.

The volume starts in 1948 and concludes in 1966. A word of explanation is required as to why this period has been selected. A West Indian federation had for years been a subject discussed in London and in various Caribbean capitals, but decisive action was taken only after the Second World War with the convening of the Montego Bay conference in September 1947 which, as part of its lengthy deliberations, agreed to establish a Standing Closer Association Committee (SCAC). This Committee held its first meeting in early 1948, and from its recommendations there followed detailed discussions and planning which led to the creation of the West Indies Federation. Other volumes in the BDEEP series include a number of documents that deal with constitutional and economic developments in the West Indies both before and after 1948.¹ The concluding date for this volume, 1966, is determined in part by the thirty-year rule of access to British official documents. To go beyond this point in an attempt to document how independence came to the small islands and to British Honduras as Belize in the 1970s and 1980s is not as yet possible. But more substantially 1966 represents the point at which, the federation having collapsed four years earlier with first Jamaica and then Trinidad proceeding to separate independence, the British government finally abandoned its efforts to put

in place a federation in the East Caribbean. Instead, Barbados followed the main islands in achieving independence in its own right while for all but one of the smaller and fiscally much weaker islands of the Leewards and Windwards, a new constitutional structure of associated status with the UK was put in place. 1966 was also the year in which a relieved British government was also able to transfer power to Guyana, thus ending several years of responsibility for the most strife-torn territory in the British Caribbean.*

In 1927, following reforms to the organisation of the CO, a separate West Indian Department was created. This was divided in 1949 into Departments 'A' and 'B' each with a number of geographic and functional responsibilities; federal affairs lay with Department 'A'. An under-secretary of state headed the West Indian Department and advised on policy while Departments 'A' and 'B' were headed by assistant secretaries. In 1945 most West Indian colonies were Crown colonies directly administered by the CO. Colonial governors were appointed to administer the larger colonies of British Guiana, Trinidad and Tobago, British Honduras, Jamaica, Barbados, and the island groupings of the Leewards (Antigua was the residence of the governor) and the Windwards (the governor was normally resident in Grenada), while in each of the small islands day-to-day government was the responsibility of an administrator. In the Leeward and Windward Islands, following decisions taken at a constitutional conference in London in 1959, the two governorships were abolished and the powers of the governors were assumed by the individual administrators for each island. Before 1940 there were limited representative institutions in the West Indies. Electorates were very small and qualified by property and income. Universal adult suffrage was demanded by many West Indian nationalists and the Moyne Commission accepted this as generally a desirable aim of British policy in its recommendations which were published, ahead of the full report, in 1940. However, following his visit to the area in 1942–1943, the permanent under-secretary at the CO reported that universal suffrage should be given only to Jamaica and that the other islands and territories did not need constitutional advance which should be preceded by local representative institutions at the village and local community level.² Universal adult suffrage was gradually introduced to all the territories that were to form the federation by 1951. It was achieved in Jamaica in 1944, in Trinidad and Tobago in 1946, and in Barbados in 1950. British Guiana and British Honduras both achieved universal adult suffrage in 1953. Elsewhere in the British Caribbean, adult suffrage came much later, the first such elections in the Bahamas and Bermuda being held in 1967 and 1968 respectively. Full internal self-government was formally recognised in Jamaica by 1959 and in both Trinidad and Barbados by 1961. Ministerial systems existed in the smaller islands of the Leewards and the Windwards but these fell some way short of internal self-government

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Eric Williams, the historian who became prime minister of Trinidad, referred to the British West Indies in the eighteenth century as 'the hub of Empire'. The West Indian islands were among England's earliest overseas possessions and along with the

¹ The editors wish especially to thank Ronald Hyam and Michael Twaddle for advice and comments during the preparation of this volume.

Atlantic system of trade they had a special place in the development of Britain's imperial might in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In those centuries a large part of Britain's commercial wealth derived from dominance of the African slave trade and exploitation of the sugar plantations of the West Indies. Additional Caribbean possessions were gained as spoils of war in the early nineteenth century, but this was not matched for long with a continued extension of fortune as it came at a time when the slave trade was abolished, then slaves emancipated and the volume and value of sugar exports declined. The Caribbean islands ceased to be jewels in the imperial crown and increasingly became pocket paupers of empire.

By the end of the nineteenth centuries the economic weaknesses of the West Indian colonies were profound. Joseph Chamberlain referred to the area as 'Empire's darkest slum'. The reasons were several-fold. In the first place the economy of most of the islands and territories was heavily reliant upon a single export crop, plantation grown sugar. Although the consumption of sugar had greatly increased during the nineteenth century, demand was largely met from beet sugar grown in temperate zones. In an increasingly *laissez faire* global market, the price of sugar on the world market fell with disastrous consequences for the economically insecure 'sugar islands' of the West Indies. Sugar was essentially a plantation crop. It had originally been grown on plantations using slave labour. After emancipation there were fears of a labour shortage and the necessary intensive labour force for plantations was provided by free blacks, supplemented from 1838 until 1917 by some 400,000 indentured East Indian workers imported from the sub-continent. The majority of these immigrant workers went to British Guiana and Trinidad with a smaller number going to Jamaica. The idea held by some emancipationists that freed slaves would become a free and self-supporting peasantry, developing into small farmers, was rarely realised. Similar ideas were expressed by the Royal Commission of 1897 and subsequent reports, but by the 1930s a main feature of much West Indian agriculture was 'shifting cultivation, low technical knowledge, indebtedness, reluctance to try new methods combined with over-sanguine adventurousness when a cash crop had a good year'—all of which 'testified to the truth that the average West Indian peasant's attitude to the land was that it was something to be used to scrape together a bare living until something better turned up'.³

Other export crops were developed, such as bananas, cocoa and cotton, but these were also grown mainly as plantation crops, and in the case of bananas control of much of the industry rested with large and powerful United States companies, notably the United Fruit Company. From the early twentieth century Trinidad, a larger and more thinly inhabited island, began to exploit its asphalt and oil industries. This gave it an economic advantage over most of its Caribbean neighbours and the oil industry also attracted migrant labour from less well endowed islands. A large part of West Indian trade was with Britain although potentially the largest and certainly the most obvious markets were in North America. However, the colonial policy of the United States in the first decade of the twentieth century placed severe restrictions on trade with the British West Indies, and it was only the special terms agreed with Canada, including steamship subsidies, that saved the sugar industry from even more severe depression.

A second problem for the West Indian islands, and one often remarked upon by officials and in government reports, was the pressure of population. The pattern of population growth and density was not uniform throughout the region. Certain islands

had higher growth rates and when this was combined with small areas of cultivable land it led to what was sometimes described as over-population. Barbados was densely populated with over 500 people to the square kilometre. Jamaica, although a relatively large island, also had a rapidly growing population which pressed on limited land. By contrast British Guiana's large hinterland was thinly inhabited. Population pressure, lack of employment and low levels of income pushed many people from the West Indian islands as migrant workers. Some moved to other islands, but by the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries a steady flow of migrants, mainly men, went to work on the plantations of Central America, as labourers to construct the Panama Canal, and increasingly to the United States.

A third economic difficulty for the West Indian islands was that poor and vulnerable economies with low levels of personal income in turn generated low levels of personal saving and consumption and also yielded small revenues to government. The infrastructure of government, especially in the poorer islands and territories, rarely extended to social and welfare departments. Social improvement rested either on private provision or, in the few cases where governments thought it politically important to act, small-scale action often supported by imperial grants-in-aid. It was clear to all informed observers, whether in the West Indies or not, that proper development of a social and economic infrastructure could only come about with the injection of substantial capital from external sources. Local revenues were grossly inadequate although, compared to most African colonies, the West Indies had a larger number of people with secondary and higher education. As a consequence of their poor economies, the West Indian islands were characterised by all the signs of poverty and its accompanying social problems—low levels of education, inadequate and insanitary housing, poor diet and standards of health. Official local reports and commissions sent from London frequently commented upon the poor economic and social conditions. However, little serious attention was given to the problem until the end of the inter-war years and after serious unrest had broken out in the West Indies.

Finally, the West Indian islands were in many respects isolated from the metropole and from each other. Steamship services to Britain and North America were limited and often irregular, and that could only be reversed if governments were prepared to subsidise services which was rarely so. Inter-island and external communications only improved with the Second World War as the region increased in strategic significance and as aircraft travel developed.

From the middle of the nineteenth century federation of the islands in one form or another was proposed. Federation, it was argued, would rationalise administration, produce a unified civil service and create common services, as well as establishing stronger economic units. The obstacles were considerable even in getting islands to agree to local union with each other. For example, the abortive attempt in 1875–1876 to link Barbados more closely with the Windward Islands led to serious riots in the capital Bridgetown. However, the confederation of the Leeward Islands was established in 1871, St Kitts, Nevis and Anguilla merged in 1882, and Tobago was attached to Trinidad in 1899, although relations between the various islands were often acrimonious. Generally there was little local enthusiasm for local federations. Insular particularism meant that neighbouring islands were viewed with suspicion, while political leaders sought to safeguard their local power bases from outside rivals. Unions with larger islands were regarded with considerable apprehension by smaller neighbours who feared that this would mean political domination and at

worst economic marginalisation. The more prosperous islands, such as Barbados, rejected unions with economically poorer islands for fear that this would prove a burden to their own exchequer; when unions were created there were squabbles over all manner of parish pump issues which invariably revolved around questions of where revenue was to come from and where and how it should be spent. A federation of all the West Indian islands and territories might have been dreamt about, but few thought it feasible. Geographical distance, history, culture, administrative structures, economics and politics, and to some extent language, all served to separate the colonies from one another. Few thought of the West Indies as a single political and economic entity, although increasingly there were cultural and sporting ties that fostered a sense of unity.

In the 1930s the international depression savagely hit the precarious economies of the West Indies. Economic problems, already acute in the 1920s, increased as trade was reduced, agriculture depressed, and the normal exit routes for labour to the United States closed and migrant workers already there began to return home. A new breed of trade union leaders emerged in the Trinidad oil fields and to organise plantation labour. At the same time there was a new nationalism which demanded an extension of the franchise and self-government. Trade unionists and nationalists also began to argue for West Indian federation which increasingly was seen to be essential for West Indian survival. As Thomas Marryshow of Grenada said at a Labour Congress in Georgetown in 1938 it was a question of 'Federate or Disintegrate'.⁴ The Colonial Office in 1933 had urged Closer Union between the Leeward and Windward Islands,⁵ an attempt at constitutional re-arrangement which barely addressed Caribbean problems.

London only began to take real notice of the social and economic condition of the West Indies when the depression and imperial neglect resulted in serious labour unrest and riots. The first trouble took place in Port of Spain, Trinidad, in 1933 with a demonstration of unemployed people which was followed early in the next year by strikes and further demonstrations. In October 1934 rioting unemployed workers were arrested in British Honduras, and in 1935 strikes and riots occurred on sugar estates in St Kitts and in British Guiana. The labour leader Uriah Butler led a march of the unemployed in Trinidad,⁶ coal carriers in St Lucia struck for higher wages, and people opposed to an increase in customs duties rioted in St Vincent. Police fired on crowds in St Kitts, killing three workers, a state of emergency was declared in St Lucia and a British warship was summoned. Unrest continued into 1936 and 1937, and the number of people joining trade unions rapidly increased. In 1938 there were further demonstrations by unemployed workers and strikers which led to riots in Jamaica and in British Guiana. In Frome, in Jamaica, in May of that year, the police fired at striking sugar workers killing four men, and later that month a strike among dock workers in Kingston led by Alexander Bustamante was followed by rioting in the capital in which eight people were killed and 170 arrested.⁷ The West Indian troubles spawned a new concern in Britain including a lengthy debate in the House of Commons in June 1938.⁸

Although a number of small political parties had existed in the West Indies since the start of the century, most were narrow in conception and in practice. The unrest of 1930s saw the growth of new and better organised modern parties which had a nationalist appeal. Among the first were the Trinidad Labour Party, the Barbados Labour Party founded by Grantley Adams, and the People's National Party in Jamaica

led by Norman Manley and Bustamante. Other political parties were formed during the 1940s and early 1950s, most of them representing labour and nationalist interests.

In response to the West Indian unrest, Malcolm MacDonald the secretary of state for the colonies, over-ruling the despairing attitudes of the West Indian Department, appointed in 1938 a commission of inquiry to investigate the economic and social conditions in the West Indies, to be chaired by Lord Moyne. Moyne's commission gathered evidence in the West Indies and its report was ready by 1940. Much of what it had to say was highly critical of government neglect in the West Indies, and the economic and social conditions that had led to the labour unrest of the decade. By then war had broken out, and reluctant to have a critical report made public in wartime the Cabinet decided that the full report should not be published for the duration. A statement of the main recommendations was made to parliament on 20 February 1940.⁹ Simultaneously, the new policy on Colonial Development and Welfare was announced.¹⁰ The full Royal Commission report was published in 1945.¹¹ Before the report appeared, MacDonald realised that the social and economic difficulties of the West Indies could be addressed only by a greater commitment by the Exchequer to higher expenditure in the region. Such ideas had already been voiced in W M Macmillan's *Warning from the West Indies*, published in London in 1936.¹² The Moyne Commission recommended the creation of a West Indian Welfare Fund to provide an annual sum of one million pounds over a twenty-year period for the region, which would be administered by a comptroller independent of any government. In addition the report recommended the development of local industries, such as cement, and changes in agricultural methods and practices. The need to introduce universal suffrage was a subject that divided the commissioners, but it was recognised that the implementation of electoral reform at some time was desirable. On the question of federation the commission, in its full report, stated that 'it is an end to which policy should be directed'.¹³ As a practical test of the advantages of federation it was suggested the Leeward and Windward Islands be combined in a single federation on the lines of that already existing in the former group.

Imperial financial aid to the West Indies from the Colonial Development Fund during the 1930s had been negligible. This was to change with the introduction of the Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1940, although not surprisingly, coming in wartime, the total investment capital promised to all the colonies was not met. In the West Indies a local Development and Welfare Organisation, established in 1940, assisted the allocation of British funds and loans to the region. The Act, said Oliver Stanley, the secretary of state for the colonies in November 1944, as he urged his Cabinet colleagues to increase the funds for colonial social and economic development, 'was never meant to be more than a gesture'.¹⁴ Nevertheless, the West Indies fared reasonably well in the allocation of this limited imperial fund. In the period 1940–1944 the West Indies received sixty per cent of total expenditure; in 1944–1946 the proportion was thirty per cent, just over £6.3 million out of the total Development and Welfare budget of £21.16 million. In the period 1940–1946, thirty-eight per cent of all such funds were invested in the West Indies, a total of £10.96 million, and under the 1945 Act, eighteen per cent which amounted to £15.4 million.¹⁵ Given the enormous social and economic needs of the West Indies these were small sums of money, but they did represent a change in imperial policy and the

recognition by the Exchequer that trusteeship included a greater measure of fiscal responsibility. The Irvine Commission of 1945 proposed plans for a University College of the West Indies which was established three years later with imperial funds on the site of the Imperial Agricultural Institute in Trinidad, although the intention was that the West Indian governments, and then the federal authorities, would assume financial responsibility for the institution.

One motivation for the Development and Welfare Act of 1940 was an anxiety that the United States by its regional predominance might steal a lead over Britain in the West Indies. In September 1940, an exchange of notes between London and Washington agreed to a deal which brought a United States military presence to the British West Indies. A number of areas, principally in Antigua, Jamaica and Trinidad, were given free of charge and on ninety-nine year leases to the United States for use as bases, in exchange for fifty old destroyers which were badly needed by the Royal Navy to guard convoys against attacks from German submarines—what became known as the ‘Bases for Destroyers Deal’.¹⁶ Another result of Britain’s increasing wartime collaboration with the United States (the Lend-Lease programme providing large sums of aid to Britain, was passed by Congress in March 1941) was the creation of the Anglo-American Caribbean Commission in March 1942. With purely advisory functions, the commission was designed to encourage and strengthen social and economic co-operation in the region and to avoid unnecessary duplication of research.¹⁷ A Caribbean Research Council was established in 1943 to provide the commission with technical advice, and inquiries were carried out into industry in the region and forestry research. The West Indian Conference established in January 1944 was designed to discuss questions of common concern to peoples of the Caribbean. In 1946 France and The Netherlands became members and the body was renamed the Caribbean Commission.

From 1943 staff at the Colonial Office became convinced that ‘the development of self-governing institutions should be linked up with the question of West Indian federation’ and ‘that this should be the declared object of British policy’.¹⁸ It was believed that none of the colonies could stand as self-governing units and thus some form of unity was essential. This conclusion was supported by the experience of the comptroller’s organisation. Perhaps more pertinently, federation was an attempt to shape a regional policy that could confront the political power and the critical gaze of the United States on to its own backyard area. As Philip Rogers, then a principal in the West Indian Department, minuted in January 1944, ‘we are perpetually in danger of being dragged along in the wake of the Americans partly because our interests there have a much more ill-defined focus than theirs and partly because of our inevitable handicaps in men and materials’. In the same minute Rogers wrote of the existing and proposed regional institutions, the rising tide of West Indian intellectual interest in federation, and thus the need to avoid being caught ‘backward on the political side’, all of which ‘have made the question of West Indian “unity” or federation one of increasing urgency’.¹⁹ Whether this would be one or two federations was for later discussion. What was important was a unity which would give the West Indies an ‘effective voice in Caribbean affairs’, and it was essential that there should be pressure from the British government to bring this about. After some delay, a despatch was sent to the governors in July 1944 in order to gather their semi-official responses to the idea of federation. The governors’ replies indicated that federation would be supported by liberal and professional groups and opposed by the white planter and commercial class.²⁰ Bahamas preferred to remain apart. Any

discussions on West Indian unity should not prejudice the discussions in hand on a possible Leeward and Windward federation. On two points the governors were clear: that Britain should provide a stronger lead and the importance of financial stability as a prerequisite to political independence.

Britain's policy towards the colonial empire at the end of the war was conditioned by the change in its own global position and the economic problems of post-war recovery and reconstruction. Considerable rethinking about the dependent empire had gone on in the Colonial Office during the war. By 1945 the CO was determined on constitutional advance to self-government in the colonies although the pace of change was going to vary. It was agreed that there should be some form of federation for the West Indies, now not only as a solution to the economic and social difficulties of the region but also as a step towards political advance. Other issues of concern were regional security and relations with the United States. In the long drawn out discussions on West Indian federation, officials at the CO recognised that most of the colonies in the region would continue to be a burden on the metropolitan Exchequer for some time to come. In a despatch to the governors of 14 March 1945, stating his desire for a West Indian federation and asking for the views of the local legislatures, Stanley emphasised the need for economic stability and suggested that 'one important responsibility of any federation would, therefore, be to show that federal administration can be carried out without recurrent financial assistance from outside'.²¹ This was to be a constant theme running through the subsequent and lengthy federal negotiations. The case for federation was summarised nearly a year later by Rogers²² whose views were discussed at a departmental meeting in September 1946,²³ while the financial implications were considered by the Treasury. A spur was given to CO action early in 1947 when Grantley Adams, the leader of the majority party in the Barbados House of Assembly, circulated among other West Indian islands a draft bill for a federal constitution of the West Indies with dominion status. Arthur Creech Jones, the Labour secretary of state, urged action and in February 1947 he proposed a conference to discuss closer association to be held at Montego Bay, Jamaica, that coming September.²⁴ To avoid an unwieldy conference, Creech Jones suggested that each colony's legislature should nominate three delegates, and that each delegation should be accompanied by the chief legal and financial advisers of the colony. The discussions between the Leeward and Windward Islands about local federation were continuing, but the course and outcome of those proceedings, it was felt, did not merit delaying the convening of a conference to discuss a wider West Indian federation. In the meantime the CO prepared a series of briefs on constitutional, financial and economic issues for use by the chairman of the Montego Bay conference.²⁵

The conference met from 11–19 September 1947. Creech Jones chaired the proceedings until he was forced to return to London to deal with the Palestine crisis. His place at Montego Bay was taken by George Seel, assistant under-secretary of state at the CO. Twenty-two delegates attended and all accepted the principle of a British Caribbean federation, with the exception of the British Guiana delegates who nevertheless agreed to participate in the future discussions. Resolutions were agreed that the British government would be responsible for establishing a Standing Closer Association Committee to draft a federal constitution, and producing reports on customs services and the unification of the public services, while West Indian governments would report on a unified currency, the formation of a British

Caribbean Regional Economic Committee, and also create a body to represent primary producers. Local delegates appointed by the legislatures of each colony were to consider and make recommendations on all these matters. SCAC was to have headquarters in Barbados and to consist of seventeen delegates under the chairmanship of Sir Hubert Rance, the former governor of Burma, who also became British co-chairman of the Caribbean Commission. SCAC was asked to produce a report for the Colonial Office not later than 30 June 1949 (document no 4).

While the Montego Bay conference was being planned, the Colonial Office was also occupied with other West Indian matters: the ongoing question of constitutional reform, the Development Commission on British Guiana and British Honduras, the scheme for closer union between the Leeward and Windward Islands which had been suggested by the Moyne Report, and regional security. The need for constitutional advance in the colonial empire had been agreed during wartime. The constitutional and political scene in the West Indies was one of considerable diversity. In many of the colonies, most notably Barbados and the Leeward Islands, economic and political power had been in the hands of the planter classes and Europeans. Government in most territories was Crown colony rule. The governor was advised by a nominated council and as representative of the Crown exercised control over revenue and expenditure. This system of Crown colony rule had even been tightened in British Guiana where the constitution of 1928 removed from the legislative council its power to control revenue and expenditure. Throughout the British West Indies the franchise was limited by property and income. Thus in 1934 in Trinidad and Tobago there were only 25,000 electors in an adult population of 400,000, Barbados had an electorate of 7,000 out of 200,000 people, and Jamaica's electorate in 1935 numbered 66,000, just over ten per cent of the adult population. Elected members of legislative councils had the power to criticise but effective power rested with the governor acting for the Crown. For many years there had been a steadily growing popular demand for self-government. The labour unrest of the 1930s and the growth of trade unions and a new nationalism in the West Indies, plus the impact of the Second World War, all increased the demand, and official recognition of the need, for the introduction of political reform. In the years 1944–1958 adult suffrage and systems of ministerial responsibility were introduced but at separate speeds in each colony. By 1951 only Trinidad and Tobago had an executive council on which the majority of members were elected, while the legislative councils in most colonies still contained official and nominated members although in all but the British Virgin Islands elected members were in the majority (10). The slowness of change to electoral and ministerial systems of government was strongly criticised by West Indian politicians who argued that self-government institutions should advance much more rapidly as a necessary preparation for federation. Well organised political parties existed in Jamaica and Barbados, but throughout the British Caribbean, reported Lord Listowel, minister of state in the CO after his visit to the region in November 1949, 'there is a growing divergence between the sources of economic and political power. Economic power ... is European ... whereas political power is passing by degrees into the hands of the coloured population.' It was right, argued Listowel, that decisions of legislatures should be taken by elected members but it was also vital that nominated members should continue to be able 'to state their case when the financial or economic affairs of the Colony are under discussion'.²⁶

The Development Commission, chaired by Sir Geoffrey Evans, was set up to

investigate the economic potentialities of the two mainland colonies and their prospects of absorbing as settlers the surplus population from the West Indies and also from Europe. Evans's report in 1948 recommended economic development for both colonies which would cost between £15–20 millions over the next ten years.²⁷ Most of the investment would have to come from or be backed by the British government. Subsequent investigations by the Colonial Development Corporation and the two colonial governments revealed obstacles to development more serious than the commission had expected. And the sums of money proposed, argued Lord Trefgarne, the chairman of the Colonial Development Corporation in 1949, were well beyond what the Corporation could expend on just two colonies.²⁸ In British Honduras there was widespread popular opposition to the idea of large-scale West Indian immigration. Evans, in comments to the secretary of state not published in his report, was highly sceptical that development in British Guiana and British Honduras over the next ten years would 'suffice to relieve pressure of population in the British West Indies'. He was also concerned at criticism by the United States and Latin American countries of British colonies in the Western hemisphere. The two mainland British colonies, he argued, were 'shop windows' and 'for the British connection to survive it was vital that a more active policy of development be pursued'.²⁹

The closer union of the Leeward and Windward Islands was discussed at a conference in St Kitts in late January and early February 1947. The smaller and poorer islands, which had little to lose and much to gain financially from federation, more warmly endorsed the proposal of federation which was accepted in principle by all eight legislatures involved. Creech Jones then set about having the legal instruments drawn up as he was anxious to achieve maximum progress on the local federation before the Montego Bay conference convened. However, as Seel pointed out in November 1947, now that West Indian federation had become a live issue there was little to be gained in labouring over the St Kitts proposal.³⁰ This view was endorsed by Rance when he observed that 'a three decker bus consisting of a British West Indian Federal Government, a Windward-Leeward Government and then unit governments would seem to be unwieldy, expensive and unworkable' (6).

Throughout the twentieth century Britain's military and naval presence in the Caribbean had increasingly been dependent upon the goodwill of the United States. The war of 1939–1945 greatly weakened Britain's economy and military capacity which, in the West Indies, was marked by the cession of bases to Washington. By 1946 British military manpower was stretched to its limit and for reasons of economy the locally recruited wartime Caribbean Regiment had been disbanded. Thus the garrison in the West Indies was reduced to less than a battalion of British troops, supported by a locally raised infantry battalion in Jamaica which was restricted to service within the island, local territorial forces, relatively weak police forces, and the itinerant presence of Royal Navy vessels. Serious external and internal security questions remained: for decades the republic of Guatemala had laid claim to British Honduras and was now renewing its clamour, while Venezuela also had a long-standing dispute over its frontier with British Guiana; and as nationalist sentiment and labour militancy increased in the West Indian colonies there was always risk of further labour unrest which local security forces might be unable to contain. By March 1948 the foreign secretary and the secretary of state for the colonies stated that Britain's dispositions in the region could no longer be regarded

as 'politic and safe'. It was essential to increase the British military presence by a further battalion of troops and also to revive the West India Regiment, part of the cost being met by the colonies, which would be subject to War Office control and available for general service (2).

The report of the Standing Closer Association Committee was published in March 1950. It recommended that federation was the shortest path to self-government, that the federal capital should be in Trinidad, and that the constitution should be based on the Australian model where the federal government only exercised those powers surrendered to it by the states. The governor-general of the federation would represent the Crown and have reserve powers over defence, foreign affairs, currency and public safety. He would preside over the executive Council of State where the prime minister and the elected ministers would form the majority of the ministers. There was to be a bi-cameral legislature, an elected House of Assembly and a nominated Senate. The House of Assembly would consist of fifty members apportioned to territories according to population, while the Senate would have two members from each territory except for Montserrat which was to have one. There was also to be a federal judicature and a federal supreme court (10, 28). The SCAC Report, which took some time to be debated in the various colonial legislatures, was accepted by all except British Guiana, British Honduras and the British Virgin Islands. The CO had expected criticisms of the SCAC report, and predictably these came from West Indian representatives who thought that the measures did not go far or fast enough and smacked of Crown colony style rule. There were objections to the governor-general's reserve powers, especially from Barbados where the governor did not have such powers, over Trinidad as the site of the federal capital, and more generally that the basis of federation was not self-government for the West Indies.

It was widely accepted in Whitehall that a customs union was an essential corollary of political federation. The creation of a union was to be a major and thorny question. There were thirteen different customs tariffs in the British West Indies, not including Bahamas and Bermuda, and import duties were often jealously guarded as the largest item of revenue, although income tax was a growing source of government income in British Guiana, Barbados and Trinidad. A customs union had been proposed for the abortive Eastern Caribbean federation in 1932 and again by Stanley in 1944 when the response was not very positive, although the CO felt that West Indian opinion was more accepting of the idea by 1947. The commission to discuss the question was set up under J McLagan, the former inspector-general of customs and excise in Iraq. The report, published in February 1951, recommended a customs union with or without federation. The secretary of state asked West Indian governments to complete detailed examination of McLagan's report before a conference in London scheduled for 1953. The questions of the customs union was such a tortuous one that it was not ready for discussion at the 1953 conference. In contrast the commission on the unification of public services, chaired by Sir Maurice Holmes, proceeded more smoothly. Although West Indian ministers feared the loss of local influence the report was published in March 1950.

The financial condition of the West Indies, and the way in which the future federal fiscal system might operate, could not be other than a matter of concern to London. The West Indies was in receipt of a large part of the CD&W funds throughout the period 1945-1956, and most territories ran a deficit in visible trade. Revenues and expenditures were very low, some islands operating budgets not dissimilar in size to

those of very small British towns. Most trade in 1951 was with Britain (57.4 per cent by value) followed by Canada (24 per cent) and then the United States (11.25 per cent) (10). The CO view, in early 1952, was that the federation should collect revenue from customs duties and possibly also income tax, and retain a fixed proportion, perhaps twenty-five per cent, of the proceeds for its own purposes and in order to build up a federal reserve. It was recognised in London that a West Indian federation would continue to require grants from the imperial Exchequer and, minuted Henry Bourdillon, head of the CO Finance Department in February 1952, these were likely to be a good deal larger than the projected £20 million over five years. HMG thinking was that an annual grant to the federal government over a period of ten years would be equivalent to the average aggregate grants-in-aid over the five years before federation was established. Additionally a grant of about £1 million might be provided for setting up the federal authorities. The Treasury suggested that this might come from the Colonial Development and Welfare votes, a view strongly resisted by the Colonial Office. However, both departments seemed agreed that, since the war, too much emphasis had been placed on improving social services and not enough on the economic development needed to sustain them (8).

It was clear to CO officials that movement towards federation would be a fairly slow process. The timetable was dictated in part by the need of SCAC and the other committees to gather information, many of the issues under consideration being controversial and not easy of resolution, while the constitutional changes and elections in twelve colonies also took time. Ministers in the colonies tended to have a possessive attitude about their new powers and to be more critical about the restraints that might be imposed by federation. In addition, in the early 1950s the Colonial Office had a heavy agenda involving affairs in Asia and Africa.³¹ Criticisms about the conditions for federation came from legislative bodies, specially those in Barbados and Jamaica, and there was a widespread view that HMG was 'foisting federation in the West Indies in order to escape from financial responsibilities' (5). When Listowel visited the West Indies in November 1949 he came forearmed with arguments and answers provided by Rance with which to confront the critics of federation. Prominent points for Listowel to emphasise to critics were that they should await the SCAC report, and that federation was for the colonies to agree on (6). This latter argument, dictated by West Indian suspicions, deprived the UK of the opportunity to bring real pressure to bear, and it was a handicap under which the UK laboured throughout the entire period of its attempts to put in place a federation of one description or another in the Caribbean. A number of governors were also concerned at the slow progress (9). There was a constant expectation in the CO that West Indian leaders would demand more aid and also want to know the level of CD&W funding in the tranche after 1956. Accompanied by S E V Luke, assistant under-secretary of state at the CO, Bourdillon visited the Caribbean between January and March 1951 to assess the financial aspects of the West Indian federation. His report was pessimistic, arguing that funds beyond those calculated would be required for the West Indies; it was nevertheless essential that financial aid should be channelled through a co-ordinated economic development plan for the region (8).

Oliver Lyttelton, who became secretary of state when the Conservatives took office in October 1951, outlined in a despatch of February 1952 a conference to discuss and refine the plans for West Indian federation to be held as planned in London the following year. In preparation for the conference the Colonial Office set up two

working parties to consider constitutional and financial matters, which included representatives from the Treasury. In the CO and the Treasury there was a good deal of pessimism about the financial future of federation.³² The London Conference met from 13–30 April 1953 and was chaired by Lyttelton (11). This was the first conference on federation attended exclusively by elected representatives, now that universal suffrage had been introduced throughout the West Indies. Representatives from Barbados, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, the Leeward and Windward Islands met with British officials; observers came from British Guiana and British Honduras, as the legislatures in both colonies had voted against participating in a federation. The SCAC report was generally accepted but there was still strong dissent over the fiscal and constitutional terms and also about freedom of movement and the site of the federal capital.

Although federation was now the established aim, discussion of its progress was often qualified by deep feelings of scepticism about its likely success. The major concern continued to be the financial viability of the federation, an anxiety which was not helped by the repeated negative reactions coming from the West Indies, and specially Jamaica, about Britain being seen to 'off-load its [financial] responsibilities for the West Indies' (31). N L Mayle, an assistant secretary, minuted in November 1954 that federation would involve 'an expensive political superstructure which none of them [the West Indian colonies] can afford' (21), while early in 1955 the CRO queried whether a CO paper circulated to Commonwealth governments on regionalisation should not be more positive about West Indian federation (28). Even Sir Stephen Luke in September 1956, a few months into his task as commissioner of the Standing Federation Committee, wondered about the 'costly edifice' of the federal government (49). This scepticism was shared by Lord Lloyd, the parliamentary under-secretary of state, who in a minute written in November 1955 which was also critical of 'mendicant' West Indian leaders, commented: 'I think we ought to examine far more closely exactly how independent the West Indies could ever become' (31). But despite the difficulties the CO still believed that federation remained the only serious option for the West Indies (21) and recommended, both as a means to encourage local opinion and to concentrate local minds on their responsibilities, that the UK should issue a statement of intent to the effect that dominion status was the aim of British policy (31).

A further dilemma for the Colonial Office was the future status of the smaller territories such as the Cayman Islands and the Turks and Caicos Islands, both of which were dependencies of Jamaica, but more particularly that of the British Virgin Islands which had opted not to join the federation. Although administered from Antigua, and also included in the abortive scheme to unify the Leeward and Windward Islands, the British Virgin Islands were closely tied economically and geographically to the neighbouring US Virgin islands. A short-lived agitation in 1949 had argued for union with the United States. These close links with a dollar economy persuaded most people in the islands that membership of the West Indian federation would not be to their advantage. Indeed, it was voiced that they were likely to receive more sympathetic financial support from London than from the federation. The Colonial Office view was that the British Virgin Islands should be encouraged to join the federation. This would give the islands access to the technical and administrative support of the federation, and also remove from British direct control a weak colony that was reliant upon grants-in-aid (16).

The CO had a timetable which aimed to resolve all the major issues at a second London conference, planned for February 1956, which would then be followed by an enabling act. Unfortunately this schedule also had to take account of the often slow responses of the various West Indian legislatures and the politics and rivalries of the islands. Federation may have been the primary concern of London, but all too often the pace of metropolitan plans was dictated by local political rivalries, elections and budgets in the West Indies, which Alan Lennox-Boyd, Lyttelton's successor, referred to as the 'game of ... bluff and counterbluff' (38). The Colonial Office was keen to act on a suggestion by Sir Hugh Foot, the governor of Jamaica, that an enabling act should be passed. This would make federation more likely, and it would be followed by elections for the federal parliament (34). Ideally an enabling act should be passed before elections were held in Trinidad in September 1956, the outcome of which might bring into office a government less favourable to federation than the quasi-ministerial administration dominated by Albert Gomes (41). In November 1955 the Colonial Office schedule looked as if it was going to be seriously interrupted when Norman Manley, the Jamaican chief minister, whose People's National Party had gained power in the elections of January, announced his 'seven propositions'. These demands raised serious questions about federation by challenging some of the matters agreed at the London conference in 1953 and led the CO to fear that federation might actually be killed (37, 41). London hoped that the delegates at the 1956 conference would have plenipotentiary powers, thus avoiding the necessity for reference back to local legislatures. This would not be possible if major changes were contemplated from what had been agreed at the 1953 talks (37). The CO accepted that discussion of decisions taken in 1953 could not be precluded, but if delegates, and Manley in particular, wanted wholesale changes this risked upsetting federation (36). For Lennox-Boyd especially, 'the whole political future of the West Indies' was at stake at the forthcoming London conference (41).

Between 1953 and the 1956 conference a number of further reports were prepared. The first was concerned with freedom of movement within the federation, or what Luke called the 'freedom to settle and accept work' (25). There were serious differences between units over this. Barbados, with its large and dense population and high levels of unemployment, accepted the idea, as did most of the smaller islands, and in June 1954 the local House of Representatives called for a conference to consider the question. Freedom of movement was strongly opposed by Trinidad which already had a substantial immigrant population. Fearful for its more prosperous economy, Trinidad viewed freedom of movement as a threat to its standard of living. However, in December 1954 Trinidad agreed that a conference should be called to consider the matter, an idea accepted by other legislatures. To demonstrate its goodwill, a few months before the conference met Trinidad relaxed certain restrictions on the entry of people into the island for employment from other West Indian territories. The purpose of the freedom of movement conference, chaired by Lord Lloyd in Port of Spain, 14–17 March 1955, was to reach agreement between the positions of Barbados and Trinidad that would be binding on the federation. The conference reversed a decision reached at London in 1953 that migration within the federation, other than on grounds of health and security, should be exclusively a federal concern. The new position was that local legislatures would exercise control for a period of just over five years after the inauguration of federation (28). This compromise position was subsequently agreed to by all West Indian legislatures.

In the spring of 1955 the British government appointed three commissions to examine fiscal, civil service and judicial matters. The first to be appointed, and the most important, was the Fiscal Commission under Sir Sydney Caine. A parallel consideration 'implicit in a federation' was a customs union, the report of which committee was then before the various legislatures (21). Caine's report recommended that the federation draw its finances not from a fifteen per cent customs duty, as had been agreed at London in 1953, but from profits on currency and from customs and excise duty on a few selected items such as cigarettes, spirits and petrol (37, 43). The two other commissions proved to be less controversial. The Judicial Commission encountered a few problems but agreement was reached over the structure of the federal supreme court and the appointment of federal judges. The Civil Service Report, although received along with the other two reports in late 1955, was not studied or adopted by the 1956 conference.³³

In preparation for the London conference, Luke toured the West Indies for two weeks in January 1955 to gather ideas about the line to be taken by the various delegates. His report helped to shape the various briefing notes provided for the British delegation to the conference.³⁴ Manley had been a firm advocate of federation while in opposition. Although he remained committed to the idea now that he was in office, the realities of local politics, specially those within his own People's National Party, imposed restraints. Jamaica was geographically the most distant island within the proposed federation, one thousand miles from Trinidad; indeed, earlier schemes of federation had not considered including Jamaica. It also had the largest population, sent most emigrants to Britain, and was building infant industries behind tariff walls (90). Manley's PNP was split between those in favour of federation and those with serious reservations. In the latter camp the most powerful figure was the burly Wills Isaacs, the minister for trade, industry and commerce, who demanded measures to protect Jamaican industry in any federation (34). Manley as a new chief minister was keen to show that he could uphold the interests of Jamaica, and by late 1955 this had to be demonstrated against the background of two impending by-elections. Manley also argued forcibly that if federal elections took place before 1958 he would face the threat of revolution within his party. The position of the Jamaican chief minister was explained to London by Foot, who, unlike Whitehall, had a stronger belief in Manley's good faith (35). In an exchange of letters with the Colonial Office, Foot revealed his more radical credentials by supporting Manley's argument that the West Indies could advance towards self-government and yet be in receipt of substantial aid from Britain (38, 47). The CO seized on this and argued internally that Foot misunderstood the position: it was not that independent governments could not receive financial aid but that budgetary support for recurrent costs and administration would be incompatible with independence and membership of the Commonwealth, and it had ever been so (39).

In opposition Manley had argued that the 1953 London conference had delivered a federation which was colonial in nature. This needed to be changed by removing officials from the Council of State, by reducing the governor-general's reserve powers and by creating a federal minister of finance rather than a financial secretary so that the federation could achieve dominion status as quickly as possible. Jamaica, with fifty-two per cent of the population of the federation, should be given more seats in the federal parliament, and in order to safeguard Jamaica's industries a more gradual approach should be made towards federation via a looser association. It was

these ideas that lay behind the "seven propositions" announced in the Jamaica House of Representatives in November 1955. The Colonial Office viewed with alarm Manley's apparent equivocation, fearing that it would put in disarray the schedule planned for establishing the federation. The CO argued that if Manley wished to amend the constitution of the federation then that could be done in its first five years of operation. More immediately, Luke viewed the seven propositions as very grave indeed in that they constituted 'a formidable threat to the success of the conference'.³⁵ Rogers thought that if Manley could not be persuaded to restrict his demands when he came to London, then it would prove to be 'a stormy conference' (37).

The Trinidad delegation to London was led by Gomes who, in opposition to the wishes of Jamaica, wanted to see a customs unions and free movement of goods introduced as soon as possible (43). For domestic political reasons Gomes was anxious to see federation advanced rapidly (34), and in 1955 he had successfully pushed through the legislature a motion suspending for one year the election planned for that September. In the event this proved unwise. In January 1956 Eric Williams formed his own party, the People's National Movement, which was well organised with a definite programme and generally pro-federation. It was more than a match for the loose coalitions of political groupings associated with Gomes and other political leaders. In the election of the following September, the PNM won a majority of the elected seats (13 out of the 24). London had fixed feelings about the prospects for the new government in Trinidad. Colonial Office officials had a high regard for Williams's intellect and integrity but a low view of his ability to be a successful chief minister of a government which had already shown that it was likely to be left-wing and radical (51).

The London conference met at Lancaster House during the bitterly cold weeks from 7–22 February 1956, a climate very different from the one from which the delegates had come (43). Typical of the difficulties in assembling delegates was that Grantley Adams, a key player, nearly did not come because it was the time of the Barbados budget. The proceedings were opened by Lennox-Boyd. The policy of the Colonial Office was that West Indian delegates should sort out differences between themselves. There was no shortage of contentious issues, one of the most serious being the question of the federal capital site (40). Manley's 'seven propositions' further fuelled controversy. For the second and the next few days, the West Indian delegates met by themselves in the Connaught Rooms, off Kingsway, where discussions were heated and 'ugly'.³⁶ Lennox-Boyd and CO officials talked individually to delegates, the secretary of state being anxious to put to rest the idea that the disputes were between progressives and reactionaries but rather an issue of balancing power between units. The site of the federal capital could not be agreed and Lennox-Boyd suggested that the issue be referred to a fact-finding commission of three non-West Indians, one to be an architect and another a financial expert. Strong objections to Manley's demands came from Gomes of Trinidad and Robert Bradshaw of St Kitts, not so much over the substance but because consideration of these major issues would delay federation.

On the structure of federal finances, delegates accepted that revenue could come from currency profits. However, exception was taken to Caine's proposal that for the first five years federal customs and duties should be confined to selected consumer items, including spirits and cigarettes, on the grounds that this would be a burden

on the poorer sections of the community and thus make federation less appealing. The solution adopted was that for the first five years there would be a fixed contribution or a federal levy from each unit which would be raised as each legislature thought best. For the CO, this was a weak compromise as it would not take federation far along the path towards economic control. On the issue of customs and excise a compromise decision was hammered out: the preamble to the constitution was to state that 'it was essential for the economic strength of the area that there should be an integrated trade policy for the Federation' with the introduction of a customs union and internal free trade. A further expert commission on trade and tariffs was created and directed to report within two years.

The fifth point in Manley's 'seven propositions' concerned future British financial support to the federation. All West Indian leaders felt strongly on this issue. The Colonial Office also had very firm ideas about financial aid which had been well rehearsed in discussions about federation with West Indian representatives over many years. The matter assumed new prominence as self-government for the federation came nearer and the question of Commonwealth membership was raised. Dominion status for the federation had been recommended by a group from the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association which had recently toured the West Indies, and Sir Alan Burns, the UK permanent representative on the UN Trusteeship Council, also thought this a valuable move not only for the West Indies but also for the federation's international relations. However, Commonwealth membership was not merely a matter for the United Kingdom; it involved all the other members as was shown by the discussions over the membership of the soon-to-be-independent Ghana. But on one thing the Colonial Office was clear; receipt of financial assistance for budgetary purposes and administration was incompatible with full membership of the Commonwealth (31). The volume of British aid from various sources to the West Indies since 1946 totalled £56 million (44). In an answer in June 1956 to Foot, who had pursued the question of self-government and levels of aid, and which also formed a despatch to other West Indian governors, the secretary of state reiterated his view that it was impossible for 'real political independence to be attained and maintained when ... financial assistance to several of the territories is at a scale which is incompatible with the reality of political independence' (47). As things stood in mid-1956, the putative federation had no means of defence and although each unit had agreed to contribute one per cent of revenue to the revived West India Regiment, that sum was insufficient. When dominion status came the full cost of the regiment would fall on the federation. The request by West Indian delegates at the London conference that Britain should make available to the federation an interest-free loan of £2 million had been rejected (44). Other sources of finance had been raised at London such as a proposed 'Caribbean Colombo Plan' which was subsequently taken up with the Canadian government. Luke, who wondered if the federal government would have anything useful to do with its limited financial resources, called this a 'vague' idea and suggested an International Bank economic mission to advise on regional economic co-ordination (49). This was not accepted by the Colonial Office and instead it was recommended that a Federal Economic Advisory Bureau be created under the aegis of the Standing Federation Committee.

Although the financial weakness of the putative federation had not been resolved in London, matters moved ahead fairly swiftly after the conclusion of the conference.

Delegates agreed to take the final steps to establish the federation, and the British government was authorised to pass an enabling act. The British Caribbean Act was duly passed by Parliament in August 1956. A few months earlier, in May, the Standing Federation Committee had been created with authority to settle the final details and to assemble staff for the federation. The commissioner was Luke who presided over the sixteen members drawn three each from Barbados, Jamaica and Trinidad and one from each of the Leeward and Windward Islands. Membership was such that the views of the smaller islands could prevail. The first meeting was held in Barbados and subsequent meetings, until October 1957, in Jamaica and Port of Spain. It was decided that the name of the federation should be The West Indies Federation not the British Caribbean Federation. The report of the fact-finding commission on the federal site, headed by Sir Francis Mudie, was published in September 1956. Mudie's report argued that the federal capital required good services and communications, all of which were lacking in Grenada and the other small islands. The commission recommended a site in either Barbados, Jamaica, or Trinidad. The three sites were discussed with some acrimony at the second meeting of the Standing Federation Committee in February 1957 and it was agreed that Trinidad should be the location of the federal capital. This was the site favoured most by the Colonial Office, partly for practical reasons but also because it was cheap and the land might be made available from little used United States bases on the island. Although this was welcomed by Eric Williams's government in Trinidad, there was some displeasure at the critical tone of Mudie's published report which branded the island's public life as corrupt (48, 69). The cost of the federal capital was to be assisted by a grant from the British Exchequer, now elevated to a sum not more than £1 million, and until the actual site could be decided upon the nascent administration moved into temporary headquarters in an office building on Treasury Street, Port of Spain.

There remained the appointment of a governor-general for the new federation. An experienced colonial governor, preferably with West Indian experience, was the kind of person favoured by the Colonial Office, and Lennox-Boyd had virtually promised the position to Foot who would also have been the street corner 'choice' in the West Indies. West Indian leaders preferred a person with West Indian experience who was sympathetic to the political ambitions of the region. But the matter was settled in London at the highest level. Harold Macmillan, the prime minister, decided in February 1957 that the post should go to 'a man who has had long experience in British Parliamentary life, who has been in charge of an administrative Department and has served in the Cabinet' (52). His choice was a loyal Cabinet colleague, Patrick Buchan-Hepburn, Conservative MP for Beckenham, a former chief whip and the current minister of works, who, for his new position, was ennobled as Lord Hailes. There was little opposition to this announcement by West Indian leaders; most criticism came from the British press and the Labour Party.

The Caribbean colony which caused the largest headache for the Colonial Office during the process of end of empire was British Guiana. The colony was socially and culturally plural, the population being mainly composed of the descendants of African slaves and of East Indian indentured labourers brought to work on the sugar plantations between 1838–1917. This racial divide existed in the trade unions formed from the 1920s and also in the small political parties that existed by the late 1940s. Economic life in the colony was dominated by white owned plantations and the bauxite mining industry. Poverty was widespread and the frequent cause of unrest, as

was officially acknowledged. During the late 1940s, Dr Cheddi Jagan, a US-educated dentist, steadily brought together some of the racially divided unions and parties and, in 1950, formed the People's Progressive Party (PPP). The PPP had a programme of radical social and economic reform for the colony which reflected Jagan's Marxist ideas. In 1951 a commission chaired by Sir John Waddington recommended that adult suffrage be introduced and a system of government with a measure of ministerial responsibility. This was established by the new 1953 constitution. In the general election that followed, on 27 April 1953, Chedi Jagan's PPP won 18 of the 24 elected seats with the support of fifty-one per cent of the votes cast (12). The activities of the PPP were being watched with some anxiety by the Special Branch both before and after the election although the commissioner of police, in the monthly intelligence report for April 1953, acknowledged that the party had popular bi-racial working class support. The police commissioner and the governor, Sir Alfred Savage, who had recently come from the much more orderly political surroundings of Barbados, acknowledged that the intransigent attitudes of the white-owned companies contributed to the economic and political tensions in the colony. Jagan's government set about implementing its manifesto and also changing some of the measures introduced by the previous administration. It was proposed to remove ecclesiastical control over schools, an issue of long-standing contention, and to lift the ban on the importation of left-wing literature and the measure preventing left-wing activists entering the colony. These were hardly matters of revolutionary intent but in a Cold War context they assumed greater significance in the minds of Colonial Office officials than they might have done at another time. The governor made an effort to work with Jagan and his ministers hoping to separate 'moderates' from the 'extremists', a line which the CO from the outset thought might not be the right one. Relations between governor and ministers became increasingly tense, reaching crisis level when strikes broke out on the sugar plantations on the last day of August 1953 when the government supported break-away unions against the Sugar Producers' Association. Savage asked that a Royal Navy frigate should remain in the area, but a week later, on 13 September, he reported by letter to the Colonial Office his fears that the 'foundations of society are being attacked insidiously almost without check', and that the PPP seemed likely to 'secure a more or less complete grip of the country, irrespectively of whether I step in, as I shall no doubt have to do before long, and use my reserved powers on this or that individual issue'. He continued: 'The crucial question is how long and how far should we allow this process to continue and how can we stop it?' Unless the opposition to the PPP could be galvanised, Savage believed that, in order to keep British Guiana in the Commonwealth, it would be necessary to go back to the former constitution (13).

The Colonial Office needed little convincing that action was needed to remove the Jagan government. On 24 September, Lyttelton, the secretary of state, instructed Savage to suspend the constitution and declare a state of emergency (15). The CO justification for this act of *force majeure* was that the aim of the PPP government was to turn British Guiana into a Soviet-leaning communist republic which would become a centre for organising communist activity throughout the British West Indies, and Central and South America. This decision was taken within the Colonial Office and then referred to the Cabinet for approval. The US was hostile to a leftist government in the Western hemisphere. This helped frame British policy but the decision to remove the PPP from office was not taken in response to pressure from Washington (14).³⁷ The

British Guiana constitution was suspended on 9 October, bringing to an end the 133-day government of the PPP. Because the governor could not rely upon the support of the police force, a battalion of British troops was sent from Jamaica to the colony, arriving on 8 October. Jagan and his political associate Linden Forbes Burnham, flew to London ten days later in order to lobby for their cause only to be closely followed by another delegation composed of their political opponents. At the same time the minister of state at the CO visited British Guiana. Within the colony, sugar plantation workers returned to work and disputes were channelled through labour officers rather than trade unions (17).

The crisis in British Guiana and the need to deploy British troops there, stirred the Colonial Office to push harder for the revival of a West India Regiment. Discussions on this had lagged for three years, caught up in local legislatures. London's aim was to re-establish a locally-recruited military force in the West Indies which would be used primarily for purposes of internal security in those colonies. This would aid Britain's military manpower problem as the British battalion based in Jamaica could be withdrawn for use elsewhere (18). The new West Indies Federation would need an armed force and defence was envisaged as an inclusive (federal) subject which would have to be paid for from federal funds (26).

The British West Indies experienced a rapid growth in population during the 1940s and early 1950s which outstripped the pace of economic and social development. Many of the officials in the Colonial Office and in West Indian administration were concerned at what they saw as overpopulation in the area, an issue that was to become closely linked with the question of West Indian immigration into the United Kingdom (45). One of the remits of the Evans Commission had been to assess the possibility of the surplus island populations being settled in the thinly inhabited areas of British Honduras and British Guiana. Another solution to the surplus population of the West Indies, floated somewhat loosely in March 1948 by Sir Thomas Lloyd, the permanent under-secretary of state in the Colonial Office and the former secretary to the Moyne Commission, was that Britain's post-war labour shortage might be assisted by immigrants from the Caribbean (1). Officials at the Ministry of Labour and National Service opposed the idea and an inter-departmental working party, reporting in July 1949, rejected the proposal. While more than 600 Jamaican men and women, two-thirds of whom had served in the forces in Britain during the war, were sailing to Tilbury on the liner *Empire Windrush* in June 1948, several Labour MPs were writing to Clement Attlee, the prime minister, demanding controls on coloured immigration, a demand that was firmly rejected (3). Britain's traditional policy had been that entry to Britain was open to all subjects of the Crown without distinction, a system of common rights and obligations for all. However, Canada in 1946 defined its own citizenship laws as had India and Pakistan when they gained independence in 1947 and Ceylon in 1948. In the light of these changes, Britain's traditional policy of right of entry for all subjects of the Crown needed to be redefined. This was done by the British Nationality Bill, then going through Parliament and passed in 1948, which created a separate status of 'citizenship of the United Kingdom and Colonies', and also the status of Commonwealth citizen, people in both categories being entitled to enter the United Kingdom.³⁸ Immigration to Britain from the West Indies increased through the 1950s; in 1953 there were 2,000 immigrants, in 1954 the figure had risen to 10,000, and by 1956 to 29,800. At the end of the decade nearly 50,000 people from the West Indies entered the United

Kingdom. In addition there had been a growing number of immigrants from the Indian sub-continent; in 1960 a total of 136,400 immigrants from the tropical empire and Commonwealth countries entered Britain.³⁹ Emigration to the United States had for long been a regular outlet for the West Indies, particularly for men from Jamaica, but this had been severely reduced by the McCarran-Walter Act passed by Congress in December 1952 (23).

Government departments were wary of imposing immigration controls because they involved questions of race and citizenship, relations with Commonwealth states and dependencies, and the position of Irish nationals who were entitled to enter Britain. The Colonial Office in particular was anxious not to be seen acting or being involved in actions or policies that might appear to involve racial discrimination of any kind. Although the CO was prepared to look at voluntary means of restricting West Indian immigration, and was not opposed to the introduction of powers to deport undesirables and measures to ensure that immigrants had guaranteed jobs, accommodation and sufficient money for maintenance, there was strong objection to any discrimination on the grounds of colour. J L Keith, the student welfare officer in the CO and a fairly liberal voice on matters involving race, regarded immigration as beyond the control of West Indian governments and more a matter to be tackled by welfare and economic development. Winston Churchill, the prime minister, saw West Indian immigrants as a problem that required action, while Lord Salisbury, the lord privy seal, regarded continued uncontrolled immigration of non-Europeans as a threat to the racial integrity of Britain. Most ministers thought that action was not necessary and that were it to be taken, it should be based on consensus with the opposition parties and also consultation with Commonwealth countries and colonies. The question of restricting West Indian immigration was brought before the Cabinet again in early 1954. Ministers authorised the appointment of a working party to report on the powers of other Commonwealth countries to deport British subjects, the outcome of which was a proposal to restrict immigration by the introduction of a 'permit to land'. While the working party was deliberating, Philip Rogers, the assistant under-secretary of state, had returned from a visit to the West Indies. He thought restrictions should be imposed and applied to all Commonwealth citizens irrespective of colour (19). Later that year Foot spoke of his fears for Jamaican immigrants in Britain if a recession were to occur; at current levels of immigration this might leave 30,000 Jamaicans unemployed in London alone. In these circumstances some form of regulation of immigration through a quota system would be necessary. As Foot pointed out, all West Indian governments had restrictions on immigration. In the discussions over federation, the question of freedom of movement was a bitterly contested idea. By the autumn of 1954, senior officials in the Colonial Office had come round to the view that 'now was the time to take steps to control' unregulated immigration although this must apply to the whole Commonwealth (20). Lennox-Boyd felt strongly on this as he told Lord Swinton, the secretary of state for Commonwealth relations, in response to a suggestion that the terms of a committee of inquiry should be limited only to selected immigrants.⁴⁰ At the end of 1954 the Colonial Office and the Home Office were together preparing draft legislation to restrict immigration into the United Kingdom, although Lennox-Boyd was concerned that the wording of the bill should not imply that his department was supporting racially discriminatory measures (22, 29). Race by then was becoming a

lively issue in British politics. An anti-coloured immigration lobby, led by Sir Cyril Osborne, the Conservative MP for Louth, represented one extreme of that party. At the opposite pole were more liberally-minded MPs such as Nigel Fisher, the parliamentary private secretary to the home secretary, who toured the West Indies in mid-1954. In a report, which Anthony Eden as prime minister called 'very helpful', Fisher summarised the economic and social conditions in the West Indies which gave rise to emigration, and he stressed that although restriction applied only to those colonies might be a quick and easy solution for Britain, it would be neither 'morally right' nor 'politically expedient' (30). As minister of defence, Macmillan, with an eye on the public mood and with the prospect of a general election not far away, suggested in January 1955 to Eden that 'we might introduce a Bill and let it fall. This would at least show willing'.⁴¹ Many of the arguments by the anti-immigration lobby, which had a growing populist currency in certain areas of the country, claimed that immigrants were a cause of social problems and crime, views which the Colonial Office took steps to refute (24).

The draft Commonwealth Immigrants Bill, prepared by early 1955, was suspended because of the general election which was called for May. Most government departments now accepted that immigration from the Commonwealth should be restricted. The Colonial Office was very anxious that this should meet with the approval and the co-operation of the West Indian governments and not be a source of economic embarrassment to them which, in the case of Manley in Jamaica, might lead to his fall from office (32). Quota figures for immigrants were regarded as discriminatory by the Colonial Office, and Sir Thomas Lloyd in October 1956 was still resisting the proposed legislation which he argued was 'directed against the West Indies'. The Cabinet was evenly divided on the need for legislation, so in late 1955 Sir Norman Brook, the Cabinet secretary, suggested to Eden that as resolution was not forthcoming the matter should be referred to a small committee for further consideration (33). Eden agreed, and the Committee on Colonial Immigrants was set up chaired by the lord chancellor, Lord Kilmuir, and including the secretary of state for the colonies. It concluded in its report of mid-1956 that immigration was an 'onerous problem which cannot now be ignored'.⁴² Cabinet discussed the issue on 11 July but the divisions remained. Predictably Salisbury was for restrictive legislation and G Lloyd George, the home secretary, argued for the changes in the law recommended by the committee in 1954-1955. Lennox-Boyd accepted the need for restrictive legislation but not on grounds of colour, and said that he would consult with the chief ministers of Jamaica and Barbados with a view to gaining their support to discourage emigration from the West Indies. At the end of the year a decision was no nearer. The Colonial Office view, put forcibly, was that although West Indian immigration was a cause for concern—for Lord Lloyd especially the root cause was uncontrolled population growth in the Caribbean (45)—its 'effects do not as yet appear to be socially or economically serious for this country as to justify the political difficulties which would be caused to the United Kingdom's relations with the West Indies, and with other Commonwealth countries, by so marked a step as legislation directed against the West Indians' (50).

The Cabinet was still divided over what should be done in mid-1957, with Kilmuir, Lennox-Boyd and R A Butler, the new home secretary, all being opposed to restrictive legislation (59). This remained the Cabinet view a year later. However, race riots in Nottingham and then in London's Notting Hill district between

23 August and 2 September 1958, brought the matter back to the top of the political agenda. The deputy prime minister of the federation, Dr Carl La Corbiniere, flew to London and so did Manley and Dr Hugh Cummins, the premier of Barbados, to discuss the unrest. The Cabinet's immediate reaction was that immigration controls were needed, but this was moderated by the need not to be seen to be reacting to racist unrest. Restrictive legislation was not to be entertained. Other measures were to be adopted to strengthen welfare services for immigrants in Britain and to encourage West Indian governments to more carefully screen prospective immigrants (78). In June 1959 a committee of ministers chaired by Butler agreed that no action should be taken to deport undesirable immigrants or to control immigration into the country (94). Over the next two years Cabinet discussed immigration control only twice, the matter being left largely for the attention of the Home Office. Immigration control was not mentioned in the Conservative manifesto for the general election of October 1959, but a group of West Midlands MPs kept the issue on the political agenda. It was an issue which the CO continued to monitor.

In early 1957 the Standing Federation Committee recommended Trinidad as the site for the new federal capital. Nearly a year before the governments of Trinidad and St Lucia asked London to enquire about the possibility of releasing areas leased to the United States in 1941. The CO hoped that Washington would make a sympathetic response to the embryo federation (46). In May 1957 the SFC agreed that the north-west peninsula of Trinidad, which included the US base at Chaguaramas, would be the best site for the federal capital. The site was near Port of Spain and possessed many advantages, as the CO acknowledged, while the US base only had a small care-and-maintenance staff mainly concerned with operating a guided missile radar-tracking station (55). Manley, Bradshaw and Adams, and other members of the SFC, were adamant that the base should be surrendered as the new federal site. Eric Williams of Trinidad, who had only recently joined the SFC, abstained and contended that he would support the existing international agreement. It was in this spirit that the West Indian leaders went to London in July 1957 to meet with British and American representatives in order to discuss what Rogers at the CO referred to as the 'trickiest question'.⁴³ A British approach to the United States over the bases issue was met with some sympathetic understanding by the State Department but with intransigence from the Defense Department (58). CO officials thought that an uncompromising attitude from Washington would not be helpful to either the interests of the United Kingdom or the United States (60). As to the military significance of the base, at least one of the UK service departments discounted its value to British and West Indian defence and said that the problem was political (61). However, US reluctance to leave Chaguaramas was dictated by the fact that it was the terminal station of the Caesar Chain, a secret anti-submarine monitoring system stretching down the western Atlantic coastline, information about which they were reluctant to share even with their British allies (62, 73). The London talks took place at the Foreign Office from 16–23 July. Manley and the other West Indian leaders presented their arguments for the surrender of the base. On the third day Williams spoke. He had moved from his previous conciliatory position and now denounced the Lend-Lease agreement and the US presence in Trinidad. Armed with documents from 1940–1941, he fiercely argued that by the Lend-Lease agreement the 'rights of Trinidad were trampled on in 1940' against the

wishes of the then governor and executive council whose protests had been overruled by the War Cabinet.⁴⁴ The situation was different now. Trinidad had an elected government and thus it was necessary to negotiate a new agreement between the two countries (64). Faced with this upset in the talks, Macmillan wrote the next day to President Eisenhower requesting support for a joint commission of technical experts to examine the question of Chaguaramas as a federal site (63). Eisenhower agreed and a joint commission was accepted by the representatives of the three parties at the London talks.

The joint commission was appointed in January 1958 and, chaired by Sir Charles Arden-Clarke, the former governor of the Gold Coast, met in Port of Spain to prepare a report which was completed in March but not published until after the federal government was in place (70). The bases questions generated strong feelings in Trinidad and elsewhere in the West Indies in the run-up to the first federal elections in March. Passions were stirred by the continued construction of a radar-tracking station at Chaguaramas and the belief that the United States was determined to keep that base whatever the joint commission recommended (67). In an aide memoire Christian Herter, the US under-secretary of state, urged Britain's active support for retention of the base and implied that the United States intended to stay put. This was 'an astonishing statement', minuted Rogers at the CO, which 'calls seriously into question the good faith of the U.S. Government in agreeing to the setting up of the Joint Commission on Chaguaramas'.⁴⁵ The Foreign Office, thinking that partition might also be possible, was prepared to await the findings of the joint commission. Once the federal government had been elected, the FO argued, the question would be more a dispute between the West Indies and the United States, a view which the Colonial Office had also adopted (68, 72). By then the joint commission had recommended that the United States should retain the Chaguaramas base as a vital part of its defence system and that partition was not practicable (70). The dilemma for the CO was that the federation was on its way to independence but the bases agreement did not have the federal government's consent and was not likely to receive it. And full details of the military bases were not to be shared with West Indian ministers (73). Foreign Office officials were opposed to any action that might threaten the integrity of the Anglo-American alliance although Selwyn Lloyd, the foreign secretary, hoped that the US might 'sugar the pill' by offering to pay for an alternative capital site for the federation (72, 77).

In May 1958 Lennox-Boyd publicly announced that Britain would not ask the US to move from Chaguaramas, a statement that greatly irritated federal politicians who felt that West Indian interests had not been properly consulted or sufficiently supported by London. Pressure from the West Indies on London increased, political feelings in Trinidad having been further stirred by the heavy-handed behaviour of the American consul-general in Port of Spain which 'appalled' the colonial attaché at the British embassy in Washington (66, 76). The British government approached Dulles, the US secretary of state, and gained his agreement in September 1958 for a proposal initially made by Hailes that the American need for all or part of the bases would be reconsidered after a period of ten years. The CO recognised that movement on the question of the bases would require slow diplomacy. There were several parties involved although London was determined that as far as possible it would try to keep the discussions away from the concerns of Trinidad and at the federal level (79). The position of the US government, that the bases were legally entailed and not

negotiable, was supported by the Foreign Office which was insistent that the western defence system should not be compromised. By late 1958 it appeared that the United States might be willing to discuss the issue (87). Three months later FO views had shifted from their unshakeable position of autumn 1958 and it was now accepted that it was better for the US to gain agreement on such a crucial issue, which also involved regional defence, with the West Indies before rather than after independence (96). Julian Amery, parliamentary under-secretary of state at the CO, visited the West Indies in June of the following year. Upon his return he floated the idea that the West Indies might be closely identified with both the United Kingdom and the United States in a shared defence scheme for the region (95, 99).

Relations with Trinidad and how to deal with its unpredictable and often fiery chief minister increasingly exercised Colonial Office time. Adams and the federal government had accepted the ten-year moratorium on the base issue without consulting Williams, and this was a cause of rancour between the two men who should have been close associates. To Williams, Chaguaramas was first and foremost a concern of Trinidad and only secondly of the federal government. Williams's repeated argument that the 1941 agreement was out of date and needed revising was received with some sympathy in the Colonial Office which was eager to bring the United States to the discussion table. A British approach to the State Department in March 1959 was rebuffed. The federal government requested, through London in June 1959, a three-power conference at which they would discuss the revision of the 1941 agreement with representatives of the UK and US (96). Williams wanted a four-power conference, to include Trinidad and to be held in Port of Spain. The CO supported the federal government, accepting that West Indian representatives, including Williams, would attend such a conference as more than observers, but there was no question of endorsing Trinidad's claim to separate representation (97, 99). US intransigence over Chaguaramas became a major political issue in Trinidad, and Williams's government, which the State Department viewed with great suspicion, threatened that measures would be taken to disrupt US activities in the base, many of which were in breach of the agreement (100, 124).

In July 1959 Amery summarised the situation over Chaguaramas. Britain recognised that western defence interests were at stake, but in the face of growing West Indian resentment at the US presence it would be impossible for the British government to publicly support American retention of the base. 'We have to avoid', Amery wrote, 'getting into a position where we might seem to be ganging up with the U.S. against a member of the Commonwealth' (99). At the end of August 1959, Selwyn Lloyd met Herter, now the US secretary of state, at the Foreign Office to discuss the question of the bases. Herter's concern was to ensure that the 1941 agreement would remain legally binding after the federation became independent. Selwyn Lloyd agreed that a British statement on the legal position would be produced. He suggested that federal acceptance of the agreement might be made a condition for independence but he stopped short of recommending such a course (105).

During 1956 the West Indies Federal Labour Party was created, a loose grouping of parties, including the People's National Movement in Trinidad, with Manley the elected leader. A rival Federal Democratic Labour party was formed in 1957. These two parties contested the first federal election held in March 1958. The result surprised observers who had expected the FLP to gain a resounding victory. Neither

party gained a majority; the FLP held 22 of the 45 seats, with the DLP holding 20 seats. The balance was held by three independents who came from Grenada and Barbados. A political arrangement was put together by the FLP and Adams became prime minister, but only because the two more obvious contenders for the position opted to remain in the politics of their home islands (69, 71). Adams presided over a structure which lacked most of the ingredients of an independent state in the making. His Council of State contained ministers who possessed little political or administrative experience. No date had been given for the federation's independence but it had been stipulated at the outset that the constitution could be reviewed within five years. An opposition motion on dominion status moved within the first session of the federal parliament raised the prospect of a constitutional review after only one year. Lord Home, secretary of state at the CRO, voiced reservations on behalf of his department. He assumed that dominion status in the West Indies could not be achieved for at least four years and he was concerned about the impact of a premature conference for the West Indies on the politically more advanced federation in Central Africa (80). While arguing that political advance in the Caribbean could not be held up by reason of Central African considerations, the CO sought to allay Home's fears. CO officials welcomed an early review of the constitution as a means of confronting West Indian leaders with the financial and administrative weakness of the federal government which, commented Lennox-Boyd, 'is hardly worth the name' (83).

From the outset the federation was destined to be weak with its only source of revenue dependent on a limited mandatory levy. Adams suggested that the federal government should collect income tax and he added that this might be made retroactive. Such talk exacerbated fears in Jamaica that its programme of industrial development would be over-ridden by a federal government intent on 'Empire building'. Large elements of the Jamaican electorate had never been well disposed to federation and threats like these only served to increase popular distaste (81, 82). Although Manley supported federation the divisions within his own party determined that he should espouse a looser and more gradual form of federalism than that envisaged by many of the other West Indian leaders (85). For its part, the CO sympathised with the federal government's need for a larger source of revenue (84) and sought every means, including the allocation of CD&W grants (128 n 4) to strengthen its authority. It might be possible, wrote Lennox-Boyd in December 1958, looking ahead to the constitutional review of the next year, to set a date for West Indian independence, say in 1962 or 1963, but this was dependent upon the federation being 'endowed with the necessary powers and finance to make it able to stand among its peers at a Commonwealth gathering' (89). Elsewhere in the federation, constitutional progress for the Leeward and Windward Islands was speeded up at conferences in Trinidad and London in March and June 1959 respectively in order to bring those units closer in line to other parts of the federation (98 n 1).

In preparation for the constitutional review conference, scheduled for Trinidad in the middle of 1959, Manley's government outlined Jamaica's stance in a ministry paper (93). Attention was drawn to the colonial character of the constitution and to this was added the demand for dominion status with representation in the federal legislature based on population and other significant demands. Prominent amongst these was the removal from federal control of any possibility of interference with the

development of industry, powers to levy an income tax or to collect excise duty. In short, Manley wanted a looser federal association. A system of free trade would allow each unit to protect its own industries and markets and the introduction of a customs union would be a very slow process. Elsewhere in the West Indies there was a growing demand for dominion status with Williams making populist statements that he would demand independence for 22 April 1960, on the second anniversary of the inauguration of the federal parliament. CO officials did not take this seriously but now realised that dominion status might be closer than hitherto assumed. They were on 'something of a runaway train' and there was a need to 'speed up action' to provide an improved administrative infrastructure for the federation (98). Amery applied the brake. He denounced as 'absurd' and 'preposterous' the West Indian proposal that dominion status be granted without a proper federal structure and defence force. Upon this basis it would not be possible for the rest of the Commonwealth to accept the federation as a member. But, he added, if the demand was going to be made for independence within twelve months, then a programme had better be prepared so that it might be possible by 1965 or even two or three years earlier (101). These effectively were the arguments used by Amery in response to renewed expressions of CRO concern and at a meeting with Hailes in August 1959. HMG would not be prepared to sponsor the West Indies for Commonwealth membership until the question of the balance of revenues had been agreed, there was progress towards a customs union, provision had been made for military forces, the administrative structures had been strengthened and a diplomatic apparatus was in place. In the meantime, with every chance that the Trinidad conference might break down, London should 'play for time' (104).

Jamaica had gained internal self-government under a new constitution introduced in July 1959. In the Jamaican elections of that month, Manley's PNP increased its hold on an enlarged legislature by gaining 29 seats to the 16 seats held by Bustamante's JLP which had campaigned under the slogan 'Jamaica must lead—or secede'. Manley argued in the campaign that the federation was flawed but that Jamaica's position could be safeguarded by negotiations. Yet in the event, negotiations at the inter-governmental conference in Trinidad in late September 1959 revealed the deep divisions that existed between Jamaica, Trinidad and the federal government. The conference got no further than discussing Jamaica's claim to greater representation in the federal legislature. Rogers, who attended as a UK observer, reflected on the 'squalid' nature of the proceedings which showed the 'bitter political antagonism' that existed between the West Indian leaders. Hailes was slightly less pessimistic, seeing the conference as a 'shock' rather than a 'set back' to federation (107). Breakdown was only avoided when it was agreed that the constitutional and economic and social issues on the agenda be referred to two committees, known as Alpha and Orion, which would report by the end of March 1960. In London officials now believed that to save the federation they would have to be more forthcoming about a date for dominion status, and that further consideration should be given to the question of future financial assistance. After the conference, the CO considered launching a discreet campaign to muster support for the federation. This involved commercial firms, the media, Canadian diplomatic aid, and the assistance of those organisations in the West Indies that had an interest in federation (108). To this end exploratory talks were held with the Canadians in London. All this was done without the governor-general's knowledge and when

eventually Hailes was informed he reacted strongly, arguing that any attempt to bring outside influence to bear would be resented locally and thus have a negative effect. The CO therefore backed off. Whether or not this was a missed opportunity to galvanise support for the federation remains an open question.

With the two-fold prospect of the federation demanding dominion status and Jamaica's future within the union uncertain, the CO, in October 1959, asked the CRO for advice on the significance of Commonwealth membership. One concern was whether small states could be members of the Commonwealth, an issue recently raised over Cyprus. The result was a CRO paper that stressed financial independence and which went on to state that Jamaica's claims to Commonwealth status were 'marginal'. Another CRO concern was Jamaica's trade boycott against South Africa. A surprising idea advanced was that Britain might deny Commonwealth membership to Jamaica if the island withdrew from the federation (109). The CO was critical of the CRO memorandum. CO officials still hoped that Jamaica would remain within the federation, but separate membership of the Commonwealth should not be ruled out (and Jamaica was to be preferred to South Africa) (110). At the end of 1959, in an attempt to bolster his position after his feeble performance at the Trinidad conference, Adams announced that the federal government would approach HMG early in the next year with a view to fixing a date for dominion status (111). Manley viewed Adams's proposal as 'little short of lunacy', forcing federation at a speed and in a direction far ahead of the minimum powers advocated by Jamaica. He was intent on ensuring that the federation would not have economic and fiscal powers that would disrupt Jamaica's economy and the ten-year development programme which was being fostered behind high tariff walls (90).

Manley visited London in January 1960 to discuss with the CO, now with Iain Macleod at the ministerial helm, the necessary criteria for dominion status and Commonwealth membership. In preparation for the visit the CO argued that there were sound economic, social and political reasons for Britain to depart from present policy and provide temporary financial or transitional assistance to the federation after independence (114). The Treasury countered that such a departure in policy would set an unwelcome precedent (115). Differences remained between the two departments but a general formula on aid was agreed for communication to Manley (117). In discussions with the Jamaicans, the CO listed eight essential attributes of sovereignty and said that Jamaica's secession from the federation would be a 'severe disappointment'. This was a factor to be taken into account if the island then sought separate membership of the Commonwealth. Jamaica's size and economy placed her in a 'marginal position' for membership, raising the question of whether small territories elsewhere could become members (118, 119).

In March 1960 exploratory talks were held with a US official on the likelihood of US aid to the federation (122). A 'Colombo Plan' for the Caribbean was also mooted, an idea which emanated from the Caribbean Commission. The CO was not sympathetic, arguing that the plan would not increase the overall amount of aid to the region, and that under a 'Colombo' scheme West Indian governments would be donors as well as recipients (123). Throughout there were growing signs that Jamaica was increasingly uneasy within the federation. In November 1959 Manley rejected a call from Bustamante's JLP for an immediate referendum on federation. When Bustamante announced in May 1960 his resignation as president of the FDLP and his intention to campaign to take Jamaica out of the federation, Manley was left

with little choice but to announce a referendum for the following year. This unilateral announcement was made shortly after a despatch from Macleod on 15 May which stated that Cabinet government would be extended to the federation (125). Macleod still believed that federation might survive although he continued the CO line that its shape and the pace of advance to independence were matters for the West Indian leaders to decide. It was in this frame of mind that he left London for a visit to the West Indies in early June. Britain, he said, was prepared to sponsor the federation for membership of the Commonwealth once the 'essential attributes of sovereignty' were achieved (126).

One of the 'essential attributes of sovereignty' was the ability of the federation to defend itself. Discussions on reforming the West India Regiment for West Indian defence and internal security had begun in 1954 with most units in favour except British Guiana while St Kitts reserved its option. At that time the WIR was envisaged as a force for the whole of the region, not just for the proposed federation. Inquiry by the Treasury, the Colonial and War Offices in November 1956 concluded that a reformed WIR could replace British garrisons and thus result in a substantial economy to HMG in the foreseeable future (53). At a conference in Barbados in June 1956, it was agreed that the WIR should be formed at the start of 1958 and be funded by a one per cent levy on the annual revenues of each unit government. The estimated cost of the force in its first five years would be slightly in excess of £3 million, much of which would have to be borne by the United Kingdom. The CO view on West Indian defence was gradually shaped as British Guiana and British Honduras indicated that they did not wish to participate in the WIR, so that by mid-1958 it was accepted that the federation would have exclusive responsibility for the regiment and eventually for its own defence (56). The intention was that remaining British troops, part of a battalion, would be withdrawn from the West Indies early in 1960 in accordance with Army Council plans to reduce the size of the British Army on the ending of conscription. In the meantime, the Jamaica Regiment could become the nucleus of the new WIR. However, plans laid in London soon got out of step with discussions on the financing of the force in the West Indies. By late 1957 the forming of the WIR had been deferred to January 1959, but more worrying for the CO was that because of this delay no provision had been made in the Colonial Services Vote Estimate for a contribution to the Jamaica Regiment for 1958–1959. In the circumstances the CO proposed that the only way to salvage the situation was to take the unpopular step of asking the federal government to meet these costs (65).

On the wider level of regional security, although the West Indies was perceived in London as largely under the arm of the United States, Britain still had a responsibility to guard colonial territory against claims by Latin American states and to ensure that internal security was maintained (74). In view of the financial and strategic requirements of the West Indies, Lennox-Boyd in December 1958 urged Duncan Sandys, the minister of defence, to agree that a British battalion should remain in the West Indies until 1963, a position which the Chiefs of Staff confirmed in September 1959 (106). When the federation achieved independence, Britain would continue to be responsible for the defence of non-federal territories and thus need troops and a naval presence in the region. Some thought was given to the stationing of British troops in the federation after Jamaica's independence but it was recognised that their presence might be politically embarrassing, particularly if the federal government wanted to use them in a civil capacity. Finance was another

consideration. A British battalion in Jamaica would cost an additional £600,000 a year, which suggested that it might be better to remove British troops to the Bahamas where they would still be available for local use but in territory under British jurisdiction (137). The defence solution put forward by Amery in July 1959 was intended both to resolve the deadlock over Chaguaramas and to meet the federation's naval requirements. It might be possible, he suggested, for the United Kingdom, the United States and the federation together to have joint control over the base and in the process to get the United States to underwrite the costs of the small naval forces required by the federation. The Foreign Office, ever protective of good relations with Washington, was not particularly impressed by the idea (99), and a year later the Ministry of Defence was quick to scotch any suggestion of a regional defence pact in the Caribbean (134). At the local level, Sir Kenneth Blackburne, the new governor of Jamaica, argued that the island occupied a strategic position in the Caribbean with three potentially politically unstable republics a short distance to the north. The defence of Jamaica and the outlying islands, he argued, required the reforming of a Jamaica Regiment and the retention of a British battalion in the region. Blackburne referred only to incursions by Castroist rebel forces, but from early 1960 there was an increasing concern by local governments and the CO over the destabilising influence of Fidel Castro's Cuba regime in the Caribbean (112, 128).

The integrity of British Honduras was also threatened by neighbouring Guatemala which laid claim to the territory. Although the frontier between the colony and Guatemala had been agreed by treaty in 1859, the conservative president Ydigoras Fuentes, who had recently come to power, sought political capital by reviving the claim. The politics of British Honduras reflected the colony's divided ethnic population. George Price's People's United Party was led by moderately left-leaning Roman Catholics, whose focus was more to the United States than Britain; and they were not averse to talking to the Guatemalans, actions often interpreted by officials in London as verging on the treasonable. The Colonial Office hoped, as late as 1959, that British Honduras might see the advantages of joining the federation. This was unlikely, and Sir Colin Thornley, the governor since 1955, proposed making a broadcast to the colony stating that the people were free to choose whether or not they joined with Guatemala. Thornley was confident that they would prefer to remain within the Commonwealth and eventually become an independent state, even if the prospect of independence seemed so remote that it might never happen. The CO rejected Thornley's proposal, arguing that it would be counter-productive and that it might encourage irredentist claims on other British territories, notably Cyprus and Malta (91).

When he arrived in the West Indies in June 1960 one of Macleod's first meetings was with Bustamante and representatives of the JLP. Here he heard first hand of their opposition to federation, in particular what they felt was the inadequate representation for Jamaica and the economic burdens that integration would entail. Bustamante interjected that the financial problem had been one of Britain's making ever since the Montego Bay conference of 1947. In all of this Macleod declared his neutrality, although he stressed that if Jamaica went it alone and applied for Commonwealth membership that would be a matter for Commonwealth members to decide, not just the United Kingdom (127). Relations between Eric Williams and the CO had been tense for some time. To improve them it had been announced that Sir Solomon Hochoy, a local career civil servant, would succeed Sir Edward Beetham as

the governor of Trinidad, and Macleod was also able to tell Williams that the colony was to be granted Cabinet government after the next elections in 1961. At Macleod's meeting with Adams and the federal ministers on 15 June, a substantial part of the discussions was taken up with financial affairs. However, in a departure from the views of his predecessor, the secretary of state acknowledged that political independence might precede financial independence although he was non-committal as to the amount of British aid that might follow that event (128). This was a significant change of policy which later impinged on other parts of the colonial empire. Over the West Indies, Britain was now in something of a paradoxical position: London wanted an independent federation in order to reduce its own financial burden but now found itself having to contemplate even more financial assistance in order to keep federation alive.

Of the many differences over the conditions for federation, those between Jamaica and Trinidad were the most serious. Manley's position was particularly acute, with a faction within his own party pressing for stringent terms and Bustamante's JLP demanding secession. Anxious to save federation, Williams sought to rescue Manley from this political dilemma by meeting those problems half way. During June the two leaders met privately at the home of C L R James in Port of Spain, and then again in Antigua in early August. The Antigua meeting was to prove controversial for two main reasons: first because Williams and Manley produced different accounts of the outcome, and secondly because the federal prime minister viewed with suspicion a covert meeting between the leaders of the two major states of the federation. Although neither Manley nor Williams had become directly involved in federation politics, this did not mean that they lacked political ambitions at the federal centre. From July 1960 Adams thought that Manley was planning to oust him from office.⁴⁶

In Antigua Manley and Williams agreed on Jamaica's representation in the federation and also that questions of industrial development and income tax should constitute a further reserve or 'third list', that is, they should remain the responsibility of unit governments and not be removed unless by majority recommendation of the Council of State and at least a two-thirds majority of the federal parliament. The second condition effectively gave Jamaica a veto over both issues. On freedom of movement, an issue over which Williams would not retreat, Manley agreed that this should remain a matter for unit governments for five years from the date of independence. Federal ministers reacted angrily to what were seen as the secret Antigua talks. So did some of Williams's own ministers, particularly Patrick Solomon who held the portfolio on home affairs, and John O'Halloran who was minister of industry and commerce (130). In Jamaica Manley hoped that the Antigua agreement would serve to persuade elements in his own party and the broader electorate that the federation posed no threat to the island's future industrial development and economy. The agreement was endorsed only after lengthy discussion by the Jamaican Cabinet. In the run up to the referendum, so an intelligence report informed the CO, the decision whether or not Jamaica remained in the federation would be decided on party lines, and for Manley there was the danger that PNP members would not turn out in sufficient numbers to vote for federation (131). Isaacs, the minister of trade and industry, remained unwilling to surrender control over Jamaica's economic interests and threatened to break with the PNP if necessary. He was a Roman Catholic, deeply suspicious of the influence of the extreme left in West Indian politics and firmly opposed to the admission of

Jagan's British Guiana to the federation; hence his demand that Jamaica should have the right of veto on the admission of any new state to membership (143). The CO saw no sign of Jagan wishing to join the federation, although it continued to believe, as did federal ministers, that along with British Honduras, British Guiana might ultimately become a member (135). From London the Williams–Manley talks could seem to be other than a means of saving federation; rather in 1960 it appeared as if the two 'protectionist dictates' of the major islands over industrial development and freedom of movement were likely to either wreck the federation or reduce it to a weak shadow of what the CO had hoped and planned for (143).

The differences between Jamaica and Trinidad, however politically resolved at Antigua, did not answer the acute financial problems of the federation. Hochoy, in September 1960, reported to the CO that Manley and Williams felt that their problems could be resolved if a substantial sum in development aid was given to the federation. CO officials were eager for a Commonwealth Assistance Loan and also to more closely involve both Canada and the United States in an aid programme for the West Indies. Prospects of a Commonwealth Assistance Loan did not appear good, however. In October 1960, a Treasury circular argued that colonies were consuming a disproportionate share of overseas aid, and that Commonwealth Assistance Loans granted to emergent territories shortly after independence would have to be offset by a corresponding reduction in Exchequer finance available to the dependent territories (132). But the prospect of US financial aid was now more promising. Although Washington was unwilling to link the question of aid with that of bases, the CO rightly thought that United States' strategic interests in the Caribbean would dictate that aid should be given to the federation. This could not be budgetary support but the federation would benefit from the Social Development Program for Latin America and other forms of as yet unspecified assistance (133, 139).

West Indian politicians rarely thought that Britain was giving a fair financial deal to either the federation or the individual unit governments. There was always deep suspicion of Britain's motives in creating the federation. W H Bramble, the chief minister of Montserrat, rather abrasively viewed it as an attempt by the metropole to rid itself of weak and impoverished colonies. The CO had little time for such ideas and viewed with patrician disdain politicians, such as Bramble, who inefficiently ran colonies where a culture of financial dependency was encouraged (136, 192). By and large CO officials were reasonably understanding of the problems encountered by West Indian politicians and the way in which they were handled. The difficulties that kept islands and territories apart as they sought means to draw themselves together were generally well understood in London, although the constant bickering and the rifts that opened up between rival personalities tended to strain the patience of officials who had spent a long time trying to create the federation and get it off the ground. Despite official acknowledgement of the economic barriers to federation, officials perhaps made less allowance than they might have done for the very real difficulties in bringing together different islands and territories spread over a large area, a point repeatedly made by West Indian politicians. For West Indians, federation was not only about decolonisation and nationhood; equally importantly it was about economic development and modernisation. All the unit governments wanted this but not all had the resources or the infrastructures to achieve it. Not surprisingly the wealthier territories jealously guarded their economies, and messages from London that said that the better off should aid the poorer were not acceptable to local

electorates in territories designated as potential donors. To the CO the 'attitude of self-pity' often present in West Indian economic thinking and demands for financial aid, and the idea that each island should be developed to the same level of economic activity as the larger islands, were unreasonable. It would be, minuted G W Jamieson, a CO principal, in October 1960, commenting on the case made by the Trinidad government for financial aid, similar to saying that HMG was 'obliged to develop say Denbighshire or Ross-shire to the same level of economic activity as Yorkshire or S. Wales'. At the same time the CO constantly pointed out to West Indian politicians that the federation enjoyed an income per head considerably higher than that of many Asian and African colonies. Indeed, argued Jamieson, the gross domestic product of Trinidad compared not unfavourably with that of France and might match that of southern European countries such as Greece and Portugal. In world terms the West Indies belonged with the ranks of the lower middle class, not the underprivileged (138).

A meeting with West Indian ministers in London in November 1960 discussed the financial settlement at independence. The CO regarded this as 'the single most important question still to be answered'. The discussions were not easy as the West Indian leaders, both federal ministers and politicians from Jamaica, Trinidad, Antigua and St Lucia, suspected British motives, especially over any suggestion that the level of UK assistance might be determined by that provided by the US (139, 140). The level of financial aid eventually offered by the US to the West Indies in November 1960 rather surprised CO officials, and it reflected Washington's growing unease about Castro's activities in the region. Washington proposed future financial aid totalling US \$3.5 million per annum to the federation over the next four years plus loans of approximately US \$8 million to Trinidad and Jamaica. Agreement having been reached at the same time over US bases, it was also suggested that US help might be given to develop the military and naval facilities of the federation (141). United States' financial assistance to the West Indies up to 1964 was intended to match, pound for pound, that granted by the United Kingdom, although it was a formula that Washington did not want divulged to West Indian politicians. The Treasury meanwhile was concerned at the 'generous and preferential share of total U.K./U.S. resources available for all under-developed countries' being directed to the West Indies. The West Indies would become accustomed to receiving a 'disproportionate level of aid' which would create problems for the federation of dependent expectation, and for future United Kingdom overseas aid policy when there were so many demands from other areas for assistance. In the circumstances British aid to the West Indies should be tapered down after 1964 (144).

In February 1961 Hugh Fraser, parliamentary under-secretary of state at the CO, visited the West Indies. While in no way underestimating the difficulties which lay ahead, his April appreciation about the prospects for federation was generally optimistic. On aid he believed that the UK might have to offer more and for longer in grant-in-aid to the smaller territories, a notion hotly contested by Sir William Gorell Barnes, the joint deputy under-secretary of state, on the grounds of the UK's own straitened financial circumstances (148). But despite Fraser's optimism, the CO was by now taking no chances and already planning to cover all eventualities. In April 1961 a draft memorandum was prepared for the Cabinet Colonial Policy Committee which anticipated the options for UK policy should the Jamaican referendum result

in a vote against continued membership with Jamaica then seceding. The memorandum summarised Britain's position:

The Caribbean is an area of the world where there are no vital United Kingdom interests and few strategic considerations, and where our fundamental aim in the area since 1945 has been political disengagement. This being so our principal objective following secession by Jamaica must be to avoid any situation which results in our being left with any of the present federated territories on our hands for which we can see no obvious future except as colonies (147).

This draft was never submitted, possibly because of the risk of a leak. But the sentences from it quoted above encapsulate the two aims of British policy in the periods both before and after the referendum in Jamaica.

Attention now shifted to the proceedings of the resumed inter-governmental conference at Trinidad in May 1961 which assembled to consider the reports of the Alpha and Orion working parties. Chaired by John Mordecai, the Alpha group provided the IGC with detailed estimates of a weak and decentralised federation and a strong centralised system. It was increasingly clear that the former would prevail. The resumed conference also revealed sharp differences over freedom of movement. Trinidad firmly opposed the working party proposal that freedom of movement should remain on the exclusive list with territories retaining concurrent powers until the end of 1966. Williams's counter-proposal, that freedom of movement remain on the exclusive list but not be exercised by the federal government during the nine years following independence and that this be linked with an approach to the British government for financial aid, was narrowly accepted by six votes to five (149). As Hailes reported, the atmosphere of the IGC was 'thunderous'. Jamaica's insistence that no item be taken off the reserve list without the consent of two-thirds of the population/electorate of the federation, effectively giving Jamaica a veto, was deferred to a full constitutional conference which was scheduled to meet at Lancaster House in London towards the end of the month. The IGC also discussed the position of the small islands in relation to the federation. The CO was anxious not to be left with a residue of financially dependent territories such as the Caymans, Turks and Caicos and the British Virgin Islands. Alternative strategies were considered to take account of the wishes of the inhabitants (145, 150).

The Lancaster House conference opened on 31 May 1961 and the proceedings were dominated by two main problems: amendment of the reserve list and freedom of movement. On the first Macleod proposed a compromise which eliminated the reserve list but which still left Jamaica in a strong position over income tax and industrial development. On the second Barbados especially threatened to make freedom of movement a breaking-point but the position adopted at the Trinidad IGC was confirmed. The conference also accepted the IGC decision that in the first five years of independence the federal government should raise finance by customs dues on a limited number of items. An insistent demand throughout was the need for substantial financial aid from Britain (153). At the end of the gruelling and acrimonious two weeks of discussions, the conference report was far from unanimous; individual delegations recorded their own points of dissent and the split between Manley and Williams had deepened and become virtually unbridgeable.

Two days after the end of the conference Britain announced that if the constitution was ratified the federation would become independent on 31 May 1962, to be

followed six weeks later by a second round of federal elections. The conference had fallen far short of CO expectations and for officials it was a depressing experience to witness such a marked lack of enthusiasm for the federal cause. The CO wanted local legislatures as soon as possible to indicate their support for the Lancaster House agreement. In a circular to governors seeking this support, A R Thomas, an assistant under-secretary of state, alluded to the fears of the smaller islands that the agreement would leave them financially worse off. As a means of placating them it had been agreed to send an Economic Aid Mission, the US and Canada being associated with the UK, to the grant-aided Leeward and Windward Islands (193). On the political front, a further conference with representatives of the Leewards and Windwards was held in London shortly after Lancaster House to consider parity of status between units when the federation became independent. Spokesmen for the islands pressed for immediate constitutional change but the CO resisted arguing that this must be conditional on the federation becoming independent (156).

Britain's interest in joining the European Common Market took Lord Perth, the minister of state at the Colonial Office, to Trinidad for discussions with federal ministers and local chambers of commerce in July 1961, a month after the Lancaster House conference. Earlier, in March 1957, two days after the signature of the Treaty of Rome, a West Indian delegation arrived in London to join with other colonial deputations to discuss the implications for trade of the European Economic Community and Britain's counter-proposal for a European Free Trade Area. West Indian reluctance to be associated with a European free trade system was largely determined by the British Caribbean's heavy reliance upon sugar exports, particularly to Canada, and the impact of the proposals on the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement (54). Perth encountered the same concern in 1961, the fear being that Britain's membership of the Common Market would threaten the export of West Indian primary products. The preferential position of sugar within the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement remained crucial and the export of citrus, bananas, cocoa, bauxite and aluminium, and oil were also important. British adherence to a European customs union or free trade association would also impinge on West Indian trade with Canada. Perth assured federal ministers that Britain would not join the Common Market without first consulting Commonwealth countries. He reported that an impression was abroad that Britain was prepared to sacrifice the Commonwealth and the West Indies in favour of Europe (154, 196, 199).

As the issue of Europe assumed growing significance in the UK's relations with the Caribbean so too did the question of immigration. West Indian immigration to Britain fluctuated in the late 1950s but increased in 1960–1961. Attempts by the CO to persuade West Indian governments to reduce the flow of immigrants were ultimately unsuccessful, although a CO minute in June 1960 stated that the solution lay not with Caribbean administrations but with the British government which could either keep an open door or pass legislation to restrict entry (129, 142). As West Indian immigration increased in early 1961 it was accompanied by intensified demands for restriction from some Conservative MPs and sections of the press. Ministers decided that if legislation were needed, it should not be introduced until after the decision of the Jamaican referendum in September 1961 and preferably also West Indian independence (152). However, the CO continued to oppose restriction on colonial subjects as unjustified and unnecessary and likely to be racially

discriminatory and thus damaging to relations with The West Indies Federation (155, 160). Legislation to restrict Commonwealth immigration was announced in the Queen's speech in October 1961. In face of protests by the federal government the Bill, which Macleod said he detested, became law in July 1962 (164). The prospect of the new law led to a surge of immigrants into Britain from the West Indies and South Asia in 1961–1962. Although the legislation regulated and reduced the number of coloured immigrants, the large demand for job vouchers in the Caribbean and Asia indicated that many more people wished to enter Britain to work. In opposition the Labour Party had opposed controls. When it took power in the autumn of 1964 coloured immigration had become a major political issue and tighter controls were sought. It was hoped that this could be achieved by Caribbean and other Commonwealth countries adopting self-regulating measures. To this end Lord Mountbatten visited the Caribbean in May 1965 for discussions with the Jamaican and Trinidad governments (232). Neither government was prepared to agree to such measures. In August 1965, the Labour government's White Paper, *Immigration from the Commonwealth*,⁴⁷ introduced tighter rules of entry for coloured immigrants by reducing the number of vouchers. At the same time a Race Relations Act was introduced which prohibited incitement to race hatred.

The Jamaican referendum held on 19 September 1961 delivered a fatal blow to CO hopes for the federation. In a poll of sixty per cent, just over half the voters said 'no' to federation. A good deal of the support for Bustamante's campaign in favour of secession had come from voters in the rural areas (163). Macleod, in a minute to Macmillan, called the result 'a most grievous blow to the federal ideal... It is certain that the Federation cannot continue in its present form and must be doubtful whether it can survive at all.' The CO now expected Jamaica to leave the federation and demand independence, to be followed by Trinidad, and for London these demands would be difficult to resist. The secretary of state described as 'dismal' the prospect that the UK might be left with indefinite financial responsibility for the small islands (158). Manley refused to resign office or hold an election, as the opposition demanded, but Jamaica's course was set not only by the referendum result but also by Bustamante's demand for independence on 23 May 1962. The bi-partisan approach to independence which Manley wished to follow did not materialise (159). At the end of September Manley and his ministers arrived in London for discussions with the CO on Jamaican independence (165). From Washington the CO's representative reported that the State Department was 'both disappointed and bewildered' by the referendum result. Ominously the prospect of US aid to the federation was now in the balance (161). Further evidence of West Indian uncertainties was provided by a report from Hochoy in late September, on a resolution passed at a recent PNM convention which gave Williams a free hand over the future of the federation. Even before the referendum Williams was said to be thoroughly disillusioned with the federal project (157). Now, in response to the referendum result, Hochoy reported that he was likely 'to shy away from consideration of any questions on Federation' and 'to seek independence for Trinidad and Tobago at the earliest possible date' (162).

Jamaica's decision to secede from the federation led to a period of confusion and uncertainty in the Colonial Office. London acknowledged that Jamaica could become independent and grudgingly conceded that Trinidad might also follow. In September, Adams and his ministers came to London to discuss ways of keeping the federation

together. For economic and political reasons the CO was equally concerned to maintain a federal system in the Eastern Caribbean. Amongst several considered, two main options emerged: a federation of nine to include Trinidad as the dominant member in what effectively would be a unitary state, or a federation of eight focused on Barbados and without Trinidad (166). Both options left the islands as a financial burden on Britain when the major purpose of federation had been to avoid this. Perth called for greater clarity over what it was that the UK wanted to achieve before the next move was taken (171). A tougher line on questions of financial aid to the small islands was urged on London (167, 173) and the CO looked to the prime minister to persuade the Americans not to withdraw from their pledges on aid (174), a task in which he did not succeed. In January 1962 Reginald Maudling, the new secretary of state, visited the West Indies to assess the chances of what remained of the federation surviving. His arrival coincided with a decision by Williams's PNM, which had won a substantial majority in the elections a month before, in favour of separate independence. When Maudling reported this back in London it was accepted by the Cabinet Colonial Policy Committee in the hope that it might still be possible to group some of the islands with Trinidad, a remote prospect given that politicians in Barbados and the Leewards and Windwards were suspicious of Eric Williams and wary of becoming subservient to Trinidad (178).

As the CO grappled with policy options for the small islands, Arthur Lewis, the distinguished economist and vice-chancellor of the University College of the West Indies, put himself at the disposal of the federal government. He too, after discussions with Williams, had earlier proposed a unitary state under Trinidad dressed up as a federation (168), the scheme that was preferred by the CRO (188). But the price likely to be demanded by Williams—said to be as much as £71 million over ten years (166)—was prohibitive. Besides, Williams was now in a mood which was both combative and unaccommodating and his antagonism was directed against the US as well as the UK (176). Following further talks with Trinidad's premier, Lewis concluded that the Trinidad option for the small islands was no longer viable. He drew up a plan for an Eastern Caribbean federation without Trinidad and made a strong plea for the continuance of regional common services (177). A conference of ministers from Barbados, and the Leeward and Windward Islands met in Barbados from 26 February to 3 March 1962 and recommended the creation of a 'Federation of Eight'. Simultaneously, in London, The West Indies Federation was formally dissolved by the West Indies Act, 1962. Officials discussed whether it was right for the UK to contribute to the deficit of the now defunct federation, some arguing that the UK had other and more important financial priorities (183).

Maudling endorsed the proposal for a new East Caribbean federation but insisted that it should have greater central power and federal control over income tax. Along with his officials, the secretary of state doubted that the UK would be able to reduce its grant-in-aid to the new federation to the figure of £1.76m per annum, a sum projected by Lewis and calculated upon the basis of price stability and an increased volume of exports from the Eight (187). Nevertheless, the Federation of Eight was formally agreed by the Marlborough House conference of 9–24 May. Differences remained between the unit governments over constitutional questions and parity of status, but agreement was achieved for a customs union, a unified public service, and the direction of all aid through the federal government. Maudling described the conference as 'quite promising' and he hoped independence could be achieved in

1963 (194). However, in view of various financial scandals in Grenada and Antigua (195, 205), he was pessimistic about the economic and political future of the federation. As with the old one, the CO recognised that the new federation would remain financially dependent upon Britain for some time after independence (204).

The Federation of Eight was taken a step further with the creation of a Regional Council of Ministers to represent the islands. But fissures were already beginning to appear in the edifice and Errol Barrow, the premier of Barbados, the most prosperous and politically most stable of the island states, announced that it would be best if a customs union was established first (201). The most serious opposition came from Grenada. Owing to financial irregularities, Eric Gairy's government was dismissed and the island's constitution suspended in June 1962. The September elections were won by the Grenada National Party which had campaigned for a unitary state with Trinidad (203). Grenada withdrew completely from the Regional Council of Ministers and exploratory talks began with the Trinidad government in October. After protracted discussions spread over three years, public hostility in Trinidad and Tobago to such a union ended the idea.

Until the autumn of 1965 Britain clung to the hope that a federation of seven or eight might materialise in the Eastern Caribbean. Inter-island discussions seemed only to exacerbate rivalries: shortly before the Barbados conference to finalise federation planned for May 1963, the Antigua government announced that it could not adhere to the proposed scheme. At one time or another most governments questioned the extent of central federal power with only St Lucia being prepared to accept arrangements which closely resembled a unitary state. When Anthony Greenwood, the secretary of state in Harold Wilson's Labour government, visited the islands in early 1965, he found little interest for or against the federal proposal, but having considered various alternatives, he was still inclined to pursue federation as the best policy option for the UK (230). Such optimism did not long survive. Antigua opted out of the federal discussions in April and a few months later the Barbados legislature agreed that the island should proceed to independence before further consideration was given to federation. In September 1965 the CO finally admitted that efforts for an Eastern Caribbean federation had broken down.

Most of the Leeward and Windward islands demanded self-government but few wanted total independence if it meant the loss of British financial aid. In the period following the Cuban missile crisis (1962), when the US had asserted its traditional hegemony in the Caribbean, the policy dilemma for the British remained stark. How were they to deal with their remaining small and economically poor colonies in the Caribbean in a way that would satisfy the strategic and political interests of the US on the one hand, and convince the anti-colonial lobby at the United Nations on the other? The US was reluctant to see a British withdrawal from the region if that might lead to the emergence of 'little Haiti's or Cuba's' and 'communist' penetration in the region (220). The CO's solution, part of a much wider policy initiative which aimed to deal with the future constitutional status of smaller territories more generally, was to suggest associated status for the Eastern Caribbean islands with the exception of the small and economically weak Montserrat. Associated status would give full internal self-government with Britain retaining responsibility for defence and external affairs, but at the same time it would remove the 'colonial stigma' from each island (234). A conference spread over February to May 1966 agreed the principles of associated status (249, 251) and Britain sought US support for this new 'voluntary

association with Britain' (235, 250). To be certain that the UK had the means to fulfil its continuing responsibilities, and to meet US anxieties, the Foreign Office insisted that a three-quarters majority would be needed in votes both in the legislative assembly and a referendum before an island could only change its associated status constitution (256). Of the Eastern Caribbean islands, Barbados alone was thought by the CO to be economically suited for independence, a status which it achieved after an election at the end of November 1966 (253).

In that US interests were a prime consideration in the arrangements made for associated status, the colony causing most concern to Washington was British Guiana where Cheddi Jagan's left-wing People's Progressive Party had been returned to office after the election of August 1961.⁴⁸ Although, in principle, independence for the colony had been conceded at the constitutional conference of 1960 (135), British ministers were aware that the US would not wish to see a 'communist' regime established in the British Caribbean. They were equally concerned that Congress would be unlikely to approve aid to the colonies should that occur. Thus London consulted closely with Washington over developments in British Guiana. What happened in the territory was not only a matter of UK colonial policy; it also had 'bearing on general Anglo/Americans relations' (175). In February 1962 riots occurred in Georgetown, the capital of British Guiana, in protest at austerity plans introduced by Jagan's government. The local police force, which was weak and predominantly African, was not trusted by the PPP government so Jagan was forced to ask for British military aid to help restore order. In view of what London saw as racial unrest in the colony, independence scheduled for later that year was postponed (185). Following the riots Macmillan and Home, now the foreign secretary, took a dim view of attempts by Dean Rusk, the US secretary of state, to dictate that Jagan 'should not to accede to power again' in British Guiana (180–182). Hugh Fraser was sent to Georgetown to investigate and at the same time to try to resolve the political differences between Jagan and his opponents in order to prepare the way for the independence constitution. Returning via Washington he had talks with President Kennedy and other senior figures about strategy in British Guiana. In London Fraser recommended to the secretary of state that consideration be given to fresh elections under proportional representation in the colony before independence was granted (184).

An independent British Guiana clearly needed an adequate internal security force. London urged that the armed police should be reformed and expanded with an increased Asian element to represent the racial divide in the colony. Contrary to this advice, Jagan's government proposed a battalion-strong military force and a 'Home Guard' which were beyond the colony's revenues (189). The CO regarded the scheme as combining 'expense and inefficiency', an attempt to create a 'politically reliable force' similar to Castro's militia.⁴⁹ The Treasury would not sanction additional money for an army, and Duncan Sandys, Maudling's successor at the CO, argued that if the British Guiana government would not expand the police then British policy would be 'no action to help' (202). When Jagan turned to Israel for help with the militia the US, also hostile to the British Guiana scheme, pressed Tel Aviv not to get involved. The difference between Georgetown and London outlasted Jagan's government and in September 1965 the new administration of Forbes Burnham, Jagan's erstwhile ally but chief political opponent since 1957, came down in favour of a military rather than an expanded police force (237). By then, however, Britain viewed the colony's political order in a much more favourable light.

As elsewhere in the Caribbean, Britain had no essential interests in British Guiana and was anxious to disengage as soon as possible. But the territory needed investment on a scale which Britain alone could not provide and the US would countenance neither aid nor independence while Jagan remained in power. A nine-week strike in the colony in April–May 1963 resulted in London proroguing the legislature. Britain was more prepared than the US to contemplate independence under Jagan but if he had to be removed and direct UK rule reinstated, which was what the US desired, the UK insisted that Washington should be more forthcoming over aid and more supportive at the UN (214, 215). However, Jagan and the PPP were increasingly viewed in London as the reasons why the UK could not withdraw and in the autumn of 1963, in close consultation with the Kennedy administration, the UK embarked on a strategy which was designed to oust Jagan. Spurning the latter's offer of neutrality (216), Duncan Sandys summoned a resumed constitutional conference in London. In the face of the expected absence of agreement amongst the contending political parties, he imposed a solution based upon a change to proportional representation in the electoral system, ostensibly 'to counteract racism' in the colony's politics. Elections under the new system were to be held as a prelude to independence (217). The strategy did not, as expected, provoke an immediate crisis with Jagan but further unrest in British Guiana during the first half of 1964, on a much larger scale than hitherto, resulted in a state of emergency being declared in June. The secretary of state now suggested that the three major political leaders might be detained and even deported, a drastic remedy which was opposed both by the governor and the permanent under-secretary of state at the CO (221). The Labour Party condemned the measures implemented under the emergency but within a few months of an angry exchange in the House of Commons (223), Labour was in power with a slim majority.

Harold Wilson, the new prime minister, met Jagan at the end of October and insisted that elections would have to be held under the new system and that there could be no question of independence until the political parties had demonstrated their willingness to co-operate (224). The British Guiana elections, supervised by a team of Commonwealth observers, were held on 7 December 1964. The PPP won nearly 46 per cent of the vote but the rival PNC and United Force gained 53 per cent and agreed to form a coalition with Burnham as premier. Jagan refused to resign, was dismissed by the governor, and thereafter he and his PPP boycotted the House of Assembly. Greenwood visited the colony in early 1965 and reported favourably upon the coalition led by Burnham. Independence, he suggested, might now be granted in 1966 (231). The Cabinet secretary urged caution because of possible adverse reactions in the US and in October 1965 Greenwood visited Washington to discuss British Guiana in the wider context of colonial policy more generally (235). Simultaneously, and in the wake of a report by the International Commission of Jurists on racial imbalance in the public services of the colony (236), arrangements were made for an independence conference in London. This Jagan refused to attend despite the urgings of the British prime minister (239).

Internal security in British Guiana remained a concern for London. The police force was still weak and in process of reform while the new army, to which London had eventually agreed, would not be effective until October 1966. It was feared that there might be either a renewed outbreak of violence in the colony or an attempt by the PPP to seize power. Burnham asked that British troops remain in the colony after independence, which was also what the Americans wanted (235). Greenwood

endorsed this and the Cabinet ministers most directly involved eventually agreed that a British military presence should remain in the colony for three months after independence (237–238, 241, 243–244). British Guiana, renamed as Guyana, finally became independent in May 1966 (246). Burnham had been anxious to secure a defence agreement with Britain in order to help protect the country from Venezuelan territorial claims. His request was refused (245) but in February 1966 the FO secured agreement with Venezuela over the disputed border area and thus removed a British defence problem in the region (247).

It had long been acknowledged in London that Britain had no strategic interests in the Caribbean and the few remaining defence commitments to dependencies and associated states could be met mainly by the Royal Navy. A potential threat was seen in Guatemala's continuing claim to British Honduras, a colony which London increasingly viewed as an embarrassing and costly possession (186). A small detachment of British troops remained to protect the colony and Stanley Field, near Belize, was extended to take strategic aircraft (191). By early 1964 British Honduras had become internally self-governing (242). Independence was a long-term aim and London viewed a greater US commitment in terms both of defence and economic aid as the only hope for this financially dependent colony.

The economic and financial issues, which had so dominated the negotiations to establish a federation in the West Indies, continued to the end of the period covered by this volume. For the governments of the two islands which achieved independence in 1962, two such issues were vital: the question of future trade relations should Britain join the European Economic Community (EEC) or the European Free Trade Area (EFTA),⁵⁰ and what they might gain financially from the UK by way of an independence settlement. Both the federal and the unit governments had been anxious about Britain joining the EEC and this increased in the second half of 1961 as discussions continued in London and Brussels. West Indian fears were well placed as Britain was their largest export market. For example, two-thirds of Jamaica's sugar crop (also a temperate crop), the price of which was protected and inflated by the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement, went to Britain, as did most bananas and ninety per cent of citrus fruit (196). The West Indian islands feared that they might be cut loose by Britain while the Commonwealth Immigrants Bill, currently before the House of Commons, was seen by Williams especially as an attempt to exclude West Indian labour in order to accommodate EEC membership and free movement of European labour (169, 172). Although Trinidad was less reliant on the UK market than Jamaica, Williams was certainly concerned about future trade and, for all his public rhetoric, he viewed Britain as a political counterpoise to US influence in the Caribbean (199, 200).⁵¹ Until such time as the French president, Charles de Gaulle, vetoed Britain's application in 1963 to join the EEC, London's aim was to pursue closer economic ties with Europe and at the same time to try to gain a favoured position for the exports of the West Indian islands in the countries of the Six. Thereafter Britain fell back on EFTA but officials advised against a surprise approach made unofficially by a minister in the Jamaican government that Jamaica might be admitted as a member (211–212).

The financial negotiations for independence settlements with Jamaica and Trinidad were far from harmonious. Both countries presented demands which UK ministers and officials regarded as excessive. While neither country came away empty handed, both were awarded much less than they had wanted or what they thought

they were entitled to. For Williams especially Trinidad's award was an insult and at first he refused to accept it. He spoke publicly his differences with the UK and the financial issue was not resolved until the end of 1963 (197–198, 206–207, 209). But for all the acrimony, it was not expected that Trinidad would break ranks with the West at a time of heightened Cold War. Just over a year into independence, the UK high commissioner in Port of Spain reported favourably on Trinidad's foreign policy although both he, and his counterpart in Kingston, were rather more circumspect in their assessments of the prospects for the domestic economies of the first two additions to the Commonwealth in the Caribbean (210, 218). Relations between Jamaica and Trinidad were also the subject of correspondence. According to UK officials, the ambitious plans which Williams had for development in the Caribbean were not always to the liking of ministers in Kingston. Relations became increasingly strained, for reasons which serve in part as retrospective judgments on why the West Indies Federation failed (225, 227).

The UK could not be other than disappointed in its efforts to disengage from the Caribbean by involving the US and Canada in aid policies to the region. Of the two, Canada was the more reliable but strings were attached in that Canadian aid was tied and the overall Canadian aid budget was much smaller than commonly assumed (193, 208). The US was still more of a disappointment, especially when, in response to the collapse of the original federation, the offer to match pound for pound UK aid was withdrawn. For all its concerns about instability and an outbreak of 'mini states' in the Caribbean—ideally the US wanted the UK to remain in the region (220)—it was not until the end of 1964 that the State Department suggested a more constructive approach based upon a renewal of American aid. By this time US officialdom was beginning to resolve its own bureaucratic differences over responsibility for dealing with the English-speaking Caribbean (255) and it was now suggested that the UK and the US, in association with Canada, should sponsor a yet further study to determine the economic needs of the region. The response from UK officials varied. Some at the Overseas Development Ministry, established in October 1964 to take from the Department of Technical Co-operation responsibility for technical assistance and development (functions which the CO had surrendered in 1961), were sceptical. Others from the same department were more enthusiastic and viewed the US proposals as an opportunity which was too good to be missed. The CO shared this latter view. The UK record on aid to the Caribbean compared unfavourably with that of the French and the Dutch to their own territories in the region and if Britain declined to participate in the US initiative its name 'would be mud' (228–229). The resulting tripartite survey produced a report which was hardly original in its findings. Wherever they went in the Caribbean, members of the survey team were told that what was needed was not more paper but cash (255). Meanwhile the UK established its own Development Division in the Caribbean with headquarters in Barbados. In setting up the division officials were concerned that it should not be identified as a 'continuation of colonialism' (233). The first head of the division identified the lack of adequate publicity for Britain's development initiatives as a particular handicap (254).

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By the mid-1960s Britain's political disengagement from the Caribbean increased in pace, but the issues involved remained constant and essentially the same as those

documented in this volume. Most of the larger islands and territories had either become independent, gained self-government or were moving towards that goal. Britain remained politically and economically responsible for the smaller territories most of which had been given associated status. St Kitts-Nevis and the smaller and poorer island of Anguilla became an associated state in early 1967 but the relationship in this union was uneasy. In May 1967 an armed rebellion in Anguilla ejected the administration and in a 'referendum' held two months later the islanders overwhelmingly demanded independence. The premier of St Kitts-Nevis unsuccessfully asked for British military intervention. Britain appointed an administrator to the island in late 1967 but the Anguillians resented London's attempts to maintain the union with St Kitts-Nevis and a year later they again declared their independence. At the repeated request of the premier of St Kitts-Nevis, and to a storm of protest in Britain and the Caribbean at what was seen as a 'colonialist' invasion, British troops occupied the island in March 1969. The affairs of this small island were discussed in the UN and a joint St Kitts-Nevis and British commission of inquiry chaired by Sir Hugh Wooding, a Trinidad judge, was appointed which presented a report to parliament in November 1970.⁵² The commission recommended substantial autonomy for Anguilla which was to remain within the associated state of St Kitts-Nevis. This was unacceptable to the islanders and in June 1971 Britain reluctantly resumed control of Anguilla. In 1980 Anguilla was formally separated from the failed union with St Kitts-Nevis and became a British Dependent Territory with a governor. A new constitution was introduced in 1982.

The Anguilla experience in the late 1960's ended the experiment of associated statehood. British governments recognised that associated status had neither fulfilled its local objective nor satisfied the critics at the UN where it continued to be regarded as a colonial relationship. It was not to be repeated for other smaller territories in what remained of the empire. Elsewhere the choice was between remaining in a colonial relationship, possibly with internal self-government, or progressing to complete independence.

In the Caribbean itself the West Indies Act of 1967 stated that the associated states were able at any time to become independent states. The first of the smaller islands to do so was Grenada which became independent in 1974,⁵³ to be followed by Dominica in 1978, St Lucia and St Vincent in 1979, Antigua in 1981 and St Kitts-Nevis in 1983. A number of smaller islands remained as British Dependent Territories—the Cayman Islands, the British Virgin Islands, Montserrat and the Turks and Caicos Islands—each with a governor and chief minister. Some, such as the Cayman Islands and the British Virgin Islands, were economically successful with off-shore financial operations and tourism. The Turks and Caicos, a Crown colony between 1962 and 1972, was beset by a corruption and narcotics scandal in 1985 and the constitution was suspended by Britain for three years. Montserrat's economic development was severely disrupted by Hurricane Hugo in 1989, while a volcanic eruption in 1996 destroyed Plymouth, the capital town, and the southern part of the island, putting at risk the future welfare of the island's 12,500 inhabitants. The ensuing debate about Montserrat's economic and financial needs, and the extent to which Britain was duty bound to sustain them, echoed the arguments which had been deployed over the island's future nearly thirty years earlier and which are documented in this volume. More positively, the uncertain future of the

Montserratans led Robin Cook, the foreign secretary, to announce in February 1998 that HMG was considering the possibility of granting British citizenship to all the citizens of those Dependent Territories that did not already have it. If implemented this would be extended to about 100,000 people in what would become known as British Overseas Territories around the world. The return to China of Hong Kong and its several million people in July 1997 made such a statement possible.

In British Honduras, British troops were still stationed as a defence against the continued territorial claims by the neighbouring republic of Guatemala. Renamed Belize, the colony became independent in 1981 with Britain maintaining responsibility for defence. At the end of the 1980s, and with US support, Britain continued to keep troops and a few aircraft in Belize at what was then an annual cost of £31 million. With the exception of about 100 troops who remained for the purposes of training local units in jungle warfare, UK forces were withdrawn in 1994. At the time of independence talks were held on a 'Heads of Agreement' designed to resolve Guatemala's claim. However, in 1994 Guatemala reasserted its claim at the UN and the matter remains unresolved.

Throughout, the process of political integration in the Caribbean failed to materialise. The diversity of islands scattered over a wide area, each with its own institutions and jealously guarded interests and political ambitions, made a federation difficult if not impossible to achieve. However, despite the collapse of the federation in 1962 and the failure thereafter to persuade the Eight to federate, a number of inter-island institutions have been maintained and provide a common sense of West Indian unity, most notably the federal University of the West Indies with main campuses in Trinidad, Jamaica and Barbados. Cricket also provides a sense of common identity which in international matches overrides particularism. Concern at economic weakness and vulnerability led to the creation by the former members of the federation of the Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM) in 1973, with the aim of providing free trade, tariff protection for goods produced in the region, and the long-range goal of regional economic integration.

S R Ashton
David Killingray

Notes to Introduction

- 1 British Documents on the End of Empire: series A, vol 1, S R Ashton & S E Stockwell, eds, *Imperial Policy and Colonial Practice 1925–1945* (London, 1996); series A, vol 2, Ronald Hyam, eds, *The Labour government and the end of empire 1945–1951* (London, 1992); series A, vol, 3, David Goldsworthy, ed, *The Conservative government and the end of empire 1951–1957* (1994).
- 2 CO 318/453/18, no 39, CO note of departmental meeting on constitutional reform and federation following Sir C Parkinson's visit to the West Indies, 12 Jan 1943, in Ashton & Stockwell, part I, 67.
- 3 Gordon K Lewis, *The growth of the modern West Indies* (New York, 1968) p 90.
- 4 Quoted in P M Sherlock, *West Indian nations: a new history* (London, 1973) p 293.
- 5 Colonial Office, *West Indies: Report of the Closer Union Commission* (London, April 1933). See also Ashton & Stockwell, eds, part I, p lvii.
- 6 Ashton & Stockwell, eds, part II, p 268 n 2.

- 7 O Nigel Bolland, *On the march: labour rebellions in the British Caribbean, 1934–39* (Kingston and London, 1995). W Arthur Lewis, *Labour in the West Indies: the birth of a workers' movement* (London 1938).
- 8 *H of C Debs*, 1938–1939, vol 337, cols 84 ff, 14 June 1938.
- 9 *Recommendations of the West India Royal Commission* (Cmd 6174, 1940).
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- 13 *West India Royal Commission: Report* (Cmd 6607, June 1945) p 93, recommendation 27.
- 14 CO 852/588/11, no 10, WP(44)643, War Cabinet memo by Stanley, 'Future provision for colonial development and welfare', 15 Nov 1944, reproduced in Ashton & Stockwell, eds, part II, 120.
- 15 The figures are given in Michael Havinden and David Meredith, *Colonialism and development: Britain and its tropical colonies, 1850–1960* (London, 1993), pp 220–225 and 254.
- 16 Ashton and Stockwell, eds, part I, 24.
- 17 *ibid*, 28, 34.
- 18 CO 318/453/18, no 39, CO note of departmental meeting on constitutional reform and federation following Sir C Parkinson's visit to the West Indies, 12 Jan 1943, reproduced in Ashton & Stockwell, eds, part I, 67.
- 19 CO 318/453/18, minute by Rogers, 13 Jan 1944, reproduced in Ashton & Stockwell, eds, part I, 73.
- 20 Among West Indian intellectuals and trade unionists there was growing support for the idea of federation, expressed at some length by the conference of the Caribbean Labour Congress meeting in Barbados in Sept 1945. See *Caribbean Labour Congress: Official Report of Conference held at Barbados from 17th to 27th September 1945*.
- 21 Included as Appendix I to the White Paper on *Closer Association of the British West Indian Colonies* (Cmd 7120, May 1947).
- 22 CO 318/466/2, no 9, memo by Rogers, 'Federation of the West Indies', [12 Feb 1946], reproduced in Hyam, ed, part III, 248.
- 23 CO 318/466/2, record by A M MacKintosh of CO departmental meeting, 4 Sept 1946, reproduced in *ibid*, 249.
- 24 CO 318/466/2, nos 45–48, Creech Jones circular despatch to West Indian governors, 14 Feb 1947, reproduced in *ibid*, 250.
- 25 CO 318/484/2–8 & CO 318/485/1.
- 26 CO 28/342/16, no 1, report by Listowel, [Dec 1949], reproduced in Hyam, ed, *op cit*, part III, 253.
- 27 *Report of the British Guiana and British Honduras Settlement Commission* (Cmd 7533, 1948).
- 28 CO 318/492/2 no 11, Trefgarne to Creech Jones, 4 Oct 1949.
- 29 CO 318/492/1, no 27, Evans to Creech Jones, 28 June 1948.
- 30 CO 318/473/3, no 36, minute by Seel, 4 Nov 1947.
- 31 In his autobiography, Oliver Lyttelton, *The memoirs of Lord Chandos* (London 1962), who became secretary of state for the colonies in Oct 1951, there are chapters on Malaya, the Central African Federation, Kenya and West African questions, but other than the 1953 crisis in British Guiana the West Indies is not mentioned.
- 32 T 220/360, Treasury minute & note by A E Drake, 19 Mar and 30 Mar 1953, & CO brief for ministers, Mar 1953, reproduced in A N Porter & A J Stockwell, eds, *British imperial policy and decolonization 1938–64* vol 2 (London, 1989) pp 219–231.

- 33 *The Plan for a British Caribbean Federation, 1955: 1 Report of the Fiscal Commissioner* (Cmnd 9618), 2 *Report of the Judicial Commissioner* (Cmnd 9620), 3 *Report of the Civil Service Commissioner* (Cmnd 9619).
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- 37 Trevor Munroe, *The cold war and the Jamaican left 1950–55: re-opening the files* (Kingston, 1992) pp 82–85.
- 38 Ian R G Spencer, *British immigration policy since 1939: the making of multi-racial Britain* (London, 1997) pp 53–55. Also Hyam, *The Labour Government* part I, p lxix.
- 39 Figures for the number of immigrants differ from one government department to another; the figures cited here are from the Home Office and are quoted by Spencer, *op cit*, p 90, Tables 3 and 4.
- 40 CAB 124/1191, minute by Lennox-Boyd, 17 Nov 1954.
- 41 PREM 11/824, note by Macmillan to Eden, 'West Indian immigration', 14 Jan 1955, reproduced in Goldsworthy, ed, *op cit*, part III, 523.
- 42 CAB 128/81, CP(56), 22 June 1956.
- 43 CO 1031/2021, nos 1 & 2, minute by Rogers, 29 June 1957.
- 44 This was not a new view; it had been argued in the Trinidad Legislative Council in 1952–1953 during Anglo-American negotiations to release deactivated bases for agricultural purposes. See CO 1031/536, no 48, Rance to Lyttelton, tel, 9 Mar 1952.
- 45 CO 1031/2025, no 264, CO minute by Rogers, 14 Mar 1958.
- 46 See the exchange of letters in Mordecai, *op cit*, pp 254–257.
- 47 Cmnd 1739, 1965.
- 48 See Arthur M Schlesinger, *A thousand days: John F Kennedy in the White House* (New York, 1965) pp 709–713; also, *Foreign Relations of the United States 1961–1963*, Vol XII *American Republics* (Washington, 1996).
- 49 CO 1031/4321, minutes by Huijsman, 5 & 9 Apr 1962, and no 24, CO to Sir R Grey, 14 June 1962.
- 50 The chancellor of the Exchequer in November 1956 announced his intention to try to draw the United Kingdom into an industrial free trade area within Europe. While this was confined to industrial manufactures it did not directly effect the trade of most tropical colonies. However, in late 1956 the French decided that the dependent overseas territories of the six European nations should be included in the European Common Market. The European Free Trade Area, with Britain as a member, was established in November 1959. See Catherine R Schenk, 'Decolonization and European economic integration: the Free Trade Area negotiations, 1956–58', *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 24 (1996), pp 444–463, although this ignores the interests of the West Indies.
- 51 Eric Williams, *Inward hunger: the education of a prime minister* (London, 1969) pp 289–91, provides the Trinidad view of the EEC.
- 52 *Report of the Commission of Inquiry appointed by the Governments of the United Kingdom and St. Christopher-Nevis-Anguilla to examine the Anguilla problem* (Cmnd 4510, 1970). See also, D J Morgan, *The official history of colonial development vol 5 Guidance towards self-government in British colonies 1941–1971* (London, 1980) pp 279–287.
- 53 Continuing US security concerns in the Caribbean led the Reagan administration, without consulting London, to launch an invasion of Grenada in 1983 to oust a left-wing government.

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1 LAB 13/42

5 Mar 1948

[Colonial labour in UK]: letter from Sir T Lloyd to Sir G Ince¹ suggesting that the British labour shortage and the problem of unemployment in the West Indies might be partly addressed by employing colonial labour in the UK

In looking through the minutes of the Labour Committee of the Cabinet, one cannot help but be impressed by what is being done to adjust the manpower position of the United Kingdom by employment of volunteers from European countries and by the resettlement of displaced persons.

2. As you know, my Secretary of State is not a member of the Labour Committee and it seems to us that the question of ways and means by which the surplus manpower of certain Colonies could be used to assist the manpower situation here might well be worth the consideration of that Committee. I think you will agree that this is a matter which could be of mutual benefit both to the Colonies and the United Kingdom.

3. There is a very definite unemployment problem in most of the West Indian Colonies, in particular in Jamaica, where the number of unemployed has been roughly estimated to be from 40,000 to 50,000; also in Barbados who are asking us to consider a proposal to import a number of women domestic workers to work in hospitals. In Malta there is an undoubted surplus of labour—local unemployed run into over 1,000 and the number is steadily increasing as a result of discharges from the dockyard, which derive in turn from the retrenchment in United Kingdom naval expenditure. The pressure to leave Malta in search of work is so intense that the new Malta Government have appointed a special Minister in charge of Emigration. Some Maltese are going to the Dominions but the flow does not yet meet the demand. St. Helena too is most anxious to secure employment in this country for a few hundred agriculturalists. Cyprus also would like us to take a few Cypriot miners who have volunteered for the coal mines.

4. There has been correspondence about the workers from the West Indies and St. Helena with Bevan² of your Overseas Department who has been of the greatest assistance in helping us to formulate proposals and is aware generally of the difficulties which we are up against in the form of opposition from the Trades Unions as well as from other Government Departments and employers.

5. We have been thinking of getting a reliable survey made of surplus labour in the Colonies, but the machinery to compile manpower statistics overseas is primitive, since the facilities afforded by unemployment insurance returns do not exist. It could, I think, be done nevertheless, and in this connexion the model form of Annual Labour report (in preparing which your representatives on the Colonial Labour Advisory Committee helped us) will yield some results. But great care would be necessary to avoid the raising of expectations that could not be fulfilled. I mean of course expectations of schemes of absorption in the United Kingdom. Already Ministerial statements on the labour needs of this country have raised the hopes of thousands of Jamaicans of finding employment here.

¹ Permanent secretary, Ministry of Labour and National Service, 1944–1956.

² M A Bevan, assistant secretary, Overseas Dept, Ministry of Labour and National Service.

6. One realises the complications in the United Kingdom of settling in employment peoples of other races, as we have found to our cost in attempts with your Ministry to place some of the many unemployed Colonial people who are already in this country and are continually arriving in small groups to seek employment here. There are over 1,000 unemployed in the London, South Wales and North Western areas and we are at present responsible for their maintenance under the Special Scheme for the Assistance of Colonials which is worked by the Assistance Board on our behalf. This scheme will cease when the National Insurance scheme comes into operation, but the human problem of the unemployment of these people will remain with its unfortunate repercussions in the Colonies where it is difficult to explain unemployment among such Colonials who come here in the face of repeated statements by Ministers about shortages of labour. I am well aware that there is a good explanation for this state of affairs but it is not easy to put it over to the Colonies and one cannot help but feel that some concerted plan for the employment of unemployed Colonials in Britain might be devised if we can persuade the Coal Board and other industries to accept them as an Imperial responsibility.

7. The object of this letter is then to get your views on the matter generally and whether you think that it would be of help to us and to your Ministry to introduce a paper on the subject of the employment of Colonials in this country to the Labour Committee of the Cabinet.

8. There is, of course, another aspect to the problem of surplus labour in the Colonies, namely its employment in other Colonies which may have deficiencies (e.g. North Borneo) or even in foreign countries (e.g. West Indians in the U.S.A.) but as this does not to any great extent affect the United Kingdom as such I have not dealt with it in this letter. I mention it merely to show that we have not overlooked it.

2 CO 318/491/1, no 4

Mar 1948

'West Indies: proposal for an increase in the garrison force': joint memorandum by Mr Bevin and Mr Creech Jones

1. In the light of recent developments in the dispute with Guatemala over British Honduras we have been reviewing the position in regard to British Forces in the West Indies.

2. *Naval Forces.* There is no British Naval Base in the West Indies. These Colonies fall within the Command of the C. in C., America and West Indies Station, whose H.Q. is in Bermuda. His fleet is understood to consist of one Cruiser, three Escort vessels and two auxiliary craft.

Military Forces. A British battalion less one company, is normally stationed in Jamaica. A detachment from this battalion has just been sent to British Honduras. The remaining company is stationed in Bermuda. The only other regular military unit in the region is a weak battalion of Jamaica Infantry, about 600 all ranks, which is not available for service outside Jamaica. Part-time forces, on the model of the Territorial Force in this country, are being raised in Trinidad, British Guiana and British Honduras, but they are still in the early stages of formation and training and are not liable for service outside their respective Colonies.

Air Forces. There are no British Air Forces of any kind in the West Indies.

3. It would be foolish to deny that, in the last resort, the security of our position in the West Indies rests on the undoubted wish of the vast majority of the inhabitants to remain within the Commonwealth, and on the goodwill of the United States. Nevertheless, recent events force us to conclude that reliance on these factors, and the general desire to reduce our military commitments, have affected our dispositions in the Caribbean to a degree which can no longer be considered politic or safe. There is no doubt that the Guatemalan Government have deliberately inflamed public feeling in their country over their claim to British Honduras,¹ which, though of long standing, has not hitherto given rise to popular excitement or demonstrations on the scale recently experienced. They are now seeking the support of other Latin American States in a policy of "America for the Americans" which is coupled with the usual attacks on British Imperialism, and are understood to be proposing to put forward a resolution on these lines at the forthcoming Conference at Bogota. They are already assured of support from the Argentine and Chile, and other Latin American countries are also likely to join them, in particular Venezuela, which has in the past had boundary claims against British Guiana. It must therefore be expected that the agitation will continue, with the likelihood of a high political temperature from time to time in the Latin American countries and the possibility of frontier incidents. Obviously, these are questions of great delicacy, needing most careful handling. But the absence of any effective defence forces in the British Colonies, being interpreted as evidence of weakness on our part, offers a standing incitement to such incidents.

4. The West Indian Colonies value the British connection, and would welcome any indication that we are ready and able to give them more effective protection against encroachment. At the same time, the question of internal security within those Colonies will continue during the next few years to cause us concern. In recent times there have been serious disturbances in Jamaica, Trinidad, the Bahamas and the Leeward Islands. The economic resources of the islands are slender; the rate of increase of their population is high. Therefore, although efforts are being continuously made to develop their trade and agriculture (we are at present awaiting the report of a Development Commission on British Guiana and British Honduras),²

¹ See 91, note.

² *Report of the British Guiana and British Honduras Settlement Commission* (chairman, Sir Geoffrey Evans) Cmd 7533, 1948. Appointed by the CO to examine the economic potential of British Guiana and British Honduras and their prospects of further settlement in attracting surplus labour from the West Indian islands, the Evans Commission reported that no settlement would be possible without a policy of vigorous economic development. The commissioners therefore regarded themselves as in effect a development commission and made recommendations accordingly. Their proposals involved investment of between £15 and £20 million over a ten-year period, during which time they anticipated that the two territories might be able to absorb 100,000 people. The Colonial Development Corporation was invited to participate in the specific schemes recommended by the commission but it soon became apparent that the obstacles to development were much more serious than expected. Lord Listowel, who visited the West Indies in 1949, reported back: 'I found no well informed person in the West Indies who supported the view that 100,000 immigrants can be absorbed within ten years, or that the large volume of capital investment to sustain their labour will be forthcoming during this period' (CO 318/510/5, no 3). Lord Trefgarne, chairman of the CDC, informed Creech Jones in Oct 1949 that, 'For us to contemplate investment in schemes of the magnitude proposed would be grossly out of scale with the claims of other colonies both in the financial sums to be committed and in the severe administrative burden on the Corporation' (CO 318/492/2, no 11, Trefgarne to Creech Jones, 4 Oct 1949).

the underlying causes for these disturbances are likely to persist for some time, and the possibility that military forces may from time to time be required to assist the police in maintaining order is a real one. The Governor of Jamaica in particular has on more than one occasion expressed grave concern at the serious situation which may develop if the Colony is left without a garrison of British troops, or when, as at present, that garrison is drawn upon for the security of other Colonies in the region. The Acting Governor of the Leeward Islands is anxious at the absence of effective means of dealing with disorder which may arise from the present strikes in Antigua and St. Kitts.

5. In these circumstances it is in our view essential that the forces should be adequate to deal with any threat to security which is likely to develop whether from external or internal sources, until reinforcements, which if required would have to be sent from the U.K., could arrive: and also to provide visible evidence—as a warning to the South American States and a reassurance to the people of our own Colonies—of the intention of H.M.G. to make no territorial concessions to threats. In the light of recent events, the very small forces at present available in this area cannot be regarded as sufficient for these purposes.

6. A proposal that the British garrison should be strengthened was considered by the Chiefs of Staff in 1946, at the request of the Colonial Office. Although the Chiefs of Staff did not question the desirability of an increase in the garrison they felt unable “in view of the manpower shortage and conditions elsewhere” at that time to provide the necessary additional forces. We consider that in the circumstances which have now developed since 1946 this decision should be reviewed, and that the permanent British garrison in the Caribbean area should be raised to two Battalions (less one company in Bermuda).

7. We also feel that the question of raising a regular West Indian Military Force available for general service should be revived. There have been such forces in the past, namely the West India Regiment (which was a regular unit of the British Army), the British West Indies Regiment, disbanded in 1927, and the Caribbean Regiment, formed during the recent war and also recently disbanded. Apart from its military value—and with the facilities for training with British troops there is no reason why it should not compare favourably in this respect with other regular Colonial forces—a regiment of this character would have a most valuable political influence. It would give the West Indian Colonies an opportunity of participating directly in Imperial defence, would strengthen the political bonds between the peoples of the Colonies and of the U.K., and would assist in maintaining British prestige especially in those Colonies where the United States have bases. It would also contribute towards a solution of the unemployment, which in the more seriously overpopulated islands creates acute economic, social and political problems both for the Colonial Governments and for H.M. Government.

8. The difficulties in the way of this proposal are wholly financial. The West Indian Governments could not afford to maintain a regiment of this kind from their own resources, though they would be willing to contribute towards the cost. The War Office, when this matter was considered in 1947, did not feel that the proposal could command sufficient priority to qualify for assistance from the limited funds at their disposal. We understand that the cost of maintaining a West Indian Battalion would be in the neighbourhood of £160,000 a year. The West Indian Governments are about to be approached with a request for a larger contribution to Imperial defence, and if

this request were coupled with a proposal to revive a West Indian Regiment there should be a better prospect of the Governments agreeing amongst themselves to contribute a substantial proportion of the cost. In any case it is our view that the present situation justifies whatever expense may be required to enable this proposal to be carried into effect, whether the U.K. contribution is found from the War Office or from some other Vote.

9. We therefore recommend:—

(a) that the British garrison in the West Indies should be increased by one Battalion;

(b) that steps should be taken to re-constitute a West Indian Regiment as a regular military force available under War Office control for general service.

3 HO 213/244

5 July 1948

[Immigration]: letter from A W Peterson¹ to F L T Graham-Harrison²
on the arguments against the introduction of legislation to curb
immigration from the colonies

You sent me on 25th June a copy of a letter which the Prime Minister had received from a number of Members of Parliament suggesting that the Government should take power to control immigration from the Colonies into this country. The Home Secretary has considered this suggestion in consultation with the Secretary of State for the Colonies and feels that there are the strongest objections to it.

It is a traditional element in United Kingdom policy that British subjects, of whatever colour and whether of Dominion or Colonial origin, are freely admissible to the United Kingdom. From time to time some particular influx of less desirable elements, e.g. the influx of Cypriots of the waiter type into London, has brought the issue into relief but the principle has stood and stands. It would be especially undesirable to abandon this principle at a time when we are officially sponsoring the introduction of foreign labour in large numbers, and the Secretary of State for the Colonies advises that any such proposal would give rise to a fierce reaction in the Colonies themselves.

It is also of especial importance at the moment in connection with the Nationality Bill that the position should not be weakened. In the Bill there was included the phrase "citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies", a phrase which in a yet more particular way associates the United Kingdom with British subjects of Colonial origin. This phrase was struck out by an amendment in the Lords and stands to be restored this week by a Government amendment when the Bill is reintroduced in the Commons. This development admittedly makes it specially unfortunate that the Jamaica party should have arrived,³ and the issue have been raised now, as it may introduce an extraneous element into the discussion in the Commons.

It would be inadvisable in replying to touch on this complication.

In some press articles, as in the letter addressed to the Prime Minister, the

¹ Home Office from 1938; assistant private secretary to prime minister, 1946–1949.

² Principal, Home Office.

³ ie on the *Empire Windrush*, see p lvii.

Jamaican party has been hailed as the precursor of larger emigrations from Colonies where unemployment is rife. Reports have appeared that there are some 2,000 more Jamaicans awaiting an opportunity of a passage. The grounds for this fear are not clear. There was a peculiar combination of circumstances in the case of the Jamaican party which are not likely to be repeated. In the first place, the passages at a particularly favourable cost were available on a troop ship, and in the second place, some two-thirds of the men who arrived were ex-servicemen who had money in their pockets from their gratuities. Even so, not all the cheap troop-deck passages were taken up. Moreover, in many articles appearing subsequent to the arrival of the Jamaicans emphasis has been laid on the fact that owing to costs here they may find that their wages will not allow them to support themselves and at the same time send remittances to their dependants in Jamaica.

Although it is not yet possible to give a complete picture of the disposal of the Jamaicans, it is perhaps worth mentioning that, out of 236 who were accommodated at the Clapham Shelter⁴ because they had no particular prospects in view, 145 had been placed in employment within one week of their arrival and the population at the Clapham Shelter had dropped to 76 on the night of July 2nd. This evidence suggests that the party consists of men who are able and willing to find and accept honest work, and it would be a great mistake to regard them as a "riff raff" of unemployables.

It may be that the episode is a comparatively isolated one, and that, although there has been a steady trickle of coloured Colonials reaching here as stowaways who have been a considerable nuisance, nothing is to be expected to call for alarm such as would justify a departure from the principle enunciated.

The enclosed draft reply, which has been agreed with the Colonial Office, is submitted for the Prime Minister's consideration.

⁴ A Second World War air-raid shelter on Clapham Common in south London used as emergency accommodation.

4 CO 318/487/2, no 1

21 June 1949

[Federation]: draft introduction by C Y Carstairs to the report of the Standing Closer Association Committee on the arguments in favour of federation

In this introductory section of our Report, we discuss certain of the underlying principles which have guided us in framing our more detailed proposals. Certain principles were provided in our terms of reference, notably that a Federal constitution should follow the Australian pattern, with residual powers remaining with the constituent units, and we have naturally been much influenced by the records of the discussions at Montego Bay. But we have found it necessary to make more precise certain other considerations and, since these have profoundly influenced us in framing our recommendations, we consider that in the interests of informed public discussion we should set them down at the outset.

2. We start from the assumption that the main underlying purpose of our task is to seek the shortest path towards a real political independence for the British peoples of the region, within the framework of the British Commonwealth. We assume

further that we have been charged with this task because there is general agreement that this object cannot be attained without some form of Federal association between the territories concerned, but that with Federation its attainment becomes practical politics. We are aware that in some circles there is a demand for "independence", on the basis of existing political units, either in advance of, or simultaneously with, the establishment of Federation. While we yield to none in the region in our attachment to the idea of independence, we venture to agree with the underlying thought of the advocates of Federation, that the sheer force of circumstances of the modern world make independence on a "unit" basis a mirage.

3. This categorical statement requires elaboration. Let it not be thought that we imply any reflection on the political capacity, or the public spirit, of the peoples of the territories as they stand today. Did we do so, we should not be justified in putting forward a scheme for a larger political unit, which, together with the existing territories, cannot fail to make even greater demands on the political resources of the region than are made today. Our reasons for this view lie in the fields of economics, public finance and administration, but particularly economics, the basis of all the rest.

4. It is now a truism to say that political independence is unreal unless it is based on financial stability which, in turn, must rest on a solid foundation of economic productivity—on an adequate "national income". It is true that there are many states in the world today which are legally sovereign and independent; but it can be asserted that only those which can pay their way can really be said to enjoy full independence. From this point of view it does not matter what form is taken by outside financial support. Grants from United Kingdom public funds are familiar to this region, whether in the form of grant-aid with its concomitant of Treasury control, or of grants under the Colonial Development and Welfare Act, which do not involve Treasury control. Other nominally independent states have, however, been assisted in other ways, e.g. by private banks or other firms, and their history shows that their real, though not perhaps their apparent, independence, is no less curbed by this form of assistance than it is by the overt receipt of assistance as from one Government to another.

5. The way to real political independence is, in short through economic stability and solvency. We should explain that by this we do not mean economic self-sufficiency. Whatever may be done to produce in the region a wider range of the goods consumed there—and in our view much can and should be done—it would be foolish to shut our eyes to the fact that the West Indies and the mainland territories live by world trade. This is a fact of cardinal importance in the political field, to which we shall return in various contexts. To resume, if economic stability and financial solvency are the necessary foundations for political independence, any proposals for attaining the latter must be judged, among other things, by the extent to which they promote the former. From this point of view, various questions arise, e.g.: (a) are the West Indies economically stable and solvent now? (b) can they become so on the existing political basis, i.e. the basis of a comparatively large number of separate political units? (c) if not, can Federation lead to stability and solvency, either immediately or in the long run? These questions demand an answer, and upon those answers will depend in large measure the nature of the proposals which we shall make.

6. Taking the first of these questions, it is the case that, over the region as a whole, broadly speaking, public revenues cover public expenditures at the present time. If that were a permanent condition, the future could be regarded with some equanim-

ity: it might even be argued that there was little needed [sic] for adding a further political superstructure in the form of a Federal constitution. But on closer examination the picture is not so reassuring. In the first place, several territories are at present in receipt of grant-aid and are likely to continue to require it. Some others may at any time come to require it. Secondly, there is scarcely a territory, even among the largest, whose finances do not give cause for concern, and which might not, as a result of some by no means unprecedented misfortune or disaster, be brought to insolvency. Thirdly, there is a basic instability about even the present apparently satisfactory state of the public finances. Revenues are very substantially greater than they were before the war; but these increases are not unfortunately due to any real increase in the basic productivity of the region, in relation to numbers. There is in fact evidence that in this region—as indeed elsewhere in the world—basic productivity has suffered a decline. This is a serious matter, since basic productivity is the foundation upon which economic stability, solvency and hence real political independence must be built. Revenues may thus be described as “elastic”, or sensitively responsive to changes in a number of factors. Expenditure on the other hand is less so. For reasons into which we need not enter, recent years have witnessed a substantial increase in public commitments in the field of social and allied services. These provisions are by no means excessive in relation to needs, or by any modern standards; but they are large in relation to revenues and, what is more important for present purposes, they could not easily be reduced substantially if revenues suddenly shrank. They therefore constitute a standing potential threat to the solvency of the region.

7. The temporarily healthy state of the public finances is in fact attributable to other factors than any basic increase in the taxable capacity of the region. These include, first, the comparatively high prices till lately prevailing for the exports of the region, and to such other sources of overseas income as wartime expenditures by His Majesty's Government and the United States Government. These incomes are directly reflected in higher taxability in the region itself, and indirectly in larger imports which, at present high prices, mean large ad valorem customs revenues. It is obvious that any important recession in the value of the region's exports could have a profound and harmful effect alike on the private incomes and the public finances of the region as a whole. Signs are not wanting in the world at large that commodity prices may be on the turn: this is a matter of the utmost significance for this region, even although there seems no present reason to expect a disastrous slump. Should there be an important recession, the consequences for the economy of the region would be serious, unless steps were taken to mitigate them by means of special price arrangements with His Majesty's Government. But it is in point to observe that such arrangements, if made, would in essence constitute indirect grants of assistance to the region, and would be doubtfully compatible with the ideal of genuine independence. We do not argue for or against such arrangements, but we are concerned here to point out their political consequences.

8. The conclusion which we are forced to draw from the above is that, taking the region as a whole, there does not at present exist that basic economic stability which we believe to be an essential prerequisite to genuine political independence. It follows, therefore, that if independence is to be achieved, there must be some hope of creating a state of economic stability. That the possibility exists in principle we do not consider it necessary to discuss at length. We are conscious that, unsuspected discoveries apart, this is not to be reckoned among the richly endowed areas of the

world. But we refuse to believe that in an age which has seen such stupendous advances in the natural sciences, and where further advances, particularly in biology and its applications to agriculture, may confidently be expected, applications cannot be found which can provide a reasonable standard of living to all those in this region who are prepared to earn it. This result will not come about easily, and we recognise that the not too abundant resources of the region will require to be freely fertilised with brains, skill and application. But that this can be done we do not permit ourselves to doubt, provided always that the political and administrative arrangements of the region are such as to enable modern knowledge to be promptly and effectively applied where it is most needed. The constitutional implications of that proviso are the subject of our report.

9. The next question is to consider whether there are possibilities that the economic weaknesses of the region can be remedied within the existing political framework—i.e. on a “territorial” rather than a “regional” basis. Can, that is to say, the existing units, or any of them, hope to achieve a sufficient degree of economic stability to enable them to achieve a real and permanent independence of outside aid and so the possibility of real as distinct from formal political independence? Setting aside miracles, the answer for many of the territories is, assuredly not. Some of the units, particularly of the smaller ones, have no evident prospect, *as units*, of moving very far from the margin of subsistence in public finance; and, while that is so, genuine independence must remain a mirage and its pursuit an occupation doomed to failure and frustration. The same is, we consider, less obviously but equally true of the larger units, for a variety of reasons. In the first place, no one of them is so large that a disaster to one of its major industries or resources could not bring it to insolvency and so to the need for outside assistance and the postponement of real independence. Secondly, no one unit is large enough, or rich enough, to be able to maintain by itself the range of scientists and others to whom, as we have suggested above, the region must look for a real improvement in its productivity and economic stability. Thirdly, all experience shows that on the basis of independent units, the joint action in economic and related matters, which daily becomes more and more important, is rendered infinitely slow and difficult and consequently much less effective than it should be. There is much more to be said on this topic, but we do not consider it necessary to labour it, since we believe that it is perhaps one of the few on which there is fairly general unanimity. We are satisfied the region will not achieve economic stability while it consists of a large number of quite separate political units, and consequently that the hopes of such units of achieving real political independence, as such, are slight.

10. But even if the preceding arguments are accepted, it does not automatically follow that the region can achieve, as a single political entity, what its constituent units cannot achieve individually. That is to say, for present purposes, that a Federation of the British Caribbean, British Guiana and British Honduras can achieve a sufficient degree of economic and fiscal stability to enable it to enjoy real political independence. We cannot in honesty discount the possibility that we may be attempting the impossible. Let us make it clear at the outset that the only real proof will be the course of history. No one can guarantee success in this undertaking. No one can legislate against major and unprecedented natural calamities, against disastrous trends in the progress of human affairs in the world at large, or against human failings on the part of those who may come to power in a Federal Government. In this, as

in other major decisions, we can only weigh up probabilities as we see them, and express our considered conclusions knowing that other views may be held, and that events may show our conclusions to be wrong. That is incidentally the measure of the responsibility of our task. In making our recommendations we do so with a full sense of the serious consequences of any important error of judgment.

11. This said, we may place on record our considered and emphatic view that Federation, and only Federation, affords a reasonable prospect of achieving economic stability and through it that political independence which is our constant object. We have chosen these words with care. We do not claim that Federation will immediately and automatically solve the economic and fiscal problems of the region, or that it cannot fail. We do claim that it will put in the hands of men responsible to the region as a whole, powers and opportunities which do not exist at present, and which these men according to their abilities and inclinations can use for the betterment of the region. Federation will not solve our problems, but will provide the conditions in which they can be dealt with.

12. We desire here to emphasise this point. There is in some quarters a disposition to imagine that immediately a Federation is established certain difficulties will cease to exist. Conversely, others appear to hold that, because the establishment of a Federation will of itself only mean another Legislature and administration, and consequent expense, in addition to those already existing (which is true so far as it goes) that it will not help the region. Both views are false, because problems are never solved automatically by new constitutions but only by the efforts of men to whom new constitutions may give appropriate powers and responsibilities which did not exist before. These two apparently contradictory views are thus closely akin, in that they rest on the fallacy that results are or should be achieved by adjustments of political and administrative machinery, instead of by the efforts of men who may be helped or hindered by the machinery but who cannot thereby be absolved from effort. Federation will not absolve the region from the necessity for physical and mental and moral effort—it may, if successful, help that effort to issue in greater productivity, more security and higher standards of living.

13. Arising from this, we wish to point out that the mere establishment of a Federation will not of itself bring about a condition of financial and economic stability. That can only come when the efforts of a Federalised region have so strengthened its economy, and adapted it to its place in the economy of the world, that it no longer requires outside backing in financial matters. This may be the work of a generation or more—events will show—but at the least it cannot come about immediately or automatically. To the extent, therefore, that financial dependence involves some form or degree of political dependence, the latter will not be achieved, whatever form a Federal constitution takes, until Federation has enabled the region to achieve economic stability. To ignore this fact and to speak of full independence, without regard to economic realities, is to run the risk of the frustration to which we have earlier referred, and to do a disservice to the region. We do not hereby imply that the actual operation of the financial links with His Majesty's Government, and particularly of Treasury Control, are incapable of improvement—far from it—but that is a separate topic to which we shall return in due course.

14. Briefly, the services that Federation can render, and which can be adequately rendered in no other way, can be summarised as prompt, effective action in the economic field on behalf of the region as a whole. There is a clamant necessity for some

single agency which can speak and act with authority, full knowledge, and at short notice, for the region in a wide field of activities, of which trade negotiations are only the most prominent example. This necessitates an agency which can act in its own right, and not by delegation from other agencies and subject to their confirmation. This in turn requires a fully representative deliberative organisation from which to derive the necessary authority—that is to say, a legislature in which the directly elected representatives of the people of the region have a preponderant voice. No other arrangement can, in our view, be more than a second-best: and to adopt any expedient short of full Federation carries with it the serious risk that the delays and frustrations which may arise from its working may turn opinion against still closer association, and so become an obstacle to Federation and not a stepping-stone to it.

15. We are conscious that much of the foregoing is a restatement of what is already accepted, and that, strictly speaking, it is not incumbent upon us to argue the pros and cons of Federation. But we have in our deliberations had an unusual opportunity of discussing the matter in much greater detail than was possible at the Montego Bay Conference, or in the discussions in the various Legislatures of the recommendations of that Conference; and we feel that there is advantage in setting out at length some of the basic considerations which we have evolved, and which have largely guided us in our more detailed recommendations. In summary, we believe that the attainment of independence within the British Commonwealth is the legitimate political objective of the region; that its attainment is contingent upon the attainment of economic stability and the prospect of continuing solvency; that economic stability and solvency can, and can only, be reached (though not in a day) by setting up a Federal Government and entrusting to it certain important powers and responsibilities, particularly though not exclusively in the economic field. The remainder of this Report consists of the detailed application of these principles to a Federal Constitution within the framework of which the statesmen of the region will have the opportunity of leading their people towards their goal. We shall treat the matter under the broad headings of, first, the relations between the Federal and the Territorial Governments, and the division of functions between them; secondly, the relations, particularly as regards finance, between the Federal Government and His Majesty's Government; thirdly, the finances of the Federation; fourthly, the Federal Executive and, fifthly, the Federal Legislature; sixthly, the Judiciary; seventhly, the position of certain Dependencies; and finally, constitutional Revision.

5 CO 318/486/3

27 June 1949

[Finance]: minute by H T Bourdillon to W L Gorell Barnes on the financial arrangements for federation

[This minute was written in response to a memo submitted by Beasley¹ through Rance² in which Beasley, having been asked by SCAC to prepare a 'personal' memo on financial

¹ Prof C G Beasley, economic adviser to comptroller, Development and Welfare Organisation, British West Indies, from 1946; adviser at Montego Bay Conference, 1947; member of Evans Commission on Settlement of British Guiana and British Honduras; chairman, Regional Economic Committee, British West Indies and financial adviser to SCAC.

² Sir H Rance, gov of Burma, 1946–1948; chairman, SCAC, 1948–1950; British co-chairman, Caribbean Commission, 1948–1950; gov of Trinidad and Tobago, 1950–1955.

arrangements, requested from the CO clarification on a number of important points. In particular Beasley wanted an expression of CO views on the arrangements for a customs union and financial devolution. The CO agreed with Beasley that customs duties would be the principal source of federal revenue and that seventy-five per cent of the total collected should be returned to the units. However, for the reasons explained at the end of the third paragraph of Bourdillon's minute reproduced here, the CO did not accept Beasley's view that financial control over the unit governments should be vested, not in the federal government but in the governor-general on behalf of or by devolution from the secretary of state (CO 318/486/3, no 4, letter from Rance to Seel, 27 May 1949, forwarding Beasley's memo, 4 May 1949).]

This is the file dealing with the financial arrangements for the West Indian Federation—if it comes off. You will remember that I mentioned the matter to you a few days ago, and told you that we had had important discussions with the Treasury. You may now like to see the papers.

There seem to be a number of trends of opinion relative to this matter in the West Indies, not all of them pulling in the same direction. In fact it would hardly be going too far to say that there are some fundamental contradictions in the West Indian attitude. On the one hand there are [sic], of course, the desire for political advance and the impatience with Treasury control (though we may hope that the latter has been mitigated by the recent improvements in the working of the system). On the other hand we find a desire for continued financial support from H.M.G. and a strong disinclination on the part of the Treasury-controlled territories to exchange control by H.M.G. for control by a hypothetical federal authority. This preference for a known evil as opposed to an unknown is doubtless natural, but is an indication, I think, of the failure of West Indian opinion to face up to the implications of federation and political independence. A similar failure is evident from allegations in the West Indian press that H.M.G. are “foisting federation in the West Indies in order to escape from financial responsibilities”. The answer to these allegations is, of course, that while H.M.G. are certainly not going to abandon their responsibilities overnight, financial self-sufficiency and political autonomy must go hand in hand. The end of direct financial support from H.M.G. should in fact be not only a concomitant of federation self-government, but one of its objectives.

It was against this background that we were called upon (see No. 4) to say something authoritative at short about a number of things, and in particular about the financial arrangements which we envisage for the future Federation. The matter was thrashed out first at an internal meeting in Mr. Seel's room, and later at a discussion with the Treasury, attended by Mr. Seel, Mr. Watt, Mr. Greig³ and myself. It might have been held that the correct [sic] course was for H.M.G. to refuse to be drawn until the people on the spot had produced at least some provisional ideas, but you will notice from the enclosure to No. 4 that Professor Beasley presses strongly for a lead from the Colonial Office in this and other matters, and it was felt by all concerned, including the Treasury, that this request should be met. The result was the telegram at No. 6, which was agreed with the Treasury before despatch. You will see that, without entering into any commitments at the present stage, we have endeavoured to indicate that H.M.G. would be prepared to go a long way in the abandonment of control at least for an initial period, provided the Federation is allowed to become a financial reality from the outset, with prospects of financial self-sufficiency at a later stage. It is proposed, as you know, that the federal authority

³ I B Watt, CO principal, West Indian Dept 'B'; R C H Greig, principal, CO Finance Dept.

should collect customs revenue and perhaps income tax throughout the constituent territories and should retain a fixed proportion (say 25%) of the proceeds for its own purposes. The major portion of this would be used to meet federal expenses, but it is to be hoped that there would be a margin, which might be used in the first instance to build up a federal reserve. Our suggestion, as you will see from No. 6, is that H.M.G. should make a block grant over, say, 5 years based on the average aggregate of grants-in-aid in the recent past, and should hand over this money to the federal authorities at stated intervals without control, provided it were understood that the federal authority would do its utmost not to come back for more and would meet any further deficits in the deficit colonies out of the federal reserve in the first instance. Under this arrangement the exact relations between the federal authority and the colonies requiring assistance would be left for local settlement. This, of course, would be bound to lead to some local opposition, but the whole point of the suggestion is that, while giving evidence of generosity on the part of H.M.G. during an initial period, it will at the same time confront the West Indian peoples with the responsibilities inseparable from political advance.

Another feature of our suggestion is that H.M.G. might make an additional grant towards the capital expenses of setting up the federal authority. There was some discussion about the source of this grant. The Treasury were in favour of the C.D. & W. Vote—a suggestion which the Colonial Office, for familiar reasons, resisted. The matter was left open.

The Treasury were as strongly in support of all this as we were ourselves. I think the results are important, and when the time comes for H.M.G. to commit themselves, I hope they will not hesitate to do so on the above lines.

When you have studied the file, perhaps you would pass it to Mr. Marnham as requested in the immediately preceding minute.

6 CO 318/487/1, no 10

5 Sept 1949

[Federation]: letter from C Y Carstairs to I B Watt on West Indian attitudes and suspicions. *Enclosure*: notes by Sir H Rance for use by Lord Listowel during his visit to the West Indies

With reference to your letter of the 19th of August, I enclose notes by the Chairman on the major points of enquiry or criticisms which Lord Listowel is likely to encounter.

I should like to add a few general observations, from which the Chairman does not dissent.

First, in this and indeed any other connexion, one must accept the fact that there is a widespread and probably ineradicable distrust of the motives of H.M.G. No statement of policy is accepted as disinterested, or without hidden motives, the search for which provides congenial employment for many journalists and others. This of course lacks factual basis: and I feel that it largely derives not from the behaviour of H.M.G. at all but from the prevailing low standards of political morality in the region. West Indians have good reason to believe that most if not all of their public men seldom if ever advocate a proposal or policy for its own sake but for some interested and personal motive. It is foreign to that experience and estimation of probabilities that H.M.G. should act otherwise.

Secondly, and consequently, any policy strongly urged by H.M.G. is *ipso facto* suspect. Witness certain reactions to the Secretary of State's statements at Montego Bay. To us, they could hardly be clearer; but the statement that H.M.G. would support a federated West Indies caused some, particularly in Jamaica, to infer that H.M.G. would be less well disposed to an unfederated West Indies, and those who twisted all this to mean "federate or else" got and still enjoy a considerable hearing. Hence the desirability of not seeming to "push" federation and of emphasising the fact that the decision is one for the West Indies themselves.

Thirdly, we have to contend with a great body of sheer ignorance about the very nature of a federal structure. Misconceptions abound, such as that territorial Governments would be "under" a federal Government for all purposes; that federation is bound to be enormously costly, that federation equals Dominion status, or independence automatically. This widespread ignorance is made use of by several who do not care openly to oppose federation: their line, which finds plenty of response is "Tell us more about it". When you meet a "Tell us more about it" man, you may be pretty sure that you are meeting a crypto-opponent [sic].

All in all, my own personal view is that the omens are *against* the acceptance by the region of *any* proposals that the Standing Closer Association Committee may put forward at this time. On that assumption, the main value of its work and its Report will be educative; and, without neglecting the chance that a scheme might be accepted, it seems that we should take a long view and, in billiards parlance, "play for the leave." This means avoiding any suggestion of "now or never"—the answer is too likely to be "never"—and so far as I am able I have been trying so to frame the draft of the SCAC report as to provide public opinion with some informative reading between what I expect will be the rejection of the Committee's proposals and the next time the matter comes up. I go on the assumption that the more information is spread abroad the better public discussion is likely to be and the better the chances of wise and "solid" decisions later on.

Enclosure to 6

1. Avoid any suggestion that H.M.G. is bringing pressure to bear so that federation may be achieved. Representatives of the weaker colonies hope that H.M.G. will adopt such a course, as they believe (with truth) that opposition to federation will be strongest in the larger or more wealthy colonies. Some of the members of the Standing Closer Association Committee have already mentioned to me that they doubt if federation will come to pass from West Indian fruition alone, and that H.M.G. should compel the colonies to federate in the same way as the Britain North American Act was forced on Canada in 1867. This latter contention is of course incorrect but some ardent federalists believe it to be true and they may well advance this argument in discussion.

Arguments

If any such representation is made I suggest that the reply could take the following line:—

H.M.G.'s policy is the same now as it was when a West Indies Federation was first mooted. Attention could be directed to Lord Halifax's¹ statement made after his visit

¹ Edward F L Wood, 1st Baron Irwin 1925, 3rd Viscount Halifax 1934; parliamentary under-secretary of state for the colonies, 1921–1922; Viceroy of India, 1926–1931; foreign secretary, 1938–1940; British ambassador to US, 1941–1946.

to the West Indies in 1921–22 in which, *inter alia*, he said “But I desire once again to emphasise my opinion that, on this or on any analogous proposition, it must be made clear that an essential condition of approval by the Secretary of State will be a deliberate opinion in favour of the change in the Colonies themselves”.

This statement is quoted in Command Paper 7291, page 3—the Report of the Montego Bay Conference 1947.

2. There is likely to be insistence from many quarters, that the constitution of any Federal Government must be an advance on all existing constitutions in the British West Indies.

Argument

Cannot prejudice or forecast recommendations of the Standing Closer Association Committee nor of H.M.G.’s reactions until report is received.

3. Many elements, more especially from the Trade Unions and extreme left, will argue that federation is unacceptable unless accompanied by complete self-government. The most vociferous of the protagonists for this theory will probably be met in the more powerful colonies.

Arguments

(a) There are many answers to this theory but the one I have found to be most useful is to play up the fears of the weaker colonies. In these colonies even the most ardent federalist fears domination by the more powerful colonies and the possibility that his country may be looked upon, and in fact become, a poor relation. For these reasons, safeguards are asked for by the weaker brethren. When analysed, these safeguards can only effectively be provided by H.M.G. All the units comprising the British West Indies will have to be coaxed into a federation for one reason or another and therefore in the first instance it is essential to devise a constitution acceptable to all, or at least the majority. After federation, when the fears and prejudices have waned then steps can be taken to achieve more responsibility.

(b) The argument that self-government must be in step with financial stability is indeed relevant and can be used to a chosen audience. To some West Indians, however, such an argument is complete anathema; they believe, like the Irish, that H.M.G. is perpetually in debt to the West Indies for errors or omissions of the past three hundred years. The sum mentioned, in all seriousness, to liquify this debt is astronomical and would undoubtedly provide financial stability for a greater or lesser number of years.

4. Fears of the weaker units that they will be dominated by their more powerful cousins.

Arguments

Essential that H.M.G. possesses safeguards for use in the last resort until these fears have been dissipated

5. Fears of the wealthy units that they will be called upon to shoulder the recurring financial indebtedness of those units now in receipt of grant-in-aid.

Arguments

Some politicians and prominent persons in the wealthy units may well advance the

theory that the enthusiasm shown by H.M.G. for federation, is due mainly to the desire to rid herself of the financial liabilities of the weaker units.

I have always used the argument that H.M.G. has no intention of escaping her financial responsibilities in this respect and have referred to the Secretary of State's financial proposals for the smaller federation Windward-Leewards. (Command Paper 7120, page 14).

I have also pointed out that the members of the Standing Closer Association Committee are well aware of the problem and the subject will undoubtedly be included in the report.

6. *Jamaica*

(a) A peculiar situation exists here. The opposition represented by the Peoples [sic] National Party (P.N.P.) with Manley at the head have weighed in strongly in favour of federation. This has placed "Busta" in a difficult position—his "volte face" at Montego Bay was probably due to his realisation that he was in a minority when initially he poured cold water on the earlier speakers who spoke as ardent supporters of federation. Although later during the proceedings at Montego Bay he came down on the side of federation, I doubt if he is strongly wedded to this view for the following reasons:—

(i) He is afraid that P.N.P. will achieve power through the back door of federation. He is confident that he can hold his opponents in check in local politics in Jamaica, but when it comes to federal elections, he is not so happy.

(ii) He prefers to be "monarch of his own castle" rather than an "also ran" in a federal set up. If he thought that he would be Governor-General, or possible Federal Prime Minister, then his attitude would probably change.

(iii) He is in any event a purely political animal. His conduct will always be determined by its effect on his own personal position, the only qualification being that, given more than one course of action, he will usually choose the more flamboyant and exhibitionist. So Busta's reaction will depend on his estimate of the form at the moment of taking a decision and one can only speculate about it beforehand.

(b) Busta's arguments against federation will probably be in the main, financial.²

²Bustamante launched a strong attack on UK policy when he spoke at the first plenary session of the Montego Bay conference in Sept 1947. Alluding to his suspicion of the motive behind federation, he observed that 'whilst most of us West Indians have been asking for self-government, we are told that self-government for the time being is really not good for us and the thing we deserve is federation. . . . Federation can come, but I cannot see the advisability of federation without self-government or greater self-determination for each and every island'. Bustamante was also critical of how it was proposed to establish a federation: ' . . . what are we going to federate with? Apart from Trinidad, who [sic] has oil, and Demerara, 98% of the other West Indian islands are pauperised and in a state of bankruptcy. I have never heard that in joining with bankrupts one can become successful or prosperous. . . . The most important thing is finance. Before this Conference was called, the first thing, in my considered opinion, that should have been done was to have an approximate estimate of the financial cost of the federation. We have not been given any idea as to the financial cost or where the money is to come from. . . . It looks to me as if we are starting at the wrong end. We are putting the cart before the horse. The horse should be before the cart, or the cart should come simultaneously—self-government before federation can come. We must be told who will finance this federal council, we must be told how much of our revenue must go abroad, we must be told many more things so that we can enlighten the other people of the country. Before we can have federation there must be a better understanding in the West Indies, there must be better friendship between the West Indies' (*Conference on the Closer Association of the British West Indian Colonies, Montego Bay, Jamaica, 11th-19th September 1947*, Part 2: *Proceedings*, Col 218, 1948, pp 20–27, copy in CO 318/488/1).

He will overestimate the cost of the federal structure and will bid for a fantastic grant from H.M.G. before he is prepared to give his support. He will know that there isn't the slightest chance of his bid being accepted by H.M.G., but he knows that a refusal, or even silence on the part of H.M.G. regarding his bid, will present him with excellent material in elections against his opponents when federation is put forward as a plank in P.N.Ps political gangway. Busta's attitude is also likely to be adopted by prominent business men in Jamaica who see no benefits for themselves and shut their eyes to any benefits that should accrue to the area as a whole or even Jamaica.

Arguments

- (i) The total cost of a federal structure will not be a very large sum.
- (ii) A regional authority representing the whole British West Indies must necessarily carry more weight in this modern world of perpetual conferences than a number of small individual units. The introduction of unified tariffs and an efficient unified customs service will undoubtedly produce benefits in time for the area and for individual units. Regional planning in essential aspects of West Indian life will also be possible. These considerations are appreciated by all, even in Jamaica, but what isn't sufficiently understood is that a regional authority without power is almost valueless. This power can best be supplied by federation.

7. Trinidad

(a) Has a prominent minority problem in that over 30% of the population are East Indians. The Indian politician generally opposes federation although he is chary of making his opinion public. At the present time East Indians are strongly represented in the Trinidad Government but they fear that in a Federal Government their representation will be nil or negligible. East Indians accordingly may ask for safeguards, but the Standing Closer Association Committee are adamant against any such concessions, on the grounds that East Indians must regard themselves as West Indians and a Federal Government will be West Indian, and will do all that is right and proper for its peoples.

(b) There is a widespread fear that Federation will open the door to widespread immigration from both the less wealthy and over-populated colonies. Trinidad has suffered recently from authorised and unauthorised immigrants from Grenada.

Argument

The Standing Closer Association Committee are aware of this problem which affects not only Trinidad, but also those other colonies where space or employment appears available. Assurance can be given that such fears are groundless.

8. British Guiana

The slogan of a "Continental Destiny" first enunciated by a former Governor still persists. There is widespread belief also among all sections of the people from high to low that British Guiana is the El Dorado of Sir Walter Raleigh's dreams. For these reasons articulate opinion does not favour federation. It will be remembered that the British Guiana Legislative Council when debating the Montego Bay Resolutions decided "that this Council records that it does *not* endorse the Conference Resolution No. 1 insofar as concerns British Guiana and further reserves judgment and full freedom of decision on all aspects of closer association as envisaged by the Conference, but agrees that British Guiana should, without prejudice, participate in

the Committees and such Commissions recommended to be set up in terms of the Conference Resolutions Nos. 2 to 14".

Resolution No. 1 reads "That this Conference, recognising the desirability of a political federation of the British Caribbean territories, accepts the principle of a federation in which each constituent unit retains complete control over all matters except those specifically assigned to the Federal Government".

(b) British Guiana fears wide scale immigration especially during the period when the Evans Commission recommendations are being implemented (See 7(b) above).

(c) British Guiana has also an East Indian problem of greater proportions than Trinidad (See 7(a) above).

(d) The negro labour organisations are in favour of federation but want more power than at present envisaged, vide Mr. Lee's memorandum referred to by Watt in his letter to Carstairs. Mr. Lee is a leader of labour in British Guiana and also a member of the Standing Closer Association Committee. The East Indians who have their own labour organisations are in their heart or hearts against federation for reasons given in 7(a) above.

9. *British Honduras*

(a) The currency is linked with the U.S.A. and many prominent persons believe that their destiny is linked with the North i.e. U.S.A. and Canada, rather than with the rest of the British West Indies and the United Kingdom. This linkage with the North is due to the sale of British Honduras products, mahogany and chicle, the latter being an ingredient of chewing gum. Thinking people however realise that these assets are wasting, mahogany because of the depletion of reserves in the past without adequate regeneration, and chicle because of the competition of synthetic ingredients. These same thinking people believe (with truth perhaps) that it will not be long, especially if the Evans Commission recommendations are implemented, before British Honduras' economy is almost entirely dependent on an eastward link. The fear of Guatemala has also undoubtedly strengthened the desire to unite with the British West Indies.

(b) British Honduras is also afraid of immigration and has almost a vitriolic hatred of Jamaicans. This is due in part to misbehaviour by Jamaican labour imported temporarily for work many years ago. This hatred however is kept alive by certain self-seeking politicians and others with an axe to grind. British Honduras is amenable to immigration when conditions warrant provided that the immigrants come from elsewhere than Jamaica.

(c) The negroes are very proud of their efforts in the Battle of St. Georges Cay (pronounced Key) in 1798 when as slaves they were armed to repulse the Spaniards.

10. *Barbados*

Is proud of running own show satisfactorily and without outside help for the past 300 years. A number of people therefore see little benefit in federation. The advocates for federation consist in the main of negro and coloured politicians and the "have nots" with the white Barbadians preferring the "status quo". The main fear of federation is finance: reckless spending by a Federal Administration and liabilities for the grant-in-aid colonies.

11. *Windwards and Leewards*

The small islands are generally in favour of federation as in their opinion they have all to gain and little to lose. The main fear is domination by their more powerful cousins. The proposal, not yet dead, to federate the Windwards and Leewards may be raised in these islands. Opinion is strongly against such a federation with the wider federation in view. It is difficult to argue against this opinion; a three decker bus consisting of a British West Indian Federal Government, a Windward-Leeward Government and then unit governments would seem to be unwieldy, expensive and unworkable.

7 CO 1031/539, no 1

[Dec 1951]

[US bases]: draft CO memorandum on the urgent need for the release for agricultural purposes of deactivated US base areas in Antigua, Trinidad and Jamaica

His Majesty's Government wish to draw attention to the serious difficulties which have arisen in certain West Indian Colonies as a result of delay in securing the release for cultivation purposes of deactivated United States Base areas. The territories particularly concerned are Antigua, Trinidad, and Jamaica. The majority of leased areas in these islands were evacuated in 1949, and negotiations were then set in motion for the conclusion of formal agreements covering the use of such areas, concurrently with negotiations for permanent leasing arrangements in the islands. These negotiations are still in progress but meanwhile valuable agricultural land has remained idle for over two years, and it has become increasingly difficult for the Colonial Governments concerned to persuade local opinion that important areas which are clearly no longer in operational use by the United States, cannot be placed under cultivation. The pressure of rapidly expanding populations and the marked rise in the cost of living in British Caribbean Colonies during the last nine months, make it a matter of urgency in these territories that all available land should be applied to the expansion of local food production or of the out-put of basic export crops. Moreover both in Trinidad and Antigua there are political elements anxious to exploit the economic situation and it is already evident in these two islands that the question of the release of the leased areas is assuming a political as well as an economic importance. It is no exaggeration to say that if delay in bringing these areas into cultivation were to continue indefinitely, it might prove to be a cause of instability and discontent. His Majesty's Government are also concerned lest the warm feelings of friendships for the U.S. which have hitherto existed in these Colonies, should be impaired as a result of such delays.

2. As the United States Government are aware, negotiations for the conclusion of formal agreements for the use of leased areas when not required operationally are still incomplete in Antigua and Trinidad, but even where general agreement in principle has been reached, the United States has not so far been able to agree that such arrangements should come into force until the question of leasing arrangements has also been finally settled. It is likely that these formal agreements regarding the leasing and use of Base areas will govern the position in the Colonies concerned for many years to come and for this reason His Majesty's Government,

while anxious to avoid undue delay and appreciative of the desire of the United States Government to secure the execution of definitive lease instruments at an early date, consider that such agreements merit detailed and careful consideration before their final ratification. There appears however to be no reason why the actual use of the land in question should be denied to the peoples of the Colonies concerned, while such negotiations are in progress, provided that there exists a basis of understanding acceptable to both the United States and His Majesty's Government on which such interim use might be made. During the war years, areas urgently required by the United States for operational purposes were readily made available by Colonial Governments, although the position regarding the legal title of the United States and the precise extent of the areas remained under discussion or was left for subsequent negotiation. His Majesty's Government have every reason to hope that in the spirit of the final paragraph of the preamble to the Leased Bases Agreement, the United States Government will be equally willing to agree to the agricultural use of Bases areas in cases where the peacetime requirements of the Colonial Governments are of similar urgency, pending a satisfactory long-term settlement by the conclusion of formal agreements.

3. If the United States Government were prepared to agree to the immediate release of deactivated areas in Antigua, Trinidad and Jamaica, His Majesty's Government suggest that their use during the interim period until formal Utilisation Agreements are brought into operation in each Island, might be on the following basis:—

- (i) The United States to have the right to reoccupy the areas at 48 hours notice, if necessary;
- (ii) The United States to be free from any liability to pay compensation for claims arising during the Colonial Government's occupation or as a result of reoccupation by the United States;
- (iii) Colonial Government to be free from any liability to pay rent or compensation to the United States for the use of the areas;
- (iv) Colonial Governments to be free to allow use of the areas by third parties;
- (v) Colonial Governments to consult with the local U.S. authorities before constructing or carrying out improvements in the areas;
- (vi) The United States to have the right to inspect the areas at all reasonable times;
- (vii) These arrangements to remain in operation until a formal Utilisation Agreement has been brought into effect.

His Majesty's Government also suggest that any difficulties in implementing these arrangements for bringing the areas under cultivation could be resolved by consultation at the local level, and that no further detailed agreement would be required beyond the concurrence of the two governments in the above understanding. These arrangements however would be expressly without prejudice to the terms of formal Utilisation Agreements now under negotiation, and in this connection His Majesty's Government wish to inform the United States Government that they hope to be able shortly to transmit definitive and comprehensive proposals for the conclusion of formal Utilisation Agreements in the various Colonies concerned.

4. Apart from the general considerations set out in paragraphs 1 and 2 above, there are also certain special circumstances in each of the territories mentioned;

(i) *Antigua*

During the past year as a result of strikes and strained labour relations, a large part of the 1951 sugar crop has gone to waste. It is imperative both to the political stability and economy of the Island that every possible acre of land should be brought under cultivation at the earliest possible date. The position in Antigua was regarded as urgent in July this year when personal representations by the Governor of the Leeward Islands were brought to the United States Government's attention. With the passage of every month it is becoming increasingly difficult to placate local opinion.

(ii) *Trinidad*

The unrestricted spread of plant diseases in the untended Bases areas is imperilling cocoa and coconut crops outside the leases areas. The increasing cost of living has presented the Government with serious political and economic difficulties and a vigorous campaign has recently been launched to secure maximum local production.

(iii) *Jamaica*

The recent hurricane has deprived the people of many of their staple sources of food supply and created unemployment among some classes of agricultural workers. In these circumstances the restoration and increase of local food production is an urgent necessity.

5. For these reasons His Majesty's Government must request the United States Government to give urgent consideration to the immediate release of areas in these three Colonies for agricultural purposes on the basis suggested. Particularly in Antigua it would be an advantage both for political and economic reasons if an announcement that the land had been made available could be made in January 1952. As the areas are required principally for sugar planting for which a four-year planting cycle is necessary, His Majesty's Government would also welcome an assurance that in the case of Antigua, subject to the United States right of reoccupation, the arrangements would remain in operation for a period of not less than four years or until the bringing into operation of a formal Utilisation Agreement, whichever might be the earlier.

8 CO 1031/760, no 9

Jan 1952

'The financial aspects of West Indian Federation': CO note for Mr Lyttelton on the estimated cost to HMG. *Minute* by H T Bourdillon

The S.C.A.C. Report makes the following financial proposals:—

(i) The Federal Government should have its own source of revenue; this should be customs revenue; but that, at least in the initial stages, *not less than* 75% of the customs revenue collected by the Federation should be returned to the constituent territories.

(ii) H.M.G. should make to the Federal Government for ten years an annual grant equivalent to the average amount actually issued by way of grant-in-aid over the five years preceding the establishment of the Federation. This would be reserved for grants-in-aid to unit Governments. If it proved insufficient, the excess would

be sought in the first instance from Federal funds, though further aid might ultimately have to be provided by H.M.G.

(iii) H.M.G. should make a capital grant towards the cost of the Federal Headquarters.

(iv) The region should continue to be eligible for C.D. and W. assistance.

These recommendations were made after informal consultations with the Colonial Office and the Treasury; and the Treasury subsequently confirmed that they were acceptable to them.

2. The purpose of this note is to estimate the cost to H.M.G of recommendations (ii), (iii) and (iv) above. (It is assumed that British Guiana and British Honduras will stand out of federation).

3. As regards (ii), the provision for grants-in-aid for West Indian territories (excluding British Honduras) for 1952–53 is about £600,000. For present purposes, this figure can be taken as the amount of the annual payment to the Federal Government for grants to the deficit units.

4. As regards (iii), the cost of providing a Federal Headquarters should not exceed £1 million, and may be less.

5. The main problem arises under (iv). For purposes of calculation, it is necessary to make certain assumptions. These are that:—

(i) There will be a further C.D. and W. Act after the expiry of the present ten-year period.

(ii) From 1956 further C.D. and W. assistance will be given *on the present basis* but for a five-year period only.

(iii) A federation will not come into being in time to disturb the existing arrangements for the allocation and disbursement of C.D. and W. funds under the present Acts.

The amount of C.D. and W. assistance to which the West Indies (excluding British Guiana and British Honduras) would be entitled on these assumptions in the five years 1956–61 can be calculated as follows:—

	£ millions
(a) C.D. and W. provision in 1951–56	14
(b) Provision for increased prices at 15%	2.5
	<hr/> 16.5

6. Payments by H.M.G. in 1956–61 to the federated group of Colonies may therefore be estimated at:—

	£ millions
(a) Grant-in-aid	3
(b) Federal Headquarters	1
(c) C.D. and W.	16.5
	<hr/> 20.5

It must, however, be emphasised that, if the assumptions in the preceding paragraph are correct, the expenditure under (a) and (c) would be incurred *whether or not* a federation came into being: a literal acceptance of the S.C.A.C. recommendations would cost H.M.G. only the small additional sum at (b).

7. Grants under (a) and (b) in the preceding paragraph would obviously be made to the Federal Government. It is felt that C.D. and W. assistance should similarly be made to the Federal Government, i.e. it should be responsible for co-ordinating the claims of the individual Governments, for putting in applications on their behalf to H.M.G. and for supervising generally the use of funds provided by H.M.G. under this head. This arrangement will not be popular with the unit Governments and may not be secured, but it seems reasonable that the Federal Government should assume this responsibility as part of their general responsibility for regional economic planning.

8. It is, however, unlikely that the West Indian political leaders, when they come to the proposed London Conference, will be satisfied with a promise of financial aid on the basis proposed by the S.C.A.C. report. Firstly, they will ask for a much more precise indication of the amount of C.D. and W. assistance they will receive from 1956 onwards than H.M.G. may be able to give in 1952. Secondly, they will argue that political federation of these scattered territories with their economic weaknesses and rapidly expanding populations is inevitably a leap in the dark, that it will be successful only if it leads to further economic development, and that it is incumbent on H.M.G. to provide the basic conditions for success by providing initially funds for development over and above what would, even without federation, be provided under a new C.D. and W. Act. We do not at present know what sort of demands may be made for supplementary financial assistance for economic development, but it must be recognised that such demands will almost certainly be made and may be on a scale which would add appreciably to the estimated figure in paragraph 6 above. H.M.G.'s attitude towards them may affect decisively the result of the London Conference.

Minute on 8

Mr. Luke (through Mr Wallace)

Mr. Smith¹ has shown these papers to me, and I am very glad to have seen them again.

2. Broadly speaking, I agree that there is nothing further to be done for the time being. I would, however, like to make one or two points, in case they are in danger of being forgotten.

3. First, I should like to say a word about the reasons for supposing that we may have to give the West Indies, if and when they federate, a greater measure of new assistance towards capital development than a mere continuance of C.D. & W. assistance on its present scale (as tacitly envisaged in the S.C.A.C. Report). I see that the later papers on the file, including the submission to the Secretary of State at No. 9 and the record of the discussion with Sir George Seel at No. 10, tend to dwell on the point that financial arrangements as laid down in the S.C.A.C. Report might be insufficient to satisfy West Indian politicians. This may be true (though it seems a

¹ D M Smith, principal, CO Finance Dept.

little topsy-turvy that we should have to bribe the West Indies to accept federation proposals which are designed entirely for their own benefit), but I do not think it is the most important point. The most important point is that by and large the West Indies, what with under-employment and rapidly increasing populations, are going economically downhill. While we may deride the claim that Britain owes a debt to the West Indies for the fortunes taken out of them in the plantation days, the fact remains that until quite recently nothing was done to put money back into these islands in order to expand their economy, and that the effects of this neglect are now being felt. Over-population in relation to economic resources becomes daily a more serious problem, and matters have been made worse by the phenomenal rises in costs (not fully counterbalanced, in the case of the West Indies as a whole, by an equivalent rise in the value of produce) over the past few years. These facts impressed themselves on both of us during our tour of the West Indies a year ago, and we both felt grave doubts whether C.D. & W. assistance on the present scale is sufficient to stop the rot. If I may quote one passage from my report² on the visit:—

“At the end of it all it is impossible not to have the feeling that we are only scratching the surface, and that the economic problems of the area will continue to advance faster than any progress we can make, without considerably greater capital outlay both in terms of loan and grant than falls within our present plans, towards solving them”.

If this is true, then the West Indies require increased assistance irrespective of federation; but the act of federation will emphasise the need, since it has always been our hope (and the hope of the supporters of closer union in the West Indies themselves) that a federated West Indies would become financially self-supporting as soon as possible.³ It is certain that the act of political federation would not by itself achieve this result, and you and I have therefore always felt that this act must be supported by H.M.G with a new measure of capital assistance if hopes are not to be frustrated and if the new political unit is ever to be more than a façade. To my mind,

² Accompanied by S E V Luke, Bourdillon visited the West Indies, including British Honduras, between Jan and Mar 1951. On this return he compiled a lengthy report which concentrated mainly on the Leeward and Windward Islands. He concluded that the policy of ‘balanced development’, designed over the past five years to secure an all-round improvement in social and economic services, had failed. There had been an insufficient concentration on ‘first things first’. In answer to the common assumption that social conditions had to be improved before developing territories could advance economically, Bourdillon argued that the opposite was true in the West Indies. The fundamental problem was over-population in relation to resources: ‘It is this which threatens to create increasing unemployment and to depress still further the general standard of living. It follows that a resolute concentration on the development and utilisation of economic resources is the only policy which, apart from maintaining financial stability, can hope to strike at the root of the social evil’ (CO 1031/760, report by Bourdillon, 4 Apr 1951). Luke agreed with Bourdillon that the mistake made in the CD&W plans evolved during the war was that so much emphasis had been placed on social improvement in advance of economic development. The smaller islands especially were now burdened with recurrent budgetary costs which they could not sustain but any attempt to correct the error and to reverse the order of priority would lead to a change of breach of faith (T 220/229, Luke to A E Drake, Treasury, 12 June 1952). T 220/229 is a Treasury file on general financial and economic problems in the Caribbean containing extensive correspondence between Luke and Treasury officials between 1951 and 1953.

³ Sir H Poynton commented in the margin against this sentence: ‘Exactly. I am glad this point has been made. We are not bribing the W.I. into Federation but trying to buy them out of recurrent financial dependency.’

therefore, the case for increased assistance to the West Indies during the next few years is only political in the very broadest sense. It is primarily economic, in that without such assistance we may be confident that the economic situation of many of the West Indian territories will go from bad to worse. So it is not merely a question of buying off political opposition. It is a question of taking steps to avert a further deterioration in the already bad economic situation. In asking themselves whether they can afford to take these steps, H.M.G. must also ask themselves—however poor they may be feeling at the moment—whether they can afford not to.

4. My second point, which is closely related to the first, concerns the regional approach. I am only too well aware that when everything has been said about the necessity for further economic development in the West Indies, the search for rewarding economic development is still far from easy. This is partly because so many of the territories are poor in natural resources, and partly because the West Indies have never attempted to co-ordinate their economic activities. One of the strongest impressions which we brought home from our visit was, therefore, that any new request for financial assistance by H.M.G. to the Caribbean area, either in connection with a new C.D. & W. Act after the present one or as a special measure to accompany political federation, must be based on a co-ordinated plan for economic development worked out in the region itself. If H.M.G. were to make further assistance conditional upon such an approach, we felt that this might at last enable West Indian economic problems to be tackled in the right way and might also promote regional thinking in wider than purely economic spheres. If I may say so, I still think that this is the key to the whole matter (if indeed there is a key to West Indian problems at all). And it was against this background that the late Secretary of State instructed us to undertake the exercise which was subsequently carried out with so much labour by Mr. D. M. Smith in conjunction with the West Indian departments.⁴ The figures which he produced were of course in the nature of crystal gazing, but they were not intended to form the basis of any immediate commitment by H.M.G. They were merely intended to suggest the order of assistance which H.M.G., once they had taken the decision to promote the regional plan, might ultimately have to offer if they were to make a realistic yet not extravagant response to the much larger requests which the West Indians themselves would no doubt produce. I am still pretty convinced that this is the correct way of tackling the problem and the correct order of events. We may be confident that the West Indian Governments, when and if they send Sir George Seel their observations in response to the despatch at No. 12,⁵ will not produce any concrete and reasoned proposals for economic development, though they may make some general remarks to the effect that the S.C.A.C. report was inadequate on this side. If this supposition is correct, then the question of future economic development in a federated West Indies will be no further advanced by the time of the London Conference than it is now. On the

⁴ Smith's survey—' "Colombo Plan" for the Caribbean' (CO 1031/760, no 1, 21 Nov 1951)—estimated the cost over the period 1956–1961 at anywhere between £45 million and £75 million, figures which Seel thought far too high (*ibid.*, minute by Luke, 5 Mar 1952).

⁵ No 12 on the file is a despatch from Lyttelton to the West Indian governments, 6 Feb 1952, asking them individually to study the financial implications of the SCAC Report, to examine the proposals made in the MacLagan Report on Customs Union (see 10), and then to circulate their findings to the other governments.

other hand, we may be sure that the Conference will be made the occasion for requests for astronomical financial aid. Such requests obviously cannot be met, but if the answer is flatly negative the whole Conference may be killed. It seems to me that when this point is reached it will be right for H.M.G., after suitable remarks about the financial straits of the United Kingdom and the impossibility of promising anything, to say that they could not even consider such requests except on the basis of a co-ordinated and practical plan of economic development, designed to achieve the viability of the whole region. It would then be for the West Indians to go away and work out such a plan (perhaps through the medium of the Regional Economic Committee), and by the time it had been produced we might in any case be moving towards the era when the Treasury will be willing to consider further C.D. & W. assistance to the Colonial Empire as a whole.

5. If it is agreed that we can think provisionally along the above lines from a tactical point of view, I think we can now let the matter rest until we have the comments of the West Indian Governments as co-ordinated by Sir George Seel (see No. 12). Between that time and the Conference itself we might consider, in the light of the West Indian comments as actually received, whether it would be necessary to warn both our Ministers and the Treasury somewhat more specifically than is done in the last sentence of No. 9, that the final bill to H.M.G.—though it may not be presented for a year or two—is likely to be a good deal bigger than £20 million over five years. . . .

H.T.B.
13.2.52

9 CO 1031/751, no 215 15 Aug 1952
[Federation]: letter from Sir K Blackburne (Antigua) to S E V Luke expressing concern over the delay in the next move towards federation. *Enclosure*: memorandum by Blackburne, 'Federation in the British West Indies' (14 Aug 1952)

I am becoming increasingly disturbed at the delay in making the next move towards West Indian Federation, and I am becoming increasingly doubtful whether anything will emerge from the proposed London Conference unless adequate steps are taken in advance to ensure that the Conference does in fact get down to real business. My feelings have been much strengthened by my recent visit to Barbados where I was able to get another slant on things.

All this has prompted me to put down my feelings on paper, and I enclose a copy of the result. My views are summarized in paragraph 17 of the enclosed note, and it will probably be enough if you just read that paragraph.

I have written the note solely from the point of view of the Leeward Islands. But perhaps I may be permitted to add a personal word in this letter about my views on the political aspects of Federation in the West Indies as a whole—based on my general knowledge of the area gained when I was working in Hastings House (and so very out of date!).

I may be unduly "starry-eyed" about West Indian politicians; but I do feel myself that there is sufficient material now among them to enable them to manage their

own affairs. Trinidad and Jamaica and Barbados are very near to doing so already. As regards the smaller islands there are one or two good men, but there are also a lot of half-baked “rabble rousers”. I am quite sure, however, that the best—if not the only way—of dealing with people of the latter type is by letting them be handled by other West Indian politicians. Take the case of Montserrat—I can deal with the irresponsible Mr. Griffith¹ by the use of reserved powers, and by financial controls; but, if I do so, I do not undermine his prestige with his followers—I enhance it. Nor do I teach him anything; I merely make him more bitter. I am sure that the only way to train or eliminate people of this kind (and there seem to be even more of them in the Windward Islands than in this Colony) is by making other West Indian leaders deal with them through a Federal Government.

At present we have the worst of all worlds. My Mr. Griffith—if I may continue to take him as an example of the worst type of West Indian politician—will attend future meetings of the Regional Economic Committee. He will make lengthy and irrelevant speeches about the way in which Montserrat is neglected. And he will receive support from some of the better West Indian leaders who, as you know well, are endeavoring to obtain the support of the small islands in their bid for power. But what a different picture would be presented if Mr. Griffith tried the same game in the Federal House of Assembly when seeking to obtain more money for Montserrat!

Another example—I have often said that the Leeward and Windward Islands will never be self-supporting so long as they retain the ridiculous panoply of independent governments. Their future—if they are ever to pay their way—lies in administrative integration. It would be fruitless for us to try to put that idea across; but I should not be surprised if a Federal West Indian Government, with full responsibility, were to force it through in order to avoid having to issue continual grants-in-aid.

To my mind all this adds up to the fact that it is in the interests of the West Indies and in the interests of Her Majesty's Government to push ahead with Federation. As things are going at the moment—with individual West Indian politicians vieing [sic] with one another for political power—I doubt whether we shall get nearer to Federation for many years to come unless her Majesty's Government gives an imaginative lead. And I hope perhaps that such a lead can now be given.

I am sending a copy of this letter with its enclosure to Seel.

Enclosure to 9

From the point of view of the Leeward Islands the only hope of political advance lies in Federation. By themselves the small islands, and particularly those which are grant-aided, cannot aspire even to internal responsible government. Even those which are not grant-aided, e.g. St. Kitts, cannot stand on their own legs in regard to such matters as trade and the staffing of their civil services.

2. The recent constitutional advance in the Leeward Islands, and particularly the local method which has been adopted for the application of the so-called “Committee system”, means that these islands have now progressed nearly as far as is possible short of the grant of fully responsible internal government. The only further advances which can be contemplated are:—

¹ R W Griffith, member of Executive Council and president of Legislative Council, Montserrat.

- (1) the grant of executive instead of advisory status to the Chairmen of Committees (or "Ministers")—as in Trinidad;
- (2) the abolition of the reserved powers of the Governor—as in Barbados.

If progress in Antigua during the past eight months is any guide, it will be possible—and desirable—to approve the advance in (1) in a comparatively short time. The advance in (2) cannot be contemplated unless the Islands are financially self-supporting, or unless a West Indian Federation is established which takes over the responsibility for issuing grants-in-aid.

3. The small West Indian islands cannot be expected to remain "static" in regard to political advance. It is the declared policy of Her Majesty's Government that all colonial territories should be given increasing responsibility until they reach the stage of managing their own affairs. It is indeed essential on practical grounds that political advance should be continuous; and it would be disastrous to "freeze" this advance in the smaller West Indian islands, particularly when the larger West Indian territories—British Guiana, Jamaica, and Trinidad—can continue to advance and can aspire to responsible government, at least for internal affairs, in the near future.

4. It follows from the above that her Majesty's Government will be faced within the next two or three years with the alternatives of "freezing" further constitutional advance in the smaller islands or of encouraging some form of Federation. The first alternative is so unwise that it can scarcely be contemplated. Federation in some form is therefore urgent from the point of view of the smaller islands; and active steps to encourage Federation must be taken if the people of the smaller islands are to be given "something to look forward to".

5. For those reasons the proposed London Conference on Federation should not be long delayed, and a definite date should be fixed for the Conference as soon as possible.

6. *The London Conference.* It is clear that the London Conference will produce no useful results unless the delegates have a clear agenda covering the political, administrative and financial aspects of Federation. It is also clear that there is no prospect of such an agenda emerging from the deliberations which have hitherto taken place in the various territories. The smaller territories see that their only hope of responsible government lies in Federation, and they recognize that the Standing Closer Association Committee Report gives them favourable representation. For these reasons they decline to comment on the detailed proposals in that Report; they want Federation at all costs; and they are reluctant to suggest any changes in the S.C.A.C. Report lest they should thereby open the door for a reduction in their representation in the Federal Legislature. (Great concern was expressed in the other small islands at the stupidity of Montserrat in pressing for better representation.) The general attitude of political leaders in Antigua and St. Kitts is "We signed the S.C.A.C. Report, and we stand by our signatures".

7. The larger territories, having less reason to press for Federation and being anxious to vie with one another for power in the Federation, are more willing to debate the form which it should take. But even the Select Committee of Jamaica, which has given more detailed study to the matter than has been the case in any other territory, has been unable to produce clear and unanimous proposals which would provide the basis even for the constitutional part of an agenda for the London Conference.

8. As regards the administrative and financial parts of the agenda, no territory is willing to make any definite suggestions until the constitutional proposals are clear. The smaller islands—not unreasonably—say, for example, that they may lose revenue if they adopt the McLagan proposals for Customs Union;² they are accordingly unwilling to discuss Customs Union until they can be assured that the constitutional and financial proposals for Federation are such as to ensure that those territories which may gain financially from Customs Union will have to accept responsibility in the Federal Government for making up the losses of those territories, such as Antigua, which may have to accept a reduction in their customs revenue.

9. It follows from the above that no agenda for the Conference will emerge from separate discussions in the West Indian territories, and that the Conference will be a failure unless Her Majesty's Government takes a lead (as it appears to have done in regard to Central African Federation).

10. In the preparation of the agenda for the London Conference it must be recognized at the outset that the principal incentive to Federation is the prospect of the grant of responsible government in the British West Indies. Unless the Conference is able to point the way clearly to the early grant of fully responsible government, West Indian Federation will not take place. An imaginative approach to the constitutional part of the agenda is *essential* if the delegates to the Conference are to be persuaded to adopt a realistic attitude to the financial problems, and if they are to enter the Conference with a real incentive to sink their differences and to accept compromise solutions on such matters as representation in the Federal Legislature. It must be recognized that the S.C.A.C. Report is out of date in its approach to the constitutional issues; and that constitutional advance in the separate territories has made it necessary to revise substantially the constitutional "safeguards" proposed in the S.C.A.C. Report. It must be recognised that Her Majesty's Government, with its policy of developing fully responsible government, must run certain risks; and that some degree of administrative inefficiency and even of political turpitude must be accepted in order to give the British West Indies an opportunity of proving themselves as fit to manage their own affairs. This risk has been taken in the individual territories; it must be taken in the Federation. It must be recognized that Puerto Rico and the "independent" republics in the Caribbean *do* manage their own affairs, and that the British West Indies are in an even better position to do so after the training that they have received under British rule. And it must be recognized that political chaos has resulted in every case in which Britain has moved *behind* political opinion in her overseas possessions. In short, the Conference must open with a clear unequivocal and liberal statement of the intention of Her Majesty's Government to grant greater immediate responsibility to the Federal Government than was envisaged in the S.C.A.C. Report. The statement should give a date, subject to such financial conditions as may be necessary, for the grant of full "Dominion" status.

11. With such a background the Conference can enter with greater hope of agreement on a discussion of the detailed constitutional proposals in the S.C.A.C. Report; and the delegates will be more willing to accept the officially prepared agenda which is described below.

² See 10.

12. With such a background, moreover, the delegates should be more willing to give realistic consideration to the financial aspects of Federation. To this end they should have available to them a clear statement of the intentions of Her Majesty's Government in regard to financial aid to the Federation. The issue of such a statement, particularly at the present time, presents obvious difficulties. Moreover the degree of financial aid will naturally be a matter for negotiation between the delegates and Her Majesty's Government. But, if the constitutional incentive is sufficiently great, then negotiations should not be unduly difficult. The West Indian politician, once he is convinced of the sincerity of Her Majesty's Government in regard to the grant of full responsibility to the British West Indies, is not likely to be unreasonable in his demands.

13. If the Conference can be opened with clear statements by Her Majesty's Government on the constitutional and financial aspects, then—and only then—will the delegates be willing to discuss an officially prepared agenda. Such an agenda is essential if the Conference is to produce concrete results; and such an agenda can only be prepared by officials in view of the reluctance of the West Indian Legislatures to embark on any detailed consideration of Federation. But the agenda will be suspect—and will be valueless in the Conference—unless the suspicions of the delegates have first been removed by an unequivocal policy statement by Her Majesty's Government on the lines suggested above.

14. The official agenda for the Conference will have to be prepared in great detail. It should cover all aspects of Federation including matters not mentioned in the S.C.A.C. Report, e.g. Postal Services. It should take the form of a blueprint of the practical steps necessary to introduce a Federal government. It should cover the financial aspects of Federation—for which statistics have already been collected by the Comptroller for Development and Welfare. Above all it should be a practical document. It should not necessarily suggest answers to the many practical problems which may arise; rather it should list the problems and assemble the facts in regard to those problems, leaving the delegates to determine the solutions.

15. This "blueprint" for Federation will cover more ground than the S.C.A.C. Report and will deal with more matters than the financial aspects of Federation which are now being studied in the Comptroller's office. If the "blueprint" is to serve its purpose, it seems clear that its preparation will be a full-time job for an official with considerable experience of the West Indies.

16. It is accordingly suggested that an official Secretary to the Conference should be appointed *now* and that he should be entrusted with the preparation of the agenda and of the "blueprint". He should work in the Comptroller's office in Barbados where he will have access to the records and will be able to call on the Comptroller's staff for information and advice—particularly for financial advice. But he should not be a member of the Comptroller's staff. He should be attached to the Colonial Office in order to ensure that the non-political tradition of the Comptroller's office is maintained.

17. To sum up, this note seeks to show:—

- (1) that Federation must be pursued with energy if the dangers of political stagnation and frustration are to be avoided;
- (2) that the Federation Conference should be held as soon as possible;
- (3) that the Conference will be a failure unless the delegates are persuaded to consider a detailed agenda;

- (4) that such an agenda can only be prepared by officials;
- (5) that the officially prepared agenda will be unacceptable to the delegates and will not be considered by them unless Her Majesty's Government launches the Conference with clear and liberal statements of intention in the constitutional and financial fields;
- (6) that an officer should be detailed now to consider the agenda for the Conference, and that the agenda should take the form of a complete "blueprint" for Federation.

18. The need for Federation is so great—or rather the choice between political advance under Federation on the one hand and political stagnation in the small islands on the other hand is so obvious—that the idea of Federation must not be allowed to die. Her Majesty's Government should accordingly keep in mind the possibility of appointing a Royal Commission to examine Federation on the spot if the Conference should end in failure.

19. This memorandum is written solely from the point of view of the Leeward Islands. It does not of course pretend to look at Federation from the point of view of the other West Indian Colonies.

10 CO 1031/751, no 234

7 Jan 1953

'West Indian Federation: a background note': paper by the Reference Division (Commonwealth Section) of the Central Office of Information

I. *Introduction*

The 1953 London conference

On 13th April 1953 representatives of the British West Indian territories will meet in London for a conference on the political federation of their territories. The object of the conference will be to see whether they can agree to some federal scheme in sufficient detail to enable a start to be made in drafting the constitutional instruments necessary for bringing a federation into being.

The need for federation

The idea of a West Indian federation has been under consideration for many years, both in the United Kingdom and in the West Indies, and has received increasing attention since the second world war. Some of the advantages of closer association of the individual colonies were stated as follows in a Memorandum on Closer Association of the British West Indian Colonies, which was sent to the West Indian Governments in 1947 by the then Secretary of State for the Colonies, Mr. Creech Jones:—

'If any considerable and sustained advance in the political and social fields is to be achieved, it would seem essential that the separate units, especially the smaller ones, should take a wider view of the problems which confront them all. Economically and administratively, also, it is important that men and women (who should whenever possible be British West Indians) with the highest professional and technical qualifications should be available to

administer the various government services, but in most cases it is not economic that the activities of persons so qualified should be restricted to comparatively small units of administration.'

'Possibly the most important reason of all for the view that closer association is necessary lies in the fact that it is clearly impossible in the modern world for the present separate communities, small or isolated as most of them are, to achieve and maintain full self-government on their own. It is not, for example, practical politics to suppose that communities of two hundred thousand souls, or in some cases even less, should play an independent part in international discussions. On the other hand a community of well over two million people in the Caribbean area, with much that is homogeneous in their culture, could reasonably hope to achieve real self-government and to be strong enough to stand against economic and cultural pressure and to formulate and carry through a policy and way of life of its own.'

The obstacles to be overcome

In the same memorandum, the Secretary of State referred to basic factors in the West Indies which affect the question of closer association:—

- (a) ethnographic and historical differences which have tended to keep the territories apart.
- (b) the difficulty of communications between the Colonies which has kept them in isolation from one another. (The distances separating them are large. There are, for instance, over 1,000 miles between Jamaica and Trinidad.)
- (c) the great disparity between the individual Colonies in respect of constitutional development (see Part IV). Nevertheless in all the Colonies there is a well developed political tradition and the legislatures have a large measure of control over their local affairs. This independence is strongly cherished and the extent to which the legislatures will be prepared to surrender any of their powers to a central authority is a cardinal factor.
- (d) the considerable inequalities of natural wealth and financial resources between the Colonies. To the wealthier Colonies any proposal for closer association might present itself as bringing upon them part of the burdens of the smaller units.

II. *United Kingdom policy and West Indian opinion*

Official policy 1922–1952

The need for some form of federation was officially recognized as far back as 1922, but it was realised then, as it is now, that the movement towards unity must come from within and not from outside the West Indies. In the words of Lord Halifax, when he was Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies in 1922:—

'The establishment of West Indian political unity is likely to be a plant of slow and tender growth. If any advance in this direction is to be achieved, it can only be as the result of a deliberate demand of local opinion . . .'

Changes in West Indian opinion

In 1922, Lord Halifax reported against federation because he considered West Indian

opinion unfavourable to it. The effects of the first world war and the economic depression of the 1930's, however, made their mark on West Indian political consciousness, and demands for constitutional reform became linked with the idea of federation. In 1932 an unofficial West Indian Conference in Dominica discussed proposals for a federal constitution, and in 1938 a West Indian Labour Congress produced proposals for a federation. These changes in local opinion before the second world war were summed up in the following words by the West India Royal Commission of 1938, which was appointed to investigate economic and social conditions in the area.

'Our general impression . . . is that . . . local opinion has made a considerable advance in the direction of political unity. . . .'

The influence of regional organizations

While common problems caused by war and the slump were some of the influences encouraging West Indians to become conscious of the desirability of co-operative action, organizations set up to tackle those problems on a regional basis were also tending to widen insular outlooks. The Imperial College of Tropical Agriculture founded in Trinidad in 1924, for instance, has always directed its research work to meet the special needs of the West Indies as a whole, and in 1932 a Central Sugar Cane Breeding Station was established in Barbados to serve all the sugar-growing territories in the region.

The organizations that have perhaps been most influential in stimulating a regional way of thought are those set up during and since the second world war: the West Indies Development and Welfare Organization in 1940, the Anglo-American Caribbean Commission in 1942 and the University College of the West Indies in 1948.

The Development and Welfare Organization was originally set up to assist in the allocation of United Kingdom Colonial Development and Welfare grants and loans to the West Indies. It has made its advisory staff of social, economic and technical experts available for examining regional and individual problems and has convened many regional conferences. The Anglo-American Caribbean Commission, which, with French and Netherlands participation, became the Caribbean Commission in 1946, is concerned with formulating plans and recommending measures for the social and economic betterment of the territories in the Caribbean for which the member countries are responsible. It has worked on the economic, social and research needs of these dependencies and, through its biennial West Indian Conferences, has enabled West Indians from all these territories to meet and discuss united action to overcome their many common difficulties. The University College of the West Indies, situated in Jamaica, serves all the British West Indian Colonies who together meet the recurrent expenditure of the College. Many of the courses given and much of the research undertaken are based on a study of the whole area.

The Regional Labour Board, consisting of representatives from each colony, was set up in 1951 to deal with problems arising from the employment of West Indian labour abroad, particularly in the United States of America.

III. *Steps towards federation since 1945*

Until 1945 federation had been recommended primarily as a solution to the economic and social ills of the area, but in that year its importance in relation to political advance was stressed.

Colonel Stanley's 1945 despatch

In a despatch of March 1945 to the West Indian Governments, the then Secretary of State for the Colonies, Colonel Oliver Stanley, wrote '... the more immediate purpose of developing self-governing institutions in the individual British Caribbean Colonies should keep in view the larger project of their political federation ... the aim of British policy should be the development of federation in the Caribbean at such time as the balance of opinion in the various Colonies is in favour of a change, and when the development of communications makes it administratively practicable. The ultimate aim of any federation which may be established would be full internal self-government within the British Commonwealth. But ... financial stability ... is an essential accompaniment of full self-government. ...' He then went on to suggest that the issue of political federation should be debated in the legislatures of all the Colonies concerned and that if they approved the aim a conference might be called to discuss the formulation of proposals for closer association.

This despatch was subsequently debated by the legislatures of the Bahamas, Barbados, British Guiana, British Honduras, Jamaica, Leeward Islands, Trinidad and the Windward Islands. The Bahamas expressed their opposition to participation in any such federation. The legislatures of the other Colonies agreed to future discussion among themselves.

Mr. Creech Jones's 1947 memorandum

Following the debate of Colonel Stanley's despatch, the next Secretary of State for the Colonies, Mr. Creech Jones, sent the West Indian Governments in 1947 a despatch proposing that a conference should be held later in the year to consider the formulation of proposals for closer association. With this despatch he enclosed, as a starting point for discussion, a memorandum setting out the nature of the problem and discussing possible forms of federation.

The Montego Bay conference

On 11th September 1947 the Secretary of State himself opened the conference, which went on until 19th September at Montego Bay in Jamaica. It was attended by 22 delegates from Barbados, British Guiana, British Honduras, Jamaica, the Leeward and Windward Islands and Trinidad, all of whom had been nominated by the legislatures of their respective territories and represented some 3 million people living in the British Caribbean. They were accompanied by the Colonies' legal and financial advisers so that they might have expert help in dealing with practical problems.

With the exception of the representatives of British Guiana these delegates accepted the principle of a British Caribbean federation in which each constituent unit would retain complete control over all matters other than those specifically assigned to the federal government. To report on the most suitable form of federal constitution and judiciary, and the means of financing federal services, they recommended that a Standing Closer Association Committee be set up.

A number of recommendations relevant to preparing the way for political federation were also made.

Preparing for action on the Montego Bay recommendations

In a despatch on the conference, the then Secretary of State, Mr. Creech Jones, recorded his agreement with the resolution accepting the principle of federation, and

stated that the policy of the United Kingdom Government was represented in the conference resolution recommending that the political development of the territories concerned should be 'pursued as an aim in itself without prejudice and in no way subordinate to progress towards federation.'

The despatch then indicated those resolutions requiring action primarily by the United Kingdom Government and those which were chiefly the concern of the West Indian legislatures. The following are the chief recommendations that have been acted on as suggested.

Action by the United Kingdom government

- (1) The appointment of a Standing Closer Association Committee.
- (2) The appointment of a Commission to examine the question of a customs union.
- (3) The appointment of a Commission to examine unification of public services in the area.

Action by West Indian legislatures

- (1) The introduction of unified currency.
- (2) The formation of a British Caribbean Regional Economic Committee which administers a Trade Commissioner Service in London and Montreal.
- (3) The setting up of a body of primary producers.

Standing Closer Association Committee: proposals for a federation and their debate

By May 1948 the legislatures of all the territories represented at Montego Bay, including British Guiana, had agreed to participate in the work of the Standing Closer Association Committee. The members of the Committee were appointed by the legislatures and they met under the chairmanship of Sir Hubert Rance, a former Governor of Burma and now Governor of Trinidad and Tobago.

The Committee's report was published in March 1950. It recommended federation as the shortest path to self-government within the British Commonwealth for the people of the West Indies, and proposed a federation with headquarters in Trinidad. The proposed constitution followed the Australian pattern in that the federal government would have only those powers specifically given to it, all others remaining with the individual participating governments. It was suggested that the federal government should consist of:—

- (1) A Governor-General, representing Her Majesty.
- (2) A Federal Legislature composed of the Governor-General, a wholly elected House of Assembly and a nominated Senate which would act as a revisionary chamber. Representation in the House of Assembly would reflect the relative populations of the territories. In the Senate each territory would be represented by two members, except for Montserrat, which would have one. The Federal Legislature would have power to legislate on two classes of subject: a list over which it would have exclusive power (including defence, external affairs and the raising of external loans), and a list on which both the Federation and the constituent territories might legislate, Federal law prevailing.
- (3) A Federal Executive composed of the Governor-General and an advisory Council of State. This body would include a Prime Minister elected by the House of Assembly who would nominate the majority of the remaining members of the Council from among the members of the Legislature.

(4) A Federal Judicature with a Federal Supreme Court having power to hear certain types of appeal and having original jurisdiction in certain subjects.

The powers of the Governor-General, as Head of the Federal State, to reserve Bills would be limited to a defined number of subjects including defence, foreign affairs and currency.

This report has now been debated by the legislatures concerned with the following results:—

*Territories accepting
federation in principle*

Barbados

(House of Assembly)¹

Jamaica

Trinidad

Windward Islands

Leeward Islands

*Territories rejecting
federation*

British Guiana

British Honduras

Virgin Islands

In February 1952 Mr. Oliver Lyttelton sent a despatch to all the Governments concerned expressing his willingness to hold a conference in London at which delegates could discuss outstanding details, and points of difference between them, and between them and the United Kingdom Government. He emphasized the importance of thorough preliminary study by the Governments of the Rance and McLagan Reports if the conference is to reach sufficient agreement to enable a start to be made on the long job of drafting constitutional instruments. Trinidad and the Windward and Leeward Islands have stated that they will adhere generally to the Rance proposals, while the Jamaica House of Representatives, while accepting these as a basis for discussion, has indicated that the Jamaica delegates will seek greater power in the Federal Constitution for elected representatives, and adequate financial support from the start. These four Governments, together with Barbados whose final agreement is still awaited, have accordingly been invited to send delegates to a conference in London in April, 1953.

Possibilities of a Customs Union

In November 1948, Mr. J. McLagan, formerly Inspector-General of Customs and Excise in Iraq, was appointed Chairman of a Customs Union Commission. The Commission's report, published in February 1951, recommended that such a union be established as soon as possible, and claimed that it could be established with or without federation and would encourage inter-colonial trade and local industries and strengthen the position of the participating territories when negotiating international trade agreements.

The Secretary of State for the Colonies has said that 'a customs union seems to be an essential corollary of political federation', and he has accordingly requested the West Indian Governments to complete a detailed examination of the McLagan Report before the London conference. In the meantime, British Guiana, while rejecting federation, has accepted the principle of participation in a customs union.

¹ At the time of going to press the matter had still to be discussed by the Legislative Council.

Unification of Public Services

A Public Services Commission, under the Chairmanship of Sir Maurice Holmes, formerly Permanent Secretary of the United Kingdom Ministry of Education, was appointed in September 1948, and its report was published in March 1950.

This Commission considered the following branches of the Service suitable for unification:—

Administrative, Agriculture, Civil Aviation, Forestry, Legal, Medical, Police (commissioned ranks), Postal and Prison.

Promotions and transfers within the region, should be made by a Caribbean Public Services Commission. No concrete steps towards such unification have yet been taken, though the Report provides a valuable basis for future action.

Currency unification

A step towards furthering inter-Colony trade, and towards eliminating anomalies, was made in 1951 when a unified currency expressed in dollars and cents (but linked with Sterling under the colonial Sterling Exchange Standard) was introduced into the Eastern Caribbean territories of Barbados, British Guiana, the Leeward and Windward Islands, and Trinidad and Tobago. Until then these territories had used United Kingdom silver and copper as well as dollar notes issued by their own Governments which were not always acceptable in other Colonies. Under the new system the unified currency is controlled and issued by a Currency Board consisting of representatives from the participating Colonies, and although British Honduras and Jamaica have for the present decided to remain outside the scheme they are free to take part in it at any time they wish.

The Regional Economic Committee for the British West Indies, British Guiana and British Honduras

The W.I. Colonies have set up a Regional Economic Committee to administer a Trade Commissioner Service in the United Kingdom and Canada, to advise the West Indian Governments on economic matters, and to collect and disseminate economic information of interest to those Governments.

This Committee held its first meeting in May 1951 and has met four times since then. It is attended by representatives from all the participating Governments and the Economic Adviser to the Comptroller, Development and Welfare Organization, is permanent deputy chairman. The Committee is financed by contributions from each of the British Caribbean territories, and it has appointed an Executive Secretary and an Assistant Trade Commissioner to the United Kingdom. Among its other activities has been the sending of a goodwill trade mission to Canada. It is hoped that when it is fully established it will act as co-ordinating agent for all conferences and working parties dealing with commodity agreements and other economic matters such as shipping, and will enable the West Indies to be represented as a unit in international economic negotiations.

IV. *Facts about the territories concerned**Area and Population*

<i>Territory</i>	<i>Total Area</i> (sq. miles)	<i>Population</i> (1951 mid-year estimate)
Barbados	166	209,000*
British Guiana	83,000	431,000
British Honduras	8,866	70,000
Jamaica and dependencies	4,677	1,443,200
Leeward Islands:		
Antigua	171	46,000
St. Christopher and Nevis	153	49,000
Montserrat	32	13,600
Virgin Islands	67	6,500*
Trinidad and Tobago	1,981	649,000
Windward Islands:		
Dominica	305	55,000
Grenada	133	77,000*
St. Lucia	233	80,000
St. Vincent	150	67,000*

*1950 mid-year estimate.

Economy

Agriculture is the principal economic activity in the British Caribbean. A number of tropical and mainly cash crops are grown including bananas, citrus fruits, cocoa, coconuts, coffee, cotton, rice and tobacco, but the most important crop is sugar. Owing to the climate, some foodstuffs cannot be grown locally. Production of sugar in the exporting Colonies in 1951 was as follows:—

	<i>Tons</i>
Jamaica	267,928
British Guiana	217,306
Barbados	187,643
Trinidad	140,668
St. Christopher and Nevis	44,272
Antigua	18,511
St. Lucia	9,824
	<hr/> 886,152 <hr/>

The area also has some mineral resources. The oil industry in *Trinidad* is of paramount importance in that Island's economy, and production in 1951 amounted to 21.5 million barrels (app. 7 barrels = 1 metric ton). *Trinidad* is also the world's chief source of natural asphalt, and exported over 132,000 tons in 1950. *British Guiana* exports some 2 million tons of bauxite annually, and produces diamonds and gold. In *Jamaica* there are estimated to be deposits of bauxite amounting to between 200 and 315 million tons, and one Company has prepared to start mining this year.

Industrialization is also attracting attention. Most of the territories have

introduced legislation designed to encourage investment in new secondary industries, and there are now factories for the production of cigars, cigarettes, textiles, cement, tomato juice, condensed milk, soap, sauces, furniture, footwear, shirts, cosmetics, boxes, time-recording clocks, industrial gases and many other products.

Currency

The British Caribbean territories are part of the sterling area. The unit of currency in each territory and par of exchange are as follows:—

<i>Territory</i>	<i>Unit of Currency</i>	<i>Par of Exchange</i>
Barbados	West Indian Dollar	W.I. \$ 4.80 = £1 Sterling
British Guiana		
Leeward Islands		
Trinidad and Tobago		
Windward Islands		
Jamaica	Jamaica Pound	J. £1 = £1 Sterling
British Honduras	British Honduras [Dollar]	B.H. \$ 4 = £1 Sterling

Revenue and expenditure

The following table shows revenue and expenditure in 1950, 1951 and 1952. (Figures include Colonial Development and Welfare receipts and expenditure, and grants-in-aid receipts.)

£'000

Colony	1950		1951 (1)		1952 (2)	
	Revenue	Expenditure	Revenue	Expenditure	Revenue	Expenditure
Barbados	2,264	2,009	2,625	2,344	2,581	2,510
British Guiana	4,741	5,134	5,495	5,410	5,463	5,370
British Honduras	1,340	1,354	1,221	1,110	1,257	1,274
Jamaica:—	10,939	10,342	12,923	13,658	14,712	15,035
Cayman Islands	62	49	75	73	63	61
Turks & Caicos Islands	77	92	122	143	(3)	(3)
Leeward Islands:—						
Antigua	648	633	765	726	932	1,075
St. Christopher-Nevis	468	520	644	583	700	662
Montserrat	85	100	177	149	145	185
Virgin Islands	26	55	74	52	95	89
Trinidad & Tobago	10,546	10,506	11,545	11,434	11,759	12,715
Windward Islands:—						
Dominica	334	351	426	427	511	590
Grenada	787	621	821	800	708	717
St. Lucia	674	741	927	888	592	644
St. Vincent	372	400	455	483	387	442

(1) Including some provisional figures.

(2) Provisional.

(3) Data not available.

Trade

There is not a great deal of inter-Colonial trade though British Guiana exports rice to the island Colonies, and Trinidad sends cigarettes.

The trade of most of the British Caribbean territories is principally with the United Kingdom, Canada and the United States, though the proportion of the trade of each territory which is transacted with each of these countries varies considerably. In 1951 the total value of this trade was approximately as follows:—

	£ million		
	UK	Canada	USA
Exports from British Caribbean territories	31	17	6
Imports into do.	42	12	11

Since the end of the war nearly all the territories have been running a regular deficit in their visible trade. Figures for 1951 are given below.

Visible Trade—1951

(a) B.W.I. \$ million

Colony	Total Imports C.I.F.	Exports including re-Exports F.O.B.	Visible Balance of Trade
Barbados	51.89	35.46	– 16.43
British Guiana	66.88	58.90	– 7.98
British Honduras	12.41	6.23	– 6.18
Jamaica & Dependencies	149.97	84.03	– 65.94
Leeward Islands	13.72	10.22	– 3.50
Trinidad & Tobago	213.79	213.57	– 0.22
Windward Islands:—			
Dominica	5.23	2.72	– 2.51
Grenada	7.90	6.65	– 1.25
St. Lucia	5.80	2.42	– 3.38
St. Vincent	4.49	3.32	– 1.17

(a) Except British Honduras: \$4.0 = £1.

Forms of government

The constitutions of the British Caribbean Colonies except those of Barbados and Jamaica, provide for a single chamber legislature and an Executive Council. In Barbados and Jamaica, the legislature is bicameral, and will be so in British Guiana under a new constitution to be brought into force in 1953. There is universal adult suffrage in Barbados, Jamaica, Trinidad and the Windward Islands, it is being introduced in the Leeward Islands, and it will be introduced in British Guiana under the new constitution.

The composition of the executive and legislature of each territory is shown in the following table:—

The Executive

<i>Territory</i>	<i>Nature of Council or Committee</i>	<i>Membership</i>		
		<i>Official</i>	<i>Unofficial</i>	
			<i>Nominated</i>	<i>Elected</i>
Barbados	Executive Council	Governor + 2	2	
	Executive Committee (a)	Governor + 2	7	
British Guiana	Executive Council	Governor + 3	5	
British Honduras	Executive Council	Governor + 3	4	
Jamaica	Privy Council (b)	Governor + 4	2	
	Executive Council(c)	Governor + 3	2	5
Leeward Islands (d)	Federal Executive	Governor + 7	1	6
	Council			
Antigua	Executive Council	Administrator + 3	1	3
St. Christopher-Nevis	Executive Council	Administrator + 3	1	4
Montserrat	Executive Council	Commissioner + 2	1	2
Virgin Islands	Executive Council	Commissioner + 2	1	2
Trinidad and Tobago	Executive Council	Governor + 3	1	5
Windward Islands:				
Dominica	Executive Council	Governor + 3	1	3
Grenada	Executive Council	Governor + 3	1	3
St. Lucia	Executive Council	Governor + 3	1	3
St. Vincent	Executive Council	Governor + 3	1	3

- (a) Introduces all money votes, prepares the estimates and initiates all Government measures. Comprises all members of the Executive Council, one member of the Legislative Council and four members of the House of Assembly appointed on the recommendation of its leader.
- (b) Advises the Governor on the exercise of his disciplinary powers over members of the Government service and on the exercise of the Royal Prerogative of Mercy.
- (c) Proposals are now under discussion to give the members of the House of Representatives on the Executive Council a majority, to establish separate Ministries and allot executive functions to Ministers.
- (d) The Colony of the Leeward Islands consists of four Presidencies with a General Federal Executive Council and Legislature as well as Presidential ones. The Leeward Islands are getting a new constitution, involving universal suffrage and a majority of elected members on the various Legislative Councils who are to elect from their number the unofficial members of the Executive Councils. The governor has also introduced what is known as the 'Committee System' whereby some of the elected members on Executive Council are appointed chairmen of Committees with advisory responsibility for such subjects as Public Works, Social Services and Trade and Production. The necessary revised Constitutional Instruments are at present in draft, but the system has already been established under the present Instruments, applied in the spirit of the new ones.

The Legislature					
Territory	Nature of Council	Membership			Total
		Official	Unofficial		
			Nominated	Elected	
Barbados	{ Legislative Council	4	11		15
	{ House of Assembly			24	24
British Guiana	Legislative Council	Governor + 3	7	14	25
British Honduras	Legislative Council	Governor + 3	14	6	14
Jamaica (a)	{ Legislative Council	5	10		15
	{ House of Representatives			32	32
Leeward Islands:	Federal Legislative Council	Governor + 8	2	13	24
Antigua	Legislative Council	Administrator + 2	3	8	14
St. Christopher-Nevis	Legislative Council	Administrator + 2	3	8	14
Montserrat	Legislative Council	Commissioner + 2	2	5	10
Virgin Islands	Legislative Council	Commissioner + 2	2	4	9
Trinidad and Tobago	Legislative Council (b)	3	5	18	26
Windward Islands:					
Dominica	Legislative Council	Administrator + 2	3	8	14
Grenada	Legislative Council	Administrator + 2	3	8	14
St. Lucia	Legislative Council	Administrator + 2	3	8	14
St. Vincent	Legislative Council	Administrator + 2	3	8	14

(a) Bills must ordinarily be passed by both bodies before they become law; the delaying power of Legislative Council is limited to one year.

(b) Presided over by a voteless Speaker appointed by the Governor from outside the Council.

11 CO 1031/751, no 308

[April 1953]

'The West Indian Federation conference': CO communiqué no 14 summarising the results of the 1953 London conference

The West Indian Federation Conference met in London from 13th to 30th April. It was attended by Delegates from Antigua, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, Jamaica, Montserrat, St. Kitts, Nevis and Anguilla, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Trinidad and Tobago, and the United Kingdom. Observers also attended from British Guiana and British Honduras, whose Legislatures had already declared themselves against participation in a Federation.

2. The purpose of the Conference was to try to reach agreement on the main features of a federal scheme, taking as a basis for discussion the proposals in the Report of the British Caribbean Standing Closer Association Committee (SCAC) which was published in March 1950 (Col. No. 255).

3. The Conference discussed the federal scheme set out in the SCAC Report and agreed to certain modifications in it. The main changes are as follows:—

(a) Certain amendments should be made to recognise the principle that there should be the greatest possible freedom of movement within the Federation.

(b) The number of seats in the Senate should be reduced by the number originally allocated to British Guiana and British Honduras, that is from 23 to 19.

(c) The title of the House of Assembly should be altered to House of Representatives, and that the allocation of seats should be as follows:—

Barbados	5
Jamaica	17
Antigua	2
St. Kitts, Nevis and Anguilla	2
Montserrat	1
Trinidad and Tobago	10
Grenada	2
St. Vincent	2
St. Lucia	2
Dominica	2
	<hr/>
	45
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As Montserrat has only one seat, there should be provision for an alternate.

(d) For the first 5 years of Federation, a person should be allowed to be a member of both the Legislature in his unit and of the Federal Legislature, but he should not be a member of the Executive body in both.

(e) Certain changes should be made in the categories of bills which the Governor-General should be empowered to reserve for the signification of Her Majesty's pleasure.

(f) Changes should also be made in the list of subjects on which Her Majesty-in-Council should have power to legislate for the Federation, including the deletion of the power to legislate for securing and maintaining public safety in an emergency, this being a matter for the unit governments.

(g) For the first 5 years, the Council of State, under the chairmanship of the Governor-General, should consist of:—

- (i) the Prime Minister;
- (ii) 3 Officials appointed by the Governor-General in his discretion;
- (iii) 7 members nominated by the Prime Minister, and
- (iv) 3 Senators appointed by the Governor-General-in-Council.

(h) The Council of State should be the principal instrument of policy in the Federal Government. In the matter of the appointment and dismissal of members of the Council, the Governor-General should, except as otherwise provided, act in accordance with the constitutional conventions applicable to the exercise of a similar function in the United Kingdom by Her Majesty.

(i) The Conference agreed that the 25% of customs revenues recommended by the SCAC Report as the maximum amount to be retained by the Federal Government for federal purposes should be reduced. They decided that on present indications a figure of 15% made up approximately of ten per cent for those Federal costs at present envisaged plus one half of this amount for additional Federal functions and for reserves, would initially be adequate and adopted this figure as the new maximum. The Conference agreed that an independent enquiry on the eve of Federation shall establish more firmly the estimates of annual Federal costs and this might result in the amount retained by the Federation in the first years being less than 15%.

(j) Provision should be made in the federal Constitution for its amendment by Federal law, subject to safeguards protecting the rights of the units.

(k) During the fifth year from the date of the coming into existence of the Federation there should be a conference to review the federal constitution.

(l) The seat of government of the Federation should be in Grenada instead of in Trinidad as recommended by SCAC.

4. The Conference agreed with the SCAC recommendation that the name of the Federation should be "The British Caribbean Federation".

5. The Conference were [sic] informed that Her Majesty's Government recognised that at the outset the proposed Federation would need some financial assistance and was therefore ready to follow up the recommendations on this matter made in the SCAC Report.

Firstly, the region would continue to share in such financial assistance towards Colonial Development and Welfare as Her Majesty's Government is able to make available to Colonial territories.

Secondly, subject to the approval of Parliament, Her Majesty's Government would make available to the Federation in the first ten years, grants intended to cover the budget deficits of those units which in spite of their best efforts could not pay their way. The annual amount to be paid in each of the first five years would be negotiated nearer the time of Federation but would not be less than the average of the ordinary deficits of grant aided colonies during the three years previous to Federation. Further negotiations would take place in respect of the second five years. Assistance in this form did not exclude the possibility of Her Majesty's Government considering special assistance to unit governments, in case of natural disasters, e.g. hurricanes, if the need were established.

Finally, Her Majesty's Government would be willing subject to the submission of prepared schemes, to invite Parliament to make a grant of up to £500,000 towards the capital cost of establishing the Federal Headquarters.

6. The West Indian delegations concluded that the SCAC proposals subject to the modifications agreed at the Conference, provided an acceptable and workable plan for a federation, and undertook to support the plan as a whole in their respective territories and when it came before their Legislatures. They were assured that Her Majesty's Government welcomed the agreement reached and that, if it was accepted by the West Indian Legislatures, Her Majesty's Government would take those measures which had been indicated to the Conference to enable the Federation to be set up.

7. The above is a summary of the main recommendations of the Conference. The full report will shortly be published as a White Paper simultaneously in London and in the West Indies.

12 CO 1031/128, no 22 5 May 1953
 [British Guiana]: intelligence report for April 1953 by W A Orrett¹ on
 the general election and the prospects for internal security [Extract]

...

2. *Political activities*

(a) *Organisations of security interest*

(i) *People's Progressive Party*. The Party was successful in the General Elections, as indeed foreshadowed in many previous Special Branch reports, beyond even the

¹ Commissioner of police, British Guiana.

expectations of their own leaders, collecting a sweeping majority of 18 seats out of 24 in the new House of Assembly.²

Special Branch records of Election meeting attendances for the period 24th March to 26th April are given below:—

<i>Name of Party</i>	<i>No. of meetings held</i>	<i>Largest Attendance</i>	<i>Average</i>	<i>Total Number of persons attending during period</i>
P.P.P.	132	10,000	1,153	152,245
N.D.P.	68	2,000	451	30,693
P.N.P.	38	800	155	5,918
U.G.P.	44	2,000	190	8,360

The above figures are a clear reflection of the wide following the Party has among the working class and of their complete success in obtaining the labour vote. As shown in my report for March these meetings throughout the Colony, carefully followed by the Special Branch, have proved to be a safe guide to public opinion among the working class and to the result of the General Elections.

The Party's success can be attributed to six outstanding factors:—

(i) the thorough organisation of the Party machine operated through well-run branch groups throughout the Colony for more than three years under the guidance of trained political minds (notably Dr. & Mrs. Jagan³ and Linden Burnham), and with no effective opposition party in the field to offer a counter-attraction.

(ii) the unprecedented success in this Colony of African and Indian unity under one political Organisation forged by the untiring effort of Dr. Jagan and L.F.S. Burnham. The former has made his name a password among the Indian working classes, especially on the over-populated sugar estates throughout the Colony, and the latter has the same if not higher prestige among the Africans. Both have strong support among Africans and Indians alike because they have always shown themselves consistently opposed to racialism and have proved it by the equitable race balance they have scrupulously maintained in their Party executive.

(iii) the complete defeat of racialism as an issue in the General Elections by accepting its existence outside Party ranks and apportioning party candidates strictly in accordance with race predominance in various constituencies. (However, it must be noted that it is a remarkable feature of the Elections that in a few constituencies a large number of Indians voted for African candidates and vice versa, notably Mrs. Jane Gay, who collected the majority of Indian votes from predominantly Indian Plantation Enmore and Chandra Persaud who collected a

² The election was held on 27 Apr 1953. Two seats were won by the NDP, the other four by independents. The parties polled as follows: PPP 77,613 votes; NDP 20,442; UGP 5,961; PNP 2,274.

³ Wife of Cheddi Jagan; first woman elected to Georgetown Town Council; editor, *The Thunder*, 1950–1964; general secretary, PPP, 1953; elected to Legislative Council; appointed deputy speaker; first woman imprisoned for a political offence in British Guiana and the British Caribbean during the emergency, 1953–1956; restricted to Georgetown, 1957; minister of labour, health and housing, 1961 (first woman to hold ministerial appointment); minister of home affairs, 1963, resigned 2 June 1964 (see 221).

large number of African votes in the Mahaica-Mahaicony constituency where he was opposed by a popular candidate of African descent among others.)

(iv) the success the Party has achieved in identifying itself as the champion of the working class thus winning the labour vote.

(v) the support from the indigenous professional classes particularly the medical profession and the Civil Service clerical and subordinate grades won by playing down and obscuring the communist taint of certain Party leaders and presenting their success at the polls as the best hope for broad social and economic reforms. (There are also a number of Party supporters in the Police Force, many of them identified but this was not an important factor in the election results.)

(vi) the profound desire by many people for a change from the old order which they saw expressed in the P.P.P. as the only political Organisation in the field with unity of purpose, sound Organisation, consistent leadership and a tangible programme to offer.

“Vote splitting” as a factor, while it could fairly be said to have been responsible for a number of P.P.P. victories, notably that of Clinton Wong over John Carter, Chandra Persaud over Eric Phillips and F.O. Van Sertima over P.A. Cummings, clearly did not give the P.P.P. their majority and at most its absence might have reduced their majority to 14. . . .

8. General

The effect of the general elections on the internal security of the colony

(I) *The industrial and domestic sphere.* The immediate implications of the Election results from the Security viewpoint as far as can be judged from the available Special Branch information and careful observation of Party meetings and statements of policy in the election period, can be set out as the obvious necessity to consolidate the Party's prestige and position by implementing legislation early in the first Session of the new House of Assembly, to give effect to those social reform measures which will immediately show concrete benefits and relief to the working classes and unemployed.

Judging by past speeches these measures will include:—

- (i) Slum clearance and housing projects with emphasis on sugar estate areas.
- (ii) A higher minimum wage Order and Old Age pension at 55.
- (iii) Speeding up of present development projects and taking steps to open up new fields of development with a view to showing an early improvement in the unemployment position.

To this end it may be expected that overtures will be made to outside capital and local business interests. It is clear that to succeed with measures of the nature mentioned above all will depend on the success of the Party in restoring confidence among capital and business interests. It also depends equally on the ability of business interests like Booker Bros. and the Demerara Bauxite Company to face facts and make sincere efforts to co-operate with the new Government, to meeting them halfway and giving them a chance to prove their intentions. If such co-operation is not forthcoming and there are many business executives loath to face the realities of the new position, the P.P.P. will undoubtedly go to the country and lay the responsibility for their failure on the shoulders of business and industry. It is in that

event, with their wide control and support of Labour Unions, that we may expect internal unrest and disturbances in the Colony.

(II) *Communist infiltration.* As I have shown in previous reports, the P.P.P. is by no means a Communist organisation as such, but is exploited by a tight clique of Communists or “fellow-travellers” in the Executive as being the nearest approach to a National Front movement aiming at self-government, the first objective of a Communist movement in any Colonial territory. The danger of further infiltration through the sweeping majority gained in the House of Assembly is therefore a distinct possibility.

I give below a list of the Communist section and the non-Communist or “self-government” section, who are now in the House of Assembly:—

Communist Section

Cheddie [sic] Jagan, Member for
Corentyne
Janet Jagan, Member for
Western Essequibo
Sydney King,⁵ Member for
Central Demerara
F. Bowman, Member for
Demerara-Essequibo

*Blind followers of Jagan with no
particular ideology or convictions*

Mohamed Khan, Member for
Corentyne River
Chandra Persaud, Member for
Mahaica-Mahaicony
Adjoda Singh, Member for
Berbice River
Ramkarran, Member for West
Central Demerara

*Non-Communist “self-Government”
section*

L.F.S. Burnham, Member for
Georgetown North East
Ashton Chase,⁴ Member for
Georgetown South
Clinton Wong, Member for
Georgetown South Central

*Followers of Burnham with no
particular ideology or convictions*

Jessie Burnham, Georgetown
Central
F.O. Van Sertima, Member for
Georgetown North

*Individualists prepared to
swing to either side*

Dr. J. Latchmansingh[sic],⁶ Member for East Bank, Demerara (fanatical figure in the sugar estates labour sphere)
Balli Latchmansingh[sic], Member for Western Berbice (Brother and follower of the Doctor)
Mrs. Jane Phillips-Gay, Member for East Central Demerara (a follower of the Doctor)
Jenarine [sic] Singh,⁷ Member for West Bank, Demerara (a close friend of both Burnham and Jagan and will support either or both according to political expediency)

⁴ Minister of labour, industry and commerce in 1953 PPP government.

⁵ Minister of communications and works in 1953 PPP government; detained during emergency; resigned from PPP, 1957; defeated at 1959 general election; jointed People's National Congress but expelled when he advocated partition; founded African Society for Racial Equality.

⁶ Dr J Lachhmansingh, minister of health and housing in the 1953 PPP government.

⁷ Jai Narine Singh, minister of local government and social welfare in the 1953 PPP government.

Further evidence of this distinct division in ideology in the party executive was clearly shown in the March 1953 edition of the Communist-controlled "Caribbean News". Significantly in this publication the success of the party's election campaign was widely displayed but all the credit and publicity was given to *Dr. Jagan* and *Sydney King* and not to Burnham and Company. It can be seen from the above that the Communist section have powerful influence but they are well-balanced by the section under Burnham who threatens to rival Jagan's position. It must be remembered that the difference between Burnham and Jagan is essentially one of final aim and that as so much hard work is necessary before either aim can be achieved they are likely to remain united for a long time as they have come so far as a direct result of their union. To achieve this Jagan will probably be prepared to keep overt Communist activities away from the Party under the façade of the Peace Committee, recognising that the Party owes its numerical support and power to a labour electorate and *not* to a Communist following. For Burnham's part he will in all probability be prepared to keep his desire for final leadership in the background.

(III) *The neutralisation of positive repressive measures against communism in British Guiana*

It is likely that attempts will be made to introduce the following measures to satisfy the electorate as to the extremist election promises made:—

- (i) The repeal of the Subversive Literature Bill, (an extract from a recent speech by Ashton Chase, one of the Party leaders, speaks for itself:—"The P.P.P. has pledged itself to the people that all laws banning the subversive literature will be torn up and thrown in waste baskets".)
- (ii) Again and again Jagan and Burnham and their party leaders have emphasised in their election speeches that they will repeal the Orders-in-Council under the Immigration Ordinance, banning the entry of Ferdinand Smith, Richard Hart, William Strachan, Rojas and other regional Communist leaders from this Colony.

It is clear that with the above measures implemented the repressive action against Communism (discussed by Government) as to travel control and subversive literature insofar as this Colony is concerned will be rendered ineffective (vide SBS GEN 11/50).

This Colony may then be expected to become the central meeting place for Caribbean Communist leaders, such as they are, and for the continued dissemination of Communist propaganda through the Peace Committee, and Pioneer Youth League which are, of course, controlled by executives of the Communist section of the P.P.P. mentioned above. However, the former measure relating to travel control has advantages as well as disadvantages in its withdrawal from the security point of view, as it may become possible for Special Branch to establish an efficient listening post in this Colony into plans and negotiations made by regional Communist leaders should they attempt to come here.

To sum up it would appear that from a general security aspect the Colony may be in for a quiet period in the opening phase of the new Government's life always provided that a willingness for co-operation is shown by industrial interests and that on the other side Ministerial responsibility induces a period of moderation and constructive legislation by the P.P.P. while they consolidate their position. A quick

glance at the mental incapacity and lack of education and experience of some of the new Members makes it appear likely that Jagan and Burnham will be able to effect complete control of the Government in the orbit allotted to the elected Ministers whether they become Ministers themselves or not.

13 CO 1031/119, no 27

13 Sept 1953

[British Guiana]: letter from Sir A Savage to Sir T Lloyd on the PPP government and the economic situation. *Enclosure*: notes by the governor

I apologise for the delay in replying to your letter of the 22nd July but apart from the considerable travelling I have undertaken, the problem is unique and complex and I wanted to have more experience of the Ministers and their actions before writing you fully. Of course I agree generally with the different points of policy to which you refer and I assure you I will keep the Secretary of State well informed of developments. But I feel the real problem is something far more subtle and difficult and will not be solved merely by the use of reserve powers.

The new Constitution has operated now for roughly four months. It is a fact that the P.P.P. have no planned policy and except for Jagan, the new Ministers had had no experience of Government departments or of normal administration. I still think that it is true to say that they were themselves unprepared for their landslide victory at the polls and had expected to find themselves in the role of a strong obstructive and disrupting opposition. It was inevitable that the new Government would suffer from growing pains, make some mistakes and until the International Bank Report arrived (which was to be the basis of a planned programme of development and taxation) it would be attacked by the opposition inside and outside of the Legislature for not making progress. I say it had no planned policy: although its election manifesto indicated broad lines of policy, it was a scurrilous document which I suggested to each Minister would best be forgotten if we were to obtain the confidence of the country and of overseas territories on whom we should depend for the capital for development.

In early conversations (and indeed subsequently to date) some of the P.P.P. Ministers and members of the House volunteered to me privately that they intended to work for a stable and not extremist policy. But all exhibit the deepest bitterness against H.M.G. and the companies and businesses I have ever experienced. Their general line is that all previous governments were dominated by big business and now they intend to dominate the country in the interests of the "working class". Added to this is a fanatical hatred by the African Ministers of the white race.

In spite of the growing difficulties I persisted in a policy of tolerance, goodwill and co-operation, but it became evident that there was little intention on their part to co-operate with me or the other members of Executive Council or, in some cases, with Heads of Departments. This does not mean to say that some progress has not been made but, as I pointed out to Jagan weeks ago, most Ministers appeared to spend most of their time on matters with a political flavour and some on questions affecting the Civil Service which were outside of their constitutional purview. Also it would be fair to say that there have been one or two notable occasions when we have

been able to persuade them to drop or defer some proposed objectionable policy particularly in economic matters. As a general rule, however, they face us in Executive Council with their minds made up as the result of previous discussion at what they have recently termed their "Council of Ministers"—(I have asked them to desist from using this expression)—and it is practically impossible to induce them to accept any reasonable compromise. I have no doubt that if they would adopt a more co-operative policy with the officials much more could be achieved.

But whilst in Executive Council Ministers have behaved themselves with a certain amount of propriety (although Sydney King and Burnham have on occasion shown a scarcely veiled insolence of manner), outside it their actions and speeches are quite irresponsible and during the recent crisis have verged on the seditious. In the House of Assembly this week Burnham has spoken of meeting "with sufficient force" any attempt to withdraw the new constitution and of being "willing to shed their blood, if necessary, for freedom".

The obvious question which poses itself is whether or not they intend to continue to work within the framework of the new constitution. I believe that at present some of them do, in the expectation that Her Majesty's Government would concede full self-government in 1956, though it remains to be seen what their reaction would be if and when the State Council imposes a check on any measure put forward by the House of Assembly. But the extremist element, with Mrs. Jagan and Sydney King in the van, appear to believe that by creating disorder and economic chaos they could force the issue of self-government earlier. For the moment there is no doubt that the extremists dominate the position and the moderates, if indeed they are moderates, are afraid to declare themselves publicly and even tend to vie with the extremists on some issues—maybe through fear of losing ground but the effect is the same. An example of this is the recently formed "African and Colonial Affairs Committee", of which Burnham and Chase are leading lights: one of its objects is probably to build up their political strength and prestige vis-à-vis the Jagan group, but it specialises in vicious anti-British, anti-white propaganda of the worst type.

Hence these party differences do not assist the cause of moderation—rather the reverse. In any case there is no doubt that the Governor, the official members of Executive Council and the State Council are the common enemy and it may well be that before you receive this letter a resolution may be tabled in the House saying that the Government is unable to carry out its plans without full self-government.

The technique of the extremists for the present appears to be to press for legislative action only in matters which will not split the party and in the meantime to develop its organisation throughout the country and to obtain party control of every possible human activity. They are hard at work trying to undermine the Civil Service, exploiting every possible cause of discontent, resorting to intimidation: they have their cells and spies in most departments. The police are thought to be 75% reliable at the moment, but here again malcontents are being used as foci for the spread of disaffection. Recognised youth organisations, the Boy Scouts and Girl Guides, the Y.M.C.A. and so on, are subjected to attack and the communist Pioneer Youth Movement is being given their official support. In this and countless other directions the foundations of society are being attacked insidiously almost without check.

By this insidious undermining process, the party could in time secure a more or less complete grip of the country, irrespectively of whether I step in, as I shall no doubt have to do before long, and use my reserved powers on this or that individual

issue. The crucial question is how long and how far should we allow this process to continue and how can we stop it? It seemed to me that the crux of the position lies with the 51% of voters who put the P.P.P. in power. An ineffective number might perhaps vote against the P.P.P. on the next occasion through dissatisfaction with their policy, but even here there is the intimidation factor to be reckoned with. My personal policy has been to get among the 51% to demonstrate that I am deeply interested in their well being and by constant contact with small groups when travelling try to get their confidence for there are many who would respond to sound leadership. The enclosed notes will give you more of the background.

The 49% who voted against the P.P.P. are completely lacking in effective leadership and cohesion and have little moral courage. Even the prestige which still attaches to the position of Governor here has the unfortunate result that in time of difficulty such as this the "opposition" tend to look helplessly to him for intervention, when the solution really lies in their own hands. Of course it may be that the outcome of the present strike or some other factor will cause a revulsion of feeling against the P.P.P., but in the absence of other leadership, particularly in the sugar areas, they would probably succumb to the intimidation and other pressures which I have mentioned above and drift back. In fact, I am rapidly coming to the conclusion that unless the opposition elements in the country rouse themselves quickly and wake up to their obligations and opportunities, then to retain British Guiana in the Commonwealth we shall have to go back on the new Constitution which would mean the use of force and the maintenance of military forces here for some considerable time.

At a recent meeting with the leading businessmen here I pressed the problem on them and the part that they could play in arresting the deterioration of the situation. Unfortunately, I feel that some of them, supported particularly by the Portuguese community, consider the best solution is to hasten the breakdown of the constitution and to press Her Majesty's Government to go back to a less liberal system.

Also may I say with respect that if Her Majesty's Government considers domestically and at an international level that British Guiana must be kept within the Commonwealth it must give more assistance in the propaganda field and assist to remove the conditions in the economic field on which communist propaganda thrives.

Finally, as regards policy in the event of the resignation of Ministers from Executive Council and/or from the House of Assembly, I understand the remaining numbers will allow us to continue without a *general* election but I have asked the Attorney General to prepare a memorandum on this and other contingencies and will forward it as soon as possible.

I realise that this letter is very patchy but you will realise that I am writing under heavy pressure. I should welcome an opportunity for discussion but that is not possible for the present and so I am looking forward very much to the visit of the Minister of State next month.

Enclosure to 13

British Guiana has a basic sugar economy of restricted output which provides *frugal conditions* of life for many people, a mining industry which gives *good conditions* for

a smaller number and a growing rice industry which does not appear to be really economic at world prices, and whose workers depend also on sugar and P.W.D. expenditure to support *poor conditions* of life. Coupled with this there is a rapidly increasing population which, unless there is hidden wealth in the interior, will mean poorer standards of living in the future. The generous grants of H. M. G. have done much to assist the local situation but the economic outlook is grim.

I have now toured all the densely populated areas and seen for myself the general conditions of life. There is indeed, as elsewhere, much fertile ground for communists. The vast majority of the people are not communists but there is no doubt that they felt the voice of the common people was not heard in the previous councils of state and they demanded a change. Unfortunately, generally speaking, the only leadership offered was the highly organized P.P.P. party [sic].

Local Government, certainly in the rural areas, is almost dead. There is no real leadership among its members.

The District Administration bears no resemblance to that of the African colonies. It started too late. District Commissioners are in the main ineffective and almost ignored by all.

The Press has but little influence on the mass of the people.

The Churches are full and although their leaders do have some influence, in the main they do not affect the lowest income groups as only recently, with notable exceptions, they have appreciated their responsibilities in social affairs.

There is no real political opposition to the party in power. There are too many parties and independents and again no apparent leadership. Attempts are now being made to correct this in relation to the forthcoming by-election.

The European Guianese have not yet recovered from the shock of the elections but they are not prepared to enter politics and indeed anti-white feeling is growing, fed by propaganda, and soon no white candidate will stand a chance of being elected. Unfortunately there is a fairly strong feeling by local Europeans against overseas Europeans. There is no real leadership in the European community. The majority of the leading business men are employees.

In the above circumstances it is not surprising that the P.P.P. not only won the elections but have met with some success in strengthening their position subsequently. It is probably true that some of their supporters are becoming a little critical, particularly in Georgetown, but they are not an effective number. The outcome of the sugar strike may affect the position temporarily.

The party members are a very mixed lot ranging from labourers to professional men and owners of substantial property. The six opposition members are of poor quality.

The six Ministers are said to be made up of three Extremists (Jagan, King and Lachhmansingh) and three Moderates (Burnham, Jenaraine Singh and Chase). There is no substance in Lachhmansingh and he is kicked around by his colleagues. The rest are very capable people and I believe far more intelligent than the previous Executive Council. After four months' experience I trust only one of them (Chase). Jagan, Jenaraine [sic] Singh and Chase appear to be working very hard and to a determined purpose to improve conditions. Burnham, whose popularity is said to be waning in Georgetown, is lazy, acid and flippant; King holds papers up and is vicious in his attacks, while Lachhmansingh flounders helplessly in everything he touches.

Every one of these men has a deep bitterness of feeling against Britain, the past

administration and/or against society generally. Jagan, brought up on a sugar estate; Burnham, twice abused publicly overseas for being black; Jenaraine [sic] Singh, a qualified agronomist, failed to obtain an appointment in this his country; Chase, a reasonable trade unionist labelled communist unfairly; Lachhmansingh and King warned off certain sugar estates.

The majority of the other P.P.P. members in the House of Assembly appear to be supporters of the Extremists.

The "behind scenes" work being done by Mrs. Jagan and others is insidious and dangerous. She is a brilliant organizer and is by no means resting on her laurels and in every district where no P.P.P. unit presently exists, an organization is being developed. But no real opposition is being developed.

The sugar estates are to a considerable extent the crux of the situation. It is there that the extremist is well supported. It is so easy for him to point to the dreadful housing and social conditions which exist (and to ignore the improvements) and compare them with the comfortable quarters and the neat compounds and the recreational facilities of the staff who are predominantly European. It is also easy for him to allege unfair profits being transferred to absentee landlords and to blame, as is done, the British Government for the conditions which exist.

I have been in the homes, in the fields and in the workshops, and I believe that many of these people would have responded, and may yet respond, to sympathetic and sane leadership. I did not see one library on the estates I visited so the people read the extremist literature provided by the Party. A swimming bath might cost the companies the interest on the capital involved and although not vital would have reflected an interest of the owners in their workpeople. But it is the housing aspect where I feel the companies have been so shortsighted. After the special sugar funds were instituted, the companies appear to have taken the line that the contribution of 10/- a ton to the Labour Welfare Fund was *their money* and relieved them of the obligation of doing anything further in respect of general housing and unnecessary for them to take advantage of the very generous Income Tax concessions in respect of workers' housing.

The attack on overseas officers in the Civil Service is fairly general and has not been relieved by the numerous discussions I have had individually and collectively with Ministers. I fear too that there have been many weaknesses in the past in the Establishment Section of the Secretariat for which we are now suffering and that the previous Promotions Board was not objective or efficient.

The most serious aspect from a security point of view are [sic] the attacks on police morale. I believe the Force to be loyal but some Ministers (particularly Sydney King) have been provocative and threatening in recent public speeches.

We have not learnt much of Mrs. Jagan's recent visit to Europe but from odd remarks I suspect that in addition to the Communist literature we shall be receiving visits from overseas communists (not only West Indian) and possibly proposals for appointment of Russian technicians and professional officers at low rates of pay, if not an approach from a company of Russian origin anxious to develop our resources.

There is a lot of racial feeling here. In spite of nationalistic slogans, there is a deep distrust by the African of the Indian and a physical fear of the African by the Indian. Many Africans hate the white man, while the Portuguese are probably more responsible than anybody for racial feelings. The African feels too that rice, which is predominantly an Indian crop, has received unfair preference in capital expenditure.

"White" clubs are a threat to security. One of these clubs recently blackballed a worthy Chinese citizen.

There is very little social contact between white people and others. At the Coronation Ball at Government House a group of "whites" left early after a "Paul Jones".

14 CO 1031/119

16 Sept 1953

[British Guiana]: minute by J W Vernon¹ on the justification for intervention to remove the PPP government

Mr. Mayle

1. The attached analysis² of the political situation in British Guiana, which has been prepared partly as a brief for Mr. Hopkinson on his forthcoming visit to the territory, makes it clear that a very grave situation is developing. It is evident that there is an important section of the People's Progressive Party in British Guiana, including some of the Ministers, which is trying to turn the territory into a Republic completely independent of the United Kingdom with a Communist political bias and a leaning towards Russia rather than the West in international affairs. Other elements in the Party wish merely to see freedom from British yoke or improved social conditions for the people, but control of the Party is firmly vested in the hands of the extremists. They are doing everything to strengthen their hold by classical communist methods, such as the organisation of specific sections of the community (e.g. youth, women), by cells, by classes in political indoctrination, rallies, peace conferences, etc. They are also increasing their hold over labour through the trade unions they control and are trying to infiltrate into the police and the public service on the lines followed by Communist Parties in Eastern Europe after the war. Such political opposition as there is to the party is pathetically inadequate in the face of this organisation. If the Communists are allowed to continue their activities unchecked they will gradually tighten their grip on the organs of control and propaganda until they feel strong enough to make an all-out bid to throw off the British "yoke" entirely. In the meantime the economic situation of the country would gradually deteriorate, capital would move out of the territory as far as it was able and eventually only massive aid from outside, which is not likely to be forthcoming, would save the country from economic chaos. Moderate opinion would be more and more afraid to come out in open opposition to an apparently all powerful and ruthless communist party.

2. From the point of view of the Cominform a Communist victory in one small bit of the South American continent is of no particular value in itself. To it the attractiveness of such a development would be that it would provide a centre for organising Communist activity throughout the British West Indies and Central and South America. This constitutes the gravest danger in the present situation from the Western point of view (see Sir T. Lloyd's letter of 4th September). Ministers have made use of their powers under the constitution to have the bans on West Indian Communists withdrawn. The proposal to organise a Peace Conference is an

¹ Principal, CO, West Indian Dept 'B'.

² See 13.

indication of further plans on the same lines. The position in this respect therefore is slowly but steadily deteriorating. It is, moreover, not counterbalanced by any apparent increase in reasonableness amongst any of the Ministers on economic or social matters nor has the hoped-for split between the moderates and the extremists developed.

3. It has already been agreed (see Sir T. Lloyd's letter of 22nd July) that if Ministers attempt to use their position to further the communist cause then immediate action should be taken before the situation gets out of hand. It might be argued, that since the people of British Guiana chose this government it is undemocratic to intervene and that we should wait until they have learnt the disadvantages of Communism and reject it for themselves. Intervention at an appropriate moment can however be justified on the following grounds:—

(a) the economic consequences of leaving the present government in power will be so serious for the people themselves as to justify us protecting them from their own folly.

(b) the bauxite, sugar and rice exported by the territory are important to other countries—the bauxite is of very considerable importance to Canada's aluminium production and hence to our aircraft production, the loss of the sugar would involve the U.K. in the purchase of \$25 million worth of dollar sugar per annum and the rice feeds many people in the Eastern Caribbean.

(c) the encouragement given to communism in other B.W.I. territories would have serious repercussions.

(d) the appearance of an overtly communist regime in British Guiana and its use as a communist centre would seriously embarrass the U.K. in its diplomatic relations with U.S.A. and other countries of the Western Hemisphere.

(e) there is the over-riding objection that we cannot allow a Communist Government to remain in power in a British territory since its whole attitude must constitute a grave threat to the preservation there of law, order, justice and democratic rights as we know them.

4. The power to intervene in British Guiana still rests in our hands. The Governor has reserve powers to act contrary to the advice of the Ministers in Executive Council and to certify legislation. If necessary the Constitution can be withdrawn by Order in Council. A note on the legal issues involved is attached.³ Any civil commotion fomented by the extremists would not be difficult to handle in view of the geographical configuration of the territory, although if trouble extended beyond the sugar estates troops would probably be needed. There is a battalion stationed in Jamaica at 48 hours readiness to move and H.M.S. "Bigbury Bay" is in Trinidad waters. It would be important to avoid bloodshed but the use of tear gas would probably be effective. None of the Ministers except possibly Sydney King is likely to prove to be a good leader of violent insurrection.

5. There are now three possible eventualities:—

(i) The extremists will realize the errors of their ways and reform. Our hope that that would happen is gradually fading.

(ii) Ministers will continue their campaign of attrition which will slowly

³ Not printed.

undermine our position without providing any excuse for vigorous action against them. It may then be necessary to take action on a matter which is trivial in itself but which is felt to be the "sticking point" beyond which Ministers cannot be allowed to go. (Sir Thomas Lloyd's letter of 22nd July refers to this possibility). It would be difficult in such circumstances to justify not holding fresh elections which might very well return the same Ministers to power and thus weaken our case against them. Nevertheless no alternative to such action may be open to us and a case history of the misdeeds of Ministers should be maintained for use in that eventuality.

(iii) Ministers may commit themselves, possibly inadvertently, to some action which would fully justify the Governor in the eyes of the world in sacking them and suspending the constitution. The spreading of the present sugar strike may well provide such an opportunity. There can now be no doubt any such opportunity should be vigorously seized and all necessary preparations should be made for the action that would then be necessary.

6. The Governor has already been informed in various letters from Sir Thomas Lloyd [of] our views on possible developments. It would now seem necessary to inform him that the behaviour of Ministers since the letter of the 22nd July has led us to believe that action against them is very probably sooner or later going to be necessary, to propose to him that preparations for that action be now taken and that a full case history of the actions of Ministers and their associates should be maintained. It should also be pointed out to him that any concessions to Ministers which would make subsequent action against them more difficult (e.g. allowing them to pack local authorities with their adherents) ought to be avoided from now on.

7. When the communist threat had been countered a long and difficult period of social and economic rehabilitation would start. The unemployment and bad housing conditions on which communism has battered in British Guiana will have to be removed and the populace educated in the virtues of true democracy so that they do not fall victims to the blandishments of Communists again.

15 CO 1031/119, no 29

24 Sept 1953

[British Guiana]: outward telegram no 21 from Mr Lyttelton to Sir A Savage on intervention to remove the PPP government and the introduction of emergency powers

Your telegrams Personal No. 37, No. 49 and No. 51 and my telegram Personal No. 20.

Political situation

It has become increasingly clear to me from your recent reports including your letter to Lloyd of the 13th September¹ that there was no prospect of Ministers acting

¹ See 13.

responsibly and foregoing their extremist aims. It was clearly right on the introduction of the new Constitution to try to do all that tact, patience and tolerance could achieve to win them away from the extremists and to see whether the responsibilities of office would make them see reason. It is however clear that they have no intention of working the present Constitution in the interests of the people of British Guiana as a whole, but are seeking a one party totalitarian control of the country and a link-up with Russia which we obviously cannot contemplate.

2. Ministers have no doubt been trying to avoid a break until they could acquire more powers and the P.P.P. more adherents. In this way they are gradually undermining our position. We cannot allow this to continue and a halt must now be called. The report of sympathy strikes² in your Personal telegrams Nos. 49 and 51, however much Ministers may attempt to disown responsibility for them, completes the justification for immediate action. Their general record is such that I have decided this latest development makes a break inevitable and that we must now act against them.

3. Pending formal suspension of the Constitution the action to be taken as we now see it, once adequate force is available (see Paragraph 4 below), is for you to remove Portfolios from Ministers and to govern on your reserve powers (see paragraph 2 of my telegram Personal No. 20). When you do this it seems to me important that you should at the same time place the dangerous leaders of the P.P.P. under restraint and raid their premises for incriminating documents. Power to enable you to do this will be included in the Order in Council referred to in paragraph 5 below.

4. Before you can take this action we must be certain that you have adequate forces available to maintain law and order. In view of paragraph 3 of your telegram No. 340 I am assuming that outside forces will be needed. I should be grateful for an estimate from you of the numbers needed and what arrangements you propose for deploying them immediately on arrival in the Colony. Meanwhile I am discussing the problem with military here. You should arrange for Commander, Caribbean Area visit you forthwith to discuss details. You will appreciate difficulty of making any reinforcements available from outside the Caribbean and length of time that would be involved.

5. You must also have in this crisis full emergency legal powers for preservation of public order and the maintenance of supplies and services. In view of the doubt referred to in paragraph 1(b) of my Personal telegram No. 20 whether the Emergency Powers Order in Council, 1939, validly applies to British Guiana I propose that an Order in Council of the kind referred to in paragraph 1(c) of my telegram (which need not be laid in draft) should be made as soon as possible giving you such powers. I have in mind applying by reference such of the Defence Regulations as were in force in British Guiana during the war as would appear to be appropriate, but I should be

² A reference to the strike in the sugar belt which was called on 31 August and which lasted until 24 September. From the outset the programme of the PPP government was viewed with disquiet by the British Guiana Sugar Producers' Association. With the strike in progress, the BGSPA mobilised support in the colony and in London through the influential West India Committee, not only for the removal of the PPP government but also for the dismissal of Savage. The governor was held responsible for having allowed the alleged excesses of his government (CO 1031/60).

grateful if you would let me know as soon as possible what powers you yourself think you will need. I will attempt to get this Order in Council made in the next 10 days, but it can be kept secret until all other arrangements for making the break are complete.

6. We must also have ready a statement for immediate issue when you take action giving the reasons for the withdrawal of Ministers' powers. I suggest that amongst other things this statement should make it clear that British Guiana was given its new constitution in the hope that it would seize this opportunity to advance along the road to responsible self-government within the British Commonwealth; that the constitution had been perverted by a small clique of Communist sympathisers who sought to impose totalitarianism on the territory and were bringing the economic life of the country to a standstill; that the Ministers had abused their authority in various ways which should be listed; that the withdrawal of their powers from Ministers would have to be followed by the suspension of the constitution; that you had the necessary emergency powers to ensure law and order and the safety of property and were proposing to do so; that it was Her Majesty's Government's intention to give the territory a revised constitution which would permit the British Guianese themselves to continue to partake in their own government; and that in the meantime you propose to take all possible measures to improve housing and the other social services and to ensure the rapid economic development of the territory's resources.

7. The Order suspending the constitution will be prepared here and referred to you for comments. This will need to be laid in draft before Parliament, which will be done, if possible, as soon as it reassembles. I propose that this Order should also provide for the setting up of an interim Government. I have in mind a nominated Executive Council (which you could, but need not, consult and whose advice you need not take) and a nominated single legislative chamber including on both bodies as many members of the P.P.P. as will be prepared to co-operate.

8. A Commission of Enquiry will also have to be appointed into the events in British Guiana which have led to this breakdown and to propose a new constitution. Reference might be made to such a Commission of Enquiry in the public statement referred to in paragraph 6 above.

9. Arrival of forces, arrest of dangerous persons, publication of emergency Order in Council and issue of statement would, of course, have to be simultaneous with withdrawal of powers of Ministers. Meanwhile the greatest secrecy is essential in making these preparations in order that Ministers shall not be warned of our intentions before we are ready. I shall assume in future cypher messages that you have arranged for suitable staff to decypher.

10. I should be glad if you would now make all preparations urgently. Please telegraph as soon as possible regarding emergency legal powers (paragraph 5 above) and forces required, including your recommendation as to timing of action if you and Commander Caribbean area regard forces from outside that area as essential despite the difficulties referred to in paragraph 4. I should also be grateful for your detailed plans for carrying out this operation and for a draft statement as outlined in paragraph 6.

16 CO 1031/752, no 15**19 Oct 1953****[British Virgin Islands]: letter from Sir K Blackburne (Antigua) to P Rogers on the arguments for and against the British Virgin Islands joining the federation**

[The CO was aware that the smaller territories were likely to pose greater problems than British Guiana and British Honduras, both of which had decided to remain outside the federation. Ultimately, British Guiana and British Honduras were said to have prospects of standing on their own feet; the British Virgin, Turks and Caicos and Cayman Islands would never be able to (CO 1031/752, minute by C E Wool-Lewis, principal, West Indian Dept 'B', 5 Feb 1952.)]

Thank you for your letter WIS 363/02 of the 2nd October about the position of the British Virgin Islands under the proposed British Caribbean Federation. The Secretary of State's despatch takes care of the immediate problem, and I think that local apprehensions will be allayed by the statement that no decision has yet been reached.

But this is only putting off the evil day when a decision has to be reached; and, if the decision *has* to follow the lines proposed in the SCAC Report and in the Plan for a British Caribbean Federation, the sooner that I start to try and "sell" the idea in the Virgin Islands the less trouble may ultimately occur.

At the risk of repetition I think that it may be helpful if I set out in some detail the position of the British Virgin Islands in regard to this matter. I feel perhaps that it may be important to do so, because I know that I never fully appreciated their position when I was with the Development and Welfare Organisation; and it seems possible that the position is not fully understood at home. Indeed one can only understand the position fully when one has had to deal at first-hand with the British Virgin Islanders and with their special problems.

At the outset I would explain that it is extremely difficult to assess "public opinion" in the British Virgin Islands. They are a most independent minded people; and I am afraid that even their elected representatives in the Legislature cannot be said to "represent" them fully. Indeed the elected members are frequently divided in their opinions on many subjects. For that reason it is quite impossible for me to answer the normal question which would be asked in this connection—"If the British Virgin Islanders do not want to join the British Caribbean Federation, what *do* they want?" At the same time I can say that all those with whom I have discussed the matter are opposed to forming a part of the Federation; and in the following paragraphs I will try and explain the reasons for their feelings.

The British Virgin Islands have the following "links" with the outside world:—

- (1) social and economic links with the United States Virgin Islands. They have no links with the British West Indies (save in respect of (2) below);
- (2) administrative links with the Leeward Islands. So long as they receive visits and advice from the Governor of the Leeward Islands and from his staff, the British Virgin Islanders are prepared to recognize that they derive benefit from their association with the Leeward Islands. (All the old records are destroyed, but I should not be surprised if the agitation for union with the United States in 1949 was due in part to the apparent breakdown of this administrative link, owing to infrequent visits to Tortola from Antigua);

(3) financial and traditional links with the United Kingdom. The Presidency receives an annual grant-in-aid from the United Kingdom; and the British Virgin Islanders take a certain pride in being British—though the more thoughtful ones often feel—and say privately—that this relationship is contrary to their economic interests.

It should be noted that the British Virgin Islands are in the above respects quite different from the Cayman Islands and the Turks and Caicos Islands. Those islands have become accustomed to being dependencies of Jamaica; and their inclusion in the Federation does not involve the breaking of any old established links. The position in those islands might well have been very different if they had been geographically situated nearer to a foreign country (as is the case of the British Virgin Islands), and if they had regarded that foreign country as their natural source of employment, their natural trading centre, and their centre for social contacts such as marriage.

Let me now put the arguments advanced in the British Virgin Islands *against* joining the Federation.

As regards (1), social links, the people of the British Virgin Islands are closely related and intermarried with American Virgin Islanders. They have no such relationships with the other islands in the British West Indies. Inclusion in the Federation would, therefore, accentuate the division imposed on Virgin Islanders as a whole by the fact that they have already been arbitrarily divided into American and British nationalities.

As regards economic links, British Virgin Islanders have always traded with the American islands rather than with the British islands simply because the former are closer. They will have to continue to purchase most of their necessities from St. Thomas in the future, whether or not they join in the Federation, because they will have lower transport costs to pay. (It should be noted in this connection that there has never been any suggestion that the proposed Caribbean shipping service should serve the British Virgin Islands; and indeed it would be hopelessly uneconomic for it to do so). If they have to purchase their necessities in St. Thomas, it is natural that they should wish also to sell their produce in St. Thomas. They are all small farmers, and they must operate their economic life on the basis of small and quick sales in the place where they have to do their shopping. They cannot see, therefore, any economic advantage coming to them through the Federation. Incidentally, the special position of the British Virgin Islands in the economic field is made clear by the facts that it is [sic] not represented on the Regional Economic Committee, and that to the best of my belief no matter hitherto handled by the Regional Economic Committee has had any bearing on this Presidency.

Under Federation there will be free movement of population within the British Caribbean. If the British Virgin Islands have to admit other British West Indians freely (who go there in the hope of gaining admittance to St. Thomas by the “back door”), the American authorities will clamp down even more firmly on immigration from the British Virgin Islands.

As regards (2)—administrative links—the British Virgin Islanders know that they need technical help and guidance from outside; but they doubt whether the Government of the Federation—faced continually with larger problems—will be able to give them as much help as they now receive from the Leeward Islands. There is

another point; I have been told in discussions that the British Virgin Islands do not want to be left on their own administratively; and that they would like to feel that they have someone to whom they can appeal when they are dissatisfied with the actions of the Commissioner; they feel that the Governor-General will be far too remote, and far too busy to pay regular visits to Tortola. They do not, therefore, like the idea of "direct administrative attachment to the Governor-General" (paragraph 79 of the SCAC Report), nor do they feel that the Governor-General will be able to take the place of the Governor of the Leeward Islands.

As regards (3)—financial links—the proposals in the SCAC Report (paragraphs 79 and 36) and in the Plan for a British Caribbean Federation (paragraphs 3 and 70) amount to a complete abolition of the financial link with the United Kingdom. The British Virgin Islands do not relish the idea of being dependent for their grant-in-aid on a British Caribbean Government on which they will have no representative and no voice. They doubt whether their financial needs are likely to receive a sympathetic hearing from a State Council whose members are unlikely to know anything of the needs of the Islands and do not have to look to the Islands for electoral support.

One cannot of course obtain any direct statement from the British Virgin Islanders about the second part of item (3)—links of tradition. People do not talk openly about this sort of thing. But there are many pointers which indicate clearly that the ties with Britain are deep and real. It is astonishing that British Virgin Islanders who visit St. Thomas and see wealth and prosperity and high wages, who eat American food, wear American clothes, smoke American cigarettes, read American papers, listen to American stations on American radios, continue to feel proud of being British. For example, I.G. Fonseca (one of the elected members, the organiser of the "Union with America" campaign in 1949, and a man who has adopted the American way of life most pronouncedly) took grave exception when I suggested that it would save expense if a new flag pole needed at Government House could be placed on the roof rather than on a specially prepared pedestal in the garden: "It is most important that the flag should be clearly seen by every ship entering the harbour; it would not be clearly seen on the roof against the background of the hills". That is just one small example of an outlook which is not openly voiced but is displayed in a number of different ways. I wonder myself whether we can honestly satisfy ourselves that we should be acting fairly if we deliberately broke this link between Britain and the Virgin Islands, and replaced it by an artificial allegiance to a Caribbean Federation with which these people have no existing links at all.

Those are some of the arguments against the inclusion of the British Virgin Islands in the Federation. If they are to enter the Federation in spite of those arguments, and if we are to persuade them to enter it voluntarily and without risk of a campaign in favour of union with the American Virgin Islands, we must be prepared to produce reasonable answers.

Here then are the arguments *in favour* of joining the Federation.

(1) *Economic and social.* One of the principal aims of the Federation is to enable the area to be developed as a single economic unit; and to enable it to speak with one voice on economic affairs. It would be advantageous for the British Virgin Islands if they could have ready and assured markets for their livestock in the British islands to the south. It would place them in a stronger bargaining position with the American islands, and would ensure that they could dispose of their livestock (though not of their fish and vegetables) in times like the present when the American authorities

ban the import of cattle to St. Thomas. This is a strong argument; but it depends on the free convertibility of sterling. (At present the Virgin Islanders *have* to earn U.S. dollars to make their own purchases). And it depends on the establishment of better communications with the southern islands.

Their social links with the American islands will be no more disrupted under Federation than they are at present by the restrictive immigration policy of the United States. The links might even be improved, because the British Caribbean Government (judging from the performances of some of the present West Indian leaders) is likely to make much more public fuss over American red-tape in St. Thomas than the British Government is able to do. (The American attitude to the Virgin Islands problem is indefensible on humanitarian grounds and I often feel that, if the British Government could attract world publicity to the problem by using "Bustamante" methods (which of course it cannot do), then we should have the problem solved at once, and free intercourse between the two groups permitted). But I do not fancy using this argument when speaking with people in the British Virgin Islands!

The British Virgin Islands' horizon is limited to St. Thomas and the broadening of their outlook and contacts with the larger Federation would be an advantage.

(2) *Administrative*. Although the Governor-General may not be able to visit the British Virgin Islands regularly, it seems probable that one of the Ministers on the State Council will have the Virgin Islands as part of his portfolio. This Minister, and his staff, should be able to devote as much attention to the Islands as the Governor of the Leeward Islands does to-day. As regards technical advice, the Virgin Islands will obviously find it easier to obtain all the help they need from other British Caribbean territories if they join the Federation. If they do not join, they may well find it difficult to obtain technical advice when they need it; and they will have to pay for it. Furthermore for staffing purposes it would be to the Virgin Islands' advantage as the Public Service Commission for the area would look after their needs. Otherwise there will be difficulty in recruitment and stagnation will result. Interchange of experience is important. It would be of direct benefit to the Virgin Islands if their horizons could be enlarged.

(3) *Financial and traditional*. It would be wrong to suppose that the British Caribbean Federal Government would be so irresponsible as to overlook the needs of what will in effect be more or less a "dependency" of the Federation. Indeed it is to be expected that the Minister who deals with the affairs of the British Virgin Islands and the State Council will take a special pride in seeing that the Federation's "dependency" is properly helped. In any event the financial requirements of the British Virgin Islands are so small that they cannot materially affect the finances of the Federal Government.

As regards the traditional link, the Federation will also be British; and the British Virgin Islands will maintain their British connection even after they are within the Federation. (I would not care to use this argument myself).

That then is the case for and against; and I must confess that my own conclusion is that we must produce some much stronger arguments if we are to satisfy our own consciences that it would be right to force the British Virgin Islands to enter the Federation (however loosely), and if we are to persuade British Virgin Islanders that it is in their own interests to do so. You may be able to produce those arguments; but in case you cannot do so, I had better conclude by setting out the possible alternatives.

If we rule out the possibility of transfer to American control (which we can hardly suggest ourselves, and which might well be unacceptable to the Government of the United States), I feel that there is only one really practicable course of action—to allow the Virgin Islands to be administered by the Governor of the Leeward Islands in the early stages of Federation; and, when the Federation attains “Dominion” status, to transfer the administration to the United Kingdom High Commissioner who will presumably be appointed to the Federation at that time.

Under this arrangement the Virgin Islands would continue to correspond on all matters with the Colonial Office through the Governor (and later the High Commissioner). They would receive their grant-in-aid direct from the United Kingdom. And they would be responsible for their own legislation.

The question of legislation calls for special comment. Even when the Leeward Islands are “de-federated”, it will presumably be necessary for the post of Governor to be retained together with one or two other “central” posts as in the Windward Islands, including an Attorney General. The Attorney General will thus still be available to assist the British Virgin Islands in the preparation of legislation.

I appreciate of course that there can be no question *at this moment* of announcing that the British Virgin Islands are to be permitted to stand out from the Federation. Such an announcement could only be made after all the other West Indian territories have decided on their stand. And it could only be made after the British Virgin Islands have been asked to re-consider their present attitude. If, therefore, you feel that there is any substance in what I have written above, there is no need for further action at the present time.

If, however, you still adhere to the view quoted in your letter that “we ourselves have reached the conclusion that . . . there could be no question of the Virgin Islands being allowed to stand out” from the Federation, then I hope that you will be able to counter the arguments in this letter and that you will be able to provide me with ammunition with which to try and persuade the British Virgin Islanders to accept your decision.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Luke.¹

¹ In his reply, Rogers suggested that many of Blackburne’s arguments were in effect reasons why the British Virgin Islands should not be under British administration at all, let alone part of the federation. While agreeing that there was much to be said for the islands being placed directly under the governor of the Leewards and later under the UK high commissioner to the federation, Rogers also argued that under such an arrangement the Virgin Islands would not have access to the technical help and guidance which they needed. The federation might provide such services on payment, but a territory outside the federation would have no right to expect them. The issue was not one which could be resolved at present (CO 1031/752, no 16, Rogers to Blackburne, 31 Dec 1953).

17 CO 1031/128, no 44

31 Oct 1953

[British Guiana]: 52nd political report by Sir A Savage on military intervention and its immediate aftermath

[Extract]

[Having made the decision to intervene on 24 Sept (see 15), the CO obtained the Cabinet’s approval on 2 Oct (CAB 129/63, C(53)261, Cabinet memo by Lyttelton on the constitutional crisis, 30 Sept 1953 and CAB 128/26/2, CC 54(53)4, 2 Oct, Cabinet conclusions on same, both reproduced in BDEEP series A, vol 3, David Goldsworthy, ed,

The Conservative government and the end of empire 1951–1957, part II, 336–337). A battalion of the Royal Welsh Fusiliers was ordered to proceed to British Guiana from Jamaica in a cruiser and two frigates. The intention was that the troops would arrive off Georgetown on 9 Oct; for the reasons explained in paras 2–3 of the report reproduced here, they arrived a day early. The reaction to this intervention elsewhere in the British Caribbean was mixed. Adams of Barbados and Bustamante of Jamaica condemned the PPP, as did other Caribbean politicians in less strident tones, but all of the Caribbean governors reported that there was little support for the action amongst the public at large (CO 1031/1188). The US supported the UK in its refusal to have the issue debated on the floor of the Assembly of the UN where representatives from Latin America and Eastern Europe were at one in their condemnation. Nehru of India was critical and there was little support for the UK elsewhere in the Commonwealth. The ‘opposition’ delegation which the CO sponsored to refute the case mounted by Jagan and Burnham during their visit to the UK (para 9 of the report reproduced here) was in fact less effective than the report suggests; the delegation found it difficult to put its case across (CO/1183, minutes, Rogers to Lloyd, 29 Oct 1953, Carstairs to Rogers, 2 Nov 1953). Officials in the CO were concerned that the Jagan-Burnham campaign might damage HMG’s case which was published in a white paper (*British Guiana: Suspension of the Constitution*, Cmd 8980, 1953). However, the government escaped censure in the ensuing parliamentary debate in the House of Commons, senior opposition speakers such as Attlee and James Griffiths, secretary of state for the colonies when Labour left office in 1951, accepting the main charge against the PPP that they were either communists or the dupes of communists (*H of C Debs*, vol 518, cols 2159–2284, 22 Oct 1953). Post-intervention CO policy towards the PPP was, in the words of Philip Rogers, ‘to go hard at it and smash the party completely’ (CO 1031/1171, minute, Rogers to Lloyd, 16 Oct 1953). The anticipated split between Jagan and Burnham to which reference is made in para 11 of this report did not occur until Feb 1955. One factor among many contributing to the growing rift between the two leaders was the manner in which the commission of inquiry which investigated events leading up to the intervention (*Report of the British Guiana Constitutional Commission* (chairman, Sir James Robertson) Cmd 9274, 1954) identified Burnham in the moderate camp of the PPP leadership and Jagan in the communist camp. The commission recommended that constitutional development in British Guiana should be suspended until such time as the people themselves recognised that the UK would never transfer power to a communist-dominated PPP.]

This report covers the period from the 1st to the 31st October, 1953.

I. *General political situation*

The events of the month have already been reported separately as they occurred. The deterioration in the general situation reported during September continued rapidly during the opening week of October and confirmed the conclusion which had already been reached that no action could be taken to check the P.P.P. leaders, now firmly under Communist control, in their arrogant and insolent career without serious risk of provoking public disorder. With the police not entirely dependable there was no alternative but to have overseas forces available in the country to support them before such action could be taken. The decision had been taken towards the end of September that action should be taken to suspend the Constitution, to remove the Ministers’ portfolios, and to vest the Governor with emergency powers. The necessary naval and military forces would assemble at Georgetown in the early hours of the 9th October in order to support the police in the event of disorder and searches would immediately be carried out with the object of securing documentary evidence of communist affiliations and subversive activities. The element of surprise was of course essential to the success of the latter operation.

2. In the event there was a serious leakage in regard to warship movements and the growing hostility evinced by the U.K. Press at the withholding of information led to a decision by Her Majesty’s Government to announce the despatch of forces to

British Guiana. This announcement was made on the 6th October. It naturally caused considerable concern here since the forces were then not due until the 9th, and if the P.P.P. leaders had decided to provoke disorder in the interval, there might well have been grave results: also the element of surprise essential to the proposed searches was thus jettisoned.

3. Fortunately, however, the P.P.P. leaders chose to adopt an attitude of injured innocence which, though nauseating in the extreme, ensured that no rash action would ensue before the arrival of the troops. The latter was accelerated by 24 hours and the first units landed in the early morning of the 8th October. Also, the news that troops were on the way resulted in an immediate improvement in the morale of the police.

4. In the meantime discussion of the Labour Relations Bill was continued in the House of Assembly on the 1st, 2nd, 5th, 7th and 8th October and it was eventually passed. There were large crowds outside the House each day and on the last two days their mood was particularly excitable. On the 7th Dr. Jagan had sought to introduce a motion protesting against the presence of military and naval forces in the Colony and demanding their withdrawal, but it was ruled out of order[sic] by the Speaker. The following day he renewed his attempt without success. The Speaker announced that Dr. Jagan had seen him before the meeting and had most regrettably lost his temper and accused him of partiality. Dr. Jagan repeated this accusation in the House. The Legislature was prorogued by me on the 9th October.

5. On the 7th and 8th October meetings of the Executive Council were held at the request of Dr. Jagan. The Ministers vied with one another in their protestations of the innocence of their conduct and intentions; maintained that they should have been consulted before troops were brought here and that their presence was unnecessary and provocative and that they should be removed; and attempted to elicit information as to the rumoured intention to suspend the Constitution.

6. The announcement of this and the other steps taken and contemplated was made locally in a statement by Her Majesty's Government which was read over the wireless by the Chief Secretary early on the 9th October and followed by a broadcast to the people by myself. These measures were received with manifest relief by a large section of the population as well as by the business community. The P.P.P. leaders who had issued a leaflet entitled "On Guard" on the 8th October put out a reply to H.M.G.'s statement on the 9th October and another leaflet on the 10th October under the heading "Call to Action", calling for stoppage of work, a campaign of non-cooperation, and boycott of U.K. goods. Copies of these are enclosed.¹ There were reliable reports that some of the P.P.P. leaders were contemplating inspiring disorder, particularly incendiarism, and firewatching precautions were taken by business firms.

7. The call for strike action had no appreciable effect except on the sugar estates where Mrs. Jagan, Sydney King and others of the extremist group were most active. Their activities were responsible for retarding the normal return to work on some estates and causing a renewal of the strike on the Courantyne in the Port Mourant/Albion area and at Enmore on the East Coast. In the former, Jagan's personal influence is very strong and it has been said that there will be no

¹ Not printed.

resumption of work until his return from his travels: Enmore is on Sydney King's home ground. During the weekend of the 24th/25th October Sydney King, Martin Carter, Rory Westmaas, Balli Latchmansingh [sic], Adjodha Singh and two others (who were subsequently released) were arrested near Blairmont where they had been holding illegal meetings. Whilst there is no doubt that these meetings were held it would be difficult owing to the prevalence of intimidation to bring prosecutions against them with any prospect of success. They are now held in detention under the Emergency Regulations.

8. Searches were carried out by the security forces on the 13th October and subsequently, and documents of some interest, confirming the Communist affiliations of P.P.P. leaders, were found: as was expected, there was also evidence that other material had been removed and burnt.

9. Shortly after the announcement of the suspension of the Constitution etc. Dr. Jagan and Mr. Burnham stated their intention to visit the U.K. to lay their case before the Secretary of State, Opposition leaders and other bodies: subsequent visits to India and to the United States to make representations to the United Nations were also contemplated. However, they ran into difficulty in making their way to London owing to the refusal of the United States and West Indian territories en route to permit them to land. Eventually by chartering a British Guiana Airways plane to Surinam and travelling from there by K.L.M. they reached London on the 20th October where they seem to have made little impression on anyone except those already of their persuasion. They were followed by a strong "Opposition" delegation consisting of Mr. John Carter, Mr. W.O.R. Kendall, Mr. L. Luckhoo, Mr. John Fernandes and Mr. Dare, the President of the Georgetown Chamber of Commerce.² This delegation seems to have played a useful part in countering the attempt of Jagan and Burnham to hold themselves out as representative of united Guianese opinion.

10. The Minister of State visited British Guiana from the 19th to the 22nd October and was able to meet representatives of all shades of opinion. On the 20th October he met a delegation of P.P.P. leaders headed by Mr. Ashton Chase, Mr. J.N. Singh, Mr. Sydney King and Dr. Lachhmansingh: Mrs. Jagan chose to absent herself, but afterwards issued a communiqué as Secretary of the Party stating that the delegation had informed the Minister that "the British Government would have to make up their minds to rule by force if they continued in this way to flout the wishes of the people". Mr. Singh described the Minister as being "ruthless and unbending in his attitude".

² In 1951, Lionel Luckhoo, a successful Indian barrister who was nominated to the old Legislative Council a year later, joined forces with John Carter, an elected member of the council and a barrister of African descent, to organise the National Democratic Party (NDP). Like the PPP, the NDP employed a strategy of racial balance and included East Indians, Africans and Portuguese in its leadership. The NDP represented the forces of conservatism in Guianese society. In 1952, Luckhoo introduced an Undesirable Publications Bill designed to ban the entry into British Guiana of literature deemed 'subversive and contrary to the public interest'. The bill was specifically aimed at the political literature imported by the PPP for distribution to its own cadres. Besides Luckhoo and Carter, the NDP candidates at the 1953 elections also included John Fernandes, a Portuguese businessman, and W O R Kendall, an African businessman. All were militant anti-communists. The NDP polled only thirteen per cent of the votes at the elections (see 12, note 2), less than half the votes polled by independent candidates, and only two of its candidates were successful, one of whom was Kendall. Luckhoo became a nominated official of the interim administration established in British Guiana in 1953. He was also minister without portfolio on the Executive Council between 1955 and 1957.

11. There have been reports during the month of anxiety on the part of the so-called moderate group headed by Chase and Jai Naraine Singh that Burnham should break away from Jagan and the other extremists and form his own party. It is also said that Burnham has insisted on the maintenance of a united front with Jagan until he returns from London and that he anticipates that Jagan will make compromising contacts with communists in the United Kingdom which would provide justification for the expulsion of him and the other communists from the party. It is doubtful what reliance can be placed on these reports and there has been no overt sign of any effective split in the party developing. Jai Naraine Singh has announced his intention to proceed on a tour of the Latin American countries to promote sympathy for the party's cause. He has no doubt been encouraged by the attitude of the Venezuelan Government (he lived and worked in a Government post in Venezuela for some years) which with the advent of British troops exchanged its fears of communist infiltration for accusations of "colonialism".

12. Although the situation is outwardly quiet and there have been few incidents apart from some instances of intimidation, sporadic incendiarism of canefields and an attempted derailment, it is reported that the P.P.P. leaders are aiming at building up their cell organisation throughout the country into a resistance movement which will be used to disseminate anti-Government propaganda and to undermine public order. It would also be used to obstruct any efforts aimed at restoring good relations on the sugar estates and promoting economic development generally. Although the detention of Sydney King and others may cause a temporary set-back to these plans, there are unfortunately others capable of carrying them into effect, whilst the return of Jagan and Burnham is awaited expectantly by their supporters. All this underlines the urgent need to accelerate positive action to improve social and economic conditions in the Colony and thus weaken the hold of the P.P.P. leaders. There remains, too, the dire need for some effective alternative political leadership. . . .

18 CO 968/371, no 71

1 Jan 1954

[West India Regiment]: draft CO letter to the governments of Jamaica, Trinidad, Barbados, Antigua and Grenada on the urgent need to establish a local force

We have recently been giving much thought to the question of the West India Regiment, the plans for which have made very little advance during the past two years.

The emergency in British Guiana in October and the consequent reinforcement of the Caribbean area by a second regular United Kingdom battalion have made it more desirable than ever to establish a local force able to move to any part of the area and preserve law and order in support of volunteer forces and police. The accepted principle that Colonial Governments are responsible for their own internal security was one of the factors which prompted the original proposal to form a two-battalion local force in the Caribbean. Another was the expectation that in due course, when the second of these battalions had become operational, the regular U.K. battalion could be withdrawn for use elsewhere. I need hardly say that the War Office's global commitments are a great deal heavier than they were three years ago, and they are

seriously handicapped by being obliged to deploy one battalion—and probably two throughout 1954—in the Caribbean where strategically they are much less valuably placed than almost anywhere else.

At the same time we must satisfy ourselves, before launching the reformation of the West India Regiment, that it will be able to do what it is meant to do, and that all the participating Governments are going to give it unqualified moral and political, apart from financial support. During the crisis in British Guiana in October we found that the temporary replacement of the United Kingdom garrison company by a company of the Jamaica battalion would be politically unacceptable in British Honduras. Admittedly the Jamaica battalion is not at all the same thing as a battalion of the West India Regiment; but obviously if this sort of attitude were to show itself towards units of that Regiment, and if for local reasons soldiers of the West India Regiment could not be successfully used for reinforcing the police or volunteers of a territory to which they do not belong, the whole conception of a West India Regiment would be stultified.

Although it would be our aim to obtain recruits to the Regiment from as many territories as possible, I imagine that the great majority of the first battalion would be drawn from Jamaica and Trinidad. No difficulty of the sort to which I have just referred would presumably arise at that stage as the U.K. battalion would still be in the area and could no doubt be used, with the consent of the Commander, to help deal with any trouble which was likely to have embarrassing political consequences. But with the formation of the second local battalion, and after the withdrawal of the U.K. battalion, Governments could not pick and choose but would have to be prepared to accept into their territory any unit or sub-unit, whether composed of men from a number of Islands or from Jamaica or Trinidad only.

We should be glad to know to what extent soldiers of the West India Regiment who were not inhabitants of your territory could be used as reinforcements on internal security duties in your territory, and to have your views on this problem generally.

19 CO 1032/119

26 Apr 1954

[Immigration]: minute by P Rogers to C Y Carstairs advocating legislation to restrict immigration from the Commonwealth

I am grateful to you for showing me these papers, which raise an issue of acute political difficulty and urgent practical importance in relation to the West Indies. I should like Mr. Wallace and Mr. Mayle on his return to see them. I would also suggest that the heads of the West African, Mediterranean and Central African Departments (the latter in respect of, at any rate, Somaliland) should also see them and that the Under-Secretaries in charge of all geographical regions should see also.

I mentioned to you on my return from my West Indian tour (at which time I was not aware of the consideration being given to this issue here) that I was much concerned at this influx of West Indians into the U.K. I foresee serious difficulty and embarrassment from two aspects:—

(1) The aspect which has already been ventilated in these papers viz. the difficulties in the U.K. from a growing and uncontrolled influx of coloured

persons, particularly in relation to the growth of colour prejudice here. Since that aspect has already been fairly fully covered in these papers, I will not comment on it further, except to say with reference to the point expressed by the Home Secretary in (4) (viz. that the influx is not yet [of] a scale to cause concern) that I am convinced from what I saw and heard in the West Indies that from that region, at any rate, we shall have to face a steadily and perhaps rapidly rising influx over the next few years, unless we take steps to deal with it. The manner in which Jamaicans, at any rate, come to this country argues some form of organisation (and financial backing) in Jamaica. In fact it has the appearance of an organised "racket" though I have no proof of this. Further, we are likely to get considerably increased numbers from the Leeward, and possibly the Windward, Islands, and also from Barbados, if Jamaica continues to send such considerable numbers.

(2) The second aspect, which has hardly been touched on in these papers, is the damage to the immigrants themselves on which there is a striking report by Mr. de Souza, the Jamaican Welfare Liaison Officer, on the file which I temporarily attach to this bundle. Moreover, it will in my view do no good service to the future of the Colonies in question if they remain under the impression that they can solve their own population problems by uncontrolled immigration to the U.K. I can, however, hold out little or no hope that West Indian Governments will find it politically possible to impose restrictions on such immigration comparable to those imposed in West Africa—nor do I think it would be sufficiently effective if they could.

In short, my own view is that it is very necessary to pass, and to pass soon, legislation which would not only enable us to deport Colonial criminals, but also to control the entry of other Commonwealth citizens into the U.K. It would, as has already been emphasised on these papers, be essential that the control should apply to all inhabitants of the Commonwealth and not only to coloured ones.

With reference to the enclosure to (23), I doubt if a deposit of £25 by itself, in the absence of definite and guaranteed employment would in any way be adequate.

I should add that I discussed (in ignorance of the papers on this file) the possibility of imposing such restrictions with Sir K. Blackburne and Sir H. Foot, as the Governors primarily concerned at this stage. I made it clear that I was speaking quite personally. Both thought that it would be fully justifiable for the U.K. to impose such restrictions, which would be no more than (and indeed in practice might well be less) than those imposed by all West Indian Colonial Governments, provided of course it was done on a non-discriminatory basis and did not exclude immigrants altogether. Sir H. Foot suggested that it would be politically much more acceptable if the legislation were presented as being in the interests of immigrants themselves, as well as of purely domestic concern to the U.K., and accompanied by measures to look after those immigrants who were allowed to enter the country. Mr. de Souza's report is independently a striking commentary on this aspect and Mr. de Souza's own appointment can properly be presented as an important part of such measures.

I cannot commit Sir K. Blackburne and Sir H. Foot to agreeing to such a proposal without further consultation, since my talks with them were purely exploratory. I think it important that all West Indian Governors should be consulted if and when it is proposed to introduce legislation of the kind now under discussion. I hope, however, that the Colonial Office will take the view that such legislation, and of the more extensive kind, is very necessary and should not be delayed.

20 CO 1032/119, no 72

23 Sept 1954

[Immigration]: CO record of a meeting with Sir H Foot (Jamaica) on the question of restricting immigration. *Minutes* by W I J Wallace and C Y Carstairs

At a meeting with Mr. Rogers, Mr. Wallace and Mr. Gordon Taylor¹ on 23rd September *Sir H. Foot* reverted to the question of Jamaican migrants to this country. He said that he had thought and talked a good deal about this since his arrival in the U.K. and that he had gradually come to the conclusion that some form of restriction would be a good thing, particularly if it could be tied to the availability of employment. At present Jamaicans were arriving here at the rate of 10,000 a year. If anything like this rate of immigration were maintained it might mean that in a recession 30,000 Jamaicans would be out of work in London alone. That would have serious repercussions. Sir Hugh thought that if the proposition were put to Mr. Bustamante in this way he might agree to co-operate in the selection of migrants within whatever quota was imposed.

Sir Hugh had visited a number of groups of migrants with Mr. De Souza. He was favourably impressed by them and by the work Mr. De Souza was doing, but was struck by the enormous rents the Jamaicans were apparently having to pay.

Minutes on 20

Mr. Carstairs

I believe you want this file urgently. I have added to it at (71) a note of some remarks made about the problem by Mr. Gomes² and Mr. Hochoy³ at lunch with the Secretary of State the other day. The most interesting point was Mr. Hochoy's remark on the subject of the U.K. applying restrictions to persons from Colonial territories and not applying them to persons from the self-governing countries of the Commonwealth.

At (72), however, you will see that Sir Hugh Foot has been so impressed by the problem as a result of his researches over here that he himself is coming to the view that somehow or other restrictions must be imposed. He even thinks that it might be possible to carry Mr. Bustamante with us. Unfortunately this item had to be sandwiched into an omnibus discussion ranging over many other matters and we were not able to pursue this point with Sir Hugh. I think what he had in mind was some sort of special agreement with Jamaica for allowing in a limited number of people each year, possibly something on the lines of the arrangement for the seasonal Jamaican agricultural labour for the United States. I seem to remember that at an earlier discussion with Sir Hugh you told him that the Ministry of Labour was not likely to view with favour any suggestions for agreements to import labour.

W.I.J.W.
30.9.54

¹ Author, specialising in understanding social change; director, Social Research Organisation, 1950–1954.

² Albert Gomes, elected member of Legislative and Executive Councils, Trinidad, 1945–1956; minister of labour, industry and commerce, 1950–1956.

³ Solomon Hochoy (KCMG, 1959); commissioner of labour, Trinidad, 1949; deputy colonial secretary, Trinidad, 1955; colonial secretary (later chief secretary), 1956; gov of Trinidad, 1960–1962; gov-gen of Trinidad, 1962.

The Secretary of State yesterday discussed with Lord Munster, Sir T. Lloyd, Sir C. Jeffries and myself the line to be taken on this subject should it be discussed Ministerially during his absence. Mr. Evans⁴ was also present.

The following conclusions were reached:—

(1) That any proposal to treat Colonials differently from citizens of the Dominions, new or old, should be resisted strongly whether as regards deportation only or as regards immigration control. It was agreed that movement of persons from Southern Ireland could be regarded for this purpose as an exception.

(2) As between deportation only, and the control of immigration, the balance of advantage lay with going the whole way now (always provided that the condition in (1) above is met). As to the argument that the Government might await a further development of public opinion in the matter, it was felt that a decisive movement of public opinion would probably only come as a result of some major scandal or disorder, and that the consequences of such in terms of relations with Colonial peoples would be so bad that it would be wrong to await any such development. On the other hand, it was felt that the trend was all in the direction of an increasing flow of unregulated immigration, and that now was the time to take steps to control it.

(3) With regard to the suggestions put forward by Sir Hugh Foot—see (72) opposite—involving the institution of some quota arrangements, and the co-operation of the Government of Jamaica in the selection of migrants, it was agreed that no quota system should be advocated; that permission to enter should be a matter solely for decision by the U.K. authorities concerned; and that their function in this respect should not be delegated to any agency of the Government of Jamaica or any other Colonial Government, if only because of the serious risk of corruption in administration.

(4) It should be suggested at the appropriate time that Sir Vincent Tewson⁵ should be brought into consultation as soon as possible when policy was beginning to crystallise, owing to the acute interest of the Trade Union movement in the question of coloured labour and migration.

(5) It was felt that this matter should not be allowed to hang on too long, since there was considerable Parliamentary interest in the matter and public interest was growing owing to the successive arrivals of large batches of Jamaicans. Decisions of policy need not await the submission by the Official Working Party of a detailed deportation scheme.

C.Y.C.
1.10.54

⁴ S H Evans, head of Information Dept, CO.

⁵ General secretary, TUC in UK, 1946–1960.

21 CO 1031/1693

22–29 Oct 1954

[Federation]: minutes by N L Mayle, P Rogers and Sir C Jeffries on whether it would be appropriate to defer the appointment of the Civil Service and Judicial Commissions until after the Fiscal Commission has reported

[Once the federal plan agreed at the 1953 London conference had been approved by West Indian legislatures, the CO envisaged the following procedure which was heavily based on

that which had been adopted for the Central African Federation: (1) Fiscal, Civil Service and Judicial Commissions established. (2) CO working parties set up to consider reports of commissions. (3) Consultation with West Indian governments on commissions' reports. (4) Final federation conference to be held with plenipotentiary powers (no reporting back to local legislatures) to consider points of disagreement and the main political issues.¹ (5) Order-in-Council to be drafted. (6) Pre-federal organisation to be set up. (7) Establishment of interim federal government which would come into being upon the appointment of the governor-general. Rogers commented in a letter to Luke: 'You may at first sight feel that we have followed the Central African procedure rather slavishly, but I confess that I for one, and I think all of us here, were impressed in discussion with those who had handled the Central African job how necessary these various stages were' (CO 1031/1693, no 11, Rogers to Luke, 19 July 1954, enclosure). Luke replied: 'I must confess that I was surprised, and rather dismayed, to find out how much still remains to be done, in spite of the past seven years' intermittent preparatory work' (*ibid*, no 14, Luke to Rogers, 5 Aug 1954). The minutes reproduced here reveal a division of opinion within the CO about the prospects for federation.]

... There are, however, other points arising out of the drafts which I think require consideration:—

(1) Ought the three Commissions to be appointed simultaneously? See in this connection my minute of the 14th September in which I suggested, for the reasons given, that the Fiscal Commission should be appointed first, and that the appointment of the other two Commissions should be deferred until after the Fiscal Commission has done its work and reported.²

(2) Ought we not to propose that the question of Federal Capital, and also that of Freedom of Movement, should be taken up with all the Governments as soon as the Barbados Legislative Council and the Trinidad Legislature have accepted the plan? At present draft "A" says that Her Majesty's Government will in due course consult the West Indian Governments about the arrangements to be made for the Federal Capital, bearing in mind the recommendation made by the Federation Conference, and makes no reference at all to the question of Freedom of Movement. But we know that these two questions have not really been finally settled and if steps are not taken to settle them before the setting up of the Commissions, they may well interfere with the work of the Commissions or otherwise prejudice the establishment of the Federation.

(3) The proposed terms of reference for the Fiscal Commission dodges the question whether there is to be a Customs Union for the West Indies. This question of a Customs Union has already been reported on in a comprehensive report (copy attached)³ which is technically under submission to the Legislatures

¹ On point 4 the CO originally thought (a) that it should be made known that it could not be taken for granted that HMG would allow any territory to stay out of the federation, and (b) that HMG might, following the Central African precedent, issue an ultimatum to the effect that if no agreement was reached at the conference after so much preparation, it would be many years before the UK could be expected to interest itself in federation again. Luke questioned the wisdom of both propositions and they were dropped by the CO.

² In his minute of 14 Sept 1953, Mayle commented: '... the main reason why I suggested that the Fiscal Commission should be appointed before the other two Commissions is that, in my view insufficient attention has been paid to the financial implications of Federation. Frankly, I think that when the territories (other than those which are grant-aided) see more clearly how Federation will affect them financially, they will wish to think again'. It was necessary therefore to be sure they were still committed and in view of the doubt on this, it would save much unnecessary work if the appointment of the other two commissions was deferred until after the Fiscal Commission had reported (CO 1031/1693).

³ Not printed.

of the territories concerned, with the exception of British Guiana which has already accepted the report. It is not, in my view, practicable to leave the question of a Customs Union uncertain like this. I think that the Fiscal Commission will want to know whether a Customs Union is to be established or not. The Fiscal Commissioner for the African Federal Scheme proceeded on the assumption that the unification of the territorial tariffs could be brought about with no important effect on revenue except for a limited number of items, and later on in his report set out his conclusions on the internal and external problems created by a decision to establish a Customs Union, and also indicated the nature of the Customs Union which they recommended should be set up. I think that the Caribbean Fiscal Commission will have to deal with the question of Customs Union to the same extent, but before they can do so it will clearly be necessary for all the Legislatures to agree in principle to the establishment of a Customs Union. There is, in my view, no doubt as to the desirability of establishing a Customs Union in the West Indies, whether there is federation or not. In this connection, the report of the British Caribbean Standing Closer Association Committee 1948–49 (Col. No. 255) stated *inter alia* that the establishment of a Customs Union, involving a free trade area, uniform tariffs and a single Customs administration, are [sic] the foundation of a federal structure, particularly one of which the functions [sic] will include responsibility for economic and commercial matters. Since the contributions of the West Indian territories towards the cost of federation are to be based on a percentage of their Customs revenues, and since it is likely that their Customs revenues, unlike those of the African territories, will be materially affected by a Customs Union, it is clearly necessary from this point of view alone to get a decision on the establishment of a Customs Union before the Fiscal Commission gets to work.

Although I must confess that I have yet to be convinced myself that there are economic advantages to the West Indian territories as a whole to be derived from federation, and that the Federation will not, in fact, mean much more to the West Indies than the setting up of an expensive political superstructure which none of them can afford, and which will certainly not help them on their way to complete financial independence, I have not, of course, raised the above points with a view to delaying matters. But I would like to suggest that whatever decision may be taken on point (1) above, we should be wise to defer the issue of the letters until we know for certain that the Barbados Legislative Council and the Trinidad Legislature have accepted federation. With so many other problems to occupy the attention of Governors in the West Indies at present, I really don't think that we should confront them with these problems arising out of federation until we are quite sure that they will need to be considered – that is to say, until we have the agreement of the Barbados Legislative Council and the Trinidad Legislature to federation. I don't think that any momentum will be lost if we do defer the issue of these documents until then.

N.L.M.
22.10.54

Sir C. Jeffries

I now submit four drafts concerning our plans to carry through West Indian federation once the Trinidad Legislature has voted in favour of a London Conference

plan. These drafts have been agreed with all concerned in the Office and I think explain themselves. There is only one major issue which I should submit to you in addition. This is the question of timing as raised in Mr. Mayle's minute of the 14th September and in sub-paragraph 1 and the final paragraph of his minute of the 22nd October. Briefly Mr. Mayle's view is that:—

- (i) We should not issue these documents until we have the agreement of the Barbados Legislative Council and the Trinidad Legislature to federation; and
- (ii) When and if that stage comes, we should only appoint the Fiscal Commission in the first place and defer the appointment of the other two Commissions until we have the report of the former.

I submit a contrary view on both issues. My major reason for disagreeing on both is that I am seriously concerned lest we lose the possibility of federating the West Indies because of delay. Self-government has now gone so far in some of the territories that in fact, if not yet in public for the most part, they are half-hearted about federation because of the checks which it will impose on island sovereignty. In Jamaica, for example, there is already public talk about Jamaica achieving Dominion status. I cannot myself for a moment believe that, even if it were practicable, which I doubt, it can in any way be considered in the interest of the West Indies. But we cannot ignore the force that may lie behind this, if we take too long over setting up a federal structure. In my view, therefore, we cannot afford to delay in agreeing our plans, either while we are awaiting the debates in Trinidad and Barbados, or later while we are awaiting the report of the Fiscal Commission. I recognise that some of our work may be made nugatory through later developments, if we go ahead now, but I believe that that is better than risking the loss of everything through delay. Similarly, in respect of the report of the Fiscal Commission, I recognise the force of Mr. Mayle's contention that we run the risk of going ahead on a plan that financially is inadequately prepared. Such indications as we have had, however, of the cost of federation do not go to show that this is beyond the financial means of the West Indies and the reasons in favour of federation are in my view so compelling that we must go ahead as fast as we can now. If we have a Fiscal Commission now, and then appoint other Commissions later, not only may one dishearten the advocates of federation, but we may find ourselves faced with the task of having to re-do our financial calculations when all the other steps have been taken. I very greatly hope you will agree that the matter should not be delayed as Mr. Mayle proposes, but that we should go ahead on the basis proposed in the drafts.

P.R.
28.10.54

This has been dealt with so comprehensively that I have little to add. On the two points mentioned by Mr. Rogers, I am inclined to agree with him. At any rate we can see if any doubts are raised from the other end. To suggest doubts from here would imply some lack of faith in Federation, and we *must* get this through while we have the chance. . . .

C.J.J.
29.10.54

22 CO 1032/120, no 113

28 Nov 1954

[Immigration]: letter from Mr Lennox-Boyd to Mr Lloyd George¹ on the terms of reference for a proposed committee on colonial immigration

At Wednesday morning's Cabinet I had a word with you as to the significance of the words "any class of" in the 3rd and 4th lines of your proposed terms of reference for the Enquiry into Colonial Immigration.

I said that I thought they could (and would) be construed as an *invitation* to make discriminatory recommendations. I said I would send you a line about it. While I think myself that the Government will find itself obliged to impose control on the immigration of British subjects into this country, and that the sooner action is taken the better, I also agree that (provided the delay is not too long) the appointment of the proposed committee and the consequent opportunity for the maturing of public opinion on this subject will bring political advantages for which it would be worth paying the price of the postponement for a few months of a statement on what the Government is actually going to do about the matter.

The time for considering whether control should or should not in fact be discriminatory as between coloured and other British subjects would in these circumstances come when we have the recommendations of the proposed committee. I will only say here and now that I would regard any discriminatory legislation as open to the gravest objections, and I must completely reserve my position on that point for the present. However that may be, I am absolutely convinced that it would be the greatest mistake for us now, in appointing a committee, to use language open to the criticism that we were inviting the committee to consider discriminatory proposals. That I am afraid would be the effect of the retention in the terms of reference of the words "any class of" before "British subjects" in the third and fourth lines of the terms of reference proposed in paragraph 7 of your paper. For that reason, I strongly urge that these words be omitted from the terms of reference. That would not by any means prevent the Committee from proposing discriminatory measures, if they saw fit to do so; and if they did, without a virtual invitation, we should be in a very good position to measure public and parliamentary reactions to such proposals, without the Government having been in any way implicated in them. If on the other hand we include the offending words, I am quite certain that the Government would be accused by many critics here, and by repercussion in the Colonies themselves, of having set themselves to discriminate against coloured British subjects, and one of our objectives, which must always be to deal with this difficult problem without raising questions of racial discrimination, would at once be lost.

I am sending copies of this letter to Swinton, Salisbury² and Monckton.³

¹ G Lloyd George, home secretary, 1955–1958.

² Lord president of the Council, 1952–1957.

³ Minister of labour and national service, 1951–1955.

23 CO 1032/1846, no 38 [Dec 1954] 'The McCarran Act in the United States and immigration from the West Indies': CO note

There are two classes of migrants from the British Caribbean territories to the United States of America:—

- (a) Immigrants proper, who go to the United States to settle;
- (b) Migrant workers, who go for short periods to do farm work under contracts negotiated between the employers and the colonial governments.

The United States Immigration and Nationality Act (the McCarran-Walter Act), which came into force on 24th December, 1952, affected these two classes differently.

Immigrants proper

2. Prior to the Act, the annual quota of immigrants allowed into the United States from the United Kingdom and the Colonies was 65,721, and within this figure no discrimination was made between United Kingdom-born and Colony-born Britishers. As about two-thirds of this quota regularly remained unused, it imposed no practical restriction on immigration from the West Indies, which was able to find its own level. This had come to be between 2,000 and 3,000 a year.

3. The McCarran Act, although it left the quota substantially unchanged, fixed a ceiling of 100 on the annual number of immigrants from any one colony (the test being place of birth). Thus the permitted maximum from the West Indies became 700, made up of seven equal lots, with no possibility of varying the allocations as between territories.

4. Despite diplomatic protests, no amendment of this provision has been secured; and as the Act was in any case passed over President Truman's veto, this is hardly surprising. (A Bill which would have restored the old arrangement was published earlier this year, but nothing has been heard of it for some months, and it is presumably dead.)

Migrant workers

5. The West Indies Farm Labour Programme in the United States originated during the war and operated on a large scale involving up to 40,000 workers until 1947. It was put on a new footing by agreements made in 1951. In 1952, some 12,500 workers entered the United States, the largest numbers being from Jamaica and the Bahamas.

6. The position of the workers under the McCarran Act is governed by regulations. At first sight it appeared that these would have a very restrictive effect. They provided that the workers, who had previously needed to carry only identity cards issued by their home Governments, would in future require passports and visas; that employers should pay an application fee of \$10 per worker; that each application should be endorsed by the local labour organisation; and that labourers would no longer be permitted to move freely from district to district. Clearly, if literally enforced, these rules would have caused considerable administrative difficulties and might well have stifled the labour scheme.

7. However, diplomatic representations and talks between United States officials and representatives of the British West Indies Central Labour Organisation and the

interested employers in 1953 led to an extremely liberal interpretation being given to the regulations. Workers' identity cards are accepted in lieu of passports, visas are not required and the \$10 employer's application fee is permitted to cover a bulk application for any number of labourers. Surprisingly, the net result has been that the new arrangements are rather more favourable to the operation of the scheme than were those in force before the McCarran Act. Their successful continuation is very much dependent on their receiving no publicity, as they might not appear to the proponents of the Act as being properly within its spirit.

8. The West Indies labour programme was thus able to continue on its former scale. Recently there has been a sharp falling-off in the numbers of workers employed: there are probably now about 6,500. This is mainly due, however, to rising unemployment in the United States and consequent pressure on the employers by the labour unions. There is anxiety about the position and an approach has been made to the United States Government by the British Embassy in Washington asking that the programme should receive as sympathetic administrative treatment as possible. But these difficulties can in no way be regarded as the aftermath of the McCarran Act.

9. The McCarran Act, therefore, has clearly resulted in a reduction in the number of West Indians able to immigrate into the United States and settle there. (Actual figures are not available here.) It has not affected the scale of temporary migration under the West Indies farm labour programme, although this is now suffering a setback due to increased unemployment in the United States.

24 DO 35/5217, no 143

Jan 1955

'West Indian immigration': memorandum by CO (Press Section) on the numbers of immigrants and the issues of employment and accommodation in the UK

It is estimated that at the end of 1954 there were some 25,000 West Indian workers in the United Kingdom. Of these, 10,000 arrived during 1954. In the immediately preceding years immigration had been at the rate of about 2,000 annually.

2. These figures are based on information from the West Indian Governments. The U.K. immigration authorities are unable to supply statistics of immigrants to the U.K. as they have no statutory authority to question British subjects entering this country about the purposes of their visits or what part of the Commonwealth they come from.

3. Most of the 25,000 West Indians are Jamaicans but in recent months there have been increasingly large numbers from other West Indian colonies (about 1,200 in the last four months).

4. The migrants are British subjects and under existing legislation are free to enter this country on proof of identification. Any restriction on their entry would mean new legislation. This is a difficult question affecting our relations with other countries in the Commonwealth, both colonial and self-governing. The matter is being urgently considered by H.M.G. and the last official public statements were in Parliament on the 16th December. In the House of Lords Lord Swinton said that the

matter was being carefully considered by the Government and a statement would be made as soon as possible. In the House of Commons the Home Secretary said that the Government was considering the question of legislation to restrict the immigration of British subjects but was not ready to make a statement.

5. The West Indian Governments cannot reasonably be expected to impose restrictions on people leaving their territories. It is not normal practice for "democratic" governments to impose such restrictions. It is for the receiving Government to restrict entry if it desires to do so.

6. Our information is that most of the migrants are finding employment. The Ministry of Labour and the National Assistance Board say that the incidence of unemployment and relief among the West Indian immigrants is not abnormal in relation to their numbers. Neither is there evidence that a disproportionate number of migrants are involved in undesirable activities or are ill-behaved.

7. The main troubles are in accommodation and social welfare but the migrants themselves are undoubtedly finding ways and means gradually to resolve their present problems. These solutions are not always of a kind satisfactory to the local authorities, e.g. buying up slum property and creating coloured quarters in some areas.

8. The Government of Jamaica have been doing what they can to warn migrants about the difficulties likely to face them in the U.K. Over the past year the Labour Department has issued statements to the press from time to time about the difficulties of Jamaican workers in England, and in addition to official statements the press has co-operated in publishing news stories emphasising the difficulties. There have in particular been many news reports recently in the local press of hardships arising from winter conditions.

9. In view of the fact that immigrants are now beginning to arrive in substantial numbers from other West Indian territories the Governments of those territories have been asked to take similar measures to warn intending migrants to the U.K. of the difficulties ahead. In general the migrants from Jamaica seem to know the ropes: most have addresses to which they can go and are quite ready for hardships and difficulties in the early stages. Migrants from the other territories, however, are not at the moment equally well aware of the difficulties and arrive without any plans or ideas. Hence the recent request to the other West Indian Governments to give widest possible publicity to the problems involved.

10. Some Press criticism is directed against the alleged inadequacy of these information measures, but the fact remains that the U.K. *is* enjoying a boom, that it *does* provide social services and that few of the migrants fail to find employment. So far in Jamaica official warnings of difficulties have not prevailed against these facts plus the fact that Jamaican migrants already here are writing home to their relatives saying they have obtained work and sending money home for relatives to join them.

11. Some Press criticism is also directed at the alleged inadequacy of the efforts taken to mitigate the hardships of immigrants immediately on reaching the U.K. To date most of the migrants have been met by friends and relatives already here and have had addresses to go to: also, they have usually known the ropes and how to set about obtaining assistance from the appropriate authorities in the U.K., whether in finding employment or obtaining relief. It is also significant that the migrants themselves do not complain. However, the Jamaican Government some time ago

attached an officer to the Colonial Office to take a general interest in the problems of the Jamaican migrants and to give them any additional advice and assistance within his power. This officer has met parties on arrival and helps to sort out the immediate problems: among other things he has distributed a pamphlet of which a copy is attached.¹ He is also available for consultation by migrants subsequently.

12. Other West Indian Governments are being consulted about joining with the Jamaican Government in this arrangement and expanding the work at present undertaken.

13. It is to be noted that special measures taken to assist the migrants on arrival may well be criticised by those who say that the migrants should be discouraged.

14. There is also a body of criticism which alleges that the migration is due to bad economic conditions in the West Indies. This is true only to the extent that, despite great efforts in recent years to increase the economic potential of the islands, productivity has not caught up with the ever-growing population. West Indians have long been accustomed to seek work abroad but in recent years outlets in foreign countries have been much restricted. The West Indian Governments, with the help of H.M.G., are doing a great deal to improve economic conditions and the movement to the U.K. is to some extent due to the fact that there is a certain degree of prosperity allowing money to be found to pay fares. For a general picture of the problems and what is being done to tackle them reference can be made to the 1953 Annual Report of the Comptroller for Development and Welfare in the West Indies, and also to the two recent turn-over articles in the Times.

Miscellaneous points

(1) No precise information is available about the proportion of the migrants who return to their own countries but at the moment there seems little doubt that very few are at present returning and that those who have done so had special family or health reasons. On the other hand it would not be possible to say that the migrants intend to settle permanently in the U.K. Many are probably thinking in terms of acquiring wider experience, cash and increased skill (there are indications that West Indians make good use of the facilities provided by evening classes and public libraries).

(2) In the past most of the migrants have been men but an increasing proportion are now women and children i.e. the families of earlier migrants. In November and December the number of women totalled 320.

(3) The total number of West Indian workers in the U.K. is still "a drop in the ocean", and it is interesting to note that the interest taken in them is out of proportion to their numbers and that corresponding interest does not seem to be taken in other immigrants, e.g. Irish, Indians, Cypriots and Maltese.

(4) It is true that in London in particular the West Indians are tending to congregate in certain districts but this tendency is on the whole less apparent in the provincial centres where they are now working. It is also the case that the tendency to congregate in certain districts in London is partly because these districts are used as jumping-off places for the provincial centres when the migrants find work. Incidentally, a similar tendency to concentrate residence in one district is apparent with other immigrants, e.g. Cypriots.

¹ Not printed.

25 CO 1031/1776, no 67 2 Feb 1955**'Federation': letter from Sir S Luke to P Rogers on the critical importance of freedom of movement within the federation**

It would, I think, be difficult to exaggerate the critical importance of the forthcoming conference on the control of movement within the federation. The federal scheme is, of course, threatened by other dangers—in particular by the growing political strength of the Indians in Trinidad. But the failure of the conference to devise a compromise offering reasonable prospects of acceptance by both the Trinidad and Barbados Legislatures would bring the danger of early disaster to the whole project.

2. I do not want to be unduly pessimistic. The favourable tide is running more strongly than it has at any previous time. Manley is a far more convinced and energetic pro-federationist than his predecessor; and he is capable of exercising both a powerful and a constructive influence on political representatives from other parts of the region. In Barbados, the recent debate in the Legislative Council has stimulated an unprecedented interest in the whole question; the effect, I am told, has been to reinforce the sections of public opinion represented by Adams and Cuke.¹ Those who attend the conference² will themselves be convinced pro-federationists; most will have played a leading part in the long series of debates and conferences that have advanced the project to its present stage; and all will unquestionably be moved by the strongest desire to find an acceptable and workable solution.

3. Nevertheless, I think that there is still a formidable gulf between the Trinidad and Barbados points of view, though each has been brought to recognise that there must be some concession to the other. (I take these as the protagonists of the two contrasting attitudes; I imagine that the other territories will probably give general support to the Barbados case). Barbados obviously has both logic and precedent on its side. It is theoretically indefensible to restrict free movement within a federation; and, as far as I am aware, no such restrictions are in fact imposed in the federations from which our ideas are drawn i.e. the United States, Canada and Australia. There is at present an intense pre-occupation in Barbados with the problems of unemployment, over-crowding, and pressure of population; against this background, it is hardly surprising that the House of Assembly has consistently taken the line that any federal scheme that failed to provide for freedom of movement would be unacceptable. On the other hand, the strength of public opinion in Trinidad, alive equally to the attractive force of the Island's present comparative prosperity and to the problems created by its own rapidly growing population, is so strongly against complete freedom of movement that even Gomes has been brought to recognise that the federal scheme in its present form stands little chance of acceptance on that account.

4. As I see it, there is only one way in which the Trinidad point of view could be completely safeguarded, that is by excluding the power to legislate for the control of movement between the Units from either the Exclusive or Concurrent Lists;

¹ (Sir) H A Cuke (Kt 1955), nominated member of Barbados Legislative Council and Executive Committee, 1943–1958; federal senator, 1958–1962.

² A reference to the forthcoming conference on freedom of movement which was held in Trinidad in Mar 1955 and chaired by Lord Lloyd (see 27).

conversely, the only way in which Barbados point of view could be completely safeguarded would be by providing in the Constitution itself that there shall be complete freedom of movement (as is the case, I understand, in the Australian Constitution). Neither side have hitherto pressed for these extreme courses; and I remember that at the London Conference we found it difficult to understand the reasons for Adams' insistence on placing control of movement on the Exclusive List, since neither that (nor, for that matter, the preamble) would fetter the ultimate discretion of the Federal Government and Legislature. Adams' argument was, I think, that, by placing that item on the Exclusive List, the Federal Government would be forced to legislate rather than to let things drift. Nevertheless, except in so far as they took note of the expression of principle in the preamble, the Federal bodies would in no way be bound to legislate either for or against full freedom of movement. The effect of the London Agreement was, therefore, to arouse apprehensions in Trinidad without providing firm safeguards for Barbados.

5. What, then, is the precise purpose of the forthcoming Conference? Presumably, it is to reach agreement on some compromise between the extreme Trinidad and Barbados views that will be binding on the Federation. It seems to me that this objective can be achieved only within the framework of the constitution itself. Adams has, I think, had it in mind that we should draft legislation which the Federal Government would be under an obligation to introduce at the first opportunity. But surely no such obligation could be imposed on the Federal Government, any more than the Federal Legislature could be obliged to enact it unaltered? It seems, therefore, that the federal constitution must itself reflect the intentions of the "Founding Fathers".

6. As at present drafted, the constitution virtually leaves the decision to the Federal Government and Legislature, subject to the general statement of principle in the preamble. This has proved unacceptable to public opinion in Trinidad. The crux of the matter is not, of course, freedom of movement *per se*, but freedom to settle and accept work. No-one questions the desirability of the maximum freedom of movement; equally, Adams accepts the need for controlling the movement of criminals, lunatics, sick persons and the like. The conference will have achieved something if it simplifies movement within the Federation, though it is difficult to see how this could in practice be brought to the same state of simplicity as movement over land frontiers. A man arriving by ship in Trinidad, for instance, must surely carry some evidence that he comes from Barbados and not Guadeloupe. But the real issue is—shall persons be free to move from one Unit to another, to settle there, and to accept work that might otherwise be available to a person of local origin. Adams suggests that Trinidad's fears might be met by providing that Unit Governments shall accept responsibility for their own "nationals" who may become a charge on local funds in another Unit. I think that there is much to be said for this suggestion, and it will no doubt be fully discussed at the Conference. It might be elaborated by requiring persons intending to settle in another Unit to produce evidence of availability of work. But I very much doubt whether these suggestions fully meet Trinidad's point. The fear there is that Barbadians or Grenadians might enter in numbers and displace or exclude Trinidadians from employment. Adams has so far shown no sign of being willing so far to modify his views as to agree that Trinidad should employ immigration legislation against fellow West Indians for *economic* reasons only. One must then seek some form of protection short of the use

of immigration legislation that the Trinidad Government might provide for its "nationals" under federation. It has been suggested to me that it might be possible to devise legislation which would enable a Unit Government to guarantee priority of employment for its own local citizens. Such legislation would not seem to be inconsistent with any provisions of the draft federal constitution. It would, however, introduce the principle of discrimination within the Units against citizens from other Units, and this seems extremely objectionable. Moreover, it would need elaborate administrative machinery, such as employment bureaux and registration offices, beyond the resources of any West Indian Government. It would seem more profitable to consider whether any system of immigration quotas related to "economic absorptive capacity" would be practicable and politically acceptable. The political and administrative difficulties are obvious but some such system would at least avoid the risk of indiscriminate shifts of population from one over-crowded island to another.

7. It cannot be said that any solution presents itself clearly at this stage. The difficulties are indeed so great that the conference might in the end decide to leave the draft constitution unchanged (i.e. to leave the problem for settlement in due course by the Federal bodies), contenting itself with issuing a report setting out as clearly as possible the arguments and facts on both sides in the hope that this would educate public opinion throughout the region. It would be for the delegates to judge whether the adoption of this course of action would be to court rejection of the whole federal scheme by either the Trinidad or the Barbados Legislature. But I do not think that either side would agree to this course, unless it was accompanied by some additional safeguard, and I do not see what this could be. Would it be possible to provide for a review of the situation after a stated period in such form as to leave the Units with any freedom of decision? At first sight, I do not see any answer to this. So long as the Federal Government has any power to legislate for the control of movement between the Units, it does not seem that the latter can ultimately have any defence against federal legislation, except secession. We certainly do not want to paper over any cracks that might destroy the edifice within a few years. But it does seem worth considering whether there is any constitutional device which would enable the position to be reviewed after a period in such a way as to leave the Unit Governments with some power of ultimate freedom of action.

8. We cannot rule out the possibility that the conference may fail to reach agreement on a solution that either the Trinidad or Barbados delegates would be prepared to commend to their Legislatures. I do not think that this is likely, since delegates would probably prefer that the responsibility for rejection should be taken by their Legislatures rather than by themselves. But it is possible; and I think that we should be prepared for this contingency. It might perhaps be premature for Lord Lloyd to issue the warning mentioned in paragraph 4(h) of your letter of 4th November (WIS 175/01), but I do not think that this very representative gathering should be allowed to disperse without giving some thought to future action in the event of its report resulting in rejection of the federal scheme by either Trinidad or Barbados. My own view is that Trinidad's defection would fatally weaken the federal project; and that, in view of the refusal of both British Guiana and British Honduras to participate, the withdrawal of Barbados would be almost equally damaging. But I think that it would be useful, in the last resort, to ascertain the views of the West Indian political leaders on these points. If the consensus of opinion was that the federal project could sustain no further defections, then I suggest that the delegates

might be asked to direct their minds to the problem of salvaging something from the wreck of so many years' pre-federal consultations and planning. I have always assumed that, if the federal project should fail, H.M.G. would initiate consultations with all the Governments of the region with a view to devising regional machinery, falling short of political federation, which would enable the participating Governments to consult together and to act together more speedily and effectively than they can at the present time. Moreover, I would not think that the U.K. Government could tolerate the indefinite continuance of arrangements under which the Development and Welfare Organisation provides a large part of the machinery for regional consultation and co-ordination of action. These are far-reaching issues on which the conference could hardly be expected to express any opinions; if, however, it reaches a deadlock which seems to constitute a direct threat to the federal project, then I think that the West Indian leaders might well be asked to express informally their opinions on the procedure which should be adopted for formal consultations on these questions in the event of the failure of the federal plan.

9. If the conference is held at Hastings House, we can provide all the necessary secretariat facilities and make the preliminary arrangements. I would propose that Rolfe³ should be secretary of the Conference. If it is held in Trinidad, both Rolfe and I would attend. I find it difficult to know what useful preparatory work we can undertake. I have sent Mayle a copy of a letter which I have addressed to Colonial Secretaries, asking for copies of existing immigration legislation and for statistics of the movement of persons between the islands in recent years. I imagine that the Colonial Office have been making some investigations about the position in other-Federations. It occurs to me that it would be most helpful if Lord Lloyd could be accompanied by one of the Legal Advisers, preferably the one who will be concerned with drafting the constitutional documents. As you know, I have no Legal Adviser and, although each delegation will be accompanied by the local Attorney General, they may well be hampered by the necessity of working loyally with their political chiefs. The presence of an impartial Legal Adviser might therefore be of great value, particularly if he was well acquainted with the position and practice under the Dominion Constitutions.

³ B E Rolfe, Development and Welfare Organisation, Barbados.

26 CO 968/444, no 125

Feb 1955

[West India Regiment]: CO note on the delay in reforming the West India Regiment

[Extract]

West Indian Governors were notified on the 11th October, 1954 (Wicir despatch No.53, copy attached) of the comprehensive outline scheme for raising the re-formed West India Regiment, and were asked for their Governments' agreement to the scheme. The despatch which followed lengthy semi-official exchanges, which had in turn followed an earlier despatch in 1952, was intended for presentation to Legislatures [sic].

2. The present position is that no Government has yet notified its concurrence, and that apparently no Legislature has yet even been consulted, although the

Governor of British Honduras proposed to do so in January of this year. Semi-official reactions have been received from the Governors of British Honduras and Barbados. The Governor, British Honduras, has:—

- (a) questioned the ability of British Honduras to “contribute where required within (its territory) by the free provision of land, buildings and services”;
- (b) pointed out that British Honduras would not be in a position to contribute its share towards the cost of the Regiment before the financial year 1956/57; and
- (c) suggested that the proposed West India Regiment Board should also have full power to scrutinise expenditure on the Regiment and to review the scale of contributions.

Governor, Barbados, has pointed out that his Premier would view with disfavour any failure by British Honduras to become a full participant financially in the scheme, and has asked whether Barbados participation on the basis of a contribution of one per cent of annual revenue, less the cost of the Barbados Regiment, would be acceptable (this financial arrangement was cleared with the Treasury towards the end of 1953). The Treasury are prepared to accept this arrangement in the last resort—as was originally agreed—but are not yet convinced that this situation has arisen. Their view is being passed to the Governor and he is being asked to confirm that no other financial arrangement for the Barbados contribution would be acceptable to his Government.

3. Four months have passed since Wicir despatch No. 53 issued, and it is desirable to reach some decision in the near future. Inconclusive correspondence and discussions about the possible raising of this Regiment have now been going on for over three years. The despatch was intended to bring matters to a head. It must not be allowed to remain unanswered until time has rendered it out of date, or to tail off into further semi-official correspondence on subsidiary points. No real progress can be made until there is a definite “Yes” or “No” from all (or most) of the West Indian Legislatures [sic]. Even then it would still be some time before the Regiment could actually be raised, because a number of administrative planning decisions have still to be taken, and certain matters of principle (e.g. the allocation of responsibility for works services) have yet to be decided.

4. A further complication is that delay will mean that the proposal to re-form the Regiment may become involved in the general question of West Indies Federation. For example, present plans for the Regiment envisage the participation of British Guiana and British Honduras, neither of which territories will initially form part of the Federation, though they may do so at a later date. Secondly, the closer Federation comes to reality the less relevant the present financial plans for the Regiment and the machinery for West Indies/War Office consultation will be in the new situation likely to be created by the Federation. For example, defence is envisaged as an exclusive (Federal) subject and the West Indies’ share of the cost of the Regiment would therefore presumably have to be met from Federal funds. The despatch proposes contributions on the basis of one per cent of the total revenue of each territory. This basis of calculation would have to be altered and a new basis worked out with the Treasury, which would presumably not be possible until the recommendations of the pre-federal Fiscal Commission had been finally agreed probably towards the end of this year. The West India Regiment Board is as at present proposed to consist of a representative from each of the participating territories; this

basis of representation would presumably have to be altered once Federation came about. There would have to be some adjustments in the sphere of legislation.

5. It is doubtful whether these points have as yet been taken into consideration in the West Indies, but there is little doubt that if concurrence in the outline plan for raising the Regiment is long delayed they will become obvious to the participating territories (particularly perhaps to those local politicians who would welcome excuses for going slow about the Regiment), with the result that the whole proposal may be thrown back into the melting pot and no further action will be possible pending the outcome of the present preparations for Federation. Even under the most favourable circumstances it will be a year or so after agreement has been reached before the Regiment will have been raised. If the object of relieving U.K. troops in the Caribbean at the earliest moment is to be achieved, and if real progress is to be made on this project, it is imperative that concurrence in the three major proposals summarised at the end of W.I.C.I.R. despatch No.53 (para.25)—vis. the financial commitment, the official request to the War Office to raise the Regiment, and the introduction of the necessary legislation—should be obtained at the earliest possible date before the whole matter becomes entangled in the wider Federal issues. Once concurrence in these three essential first steps has been obtained it should be possible to make any adjustments to the financial consultative and other provisions which Federation makes necessary at leisure without impeding the practical work of raising the Regiment.

6. It would therefore be most desirable if opportunity could be taken during Lord Lloyd's tour and the forthcoming conference on movement to impress the urgency of getting a decision, on Governors and territorial representatives. . . .

27 CO 1031/1777, no 140

17 Mar 1955

[Freedom of movement]: Report of the Conference on Movement of Persons within a British Caribbean Federation held in Port-of-Spain, Trinidad, 14–17 Mar 1955

The report of the British Caribbean Standing Closer Association Committee placed all aspects of the movement of persons within the area among the list of subjects on which the Federal Legislature would have legislative powers concurrent with Unit Legislatures, the former prevailing in the event of conflict. At the Federation Conference in London in April, 1953, when the Standing Closer Association Committee report was re-examined, this recommendation was not accepted as it stood. The solution worked out in the Federal Plan produced by the Conference was that the desirability of freedom of movement was to be written in the preamble of the Constitution, that is to say, it should recite as one of the objects of federation that there should be the greatest possible freedom of movement for persons and goods within the federation. Further, the Constitution itself was to give the Federal Legislature exclusive powers to legislate for the control of the movement of persons between Units, subject to both the Federal and Unit Legislatures having power to legislate for the control of movement on health and security grounds, and provided that no federal law should make provision for the restriction on economic grounds of the movement between Units of persons other than aliens. This compromise was not

acceptable to one of the two delegates from Trinidad and Tobago, who only signed the report subject to disagreement on this issue.

2. In their resolutions accepting the Federal Plan, the Legislatures of Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago, Antigua and Montserrat commented on this subject. The resolution passed by the Barbados House of Assembly on the 29th June, 1954, stated: "The House stresses that freedom of movement for West Indians among the federated units of which they are natives is essential to any scheme and suggests that some scheme be devised whereby Federal legislation designed to secure this object may be enacted immediately after the institution of a Federation. The House, therefore, recommends that a conference be convened of legal and political representatives of the Units to make recommendations for the enactment of legislation which will, within the context of 'the greatest possible freedom of movement of persons' be likely to meet with general acceptance of the units. This legislation it suggests should cover all aspects of the movement of all peoples into, out of, and among the units comprising the Federation".

3. The Legislative Council of Trinidad and Tobago in their resolution of the 11th December, 1954 supported the holding of a conference. This said that "Since there are reasonable doubts whether freedom of movement could be introduced without detriment to some islands, this Council welcomes the proposal of the Barbados House of Assembly for a conference on immigration, with a view to reaching the greatest measure of agreement on the measures designed to protect the position of the islands which may be so affected." On the 22nd December, 1954 the Legislative Council of Antigua approved "the plan adopted at the London Conference for a British Federation with the greatest possible freedom of movement for persons and goods within the area. . . ." On the 18th January, 1955 the Barbados Legislative Council concurred in the Federal Plan "subject to the modification that before the Plan is implemented, the question of freedom of movement of persons between the units of the Federation should first be settled. For this reason this Council supports the recommendation of the Barbados House of Assembly for a conference on immigration with a view to reaching the greatest measure of agreement on this question". The Montserrat Legislative Council passed on the 27th January, 1955 a resolution in similar terms to the Antigua resolution.

4. In accordance with the wish of West Indian Governments, Her Majesty's Government accordingly arranged for the holding of a Conference to discuss the question of the control of the movement of persons between one member territory of a proposed West Indian Federation and another. It opened in Trinidad on the 14th March, 1955 under the Chairmanship of the Lord Lloyd, M.B.E., Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for the Colonies, assisted by Sir Stephen Luke, K.C.M.G., Commissioner for the preparation of a Federal Organisation and Mr. J.S. Mordecai, Assistant Commissioner. It was attended by delegates from Barbados, Jamaica, the Leeward Islands, Trinidad and Tobago and the Windward Islands and by an observer from British Guiana.

5. The Conference was marked throughout by a conspicuous determination to find a solution which would be acceptable to the Governments of all the territories concerned. The discussions and debates on federation had already continued for nearly ten years; the principle of federation had twice been accepted by West Indian Legislatures; and the delegates were unanimous that no obstacles must now be allowed to stand in the way of achieving this great aim.

6. The Conference unanimously adopted the following resolutions:—

(1) The Preamble to the Federal Constitution should recite as one of the objects of Federation that there should be the greatest possible freedom of movement for persons and goods within the Federation.

(2) Sub-paragraph (b) of the Exclusive Legislative List in paragraph 6 of the Plan for a British Caribbean Federation as agreed by the London Conference should be deleted.

(3) Control of the movement of persons between the Units of the Federation on grounds other than health or security should be placed on the Concurrent Legislative List in paragraph 7 of that Plan with a provision that any Unit legislation on this matter in force at the expiry of five years from the date of the coming into force of the Federal Constitution should cease to have effect at the end of a further period of three months unless before the end of such further period a Resolution is passed by both Houses of the Federal Legislature approving such legislation. In calculating the period of three months no account should be taken of any time during which the House of Representatives is dissolved. All such Unit legislation should forthwith upon the expiry of the five-year period be laid upon the Table of both Houses and should be considered by both Houses before the end of the period of three months.

Any Unit legislation on this matter enacted after the expiry of the five-year period should have effect only if it is approved by Resolution of both Houses of the Federal Legislature. Such legislation should forthwith upon enactment be laid on the Table of both Houses and be considered within two months of being laid, no account being taken of any time during which the House of Representatives is dissolved or prorogued.

(4) Control of the movement of persons between Units on grounds of health and security should remain, as already agreed, as a separate item on the Concurrent Legislative List.

(5) That this Conference expressed the wish that in the interest of the early achievement of federation, its recommendations should be considered and determined by the various Legislatures at the earliest possible opportunity.

(6) That the consideration of the recommendations of the Conference should in no way delay any of the work preparatory to the establishment of the federation including that of the Fiscal, Judicial and Public Service Commissions; and that the British Government should be requested to proceed with the greatest possible speed with the completion of the preliminary measures to enable the Federation to be established.

7. During the course of their discussions the Conference were informed that the Government of Trinidad and Tobago had decided to demonstrate their faith in the future of federation by making immediate relaxations in their present restrictions on the entry of persons for employment into that Colony from other West Indian territories. These relaxations provided for the removal of no less than 53 categories from the list of occupations entry to which is at present prohibited on the part of persons from outside the Colony [sic]. This act on the part of the Government of Trinidad and Tobago was warmly appreciated and welcomed by all the delegates to the Conference.

8. In conclusion, all those present at the Conference wished to express to the Government of Trinidad and Tobago their warm appreciation of the excellent facilities afforded for their Conference and of the generous hospitality offered to them.

28 CO 1031/1937, no 9

May 1955

'United Kingdom policy in its Caribbean territories' CO brief for circulation to Commonwealth governments

[Extract]

[This was one of two papers circulated to Commonwealth governments; the first, on regional co-operation, was circulated in Jan 1955 (CO 1031/1937, no 10). The first draft of para 8 of the paper reproduced here was much more explicit about the problems surrounding federation. It read: 'Naturally each territory has fears about the effect of Federation on its own economy. Barbados which is proud of the effort which has enabled it, though not with a great deal to spare, to stand on its own feet financially is afraid that the cost of federation will unbalance its budget. Trinidad, the most prosperous of the territories, realises that with the present Federal Plan placing immigration on the exclusive federal list for purposes of legislation, it will lose the power to prevent immigrants from its more over-crowded neighbours upsetting the Trinidad labour market, and regards with disfavour the 1953 Conference's choice of Grenada for the site of the federal capital after S.C.A.C had chosen Trinidad. Furthermore the local East Indian community is afraid that it will be numerically swamped in a Federation. The new government in Jamaica has expressed itself no less in favour of Federation than its predecessor but sections of Jamaican opinion have always thought it unsatisfactory that a percentage of customs duties should be taken as the main source of federal revenue because Jamaica derives a much higher proportion of her own revenue from customs duties than does the other large unit in the proposed Federation, Trinidad. The smaller islands have shown signs of fearing that federal industrialisation would concentrate on the larger Units at the expense of the smaller which would be left to provide the market. Most territories have fears over the question of movement of West Indians within the federal area either, like Trinidad, that such freedom would lead to their own labour market being upset by an influx from poorer and more densely populated territories or, like most of the rest, that, if movement were unduly restricted, the population of some of the federal territories would be prevented from sharing in the economic prosperity and industrial development concentrated in others. In addition none of the territories is really satisfied with the strength proposed for its own representation in the Federal House of Representatives.' When consulted the CRO queried whether the paper should not be more positive about the advantages of federation and also whether it was wise, in view of the likely reaction in New Delhi, to be so explicit about the position of East Indians in Trinidad. The CO accepted this second point and itself decided to recast the whole of para 8 on the grounds that the original draft struck too pessimistic a note about the prospects for federation. On the question of being more positive about the advantages, the CO decided that the redraft of the paper was adequate as it stood: '... we do not want to involve H.M.G. in any definite views. H.M.G.'s attitude to Federation is little stronger than benevolent neutrality, in order to avoid any suggestion of a special obligation to support Federation in financial difficulties and any suspicion that H.M.G. was trying to off-load its responsibilities for the West Indies' (CO 1031/1937, minute by Miss B M Turnell, assistant principal, 18 Apr 1955.)

Parallel with the increasing regional economic co-operation and the improved communications in the British Caribbean, to which reference was made in Part I of this Paper, there are two other trends making towards closer association. One is a greater interchange of ideas between the territories, fostered by the common training ground for the region's politicians, higher civil servants, and professional men and women which has been provided by the University College of the West Indies, established by Royal Charter in 1948, and by other shared institutions of

higher education. The other, with which we are here concerned, is the growth of the idea of closer political association which has drawn strength from the greater cohesion in the economic and cultural fields and is based on a feeling of "British West Indian" nationality, which though not yet universal, is becoming gradually more prevalent among the educated classes, especially the younger members, throughout the area. . . .

5. The Federal Plan as drawn up by the London Conference¹ provides for 45 seats in the elected House of Representatives allotted among the units in accordance with a number of factors—size of population, economic development, financial stability and so forth—and a nominated Senate or Upper House of nineteen (two from each territorial Unit except the smallest which supplies only one). Legislation to be exclusively federal includes defence, exchange control, external affairs and federal courts. Legislation which may be undertaken by either the Federal or territorial legislatures includes aviation, banking, criminal law, currency, industrial development, postal services, shipping and trade unions. The Federation is to derive its revenue mostly from an equal percentage of the customs duties levied on imports by the unit governments. The proposed Constitution, although it does not provide for full powers of self-government, is a fairly advanced one. In general it is in connection with the specified matters of defence, international relations and, in so far as the United Kingdom Government is affected, financial credit, that Bills may be reserved for the signification of Her Majesty's pleasure, legislation disallowed by Her Majesty on the advice of the United Kingdom Government and Her Majesty in Council may legislate for the Federation. The advice of the Members of the Council of State, which is the executive body, has to be taken except in regard to certain specified matters which include those referred to in the previous sentence. The Federal Plan provides that the constitution should remain in its present form until five years after coming into force (unless each of the legislatures concerned raises no objection to a specific piece of amending legislation) but that during the fifth year of the Federation a conference should be convened to review the Constitution.

6. Consideration by the federation territories of the Reports on Customs Union and the Civil Service has been postponed as being subsidiary to the larger question of federation. A customs union is, however, recognised as implicit in a Federation. British Guiana, which in all earlier conferences had not proposed to join the Federation for the time being, has however accepted customs union in principle, and it will therefore presumably be for the Federal Government and the British Guiana Government between them to work out an extension of the customs union area to British Guiana.

7. British Guiana and British Honduras, with their as yet undeveloped natural resources and their space for a larger population, would be a valuable part of the Federation, and the Federal Plan does not exclude the possibility of these mainland territories later joining it. The present position is that the Legislature of British Honduras, by a decision made before the People's United Party was elected to office in 1954, deferred indefinitely the further consideration of proposals for federation. In British Guiana in 1952 the Legislature specifically rejected proposals for federation. This was prior to the coming into power of the People's Progressive Party, which

¹ See 11.

although nominally in favour of federation, envisaged it only with immediate fully independent status and showed no interest in the Federal Plan. The present nominated government of British Guiana is keeping in touch with developments and a recent debate shows that there is a revived interest in the possibility of British Guiana becoming part of the Federation.

8. The Report and Plan of the 1953 Conference have now been adopted by the Legislatures of all whose representatives formulated them, by the last on the 27th January of this year. On the 2nd February the Secretary of State for the Colonies in an announcement to Parliament welcomed the agreement reached and stated the intention of Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, in pursuance of the wishes of the British West Indian territories concerned, namely, Barbados, Jamaica, the Leeward Islands, Trinidad and the Windward Islands, to proceed with the next steps towards the creation of a Federation. These have included the establishment of three Commissions, which are about to begin work, to examine the Fiscal, Civil Service and Judicial aspects of Federation. The Barbados Legislature, in supporting the Federal Plan, included a recommendation that a conference on the movement of people within the federation should be held at an early date to reach a settlement of outstanding differences on the matter. The Legislative Council of Trinidad also asked for such a conference. A conference was accordingly arranged in Trinidad from the 14th to 17th March under the chairmanship of the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies to reconsider the question of the control of movement of persons between member Units.² The conference speedily reached a unanimous conclusion. Subject to the approval of Legislatures, the principle of the greatest possible freedom of movement of persons and goods within the Federation will be recited in the Preamble to the Constitution, and the subject of movement will be placed on the Concurrent Legislative List, with qualifications. The concept of free movement within the federal area arouses strong emotions in these territories with populations generally bigger than their economies can carry. Trinidad, the most prosperous, is afraid of its labour markets being disastrously upset by an influx from the poorer territories. Those territories fear that if movement is unduly restricted their people may be prevented from sharing in the prosperity deriving in a federal economy from concentration of industrialisation in the larger units, they themselves being left to provide the market. Seen against the background of these strains and stresses the compromise conclusion reached at the Trinidad Conference is heartening evidence of the desire of the West Indian territories to sink sectional interests for the sake of the greater whole.

9. The major problems remaining to be dealt with are primarily administrative and financial, arising from the distances between the units of the proposed Federation and their comparative poverty. These problems will be dealt with in the reports of the Fiscal, Civil Service and Judicial Commissions. When their reports have been presented, the next step will be the calling of a Final Conference to approve a detailed Plan for the British Caribbean Federation which would take into account the recommendations of the Commissions. Either before this Conference (if plenipotentiary delegates are sent) or after it (if delegates are not plenipotentiary) West Indian Governments will have to give Federation their final approval. This will

² See 27.

entail debates in ten legislatures, twelve houses in all, with the delays inevitable in democratic processes and with, possibly, the elements of opposition, some of which are based on ethnographic and historical differences which were evident when the Plan produced by the 1953 London Conference went to Legislatures for approval. There is finally the difficulty of deciding on a site for the federal capital, for reasons which are common to many federations, *i.e.*, jealousies between the larger units. On the basis of the Final Plan the constitutional instruments will be drawn up for the approval of the Queen in Council. At the same time, the necessary enabling legislation will be put before the United Kingdom Parliament. The new Federation will then come into existence.

29 CO 1032/121, no 193

21 Oct 1955

[Immigration]: minute by C Y Carstairs on the 'principle' involved in the proposal to control immigration

The position is that at their meeting on the 15th of September the Cabinet asked the Home Secretary to circulate a draft Bill as a basis for discussion at a later meeting.

The Home Office have accordingly prepared a memorandum, of which a copy is enclosed in (192), circulating the draft Bill prepared in consultation between the Home Office and the Colonial Office as a result of a decision taken by the Cabinet earlier in the year. The Home Office memorandum has not yet been circulated to the Cabinet, and I understand that the draft is at present with the Home Secretary. The Home Office will let us know at once as soon as it has been decided to circulate this paper; but I thought it well, in advance of that, to ask the Department, in consultation with Students Department and the West Indian Division, to prepare the papers for submission to the Secretary of State. The drafts opposite are the result.

Briefly, the position is that it was decided in principle some considerable time ago by the Secretary of State (see my minute of the 1st of October, 1954 on Part A, Conclusion (2)) that the balance of advantage lay in favour of taking powers to control immigration now, rather than wait for some catastrophic development, subject to the rider that there should be no legislative discrimination between Colonials and the citizens of independent Commonwealth countries, whether white or not (saving only the Irish Republic).¹

Since this [sic], the position has changed in that the West Indian Division feel, and for my part I have no grounds for dissenting from their judgment, that while they have no grounds for opposing the introduction of control as a matter of general principle, the political and economic situation in the West Indies has become such that before any decision to introduce control is promulgated, the Governors concerned should be consulted and, should it be decided as a result of such consultation to proceed with control, special steps should be taken to inform some at any rate of the West Indian Ministers concerned in advance of any public announcement here.

As will be seen from proceeding minutes, Mr. Keith² strongly adheres to his root and branch opposition to the idea of control, both on grounds of principle, and on

¹ See 20.

² J L Keith, head of CO Students Dept and director of colonial scholars.

the ground that he does not consider that the control scheme contemplated, and particularly that aspect of it which relates to housing, would in fact be operable. With the greatest of respect to the strength and sincerity of Mr. Keith's views on the matter, I think that the time for review of the question of principle has now passed. There is indeed in my view no real question of principle involved, or if there is, the principle is that it is open to any country to take steps to control the composition of its own population. This principle has been accepted and indeed repeatedly proclaimed in respect of other Commonwealth countries, including Colonies, and the only difference so far as the United Kingdom is concerned has been that it has not until now been thought necessary to give it legislative expression here in respect of British subjects from overseas. As to the practicability of the control scheme, it is I think rather for the other "Home" Departments here to deal with that aspect of the matter, and it is pertinent that these points were in fact thrashed out at the last Official Interdepartmental Committee, whose report is at (184), and on which the Colonial Office was represented by a member of Students Department as well as by myself. In the circumstances and since advice to the Secretary of State must take the form of a single consistent view, I have ventured to amend the draft brief in such a way as to avoid exposing internal conflicts and inconsistencies. . . .

30 PREM 11/824, ff 18–28

28 Oct 1955

[Immigration]: minute by Mr Lloyd George to Mr Eden. *Annex*: report by Mr Fisher,¹ 'West Indian migration to the UK' (nd)

Prime Minister

I am submitting a paper to the Cabinet on the subject of Colonial Immigration (C.P. (55)166). You may care to see the attached report by my Parliamentary Private Secretary, Nigel Fisher, who was a member of the Parliamentary delegation to the West Indies, last summer. This gives the best, short account of the position in the West Indies that I have come across.

Annex to 30

1. *The character and causes of the problem from the West Indian point of view*

The problem is caused by:—

- (1) *Over-population*, which is everywhere on the increase.
- (2) *Unemployment and under-employment*, which is considerable in some Colonies and noticeable everywhere.

(1) The increase in population is mainly due to the absence of birth control. There is comparatively little instruction in birth control in most territories and none in those Islands where the population is predominantly Catholic. Working class morals are lax and it is not uncommon to find an unmarried woman living with

¹ Mr N T L Fisher, parliamentary private secretary to home secretary, 1954–1957 (later parliamentary under-secretary of state for Commonwealth and colonies, 1962–1963).

her 3 or 4 young children of different fathers and called by different surnames. In some cases the woman does not even know the name of the father, who frequently contributes nothing to the support of his children and probably scarcely knows of their existence.

(2) The unemployment and under-employment is due in many of the territories to under-development of the land and other natural resources. This is particularly true of the Windward Islands and of British Guiana. Nevertheless (apart from British Guiana and British Honduras) the Colonies could not absorb in employment their increasing populations even if their resources *were* fully developed.

2. Reactions in the colonies to the U.K. problem

In every Colony public men and private individuals were conscious of the issue, but seldom fully aware of its awkward features from the U.K. point of view. They were prepared to listen to our side of the picture and to talk it over in a frank and friendly way as a common problem to which a solution must be found. I did not encounter anywhere any reluctance to discuss the matter. On the contrary, discussion was usually initiated by W. Indians.

(1) Barbados

The Prime Minister, Grantly Adams, talked quite frankly about the problem, which is particularly acute in this small densely populated Island. The Barbadian Government is the only W. Indian Government which actually makes a per capita grant of £50 to certain emigrants to assist with their passage money.

Mrs. Adams is herself on the newly-formed unofficial Family Planning Committee and confirmed the view expressed to me by a prominent local Doctor that Colonial opinion is not against family planning. No-one to whom they have so far suggested and explained the use of contraceptives has yet refused to use them and most are grateful for the instruction. But this work is only in its initial stages and it will be a long time before it has any real effect. Moreover, contraceptives are too expensive for most people to use. It would be helpful if they could be subsidised by the local Government.

I had a long talk with Sir Stephen Luke, Comptroller for Development and Welfare in the W. Indies, who is sound and intelligent. He hopes the British Government's policy of "masterly inactivity" will continue, as reactions against restrictions would be considerable in Barbados. He thinks the flood of immigrants to Great Britain will not continue to increase at the present rate, because there will soon be fewer who can afford the passage money. So far, we have had only the comparatively affluent and enterprising among working-class Barbadians. He says that Barbadian immigrants do not concentrate in certain areas in England, as the Jamaicans do, but tend to disperse as individuals or in small groups.

(2) Windward islands

St. Lucia. The poorest Island we visited, with sub-human housing conditions and a rapidly increasing population.

Between 3,000 and 4,000 children leave school every year and 9,000 of these are now unemployed and have no prospect of employment in the Island. This figure will increase.

99% of the population are Catholic. Possibilities of birth control are, therefore, negligible.

Much of the land is uncultivated due partly to lack of capital to plant or develop it, and partly to the French system of land tenure which has produced acute fragmentation. (1 acre of land may be jointly owned by as many as 10 different people).

As St. Lucia is so depressed, few St. Lucians can afford the fare to England, but the view was expressed to me that restrictions by H.M.G. would be regarded unfavourably.

Grenada is more prosperous than St. Lucia, but the standard of living is low. Population 85,000, increasing at the rate of 2,000 p.a.

There is very little migration to the U.K. but some to Trinidad, and good prospects of migration to British Guiana, if the interior there could be developed.

Generally, migration to Britain from the Windward Islands is on a small scale because very few people can afford the passage money.

(3) *Leeward islands*

St. Kitts and Nevis. Population 50,000, increasing at rate of 1,200 p.a.

There is some unemployment among the younger people, and some under-employment in the out-of-crop season. There is a minor migration to Great Britain—about 300 last year.

There is also migration from Montserrat to St. Kitts. Island politicians and officials initiated discussion on W. Indian immigration to U.K. and took the line that informed opinion in St. Kitts is conscious of the problem and would not be unduly critical if H.M.G. felt obliged to impose restrictions, but that popular opinion (at least at first) would be resentful, and action by U.K. would provide fertile ground for anti-British trouble-makers.

Montserrat. Population 13,500. In grave economic difficulties due to persistent droughts. There is severe unemployment. 11% of the entire population have gone to Great Britain in the past 18 months, and many to St. Kitts and Antigua.

In contrast to the other Islands, it is not the more prosperous who are going (almost no-one is prosperous in Montserrat). Passage money is usually sent back by earlier migrants who have saved money in the U.K. in order to pay for the fares of their friends and relations, who later repay the loan out of their U.K. earnings. Due to the extreme depression in Montserrat, the view was expressed that one of the migration factors there might be the existence of the Welfare State and a minimum subsistence standard in Britain. It is not considered that this motive applies to the W. Indies generally.

Antigua. Population 51,000, increasing at rate of 1,000 p.a. There have been a few immigrants to the U.K. but these are discouraged by the political leader, Bird,² who does not want them to go because it is the better and more enterprising people who leave and they are a loss to the Island's economy.

Generally, informed opinion in the Leeward Islands would not object to H.M.G. restrictions to exclude those of low health standards or with criminal records, or if we insisted on immigrants possessing a return ticket or putting down a cash deposit

² V C Bird, member, Antigua Legislative Council from 1945, Executive Council from 1946; minister of trade and production, 1956–1960; chief minister, 1960–1967; led delegation to UK which achieved associated status for Antigua, 1966; premier, 1967–1971, 1976–1981; minister of planning, external affairs, defence and energy, 1981–1982, of finance and defence, 1982–1984.

in lieu of a return ticket. It would not be thought unreasonable to impose British military service upon immigrants. But all were agreed that a ban on immigration from the W. Indies, or even a quota system, would be much resented, and any restrictions would have to be applied to the whole Empire and Commonwealth, white and coloured.

(4) *Trinidad*, like the United Kingdom, is at the receiving end of the Caribbean migration problem, because of her comparative wealth, based on oil. There is virtually no migration from Trinidad to Great Britain.

Some politicians to whom we talked took the illogical and unreasonable view that Trinidad has the right to impose restrictions on immigration from other W. Indian islands, but H.M.G. has no right to impose similar restrictions on immigrants to the U.K.

But the best opinion on the issue was expressed by Hugh Wooding, Q.C. (a very able and sound barrister of considerable standing) and others who consider that H.M.G. could impose restrictions such as Trinidad herself imposes, provided they were applied throughout the Commonwealth (including white immigrants) and provided the case was well presented and seen to be of universal application—e.g. the numbers of those affected in each Commonwealth country should be published. (It is conceded that an exception would have to be made, on practical grounds, in the case of Ireland).

Hannais³, [sic] Q.C. (reputed to be the cleverest man in the W. Indies) thinks legislation by H.M.G. would be a mistake, and that the better method would be to get agreement with Manley (Jamaica) and Grantly Adams (Barbados) to co-operate from W. Indies end by limiting exit permits to the U.K. to a fixed and specified period, say 2 years, so that immigrants could learn a trade and then return to the W. Indies better qualified and of greater usefulness to their own Island. This sounds sensible, but I am sure neither Manley nor Adams would agree, because neither could get away with it politically to their own electorate.

(5) *Jamaica*. Birth control here is privately organised by doctors and social workers. It is not either officially encouraged or discouraged. Young girls often start babies at 14 years old, so sex education should really start in the schools.

It was at once clear that it is not just the riff-raff who are going to Britain. Many of the emigrants are comparatively skilled men, whose departure is a serious loss to Jamaica. This aspect of the problem is well understood in the Island. A tailor and shirt maker I talked to when shopping in Kingston told me he had great difficulty in producing good clothes because his best men were always leaving to go to England.

The W. Indian of African descent puts a high premium on leisure and is usually content to work 2 or 3 days a week to provide the necessities of life, and is idle for the rest of the week. Most of the Jamaicans who are coming to England are, therefore, the more enterprising who come here to better themselves.

The Prime Minister, Manley, was reticent in expressing a personal view on the problem, which is political dynamite in Jamaica, but he listened with interest and sympathy when I spoke (without reporters present) to the two Houses of the Jamaican Parliament of the difficulties which confront Great Britain with regard to the matter. Those close to him told me afterwards that he had not at all resented my

³ (Sir) L C Hannays (Kt 1957); member, SCAC; represented Trinidad at conferences on federation, 1946–1956.

frank statement of the U.K. case, and he wrote me a charming (though still non-committal) letter after I left Jamaica.

Glasspole,⁴ his Minister of Labour and Leader of the House, told Patrick Gordon-Walker that he would not object to restrictions on entry which were genuinely applied to the whole Commonwealth, but would deeply resent discrimination against W. Indian immigration. This was the usual view Jamaicans take of the matter.

Colonial officials in Jamaica think we should not impose a total ban or even a quota; but that it would probably be possible to obtain agreement with the Jamaican Government to channel workers through a central organisation in London, which would send them to specific jobs or areas where they are needed, and thus avoid excessive concentration in certain localities in England.

3. *Conclusions and suggestions*

1. *The long-term solutions to this problem are social, political and economic*

(a) *Social*

Family planning and effective birth control measures are the best long-term social solutions and should be encouraged as much as possible; but they can make no real contribution for at least a generation, and are only even being attempted in Barbados and Jamaica (and in the latter only on a very non-official basis).

In the other Islands this aspect of the problem appears to be virtually insoluble owing to the large Catholic communities in many of them and the high rate of illegitimacy in all of them.

(b) *Political*

This solution lies in W. Indian Federation and greater freedom of movement within the Caribbean, which may enable the smaller, poorer Islands to export part of their surplus population to the larger and richer Caribbean territories.

(c) *Economic*

This solution lies in the development of all the Caribbean Colonies by capital investment on a large scale from both public funds and private enterprise. In particular, British Guiana and British Honduras could absorb the whole of the surplus population of all the Islands if they could be developed and the interiors opened up on a sufficient scale. (This would incidentally also have the effect of solving the E. Indian problem in British Guiana). But (especially in the case of B.G.) adequate capital investment from private enterprise sources is unlikely to be made available until greater political stability has been achieved.

2. *Short-term action*

(1) H.M.G. could make the forthright, direct and realistic approach and say "This is essentially a W. Indian problem and we must treat it as such"—and proceed to introduce restrictions applicable only to the W. Indies.

This would be simple, easy and effective from our point of view and would avoid embarrassment and difficulty in the Commonwealth generally. But it would have serious repercussions throughout the Caribbean on the event of Federation and would presumably, therefore, not be acceptable to the Colonial Secretary.

⁴ F A Glasspole, leader of House of Representatives, Jamaica, 1955–1962; minister of labour, 1955–1957; minister of education, 1959–1962.

It would be a convenient approach, but I do not think it would be morally right, or even (if we place any value on the British Caribbean Colonies) politically expedient.

(2) My own view is that we could impose almost any reasonable restrictions (other than a total ban or a severe quota system) without any serious repercussions in the W. Indies, provided they were also applied to the whole Commonwealth and Empire, irrespective of race or colour, and provided they were clearly *seen* to be so applied fairly and fully and universally. Ireland would have to be exempted as a special case.

The following are some of the restrictions which could be introduced, if it were thought desirable:—

- (a) Minimum health standards.
- (b) No-one with a criminal record in his country of origin.
- (c) Immigrants of service age to be subject to British military service if remaining in U.K. for longer than an agreed period, say 2 years.
- (d) Immigrants to possess return ticket, or to put down cash deposit in lieu of a return ticket.
- (e) Duration of stay in U.K. to be limited to a specified period, say 2 years.
- (f) Joint central organisation to be set up in London by U.K. and Jamaican Governments to channel Jamaican workers to jobs or localities where they are most needed, thus avoiding concentration.

I think H.M.G. should discuss the problem with Manley and Grantly Adams; but if anything is done it will have to be *imposed* by the U.K. (though in such a way that local leaders in W. Indies would not think it unreasonable or discriminatory).

W. Indian politicians cannot be expected publicly to agree with restrictions, still less impose them themselves on their own would-be emigrants. They have their electorates to consider just as we have here. But if H.M.G. take the trouble to explain our difficulties and our decision fully, no responsible leader of opinion in the Islands will rouse popular feeling against Great Britain, provided our proposals are reasonably limited in scope and are applied universally throughout the Commonwealth.

I think all members of the British Parliamentary Delegation were agreed that H.M.G. should not impose restrictions unless forced to do so by events, and that even then any restrictions should be applicable throughout the Commonwealth.

Before imposing any restrictions, we felt that real efforts should be made to overcome the present concentration of immigrants in certain areas of Great Britain.

31 CO 1031/1718, no 2

28 Oct–7 Nov 1955

‘Full Commonwealth status for the Caribbean Federation’: minutes by P Rogers, Sir T Lloyd and Lord Lloyd

Sir T. Lloyd

The Department and I have discussed with Sir S. Luke the question of the Caribbean Federation becoming in due course a full member of the Commonwealth. I think it is fair to say that it has always been in the mind of everyone here that one day it should become such, but so far this has never been said publicly by a Secretary of State. Colonel Stanley’s despatch of the 14th March, 1945 (Cmd. 7120) referred only to “full

internal self-government within the British Commonwealth". It was however referred to more explicitly by the Standing Closer Association Committee in its Report (Col. No. 255 para. 17) thus "... we may place on record our considered and emphatic view that Federation, and only Federation, affords a reasonable prospect of achieving economic stability and through it that political independence which is our constant aim". There is no doubt that the prospect of full membership of the Commonwealth has been one of the most important reasons, if not the most important, why Federation has received such widespread support. But the issue has not so far been clearly defined by H.M.G. and we feel that the time has come for clarification.

There has been little understanding of the obligations of independence, although it is true to say that the assumption has always been that this would mean full Commonwealth membership, and not secession; but the relationship between the proposal for federation and complete political independence within the Commonwealth has not always been clear in the minds of the general public in the West Indies, nor indeed in the U.K. and it is often assumed that promotion to this status will automatically accompany the achievement of Federation or follow close on its heels. Nor, again, does the West Indian public appear to have much appreciation of the obligations which attach to full membership of the Commonwealth. On the other hand, those political leaders who recognise the obligations are far from clear about the prospect of the Federation achieving full membership of the Commonwealth and are mostly inclined to think that the U.K. intends to keep them on leading strings for a long time to come. They are therefore more grudging on their immediate approach than they otherwise might be. In the ordinary way we could wait and let all this take its course, but there are, in the view of Sir Stephen (and all of us here agree with him), special reasons for considering this issue now. We are going through a very uneasy period over federation, when on the one hand it is at long last becoming tacitly accepted as inevitable throughout the West Indies while on the other political leaders are becoming concerned about its financial and administrative implications and (particularly in Jamaica) are trying to slow down the pace. On the other hand if the pace is slowed down too much that will give a further chance to the East Indians in Trinidad to try and wreck it altogether. With great difficulty we have nearly got to the point of agreement that there should be a final Conference in February next year, but we know that Mr. Manley will have a number of proposals about adjusting the federal constitution to the present stage of political development in the more advanced West Indies constitutions, i.e. making it more advanced than is contemplated in the Federal Plan drawn up at the London Conference in 1953. We know too that this is likely to receive a great deal of support from delegates except those of Trinidad but we ourselves feel it is a bit premature at [the] outset. Our reason for thinking it to be so is that we foresee that the first few years of Federation will be a difficult period administratively and politically, in which it will be vital to establish the federal machinery soundly i.e. they will be years in which administrative experience at the top may be of crucial importance. On the other hand, once the Federation is properly established, we see no reason to expect that it will not then be politically capable of full independence.

In short, opinion in the West Indies, which has accepted federation, is not quite clear where it is leading and we may well face more difficulties than we need, because

there has so far been no clear statement of aim e.g. the delegates to the Conference may well seek greater political independence at the outset than we think wise, because they are not confident of an early prospect of independence. Sir Stephen Luke tells us that the members of the delegation of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association which recently toured the West Indies feel very strongly that quite soon H.M.G. should make a statement that the Caribbean Federation will be admitted to full membership of the Commonwealth within a relatively short period after it is set up. Sir Alan Burns¹ has told us more than once that a statement on these lines would be extremely valuable not only in the West Indies, but in the United Kingdom and the U.S.A. There is no doubt on the part of any of us that such a statement would have a galvanising and entirely favourable effect throughout the West Indies and, rightly timed, might well be decisive in achieving the success of the forthcoming Conference. There are, however, several snags. We recognise that admission to full membership is a matter for all the members of the Commonwealth, which it would seem premature to raise before a federation has even been set up. There is the financial difficulty, in that for five years at least and almost certainly for much longer, the Federation will not only be heavily dependent upon C.D. and W. monies, but will require grants-in-aid of administration for certain of its units. I am sufficiently old-fashioned to think that financial assistance of this kind is incompatible with full membership of the Commonwealth. It is true that we have the examples of, say, Jordan and Libya before us, as “independent” countries which receive such assistance in effect, but I cannot think that the interests of the Commonwealth are best served by suggesting that States of this order are suitable as full members of it. Indeed that would seem to me positively derogatory. In view of the financial uncertainties there is therefore even more than the usual difficulty and objection in fixing a timetable for the achievement of independence. Not only do we strongly dislike that on merit, but there is indeed the risk that if we seek to fix an early date for it, we run the risk of H.M.G. being accused of trying to deprive the West Indies of financial assistance before they are ready i.e. of promoting Federation solely for their own financial benefit. That would stir up strong opposition to Federation in many quarters.

Nevertheless, in spite of the difficulties, we all agree with Sir S. Luke that it is very important that a statement of intention should be made. The only way that we see out of the financial difficulty is to make it clear to the West Indies that H.M.G. are not seeking either to deprive them of financial assistance prematurely, or to delay their independence. This can only be done by leaving the final move for full independence to the West Indies themselves. The Secretary of State's opening speech cannot avoid reference to the ultimate aim of Federation and I should like to see it clarified. The statement should, I think, be made at some length. It might start with a brief history of the moves towards Caribbean Federation onwards from Colonel Stanley's despatch and then explain candidly the difficulties which still have to be overcome and the very great deal of work which remains to be done before Federation is achieved. So far the speech would be very much down to earth and almost depressing. Then would come the peroration which would we hope lift the Conference out of the mass of

¹ Gov of Gold Coast, 1941–1947; permanent UK representative, UN Trusteeship Council, 1947–1956.

detail and inspire them with a clear sight of the goal. The Secretary of State might state, while making it clear that he was *not* putting forward the subject of Commonwealth Membership for discussion as an item on the Agenda, that full membership of the Commonwealth was the goal towards which Federation was leading. Full Commonwealth membership would involve many obligations, not least of which would be the Federation's ability to stand on its own feet financially. As the delegates would know, one of the great principles of the Commonwealth was mutual help and there was no reason why one member or group of members should not give financial assistance towards further economic development to X other members (as in the Colombo Plan); but the Federation's ability to raise money on its own credit and to assume, to the extent involved by the geographical position, responsibility for defence and for its international relations, would be pre-requisites for entry into full membership of the Commonwealth. It would be for the Federal Government in the first instance to satisfy itself that it had reached the stage when it could carry these burdens; when it was so satisfied, and decided to seek full Membership of the Commonwealth, it would find H.M.G. ready to sponsor the application although of course the decision would involve the other Members of the Commonwealth as well. With this ultimate goal in mind the Delegates to the Conference might be reminded of the heartening degree of agreement already reached over the achievement of the more immediate goal of Federation and invited to press on from there towards taking the final decisions that would bring the Federation into being at an early date.

A statement on these lines would require prior consultation with the Treasury and the Commonwealth Relations Office. We do not think that there could be any objection to making this statement for the first time in the Conference rather than in Parliament, since there is no early intention of introducing a Bill for the purpose of conferring independence on the West Indies.

This minute has been agreed with the Dept, Mr. McPetrie² and Mr. Watt. Sir Stephen Luke agrees in general.

P.R.
28.10.55.

Secretary of State (through Lord Lloyd)

Two or three days ago I showed you Mr. Roger's minute at No. 2 but you then had time to read only the last two paragraphs of it. You told me that you approved unreservedly the thought underlying Mr. Rogers' proposal at X in that minute though there were, as we agreed, some details which needed further consideration—e.g. some more precise reservation might be necessary about financial stability as a pre-requisite to full Commonwealth membership and H.M.G. as well as the Federal Government could reasonably expect to be satisfied, before there was any question of Commonwealth membership, that the Caribbean Federation could in fact carry the burden of responsibility for defence and for international relations.

These points and others Sir C. Jeffries, Mr. Rogers and I have discussed this morning.

If, on a closer reading of No. 1,³ you confirm your acceptance of the general

² J C McPetrie, assistant legal adviser, CO.

³ No 1 is another version of Rogers's minute reproduced here as No 2 from the file.

principle there expounded, Mr. Rogers would prepare and discuss with Treasury officials and the C.R.O. a first draft text of this part of the speech which you would have to make at the opening of the Federation Conference in February.

T.I.K.L.
4.11.55

Secretary of State

I quite agree with Mr. Rogers and Sir S. Luke that the time is very near when it would be advantageous to give the West Indies a glimpse of the prospect which lies ahead after Federation has been established, and I agree also that the ultimate prospect should be Dominion status.

I equally agree very much with what has been said about the achievement of something near to economic [sic] independence before Dominion status is reached. I am quite sure that Mr. Rogers is right when he says that the admission of countries who would depend on us to any large extent for grants-in-aid, etc. is really derogatory to the whole conception of Dominion status.

The general attitude of most of the West Indian leaders is still too much that of the mendicant and too many of them still seem to think that we have a duty not only to give them independence but also large sums of money, and that their responsibilities are confined to asking for the money and spending it. I am sure therefore that we have got to bring the economic aspects home to the West Indian leaders. In this connection the question of birth control is to my mind still paramount. Of all the West Indian leaders Grantley Adams so far is the only one who has had the political courage to give any public support to family planning. It is time that Manley and others put their own house in order in this respect. If we do this however we are almost bound to be told that the West Indies can never stand on their own feet economically and before we put over this line I think we ought to examine far more closely exactly how independent the West Indies could ever become.⁴

L.
7.11.55

⁴ Lennox-Boyd minuted (8 Nov): 'I have re-read and am in general accord with the general principle in No. 1'.

32 CO 1032/121, no 197

Nov 1955

'Colonial immigrants': CO brief for Mr Lennox-Boyd on the proposals put to the Cabinet by the home secretary

On the 15th September the Cabinet asked to see the draft Bill which had been prepared on the Immigration of British subjects from overseas. This Bill has now been circulated to the Cabinet by the Home Secretary under cover of his Memorandum C.P.(55)166. The Home Secretary's memorandum discusses the question whether such legislation should apply to Commonwealth immigrants generally or to coloured immigrants only. It also discusses whether or not the Home Secretary's proposed power of deportation should be subject to a judicial process. It is suggested that the Secretary of State should circulate a memorandum to the

Cabinet on these two points. A note¹ is annexed hereto giving the available facts regarding immigration from the West Indies over recent years, and discussing probable future trends.

2. The main question which the Cabinet will wish to consider, however, is whether any legislation to control the entry of British subjects into the United Kingdom should, or should not, be introduced at the present time. In order to advise the Secretary of State, this matter has recently been reviewed in consultation with the West Indies Division and the Students Department, both of which are of course closely concerned.

3. As the Secretary of State knows, the introduction of legislation to control the entry of British subjects into the United Kingdom and their stay here would be unprecedented. It would be a break with the traditional right of British subjects to come here freely. Such a change would be regarded as a serious matter by the general public here and throughout the Commonwealth, and it is not possible to foresee all the repercussions.

4. Under the Bill circulated by the Home Secretary, entry into the United Kingdom could be refused to British subjects from overseas who cannot satisfy the Immigration Authorities that they are coming here

(a) only on a temporary visit, or

(b) to take up authorised employment or are in a position to support themselves and their dependents without employment, and that in either case suitable housing accommodation is available for them.

Persons convicted of crime and persons whose entry would be undesirable on medical or security grounds could in any case be excluded. Powers are also provided for the deportation of British subjects who do not belong here.

5. It has already been decided by the Secretary of State that in principle the proposal to extend the control of immigration to overseas British subjects is acceptable (provided that it extends to *all* overseas British subjects and is not confined to Colonials only) and that the balance of advantage is in favour of doing so. This is however subject of course to a workable scheme being introduced. On this point, doubts have been expressed whether the Home Office proposal involving evidence as to housing accommodation in this country would in fact work smoothly in the case of British subjects. This is primarily a matter for the "Home" Departments who would have to operate the scheme, but the Secretary of State might wish to raise the point specifically and seek an assurance from or on behalf of those Departments that this part of the control scheme would in fact work sufficiently well, since a breakdown in the control scheme as a whole might well be worse than having none at all.

6. Given satisfaction as to the workability of a control scheme, current political and economic problems in relation to the West Indies have also to be taken into account. It has to be recognised that the introduction of control legislation now would cause much more political difficulty in the West Indies than would have been the case a year or 18 months ago. It has been represented that Mr. Manley's survival as Chief Minister in Jamaica depends on his obtaining more employment for Jamaicans; to the extent therefore that the emigration of Jamaicans to this country helps to deal with this problem, any impediment to the flow would aggravate the

¹ Not printed.

unemployment problem there, endanger Mr. Manley's position, and indirectly affect the degree of financial assistance from United Kingdom funds which may have to be given to the West Indies. This last effect could however arise even more sharply were there to be a considerable exodus of West Indians from the United Kingdom as a result of a recession here.

7. It is not considered that a decision on the broad question of policy should be *dictated* by West Indian political considerations; but it is recommended that, should the Cabinet favour control in principle, the following conditions should apply and steps should be taken:—

(a) that legislation should apply to immigrants from the whole of the Commonwealth (with the exception perhaps of the Irish Republic) and not to immigrants from the Colonies only;

(b) that Governors in the territories most directly concerned should be consulted privately about the effects of such legislation before any public statement is made to the effect that legislation has been decided upon;

(c) that before any such public statement is made, West Indian Ministers should, preferably 24 hours beforehand or at least simultaneously, be given a careful explanation of the reasons for this decision of policy, which would require to take account of the fact that immigration control was not necessary to protect the immediate employment situation in this country.

8. There is one subsidiary but nevertheless important point which should be exposed at the Cabinet. The Home Secretary's proposals involve giving the Home Secretary discretionary power to deport British subjects, corresponding to the similar power which he already has in respect of aliens. The Home Office are anxious to avoid having to concede some form of prior judicial process before deportation, since they attach the greatest importance to the discretionary principle in regard to aliens, and are already under regular pressure to introduce some judicial procedure as regards aliens. They fear that they would find their position much more difficult to hold if judicial process were introduced in regard to overseas British subjects. There are however two important objections to this from the Colonial point of view. The first is, as is pointed out in the Secretary of State's memorandum on the Home Secretary's paper, that it would make it difficult—and in constitutionally advanced territories probably impossible—to prevent Colonial Governments from assuming similar powers. The second, and more important, is that in removing the distinction between British subjects and aliens it might well strike a real blow at the concept of the Commonwealth community and reduce its attractions for Colonial territories.

33 PREM 11/2920

10 Nov 1955

'Colonial immigrants': minute by Sir N Brook to Mr Eden proposing the appointment of a Cabinet Committee

Prime Minister

Since the Cabinet's discussion on 3rd November I have been thinking how you might wish this matter to be pursued.

2. This was the fifteenth time that the Cabinet have considered the problem, without being able to reach a conclusion. This, I believe, is because opinion in the

Cabinet is pretty evenly balanced on the main question, viz., whether the time is ripe to deal with the matter by legislation. Some Ministers, notably the Lord President,¹ favour early legislative action to guard against the long-term threat to the racial character of the English people. Others feel that Colonial immigration is not yet a matter of general public concern, save in a few districts where the rapid influx of West Indians has been concentrated, and that it would be inexpedient to embark on such controversial legislation now.

3. I doubt whether this difference of view will be resolved immediately, since each side appreciates the scruples of the other; and the difference between them is in deciding just where the balance of advantage lies. There may, therefore, be something to be said for avoiding further Cabinet discussion for a time—the case for legislation may become more clear.²

4. It might, however, help Ministers if a further examination were made of the problems which would have to be solved if there were to be legislation. Unless these points can be got out of the way, Ministers who do not want any legislation on this subject will continue to use them as arguments on the question of principle. We could, when the time came, have a cleaner discussion on the main question if it had already been established what would be the best form of legislation to introduce if there was to be any at all.

5. If you agree with this, there might be a small Committee composed as follows:—

Lord Chancellor (Chairman)
 Lord President
 Home Secretary
 Commonwealth Secretary
 Colonial Secretary
 Attorney-General

to consider what form the legislation should take if it were decided to take powers to control this immigration.

6. The Committee might also consider how this legislative action could best be justified. Three months ago officials prepared an objective statement on the problem (attached to C.P.(55) 102), but this was a purely factual document designed for publication in advance of any policy decision. What the Cabinet need now is to see what sort of a case could be made in favour of the Bill if the Government decided to introduce it.

7. If you would like to proceed on these lines, I could draft a note which you might circulate to the Cabinet for their information.³

¹ Lord Salisbury.

² Marginal comment by Eden: 'Yes'.

³ Eden responded: 'I agree. This is, I think, the best we can do'.

34 CO 1031/1703, no 2

17 Nov 1955

[Jamaica and federation]: letter from Lord Lloyd to Sir H Foot on the position of Mr Manley

As you will realise I have kept in close touch with all developments affecting Federation and I have seen your letter of the 2nd November to Rogers.

The stage in Federation which we are now approaching is likely in my view to be the most difficult stage of all and we may well need all our ingenuity to bring matters to a successful conclusion. I am sure, therefore, that you will agree that it is important that there should be no misunderstandings between us and I felt that it might be useful at this juncture if I were to write to tell you what is in my mind and the difficulties as I see them.

When Manley was last in London I took the opportunity of discussing the whole question with him and of eliciting his views.¹ He declared that he was strongly in favour of Federation but that his party was divided upon the issue, some being completely opposed to Federation and even the majority, at the moment, more concerned with the implementation of the party's domestic programme than with Federation. In these circumstances any attempt on his part to force the pace and to involve his party in all the complications of Federal elections before 1958 would split the party. On the other hand he told me that he appreciated Gomes's difficulties and was anxious to reach some compromise which would solve their mutual problems. The proposals set out in your telegram No. 725² seem to him to provide such a solution.

I do not know the extent of the internal dissension in Manley's party upon this issue. I know, of course, that Wills Isaacs³ is radically opposed to Federation but I was not aware that this feeling was shared by others. I shall be interested to have your impressions on this point. I assume, however, that Manley was not exaggerating his domestic difficulties and on this assumption his proposal seemed to me to be a genuine attempt to produce a reasonable compromise. Our talk was most friendly and at this time I felt much reassured about his attitude.

The Trinidad problem is, I am sure, well known to you and it is a very real one. I am advised that the Indians may well win the Trinidad elections next September. As long as they regard Federation as a foregone conclusion, they will probably accept it and an Enabling Act will, I hope, have this effect upon them. If, however, there were no Enabling Act they might well decide to withdraw from Federation which would mean the collapse of the whole scheme. It is therefore not merely a parochial Trinidad interest. On the contrary it involves the future of Federation itself and I am satisfied that if Federation is to come about an Enabling Act before the Trinidad elections is absolutely essential. I emphasise this point because in my view it is the key to the whole issue. For all these reasons Gomes's interest is to expedite Federation and he has no interest in waiting until 1958. On the contrary if it were possible he would like to see Federation fully established before September 1956. Since, on the question of timing at any rate, his interests and those of Manley are so diametrically opposed, it seemed to me all the more important to endeavour to secure an agreement between them.

The next time, therefore, that Gomes was in London I took the opportunity of discussing your proposition with him. I did not expect him to be enthusiastic about it

¹ Lloyd saw both Manley and Gomes in London in Oct 1955. In discussion Manley said that 'any attempt on his part to have Federal elections before 1958 would involve him in a revolution within his own party' (CO 1031/1694, minute by Lloyd, 6 Oct 1955).

² Tel 725 suggested that as soon as possible after the 1956 constitutional conference there should be an act of the UK parliament enabling HMG to provide for a federation of the colonies concerned and for the establishment of a federal government, legislature, supreme court and the necessary federal authorities.

³ Minister of trade and industry and deputy premier, Jamaica, 1955–1962.

since he has nothing to gain by delay and he is quite shrewd enough to realise that an Enabling Act, although it takes us a long step towards finality, does not completely safeguard his position. Nevertheless, if not enthusiastic, he was very ready to be helpful and was quite prepared to agree to this proposal provided that the London Conference was plenipotentiary in character and that there was a definite date in 1958 for Federal elections.

The question of a Plenipotentiary Conference in London, of course, puts us all in a difficult position. I agree with you that it is highly undesirable that the Reports of the Commissions should be debated in Legislatures before the Conference. I agree also that if Legislatures are to be asked to send delegates with plenipotentiary powers there is inevitably a risk that they will press for such a debate. On the other hand if the decisions of the London Conference have to be referred back to Legislatures the consequent delay would make it impossible to pass an Enabling Act through Parliament before the Trinidad elections. Since the Enabling Act is a fundamental part of your whole proposal (to which Manley agrees) it is clear that reference back after the London Conference must at all costs be avoided and therefore that the delegates must come with plenipotentiary powers. I still hope that by avoiding the use of the word "plenipotentiary" we may avoid the risk of premature debates and that by persuasion at the Conference itself we may avoid any question of reference back to Legislatures and thus steer between Scylla and Charybdis. I am glad to see from your telegram No. 114 that although he is not enthusiastic about a Plenipotentiary Conference Manley is prepared to agree to such an arrangement.

Gomes's second condition is that there should be a definite date in 1958 for Federal elections. In your letter to Rogers you say that Manley has been very anxious not to be committed to a definite date in advance. I understand his anxiety, but I should have thought that this would have been largely dispelled now that Gomes has agreed to meet him on the question of the elections in 1958. It is only fair to add that while I am sure Gomes will keep to his bargain, Manley is going to be under strong pressure for early elections from a number of other West Indian delegates. However, I am sure that that is something that can be sorted out in the Consultative Committee, and that that Committee can be used for settling the date of elections, so that Manley will therefore have every opportunity of having his views considered. I believe that this could fully meet the point you make at (b) of your letter to Rogers.

There have, as I am sure you know, been a number of disquieting rumours throughout the Caribbean in the course of the last few months about Manley's attitude towards Federation. It is said that he is lukewarm about it and that he would be not unduly distressed if Federation were to collapse provided that he were not saddled with the responsibility for its dissolution. For my part I have never wished to pay too much attention to such rumours and, as I have already said, I was considerably reassured by the talk I had with Manley in London. If, however, in the new circumstances he continues to equivocate about a final date I am bound to confess that it makes it difficult to dismiss these suspicions completely from one's mind, and if he really wants Federation I should have thought he could well accept a definite date in 1958.

There is a further matter which also disturbs me. I understand that at the London Conference Manley intends to propose various amendments to the Constitution which go a long way beyond what was agreed in 1953. Within certain limits which can hardly be defined precisely in advance, without knowing just what Manley has in

mind, it may well be possible to agree some changes which make the constitution politically more advanced, without it being felt that such changes call for reference back to Legislatures, but to take the proposals beyond that limit would, even if the proposals were agreed by delegates, certainly make some of them consider that reference back was necessary, if faith was to be kept with their Legislatures. This would not be a question of whether or not Legislatures would be likely to approve, but rather that the proposals went so far beyond what they had previously approved, that they ought, despite the status of delegates, to be consulted again. In saying all this, I am, let me make it clear, not thinking of any difficulty on the part of Her Majesty's Government, though naturally we should have to consider any such proposals on the part of the Conference, but as I have said some delegates would, I am convinced, feel that political proposals which went beyond the limits I have mentioned would have to be referred back. In saying this I have Barbados particularly in mind, partly because of the general way in which their constitution works and partly because of their Upper House in particular. Indeed, it is possible that the issue might bring about a split between Adams and Cuke and a constitutional crisis between the two Houses, which would not only do great harm in Barbados, but leave Federation as its victim.

A demand at the Conference for reference back would be very difficult to resist, if Manley's proposals go too far beyond what was agreed at the 1953 London Conference. Any proposal for constitutional advance is obviously likely to attract strong support from the other delegates and therefore it is quite possible that the Conference might agree to Manley's proposal and also to a Barbados demand for a reference back. You say in your letter to Rogers that Manley "was not finally decided in his mind whether reference back to the Caribbean Legislatures should or should not be made following the London Conference . . . but that if reference back was considered necessary he would not shrink from it." Frankly I cannot understand how Manley could make such a statement if he really wanted Federation. He must be fully aware that if there has to be any reference back to Legislatures there can be no Enabling Act before the Trinidad elections and that as a result the whole of Federation may collapse. Since he is also very close to Grantley Adams I would have expected [sic] him also to be aware that if these constitutional amendments are agreed there will be a demand for reference back in Barbados. Finally, he is sufficiently intelligent to realise that his objective could just as well be achieved by insisting that amendments to the Constitution might be made within the first five years of Federation if this was the general desire.

Nevertheless, from your telegrams, I get the impression that he is determined to proceed with these constitutional amendments, beyond the limits which could be agreed without reference back to Legislatures. In the circumstances you will I am certain not be surprised if I and others are puzzled at what Manley is really after. I wish to believe his sincerity about Federation. At the same time he does appear not merely to be equivocating but actually taking a course which may deliberately endanger the whole Federal project. Furthermore, it is only fair to point out that should he insist upon these constitutional amendments he could count on being held in the West Indies as the champion of constitutional freedom whilst those who felt compelled to oppose him would be branded as reactionaries. If it were true that he wished to destroy Federation there could be no better or simpler way, from his point of view, of doing it. It could all be done in the name of constitutional freedom and far

from being blamed Manley would actually be praised. At the same time Federation would be killed just as surely as if Manley himself had deliberately opposed it.

This is the situation as I see it. I had hoped that if I could get an agreement between Manley and Gomes, our course might have been set reasonably clear. To reach such an agreement it is, of course, necessary to overcome the difficulties implicit in a Plenipotentiary Conference. I cannot help feeling, however, that with skill these difficulties could be overcome. It is also necessary for Manley to be prepared to settle a fixed date in 1958, and this I should have thought was not an unreasonable request. If in addition to this Manley were prepared—not to abandon any of his constitutional proposals—but to fight for the right to amend the Constitution at any time without the five year limit, I had hoped that success was within our grasp. I do not think that we here should make difficulties over the amendment of the Constitution and I would have thought that Manley could have been satisfied with this.

In your letter to Rogers you suggest that of late we have been unduly critical of the Jamaican attitude. I think that “critical” is perhaps the wrong word. I would say rather that we have of late been finding increasing difficulty in equating Manley’s avowed enthusiasm for Federation with some of his proposed actions. If he persists in his constitutional proposals I am afraid that we may have a very difficult Conference and although I do not say that Federation will inevitably be wrecked, I am bound to say that I think it will be in great danger. It was originally in my mind to ask you to use your influence with Manley to prevent him raising these particular amendments. The whole situation is, however, so delicate that I have decided that it would be a mistake to take any action with Manley until I had had your views on this letter. I should, however, be grateful if you would let me have your full and frank comments at the earliest possible moment.

Perhaps I should add that this letter is not going on official record here and is obviously very personal to yourself.

35 CO 1031/1703, no 3

25 Nov 1955

[Jamaica and federation]: letter (reply) from Sir H Foot to Lord Lloyd on Mr Manley’s position

I thank you very much for your letter of the 17th of November¹ about developments affecting Federation and I shall try in this letter to set out the situation as I see it here with special reference to Manley’s position.

Manley’s attitude to Federation can I think be summarised by stating the following four points:—

- (a) Ever since the Montego Bay Conference of 1947 he has plainly and clearly stated his support for West Indian Federation and never has he said a word in public against it.
- (b) He accepts the proposition that the Scheme agreed at the London Conference in 1953 must be the basis for Federation. He has several times said that there must be no question of scrapping that Scheme.

¹ See 34.

(c) He considers that in the light of constitutional advance in the separate territories in the past two years the 1953 Scheme should be improved by making a limited number of major changes. He has publicly said this on many occasions as I have duly reported over recent months.

(d) He does not wish to be rushed in regard to the fixing of the date for Federal Elections and, as he told you in London, he does not wish Federal Elections to be fixed before early in 1958.

As to the limited number of major changes in the 1953 Scheme which he wishes to propose I have asked him to set out for the purposes of the Agenda for next February's Conference in London the proposals which he wishes to raise. He has not yet done so partly because, as I reported in my Personal telegram No. 115, one of the issues involved has recently been raised as a matter of local controversy by Bustamante.

I know from conversations with him that the main new points which he wishes to raise, apart from those which will in any event arise from consideration of the Commissions' Reports, will be these:—

(a) He does not like the proposal that officials should sit in the Federal Cabinet. Particularly he does not like the idea that there should be a Financial Secretary rather than a Federal Minister of Finance.

(b) He thinks that it would be unsound to impose restrictions in advance on who is eligible to serve in the Federal Cabinet.

(c) He does not think it necessary to include in the Federal Constitutional Instruments complicated provisions covering the method of future amendment of the Federal Constitution. He thinks that the way to change a constitution is by straight negotiation between the representatives of the people of the Region and H. M. Government.

There may be one or two other major changes which he wishes to propose, in addition to those arising from the Commissions' Reports, such as the major change regarding Federal revenue proposed by Sir Sydney Caine² (which is in fact probably more important than any of the changes that Manley has in mind).

Except in regard to timing I myself generally agree with all Manley's views as I have recorded them. I think that I fairly well understand the situation in Trinidad and Barbados in this respect but I nevertheless think that it would be wrong for a Conference taking place in 1956 to be precluded from considering any major change in proposals agreed in 1953.

Where I do not agree with Manley is on the question of timing and I wish that he was prepared to go full steam ahead and agree to hold Federal Elections as soon as all outstanding questions have been settled.

I do hope however that you understand his position on this question of tactics and timing. After waiting ten years his Party has now achieved power. He is starting out on a period of office and he is therefore in a very different local position from that of Gomes and Grantley Adams whose time is up and who have to face new elections this

² Formerly financial adviser to S of S for colonies, 1942, deputy under-secretary of state at the CO, 1947–1948 and 3rd secretary, Treasury, 1948, Caine was the fiscal commissioner for the Caribbean Federation. For the major change in federal revenues which he proposed in his report, see 37.

year. He is determined to show that he and his Party can justify the support which they won at the polls this year. Moreover, to put it at its lowest, he is fighting for political survival. He knows that if he and his Party fail to seize the opportunity they now have in Jamaica his Party will be destroyed and all he hopes to achieve will be lost. It is quite likely that the two pending bye-elections will be won by his opponents and any defection in his Party even if led only by one Minister might bring his Party down. Wills Isaacs, as you say, is opposed to Federation and has already threatened to resign on the issue. If he went he would carry with him substantial support in the Party from the many people who say that the first obligation of the P.N.P. is to keep its election pledges to Jamaica. I am sure that you will appreciate that in these circumstances it is not surprising that Manley has uppermost in his mind the difficulties and dangers of his position in Jamaica.

It came as a shock to me, however, when Manley told me after his return from London that he wanted it to be agreed that Federal Elections should not take place until early in 1958. I myself thought that that was much too late. I am bound to say however that in view of the local political situation here I am not surprised that a man in Manley's position should be determined to produce practical results in Jamaica before embarking on an adventure for which, we have to recognise, there is not yet any great popular enthusiasm.

You can also picture, I am sure, how irritating it is to Manley to be told that not only the Federal system to be established but also the timing must be dictated by the local situations in Trinidad and Barbados.

Jamaica throughout has, I would claim, a good record in regard to Federation. It is much the biggest territory. It has a population half of the whole but it has never put forward a claim for the Capital to be in Jamaica and it has agreed to representation in the Central Legislature much less than its population would justify. At every stage so far Jamaica has done its duty in the steps towards Federation.

You say in your letter that I am no doubt aware of "disquieting rumours throughout the Caribbean" about Manley's attitude towards Federation. The first I heard of these rumours came from your letter and I have never imagined that Manley's good faith on the general purposes to be pursued was in question.

To suggest that his proposal for certain limited but major changes in the Federal Scheme is an attempt to kill Federation and at the same time gain credit for himself is something which I do not for one minute believe.

I very well realise the strong objections that exist to any reference back to Legislatures after the London Conference and Manley, as you know, has agreed that the invitation to attend a Conference to reach final decisions on the main questions at issue should be accepted.

You must not think that I do not understand the full force of the arguments which you have set out in your letter against any reference back to the Legislatures after the Conference, but I must say that I should not have regarded it as impossible for successful reference back to the Legislatures to take place immediately following the London Conference and prior to the introduction of the Enabling Act in the United Kingdom Parliament before the Trinidad Elections. As far as Jamaica is concerned I think Manley is right in saying that he would not at that stage have difficulty from the Jamaica Legislature. And again I say that I do not regard it as reasonable that Manley should be precluded from raising limited and major proposals for improvement on the 1953 Scheme. In any event I very much hope that accep-

tance of the invitation to attend a Conference to reach final conclusions on the major issues will in fact make it unnecessary to go back to the Legislatures after the Conference.

As to the date of the Federal Elections I cannot of course give any firm assurance on Manley's behalf but in my correspondence with him he has said that one of his main objects is "to secure that the Jamaica Government is not compelled before the beginning of 1958 to plunge into Federal Elections with the tremendous strain on our energies and our resources that that is going to involve".

I take it from that wording and from what Manley has told me in conversation that he will be content if a date early in 1958 is set for the Elections.

Finally let me say that though I have great admiration and affection for Manley I am not in any way blind to his faults. Compromise does not come easy to him and he can turn nasty when things don't go his way. Particularly he can be unreasonable and obstinate and even vindictive when he has taken up a false position. Moreover I have emphasized that he is obsessed with the need to succeed in Jamaica in the genuine belief that he and his Party can serve and save Jamaica at this time. Certainly that overriding sense of obligation to Jamaica comes first in his mind and Federation is to him a comparatively secondary object. He feels, I am sure, that if he fails in his obligations to Jamaica everything else he cares about will fail too. He might become extremely difficult if his own position were not understood and if he felt that the situations in other territories were made a justification for hurriedly forcing through the 1953 Scheme unchanged.

But to suggest that he is so dishonest as to wish to destroy Federation for which he has stood throughout his political life and so mean as to endeavour to gain political credit by doing so is something which I certainly could never believe.

I on my part will continue to do my best to persuade Manley:—

- (a) to keep his major proposals for change in the 1953 Scheme to a minimum;
- (b) to agree to Federal Elections not later than early in 1958;
- (c) to recognise the importance of avoiding reference back to Legislatures after the Conference;
- (d) to go to London next February determined that the Conference should succeed in reaching final agreement on all major issues.³

³ Foot addressed a further letter to Rogers in Dec 1955 in which he referred to a discussion about federation in the Jamaica Executive Council on 28 Nov. Isaacs recorded his 'serious alarm' that federation might lead to the destruction of measures taken to protect Jamaican industries and he urged Manley to make a public statement to the effect that Jamaica's support for federation should be made conditional upon assurances being provided that there would be no interference with the policies of the Jamaican government to protect local industries. He was particularly concerned that the coconut industry and soap factories would be ruined by competition from factories in Trinidad 'backed by big interests from outside the Caribbean'. Manley responded that although he proposed to put forward 'a limited number of major changes' to the recommendations made at the 1953 London conference, he was not prepared to make the statement suggested by Isaacs who was told that he should have raised his arguments long ago. Foot reported the incident, partly by way of demonstrating how important the protection of local industries would be in Jamaica but mainly to illustrate that Manley was not having an easy time in persuading some of his supporters 'to come into line on the Federation issue' (CO 1031/1703, no 1A, Foot to Rogers, 2 Dec 1955).

36 CO 1031/1703, no 8

15 Dec 1955

[Jamaica and federation]: letter (reply) from Lord Lloyd to Sir H Foot on Mr Manley's position and the prospects for the forthcoming 1956 London conference

I am most grateful to you for your helpful reply,¹ to my letter of the 17th November² about federation. It has been most valuable to all of us here to have had your reactions and such a full assessment of Manley's attitude. I should like to dispose at once of the question of his good faith. As you know, we do not in the Colonial Office set much store on rumours, but those about Manley's attitude had come from a number of well-placed and well-disposed people, (and certainly not exclusively from Trinidad!) so that we could not afford to disregard them. Moreover I must say frankly that his behaviour at the Trinidad Conference did not reassure any of us on the U.K. side, but left us with the impression that he was playing a devious political game which did not quite accord with his public support of Federation. It is therefore a great relief to know that you who know Manley so much better than we do have no doubt about his good faith in this matter.

Let me assure you at once that we are very conscious of his domestic political problems and that we understand and sympathise with his ambitions to serve Jamaica. With much of what you say in your letter about his attitude we would agree in general terms, such for example as the view that a Conference taking place in 1956 should not and cannot be precluded from considering a major change in proposals agreed to in 1953, though, if we work on the theory that each successive Conference should review what happened at the previous one (and the results must go back once again to Legislatures), we shall clearly never reach finality. We sympathise too, as you know, on what is, I imagine, the really crucial issue for Manley, namely the date of federal elections. We also quite understand that it is irritating to Manley to be told that the federal system and also its timing must be dictated by the local situations in Trinidad and Barbados. I hope that he for his part equally understands that it is irritating to political leaders elsewhere for it to be suggested to them that the same issues should be dictated by the situation in Jamaica. Does not Manley in fact want the best of all worlds with his federation in the shape he favours and at the time it suits him best politically? As one who has always liked the best of all worlds, he has my sympathy, but as a practical politician, I hope he realises the difficulty.

To say that he accepts the 1953 London scheme as a basis for federation and only wants to make a limited number of major changes sounds quite reasonable. But if the changes are major enough, even if limited in number, they can upset the whole basis and from the broader point of view of West Indian politics this is just what Manley is risking doing. I was frankly disappointed that he should have taken a public stand, since your letter was written, as reported in your telegram No. 801. There is certainly room for compromise and agreement on much of what he proposes, but some of his propositions are, I believe, unacceptable in full and others would certainly involve reference back to Legislatures, even if they were acceptable. I would have hoped that Manley would have been prepared to come without advance publicity and in a spirit of readiness to discuss and compromise round the table. My fears on this point are

¹ See 35.² See 34.

enhanced by what you say in your letter about his difficulty in compromising and the fact that he can be unreasonable when he has taken up a false position.

I have considered again what you say about reference back to Legislatures after the Conference which is the crux of much of this, but here I really must ask you to accept in the light of our knowledge of the general West Indian scene and of Parliamentary difficulties here that there is the gravest risk that reference back after the Conference runs the risk of killing Federation. Although I hope we should certainly avoid the dismal history of what happened after the 1953 Conference when it took nearly two years to get the agreement of all Legislatures (even Jamaica took a year because of its preoccupation with internal politics), I see no prospect of the results of the Conference being rushed through all the West Indian Legislatures in a short space of time. For example, we have had the greatest difficulty in getting Grantley Adams to the Conference in February, because of the Barbados budget which is scheduled to go on until the end of March. There would be no hope whatever of getting Federation considered in Barbados until April at the earliest and if the Upper House should be difficult, it might take considerably longer. There is, moreover a very full Legislative programme in Parliament here and it is almost impossible to rush even important Bills through at short notice. If there is reference back to Legislatures after this Conference, we can therefore hardly achieve anything effective before the next Trinidad elections are through. Even if their new Legislature is not hostile to Federation, it may well wish to consider the matter afresh. If it is given time for that, then the next Barbados elections are upon us and the same process might be repeated. I fear that I may not have been sufficiently clear in my previous letter about the crucial nature of this aspect of the problem and I do hope that you will do your utmost to get Manley to come to the Conference in a spirit of willingness to compromise on his proposals and determined to avoid anything which necessitates reference back to Legislatures. The propositions which will cause the greatest difficulty in this respect are those at (1), (2) and (3) of your official telegram No. 801 to some of which, incidentally, H.M.G. will also probably object.³ If Manley is adamant about those, I will say frankly that I think Federation may be killed. If, on the other hand, he is willing to compromise now, provided he can get agreement to a procedure which would facilitate early amendments to the federal constitution once it is working, I believe that everyone could meet him. That surely would meet his principles. Moreover, if he does not show willingness to compromise on this we feel sure that many of the delegates from the Eastern Caribbean will be gunning for him over an early date for the federal elections. Manley might, therefore, get federation more or less in the shape he wants, but at a time which will be disastrous for him because of his position in Jamaica. We will do our best to help him on that, because we understand and sympathise with his difficulties, and I think we can help him, but he must not make our task impossible by insisting on having everything his own way.

I have written very frankly, because I felt that I had not fully succeeded in explaining the way in which we looked at this in my earlier letter and we had in any case been perturbed, as we know that some people in Trinidad and Barbados have been perturbed, by Manley's propositions.

We are all of us here most apprehensive about the possible outcome of the

³ These were the first three points of what became known as Manley's 'seven propositions'. They are explained in 37 and 41.

Conference in February. I think that we can deal with most of the difficulties that are likely to arise in respect of other territories, but Manley seems likely to present a more difficult problem. Our only real hope is that you, who have, if I may say so, achieved such outstanding success in getting a highly diverse set of Ministers with the most prima donna-ish of Chief Ministers to work as an effective team will once again be able to achieve a miracle here. I very greatly welcome what you say in the last paragraph of your letter, which I am sure is the crux of the matter. If Manley comes here willing to compromise, I am sure that we can go quite a way to meet him. If, before the Conference, you can get Manley to come here in a suitable frame of mind, I think you will fairly be able to take credit for a successful outcome of the Conference and for the achievement at long last of West Indian Federation. May I wish you all good fortune in what I know will be a very difficult task.

37 CO 1031/1703

16 Dec 1955

[Federation]: minute by P Rogers on the recommendations of the fiscal commissioner and the prospects for the 1956 London conference

Sir C. Jeffries

In the course of our discussion with Lord Lloyd yesterday he asked for a note about the present stage of our dealings with West Indian Federation, so that he could inform the Secretary of State of how things stand.

We have received the reports of the three Commissions on Fiscal, Judicial and Public Service matters and have studied them in detail in the Colonial Office. The Fiscal Report makes some important proposals for changes in the Plan agreed at the London Conference of 1953 as regards the finance of the Federal Government. The London Plan recommended that that Government should be financed by drawing a percentage, up to a maximum of 15%, of the customs revenues of all the unit administrations. The Fiscal Commissioner recommends instead that the Federal Government should draw its revenue from the profits on currency and from customs and excise duties on a few selected items viz. cigarettes, spirits and petrol. There is no doubt that technically this is a much better proposal and from all the soundings we have been able to take of West Indian leaders, we expect that it will be acceptable to them also. Certainly, I think we can say that as far as we know at present there is nothing in the report of the three Commissions which is likely to cause a crisis in our progress to Federation. There may of course be considerable argument over some points, but if that were all, I would expect a fairly easy Conference.

We are, however, running into a nasty storm over other aspects. The interests of Trinidad in particular, and to a lesser extent the Leeward and Windward Islands, on the one hand, and of Jamaica on the other conflict. The Trinidad Government is very anxious to see Federation established very soon, and certainly to see a decisive step, in the shape of an enabling Act of the U.K. Parliament passed before their elections are due in September, 1956. For more general reasons the small islands are anxious to see Federation in operation as soon as possible. Mr. Manley, on the other hand, is most anxious that Federal elections should not take place until 1958, so that he may be given time to show that his party can achieve results before there is an appeal to the Electorate. Further, Mr. Manley is very anxious to make the Federal constitution politically more advanced, by withdrawing the three officials from the Council of State (i.e. the Cabinet), by reducing the reserved powers of the Governor-General and by modifying the pro-

vision for the appointment of members of the Upper House, or Senate to the Council of State. These proposals are unwelcome in themselves to Trinidad and to the delegate from the Upper House in Barbados (Sir A. Cuke) and, moreover, their adoption by the February Conference would in their view mean that even though delegates are given plenipotentiary powers, they would still have to refer the results of the Conference back to their Legislatures, since these proposals would represent such a major departure from what was agreed at the 1953 Conference, and subsequently endorsed by all West Indian Legislatures. On the other hand, there is likely to be great emotional sympathy on the part of the West Indian delegates with these proposals for a more advanced constitution and it will be difficult for any of the delegates to oppose them openly.

We all feel that if the results of the February Conference have to be referred back to Legislatures for their endorsement, there is a very grave risk indeed that the movement towards Federation will break down. Barbados will be in the middle of its budget session which is all important in the eyes of local opinion, and could not therefore take the results of the Conference before April at the earliest. Even if all the other Legislatures endorsed the results of the Conference very quickly (and on previous form, it will be wildly optimistic to expect that they would, for the results of the 1953 Conference took nearly two years to get through!), this would make it pretty well impossible to pass through all its stages in the U.K. Parliament an Act to enable Federation to be set up, i.e. the decisive step could not be taken, before the Trinidad elections will be upon us. Even if the Trinidad elections did not result in the return of a Legislature hostile to Federation (and there is a risk that they may), it would be not unreasonable for that Legislature to ask for an opportunity of considering the issues, if they are not then settled. That would result in further delay which might then take us on to the time of the next Barbados elections and there is a prospect of the whole process being repeated. It could hardly fail to result in such a decline of interest and indeed almost ridicule that Federation might well be killed.

It will, therefore, be necessary at the Conference to induce Mr. Manley to reduce his demands for constitutional advance to a point at which they are acceptable to other delegates, without the need for reference back to Legislatures. This will be extremely difficult, the more particularly as he will have the sympathy of most of the delegates with him. There is, moreover, the question of H.M.G.'s own direct interest in this in which our proposals are set out in the attached file. If on the other hand Mr. Manley does not modify his constitutional proposals, he is likely to find his wish and indeed real need to see Federal elections postponed until 1958 sabotaged by Mr. Gomes and the representatives of the small islands.

Taken all in all, there is every prospect of a stormy Conference. Personally, I believe that we shall be successful in getting an acceptable Federal constitution agreed without the need for reference back, but no-one could possibly state this with certainty and I am sure that at the best there will be many an anxious moment. There is certainly the very real possibility of failure.

We are doing all we can to moderate the extreme demands on both sides and Sir S. Luke will be making a rapid tour of the Caribbean for a fortnight in January to see what line delegates are then taking and to try and clarify the issues and induce them to compromise. He will come back in time to brief us all before the Conference starts.¹

¹ Luke's report on his tour, which he enclosed with a letter to Rogers dated 22 Jan 1956, is in CO 1031/1696, no 371.

38 CO 1031/1703, no 54

6 Jan 1956

[Federation]: letter from Mr Lennox-Boyd to Sir H Foot on Mr Manley, the critical importance of the 1956 London conference and financial assistance

I have been meaning to write to you myself for some time because I want to sound a personal note in the midst of our exchange of telegrams, which has ended today with my Secret and Personal Telegram No. 3. First of all I want you to know how strongly I agree with all that Lloyd said to you in his letter of the 15th December regarding Manley's attitude.¹ I hope that from what has already been said on many occasions Manley will be assured that we fully understand and sympathise with his own difficulties. At the same time, I am bound to say that I am very worried indeed about the line that he has been taking, particularly by publishing his seven propositions before the Conference.

As I see it, if this Conference does not succeed in its objective of securing final agreement to the establishment of the Federation, there will be no chance of Federation coming into being within the foreseeable future. In short, Federation, and with it the whole political future of the West Indies is the stake at this Conference. This being the case I am sure you will agree that it behoves all of us to do everything possible to make the Conference a success. This is the spirit in which I trust all the delegates will approach the Conference and I must confess that I personally was greatly dismayed to find Manley committing himself in public to his seven propositions. As you know, some of these propositions are far from being wholly acceptable to Her Majesty's Government. The telegrams from the Leewards and from Trinidad, as well as what I know of the attitude of the Barbados Legislative Council and other indications, all make it clear that Manley is stirring up a hornet's nest. I have given you in the official telegram sent off today what I at present regard as the only way out. I am most grateful to you for the efforts you have been making to persuade Manley to approach the Conference in the spirit of constructive compromise, and I profoundly hope that you will also succeed in persuading him, if he is not prepared to make any further public announcement at this stage, to send reassuring messages to the other delegates, as I gather from paragraph 6 of your telegram Personal No. 126, you think he might do.

Your Personal telegram No. 127 of the 28th December is encouraging on the prospect of a compromise being reached at the Conference and I very much hope that you will be able to bring Manley to this point of view before it starts. At this stage I would only add one comment on what you say, namely in paragraph 5 of your telegram, in which you suggest that it would be unfortunate if Her Majesty's Government were to insist on the test of officials in the Council of State or the ground of the extent of Her Majesty's Government's financial assistance.² Naturally I recognise the force of what you say, but however sympathetic I am to your point of view, I must point out that West Indian Governments will be receiving very extensive finan-

¹ See 36.

² In para 5 of his tel 127, Foot remarked that it would be a pity if HMG insisted, against the view of a majority of West Indian delegates at the 1956 conference, that officials had to be retained in the Council of State. Foot believed that there should be a minister responsible for finance from the outset and he added: 'It would be particularly unfortunate, it seems to me, if H.M.G. were to insist on retention of officials on grounds of extent of H.M.G.'s assistance' (CO 1031/1703, no 25, Foot to CO, 28 Dec 1955).

cial assistance through local, regional and central C.D. & W. allocations, through price assistance schemes for bananas and citrus, through increased preference for some of their products, through a grant for the federal capital and last, and most important of all in this particular connection, through a block grant in aid of administration. It would be doing the West Indians no good service to burke the fact that financial assistance of this kind and of this order cannot come from anywhere in the world without some strings attached. Her Majesty's Government are after all themselves responsible to Parliament and through them to the Electorate, though that is a fact that I feel is often conveniently forgotten by West Indian political leaders when pleading their own electoral needs. I am sure we can find ways round the various difficulties that will arise over this from time to time, but only if West Indian leaders realise that they cannot have both extensive financial assistance and complete independence. That no doubt is putting the matter at its extreme, but it is a factor that all of us concerned with West Indian advance must have in mind. I very much hope that in handling it in the course of the Conference, probably in the way you suggest in paragraph 7 of your telegram, we can reach agreement on what should be done at various stages, provided always Manley comes willing to make compromises.

Finally, I may say, lest you feel that I am reading messages from Bradshaw³ and Trinidad too much *au pied de la lettre*, that I take a good many things said by politicians in the West Indies with a considerable pinch of salt. The game can be seen as one of bluff and counter-bluff. On this occasion it has gone far enough and the great danger is that someone will get caught by his own stratagem, i.e. will say in public what he has only threatened to say. I feel most strongly that Manley must take some action to reassure his fellow-delegates, and Her Majesty's Government, before the Conference starts. Otherwise, it will not be merely a case of prolonging the Conference and prejudicing its prospects, but of destroying the possibility of Federation for many years to come.

³ R L Bradshaw, chief minister of St Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla; federal finance minister, 1958–1962.

39 CO 1031/1703, no 65

16 Jan 1956

[Federation]: letter (reply) from Sir H Foot to Mr Lennox-Boyd on West Indian self-government and financial assistance from the UK. *Minutes* by Lord Lloyd and E Melville¹

Thank you very much for your personal letter of the 6th of January² about West Indian Federation. In my personal telegram No. 5 to Rogers I tried to summarize the position as it looks to me—and as you will by now know Manley has sent personal messages to the other delegates.

I can influence him and push him a certain amount but you will realise, I am sure, that anything I can do now and in the future will be prejudiced if I badger him too much and too often. And at the risk of your displeasure I must say that so far I do not think that he has been seriously at fault.

¹ Assistant under-secretary of state, CO, responsible in 1956 for Economic General, Finance, Statistics, and Commercial Relations and Supplies.

² See 38.

I have always felt that given reasonable goodwill and straight dealing the Conference next month can succeed. West Indian politicians, in spite of their rivalries and animosities, have always agreed on Federation when they have come together in the past, and I still believe that they will agree this time. That is not to say that I am not anxious and alarmed by some recent developments—not the least of which is the tendency in many quarters here in Jamaica to back-pedal now that we come close to final decisions. So far Manley has courageously stuck to his guns in spite of local indifference and opposition. Bearing in mind the difficulties and dangers of his own position here I admire his determination to go ahead on Federation.

I do not think that you will want me to enter into a discussion now on the very big question about United Kingdom financial assistance to which you referred in your letter. I know very well that West Indian leaders often take all the aid they receive far too much for granted. Nevertheless I should like to say that I do not regard political advance towards self-government as an argument for cutting down aid from Her Majesty's Government. Even when self-government is achieved it is my own view that Her Majesty's Government should continue to give substantial—indeed possibly increased—aid to the British West Indies. Existing arrangements will have to be radically changed of course. But can't we contemplate something very roughly on the lines of the Colombo Plan for the future? We surely should not rule out the possibility of assistance in marketing concessions and provision of capital and technical advice and even direct financial assistance from the big and powerful members of the Commonwealth to help the small and weak ones.

I believe whole-heartedly in West Indian self-government, but if I felt that West Indian self-government would mean the end of all assistance from the United Kingdom I should be bound to be against it. I realise of course that financial assistance is never given without strings and if assistance is given there should be something given in return. But it would be wrong, I feel strongly, to make the continuation of financial assistance an argument against agreeing with constitutional changes which in themselves are justified.

Do please forgive me for pursuing this here when you are so very busy with a thousand things. But I do most strongly believe that we shall have to work out some plan for the future under which we have Dominions of various sizes and resources and stages of development, with special arrangements for assisting the poorer members of the family to get the markets and the capital and the aid that they will continue so badly to require.

May I send my most respectful good wishes for the success of the Conference? I earnestly and anxiously pray that Jamaica will not disgrace herself. My own bet is that you will find Manley the awkward one at the beginning but that others will be a much greater headache to you before the end.

Minutes on 39

Mr. Rogers

Please see the attached letter from Sir Hugh Foot to the Secretary of State, upon which he has asked for my comments.

I think that the Secretary of State ought to see the Governor's last telegram to you regarding his talk with Luke. As regards the question of financial aid it seems to me that once again Sir Hugh has misunderstood what we were trying to say to him. I do

not remember that we ever suggested that political advance was an argument for cutting down aid. Certainly we have always urged that aid should not be used by the West Indies as an argument for inefficiency or for lack of economic advance. Our aim has been to support the West Indian economy and at the same time to try by means of our support to help their economy to become more self-supporting.

What we have said is that the fact that the British taxpayer is forced to make a very substantial contribution to the West Indies remains an argument as to why H.M.G. should continue to have an opportunity of supervising the expenditure of the money until such a time as they can be satisfied that such supervision is no longer necessary. May I please have your views?³

L.

24.1.56

I am sorry to have delayed this, because of similar preoccupations with Malaya. Indeed, I set the file aside to see whether the discussions in the Malayan Conference on this very issue would throw some light on the darkness with which Sir H. Foot's thoughts are surrounded.

There was no disposition, on the part of the Malayan delegation, to deny that full self-government, within or without the Commonwealth, means financial self-sufficiency, at any rate in the longer run. That is to say, while there might be transitional problems (aggravated, in Malaya, by the Emergency), there could be no real political independence without financial independence too. That would not, of course, exclude some form of inter-Commonwealth co-operation to which Sir H. Foot refers (and which he seems to confuse with budgetary aid)—access to the London loan market, private capital, preferences and marketing assistance and technical aid of the kind given under the Colombo plan. As the Commonwealth expands, the quantum of material aid through these channels may well expand, and the channels themselves may broaden. But the fundamental point—which is brought out in Mr Roger's draft but which might be made more precise—is that the continuation of budgetary support, especially for recurrent costs of administration, must carry with it an obligation to establish need, and hence involves interference in local budgetary policies which may be incompatible with independence. This has certainly been the experience so far, in the evolution of Commonwealth relations.

It is true, of course, that the U.K. makes available certain budgetary assistance to a few foreign countries—Jordan and Libya, in particular; and that the Americans provide very large sums out of tax revenue for various forms of aid overseas. These exceptions to the principle of financial self-sufficiency can be explained in various ways—but essentially they are made because the donor country regards it as in its interests to make them. There is, therefore, some substance in Sir H. Foot's contention that, as the Commonwealth expands and new "poor relations" are admitted to it, there should be more help from the richer members. The only problem is to identify these richer members. On present showing, the U.K. is not one—with an overall deficit in her balance of payments with the rest of the world. It is possible, but usually dangerous, to offer help on an overdraft. . . .

E.M.

2.2.56

³ Rogers drafted a reply to Foot and Melville was asked to comment.

40 CO 1031/1785, no 22

30 Jan 1956

'The site of the Federal capital': CO brief no 6 for the UK delegation at the London British Caribbean Federation conference

1. The question of the site of the capital has long been a subject of dispute and rivalry in the West Indies. It needs also to be considered also [sic] in relation to the question of capital cost of setting up the Federal Headquarters, which is dealt with in a separate Brief.

2. The Report of the Standing Closer Association Committee (Col.No. 255), Section 106, recommended that the seat of Government of the Federation should be in Trinidad. The 1953 London Conference, however, unable to agree on this recommendation, decided on Grenada (Cmd. 8837, Section 43). In accepting in principle the London Conference Report, several Legislatures (Trinidad, Barbados House of Assembly, Antigua, St. Lucia and Montserrat) reserved their position on the question of the site of the capital, and current talk in the West Indies certainly suggests that no one, except possibly the Grenadians, is satisfied with the choice of Grenada. The Fiscal Commissioner in presenting his estimates for the cost of setting up the Federal Capital has made it clear that these will be considerably increased if the capital should be established where services and communications are poorly developed. For all these reasons the question of the site of the capital will almost certainly be re-opened.

3. The notion has been canvassed that a temporary Federal Headquarters might be set up, e.g. in Barbados where the organisation of the Comptroller for Development and Welfare already is, and that the eventual site of the capital might be left for the Federal Government itself to decide. The Fiscal Commissioner states however, that the formidable estimated cost (net £1,725,000) of establishing the capital can only be held to a minimum by an early final decision on the choice of the capital and by choosing as that site an area suitable also for use as the temporary capital.

4. Antigua has also voiced claims to have the capital but in view of the Fiscal Commissioner's recommendations there will probably be a move away from the notion of any of the smaller islands housing the capital. Jamaica has given indication that it will renounce its claim to be considered for the capital; it is in any case, despite its size and other advantages, too far removed from the centre of the Federation.

5. Trinidad and Barbados therefore remain the main claimants. Of these two, Barbados, has the pleasanter climate and contains the more stable and unified society but although it is likely to press its claims vigorously, it is small and already over-crowded. Nor does the continuing existence of some social colour bar there commend it to other West Indians. In Trinidad there is greater space for the development of a capital, and it is understood that there is already a set of buildings on an unused United States Navy base in the Main West Peninsular which might well serve as temporary headquarters. Trinidad furthermore is at the centre of the communications network of the West Indies, and its people, of mixed origins themselves, have more of an "international" outlook than anywhere else in the West Indies.

6. The choice of a site for the Federal capital is one for the delegates themselves.

There are three practical considerations which must play a large part in the decision. First, Government Services and good communications should be available. It is also very desirable that there should be labour of a suitable educational standard available for subordinate employment in the Federal Government e.g. as clerks, since it would be far too expensive if practically all the Federal Government staff had to be imported from other islands. Second, there must also be suitable accommodation which can be used temporarily whilst the Federation buildings are being constructed. Third, it will be necessary to keep down the cost, especially if Her Majesty's Government's contribution is to be limited to £½ million. These considerations all militate against the choice of one of the smaller islands and in effect confine it to a choice between Trinidad and Barbados, in which it would be unpolitic for the Secretary of State to intervene, except perhaps if the Conference were to request him to do so.

7. A separate brief will be submitted on the question of a grant from Her Majesty's Government towards the cost of the capital.

41 CO 1031/1696, no 369

1 Feb 1956

'Mr Manley's "seven propositions"' : CO brief no 15 for the UK delegation at the London British Caribbean Federation conference

[As this brief indicates, the more contentious issues in Manley's seven propositions were nos 1–3 and possibly no 7. They were resolved at the 1956 conference in the following way. No 1: it was decided that the Council of State should not contain three official members. The governor-general would, however, nominate three officials, selected by him, who would have the right to attend council meetings and take part in its discussions. The secretary of state gave an assurance that the need for the attendance of the officials would be kept under review. No 2: it was decided that the governor-general would consult unit governors before making appointments to the federal Senate and that three senators would be appointed to the Council of State on the recommendation of the federal prime minister and not, as proposed in the 1953 plan, by the governor-general in council. No 3: it was decided to make general the powers of the governor-general to reserve bills instead of specifying the particular categories of bills in respect of which the power might be exercised. No 7: it was decided to reinstate the ban proposed by SCAC but overturned at the 1953 conference on duality of membership of the legislative and executive bodies of the units and the federal legislature. The period within which a member of a unit legislative or executive body would be required to resign after becoming a member of the federal legislature would, however, be three months and not four weeks as proposed by SCAC. *Report by the Conference on British Caribbean Federation held in London in February, 1956* (Cmd 9733, 1956) paras 14–17.]

1. A fundamental danger to the success of the Conference lies in the possibility that some delegation may take a stand on proposals for amendments to the Federal Plan which involve a reference back to some, if not all of the West Indian Legislatures after the Conference, with consequent delays and the impossibility of getting enabling legislation through the United Kingdom Parliament this summer. The early passage of an enabling Act is particularly needed to meet Trinidad's requirements for the reaching of a "point of no return" by September. The East Indian element in Trinidad is opposed to Federation but has come to acquiesce in it, and would probably regard the U.K. enabling legislation as the point of no return. Should they achieve the increased success at the polls which is expected and take the view in the absence of U.K. enabling legislation that Federation is still in the melting pot their now quiescent opposition might well be re-aroused and we may find the Trinidad

legislature reversing its decision to join the Federation. Without Trinidad a worthwhile Federation is impossible. Delays would be unpalatable also to the smaller Islands which want Federation with their larger neighbours as soon as possible. Apart from the peculiar dangers of the Trinidad situation a reference back to the legislatures would inevitably mean delays which (on the precedent of the Federal Plan of April 1953, which was not adopted by the last of the Legislatures concerned until January 1955) might amount to as much as two years, creating a vicious circle whereby any constitutional plan is overtaken by events and becomes out-of-date before it can be implemented.

2. These considerations apply to some of Mr. Manley's propositions and would apply to any other proposals which would involve changes in the London Plan requiring reference back to any of the Legislatures.

The seven propositions

3. On the 30th November 1955 in moving a resolution to accept the Secretary of State's invitation to the Federation Conference, Mr. Manley, the Chief Minister, put to the Jamaica House of Representatives seven propositions, the acceptance of which the Jamaica Delegation would urge at the Conference. These were unanimously accepted by the House.

4. The seven propositions are as follows:—

(1) That Official Members should be removed from the Federal Executive (See U.K. Brief No.16).

(2) That the Federal Prime Minister should be given sole discretion in the appointment of Federal Senators to the Executive without minimum limitation to number (See U.K. Brief No.17).

(3) That the reserve powers of the Governor General should be reduced (See U.K. Brief No. 19).

(4) That the Federal Government be given power of regional planning and initiation and maintenance of consultative and advisory services (See U.K. Brief No. 7).

(5) The reconsideration of United Kingdom financial assistance to the new Federation (See U.K. Brief No. 22).¹

(6) The working out of a new method for revising the Federal Constitution (See U.K. Brief No. 18).

(7) The amendment of the 1953 Conference recommendations on the status of unit and Federal Members and Ministers (See U.K. Brief No. 16).

No elaboration of these propositions has so far been given.

Reaction in the West Indies

5. It was hoped that Delegations would refrain from nailing their colours to the mast by making advance announcements of their requirements and that they would arrive at the Conference in a spirit of compromise.

6. As was to be expected the first reaction to Mr. Manley's propositions was violent, particularly on the part of Mr. Gomes of the Trinidad Executive Council and Mr. Bradshaw of St. Kitts. The opposition did not arise over objection to the

¹ See 42.

propositions as such, although not all of them are acceptable in all parts of the West Indies, but because they were seen as going so far beyond the agreed Plan as to mean, if they were adopted, that reference back to Legislatures for many, if not most, of the Delegations would be inevitable. So far as the propositions themselves are concerned the Trinidad Government early made it clear that its Delegation could not go on record as reactionaries standing out against the Manley propositions as such, but would feel forced to support them and might even put forward more extreme proposals of their own. The difficulties must be viewed against the background of the fundamental Manley/Gomes antagonism and the rivalry between one whose star is in the ascendant and one who is about to face a very difficult election.

7. The difference must also be seen as an expression of basic differences in political philosophy. Mr. Manley is thinking in British Constitutional terms with responsibility clearly in the hands of a party Cabinet, and he is anxious to get out of any constitutional provisions that might serve to blur that responsibility or retard the growth of Federal party structures. His opponents not only think that his proposals involve fundamental changes necessitating a reference back to their Legislatures; they consider that these changes would gravely threaten the stability and success of the Federation in its early years by concentrating too great power in the hands of the Prime Minister and by unduly weakening the restraining influence of the British Government.

Steps already taken to reduce tension

8. Mr. Manley has been persuaded to reiterate, both in a public statement and in a message of reassurance to other Delegations, his firm support of Federation as well as his conviction that difficulties can be resolved at the plenipotentiary Conference without reference back to Legislatures and that the Conference can be brought to a successful conclusion which will finally pave the way to the establishment of Federation.

9. Sir Stephen Luke, during his pre-Conference tour, has both further reduced tension by giving delegates an opportunity for impartial discussion with him and thrown light on Her Majesty's intentions and the attitude of other West Indian leaders towards his propositions. It has become clear that only Points 1 (officials), 2, (senators), and 3 (Governor-General's powers) and possibly 7 (Unit and Federal Ministers) raise difficult issues which threaten the success of the Conference, and that [while] even over these the possibility of compromise exists, it would be false optimism to pretend that deep difficulties and dissensions no longer exist.

The latest position

10. Briefly summarised the latest known position of delegations is as follows:—

(i) *Jamaica*. Mr. Manley has now a much better although not yet complete understanding of the difficulties in which his insistence on his propositions would place other delegations. He does not expect to gain support for Point 7, and is prepared not to press either this or Point 3 to the embarrassment of others. Of the remaining Points 1 and 2, it is Point 1 (officials) that he regards as fundamental. The results of a meeting to be arranged between the Secretary of State and Mr. Manley after his arrival will not be known until after completion of this Brief.

(ii) *Trinidad* favours a simplified procedure for revising the Constitution (Point 6) but continues to oppose even discussion of the remaining crucial points (1, 2, 3

and 7) on the grounds that they go beyond the agreed Federal Plan. It has been made clear to Mr. Gomes and other members of the Trinidad delegation that there can be no question of refusing discussion of any matter affecting Federation which delegates choose to bring before the Conference, but this does not mean that the Conference need reach decisions on them involving reference to Legislatures. The results of a meeting to be arranged between Mr. Gomes and Lord Lloyd will not be known until after completion of this Brief.

(iii) *Barbados* is deeply divided on many issues affecting Federation but now accepts it as a fact. Its delegation will wholeheartedly oppose Point 7 (Unit and Federal Ministers), sympathise with Point 5 (financial assistance) and are dubious about Point 4 (regional planning). The Barbados formula is that no major modification of the Federal Plan (as already modified by The Trinidad Conference) ought to be pressed or adopted so long as it was unacceptable to any individual delegation either on its merits or because it might involve reference back to the local Legislative [sic]. The results of a meeting to be arranged between Mr. Grantley Adams and Lord Lloyd will not be known until after completion of this brief. (Since his arrival in London Mr. Grantley Adams has sent a message to Mr. Manley in Jamaica promising co-operation on all Mr. Manley's propositions with the exception of No. 7—duality of Ministers).

(iv) *Windwards*. Their final conclusions are not known but in general their delegations will probably give support to the Barbados formula.

(v) *Leewards*. So far as their views are known, the Leeward delegation may be expected to accept wholeheartedly the basic proposition that there must be no reference back to Legislatures.

Line at conference

11. It is important that if at all possible delegations should settle their differences outside the Conference. It is understood that Mr. Manley hopes Delegations will agree to meet informally on Monday, 6th February. If they do so they may be able to come to the Conference having agreed on a joint course of action. Steps will have been taken to ascertain in advance whether they have done so. If Mr. Manley no longer regards Points 3 and 7 as crucial and may not insist on Point 2, there may remain only Point 1 (officials), which is discussed in U.K. Brief 16. In this case the position will be considerably eased.

12. The tactics of handling the Conference on these points will have to be dealt with as the situation demands. If it is evident that delegations have not resolved in advance their differences on fundamental points, the Conference should nevertheless open formally as planned on the morning of the 7th February. It is suggested that at the first 'business' meeting after the session of opening speeches, the Secretary of State should take the agenda for the Conference as the first item for discussion. Subject to the outcome of the soundings referred to in paragraph 11 above. It is recommended that he should say that he understands some members of Delegations may wish for a little more time for discussion among themselves before the Conference. If so, he would suggest taking first on the agenda the items which are not expected to be controversial (in order to free some members of delegations for other discussions) and would propose that these should be the Reports of the Civil Service and Judicial Commissioners. Should this be unacceptable the Conference might in the last resort be adjourned for a day.

13. On present indications, it is likely that all the seven points will be discussed privately between the delegates before the Conference formally opens, in an endeavour to reach agreement. In so far as H.M.G.'s interests are concerned, it is proposed elsewhere that the Secretary of State or Lord Lloyd should see Mr. Manley, Mr. Adams and Mr. Gomes to warn them not to disregard these interests in reaching such agreement. It may therefore be that intervention by H.M.G. in general terms about the propositions as a whole will not be called for. If it is, whether in private discussion outside the Conference, or at the Conference table, it is suggested that the following are the points which might be made.

14. The Secretary of State might suggest that the question should be approached not as issues between progressives and reactionaries but as issues affecting the balance of power between the Units until such time as federal parties are developed across the existing geographical barriers. He should, it is suggested, deal with the Manley propositions and any others which threaten a reference back to Legislatures in the following way. He should refer to the fact (which is mentioned in the draft of his own opening speech) that West Indian Legislatures had already considered Federation on four or five occasions, in the course of which they had reached certain very definite conclusions about the nature of the Federation they wished to see; and he should point out (as in the draft speech) the dangers and delays implicit in any further reference back to the Legislatures. He should then go on to say that he regarded it as by no means unreasonable that after a lapse of nearly three years from the drawing up of the Federal Plan in 1953 certain amendments should require consideration. Some amendments indeed were to be welcomed (such as the arrangements to cover regional consultative and advisory services) if they met with the general approval of delegations. The tactics of how the more objectionable issues should be dealt with if they are pressed at the Conference will have to be concerted at the time.

15. Separate briefs are provided on each of the Manley propositions as indicated in paragraph 4.

42 CO 1031/1737, no 39

1 Feb 1956

'United Kingdom financial assistance': CO brief no 22 for the UK delegation at the London British Caribbean Federation conference.

Annexure

1. The fifth of Mr. Manley's seven points is "The reconsideration of United Kingdom financial assistance".

2. A large increase in United Kingdom financial assistance is likely to be urged under several heads, and by no means by Mr. Manley alone. These heads may be:—

(i) *Increased Grant-in-Aid.*

(ii) *A special grant to the smaller islands.* Sir Stephen Luke has reported a very strong feeling in the Windward Islands that H.M.G. should be asked to make a special capital grant to bring up the standard of services in the smaller islands to something nearer the bigger ones.

(iii) *A much increased grant towards the cost of setting up the Federation.*

(iv) *An increase in the present Colonial Development and Welfare Allocations.*

3. If, as seems likely, the Report of the Fiscal Commissioner is taken at an early stage in the Conference these questions are likely to be raised in that context rather than in any discussion of Mr. Manley's points as such. They are therefore dealt with in Briefs relating to that Report, in particular U.K. Brief 5 on Grants-in-Aid and Financial Relations, together with the Conference Paper on this subject, and U.K. Brief 6 on the Federal Capital (Section on Cost). The Annexure to U.K. Brief 5, which for convenience is also annexed here, sets out the extent of H.M.G.'s financial assistance to the West Indies in the past ten years.

4. Put shortly, the answer to these requests is that H.M.G. cannot increase its present financial commitments, but it will, of course, be desirable to deal with any such request in the fuller manner suggested in the Briefs.

5. With regard to C. D. and W. allocations (not covered in the Briefs referred to), as stated in the Secretary of State's circular despatch No. 411 of the 26th April, 1955, there may be later on some small further allocation out of the existing reserve to West Indian territories, among others.

Annexure to 42: Assistance given by HMG to British Caribbean territories

The following information is supplied in support of H.M.G.'s case that it would be neither appropriate, nor in the present circumstances possible, to make a capital grant in order to meet any need which may be expressed at the Conference for raising the standard of services in the smaller islands to something nearer those in the larger islands. The information can be used also in rebutting any other form of accusation that H.M.G. have been ungenerous towards the West Indies.

1. *Assistance under the Colonial Development and Welfare Acts*

During the period April 1946 to March 1955 nearly £22 million has been allocated to the West Indian Governments (including British Guiana £4¼ million and British Honduras £2¼ m.) for development purposes. Issues over the period amount to about £17 m., or little over three-quarters of the total allocation. A further £13½ million has been allocated under the 1955 Act. £18½ m. or more than £3½ m. a year, are therefore available for spending up to 1960.

In addition the Governments have shared in the funds allocated for research work and for centrally administered development schemes for higher education and training, surveys, communications etc. Comprehensive figures are not available but C.D. and W. grants totalling some £1½ m. have been made in the period 1946–1955 to the University College of the West Indies. Undertakings have also been given to certain West Indian Governments to evolve such schemes of assistance as may be necessary to safeguard their banana and citrus industries.

It could be pointed out that a relatively high proportion of the total funds made available under the C.D. and W. Acts have gone to the West Indies. Although no precise figures are available it appears that the assistance received is very much greater in relation to the size of the population than in any other regional groups of territories.

2. *Grants-in-aid*

Over the ten year period 1946–1956 grants-in-aid of administration totalling £3¼ m.

have been made, chiefly to the islands of the Windwards and Leewards groups (this figure takes in only a very small part of the grants recently approved or under consideration in connection with the Hurricane Janet). Grants for relief and rehabilitation following natural disasters have already totalled over £4 m., and loans totalling over £1¼ m. have been made for the same purposes. There has also been given assistance to the extent of over £3½ m. in the form of price subsidies, expenditure on defence and other special items of regional and territorial expenditure. (Total: grants £10½ m., loans £1¼ m.)

3. *Capital grant for federal headquarters*

Notwithstanding the economic difficulties at home and the increased demands upon U.K. funds for financial assistance to Colonial territories in general, H.M.G. are still prepared to stand by their offer, made at the 1953 Conference, of a capital grant to establish the Federal Headquarters (see U.K. Brief 6a).

4. *Other forms of economic assistance*

Reference might be made to the arrangements for duty free entry of goods (with certain exceptions) into the U.K.; to the great expansion in the West Indies sugar industry in recent years and the considerable degree of stability afforded to it by the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement which has resulted in prices greatly above the world price (although both the preceding forms of assistance are available also to Colonial territories other than the West Indies); and to the support given to the banana industry (£1¼ m.) and the citrus industry (£370,000)—again largely in the smaller islands.

There are of course other forms of assistance, both direct and indirect which the United Kingdom has given, and continues to give, to the West Indies and which are too numerous to mention here. One instance is the annual grant of £13,000 which the Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation has been making to the British West Indies Meteorological Service since 1951, and another is the annual subsidy which B.O.A.C. has been making until recently to British West Indian Airways.

Such calculations leave altogether out of account the many "hidden" forms of financial assistance given by the United Kingdom, such as the loan of staffs and advisers from Home Civil Service Departments without charging their salaries to the recipient West Indian government.

43 CO 1031/1754, no 4, BCF(56)3

13 Feb 1956

[Sources of federal revenue and the cost of the federal capital]:
summary record of the third plenary session of the London British
Caribbean Federation conference. *Annexes: II and III*

The Conference agreed to adopt the Agenda proposed by the Secretary of State in his Despatch of the 1st December and to discuss first, in general terms, the most important considerations arising out of the Report of the Fiscal Commissioner, remitting specific points as necessary to a Committee. The agenda is set out in full in the Press Communique issued after the Meeting (Annex I).¹

¹ Annex I not printed.

The Secretary of State explained that it remained the view of Her Majesty's Government that, as stated in the report of the Standing Closer Association Committee (S.C.A.C.) (Col. No. 255), any Federal Government must have its own direct sources of finance and must not depend on contributions voted by the constituent territories which could be withheld; and moreover that it was essential for the Federation to be able to raise loans on the security of revenues raised and controlled by itself. These desiderata were in accordance with the proposals of the Fiscal Commissioner, which Her Majesty's Government were prepared to accept in principle if that was the wish of the Conference.

In the discussion which followed, delegates made clear that they had discussed at length among themselves what they felt to be the most important aspect of the Fiscal Commissioner's Report—the method of raising revenue. They saw no objection to the proposal that profits from the currencies of the Units should be treated as Federal revenue, but foresaw a danger of inflaming existing prejudices among the populations if it were decided to confine Federal customs and excise duties during the first five years to those on gasoline, cigarettes, beer, rum and other potable spirits. They would prefer a formula which would avoid pin-pointing these particular commodities. Such a formula would give the Federal Government the power to impose fixed, obligatory contributions from Unit Governments which would produce the same revenue as would accrue under the Fiscal Commissioner's proposals, and to increase these contributions if necessary to the maximum already suggested, but would leave the Units free to raise their contributions in whatever manner they thought fit without necessarily relating them to any specific commodities. Like the other methods of raising revenue proposed, this would be an interim measure for the first five years, but it would have the further advantage of flexibility, since the levies could be imposed on a broad band of commodities and would be limited only by the overall sum required of each Unit and not by the specific rates for particular commodities. The proposed method, which had been agreed by all the West Indian delegations, is set out in Annex II to these Minutes.

The West Indian delegations were, in general, of the opinion that the proposal to link Federal revenue to duties on individual commodities, particularly those affecting the poorer sections of the population, might arouse local opposition which might well prejudice the success of Federation as a whole. The Barbados delegation considered that in practice it would be irrelevant whether the Federal Government had its own sources of taxation earmarked, so long as the ordinary people could be assured that their cigarettes and liquor would not cost them more after federation, but that it should be left to the Unit Governments themselves to decide in what manner their individual contributions should bear on the peoples' pockets. Against this, however, it was pointed out that whatever commodities were taxed the pockets of some persons would be affected, and that to impose two taxes on one commodity might well lead to resentment and widespread evasion.

It was pointed out on behalf of Her Majesty's Government that from the purely financial point of view the method suggested might meet the criteria proposed, but that, unless it were employed as a purely temporary measure, it would not satisfy the principle envisaged by S.C.A.C. that one of the aims of federation was to strengthen the economy of the Caribbean area with a view to eventual independence, since it would not take the Federal Government far on the road towards economic control. Politically, too, it involved a danger in that, notwithstanding the mandatory nature of

the Federation's call upon Unit resources, it would be necessary for each Unit to present annually a Federal Finance Bill to its legislature. Even though the contribution to the Federal Government would be mandatory, it would inevitably provide an opportunity for criticism of the burden of Federation on the population.

The Barbados Delegation pointed out that part of the Barbados budget consisted of statutory items which were not discussed in the legislature. This same procedure could be adopted for the Federal Levy. If all territories agreed to reduce their own duties by the amount of the federal rate suggested by Sir Sidney Caine and to spread these charges elsewhere, the man in the street would not notice the cost of Federation to the extent that he would resent it, even though not discussed in the legislature, if payment was by means of a levy.

Further discussion showed that the proposal for a Federal Levy had the support of all the delegations. The United Kingdom Delegation agreed to consider the matter further at the next meeting after they had had time fully to consider its implications.

Customs union

Mr. Gomes read a draft note by the West Indies Delegation (text at Annex III) on the subject but made it clear that final agreement had not yet been reached on it within the Delegation. The Trinidad delegates had based their own calculations on the establishment of a customs union at an early date; they regarded it as fundamental to the act of federation and held that machinery should be set up immediately at the highest possible level to prepare for the introduction of a customs union. They also held that a directive to the Federal Government to establish a customs union ought to be included in the Constitutional instruments. Unless such a union was established at a very early date it was extremely difficult to foresee how the burdens of federation could be borne after five years.

Mr. Manley said that Annex III had been prepared jointly and discussed by delegates, but that it had not yet been finally agreed. It would in any case be useful to have an exact definition of what was meant by customs union. *The Secretary of State* made it clear that Her Majesty's Government's views on the interim proposals for financing the Federation would be considerably influenced by the agreement of the delegates to the immediate establishment of a customs union. This would of course include both an internal free trade area and a co-ordination of the Federation's external customs tariff.

On behalf of the smaller territories it was pointed out that customs union was the *sine qua non* of Federation, but that internal free trade and an external customs union must be introduced simultaneously.

The Secretary of State said that he clearly understood that Annex III had been produced merely as a basis for discussion, but that it was extremely valuable to him and his advisers to have some idea as to the way delegates were thinking, and he much preferred to learn of their possible proposals at the Conference table than from the Press.

Income tax

In discussion it was agreed that any proposal to introduce a federal income tax during the first quinquennium would be of such importance as to necessitate reference back to the legislatures.

Cost of the federal capital

The Secretary of State drew attention to the fact that in 1953 the cost of establishing the federal capital had been estimated at £520,000 towards which Her Majesty's

Government undertook to make a grant of £500,000. In the Fiscal Commissioners' report the cost, based on the assumption that the host territory would provide the necessary land free of charge, was estimated at about £1,725,000. Delegates were aware of the financial difficulties facing Her Majesty's Government which had necessitated the curtailing of support for many desirable schemes. However, as an earnest of the importance Her Majesty's Government attached to Federation he had obtained consent, subject to the approval of Parliament, to an increase in the amount of the grant to a total not exceeding £1M. He must stress that this was the absolute maximum which could be given and that in due course they must discuss the period over which it should be paid. He hoped that this would be regarded as a generous donation.

In discussion the delegates expressed appreciation of this offer. Nevertheless, while they understood the difficulties of Her Majesty's Government they hoped that Her Majesty's Government would understand that their own difficulties in the West Indies were even greater. They intended shortly to put forward a suggestion for a loan of £2M. at a low rate of interest to provide the working capital for the Federation. Attention was also drawn to the fact that proportionately to the total cost of the establishment of the capital the offer was not as generous as that of 1953.

The Conference agreed to meet again at 10.30 a.m. on the 14th February, 1956.

Annex II to 43: 'Fiscal commissioner's report: federal government revenue': memorandum by the West Indian delegations

1. The Fiscal Commissioner recommended that the federal revenue should be obtained in the main from taxes under the direct control of the Federal Legislature. Specific recommendations were made for initial and maximum rates of federal customs and excise duties on gasoline, cigarettes, beer, rum and other spirits.

2. The West Indian Delegations accept the principles underlying Sir Sydney Caine's proposals, but consider that the levying of federal consumption taxes on the specific commodities mentioned is likely to cause considerable public resentment in the early days of federation and, in some cases, to have an adverse effect on the manoeuvrability of unit governments which are themselves dependent on the taxation of these commodities for their own revenue. In these circumstances, the West Indian Delegations recommend that for the first five years the federal revenue should be raised in the following manner:—

- (a) Currency profits;
- (b) The Federal Government should levy an initial annual charge on the Unit Governments, the amount to be determined in the light of the Conference decisions on financial assistance from Her Majesty's Government and the economies which the Federal authorities are expected to be able to effect during the early period of operations;
- (c) This amount should be levied from *Unit Governments*, payable out of unit revenues as a whole and unrelated to taxation of any specific commodity;
- (d) The amount should be shared between the Unit Governments in the same proportions as the estimated initial contributions from each territory under the Caine proposals for Consumption taxes (cf. Column (2) of Table 8);

(e) The Federal Legislature shall have the right, as need may arise, progressively to increase the charge on Unit Governments, but subject to the maximum proposed in the Caine Report, to wit, \$9,110,000 per annum (cf. Table 7), to be shared in the proportions laid down in (d) above.

Annex III to 43: 'Customs union': draft note by West Indian delegations

The West Indian Delegations recognise that the imposition of Customs duties and the regulation of external and internal trade are matters within the Legislative competence of the proposed Federal Government, but record their opinion:—

(a) That the declaration in the Federal Constitution in favour of the free movement of goods (with special reference to goods originating within the Federal territories) should be implemented as soon as possible after Federation becomes an accomplished fact. Due regard being paid to particular problems and difficulties arising in each Unit.

(b) That the establishment of a Customs Union embracing in addition to internal free trade the wider area of external trade and tariff arrangements is a desirable objective, but recognises that the economic existence and development of each territory is closely related to its own trade and tariff policy in relation to countries outside the Federal territory and considers that in the first five years of the Federation uniform tariffs should not be imposed except on consent by the Units affected.

(c) That both the above matters should be made the subject of immediate further examination in the Caribbean area by experts so that action may be taken at the earliest appropriate times, but that all the objectives should not in any way delay the establishment of the Federation.

(d) That the Federal Government should endeavour at the earliest possible opportunity to achieve an integrated policy amongst the units in relation to external trade.

(e) In connection with these studies the position of British Guiana and British Honduras should be taken into account to facilitate their participation.

44 CO 1031/1754, no 9, BCF(56)7

15 Feb 1956

[UK financial assistance]: summary record of the seventh plenary session of the London British Caribbean Federation conference

Discussion continued on the memorandum submitted by the Jamaican Delegation (B.C.F. (56) 9) proposing the establishment of a Consolidated Fund to be initiated by a loan of £2M. from Her Majesty's Government bearing interest at a nominal or low rate and having no fixed term of repayment.

Lord Lloyd, who was in the Chair, repeated the Secretary of State's expression of Her Majesty's Government's willingness to do all it could to assist both the Federation and the Unit Governments, and referred to the statement given in B.C.F. (56)12¹ of

¹ cf 42.

the assistance already given or allocated under the Colonial Development and Welfare Acts and by way of grants-in-aid of expenses of administration and grants for specific purposes, such as relief and rehabilitation following natural disasters. Allocations totalled some £56 M over the past ten years. He re-stated Her Majesty's Government's opinion that no case had been made so far for a loan of the order of £2 M. to provide working capital for the Federation, and that the resources of the Federation would be adequate to meet the relatively small sum of £350,000 which the Fiscal Commissioner had estimated would suffice to meet both initial expenditure and working capital. Nevertheless he would welcome evidence in support of the Jamaican proposal.

Mr. Gomes acknowledged the very considerable assistance which Her Majesty's Government had given to the British Caribbean territories in recent years, and agreed that if the Federation was to be self-sufficient it must as far as possible bear its own burdens, the wealthier territories contributing their full share. Nevertheless, considerable local resources had already been put into capital and industrial development plans, leaving a very slender margin to meet the cost of Federation. Further development would be desirable in the early stages of Federation, and this at a time when, thanks to political advances and the development of autonomous institutions, those in high political office were subjected to far more intense pressure and criticism than had been experienced ten years ago.

Other delegates supported the Jamaican proposal, and expressed acute disappointment that Her Majesty's Government felt unable to agree to make a loan of the order suggested. The Windward Islands expressed the appreciation of the smaller territories of the assistance given by Her Majesty's Government so far in the way of grants-in-aid, but made it clear that they would much prefer to do without such assistance, and that they did not relish the idea of entering the Federation as grant-aided territories. In the circumstances they felt that an initial loan by Her Majesty's Government was justified.

The United Kingdom Delegation then outlined the requirements of the Federation with regard to the initial expenditure as they saw them. The Fiscal Commissioner had worked on the assumption that Her Majesty's Government would make a grant of £½ M. towards the cost of the Federal Capital, leaving £1¾ M. to be found; this sum could be met by annual contributions of £60,000 and, when the time came to raise a loan, the interest charges would similarly amount to £60,000 per annum. The situation had now been altered by Her Majesty's Government's consent to increase the amount of the capital grant to a total not exceeding £1 M., so that the deficit was expected to be only about £¾ M. If a loan were to be raised to cover this deficit the interest and sinking fund payments would be about £45,000 per annum, and even if the Commissioner had under-estimated the cost of the capital to the extent of £2 M. the service charges would still amount to only £130,000 per annum. Such a liability, it was thought, would not impair the viability of the Federal Government, though it would mean that reserves would be built up at a slower rate than the Fiscal Commissioner had envisaged. His assessment had aimed at producing a reserve of one year's revenue at the end of five years. It was not the wish of Her Majesty's Government to impose any restriction on the expenditure of the capital grant in relation to the expenditure from local funds; they would be quite happy to see their contribution used first.

In reply to a question by *Mr. Gomes*, *Lord Lloyd* said that in addition to the grant of £1 M. towards the cost of the Federal Capital Her Majesty's Government would, of

course, continue to make available Colonial Development and Welfare funds, grants-in-aid to unit governments, etc., as at present. At the moment Her Majesty's Government bore the cost of defence in the Caribbean area, namely the cost of the Jamaica Regiment and the wider cost of the maintenance of the three British services. The wish had been expressed in the West Indies that the West India Regiment should be revived, and most of the territories had agreed to contribute 1 per cent of their revenues to this project. Her Majesty's Government would, of course, pay the substantial outstanding balance of the cost. This proposal had developed separately from that of Federation, though when full Dominion status was reached the full cost of the Regiment would presumably fall on the Federation. It was not correct to say that the whole cost of the defence of Malaya fell on the United Kingdom Government; in fact Malaya made a substantial contribution to her own defence.

In further discussion the point was made that the report of the Fiscal Commissioner was not necessarily infallible. It was not fair that the larger colonies should be expected to make a loan to federation when they themselves were in need of C.D. and W. assistance to develop their own economies. Several delegates suggested that the United Kingdom attitude seemed to imply little faith in the improvement of the United Kingdom's own economy or in the future viability of the Federation. It was stressed that a strong Federation could not be created if overshadowed with constant fear of economic insecurity. A proposal for a loan from the United Kingdom was made to ensure that from the start the federal government could work. The hope was strongly expressed that Her Majesty's Government would not throw away all the good-will it had earned in the West Indies from Montego Bay to the present day.

After further discussion, the *Trinidad Delegation* asked whether Her Majesty's Government would agree that if their calculations and those of the Fiscal Commissioner proved to be wrong they would be prepared to make a loan available. The discussion had shown that if the Federation in its early days found itself in financial difficulties it would be impossible for it to raise a loan on the open market. The impression had been given that if this situation arose Her Majesty's Government hoped that the two wealthy colonies, Trinidad and Jamaica, would carry the burden. It would be fatal to the whole success of the Conference if Her Majesty's Government were to give a blunt refusal to the Delegation's proposal. On the other hand no one wished to borrow before the money was actually needed, since this would involve paying interest on money lying dormant. The position could be rectified if Her Majesty's Government would agree that a loan would be made available as and when the Federation Government proved its need.

British Guiana Observers made the point that if Her Majesty's Government could acquiesce in this proposal it would be an important factor in influencing non-federalists in British Guiana in favour of the federation.

Lord Lloyd said that the United Kingdom in no way doubted the viability of the Federation. Nevertheless, by any test of area or standard of living, more money was made available to the Caribbean than to any other comparable area administered by the Colonial Office. Good-will was something we all wanted, but it was a two-way traffic and the Conference must try to see the United Kingdom's position. Only a limited amount of capital was available for overseas investment by the United Kingdom, and demands for capital were presented to the United Kingdom from all

over the world. He had taken careful note of the Trinidad Delegation's proposal and would discuss it fully with the Secretary of State. The United Kingdom Government would examine the Trinidad Delegation's compromise proposal very carefully, but at this stage he could give no commitment on behalf of Her Majesty's Government.

The terms of a short press communiqué were agreed, and the text is annexed to these Minutes. The Conference agreed to meet again at 10.30. a.m. on Thursday, 16th February.

45 CO 1032/121, no 232

14 Apr 1956

'West Indian immigrants': minute by Lord Lloyd to Mr Lennox-Boyd on the problem of population growth in the Caribbean

Secretary of State

When we last discussed this appallingly difficult question there was, I fear, no complete agreement either between you and me or between those of the Department concerned on the crucial point of whether or not it would be right at the present time to restrict immigration. There are of course two aspects of the matter. First, the effect of this continued immigration upon the United Kingdom and secondly, its effect upon the Caribbean.

2. My own feeling is that generally in discussion most people have concentrated upon the first aspect and have possibly paid too little attention to the second and, indeed, even if one considers the effect on the U.K. in isolation, there are a number of very thorny questions which arise. For example, are the people of this country really prepared to accept anything up to another half million coloured people over the next 10 years? Is the influx of so many coloured people going to lead to strong colour prejudice in this country which at the moment is mercifully absent? How can we ever clear away our remaining slums if we encourage West Indians to go on creating them? I do not minimise the difficulty of these problems but I must say frankly that it is not so much the effect of West Indian immigration on this country that has influenced my views as the appalling population problem in the West Indies, and before you finally make up your mind upon the policy you wish to adopt, I would like to put before you the Caribbean situation as I see it.

3. I attach to this minute the population estimates¹ for the last ten years. Fifteen years ago the Moyne Commission, which realised the menace of the growing population, predicted that the average annual increase in the population would become as high as 2%. In effect this means that the population would double itself in thirty years. The figures show that in the three main territories which are sending immigrants to this country, namely Barbados, Jamaica and Trinidad, the average annual increase is more than 2%. Taking Jamaica alone if the population continues to increase at its present rate it will in ten years' time be very nearly 2 million. If the population of this country were to increase at a similar rate we should have an additional million people every year. Even India and Pakistan whose population problem is considered by all the experts to be very serious, is only at the rate of some 1.5% per annum.

¹ Not printed.

4. At this rate of increase the prospect in the Caribbean would be serious enough even if at the present time there were full employment and if moreover there were very great opportunities for creation of more employment through development. But the reverse is in fact the case. The statistics regarding employment in the West Indies are not very reliable. Nevertheless the following facts are relevant:—

- (a) the International Bank Commission which visited Jamaica in 1952 estimated unemployment at that time at roughly 15–20% of a labour force of about 600,000;
- (b) in Trinidad a 1951 estimate put the unemployed at 6.6% of the total working population;
- (c) in Barbados it is estimated that seasonal unemployment in the sugar industry is approximately 10,000;
- (d) in Antigua an estimate in 1950 was that 25% of the labour force was unemployed and there does not appear to have been any significant change since then.

5. If even at the present time the employment situation is so unsatisfactory, the prospects of employment through development are equally not very encouraging. Nearly all the islands are pretty fully developed already and the only hope of an outlet for any considerable number of people must be pinned upon development in British Guiana and British Honduras. It would however be very foolish I think to place any great reliance on this prospect. Development in British Guiana will be a slow and extremely costly business and the same applies to British Honduras where, in addition, there are strong political fears of an influx of people from Jamaica.

6. At the present time the situation is only being held by the wholesale export of people to this country and the deterioration in the situation can be seen from the following figures of West Indian immigrants:—

1952	2,000
1953	2,000
1954	9,000
1955	26,000 (18,000 from Jamaica)
1956	4,200 (first quarter)

This last figure already represents an increase of 100% on the figure for the first quarter of 1955 and does not include the recent arrival of some 1,200 in one ship. There is every reason to expect that the total figures for 1956 will exceed those for 1955.

7. The situation is therefore that in an area where present unemployment is high and the prospects of development are very speculative the situation is only being held by the steadily increasing export of surplus population. If the import of this population by the U.K. represented a lasting solution to this problem there might be a good deal to be said for continuing to allow it despite the danger of encouraging a similar migration from India and Pakistan, but from the figures it is clear that there can never be enough jobs in this country to cope with the problem and therefore sooner or later a day of reckoning is bound to arrive. How soon it arrives will depend I suppose on how soon there is either saturation of the market or a recession in this country. But when it does arrive we may well be faced with a situation where we either have to maintain a very large number of West Indians in this country on public assistance, or send them back to Jamaica, and the longer the situation is left and the more the numbers pile up the more difficult the problem is going to be.

8. To suddenly send a large number of workers back to the Caribbean at a time when it is probably also suffering from a recession would be catastrophic. One need only remember what happened during the 1930's when there was a considerable movement back to the British Caribbean islands of workers who had gone to the neighbouring republics. In some cases this movement was voluntary, in others, such as Cuba, the Dominican Republic and also, I believe, Panama, the Government concerned decided to get rid of a considerable number of their unemployed foreign workers. No figures are available of the total number of persons involved, but there is no doubt of the distress which it caused and the consensus of opinion seems to be that it was this as much as an increase of the population which caused congestion in the labour markets on the islands. As such it must be reckoned as a contributory factor in the conditions which led to the riots of the late 1930's.

9. To sum up, I believe that unless something is done to deal with the root causes of this problem in the Caribbean we are riding for a fall. And the only real way of tackling the situation is some limitation of the population. If anything is to be done it must clearly be done by the local politicians and, if nothing else is certain, it is certain that nobody is going to face up to things as long as they think that their difficulties can be solved by exporting their surplus population to the U.K.

10. It may be said that if you restrict immigration to-day it will be extremely unpopular in the Caribbean and that there is no guarantee that even so the West Indian politicians will take the only action which can ultimately save them, and that therefore we had better join them in putting off the evil day. I am quite prepared to admit that there is no guarantee that Manley, for example, will take the plunge, but I submit that we should at any rate make him face up to the problem and that by encouraging him to ignore it we shall create ultimately a situation of such gravity that nobody can cope with it. We shall of course come in for difficulty in the West Indies if we restrict although I think that restrictions based on housing will be far the easiest to defend. And of course it goes without saying that any restrictions which we impose must be effective and must be applied in the Commonwealth without discrimination. Nevertheless for the long term benefit of the West Indies, I am sure that this problem ought to be faced now and I am sure that in any policy decision which we reach, these considerations must take a very prominent place in our minds.

46 CO 1031/1226, no 8

18 Apr 1956

[Federal capital]: letter from P Rogers to R L Speaight¹ on the possible use of a US naval base as the location for the federal capital

Here is a slightly awkward one on which we should be grateful for your help. The story is this. At the recent London Conference on British Caribbean Federation, it was agreed that a Fact-finding Commission should be appointed to make recommendations on the three most suitable sites, in order of preference, for the Capital of the Federation. The Commission is enjoined to bear in mind such factors, inter alia, as the availability of land, the cost of necessary buildings and other works

¹ Assistant under-secretary of state, American Dept, FO.

on the selected site, communications and the services already available. As you may imagine, the Governments of the constituent units of the prospective Federation are most anxious to see the site located in their own particular territory. In preparation for their submissions to the Commission, the Governments of Trinidad and St. Lucia have asked that enquiries should be made about the possibility of releasing certain areas leased to the U.S. Government under the 1941 Leased Bases Agreement. The Government of Trinidad has enquired whether the leased area at Waller Field (which has been completely evacuated by the U.S. Forces) or an adequate portion of it, could be released permanently and whether, subject to suitable safeguards, use might be made of the buildings and other facilities at the Chaguaramas Naval Base as a temporary measure whilst a permanent Capital is being built. If the U.S. Government were disposed to give these proposals, or either of them, favourable consideration, details could perhaps be discussed on the spot between the U.S. Consul-General and the Trinidad Government, bearing in mind of course the fact that at present all this is hypothetical. The Government of St. Lucia has asked whether the leased area at Beane Field could be released permanently.

While both Governments fully understand the importance generally of the U.S. bases in the Caribbean to Western defence, they naturally wish to be able to inform the Commission of all the material considerations which might affect the siting of the Federal Capital. Until a decision is taken about the site of the Federal Capital, we shall not know whether in fact any of these facilities would in fact be required, so that it is only a hypothetical question which can be put to the U.S. Government at this stage. On the other hand, we quite recognise the anxiety, not only of the individual Governments immediately concerned, but indeed of all the West Indian Colonies that the full facts should be available to the Commission on the Capital, so that they may recommend the most suitable sites, bearing in mind what facilities will prove to be available. It is for this reason that we are anxious to meet the request of the Governments of Trinidad and St. Lucia for a statement of the views of the U.S. Government as to whether or not these particular areas could be made available in the manner suggested, if the Commission were to recommend any one of them as the most suitable site for the Federal Capital and that site were agreed by the representatives of the West Indian Governments concerned.

This matter was mentioned by W.I.J. Wallace to Man² during the recent discussions on U.S. defence requirements. I gather that the matter was mentioned informally to Taylor of the State Department who said that he had already heard of Trinidad's interest in this matter from the U.S. Consul-General in Trinidad, where the issue is, as you may imagine, a very lively popular topic. We realise, of course, that at the present stage of defence programme in the Caribbean, it may well be difficult for the State Department to give any definite assurances in this matter. Nevertheless, we hope very much that the Foreign Office will agree that the matter should be taken up with them. It may be indeed that if, for example, the U.S. Government are no longer interested in, say, Waller Field, they might be glad of an opportunity to make a gesture of goodwill to the new British Caribbean Federation by making it available as a site, should that in fact prove to be the Commission's recommendation and that be endorsed by West Indian Governments.

² M C G Man, head of American Dept, FO.

There is some urgency about this, because the Commission will, we expect, start its work about the end of May. If you see no objection, we should therefore be grateful if the matter could be taken up with the State Department and, if they could be asked to give a reply before then, so that the Governments concerned will be in a position to know what submissions they may make to the Commission.

47 CO 1031/1741, no 3/9

23 June 1956

[Federation]: letter from Mr Lennox-Boyd to Sir H Foot on the incompatibility between political independence and financial dependence. *Annex*

In the course of our correspondence¹ just before the Federation Conference, we touched on the very big question of U.K. financial assistance in relation to self-government. I quite agreed with your suggestion that we should not pursue that issue at the time, since that was not the occasion to do so. Now, however, that we are well clear of the conference, I think it might be useful to you and to other Governors in the West Indies, to whom I am accordingly sending a copy of this letter, to know the way I look at this matter.

In your letter, you said that while you know very well that West Indian leaders often take far too much for granted of the aid they receive, nevertheless you did not regard the political advance towards self-government as an argument for cutting down aid from H.M.G. Even when self-government was achieved it was your view that H.M.G. should continue to give substantial—indeed possibly increased—aid to the British West Indies, not necessarily on existing arrangements, but perhaps on the lines of the Colombo Plan. You suggested that we should not rule out the possibility of assistance in marketing concessions, the provision of capital and technical advice, and even direct financial assistance from the big and powerful members of the Commonwealth to help small and weak ones.

I made some comment on this in my speech at the opening of the conference, in relation to the achievement by the Federation of full membership of the Commonwealth. I attach for convenience a copy of paragraph 8 of the Conference Report which summarises my statement.

I think it may be helpful if I expand a little in this letter on what I said then. It is important, first of all, to distinguish between the various kinds of assistance, for that difference is much more than one of the esoteric issues of financial propriety. To my mind it goes to the root of the political problem.

We can all agree at once that there is nothing in full membership of the Commonwealth and political independence which rules out arrangements for intra-Commonwealth marketing concessions, whether by tariff preferences, arrangements on the lines of the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement, or otherwise. I should point out, however, that of the present arrangements of most interest to the West Indies—the G.A.T.T. waiver—is specifically limited to the “Colonies” and we cannot use it to help “Dominions”, even if we wanted to do so. I would only add on this that politically it would not be possible for any arrangements that were applied to West

¹ See 38–39.

Indian Federation to be completely one-sided. By this I mean that no country can expect the U.K. Government to extend or continue trade concessions if it itself pursues a policy of narrow protectionism, without any regard to the interests of U.K. exports.

We can also agree readily that there is nothing in political independence to prevent the provision of technical advice, and even capital assistance, from one member of the Commonwealth to another, whether on the lines of the Colombo Plan or otherwise. Indeed, it may well be that the future will see a considerable extension of this kind of arrangement. But it must be borne in mind that the assistance which has so far been given in this way is all marginal to the economies of the countries assisted and they are not dependent for their continued governmental existence upon it.

It is over the third kind of assistance that I think the great difficulty will arise, that is assistance direct to the budget of a territory without which that country would be unable to maintain its administration. I recognise that the cases of Jordan and Libya are constantly cited as examples of countries which receive from the U.K. Government heavy financial assistance without detailed budgetary control. It is, I am sure, however, clear to leading politicians in the West Indies that that aid is given purely for reasons of defence and is as much a part of defence expenditure as money incurred in maintaining troops. Whatever the pros and cons I think that as a mere matter of political fact it must be faced that the electorate in this country would not be likely to acquiesce in payments of this kind to countries even within the Commonwealth where it was not needed on defence grounds. Grants-in-aid of expenses of administration, to give them their technical name, are given to dependent territories by virtue of this country's responsibility for them as long as they remain dependent. If political independence is to mean anything, it clearly must alter that status and relationship and I do not see how it is possible for real political independence to be attained and maintained when the Government of the country concerned is unable to maintain itself without financial assistance from outside. That is not merely a matter of the way in which the assistance is given, for if it were the amount could merely be transferred to a Colombo Plan type grant. It is a matter also of the scale of assistance and frankly it is here that it seems to me that the West Indies are going to meet their greatest difficulty. The fact is that financial assistance to several of the territories is at present required on a scale which is incompatible with the reality of political independence. If the Caribbean Federation is to become a full member of the Commonwealth there will have to be a combination of economic growth and assumption of the burden of assistance by the wealthier territories, in order to enable the Federal Government to pay its own way without being dependent for its very existence as such and as it may receive from outside. The great question-mark in all this is, as we all know only too well, the continued growth of the population.

Annex to 47: Extract from Mr Lennox-Boyd's speech at the London conference

8. Mr. Lennox-Boyd went on to refer to the future of the Federation. Pointing out how Federation would facilitate the eventual achievement of self-government within the Commonwealth, he drew attention to the implications of that status. Self-

government meant something more than the formal relinquishment by Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom of constitutional powers of control. It meant that a country must be able to stand on its own feet economically and financially, that it could finance its own administration and that it was able and prepared to assume responsibility for its own defence and its own international relations to the extent that either was involved by its geographical or international standing. On the other hand, in these days no country was independent in the sense of being entirely self-contained and self-sufficient. Mutual help was one of the great principles of the Commonwealth and there was no reason why one member or group of members should not help other members with their economic development, perhaps on the lines of the Colombo Plan. Nor would self-government preclude arrangements for intra-Commonwealth commerce of which the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement was an example. Unlike the situation where a state relied for its existence on outside help, there was nothing derogatory to a country's dignity in accepting the help of other partners to improve its economic situation and develop its resources to the general advantage of the partnership. The Commonwealth was an association of free nations, each of which was independent in the sense outlined. Membership of the Commonwealth was a matter for all members to consider, but delegates could be assured that when the British Caribbean Federation Government felt in due course ready to assume the responsibilities and obligations involved, it would find Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom glad to sponsor its admission to full Commonwealth membership.

48 CO 1031/1791, no 177

Sept 1956

[Federal capital]: Report of the British Caribbean Federal Capital

Commission (chairman, Sir F Mudie) Col No 328, 1956

[Extract]

...

Chapter IV

Communications

37. In Chapter II we came to the conclusion that the capital of the federation should be based on an existing town and in the previous Chapter, by an examination of the available accommodation and the services and amenities of the towns of the federating colonies, we eliminated as possible base towns all towns except Kingston in Jamaica, Port-of-Spain in Trinidad and Bridgetown in Barbados. We have thus completed the first part of our task, the selection of the three most suitable places for the capital. There remains the second part of our task, their arrangement in the order of our preference. From the point of view of amenities and services we saw that Kingston is to be preferred to Port-of-Spain, and Port-of-Spain to Barbados, but, before we can reach any final order of preference, we have to examine other matters referred to in our terms of reference. We take up first the question of communications.

38. We have to consider communications by sea and air and by cable and wireless. The headquarters of Cable and Wireless (West Indies) Limited are in Barbados, which therefore fulfils all our requirements as regards this form of

communication. But so, we are satisfied, do Jamaica and Trinidad. Ocean-going steamers can come alongside in both Jamaica and Trinidad and the same will, in a few years, be true of Barbados. In any case it is air and not sea communications that are important. Those visiting the capital on business will do so by air and not by sea. The capital, therefore, must have good air communications, both with the other federating colonies and with the outside world.

39. The main difficulty in inter-island communication by air is, of course, the crossing of the thousand-mile gap between Jamaica and the other islands. From this point of view it might appear to be a matter of indifference whether that half of the population that lives in the islands in the east had to go to a capital in Jamaica, or the half that lives in Jamaica had to go to a capital in one of the islands in the east; but the matter is not so simple. If the capital were in Jamaica then it would be important that communications between it and all the colonies in the east should be good, whereas if the capital were in Barbados or Trinidad all that would be important from this point of view would be the communications between Jamaica and Barbados or Trinidad. There are through flights between Jamaica and both of these islands and Antigua⁽⁸⁾ but no through flight between Jamaica and any of the Windward Islands. Jamaica would therefore be a very awkward capital for the people of the Windward Islands, as to get to it they would have to change at Antigua, Barbados or Trinidad.

40. To carry the analysis further it is necessary to make some estimate of the air traffic between the capital and each of the other colonies. In some cases such as a conference of representatives of the Colonial Governments, there would be more or less the same number from each colony, whether it is large or small. Generally speaking, however, there would be more coming and going between the capital and a large colony than between the capital and a small one. Perhaps it would be fair to assume that over the year the traffic from the various colonies to the capital would be in proportion to their representation in the two houses of the Federal Legislature. On this assumption, if the capital were in the east, in either Barbados or Trinidad, the number of people who would cross the gap to visit it from Jamaica would be represented by the number 19, against the number 45 who would have to cross the gap from the east if the capital were in Jamaica. On this showing, therefore, the advantage clearly lies with Barbados and Trinidad and against Jamaica. From the point of view of communications with Jamaica, Trinidad is to be preferred to Barbados, as it has three flights a week⁽⁹⁾ to that island totalling 96 seats against one flight a week from Barbados, totalling 24 seats.

41. As regards communications between Trinidad or Barbados and the other colonies in the east there is little in it. The local flights from Trinidad to St. Lucia and Antigua go through Barbados. Both Barbados and Trinidad are connected directly with Grenada, though Trinidad has four flights a week totalling 96 seats to that island, while Barbados has only two flights totalling 48 seats. On the other hand Barbados is directly connected by air with Dominica and St. Vincent, neither of

⁽⁸⁾ St. Kitts and Montserrat are connected by air only with Antigua. They may therefore, for our present purposes, be omitted and their populations considered as being concentrated in that island.

⁽⁹⁾ When we say in this and the following paragraphs that there is a number of flights from one place to another it is to be understood that there is an equal number of returning flights in the reverse direction. The numbers of flights and seats have been collated with all possible care from various sources, but their accuracy cannot be vouched for.

which has any direct communication with Trinidad. There is an excellent air service between Trinidad and Barbados, fourteen flights a week totalling 492 seats each way. From the point of view, therefore, of air communications with the other colonies in the east Barbados would perhaps be slightly better than Trinidad. The air communications between the islands are shown in Map No. I.¹

42. As regards external communications, Jamaica, Trinidad and Barbados have each one flight of 48 seats a week to London. To New York there are nine flights a week from Jamaica totalling 572 seats, seven from Trinidad totalling 471 seats, and two from Barbados totalling 96 seats. To Montreal Jamaica, Trinidad and Barbados each have two flights per week totalling 120, 108 and 48 seats respectively. There are no fewer than sixteen flights or 818 seats a week from Jamaica to Colombia and Venezuela and nineteen flights or 1,291 seats to other countries in South America; from Trinidad there are fifteen flights or 616 seats a week to Venezuela and nine flights or 530 seats to the Argentine and other countries in South America. Barbados has only two flights or 54 seats per week to Venezuela and one of 24 seats to British Guiana. From the point of view of external communications there is thus little to choose between Trinidad and Jamaica, and both are considerably better off than Barbados. All three have, or will shortly have, airports that can take Stratocruisers. The trunk air lines between the islands and other countries are shown in Map No. II.

43. To sum up on communications. Material differences from our point of view between these three islands are found only in the air. From the point of view of internal communications within the Federation, Jamaica would be a far less convenient place for the capital than either Trinidad or Barbados. From the point of view of external communications both Jamaica and Trinidad would be better than Barbados. It must be remembered, however, that the figures given above for flights and seating accommodation have been taken from the existing schedules, or rather from the schedules that will probably be in force when the Federation comes into being in the second half of 1957. If the traffic demands it there would, presumably, be no difficulty in making suitable adjustments to these schedules, provided the necessary airport facilities exist. Communications could, therefore, be improved between these three islands, or between any one of them and the outside world, if this were found to be necessary. It would, however, be difficult to improve communications between Jamaica and the Windward Islands, where airport facilities are either non-existent or unsuitable for long-distance aircraft. There is therefore in the long run very little to choose between these three islands in the matter of communications with the outside world. If, however, Jamaica were chosen for the capital, the problem of internal communications would remain and could only be got over at great cost.

Chapter V

Political and social considerations

44. We now turn to the question of political, social and intellectual atmosphere and examine the conditions prevailing in Kingston, Port-of-Spain and Bridgetown from this point of view. For the atmosphere of the capital will inevitably, for many years at least, be strongly influenced by that of the base town. As the capital grows

¹ Maps not printed.

and comes to possess a distinct society of its own it will, in its turn, influence the base town, but this will be slow to develop. Unless the capital grows much more rapidly than we consider likely, the base town will, for a long time to come, be the larger and exercise the greater influence. It is of the first consequence, therefore, that the political traditions and practices of the base town should be sound, that its society should be united and progressive and that its people should be well educated, broad-minded and susceptible to new ideas.

45. Trinidad, as already mentioned, is less politically advanced than either Jamaica or Barbados, in that up to now it has had no Chief Minister and no clear-cut political parties with established programmes. Recently, because of the elections, a number of parties have been formed, but many are based on personalities rather than programmes, one is communist, and another depends mainly on race. Whatever the result of the elections may be, the political future of Trinidad seems to us uncertain because of the traditional fragmentation of parties and the racial cleavage which exists there.

46. A disturbing element in the public life of Trinidad, to which importance is attached in the other islands, is the presence there of a large population, 35 per cent. of the whole, of East Indian descent. East Indians, it is alleged, have ideals and loyalties differing from those to be found elsewhere in the Federation and they exercise a disruptive influence on social and political life in Trinidad which would vitiate the social and political life of the capital if it were placed on that island. We pass no judgment on these allegations, except to say that the existence of such a large minority, differing in so many ways from the rest of the people of the island, is bound to introduce complications which will make the growth of healthy political conditions in Trinidad even more difficult than it would otherwise have been.

47. There are widespread reports of corruption in the public life of Trinidad. This is a matter on which we would hesitate to comment after a short stay of only one week on that island were it not for the almost universal belief in the other islands that the accusation is true. We naturally accepted with some reserve what we were told in other islands, particularly in those that themselves put in a claim for the capital. The state of affairs in the Port-of-Spain municipality was, however, only a few years ago the subject of a public enquiry, with the result that grave suspicion was thrown on the financial and other integrity of persons now prominent in the public life of the colony.⁽¹⁰⁾ Financial scandals may, of course, occur anywhere, however high the tone of public life. What is significant in the case of Trinidad, however, is that these practices appear to be tolerated. This tolerance of such practices in public life would be a disquieting augury for the future of a capital located there.

48. In Jamaica and Barbados the political atmosphere is healthy, but there are accusations in the other islands that there exists in Barbados a prejudice against colour not found elsewhere. This, too, is naturally a matter on which those who have been in the West Indies for a short time can comment only with the greatest diffidence. The colour question was, however, one into which we made discreet enquiries wherever we went. Colour prejudice was strong throughout the islands a

⁽¹⁰⁾ Report of the Commission appointed to enquire into the affairs, administration, management and conduct of the Port-of-Spain Corporation and the activities and conduct of any person who holds, or has held, any corporate office in the Corporation or any person who is, or has been, an officer or in the employment of the Corporation, 1952.

matter of only 10 to 15 years ago, but it is fast disappearing everywhere. Pockets of prejudice certainly exist here and there, both in small islands and in large, but there is nowhere any organised or important public opinion that supports a colour bar, or anything like it. It may be that there remain more of these pockets of prejudice in Barbados than in some of the other islands. Changes occur more slowly in a stable society such as that of Barbados than in one which is less stable. But we have no doubt that Barbados is changing like the rest and after careful enquiries we are satisfied that the colour question raises no difficulty in the schools.

49. The general level of education is probably higher in Barbados than in any other of the federating colonies, though Jamaica is close behind. Its schools are well staffed and some of them have a long tradition of successes at the Universities and elsewhere. Codrington College, though now confined to theology, had till recently classes in law as well. Barbadians are found all over the eastern islands in positions for which a good education is required and the Barbados schools have a considerable number of pupils from other islands. On the other hand the University College of the West Indies, which will be the intellectual centre of the Federation, is situated in Jamaica. In Trinidad the research work of the Imperial College of Tropical Agriculture is world famous but locally it provides a technical and not a general education. From the point of view of its intellectual atmosphere either Barbados or Jamaica is to be preferred to Trinidad. In the matter of the Press, however, both Jamaica and Trinidad are in advance of Barbados. The *Barbados Advocate* is quite a good paper, but it contains far less foreign news than the *Daily Gleaner* in Jamaica, or either of the two dailies in Trinidad. The *Trinidad Guardian* circulates throughout the eastern islands but no other paper has any appreciable circulation outside its own island.

50. One thing that struck us about Jamaica was its aloofness from the other islands. There is considerable movement between the islands in the eastern half of the Federation, but little between these islands and Jamaica. This may improve with the growth of the influence of the University College of the West Indies, but at present it would be fair to say that in the east far more is known about life in the United Kingdom than about life in Jamaica. As one speaker put it "It is not so much that Jamaica is far away as that Jamaicans are." Similarly we found that in Jamaica very little is known about the islands in the east. Jamaicans, when they go abroad, go to Britain, the United States, or Canada and only very occasionally to the other islands of the British West Indies. The two halves of the Federation are widely separated by more than water. It will be one of the tasks of the Federation to bring them together, but this will not be easy and may well take a long time.

51. Finally, we have to take into consideration the general feeling throughout the islands of the kind of capital that would be best suited to the new Federation. As we have said, opinions differ on this point, but there was one frequently held opinion which is of great importance, and that is that the capital should be in a small island, rather than in a large one. This feeling is naturally strongest in, but is not confined to, the small islands. The two large islands of Jamaica and Trinidad will, inevitably, because of their size and wealth, have very great influence on federal affairs and the fear is that, if the capital were placed in one of them, the influence of that island would be so great as almost to amount to domination. This is a possibility that cannot be ignored. It is also one that we would deprecate. If the small islands are to enter the Federation with zest, they must feel that they are taking a step nearer to

independence and to the management of their own affairs. This is the feeling that inspires the urge to federate and nothing should be done to discourage it. Domination, or fear of domination, of the Federation by one island would clearly do so. It would also hamper the growth of that common West Indian patriotism, which, as we have said, is essential if the Federation is to be a real one.

Chapter VI

Our order of preference

52. We have set forth as they appear to us the relevant facts regarding the islands of Jamaica, Trinidad and Barbados and their principal towns and have added such comment as our limited experience warrants. We now take up the second part of our task, the arrangement of these islands in the order in which we would place them according to their suitability to contain the capital. Here fact-finding ends. There is no objective method of combining, as it were, the marks that the different islands get under different tests into one combined set of marks indicating their final order. There exists no calculus by which we can measure the better communications of one against, say, the greater political stability of another, or against the better civic amenities and services to be found in a third. The final order of preference must be an act of judgment. All that we can claim for our order is that we reached it unanimously after careful thought and prolonged discussion. We can do little more, therefore, than indicate the main considerations that led us to our conclusions.

53. Trinidad is wealthy and goes ahead and has good communications and a good Press, and Port-of-Spain would be suitable, from the material point of view, as a base town. Nevertheless we consider it would be better to put the capital either in Jamaica or in Barbados than in Trinidad. Our reasons are the instability of that island's politics and the low standard accepted in its public life. To put the capital near Port-of-Spain would, in our opinion, be to run a very great risk, which need not be run.

54. The decision between Jamaica and Barbados is a difficult one. In the matter of external communications there is, taking the long view, little in it. As regards the colour question, it did not appear to us that there was any fundamental difference between Barbados and the other islands. Kingston is a better town than Bridgetown and has a better Press, but the average intellectual atmosphere in the daily life of Barbados appeared to us to be the keener. From the point of view of inter-island communications, however, Barbados would be distinctly better than Jamaica. To place the capital in Jamaica would almost certainly be to increase the number of persons who would have to cross the big gap between the two halves of the Federation on their way to and from the capital. Also, Barbados has direct air communication with the colonies of the Windward Islands, which Jamaica has not. But our main reason for preferring Barbados to Jamaica is that we hold the view that, if possible, the capital should be on a small island. Jamaica is so large and its potential development so great that the fears of the other islands that it would dominate the Federation, if it were chosen for the capital, would be very real. They would be increased by Jamaica's aloofness. The small islands would fear, not only that the Federation would be dominated by one island, but that the people of that island knew nothing about their needs and aspirations and so would tend to ignore them, however good the intentions of those in authority might be. And in our opinion these fears would not be groundless. Barbados is, on the other hand, a small

island in the eastern group and has knowledge of the other small islands and close connections with them. To place the capital in Jamaica would therefore, we think, be a psychological mistake which would give the Federation a bad start and so might have serious consequences.

We would, therefore, arrange the three islands, which alone have towns that could act as base towns, in the following order:

Barbados,
Jamaica,
Trinidad. . . .

49 CO 1031/1743, no 3

20 Sept 1956

[Federal government]: letter from Sir S Luke to P Kennedy on the functions of the federal government and economic planning

Thank you for your letter of 10th September (WIS. 175/23/01) about the provision of economic advice for the Federal Government.

I am afraid that we are not convinced that the solution to the problem has yet been found; but I do not think that we can carry this matter further until Mordecai and I can discuss it in London next month against the background of the detailed plan for the federal administration, which I shall be sending to you in a few days.

In the meantime, I should like you to be giving preliminary thought to another, but related, proposition. As we progress with our detailed planning, we find ourselves increasingly pre-occupied with the difficulty of finding the answer to the simple question—what is the Federal Government going to do? That is, what functions is it going to perform which will justify, in the public eye, the large and costly edifice of its two Houses of Legislature, its numerous Ministers, and its extensive bureaucracy?

The powers given by the constitution to the Federal Government are so niggardly that the development of policies that will provide an effective answer to these questions will test the first Federal Government very severely. Yet, if federation is to be successful, it must (to put it crudely) produce results during its first five years of life. It will not be sufficient for it merely to continue, in an elaborated form, the work of the Regional Economic Committee and the Organisation, though this in fact will necessarily be the starting point of its activities.

For the most part, in this interim stage, we can do little more than plan for the establishment of the minimum administrative machinery which the Federal Government must have to fulfil, from the outset, its essential functions and responsibilities, and which shall be capable of quick expansion in response to the demands of policy. We cannot anticipate the programme of the Federal Government, nor attempt to impose policies on it. Nevertheless, I think that there would be general agreement that the success or failure of the Federal Government will largely depend, at least in its early years, on its economic policy; certainly, this was very much in the mind of the Standing Federation Committee when it decided that the Federal Prime Minister ought to have under him a highly qualified statistical and economic advisory staff. Most people who think about such matters feel that the Federal Government ought to work out a co-ordinated programme of economic development for the region as a whole, and that this would be the most effective way

of making a powerful impact on public opinion throughout the area. Some such conception was, of course, behind the "Caribbean Colombo Plan" proposal put forward at the London Conference, which was subsequently taken up with the Canadian Government.

The idea is, however, a vague one, and no one knows in what form or by what means it can be translated into reality. In so far as the idea implies something more than the greater co-ordination of policy and activity made possible by the creation of a central Government, it involves an imaginative and constructive effort in planning that has not so far been attempted. It seems to us that the Federal Government is bound to address itself to this task without delay, and that, indeed, it will expect its statistical and economic staff to have made some progress with the preparatory work before it comes into office. If this assumption is correct, we wonder whether it might not be a good idea, in the meantime, to try to persuade the International Bank to send one of its Economic Missions to advise on regional economic co-ordination and development. My recollection is that, some years ago, the Bank showed reluctance to undertake any further individual surveys in the area, but indicated that they might be prepared to do so if the field of enquiry could be widened. If they could be asked to send a Mission in 1957, its findings would provide a very valuable basis for the formulation of the Federal Government's policy, and would enable that Government to get to grips with its problems without the lengthy delays involved in preliminary investigations.

Mordecai and I will elaborate these ideas in discussion, but I thought it advisable to give you advance warning of what is in our mind.¹

¹ When Luke's suggestion of an International Bank mission was discussed at a meeting in the CO which he attended in Oct 1956, it was agreed that this was not the 'ideal solution', particularly as Bank reports 'seemed more expert in presentation than in content'. Rather than have one comprehensive inquiry into Caribbean economic problems, it was decided instead that it would be more worthwhile—and probably cheaper—to single out a few, specific subjects, eg civil aviation, citrus fruit industry, and have small commissions of 'real experts' to examine and report on each one. It was recommended that a Federal Economic Advisory Bureau should be established to consider the subjects on which they thought an inquiry would be valuable; the Standing Federation Committee would arrange that the inquiries be made and the reports presented to ministers (CO 1031/1743, no 4, record of meeting, 10 Oct 1956).

50 CO 1032/121, no 273

Oct 1956

'Committee on colonial immigrants': CO brief for Lord Lloyd on the reasons why there is as yet no justification to restrict by legislation immigration from the West Indies

1. The most up-to-date figures of West Indies immigration for this year show that for the first eight months 20,500 have arrived. This compares with the following annual rates for the past four years:—

1952	...	2,000
1953	...	2,000
1954	...	9,000
1955	...	26,000

2. Unemployment figures as revealed by special counts made by the Ministry of Labour at selected dates are as follows:—

July 1955	2,065
June 1956	3,817
September 1956	4,909

N.B. The figures in this paragraph include Africans as well as West Indians, but the proportion of the former is small—out of the total of 4,909 quoted above for September, 1956, only 577 are Africans.

3. At the Cabinet meeting on 11th July, the Secretary of State undertook to discuss the problem with the Chief Ministers of Jamaica and Barbados when they are next in this country, with a view to inducing them to discourage emigration from the West Indies.

4. To follow up this undertaking by the Secretary of State meanwhile, a savingram was sent to the Governments of Jamaica and Barbados (repeated to the other West Indies Governments), whose gist was that at the immediate moment there is short-time and redundancy in a number of industries, and that if further unemployment should arise it would undoubtedly re-act on all immigrant workers. The savingram put it to the West Indies Governments that prospective immigrants who continue to come to this country without some fair indication that a job is waiting them, as well as housing accommodation, may be faced with more serious difficulties than have arisen in the past. It requested the Governments to consider seriously what steps can be taken to slow down the flow of emigrants from the West Indies to this country. To supplement the savingram to *Governments*, Sir Hilton Poynton wrote a secret and personal letter to Sir Hugh Foot and Sir Robert Arundell, in which he warned them of the interest of Ministers here in the situation caused by the arrival in recent years of a large number of coloured immigrant workers, and informed them that Ministers have been considering whether legislation to control emigration would be desirable. The letter warned both Governors that Ministers intend to review the question of legislation in the autumn, and asked the Governors to encourage their Ministers to do everything practicable to make public the possible danger.

5. In reply to Sir H. Poynton's letter, Sir Hugh Foot has said that:—

“We still see no sign of any drop in the rate of migration of Jamaican workers to England. Over recent weeks we have given to the Press all available information about the more difficult employment situation in England and the Press has been very good in giving prominence to this news. It is, however, too early to see any result from this and there is in any event a heavy back lag [sic] of migrant bookings, both in ships and chartered aircraft. I have already had a preliminary talk with the Chief Minister and the Minister of Labour about this and we hope to raise the matter in Executive Council very soon”.

Sir Hugh wrote this letter on 15th August, and in a subsequent telegram of 18th September has reported that: “the question has been mentioned on several occasions recently in the Executive Council and I think that Ministers are well aware of the dangers and are anxious to do nothing to encourage the exodus of Jamaican workers to England”.

6. Lord Lloyd will be able to add to the above any points which came out at his lunch with Sir Hugh Foot, the Secretary of State and the Home Secretary.

7. The Governor and the Premier of Barbados are coming to London in the second half of October, and there will be an opportunity then to discuss the subject with them.

8. At its meeting on 11th July the Cabinet asked officials to examine both the policy and administrative aspects of a suggestion that any legislation on immigration should include a reserve power to impose a quota on Commonwealth subjects permitted to enter this country. Lord Lloyd should be aware that the Officials' Committee is likely to report to Ministers that such a quota would be explicitly discriminatory against coloured people if it were to be of any purpose at all, and would be exceedingly difficult to administer. The Ministry of Housing has been asked to provide the Colonial Office with an assessment of the housing situation as it is affected by concentration of Colonial Immigrants in different parts of the country. This assessment has not yet been sent to us and Lord Lloyd might care to ask the Minister of Housing and Local Government for his views on the point. Meanwhile, Lord Lloyd may have seen the article in yesterday's "Times" describing how in Birmingham the local authorities are setting up bodies to assist the social welfare of the various Commonwealth immigrants working there. The project was favourably reported on in the "Times". There is not as yet any serious sign of interracial friction because of the recent comparatively modest industrial difficulties in the Midlands, and on the evidence of recent years it would seem unlikely that there will be any serious interracial friction unless and until unemployment becomes much more serious than at present.

9. Generally, while the continuing rate of emigration from the West Indies must cause concern, Lord Lloyd might emphasize that its effects do not as yet appear to be socially or economically so serious for this country as to justify the political difficulties which would be caused to the United Kingdom's relations with the West Indies, and with other Commonwealth countries, by so marked a step as legislation directed against the West Indians. While it would be idle to pretend that the unrestricted flow of men and women from the West Indies here is at all in the best interests of the West Indies countries, there are some grounds to believe that the political leaders of the West Indies Governments concerned are aware of the dangers of letting things run as they have done in the past, and the Secretary of State has already begun to convey to them some of the real difficulties which its continuation will involve. Again, it does seem possible that the tone of the reports which immigrants are sending back to the West Indies is somewhat more sober, and is thus helping to discourage the kind of "free for all" departures from the West Indies which have created the problem. The Governor of Jamaica has said that already the Press there is proving helpful and that the speculative "travel agents" who have been much to blame in connection with the "free for all" immigration seem to be less prosperous.

10. The case argued in the Home Secretary's memorandum CI (56)5 on "Migration from the Irish Republic" is quite acceptable.

51 CO 1031/1301, no 17

Nov 1956

'Trinidad and Tobago elections': CO note on the general election and the new government of Dr Williams¹

A general election took place in Trinidad and Tobago on 24th September, at which the recently-formed People's National Movement, led by Dr. Eric Williams, won 13 out of the 24 elected seats in the Legislative Council. The following is background to the elections and a short appreciation of the effect which the victory of the People's National Movement may have on the political situation in Trinidad and the wider field of the British Caribbean.

2. Under a revised constitution introduced in June 1956, the Legislative Council of Trinidad and Tobago consists of a Speaker, two ex-officio Members, five Nominated Members appointed by the Governor in his discretion, and 24 Members elected on adult suffrage. The Executive Council, which is the principal instrument of policy, consists of the Governor as Chairman, a Chief Minister and seven other Ministers (including a Minister of Finance) and two ex-officio Members. All the Ministers are elected by the Legislative Council from amongst the elected Members of the Council. The Governor retains reserve powers. Direct responsibility for the administration of defence, external affairs and security is with the ex-officio members of Executive Council, but, as in all other matters, the Governor is here equally bound to follow the advice of the Executive Council, subject only to the use of reserve powers.

3. Until the beginning of this year, political parties of any size or permanence had not existed in Trinidad and at the last general election in 1950, the members of the Legislative Council were elected primarily on personal grounds. The Government of 1950 was then largely formed by independents loosely attached to political parties which really existed only in name. Amongst the most capable of the former Ministers were Albert Gomes, the burly Minister of Labour, Industry and Commerce and Victor Bryan, Minister of Agriculture. Despite occasional storms, they gave Trinidad stable and quite sound administration for the five years they were in office. Towards the end of their term of office, however, the first real political party with an organisation and programme emerged. This was Dr. Williams' Peoples National Movement. Founded early in 1956, it rapidly gained ground over such other parties as the Peoples Democratic Party (the East Indian Party), the Trinidad Labour Party, the Butler Party² and the new Caribbean National Labour Party, led by Rojas,³ leader of the Oilfield Workers Trade Union. As the elections approached, efforts to contain the P.N.M. by a "National Front", advocated by several Ministers and intended to unite the smaller parties, were unsuccessful. Even so, on the eve of polling, it was generally felt in Trinidad that the P.N.M., most of whose candidates had little or no previous political experience, stood only a slightly better chance of polling more votes than

¹ Circulated as FO intel no 178, 8 Nov 1956, to selected diplomatic posts.

² The party of T Uriah Butler, radical trade unionist and strike leader, which contested twenty seats at the 1956 election and secured two with eleven per cent of the votes cast. Butler himself might have been a spent force but his movement was still strong enough to prevent the PNM winning any seats in the oil belt.

³ John Rojas, president of the Oilfield Workers Trade Union and of the Caribbean National Labour Party which contested nine seats at the 1956 election and secured none with 1.5 per cent of the votes cast.

any of the other parties or personalities. The mixture in the new Government, it was felt locally, would be little different from the old, although the possibility of a landslide in favour of the P.N.M. was not discounted.

4. The election was contested by 129 candidates, including 40 Independents, and the results provide a classic instance of what happens when an organised party with a definite programme enters the field where the opponents are numerous, but disunited. The P.N.M. won 13 of the 24 elected seats, the P.D.P. five, the Butler Party two, the Trinidad Labour Party two and Independents two. Of the former Ministers only Bryan (T.L.P.) and Ajodhasingh⁴ (P.D.P.) were re-elected. Amongst the successful candidates were Dr. Williams, Learie Constantine (the Test cricketer), Dr. Solomon,⁵ a former member of the Legislative Council, and Gerard Montano, the Mayor of San Fernando. Eighty per cent of the electorate voted, compared with 70% in 1950, and it is reported that the P.N.M. polled 103,000 out of the total of 239,000 votes cast.

5. Immediately after the election the Governor, Sir Edward Beetham, sent for Dr. Williams and invited him to form a Government. Dr. Williams then asked that his nominees should be appointed to fill the nominated seats and this request at first threatened to give rise to some constitutional difficulty. The reason for this request was that the People's National Movement, holding 13 out of the 31 seats in the new Legislative Council, would, even with the votes of the two official members have to command the vote of at least one other member to give them an overall majority in the Council. Dr. Williams was not prepared to have to rely on the votes of independent nominated members to implement the Movement's programme which he claimed he had a clear mandate from the electorate to pursue. As he put it, he could not accept that the "nominated tail should wag the elected dog".

6. The revised constitution had been designed (in all essentials by a Constitutional Reform Committee in Trinidad) which included all the members of the previous Legislative Council, most of whom had been elected under adult suffrage, to suit the probable continuation of a situation where the electorate had not returned a majority of one party. The basis on which Nominated Members should be appointed remained as it had been set out in 1949 in a despatch from the Secretary of State to the Governor, namely that such members should "strengthen the experience and knowledge of the Council in dealing with the complex issues of Government" and should be appointed not to represent any particular interest, but "to serve the broad and best interests of the Colony as a whole."

In one or two other colonial territories with advanced constitutions, it had, however, been recently recognised that nominated members could not be appointed to a Legislature to oppose the policy of the majority of the elected members, and in those territories the Governors had consulted with the Leaders of the majority parties about how they, the Governors, should fill the nominated seats.

In Trinidad, therefore, the emergence of a majority party was recognised as calling for some modification of the principles of the 1949 despatch; in line with the kindred developments in other territories described above, the Secretary of State authorised

⁴ Minister of communications and works, 1951–1956.

⁵ Dr Patrick Solomon; minister of education, Trinidad, 1956–1960, of home affairs, 1960–1964, of external affairs, 1964–1966; deputy prime minister, 1962–1966; subsequently high commissioner for Trinidad and Tobago in the UK, 1971–1976.

the Governor to "take such steps by way of nominating suitable persons to the Legislative Council, after consultation with the leader of the majority party, as will provide a reasonable working majority for that party."

Discussions between the Governor and Dr. Williams have now taken place with a view to the former's appointing two or three Nominated Members who may be expected to support the P.N.M. It may therefore be expected that when the new Legislative Council meets to elect Ministers, the next Government of Trinidad will be formed by the P.N.M. and that Dr. Williams will become the Chief Minister.

7. Born in Trinidad in 1911 of African descent, Dr. Eric Williams took a B.A., D.Phil., in an academically brilliant career at Oxford. He subsequently became a lecturer at Howard University, U.S.A.; he later joined the Caribbean Commission and became Deputy Chairman of its Research Council. His inability to work with others and his egotistic attitude however led to a decision by the four co-Chairmen of the Commission (representing the United Kingdom, United States, French and Netherlands Governments) not to renew his contract last year. He then returned to Trinidad to enter politics for the first time. In politics he is in close sympathy with Mr. Manley, Chief Minister of Jamaica and leader of the People's National Party there, from whom he has received moral support and, the signs suggest, moderating advice. Williams, like Manley, is an intellectual and a Socialist, and of unblemished personal integrity, but he is a smaller man than Manley and is at present to some extent a disappointed and frustrated person, with a marked "chip on his shoulder" about "imperialism" and colour. Otherwise able economic/historical studies, written while he was with the Caribbean Commission, seem mainly designed to show that any of our humanitarian efforts in the British West Indies were governed by purely economic motives. He has not hitherto shown any capacity for co-operating with others and it remains to be seen whether he is able to hold a Ministry together. The accent in his Party programme was on the improvement of social services and education, immediate constitutional reform in Trinidad and early independence for the British Caribbean Federation, of which he is a strong supporter. Since his party's victory, however, he has announced that he will not seek early major changes in the constitution. He has also said that his Government would not be socialist and that he did not believe in nationalisation, though he would not say he was against public ownership in certain cases. He has also stated his intention of attracting overseas investment in Trinidad. It seems clear that under Dr. Williams' leadership the new Government will pursue more left-wing and radical policies than their predecessors, but experience and responsibility can often have a moderating influence, and, although the Opposition in the Legislative Council may lack cohesion, it will nevertheless be necessary for the P.N.M. Government, especially when Ministers are absent abroad, to have regard to them and to avoid alienating the votes of the non-party members by pursuing an extremist policy.

8. In the wider field of impending British Caribbean Federation the presence in power in Trinidad of a party of the same political sympathies as that in power in Jamaica should tend to some extent to blunt the edge of the rivalry between these two leading territories of the Federation, though basic differences of interest will remain. It can certainly be said that the election results in Trinidad have at least not added to the difficulties of establishing a successful Federation.

9. The above may be used at your discretion, with the exception of the personal assessment of Dr. Williams in paragraph 7 above.

52 CO 1031/2870, nos 7 & 8**28 Feb 1957****[Governor-general]: minutes by Sir J Macpherson and Mr Macmillan on the appointment of the governor-general**

[Macmillan's views on the appointment of the governor-general initially caused some embarrassment in the CO. Lennox-Boyd had virtually promised the position to Foot. Officials were also concerned that the federation would get off to the worst possible start if an appointment were imposed from outside. Adams, Manley and Williams were consulted, not about Hailes but about the criteria laid down by Macmillan. All three emphasised that the person appointed should have sympathy with the political aspirations of the West Indian people. Williams commented: 'The value of "long experience of British parliamentary life" and of service in the Cabinet would be purely academic if they were to be used in the West Indies to suppress, frustrate or retard the growth of Cabinet conventions and Cabinet government.' Lords Rosebery and Salisbury were identified by Williams as individuals meeting Macmillan's criteria who lacked the necessary political sympathies; the reverse, he argued, was probably true of Lords Oliver and Listowel, the latter being the newly appointed governor-general of Ghana. In the absence of specific information regarding the name under consideration, Williams regretted his inability to be more precise but concluded that West Indian history over the past twenty-five years had 'abundantly' demonstrated that 'political experience and administrative competence cannot alone be taken as criteria of suitability' (CO 1031/2870, no 21, inward tel no 19, Beetham to Lennox-Boyd, 18 Mar 1957). Reaction in the Caribbean to the announcement on 17 Apr of Hailes's appointment was muted; press comment in the UK was much more critical. A *Times* leader of 10 May argued that the position should have gone to Foot. The *News Chronicle* on 4 May described the appointment as 'tactless' and observed: 'Nor is this an isolated example. The new Governor-General of the Central African Federation, Lord Dalhousie, shares with Lord Hailes a general unsuitability for his post and a career as a Conservative whip' (CO 1031/2870).

*Mr. Bishop*¹

As promised, by telephone this morning, I send this note on the position regarding the appointment of the first Governor-General of the West Indies.

There are two issues:—

(i) Should the appointment go to a person with experience of administering a Colonial Government or Governments or should a public figure (with Parliamentary experience) be chosen from this country:

(ii) What degree of consultation, if any, should there be with political leaders in the West Indies before an appointment is made.

On (i) there is a considerable body of opinion, official and otherwise, both here and in the West Indies that as the job—and indeed the whole structure of the Federal Government—has to be created, and is not a going concern, administrative ability and Colonial experience are scarcely less necessary than political flair.

On (ii) it will be seen from telegram No. 61, of which a copy is attached,² that on 5th February the Standing Federation Committee, meeting in Jamaica, adopted a resolution asking that the Secretary of State for the Colonies should consult a small sub-committee (consisting of the Premiers and Chief Ministers of the West Indian

¹ Private secretary to the prime minister.

² Not printed.

territories) on all the circumstances before an appointment is made. We asked Sir Stephen Luke, Chairman of the Standing Federation Committee, about the background to this resolution, pointing out that consultation about the actual name would not, in any event, be proper, and that it might not be possible to go any way to meet the resolution at all. We now have received Sir Stephen Luke's reply, and I enclose a copy of his telegram of 19th February. You will see that he does not think that the three principal leaders back the request for setting up a formal sub-committee, and that they would be fully satisfied if there could be informal consultation with them, individually, on the kind of person that they think should be chosen. You will also see that Grantley Adams, Premier of Barbados, favours the appointment of an administrator with a knowledge of the West Indies, and that it is Sir Stephen Luke's impression that this is also the opinion of Eric Williams, Chief Minister of Trinidad.

We are giving thought now to how to ascertain, in the most informal way possible, the views of the principal West Indian leaders on the kind of appointment that should be made.

J.S.M.
28.2.57

Minister of state, colonial office

I have seen Sir John Macpherson's note about the present position of the choice of a Governor General for the West Indies.

I think we should inform Sir Stephen Luke and the three Chief Ministers concerned of my intentions without delay. I propose to appoint as first Governor General a man who has had long experience in British Parliamentary life, who has been in charge of an administrative Department and has served in the Cabinet. In my view this is the right kind of appointment. I feel sure that these qualifications are more important than actual administrative experience in the West Indies. Indeed I should not be willing to recommend an officer of the Colonial Service. This would seem to me quite out of tune with the new approach that we are making to the problems of the Caribbean.

I would be grateful if this information was sent as soon as possible in order that I may get the appointment settled. Perhaps you would consult with Sir John Macpherson.

H.M.
28.2.57

53 CO 968/564, no 18

28 Mar 1957

'West India Regiment': brief by the Defence Department, CO, for Mr Lennox-Boyd on the costs to the UK

The Secretary of State will recall that on the 11th October 1954 he addressed a despatch to the territories composing the West Indies Federation plus British Guiana and British Honduras, proposing that the West India Regiment (which was disbanded

in 1927) should be re-formed and should take over responsibility for the local defence and internal security of the participating territories. This despatch ended by asking three questions:—

- (a) whether the Governments and legislatures of the territories addressed concurred in the raising of the Regiment by Act of the U.K. Parliament;
- (b) whether they agreed that the Regiment should be raised and initially administered by the War Office; and
- (c) whether they were prepared to contribute one per cent of their revenue towards the recurrent cost of the Regiment, H.M.G. undertaking to meet the capital costs and any difference between the total recurrent cost and the contributions of the participating territories.

2. All territories addressed, with the exception of St. Kitts and British Honduras, accepted the Secretary of State's proposals and steps were accordingly taken to secure space in the legislative programme for an Enabling Bill to raise the Regiment. Before the discussions in the Colonial Policy Committee on this proposal, the Prime Minister (Sir Anthony Eden) queried the desirability of raising the Regiment. After the discussion in the Colonial Policy Committee Mr. Macmillan, in his capacity as Chancellor of the Exchequer, instructed that further action on the Regiment should be suspended until he was satisfied that its re-formation should not prove to impose an undue burden on the U.K. taxpayer. It is understood that he had gained the impression that the cost of raising the Regiment on the terms set out in paragraph 1(b) might be greater than the cost of retaining a British garrison in the Caribbean.

3. In November last year the Treasury, the War Office and the Colonial Office re-examined the financial implications of raising the West India Regiment. The War Office and the Colonial Office submitted a joint paper pointing out the need for the Regiment, and, after thorough discussions with the Treasury, Treasury officials agreed that the estimates provided showed that the re-formation of the Regiment might well result in a substantial economy to H.M.G. within the foreseeable future. The Treasury have accordingly prepared a submission to the Chancellor.

4. One of the main reasons why this submission has not yet reached the Chancellor is that he has been fully occupied with other urgent matters. In addition, however, the War Office have complicated the issue by producing new estimates for capital expenditure on the Regiment which are well in excess of the figures originally produced by them. Treasury officials are accordingly unwilling to forward their submission until the War Office produce a firm estimate by which they are prepared to stand.

5. The latest War Office estimates which have caused this hold-up have been seen inside the Colonial Office and, with all due deference to the experience of the War Office Quartering Branches, it appeared as if accommodation for the West India Regiment is being planned on a plus-bottom scale. It is quite evident that great economy will have to be exercised in the capital expenditure on the West India Regiment in view of the high building costs in the Caribbean area, and it is suggested that if the Secretary of State has an opportunity of discussing this matter with the Chancellor he might undertake to accept a ceiling on the total U.K. capital expenditure on the Regiment, the exact figure to be agreed in consultation with Treasury officials. This should remove the last major obstacle to re-forming the Regiment, and it seems a reasonable concession to offer in order to secure removal of the Chancellor's objections to raising the Regiment as soon as possible.

54 CO 852/1702, no 1

4 Apr 1957

[European Customs Union and free trade]: report by the Regional Economic Committee of the West Indies on the implications for the West Indies of the proposed European Common Market and the European Free Trade Area [Extract]

In September 1956 the Secretary of State, referring to the plans of the Messina Countries, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands to form a Customs Union, invited the views of West Indian Governments about proposals for the U.K. to enter a Free Trade Area with other O.E.E.C. countries including the countries proposing to create a Customs and Economic Union. The other O.E.E.C. countries are Austria, Denmark, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland and Turkey. The Secretary of State advised that no decision had yet been taken by the Messina Countries to include their overseas territories in the Customs Union nor was it known whether European Countries would wish to include overseas territories in the wider Free Trade Area which H.M.G. had in mind to propose. The Secretary of State also advised that H.M.G. would make it an unqualified condition that food including manufactured foods, feeding stuffs for animals, drink and tobacco should be excluded from the scope of the Free Trade Area. West Indian Governments advised the Secretary of State that they saw no objections to the U.K. entering the proposed Free Trade Area, provided the arrangements would not apply to dependent territories and food, drink and tobacco were excluded.

2. On the 28th February, 1957, the Secretary of State advised West Indian Governments that the Messina Countries had decided to associate their overseas territories with the Customs Union Area and that it was proposed to examine the Treaty in the G.A.T.T. on April 23rd. In order to assist H.M.G. in reaching decisions on her attitude to be taken in the G.A.T.T. and to assess the problems of individual West Indian territories arising from the complexity of problems relating to the Association of overseas territories with the Customs Union area and possibly the Free Trade Area, the Secretary of State invited West Indian Governments to send delegates to a meeting in London from March 27th to April 2nd, with the following terms of reference:—

To examine at an official level problems relating to Colonial Territories against the background of knowledge available to the U.K. departments in order to assist Colonial Governments to a full appreciation of all the complicated economic and technical problems involved on which their final views would depend and to assist the Secretary of State to assess the particular problems of individual territories.

3. The West Indian Governments referred the matter to a meeting of the Standing Committee on Commerce and Industries of the Regional Economic Committee held in Barbados on March 18th. The Standing Committee decided that West Indian Governments should be represented on a regional basis through the R.E.C. and appointed us a delegation for the purpose. . . .

5. The Treaty which deals with the creation of the Customs Union Area was signed on 25th March and is known as the Treaty of Rome. The objects of the Treaty are as follows:—

- (a) to harmonise the economic development of the Messina Countries;
- (b) to ensure a balanced and continued expansion of their trade;
- (c) to increase stability and raise standards of living;
- (d) to secure closer relations between the member states.

These objects are to be achieved through co-operation by the following methods:—

- (1) The abolition of tariffs, quantitative restrictions and other restrictions on trade between member states and the establishment of a Common Market;
- (2) The establishment of a common exterior tariff and a common commercial policy;
- (3) Free movement of persons, services and capital within the Community;
- (4) A common agricultural policy;
- (5) A regime to ensure fair competition;
- (6) A co-ordinated economic policy;
- (7) Harmonisation of legislation as far as necessary;
- (8) The creation of a European Social Fund to deal with the problems created when an industry faded out and movement and retraining of workers are required;
- (9) A European Investment Bank;
- (10) The association of oversea territories.

Five institutions are to be set up:—

- (1) A Council of Ministers to work out various details and procedures under the Treaty.
- (2) A Commission of nine persons, who would be internationalised, to prepare the work for the Council of Ministers.
- (3) A Court.
- (4) An Assembly which will be non-legislative and would give advice on which certain decisions would be taken.
- (5) An Economic and Social Consultative Committee comprising representatives from various walks of life from each of the Messina countries.

6. The objects of the Treaty were to be realised over a period of 12 years in three stages. Each stage could be extended, but in no case could the total transitional period exceed 15 years.

7. The elimination of tariffs between the member states are [sic] to be achieved by a series of steps with an overall 10% reduction at each step. A certain amount of flexibility in adjusting particular items is to be permitted but there must be a reduction of at least 5% on which item at each step. All customs duties are to be abolished and replaced by internal taxation.

8. The Common exterior tariff is to be based on the arithmetical mean of the existing duties in each particular state subject to the provisos that no raw material should bear a duty of over 3%; that no semi-manufactures should bear over 10% and that the duties on certain chemicals be limited to 15% and others to 25%. The duties incorporated in List F of C.E.I. (57)10 have been agreed and those in List G of C.E.I. (57)10 have been specifically left for later negotiation. Movement towards the common tariff would not start for four years, then all duties which were different by less than 15% from the common customs tariff figure would be adjusted to that

figure; where the difference was more than 15%, the move to the common tariff would be in three stages 30%, 30% and 40%. There are provisions covering cases in which difficulty would arise for a member state and there are arrangements for duty-free or reduced duty quotas.

9. It is not proposed that there should be free trade in agriculture between the members and there are special arrangements including long term contracts and minimum price arrangements.

10. Provision for the association of overseas territories with the Customs Union Area are contained in a Convention attached to the Treaty. The association of overseas territories was the result of insistence on the part of France and there is reason to believe that the other five countries had shown great reluctance to their inclusion: this could be seen from the time which elapsed before the final decision had been taken by the Six—and then only at the Prime Minister level—and also from the proviso contained in the Convention that the arrangements for association of overseas territories would be for an experimental period of five years only. The provisions embrace Algeria and the French Overseas Departments of Martinique, Guadeloupe, Cayenne and Reunion; the French overseas territories proper, namely French West and Equatorial Africa and the trusteeship territories of the Cameroons and Togo; and Madagascar and the small Pacific dependencies of France; the Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi and Dutch New Guinea. Provision is also made for the inclusion of the following independent territories: Morocco, Tunisia, Surinam, the Netherlands Antilles and Libya.

11. The main features of the Convention provide for the establishment of an investment fund, the removal of discrimination and the application of the special arrangements for agriculture to the tropical products of overseas territories. The arrangements for the removal of discrimination are also contained in Articles of the Treaty because the tariff arrangements unlike the other aspects of the association of the overseas territories, would not be subject to review at the end of five years. The tariffs of the Messina Six against imports from the overseas territories would be gradually removed and the Six would move gradually to a common tariff on such products from elsewhere based on the arithmetical mean.

12. The Treaty now has to come before the Parliaments of the Messina Countries, for ratification. In European political and economic circles it is regarded as important that the ratification should be completed in all the territories before the date of the next West German elections which are due to be held in September or October this year. Measures to secure the early ratification of the proposals will therefore be pressed forward.

13. The United Kingdom regards it as desirable that as many as possible of the member countries of the O.E.E.C. should enter the Free Trade Area. As regards the timing of its establishment also, the United Kingdom considers it a matter of importance that the Free Trade Area should be established within a few months after the European Economic Community comes into being.

14. The Council of Ministers of the O.E.E.C. having accepted the report of its Working Party on methods of association with the Common Market of the Six, has decided to enter into negotiations in order to "determine the ways and means of bringing the European Free Trade Area into being". The Council has also requested the Chairman (Mr. Thorneycroft) to set up and guide Working Parties which are to submit a report in time to enable further decisions to be taken by the Council before the 31st July, 1957. As the minutes of our conference show, three such Working

Parties have been set up and the negotiations by these Working Parties will begin within the next few weeks. The next few months will therefore be a period of intense diplomatic activity and it is a matter of importance that the United Kingdom representatives should be in a position to make quick decisions on the basis of previous views as to the effects on United Kingdom and Colonial trade of particular proposals or suggestions.

15. In the opinion of H.M.G. once a decision of the Messina Powers to include their overseas territories in the new Community had been taken it became essential that the British Overseas Dependent territories should be brought in so as to be informed as fully as possible about what was taking place. United Kingdom representatives also hoped that the Colonial representatives would be in a position to give detailed explanations of specific Colonial problems which would arise as a result of the creation of the Customs Union including the overseas territories of the Messina Powers, or which could be foreseen as arising out of the proposals for an Industrial Free Trade Area. The intention was that these problems should be taken into account in the future negotiations within the O.E.E.C. and elsewhere. In addition to defining exactly how the interest of their territories would be affected, Colonial representatives were invited to say whether, in their view, their respective territories should or should not be associated with the Industrial Free Trade Area. They would then take back to their governments information on the economic and other implications of the new proposals so as to assist the governments in making their decisions in regard to association with the Free Trade Area or otherwise.

16. Our Report will therefore concern itself with three questions:—

(1) The implications for the British West Indian territories of the Treaty of Rome which brings the European Customs Union into being and associates with the six Messina Powers their Overseas Territories.

(2) The implications for the West Indian territories, including British Guiana and British Honduras, of the Industrial Free Trade Area.

(3) Whether it is in the interest of these territories to be included in the Free Trade Area.

17. The Customs Union area proposals pose problems for the West Indies. The exports of the Messina overseas territories will enter those countries free of duty whereas West Indian products will have to pay the duties fixed under the common external tariff. At present the West Indies exports to Messina Countries total about £5 m. The 1955 figures were:—

France	—	£2.139 m.
West Germany	—	.857 m.
Italy	—	.323 m.
Benelux	—	£1.714 m.
		<hr/> £5.033 m. <hr/>

The main items are cocoa, coffee, spices, rum, scrap metal to Germany; asphalt and asphalt cement to Belgium, Luxembourg; rum, cocoa, spices, cocoa butter, petroleum products, iron and steel scrap, timber, bauxite to the Netherlands.

18. The following is the position regarding the common external tariffs on items of West Indian exports:—

Crude Petroleum	—	To be negotiated by members
Bauxite	—	Not yet fixed but not to exceed 3%
Alumina	—	" " " " " " " "
Asphalt	—	" " " " " " " "
Sugar	—	80%
Bananas	—	20%
Cocoa	—	9%
Rum	—	To be negotiated by members
Molasses	—	Average not yet worked out
Citrus:		
Oranges	—	From 15th March to 30th September 15%
	—	Other times 20%
Grapefruit	—	12%
Other Citrus	—	16%
Coffee	—	16%
Cotton	—	Free
Cotton Linters	—	Not yet fixed but not to exceed 3%
Bitters	—	To be negotiated
Logwood Extract	—	Not yet fixed but not to exceed 10%
Timber	—	To be negotiated
Balata	—	Free
Lime Oil	—	12%
Arrowroot	—	Average to be worked out
Vanilla	—	" " " " "
Annatto	—	" " " " "
Pimento	—	" " " " "
Scrap Iron	—	Free
Glycerine	—	Average to be worked out
Ginger	—	" " " " "
Honey	—	30%
Bay Oil	—	12%
Veneer & Sheets		
for Plywood	—	10%
Plywood	—	15%
Cigars	—	Average to be worked out
Hides & Skins	—	Free
Precious Stones	—	Not yet fixed but not to exceed 3%
Tamarinds	—	Average to be worked out
Common Salt	—	To be negotiated

19. At present the oversea territories produce tropical products competitive with those of the West Indies and can now be expected to expand their production on a planned basis. French Morocco and Algeria export citrus fruit; Madagascar tobacco; French Equatorial Africa and French Cameroons tropical hardwoods; French Cameroons bananas and nearly all produce coffee and cocoa in great quantity and some cotton.

20. The common external tariffs fixed for bananas, cocoa, citrus, coffee, logwood extract, lime oil, honey bay oil, veneer sheets and plywood and those likely to be fixed

on other items are certain to operate to the detriment of West Indian interests. It should be remembered that even though we do not at present export certain items to Messina Countries, the exports of others who do will be replaced and come seeking alternative markets in the U.K. and elsewhere to our disadvantage. There will be also incentives for the production of artificial substitutes for some products.

21. We have represented very strongly that H.M.G. should do everything possible to effect a reduction of the rates fixed under the common external tariffs on items of West Indian exports when the Treaty is considered in the G.A.T.T. later in the year. We have also suggested that if necessary delegates from the West Indies should be associated with the U.K. Working Party in Geneva for the purpose.

22. The Industrial Free Trade Area is a United Kingdom idea. It is intended to include the six Messina countries, the United Kingdom itself and as many other member countries of O.E.E.C. as wish to join. It is not the intention of the United Kingdom that any overseas territories, whether of the Messina Powers or in the British Commonwealth, should be included. It is also the United Kingdom's intention that trade in food and drink (for man or beast) and tobacco should be excluded from the system.

23. The proposals have not been formulated with any precision. There is no documentation except the O.E.E.C. Working Party Report, the United Kingdom Memorandum to O.E.E.C. which has been published as CMD 72, and the United Kingdom Memorandum on Definition of Origin within the Free Trade Area which has been circulated to Colonial Governments.

24. It was generally admitted that the decision to include overseas territories of the Messina Powers in the European Economic Community seriously complicates the plans for establishing an Industrial Free Trade Area. Many Colonial territories would because of this decision be obliged to reconsider the question of their association or otherwise with the Free Trade Area. In the course of the discussion a clear interest emerged in the case of Colonial territories like Honk [sic] Kong, Singapore and Malta, with predominantly non-agricultural economies, in favour of association. Unless therefore it could be agreed that such Colonial territories should nevertheless be excluded it would become difficult for H.M.G. to secure the exclusion of the Messina Oversea Territories. British West Indian representatives were therefore forced to consider the question of association, or otherwise, in their case on the assumption that one or two British territories might be included and that the overseas territories of the Messina Powers almost certainly would be.

25. What then were the considerations in the light of which the decision should be taken? The first is that within a period not exceeding fifteen years, complete free trade in non-food items would be introduced between the majority of the European countries, the United Kingdom and all of French and Belgian Africa. United Kingdom tariffs would still apply to the food exports from the French and Belgian territories in Africa and the French territories in the West Indies. Examples of the above would be, bananas from the French Cameroons, Martinique and Guadeloupe, citrus from Algeria and Morocco, coffee and cocoa from French Equatorial Africa, Belgian Congo, Madagascar, etc.

26. Non-food items exported by these overseas territories would enter the United Kingdom entirely free of duty, sharing in effect in the United Kingdom preference. Examples of the above would be cotton, hides, skins, etc.

27. Certain basic commodities, however, which would otherwise have to surmount the United Kingdom tariffs, would because of the system being introduced

in regard to definition of origin be accorded Free Trade Area treatment, viz: they would be regarded as having originated within the Free Trade Area, whether they had in fact done so; in effect they would enter the United Kingdom market, free of duty.

28. It becomes a matter of delicately balancing the advantage on the one hand of securing Free Trade Area treatment for some British Caribbean non-food exports, thus enabling them to circulate into the Western European market, and the disadvantage on the other of allowing similar or non-food exports from the overseas territories of France, Belgium and the Netherlands to circulate into the United Kingdom market via European Metropolitan countries.

29. Appendices 1 and 2 of C.E.I. (57)9 which represented proposals put to H.M.G. by United Kingdom commercial interests (and which the Conference was specifically reminded had not yet been accepted by H.M.G.) include very detailed proposals setting out the basis on which particular commodities would, or would not, be given Free Trade Area treatment according to the extent of the processing they had undergone after importation. We consider it essential that the West Indian trading interests should be consulted on these particular details and have requested the United Kingdom representatives to consider whether commercial interests may in fact be consulted. We are to hear from them further on this point. Broadly, however, the position is that since the range of British West Indian non-food exports is so small, it is in our interests that the principles on which Free Trade Area treatment is accorded to such items should be restrictive rather than liberal.

30. There are two main reasons why the B.W.I. should not join the Free Trade Area. The first of these is our special relations with Canada. The Canadian preference on sugar is of the utmost importance to the financial stability of the British West Indies. It is now under attack in Canada largely on account of currency restrictions. If the British West Indies came into the Free Trade Area Canadian exports would no longer enjoy the preference provided them under the Canada/West Indies Trade Agreements since European exports to the West Indies would receive the same preferential treatment. This would be the death knell of our Canadian Sugar preference—moreover, if the United Kingdom enters the Free Trade Area, Canada will suffer the loss of the United Kingdom preference or at least have to share this preference with European countries. To recompense Canada for this loss we should press for the removal of all currency restrictions against Canadian exports to the West Indies.

31. The second reason is that at the present time we have the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement by which the United Kingdom agrees to purchase 640,000 tons sugar for a period of 8 years at reasonably remunerative prices. This Agreement can be and has in the past been extended each year for a further year, thus keeping the Agreement in force perpetually. In return United Kingdom exports to the West Indies enjoy preferential treatment. If the British West Indies joined the Free Trade Area, the United Kingdom's exports would no longer enjoy exclusively the West Indies preference since European exports would come in under the same preferential tariff. In the course of time the pressure would come from United Kingdom manufacturers against H.M.G. continuing the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement.

32. The meeting considered that there were four possible courses of action open to H.M.G. as follows:—

- (1) Formal opposition to the provisions of the Treaty of Rome Associating overseas territories with the Customs Union.

(2) Negotiations with the six Messina States for specific adjustments to mitigate damage to the U.K. Colonies' interests caused by the inclusion of the Messina overseas territories in the Customs Union Treaty.

(3) Amendment of the proposals for an Industrial Free Trade Area to permit association of overseas territories with it.

(4) Maintenance of the U.K. proposals for a European Industrial Free Trade Area excluding dependent territories.

33. It was the feeling of the majority that while reserving her position regarding point (1) the United Kingdom should pursue points (2) and (4). The West Indian Delegation supported the majority view. It was also the majority view that in the event of opposition to the inclusion of overseas territories in the Customs Union developing when the matter is being considered in the G.A.T.T., H.M.G. should then move for their exclusion. It was felt that it would be embarrassing for H.M.G. to initiate action to oppose the inclusion of the Messina overseas territories in the Customs Union Area as such action would be tantamount to taking the lead in opposing the whole Messina Treaty and with it the whole concept of a strengthened Europe on which so many hopes had been set, both in Europe and the Free World. We recommend that an early meeting of the Regional Economic Committee should be convened, to consider these proposals as well as the definition of origin in the Free Trade Area, and to make recommendations to West Indian Governments. . . .

55 CO 1031/2024, no 42, enclosure 2

June 1957

[Federal capital]: CO note on the US naval base at Chaguaramas in Trinidad

At a meeting held in Trinidad at the beginning of May, 1957, the Standing Federation Committee (which is composed of political representatives from the territories forming the future Federation of the West Indies and which is charged with making the final administrative arrangements to bring the Federal Government into being) decided that the North West peninsula of Trinidad should be the site of the Federal capital. Since the area concerned is leased to the United States as a Naval Base, the Committee asked that Her Majesty's Government should take up with the U.S. Government the question of surrendering the leased area on such terms as may be agreed upon.

2. On being informed of the Committee's resolution the U.S. State Department requested that H.M.G. should not take up a firm position before hearing the U.S. Government's views, and this was agreed to by H.M.G. The U.S. Government's views are expected to be received within two weeks, and, since the Standing Federation Committee have indicated their wish to discuss this matter with both H.M.G. and the Government of the U.S.A., it is likely that discussions, to which the U.S. Government have already agreed, will be held either in London or Washington (or both) about the second half of June, or as soon thereafter as may be arranged. Pending receipt of the U.S. Government's views, the object of this paper is to give the background to the Committee's decision.

3. The U.S. Naval Base in the North West Peninsula, known as Chaguaramas, was leased to the United States for a period of 99 years under the Leased Bases Agreement of 1941 (Cmd 6259)—the "Destroyers for Bases" Agreement. This Agreement,

whereby a large number of bases in the Caribbean, the Bahamas and Bermuda were similarly leased, has always been resented by the people of the territories concerned. Whilst not lacking in loyalty or an appreciation that unpalatable things must be done in war-time, they feel that they were not closely enough consulted over the Agreement (there was, of course, no constitutional need to do so) nor the areas selected; and that the period of 99 years is excessive. Feeling has always been particularly high in Trinidad where two of the largest U.S. bases, the airfield at Waller Field (18 square miles) and the Naval base at Chaguaramas (15 square miles) are situated. In addition, the base at Chaguaramas occupies some of the most attractive country and beaches near the capital, Port of Spain.

At present the Chaguaramas naval base is on a care and maintenance basis and is occupied by between 150/300 U.S. servicemen only. There is also a radar installation used, it is understood, for the detection of Guided Missiles using the Long Range Proving Ground in the Caribbean and South Atlantic and in the development of an anti-missile programme. The Waller Field base has been inactive for a number of years and though much of it is being used for agricultural purposes by the local inhabitants, the U.S. retain the right of immediate re-occupation.

4. There is no doubt that Chaguaramas has greater natural advantages than those of any alternative site in Trinidad; and it appears to answer many of the specifications laid down as suitable for a federal capital site last year by an independant [sic] Committee of experts from the United Kingdom.

5. In passing the resolution on the capital site, the Committee also asked that the discussions between Her Majesty's Government and the United States Government should include the question of arriving at agreements between the United Kingdom, the United States of America and the Federal Government for the security of the West Indies. The meaning of this proposal requires clarification but in so far as it may concern the question of the capital site, it is thought to mean that alternative naval facilities, either in Trinidad or elsewhere in the federating territories, might be offered to the United States in return for the surrender of Chaguaramas; or alternatively, that part of the Chaguaramas base, particularly the Tucker Valley, might be surrendered.

6. On receipt of the views of the United States Government it will be for Her Majesty's Government to consider their own position and to decide whether or not formally to seek amendment to the Leased Bases Agreement, 1941, to release permanently all or part of the Chaguaramas leased area. Her Majesty's Government's decision will depend upon their evaluation of the United States case and upon a consideration of the wider defence and political issues involved.

56 CO 968/564, no 45

14 June 1957

[West India Regiment]: CO report on the proceedings of a conference in Barbados, 3–7 June 1957¹

After welcoming the delegates, the Chairman recalled that the proposal to re-form the West India Regiment had been put to the West Indian Governments, including

¹ The conference was chaired by N L Mayle, now administrative secretary, Development and Welfare Organisation in the West Indies, and attended by representatives of the West governments and commanders from the Caribbean Area Forces. N B J Huijsman, of the Defence Dept, CO, also attended.

British Guiana and British Honduras, some time ago, and that the unit governments of the Federation (with the exception of St. Kitts, which had reserved its position) and the Governments of British Guiana and the Virgin Islands had agreed to the proposal for the re-formation of the Regiment and:—

- (a) to make contribution of not less than 1% of the revenue (in the case of Barbados 1% less the cost of local forces, and in the case of British Guiana on the basis of a fixed annual payment not exceeding 1% of the territory's yearly revenue at the time of the Regiment's inception);
- (b) to ask the War Office to raise the Regiment on their behalf;
- (c) to the constitution of the Regiment by United Kingdom Act of Parliament.

2. The Chairman went on to say that, in view of this measure of agreement, it had been decided to go ahead with the re-formation of the Regiment, and the House of Commons had been informed to that effect. Since then the military authorities in the United Kingdom and the Caribbean, in conjunction with the Colonial Office, had worked out detailed plans for the re-formation of the Regiment, which were set out in the seven papers which had been circulated to the West Indian Governments. The task of the Conference was to make recommendations on these plans, and the Chairman said that he hoped that they would be able to submit to the Governments a comprehensive plan for raising the Regiment.

3. The Chairman invited the members of the Conference, before discussing the detailed plans, to consider two general questions. First, whether they should make any recommendation regarding the transfer to the Federal Government from the territorial governments of the financial liability accepted by those governments in respect of the Regiment. Second, the date when a start should be made on raising the Regiment.

4. On the first point, the Conference took the view that this was a matter for the Standing Federation Committee, which would no doubt consider it at their next meeting in October.

5. As to the date on which a start should be made on raising the Regiment, the Conference recognized that, when the West Indies achieved nationhood within the Commonwealth, there would be an obvious need, as had been recognized by other Governments on attaining independence [sic], e.g. Ceylon and Ghana, for a national defence force, fully trained and efficient, even if numerically small, consonant with its status and dignity as a new nation. Such a force would provide a central reserve in aid of the civil power, where required, following natural disasters or to deal with civil disturbances, and would avoid recourse to external aid. It would however take some time to raise, equip, train, and accommodate the Regiment, and if the Federation was to be in a position to assume its proper responsibilities no time should be lost in making a start in raising the Regiment. A further consideration was that the United Kingdom's new defence policy would impose a contraction to half its present size of the British Army, while reducing few of its essential commitments, and a withdrawal of overseas garrisons was therefore inescapable. While there was no definite information as to the future of the United Kingdom Battalion in the Caribbean, the recent reduction in United Kingdom Forces in Europe and elsewhere, including the withdrawal of the Bermuda Garrison, led to the conclusion that it would be unwise to rely on the retention of the United Kingdom Battalion in the Caribbean for more than a strictly limited period. Militarily, it would take at least two years to train the

Regiment to that stage at which it could dispense with the aid of the British Battalion. It would certainly be much more difficult and expensive to raise the Regiment in the absence of any United Kingdom Forces in the Caribbean.

6. It was recognized that all the considerations mentioned above did not necessarily apply to British Guiana. British Guiana, however, like the Federation, would need a permanent central reserve in aid of the civil power to be available on call, and participation in the West India Regiment was the only economic way to meet this requirement.

7. *The Conference therefore strongly recommended that a start should be made with the raising of the Regiment as soon as the United Kingdom legislation was brought into force, which it was understood might be about the 1st January, 1958. They accordingly recommended that this date should be adopted as the date for the re-formation of the West India Regiment.*

8. Turning to the financial arrangements, the Conference noted that the participating territories had not disputed that the whole cost of the Regiment, both capital and recurrent, should be regarded as their responsibility, and had agreed, with reservations on the part of Barbados and British Guiana, to make a contribution of not less than 1% of their annual revenue. The Conference considered the proposals put forward for clarifying the financial arrangements and recognized that, even under these proposals, Her Majesty's Government would still bear the greater part of the capital cost of the Regiment over the first five years, estimated at £3 million plus. On the assumption that the contribution in respect of the federating territories will be met from Federal funds and given the ceiling fixed for Federal revenue for the first five years (which, although it includes provision for a contribution towards the cost of the Regiment, seems likely to restrict the activities of the Federal Government), the Conference felt obliged to take the view that the amount of the contribution from the Federal Government during the first five years should be fixed at the lowest possible figure consistent with the liability already accepted by the territorial governments.

9. *On this basis, the Conference recommended that the contribution should be fixed for the first five years at 1% of the aggregate of the tax revenue of the participating territories in the year in which the Regiment was raised. Given the Secretary of State's proposal that, in so far as the participating territories would be unable to meet the full cost of the regiment in any one year, the shortfall would be made good by Her Majesty's Government, The Conference further recommended that, if the total cost of the Regiment in any one year should fall below the amount of the contribution payable under the above formula, then the actual contribution paid in that year should not exceed such expenditure. The delegate from Jamaica however considered that the contributions should be based on revenue during the year 1954/55 so as to conform to the pre-federal Fiscal Commission's recommendations.*

10. The above recommendations were made on the assumption that the Regiment would not be raised before 1958, and that accordingly contributions would not become payable before then.

11. The adoption of these recommendations would mean that, on the rough estimates which had been prepared of the capital and recurrent costs of the Regiment over the first five years, the contribution from the participating territories would approximately meet the recurrent costs over that period, leaving Her Majesty's

Government to bear a capital cost estimated at \$(B.W.I.) 14.4 million plus (£3 million plus).

12. The Conference then proceeded to consider the detailed plans for the reformation of the Regiment set out in the seven papers which had been circulated to the Governments concerned. They decided to recommend that certain modifications should be made in these plans. An outline of the plans, modified in accordance with the recommendations of the Conference, is given in the annex to this report.²

13. *The Conference recommended that these modified plans should be adopted, and that Her Majesty's Government should be informed at the earliest possible date of this approval so that the necessary legislation might be prepared and the War Office given time to make the complicated detailed arrangements for raising the regiment by the 1st January, 1958.*

14. The recommendation in the outline plan is that Headquarters should be located initially in Jamaica, but that it should be transferred to Trinidad as soon as permanent accommodation is available there. This would face the Commander with the problem of maintaining proper liaison with the Governor General in Trinidad and with the Governor of British Guiana for this initial period.

15. The Conference understood that the most suitable arrangement to meet this problem would be for a senior staff officer to be stationed in Trinidad as the Commander's personal representative pending the move of Headquarters to Trinidad. An appointment of this nature would of necessity be additional to existing or proposed Headquarters establishments. The Conference hoped that the War Office would provide a suitable officer for this purpose.

16. The Conference discussed the proposals, which had been made by the Secretary of State in his despatch to Governors of the 11th October, 1954, for the establishment of an advisory and consultative Board, without executive powers, in order to provide a regular channel through which Governments could obtain information and express their views on administrative and financial questions relating to the Regiment.

17. *The Conference recommended the setting-up of an advisory board for the above purposes, consisting of representatives at the official level of the Federal Government and the governments of British Guiana and the Virgin Islands; and the Commander, Caribbean Area, or his representative.*

18. The Conference recorded its appreciation of the services of the Secretary, Mr. John Vaughan, whose prompt and accurate summaries of the daily discussions contributed so much to the completion of their task.

² Not printed.

57 CO 1031/2024, no 57

19 June 1957

[Federal capital]: minute by N B J Huijsman¹ reporting Mr Manley's determination to secure concessions from the US over the proposed site in Trinidad

[The report of the Federal Capital Commission (see 48) aroused considerable feeling in the West Indies, and nowhere more so than in Trinidad where the commission's

¹ See 56, note 1.

comments about the East Indian population and corruption in public life were deeply resented. Eric Williams used a curious argument to counter the charge of corruption. Addressing the Standing Federation Committee on 11 Feb 1957, he explained that in 1946 nearly ten per cent of Trinidad's population of 558,000 came from other West Indian territories. Continuing his theme of migration to Trinidad he argued that if the commission's charges were to be accepted 'then what we are doing is condemning the principle of freedom of movement in the West Indies; because surely, if Trinidad is what it is today, it has been made so by freedom of movement, and if Trinidad is what it is today then it is in the interest of every territory in the West Indies that its people should not be permitted to migrate there. Trinidad is the West Indies in terms of freedom of movement and you cannot condemn one without condemning the other'. In answer to the commission's argument that the East Indians were a disruptive influence in Trinidad, Williams countered that the existence of a large minority in Canada had not been considered a danger at the time of the formation of the Canadian federation. He also used the US to support his view that diversity of population was a source not of weakness but of strength (CO 1031/2888, no 74, enclosure). Trinidad's position attracted sympathy elsewhere and in Jan 1957, before Williams's speech, the Standing Federation Committee had already voted for Trinidad as the location for the federal capital, with Barbados as runner-up. A more extensive examination of possible sites in Trinidad led the committee to decide in favour of the Chaguaramas peninsula, in the north-west corner of the island and about seven miles from Port of Spain. A resolution was passed asking that the US should be approached for the release of Chaguaramas. The release of any US base territory was a highly contentious issue in Washington (see 58) and the UK line was that in order to avoid Caribbean politicians visiting Washington and demanding the right to put their case directly to the president, discussions should be held in London between the US, the UK and representatives from the West Indies.]

Mr. W.I.J. Wallace

Mr. Kennedy

During my visit to Jamaica Mr. Stow² arranged a meeting with Mr. Manley for me. The object of the meeting was to inform Mr. Manley of the outcome of the Barbados meeting on the West India Regiment.³ However, during the course of our talk Mr. Manley switched to the question of the Federal capital site. He said that he had heard of a proposal to discuss the Chaquarramas [sic] site in London. Did I know of this and why was this being done? I said that I had heard some mention of it in Barbados and had assumed that London was selected as being a more neutral venue than either Port of Spain or Washington. Asked for my personal view on the American reaction to the S.F.C. recommendation, I said that this was really an impossible question. The North West Peninsula contained a U.S. base and since the U.S. reaction would be coloured by the strategic value attached to this base by the U.S. Services my guess would probably have very little relevance to the American reaction. This led Mr. Manley to do some thinking aloud. Drawing a sketch map of the Peninsula he explained to me that what "we" (by which apparently he meant the S.F.C.—including Dr. Williams) wanted was the northern half of the Tucker Valley and the northern littoral. The Valley was required for the capital site, the littoral for recreation. (This requires a little explanation. Mr. Manley's argument is that if the littoral were Federal property U.S. Servicemen and their families would have complete liberty of access and residence there, whereas if it remained leased to the U.S. Government Federal employees would be debarred from using the beaches because these would be located in a military area). The S.F.C. had no desire to turn out the Americans and

² (Sir) John Stow (KCMG 1959) was colonial secretary, Jamaica, 1955–1959, before his appointment as governor of Barbados.

³ See 56.

fully recognised their right of occupation of the southern half of the Peninsula; on the other hand, he (Mr. Manley) was not convinced that the base had a real value in a nuclear age (a murmured interjection about anti-submarine patrols and coastal protection was waved aside), or that the security of the base required the U.S.A. to hold the whole of the Tucker Valley and the northern coast. In his view the Americans held far more land than they really needed; this was the trouble with the U.S. military, they behaved in small islands as if they had the whole of the North American continent to spread themselves in. He himself would certainly enter the negotiations in London determined to secure concessions from the Americans.

He next turned to the question of tactics. He was convinced that if only the matter could be put fairly to the President the latter would see the West Indian point of view and would be inclined to be helpful. The aim should therefore be to force the negotiations to the "top level" if the Americans proved to be sticky. To achieve this Mr. Manley would be prepared to make himself as difficult as possible, and in doing so he would be able to count on the help of the other members of the W.I. delegation.

At this point he digressed and discussed whether an independent West Indies Federation could legally be bound by the Bases Agreements. He rather doubted it. "Of course", he said, "accepted standards of international morality would make it impossible for us to act in such a way, but (here an impish smile) I don't see why we shouldn't behave as if we would." Given a situation in which they would be faced with a resentful independent Federation disinclined to concede the Americans any further defence and other facilities, the U.S. Government would probably feel that the political advantages of making a concession which would mean so much to the Federation would outweigh the minimal security risks involved ("After all, they have not much to fear from the West India Regiment.")

After reiterating that he was prepared to stir up a lot of trouble over this issue ("And believe me I have enough influential friends outside the West Indies to help me over this.") he steered the discussion back to the original subject of our talk.

Two things struck me particularly about this part of our discussion; one was an unmistakable tone of hostility towards the U.S. Services, the other an insistence on the rights and prerogatives of the Federation. The former may have been assumed, although he spoke very quietly and deliberately; the latter contrasted rather strongly with what I had been led to assume was the rather lukewarm attitude of the P.N.P. towards the Federation. His emphasis on strengthening the Federation was repeated again and again during the rest of our talk.

You may find this account of some interest.

58 CO 1031/2024, no 92

26 June 1957

[Federal capital]: inward telegram no 30 from D Williams (Washington) to CO reporting a difference of opinion between the US State and Defense Departments over the release of US bases

Your telegram No. 36.

Federal Capital Site.

Your views have been explained to the State Department who are entirely sympathetic. There is, however, a deep cleavage of opinion between them and the

Defence [sic: throughout] Department, which discussions they have had together today have not so far resolved. These discussions will be resumed tomorrow.

2. I understand Defence Department representatives at one stage took the view that they would not enter into any discussions in London, if there was a possibility that they might be faced with a West Indian delegation backed with British support. They had foreseen their role as that of defence experts explaining the specialised defence reasons for rejecting the West Indian case. In this connection they seem to feel they have a right to expect U.K. Government support, because of the (to them) patent overriding defence necessity of their holding this base and because of the obligations which the U.K. Government accepted under the 1941 Agreement.

3. I understand State Department have taken the line with them that (a) the U.K. Government must clearly take into account the political considerations as well as the military, (b) that it is not reasonable to expect the U.K. Government to come forward with an expression of view, until they have had a chance of consulting the West Indians further, and (c) that all parties are now committed to these discussions and that to postpone them at this stage would be extremely embarrassing to all concerned and of no advantage in the long run, even to the Defence Department. So far, however, State Department have failed to persuade Defence Department of the reasonableness of these views.

4. State Department said it might help if U.K. Government would agree in advance that the arguments put forward in the U.S. memorandum were at least militarily sound and also admit that they were bound to honour the 1941 Agreement. I promised to put this suggestion to you, though I doubt very much whether you will be willing to commit yourselves so far at this stage. In order to help the State Department, however, would it be possible for you to authorise me to give them an assurance on the general lines that in considering the West Indian request, the U.K. Government will pay full regard to their obligations under the 1941 Agreements and also give full weight to the value of the naval base in Western defence? To be of any use, a reply on this point should reach me before 3 p.m. G.M. time tomorrow.

5. Please pass copy to Foreign Office.

59 PREM 11/2920

3 July 1957

[Immigration]: minute by Mr Butler¹ to Mr Macmillan on the current position

Prime Minister

You asked in your minute to me of 21st June what is the position now about West Indian immigrants into the United Kingdom.

This problem has been kept under constant review by the Committee on Colonial Immigrants presided over by the Lord Chancellor. This Committee recently received a progress report from the working party of officials and will be reporting to the Cabinet on the whole question in a week or two.

The total number of West Indians in this country continues to increase, but the

¹ R A Butler, home secretary, 1957–1962.

flow of immigration has displayed a continuous and striking fall since last summer. The total net immigration in 1957 is unlikely to be anything approaching the figure of 29,000 for 1956. Immigration from India and Pakistan, however, though on a smaller scale, shows no signs of abating. The presence of some 120,000 coloured people in this country has not so far given rise to such difficulties as to make legislation imperative, and the Lord Chancellor's Committee will be reporting accordingly, although it will recommend that the trend of immigration should continue to be closely watched.

I am sending a copy of this minute to the Colonial Secretary.

60 CO 1031/2024. no 116 [8 July 1957]
'Federal capital site': minute by W W Wallace¹ to W I J Wallace on the reasons why the US should be warned against adopting an uncompromising position over Chaguaramas

The following are some personal thoughts on the Chaguaramas issue.

2. This issue should, I think, be looked at against the background of the entire defence requirements in the Caribbean of the United States, the United Kingdom and even the Federal Government. We are familiar with the recent installations—the Guided Missile stations, the Oceanographic Research Stations and the proposed LORAN stations.² The two latter types of stations are of importance to the United Kingdom as well as to the United States in that they are essential to the protection of wartime shipping in the area. The Guided Missile and Oceanographic Research Stations chains are, I think, practically complete but none of the four LORAN stations projected for British territory (Jamaica, Tobago, St. Kitts and the Bahamas) have yet been finally agreed. In addition, as techniques improve, I think there may well be further requests for new types of facilities which it might be in everyone's interest to grant.

3. I believe therefore that if the U.S. refuse to surrender any part of Chaguaramas, future defence requirements of U.S., U.K. and Federal importance may well be seriously prejudiced and even the operation of existing facilities might be made difficult. This is not a new thought but I think that we may not have fully appreciated that it may be a point of concern to both the U.K. and the West Indian Governments as well as to the U.S. If a compromise is not reached on the

¹ Principal, CO, West Indian Dept 'A'.

² The function of a Loran Station was to transmit a signal on a fixed line so that aircraft and ships having suitable equipment could determine their exact positions from the direction of several Loran signals. They were useful not only for military purposes (eg to naval patrols) but also as a general navigational aid to civilian traffic. They operated in groups. One group included stations under consideration in 1957 at San Salvador in the Bahamas; at South Caicos, Turks and Caicos Islands; and at Portland Ridge in Jamaica. The US had also expressed an interest in establishing stations at St Kitts and Tobago as part of another group. As it was to be established in an area made available under the 1941 Leased Bases Agreement and would have a certain defensive value, the Jamaica station would be operated under the terms of that agreement. The other stations, being situated in islands where there were no such areas, would be operated under separate agreements for ten years in the first instance. CO 1031/2022, no 1, provides a description of the various categories of US bases in the West Indies. See also 73.

Chaguaramas issue, I would expect that there might be very serious repercussions in the West Indies (this minute was dictated before our first meeting with the West Indian delegation on 10th July, but the views then expressed seem to me to reinforce the likelihood of strong W.I. reaction if no agreement is reached). We could reasonably expect, of course, that men like Mr. Manley are big enough not to adopt a dog in the manger attitude but other West Indian Ministers might not take the same broad view and Ministers in some of the smaller islands would almost certainly become even more unco-operative than at present in their attitude to U.S. requests for defence facilities. Further, the attitude of the general public in the West Indies if at least a part of Chaguaramas is not released, is likely, in my opinion, to make it politically impossible for any West Indian Government Federal, or Territorial, to entertain future U.S. requests at least for some years to come.

4. I think therefore that we have to try to put it across to the Americans in the strongest terms that, in our view, if they adopt an uncompromising attitude on Chaguaramas, the repercussions will in our opinion be serious indeed and will affect the U.K. as well as the U.S. The Caribbean is an area of the utmost importance in the defence of America and the protection of Britain's sea-borne traffic of war materials and it would, I think, be short-sighted in the extreme to prejudice future, and even existing defence requirements of importance to us all for the sake of a part of the Chaguaramas base.

5. On a minor point, we know that the U.S. fear that the release of even part of Chaguaramas Base would lead to further demands. I think this fear could be overcome if we could get the West Indian representatives to give an undertaking on the lines, for example, that so long as defence requirements exist, the need for facilities if [?is] fully recognised by them. This undertaking might with advantage be endorsed in due course by the future Federal Government. In particular, in Trinidad, this pledge could be reinforced by the Trinidad Government entering into a revised lease of the Chaguaramas area (less what might be surrendered) without delay.

6. I am sending a copy of this minute to Mr. Rogers, Mr. Hughes (Defence Dept.), the Foreign Office, the Admiralty and the Ministry of Defence.

61 CO 1031/2024, no 137

10 July 1957

[Chaguaramas]: letter from F Cooper¹ to Sir I Kirkpatrick² conveying the opinion of the Air Council that the problem is political not military

I am commanded by the Air Council to refer to your letter A. 1075/21 of the 14th June, 1957, on the subject of the United States Naval Base in Trinidad, and to say that they have now considered your request for a statement of views on the importance to the United States and United Kingdom Governments of the United States Trinidad Naval Base.

2. As regards the importance of the base to the United Kingdom, the Council wish to point out that the facilities which it offers could be of significance only

¹ Assistant secretary, head of Air Staff Secretariat.

² Permanent under-secretary of state, FO.

during the post-nuclear phase of a global war. In the defence plans of the United Kingdom, expenditure related to this purpose is, under the terms of the Defence White Paper, accorded a low priority. If the war at sea did continue after the initial nuclear exchanges in a global war, the facilities provided by the United States base in Trinidad might be used but, so far as the air component of such facilities is concerned, and in relation solely to the defence of the United Kingdom and of the West Indies, the Air Council feel that the disappearance of the United States base from Trinidad would not be a serious loss. The Council recognises that, in the United States' view, which is based on the hypothesis that the war at sea would continue on a substantial scale after the initial nuclear exchanges, the base represents a defence investment worth retaining.

3. The Council consider, however, that the military value of the aircraft operating installations in Trinidad are not such that they should influence the United Kingdom Government's approach to the problem. In the Council's view, the problem should be regarded as purely a political conflict between the wishes of the United States Government, and the aspirations of the countries of the proposed Caribbean Federation.

4. Finally, I am to suggest that, in the event of a need for the military value of the installations to be explored further, the matter should be placed before the Chiefs of Staff, so that the agreed views of the three Services may be obtained.

5. Copies of this letter are being sent to the Colonial Office, the Admiralty and the Ministry of Defence.

62 CO 1031/2024, no 185A

July 1957

[Federal capital]: CO note on a secret US defence installation in the northern half of Tucker Valley in Trinidad

The Standing Federation Committee selected the United States Naval Base at Chaguaramas as the site for the Federal capital by ten votes to two with two abstentions. While a number of other sites in Trinidad were inspected by a Sub-Committee and some by the full Committee, no alternative to Chaguaramas was decided upon by the full Committee. Some members consider that Waller Field (also a U.S. Base, a large part of which the U.S. have offered to surrender) would be suitable, while others, in the hope that the question of having the capital elsewhere than in Trinidad might be thrown open, take the line that there *is* no alternative site in Trinidad. In any case, it is clear that if at least part of Chaguaramas is not released by the U.S., the Committee will have to think again. If a site outside Trinidad were to be selected such a decision would permanently embitter Trinidad/U.S. relations. It might also conceivably lead to Trinidad's withdrawing from the Federation. At best such a decision would turn Trinidad into an unwilling partner in federation.

2. In their Memorandum, the U.S. have said that they cannot surrender the whole or any part of Chaguaramas. In recent discussions, the S.F.C. delegates have made it clear that they will not accept the U.S. views without further substantiation. They appear willing, however, to drop their request for the release of the whole area provided the Admiralty can assure them that there is a firm requirement for a U.S.

Naval Base in the Eastern Caribbean and that there is no real alternative site in British territory to Chaguaramas. If this assurance can be given, then it seems likely that the delegates will accept it and will then press for the release of part of the Base, namely, the whole of the Tucker Valley. In doing so they are likely to take the line that the cost of re-locating the many installations in the southern half of the Valley should be at any one's expense but their own. There are fewer installations in the north of the Valley than in the south but it is not certain that they would accept only the northern half and, in addition, access to it would be difficult.

3. The Admiralty are in an awkward position in this matter though they were warned in writing a month ago that they should be ready to answer exactly the points that the West Indian delegates have made. The Admiralty do not know enough of the U.S. defence plans to be able to form a firm view one way or the other of the validity of the U.S. case. The U.S. are notoriously reluctant to reveal defence secrets but the Admiralty hope to obtain sufficient information from the U.S. delegates to the discussions to enable them to reach a firm view. It is the Admiralty's private view at present, however, that it is unlikely that they could support a request for the release of the whole area.

4. In considering the possible release of the Tucker Valley, there is an added complication in that, while no obvious defence installations are shown on the U.S. plan of the area, the Admiralty have just been informed that there is in fact a highly secret and important defence installation either sited in, or about to be sited in, the northern half of the Valley.¹ The installation is, or will be, of importance to the Royal Navy as well as to the U.S. Navy. Its security classification however is such that it cannot be spoken about in the presence of the West Indian delegates and indeed the U.S. Navy will not speak about it to anyone but the Admiralty. The Admiralty will discuss urgently with the U.S. Navy delegates whether this project could be moved westwards from the Tucker Valley into the main base area. If this can be done, the U.K./U.S. discussions are likely to centre on the possibility of the surrender of the whole or the northern part of the Tucker Valley and on the question of who will pay for the re-location of existing installations. There is in practice no alternative to the United States paying. If this secret project cannot be moved, there is a real risk that the London Talks will break down. In this event, some at least of the West Indian delegates are likely to insist on going to Washington to see President Eisenhower.

¹ On which see 66 and 67, enclosure, para 4.

63 PREM 11/2880, pp 75–76

19 July 1957

[Federal capital]: letter¹ from Mr Macmillan to President Eisenhower on a proposal to appoint a joint commission

[Talks on the release of Chaguaramas were held in London between 16 and 23 July 1957. The UK was represented by Mr D Ormsby-Gore, minister of state, FO, Mr Profumo from the CO and officials from the FO, CO and Admiralty. The US was represented by J H Whitney, US ambassador in London, and Admiral Collins of the US Navy. The West Indies were represented by Adams, Manley, Williams, Bradshaw (see 38, note 3) and Mr F A

¹ Sent as prime minister's personal tel no T.263/57 in FO outward tel no 2938 to the UK embassy in Washington.

Baron (minister of trade and production, Dominica). On the first day of the talks Whitney confided to Ormsby-Gore his concern that Collins had arrived with instructions from Washington which seemed very inflexible and to have little hope of satisfying the West Indian delegation. Ormsby-Gore suggested that the matter should be taken up 'at the very highest level' in Washington (CO 1031/2024, no 143, minute by Ormsby-Gore, copied to Lennox-Boyd and Profumo). On day two of the talks Lennox-Boyd expressed similar concerns to Rogers. The issue had to be settled because of its importance to the establishment of the federation, a point which Whitney appeared not to appreciate. Lennox-Boyd also referred to the speech made by Eric Williams on the first day which made extensive use of official papers revealing the views of the governor of Trinidad in 1940–1941 when the base agreement had been concluded. Williams used the same information in a memo which he circulated on 18 July (see 64). Whitney assumed that the papers had been made available in London (ie by the CO). Rogers denied this; they were papers either seen by Williams in Trinidad or which he had sent for from Trinidad while in London. Whitney, according to Lennox-Boyd, was 'clearly disturbed' by the speech which he regarded as an 'ultimatum'. The secretary of state believed that some good had come of it; it had at least jolted the Americans 'into a recognition of the inherent dangers of adopting a purely negative attitude' (CO 1031/2024, no 145, minute by Lennox-Boyd to Rogers, with marginal comments by the latter, 17 July 1957). Meanwhile the FO drafted the letter reproduced here which Macmillan sent to Eisenhower.]

Dear Friend,

I have been meaning to send you a letter about our general situation, but in the last weeks of the Session, as you can imagine, I am pretty heavily pressed. We hope to get Parliament up early in August and I will try to give you a picture of things as I see them when I have a little time to compose my thoughts. Meanwhile I am sorry to have to trouble you about rather a difficult matter which is causing us some anxiety. As you know, in accordance with our policy of developing our colonies into self-governing and independent states within the Commonwealth, we have dealt with Ghana; Malaya follows in August. Now we are taking the first stages for the West Indian Federation, in which I know many Americans have taken a great interest for a long time. This development is going pretty well and I think it is going to be a real success. Their chief trouble is to find a capital for the Federal State. They can't have it in Jamaica, although, or really because, it is so much the largest unit—50% of the whole population of the proposed Federation. So everyone has agreed that it should be in Trinidad. The trouble is that the place they want to use in Trinidad is the site, or part of the site, of your naval base at Chaguaramas. We have got the representatives of these different islands over here now and they are really concerned about it. These politicians are not very easy to handle and I think it would be very embarrassing to us both if they insisted on visiting Washington and trying to discuss the question personally with you. With a good deal of difficulty we have persuaded them to retreat considerably from their original claims and we have been able to reach agreement in principle over a proposal for a joint commission to discuss possible solutions. As I understand it, it would be a commission representing the British Government, as still responsible, the West Indians and your own people. I believe this is agreeable to you; at least I hope so; and now the only point of trouble is really one of presentation more than of substance. Very strong political feelings have been raised in the West Indies and I am anxious that there may be a breakdown unless we can agree the terms of reference along the lines of our delegation's proposal of July 18. I very much hope you will be able to authorise your delegation to meet with ours and that the terms of reference proposed will be acceptable to you. I am sending these in a separate telegram to our Ambassador to make sure that there

is no mistake. I really feel rather guilty in troubling you about this matter, but all this “liquidation of colonialism” is going so well that I would be sorry if there was any hitch, especially one in the Caribbean.

All kind regards,
Yours ever,
Harold

64 CO 1031/2024, no 168

July 1957

[Federal capital]: FO record of discussions on the release of Chaguaramas; statement by the US ambassador and memorandum by Dr Williams

[At the end of the discussions, the FO produced a summary record of the seven meetings which had taken place. Reproduced here are annexes D and E to the record, a statement made by Whitney, the US ambassador, at the fifth meeting on 22 July, and the memo circulated by Williams on 18 July. After opening statements on day one by Ormsby-Gore, Manley and Whitney, and an independent statement on behalf of Trinidad by Williams calling for the complete evacuation of Chaguaramas but offering to discuss alternative sites for the base in Trinidad, day two was devoted to a discussion of the strategic importance of Chaguaramas led by Admiral Collins who emphasised in particular the problems involved in relocating any part of the base elsewhere. The West Indian delegates proposed that surveys should be made to determine if an alternative site could be found for a combined naval and military base. On day three a draft agreed between the West Indian and UK representatives for the terms of reference of a proposed survey was handed to the US delegation who suggested amendments to make it more acceptable to the US government. This was then referred to the State Dept. On day four Profumo explained that Macmillan had been in touch with Eisenhower (see 63) about a joint commission, a subject which formed the basis of the Whitney memo reproduced here. The final day consisted of two meetings to discuss the statement about a commission and a communiqué to be issued once the proceedings were over. The communiqué explained that although the West Indian delegates ‘unanimously agreed’ that there was a need for a US naval base in the Eastern Caribbean, they did not accept the US view that for economic and strategic reasons it should continue at Chaguaramas; they had therefore requested the release of the base which should be relocated. The communiqué concluded that the three parties had agreed to the establishment of a joint commission of technical experts to investigate all aspects of the West Indian request, taking into full account military and economic considerations.]

Annex D to 64: Statement by the US ambassador at the fifth meeting (22 July 1957)

In my opening statement at the beginning of these discussions I put forward the idea that the problem we were taking up was not one which represented a dispute between the United States and the West Indies. I said that it was rather a conflict between our mutual defense interests on the one hand and our mutual political problems on the other hand. Our discussions over the past week have shown that, with the best will on both sides, we do not yet have the necessary facts and figures to reach any firm conclusion as to the manner in which this conflict of interests can be finally resolved. In the meantime we have all learned a great deal more about each other’s points of view and the desire on both sides to reach a satisfactory reconciliation of interests has been amply demonstrated.

At this stage I would like to point out first, that this problem has been thoroughly reviewed at the highest levels of my Government and, secondly, I would like to

recount some of the considerations which have entered into that review. It is the basic policy of the United States never to force ourselves into a place where we are not wanted nor to remain in a place when we are not welcome. However, the United States feels strongly that to abandon Chaguaramas would be most unwise in view of our continuing common defense requirements for a major naval operating base in the Gulf of Paria. The base at Chaguaramas is the only facility in that part of the Caribbean adequately equipped to safeguard our common defense interests. The strategic considerations involved have already been thoroughly explained by Admiral Collins and he has also explained how the proposal for the release of Chaguaramas would affect not only the three of us but also the members of the Inter-American Defense Board. As we have already pointed out, the base at Chaguaramas represents a replacement cost of some 100 million dollars. The United States expended large sums in constructing the facilities at Chaguaramas on the presumption that we had a 99-year lease thus warranting investment in permanent and more efficient facilities.

Last week you proposed that a joint commission be established to examine whether feasible alternate sites exist for the establishment of either a combined Naval and Air Base or a Naval Base alone and to determine what if any parts of Chaguaramas might now be released. The President has now confirmed that the United States is prepared to agree to the establishment of a joint Commission whose purpose would be to investigate all aspects of the Standing Federation Committee's request for assistance in making Chaguaramas available as a capital site, taking into full account the military and economic considerations involved.

My Government is not prepared to agree to the specific terms of reference which you originally proposed since they carry a clear inference that the United States would be committed in advance to the release of Chaguaramas and the selection of the best alternative site. This inference is unfortunate and inaccurate. We still maintain the hope of being able to convince you that this would not be a feasible or desirable solution to the problem. You on your side have similarly expressed the hope that we will be convinced that this would be in fact a feasible and desirable solution. As I understand it, we have now tacitly agreed to put aside further efforts of persuasion until a survey is able to develop the necessary facts which we then can consider. What I feel we both want is examination of the entire problem without having the Commission directed in advance toward just one solution of the problem either way. I would like to stress here that the final views of both sides will be affected by the results of the survey—thus the survey must have a broader scope than you have proposed for it.

Having said this, there is one point I would like to clear up in advance. I do not want you to interpret the United States desire for broad and general terms of reference as implying that we will not participate actively and fully in an examination of possible alternative sites for the location of the facilities at Chaguaramas. Obviously this is one of the more important aspects of the entire survey. The survey would be pointless if it did not go into this problem. But we do not want the scope of the survey defined in such narrow terms.

My Government is keenly interested in the future of the West Indies Federation and is determined to assist the Federal Government in every way practicable in the furtherance of its national aims, including that of the question of the site of the Federal capital. To this end we agree to the establishment of a joint Commission to investigate all aspects of the British West Indies request for assistance in making the

base at Chaguaramas available as a capital site taking into full account the military and economic considerations involved.

I therefore propose consideration of language which the United States would like to see embodied in a joint statement that would serve both as a summary of these discussions and as a press statement at their conclusion. You will note that its first paragraph is based principally upon the preliminary paragraph of your proposal for the establishment of the joint commission.

Annex E to 64: Memorandum by Dr Williams (18 July 1957)

Almost a year ago the People's National Movement, of which I am the Political Leader, gave an unambiguous pledge in its Election Manifesto to respect and honour all international obligations, both military and economic, with particular reference to the 99-year agreement between the United Kingdom and the United States of America. In accordance with this pledge the Trinidad Delegation to the S.F.C., at its meeting last May, abstained from voting—and gave its reasons for so doing—on the decision to site the Federal Capital in Chaguaramas.

In taking this public stand we were unaware of the conditions and circumstances preceding the grant of the North West Peninsula. We took the matter in good faith, assuming that the only ground for complaint was the familiar one that the action had been taken without consulting the Government and people of Trinidad and Tobago. Within the past few days, however, certain facts have come to my knowledge which place me in no position to continue to pledge support of this Agreement or to abstain from discussion of the document submitted by the U.S. Government. Instead I give my wholehearted support to my Federal colleagues, for the reasons set out hereunder.

The U.S. Ambassador, in his opening remarks, spoke of the conflict between our mutual defence interests and our mutual political interests. In 1940 that conflict resulted in a victory for defence. The 1941 Agreement was signed in the face of the unrelenting opposition of the then Governor of Trinidad and Tobago, Sir Hubert Young,¹ and his Executive Council.

1. *The opposition of the governor*

The Governor, in a despatch to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, on October 22, 1940, expressed

“the hope that it might be found possible to combine the provision of the necessary facilities for the United States forces with some at least of the requirements of the Colony in which they were to be our welcome guests for such a long time . . . we were now discussing arrangements which would have to stand the test of ninety-nine years, and . . . it was in my opinion essential that these arrangements should contain no germs of future friction or hostility.”

Accordingly he (i) resisted the choice of Chaguaramas, (ii) advocated a combined base, and (iii) advocated a Joint Commission to deal with the entire matter.

¹ Gov of Trinidad, 1938–1942.

(i) *Chaguaramas*

On the U.S. desire for Chaguaramas, the Governor's view was as follows:—

“To anyone acquainted with Trinidad and the way of life of its inhabitants this suggestion is revolutionary. I am informed that for the past hundred years this particular area has been the recognised holiday area not only for all those who have not the opportunity of going elsewhere but for every class of the community. There is no other place in the Colony in which anything approaching the same amenities and facilities could be provided and I should be quite unable to agree to this suggestion unless it were proved that the requirements of the naval and military situations could be met in no other way . . . the cutting off of these amenities from the people who at present enjoy them and from the increasing number who might potentially enjoy them in future would cause friction which it was desirable to avoid.”

The Governor was particularly opposed to the inclusion of the northern part of Tucker Valley in the United States proposal, and was obviously not impressed with the United States reply to his question on this point:—

“Why does the area in Tucker Valley cross to the eastward of the road leading to Macqueripe, and what are the reasons for desiring the valley.”

Answer:

“In the valley we intend to locate quarters for housing and stores . . .”

(ii) *A combined base*

In the Governor's view it was “highly desirable that the United States base should be in one area and not dotted about in different localities all over the Colony.”

The Governor's choice was the Caroni Swamp, and he recommended, on the basis of the advice of his technical experts (one an American engineer) that it be reclaimed. He saw in this many advantages “from the administrative and political point of view”, the most important being

“that the association between the two Governments in Trinidad would start upon a basis of mutual benefit and goodwill, whereas the adoption of the (U.S.) proposals put forward . . . would, I fear, involve the risk of steadily increasing friction between the two Governments, which might in the end lead to serious results.”

The United States took the opposite view. As reported by the Governor by telegram to the Secretary of State for the Colonies on October 14, 1940, they were

“inclined to pooh-pooh any suggestions of political difficulties if U.S. soldiers and sailors are dotted all over the island and do not understand that what can easily be done in Canada and Newfoundland cannot be done with equal ease in a place like Trinidad.”

With the approval of the United Kingdom Government, the Governor subsequently went to Washington to develop his ideas and the reports of his technical advisers who were of the opinion that it would take two years to reclaim the Swamp as against the U.S. estimate of 15 years. The Governor met representatives of the British Embassy and of the State, Navy and War Departments of the U.S. His account of the meeting,

transmitted to the Secretary of State for the Colonies on December 28, 1940, reads:—

“I . . . suggested that the United States Government should send a competent representative down to examine (the) scheme and present an agreed report with (the Trinidad advisers) in order to satisfy the people of Trinidad that it had received proper consideration . . . I said that . . . it did seem to me reasonable to ask that their views should be examined with rather more care than was possible during the visit of the . . . Mission. I pointed out that the objections raised . . . on the ground of the unsuitability of the soil to bear heavy weights had already been disposed of by subsequent boring, and it seemed to me that further investigation might still more strongly bear out the views of my advisers. Alternatively, I was ready to send (them) to Washington to discuss the matter with United States engineers. Neither of these proposals found favour with the United States delegation . . . The question of expense was then raised . . . the people of the United States had unfortunately assumed that they would be called upon to incur no expenditure upon the bases in view of the fact that fifty destroyers had been handed over in exchange for them . . . I then threw out the tentative suggestion that if their own proposals were accepted the Trinidad Government might be prepared in due course to refund to the United States Government the difference between the actual cost of their operations in the Caroni area and an agreed estimate of all the operations that they would otherwise have carried out in the neighbourhood of the North-West Peninsula and the Cumuto area, but this suggestion was brushed aside.”

The Governor, in insisting on the reclaimed Caroni Swamp as the site of a combined base, bore in mind the analogy of Singapore, another base built on a reclaimed swamp.

(iii) *Joint commission*

In his despatch of October 22, 1940, the Governor advocated

“the immediate appointment of a Joint Commission to recommend (a) what immediate measures are necessary in order to ensure that Trinidad is adequately defended not only for the period of the present war but for the whole period of the least [sic: lease]; (b) by which government each of these measures should be taken; and (c) whether it is necessary or desirable to decide immediately what shall be the area or areas to be permanently leased to the United States Government under the agreement of the 2nd September, or whether . . . it would be wiser for the two Governments to content themselves with the continuance on a temporary basis of the immediate measures referred to in (a) above until they have examined the position more closely and agreed exactly what the permanent facilities should be.”

What the Governor was opposed to was, as he phrased it in his telegram to the Secretary of State for the Colonies on October 14, 1940, that

“It seems hardly reasonable for a foreign power to expect to find a suitable site for the 99-year lease of a combined Singapore and Aldershot in a closely populated island like this in ten days.”

He himself saw the explanation of the haste in the fact that the United States Mission which arrived in Trinidad on October 10,

“did not regard the object of the Mission as the quest of a naval and air base for the United States in a part of the British Empire, for the security of which the British Empire was and would remain responsible, so much as that of a naval, military and air base in an outlying island of the South American continent, for the defence of which the United States Government would assume responsibility, and which was to serve if necessary as a jumping-off ground for operations by the United States Army in South America.”

2. *The governor is overruled*

Sir Winston Churchill, in his war memoirs, makes mention of certain things done by the United States Government which were “harsh and painful” to us. These are the precise words to be applied to the 1941 Agreement.

It is certain that the United States brought very heavy pressure to bear on Trinidad, which was regarded as representing forty of the fifty destroyers. Admiral Collins has stated that if the Trinidad base were not available, Venezuela might provide the site of a suitable alternative. The facts are that the pressure on Trinidad was due precisely to the fact that Venezuela would not provide a base. On November 29, the British Ambassador in Washington cabled Sir Hubert Young as follows:—

“It is practically impossible for the United States to get any equivalent facilities in Venezuela or other parts of the north of South America because of the sensitiveness of all South American Republics to give the United States permanent facilities on their own territory. That is why United States Government is so concerned that the work at Trinidad should be begun and completed as soon as possible.”

The Governor complained in a telegram to the Secretary of State for the Colonies on December 21, 1940, that the American attitude “is all take and no give”. But the British Government yielded to the pressure. The Governor was advised by the Secretary of State for the Colonies on January 2, 1941 that

“War Cabinet . . . have decided that United States wishes in matter of site to be leased must be met in full . . . United States Government will appreciate that this decision involves people of Trinidad in great sacrifices and is taken in many respects of contrary to views of local Government.”

A fuller explanation was tendered by the British Ambassador in Washington who, in a personal letter on January 20, 1941, wrote to Sir Hubert Young as follows:—

“I am afraid that you must have felt that some of our telegrams showed little appreciation of the local difficulties and that we harped too much upon the necessity of meeting the American wishes in toto. As you know, we believed that we had substantial grounds for fearing that there would be trouble with the Administration and with the Press if there were any prolonged delays in settling the question of the location of the bases in Trinidad, and that this would react badly on some other very important issues.”

3. *The political aspect*

The 1941 decision reacts particularly badly on the most important issue today, the political.

The Governor's views were fully endorsed by his Executive Council, which advocated a combined base, opposed the cession of Chaguaramas or [sic] at least for 99 years, and supported the view that the siting of permanent facilities should be carefully considered before a decision was reached. On December 10, 1940, the Council decided

"we are not convinced that proposal of Trinidad Government is impracticable but if U.S. Government whose whole hearted cooperation is necessary to its success decline even to examine it seriously and His Majesty's Government do not feel able to insist upon this we can only accept the position."

Sir Hubert Young expressly warned of the Constitutional aspect of the problem. He made it clear in Washington that the British Government was even then considering constitution reform proposals recommended by the Moyne Commission, and accordingly expressed the view

"that in making arrangements which were to hold good for a century it would be prudent to bear in mind the degree of self-government which might be attained by the people of the Colony before the end of that long period."

Even in the absence of self-government in those days, it would have been prudent to take the local viewpoint into consideration. On January 18, 1941, the Governor advised the Secretary of State for the Colonies with respect to extra-territorial rights that the Executive Council regarded the American draft as

"quite unsuitable and wholly unacceptable and are profoundly shocked both by the American attitude and by the concessions which H.M. Government appear to be ready to make . . . it will in their opinion entirely stultify the constitutional reforms which have just been effected and will sow the seeds of that very friction between the United States and Trinidad which, as you know, I have worked so hard to avoid by putting forward my alternative proposals . . . They . . . are clearly apprehensive as to what may be agreed to in London without their being consulted."

The Governor added:—

"My own view is that it is essential that any agreement between H.M. Government and the U.S. Government affecting Trinidad must command the consent not only of the present Legislature but so far as can reasonably be foreseen of future Legislatures throughout the 99 year period."

But the U.S. Government was prepared to exert pressure on the West Indian Governments as well as on the British Government. On January 16, 1941, the Governor of the Leeward Islands cabled as follows to the Governor of Trinidad and Tobago:—

"I feel their attitude indicates that American Service interests will be put first, second and last with disregard of West Indian political conditions constitutions and outlook."

4. *The present position*

The United States Document indicates that, in 1957 as in 1940, West Indian political conditions, constitutions and outlook are disregarded and subordinated to the service interests and the military rather than the diplomatic mentality.

For, according to the document, everything is impossible. It is impossible to give up Chaguaramas because of its deep water harbour. It is impossible to find another base. It is impossible to move from Chaguaramas because it is too costly. It is impossible to surrender Tucker Valley which has a beach house, golf course, plantation, hospital, radio station, etc. One is tempted to ask after reading the document, what *is* possible? The document disregards entirely the only thing that is really impossible—that is to ask Trinidad people in 1957 to put the seal of approval on what was done in 1940 in defiance of the Governor's views.

The document places considerable emphasis on the financial aspect of the question. It would cost, we are told, \$100 millions to move Chaguaramas. What does that mean? This is equivalent to 34 cents a year per head of the Federation population of 3½ million for the unexpired portion of the lease, 83 years. One would have thought this a small price to pay for West Indian goodwill and the avoidance of friction. Certainly no amount of money would be able to buy that goodwill if the West Indian people learn how the rights of Trinidad were trampled upon in 1940.

For friction there will be, and an intensification of it. Some of those who went through this period are still alive. One of the newspapers in Trinidad is today advocating exactly what the Governor advocated in 1940. What appears to the Americans as only a base, what the S.F.C. sees as the only capital, I see as an explosion of the first order.

For the people will get to know. They are well informed of these matters. They know that the British were compelled to abandon their base in Ceylon, and will want to know whether they are to be penalised because they are not yet a Dominion or whether in order to achieve their rights they must have an election fought on the issue of driving out the Americans. They know that the British are now contemplating removal of their Cyprus base to East Africa, and will want to know whether they are to be penalised because they don't have an emergency. They know of developments in Egypt, Jordan and the Panama Canal. They know how the phrase used by one of my British friends opposite, "concepts about modern warfare", have changed in the light of political developments in the past few years. They will see in the whole American document nothing but military pressure, and I deeply regret the advice I have just received, that as we sit here in conference, arrangements are being made for shore leave in Trinidad for American troops on such a scale that it can only be regarded as a demonstration calculated to influence the Government. I ask you seriously, Gentlemen, if you seek to create disturbances in Trinidad?

5. *The solution*

The time has clearly come to reconcile, in the Ambassador's phrase, our mutual defence and our mutual political interests.

Article 28 of the 1941 Agreement provides:—

"The Government of the United States and the Government of the United Kingdom agree to give sympathetic consideration to any representations which either may make after this Agreement has been in force a reasonable

time, proposing a review of any of the provisions of this Agreement to determine whether modifications in the light of experience are necessary or desirable.”

You note the complete disregard of the Government of Trinidad.

In accordance with Article 28, I now call upon the United Kingdom Government, after the reasonable time of 17 years, to propose the following modifications of the Agreement which in the light of experience are necessary and desirable:—

1. The evacuation by the United States of Chaguaramas.
2. An amicable agreement between the Governments of Trinidad, the United Kingdom and the U.S., on a footing of equality, regarding an alternative base in Trinidad. There was no time for this in 1940. We have the necessary time in 1957.

Conclusion

It would be unreal to the participants in this conference not to leave them clearly aware of one fundamental consideration which must under no circumstances be lost sight of.

The other representatives of S.F.C. are dealing with the question of a site for the Federal Capital. In my position as representative of Trinidad and Tobago on the S.F.C. I am also dealing with the same thing. But I am also concerned with another question which does not concern them, at least not directly, and that is the question of the disposition of Trinidad's territory. In this connection I wish to inform the conference that, as the Chief Minister of Trinidad and Tobago at the present state of constitutional development with the perspectives for the future, I could not possibly put myself in a position in 1957 of being less concerned and less vigilant in defence of the fundamental interests of the people of Trinidad than a British Colonial Governor and the Executive Council of the period of 1941. To do so would not only be a gross betrayal of the confidence which the people of Trinidad have so generously placed in me, my Party and my Government. It would also be political suicide. I intend neither betrayal nor self-destruction.

65 CO 968/565, no 84

25 Nov 1957

[West India Regiment]: CO note for Lord Hailes on the reformation of the regiment and the financial implications

One of the most intractable difficulties since the last war has been the provision of local troops for the security of the colonies in the Caribbean area. As long ago as 1949 the Chiefs of Staff assessed the local defence and internal security requirements of the West Indian territories as a force of two battalions. This requirement still stands (see the joint Colonial Office/War Office appreciation at Annex A),¹ and the raising of a local force is now urgent because, as a result of wider defence decisions, the British troops in the Caribbean are due to be removed at the beginning of 1960, leaving the area virtually denuded of troops.

2. This defence requirement is at present met by a British battalion and a

¹ Annexes not printed.

battalion of the Jamaica Regiment, both under the operational control of the War Office acting through the Commander, Caribbean Area. The Commander's Headquarters, the Jamaica Battalion, and two companies of the British Battalion are stationed in Jamaica, and of the rest of the battalion one company each is located in British Guiana and British Honduras respectively. The cost of Headquarters and the British Battalion is met from War Office votes; as a temporary expedient the cost of the Jamaica Regiment is also met by the United Kingdom but from the Colonial Services Vote on the understanding that the Government of Jamaica pays the War Office an annual defence contribution of £50,000. This agreement was made in 1947 when it was considered a local battalion should be raised in Jamaica, but the colony was not in a position to meet the whole cost.

3. The original West India Regiment (which formed part of the British Army) was first raised at the end of the eighteenth century and existed until 1927 when it was disbanded for reasons of economy. It was felt that for reasons of tradition, etc., the raising of a local Caribbean force could best be achieved by re-forming the West India Regiment. Proposals to this effect have been under consideration since 1947, and following lengthy semi-official and official correspondence firm proposals were worked out by 1954 for submission to West Indian Governments and Legislatures. These proposals were addressed to West Indian governments in WICIR despatch No. 53 of the 11th October, 1954 (copy attached at Annex B). This despatch asked the West Indian Governments and Legislatures whether they would accept the financial commitment; whether they agreed that the War Office should be asked to start raising the Regiment; and whether they agreed to the necessary legislation being introduced into the United Kingdom Parliament.

4. Consideration of this despatch by the seven Governments (many with advanced constitutions) and the thirteen Legislatures (all but one with unofficial majorities) inevitably took time. By October, 1956, however, all territories concerned, with the exception of St. Kitts and British Honduras, had accepted the Secretary of State's proposals. At this point it is relevant to point out that the West India Regiment is as a result sponsored by all except one of the territories comprising The West Indies, British Guiana, and the British Virgin Islands. It is therefore not an exclusively Federal force. The then Chancellor of the Exchequer however queried the desirability of raising the Regiment at that point and instructed that further action should be suspended until he had been satisfied that its re-formation should not prove an undue burden on the U.K. taxpayer (this information has not of course been passed to governments).

5. This difficulty was not resolved until the spring of this year. By this time the advent of West Indies Federation had to some extent overtaken the original proposals for re-forming the West India Regiment, which had been framed on the assumption that the Regiment would come into existence before the Federation. In order to avoid further delay through protracted correspondence the Secretary of State proposed in his circular despatch No. 331/57 (Annex C) a conference of officials to be held in June, which would discuss the outstanding issues, and whose recommendations could then be submitted to a subsequent meeting of the Standing Federation Committee for endorsement. The conference of officials took place at Barbados in June,² and copies of its two reports are at Annexes D and E.

² See 56.

6. Although the officials at the Barbados Conference disposed of most of the outstanding problems there remained the fundamental questions of how The West Indies should finance its share of the Regiment; whether the Federal Government should assume this responsibility, and if so what the level of the Federal contribution should be. H.M.G.'s views on these points were that as under the Federal Constitution "Defence" was to be an exclusive responsibility of the Federal Government the Regiment would be a Federal force and its financing a Federal responsibility, and that despite the changed circumstances the Federal contribution towards the Regiment should continue to be an amount equal to the aggregate of one per cent of annual revenues of the unit territories at the time of forming the Regiment. This financial commitment was foreseen by the Fiscal Commissioner when drawing up his Report on the allocation of revenues to The West Indies during the first quinquennium, and he included a sum equivalent to one per cent of unit revenues for 1954/55 in his calculations of Federal expenditure. You will be aware of the decision S.F.C. took to fix a ceiling to the Federal Government's mandatory levy and of the difficulties which this has caused. The position was further complicated by the fact that whereas H.M.G. expect an annual Federal contribution rising concurrently with revenues, the Fiscal Commissioner recommended in his Report that the Federal contribution should be fixed for a term of years. The United Kingdom views regarding the financial arrangements for the Regiment were put to the Barbados Conference in paper W.I.R.(57)7 (copy at Annex F). The position is therefore that H.M.G.'s present view is that the West Indies' contribution to its Regiment (which has to be met from Federal revenue) should be calculated on present-day unit revenue figures, whereas the mandatory levy is calculated on earlier and lower figures. This creates a serious financial problem. You will note the views expressed by the Barbados conference in Annex E on this point. These views were due for discussion by the Standing Federation Committee at its October meeting.

7. Before passing to the next stage in the negotiations it is relevant to look at the Jamaica Regiment. This Regiment is intended to be absorbed into and to form the nucleus of the West India Regiment when raised. Unless this is done it would be exceedingly difficult to raise and train a two-battalion force from scratch, particularly if this is to be done before the final departure of the British Battalion and Headquarters Caribbean Area in 1960. With the re-formation of the West India Regiment in the offing very little has been spent on the Jamaica Regiment. Its present terms and conditions of service are consequently most unsatisfactory and its accommodation deplorable, and there is every indication that a large number of the personnel of the Regiment, including most of its senior N.C.O.'s, who are essential to the reformation of the West India Regiment, will not renew their engagements when these expire during the first quarter of 1958, unless either the West India Regiment is re-formed soon or the Jamaica Regiment is radically improved. Sir Hugh Foot was in fact very concerned about this and when he was in London during last July and August he devoted a great deal of attention to devising some formula which would enable the Jamaica Regiment to be improved and brought up to strength (in effect as a disguised battalion of the West India Regiment) if the Standing Federation Committee should fail to approve the early raising of the West India Regiment.

8. It was clear that as far as H.M. Treasury was concerned the sands were running out and that if the Standing Federation Committee should fail to agree to raising the West India Regiment it would be extremely difficult to achieve anything

much in respect of the Jamaica Regiment. A determined effort was therefore made at the October meeting of the Standing Federation Committee to get a decision, even if this meant tailoring the size of the force to suit the sum used by the Fiscal Commissioner in his calculations (see paragraph 6 above). The circular despatch No. 1038/57 of the 24th September (Annex G) was presented to the Committee in the hope that this would stimulate the Committee and encourage it to take a decision.

9. Paragraphs 19–21 of this despatch put two alternatives to the Committee, but unfortunately they chose neither. The Committee considered that when the Federal Government came into being it should be left free to decide, in consultation with H.M.G. and unit governments, what sort of force it should have and how this should be used, and resolved as follows:—

“This Committee, considering it essential that the Federal Government should set up and maintain a defence force during the first five-year period; and recognising that an annual provision of \$1,536,000 in the Federal Budget will suffice to enable a force of the size recommended in the report of the Barbados conference of officials to be established in the four-year period commencing in 1959 and ending in 1962; but considering it appropriate, however, that the Federal Government should be given the opportunity to discuss with H.M. Government the arrangements involved in the proposed formation of the West India Regiment, and with the Unit Governments questions affecting the use and disposition of the Regimental forces;

Recommends

(a) that the setting up of the West India Regiment be regarded as deferred until January, 1959; and

(b) that in the meantime

(i) H.M. Government be invited to proceed in consultation with the Federal Government to arrange for the raising of the Regiment and the meeting of the capital and recurrent cost;

(ii) that Her Majesty's Government be requested to continue the existing arrangements with the Jamaica Government in regard to the Jamaica Battalion, on the basis of the offer of the Jamaica Government to increase its contribution towards the cost of the Jamaica Battalion, for the year 1958 only, by the amount needed to improve the Battalion's conditions of service and raise its strength to 520 men, which offer the Committee accepts, (the increase in the contribution being estimated at \$240,000); and that

(iii) provision should be made in the Federal Budget for 1958 of a sum of \$1,536,000 for defence expenditure, this being the amount included by the Fiscal Commissioner in the computation on which the mandatory levy was based.”

10. The implications of this resolution so far as the United Kingdom is concerned are that:—

(i) Her Majesty's Government is to negotiate with the Federal Government (i.e. from about May, 1958) questions concerning the re-formation of the Regiment;

(ii) Her Majesty's Government, would during the coming United Kingdom financial year continue the existing arrangements for the Jamaica Regiment, i.e.,

at a cost of three-quarters of £245,000 to cover the period 1st April–31st December, 1958, and

(iii) while provision would be made in the 1958 Federal budget for \$ 1,536,000 for defence expenditure, nothing would be paid by the Federal Government towards defence costs until 1959. (The actual intention behind this is to raise \$1.5 million per annum over five years but to spend the money over the last four at an increasing rate to enable Federal defence expenditure to reach a figure of \$2.2 million by 1962).

11. If H.M.G. accepted the arrangements contained in the above resolution it would mean assuming an additional financial commitment of about \$900,000 (West Indian) in respect of the Jamaica Regiment for the period 1.4.1958–3.12.1958, and foregoing over the quinquennium some \$3.5 million in contributions from the Federation. In return the Federal Government could claim that by the end of the quinquennium it would be spending a sum equivalent to its proper share of 1% of present-day unit revenues and that it would therefore be entitled to a two-battalion Regiment and that H.M.G. should still be bound to meet the whole capital cost as well as forego substantial sums from the Federation.

12. The Standing Federation Committee resolution substantially alters the nature of the agreement reached between H.M.G. and the participating governments on the proposals covered in WICIR No. 53. This can, however, be discussed with the Federal Government during 1958; what is of immediate urgency is the future of the Jamaica Regiment pending the outcome of this discussion. No provision has been made for this force in the Colonial Services Vote Estimates for 1958/59 and there is no prospect of such provision being made considering that there is an unused provision of \$1.5 million in the Federal Estimates. The only alternative to the disbandment of the Regiment after the 31st March, 1958, would be for the Federal Government to meet its cost from the Federal defence vote for 1958. A straightforward request to do so would be unlikely to achieve the desired result if only because your Advisory Committee may well feel itself unable to commit the future Federal Government in this way, and it is therefore intended to propose that the cost of the Jamaica Regiment should for the time being be met by the Federal Government from an "advance account" out of the \$1.5 million defence vote, this being taken into account without prejudice to the Federation's case during its discussion with H.M.G. on the re-formation of the West India Regiment. A draft despatch has been prepared and now awaits Treasury concurrence (we have been informed orally that they only propose to suggest some alterations of detail and not of substance). A copy of this draft despatch is attached (Annex H).

13. Although this despatch will be addressed to the Chairman of the Standing Federation Committee and repeated to the unit governments (and the participating governments outside the Federation) it is anticipated that this item will come before your Advisory Council at its first meeting. There will undoubtedly be much (and no doubt angry) criticism of the line taken by the Secretary of State, but it represents the only possible way now of salvaging a project which is essential to the internal security and defence of the West Indies and which provides you in the last resort with the necessary sanction to maintain the authority of the Federal Government. Unless the Advisory Committee accept the proposal in Annex H the Federal Government will have to be resigned to losing the West India Regiment and probably the Jamaica

Regiment now, and losing the British garrison in 1960 or possibly even earlier (since it will no longer be required to train either the West India or Jamaica Regiments).

66 CO 1031/2025, no 250

19 Feb 1958

[Federal capital]: letter from Sir E Beetham (Trinidad) to P Rogers
on the response in Trinidad to the US stand over Chaguaramas

[Concern over the US attitude was not confined to Trinidad. In Aug 1957 Luke forwarded to the CO complaints made by those West Indians who had attended the London discussions in July about statements made by US base officials, including the base commander. The statements included comments to the effect that the naval facilities at Chaguaramas could not be duplicated elsewhere in the Caribbean, that the western hemisphere's chain of defence would be seriously weakened if Chaguaramas were handed over, and that 'aside from strategic considerations men stationed here would be very sorry if the United States ever (repeat ever) has to leave it'. Such comments seemed to invalidate the statement made by Whitney at the London discussions about not prejudging the outcome of the inquiry to be undertaken by the joint commission (see 64). Through Luke, the West Indian delegates asked HMG to convey a strong protest to the US government. They also expressed their concern over reports in the US press that the US government was now proposing to build (or actually building) a guided missile tracking station at Chaguaramas (CO 1031/2025, no 201, inward savingram no 27, Luke to Lennox-Boyd, 30 Aug 1957).]

Public controversy about the United States Naval Base at Chaguaramas, to which you refer in your letter WIS 30/375/02 of the 11th of February has caused us all here a great deal of embarrassment.

We must, however, face certain inefaceable facts, the most important of which are:—

- (a) the acute sensitivity of the Americans to any form of public criticism, no matter from what source it comes (e.g. Dr. Billy Graham, the American Evangelist, who stated in a Press interview that the Base would make an ideal Federal Capital, may, according to an American Consular Officer, be called to account when he returns to the United States);
- (b) the equally extraordinary belief by the Americans that the taking of any one into their confidence and giving such information as security allows, is a sign of national weakness, with their consequent reluctance to give quite harmless information to those politicians with whom, in a very few years, they will have to deal direct as leaders of an independent nation. This has, since the Commission started working, caused Arden-Clarke¹ to speak his mind to his American colleagues in no uncertain terms on more than one occasion;
- (c) the violent antipathy of the Trinidad Guardian—the most widely read daily newspaper in Trinidad and the Eastern Caribbean—to anything American in general and the American Base at Chaguaramas in particular;

¹ Sir Charles Arden-Clarke, formerly governor of the Gold Coast, was chairman of the joint commission investigating Chaguaramas. Members of the commission were, for the UK, Vice-Admiral W K Edden, representing first sea lord as naval adviser to the West Indies, and R W Taylor, engineering adviser to CO; for the US, Rear Admiral J H Wellings, US Navy, assistant chief of naval operations, Rear Admiral M K Kehart, US Navy, director, Atlantic Division of US Navy Bureau of Yards and Docks, and E E Seelye, a senior partner of a consulting engineering firm; for Trinidad, A H Richard, consulting engineer, and Lt Comdr L H Geofroy, Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve.

- (d) the approach of the Federal Elections and the intended use by the Opposition, not by the Government, of the Chaguaramas Base question as political ammunition. This means not only that the Government must join issue but also that the matter will not be allowed to recede into the background;
- (e) the Americans' lack of any sense of timing and their reluctance to give the Press a statement which would take all the heat out of a particular incident until it is too late and the pot has already boiled over—and this in spite of strong advice by Arden-Clarke;
- (f) the repeated mis-quotation in the local Press of statements made by the Chief Minister—see also (c) above; and
- (g) the understandable difficulty of the ordinary Trinidadian in believing that the starting of “the third phase”, indeed the speeding up, of the construction of the Missile Tracking Station is not prejudicial to the work of the Commission. The Press did not, of course, do anything to clear this misunderstanding.

When, therefore, the Trinidad Government made its protest which it had to do in the prevailing atmosphere, regarding the work on the Missile Tracking Station—which protest you will notice was classified as secret—discussions were held between Arden-Clarke and Edden and myself, and immediately after with Arden-Clarke, Edden and myself, and Lord Hailes. As a result of these discussions and further discussions between Arden-Clarke and Edden with the Americans it was decided that, provided permission could be obtained from Washington, Wellings (with Arden-Clarke and Edden present) should give a confidential talk to the Trinidad Executive Council on the over-all defence strategy of the Western Hemisphere. The meeting was held (I was in the chair) on the 5th of February. While it did not do an awful lot of good it has at least strangled at birth the possibility of any member of the Government saying that he has been kept in the dark about the general defence planning. Wellings was good and answered questions well, though I do not myself think that the elected Ministers understood much of it, not because it was difficult to understand, but because their minds were on the pin-point of Chaguaramas and not on the over-all picture. Williams did not cut a very intelligent figure when he implied that he believed that Trinidad could stand alone no matter what the United States and the United Kingdom may do. One question that was somewhat pressed was “we understand that the Gulf of Paria is vital to the supply needs of America during a war, but why, in that case, doesn't America consider leasing a portion of the Venezuelan peninsula which sticks out on the north of the Gulf opposite Chaguaramas and release Chaguaramas?” At the end of the meeting the Chief Minister made a statement (which he later put in writing and a copy of which I enclose)² denying certain remarks in the Press attributed to him under the headlines “Chag. or Trinidad walks alone”.

In the meantime on the 21st of January, the Commission sent a very prompt reply to the Trinidad protest which, for the time being at any rate, seems to have satisfied the Government that the continuation of work on the Missile Tracking Station is not prejudicing the work of the Commission.

There was a good chance that members of the Government would have felt that they had registered their point and would not pursue the matter any further. The

² Enclosures not printed.

Press, however, continues to publish articles daily and there is nothing in this instance that we can do. Indeed, in all the prevailing circumstances, we must do nothing as the matter is resolving itself into an open political controversy. This is evidenced by the following Opposition motion which is on the order paper for the sitting of the Legislative Council the day after tomorrow:—

“Be it resolved that this Honourable House has no confidence in the recent statements and actions of the Honourable the Chief Minister in dealing with matters of national and international interest.”

The Opposition will, I expect, attack the Government on its taxation policy from the national point of view and, internationally, on the Chaguaramas issue.

You will appreciate, therefore, that there is nothing more we can do at this juncture which could be of any material advantage: we cannot muzzle the Press or the politicians any more than you in the United Kingdom can do so. I enclose a Press report which appeared in today's Trinidad Guardian purporting to give the Secretary of State's reply on the Chaguaramas question. The last sentence of this report which reads: “The site was in a high ridge, which would probably not be suitable for buildings for the Capital” is, whether reported correctly or incorrectly, perhaps a little unfortunate since we have been informed that should the Base be handed over to The West Indies, the Americans would move the Missile Tracking Station to another site and it is for this very reason that the continuation of its construction is not prejudicial to the work of the Commission—this information was, of course, given to us by the Americans under cloak of secrecy.

I have talked all this over with Arden-Clarke, and should it become advisable, as time goes on and as the Federal election campaign becomes hotter, either he or I or both of us will have a talk to Williams, but it must be clearly understood that Wellings will never be able to tell Williams or the members of the Government anything more than he has already told them.

67 CO 1031/2025, no 264

7 Mar 1958

[Federal capital]: letter from H A A Hankey¹ to P Rogers on the US stand over Chaguaramas and the most appropriate UK response.

Enclosure: letter from Lord Hood² (Washington) to FO (1 Mar 1958)

I enclose a copy of a letter to Sir F. Hoyer Millar³ from Lord Hood at Washington, about Chaguaramas, forwarding a copy of the American aide mémoire⁴ referred to in Washington telegram No. 473 of February 27 and commenting on it. As you will see, the aide mémoire more than bears out the indications given in the telegram about the concern felt by the State Department over the danger of a serious deadlock arising after the Joint Commission has reported. In particular, the State Department make certain specific requests: however anxious we may be to go along with them as far as possible in the interests of defence and harmonious relations in general, it may

¹ Head of American Dept, FO.

³ Permanent under-secretary of state, FO.

² H M minister, Washington.

⁴ Aide mémoire not printed.

be hard to comply with these at the present stage without compromising our position with the West Indians.

2. As regards the renewed plea from the State Department for further pressure on our part to moderate the expression of local feeling, the letter from Sir E. Beetham to you of February 19⁵ provides a clear account of what has already been done in this direction and the limits beyond which it is practically and constitutionally impossible to go. As I think you know, we showed this letter to the United States Embassy informally, and I believe that it may already have had a salutary effect on them; they now appear to realize that there is very little more we can do at this stage. Nevertheless, it would be too much to hope that they will be able to convince the State Department of this. I suggest therefore that our best course will be to prepare a memorandum embodying Sir E. Beetham's material for communication to the State Department by our Embassy in Washington. It will be necessary at the same time for the Embassy to give our considered replies to the requests made in the *aide mémoire*.

3. A new and unpleasant factor in the situation, of which we need to take account, is the indication in paragraph 2 of Lord Hood's letter that the United States Government intend to stand firm in their possession of the Base no matter what the Commission recommends, and that in any case they believe the Commission's report will be against release or partition. We had always feared this might be the case, but had supposed that there was a fair chance that the Commission might report that at least partition was practicable from the defence angle provided the costs involved could be met. Foster, of the United States Embassy, who called under instructions from Washington to make to us the same points that Mr. Herter⁶ had made in his conversation with Lord Hood, expressed the view in this connexion that while the State Department fully appreciated the political case in favour of meeting the West Indians, the Defense Department were quite impervious to any political considerations and would decline to volunteer a cent to contribute towards a settlement based, for example, on partition.

4. The arguments advanced by Lord Hood in his paragraphs 9 and 10 in favour of deciding here and now to come down firmly on the American side in this dispute are powerful. Nevertheless, it seems abundantly clear from Sir E. Beetham's letter that our opportunities for guiding the opinions of the West Indians are far more limited than the Embassy believes. If only for this reason we may, however reluctantly, have to postpone finally making up our minds what our position is to be (or at least postpone appearing to do so) until the Commission has made its report and we can gauge the impact on the West Indians. With these considerations in mind, I would tentatively suggest that our reactions to the points in the last paragraph of the State Department's *aide mémoire* should be on the following lines:—

(a) We have always recognized the importance of the Base from the point of view of defence, and we have always acknowledged the validity of the United States' legal position. On these points our policy will remain unchanged. We do not think, however, that we can commit ourselves in advance of the Commission's findings. (We have in fact always hoped, and cannot refrain from continuing to do so until the Joint Commission makes its report, that a compromise based on partition

⁵ See 66.

⁶ C A Herter, US under-secretary of state, 1957–1959; secretary of state, 1959–1961.

might be found which would continue to meet the United States' defence requirements and avoid any serious clash with the West Indians).

(b) We have been doing all we can. We should of course inform the Governor of the renewed representations by the Americans on this point. But at the same time, for the reasons advanced in his letter of February 19, he is debarred from going further than he has already gone. Furthermore, it would be tactically unsound for us to over-emphasize our support of the American case at least until the Commission's report is available. The most critical moment, when the need for our restraining influence will be at its greatest, will presumably come after the Commission has reported and when it becomes clear that whatever the nature of the report the Americans intend to remain inflexible; by taking the American side now, far from swaying the West Indians in the right direction, we would be undermining our capacity for influencing them when and if this crucial moment arrives.

(c) We should certainly not ourselves put forward any such suggestion. Our information, however, does not confirm the American theory that partitioning of the Base would be unacceptable to the West Indians in the last resort. Even if we have to accept the fact that partitioning is out of the question at this stage, the United States may be faced with a request to release part of the area in, say, 1961 or 1962, by which time they should have been able to make alternative arrangements. In that event, we should have to invite the State Department to consider with the Defense Department whether the political advantages of retaining friendly relations with the Federation in its early years might not be worth the cost involved; they would also have to take into account other political considerations, such as that the nascent Federation might collapse altogether on the capital issue, with all that this would involve in giving propaganda material to anti-American elements all over the world.

(d) The Governor should be informed of this, but we have no reason to believe that he is not already fully aware of the importance of maintaining the non-political status of the Commission.

5. I should be glad to know what you think about all this. As we should send a reply soon to Washington, it would perhaps be best if we were to discuss the matter further at a meeting of representatives of our two Departments.

Enclosure to 67

As you will have seen from our telegram No. 473 Mr. Herter saw the Ambassador on February 26th and handed to him copies of the enclosed Aide Memoire on Chaguaramas. The Ambassador, who left Washington early the next morning, asked me to write in his absence.

2. The main point made by the Americans both in the Aide Memoire and orally is that they want our active support for their retention of the base. Although they seem fairly confident that the Commission's report will in fact be against release or partition, it is now plain that the United States Government intend to stand firm in their possession of the base no matter what the Commission recommends and that they will resist all attempts to persuade them to abandon it. What they are in effect

asking us to do is to take a decision now in principle to support them and, in the intervening period before the time comes for formal consideration of the Commission's report, to take what action we can to prevent a possible explosion over this issue. In particular, they are perturbed at the way in which Dr. Eric Williams and, probably, the whole West Indies Federal Labour Party are bent on making the base an election issue, regardless of what the Commission recommends. They ask us to use whatever influence we may possess with the West Indian politicians to persuade them not to inflame the situation by making a political issue of it in this way.

3. Before considering the merits of the American position, there are certain criticisms of it which I should like to dispose of.

4. The first is that it is now plain that the United States Government have been less than frank with us about the full implications of establishing the missile tracking station. Although it remains true, as stated by the Colonial Secretary in the House of Commons, that the missile tracking station will not prejudice the findings of the Joint Commission on the Capital Site, it was somewhat disingenuous to have led us to believe that this was because it was (again to quote the Colonial Secretary) "on a high ridge in a remote and undeveloped part of the leased base." The briefing which they gave the Ambassador showed clearly that in fact the missile tracking station will depend for its effectiveness on certain ancillary installations which are within the Tucker Valley areas. The reason for this lack of frankness is that until the last few days the Air Force had not explained the situation fully to the State Department. The State Department have subsequently told us that in fact the Air Force speeded up the construction of the tracking station as part of a crash programme set off as a result of the arrival of Sputnik. Quite apart from the dependence of the missile tracking station upon ancillary facilities in the main base area, a further factor in the situation now is that any interruption of its construction or subsequent operation would seriously affect the installation in Thule of an effective ballistic missile early warning system for the whole of the North American continent. We believed that the Ministry of Defence already know something of this. Despite these new elements in the situation, however, the main point—happily—remains as stated in the Colonial Secretary's reply, that the decisions of the Commission will be based upon the importance of the Naval Base alone, and the missile tracking station will have no bearing upon the final recommendations.

5. A second point of criticism can be made against the suggestion in their Aide Memoire that we "urge British officials . . . to assist the Commission in maintaining its non-political status". As far as we are aware there is no evidence to suggest that the Commission has allowed local political considerations to influence it in the slightest. We might, if we felt so inclined, take some umbrage at the American suggestion that this were even a possibility. The State Department in subsequent discussions have made it plain that they did not intend the comment to reflect upon the Commission; but they had misunderstood the role which Trinidad officials had played last month in the lodging of the protest to the Commission about the missile tracking station. They thought that these officials were in some way acting on the orders of the Colonial Office. They have been put right on this point, and the last sentence of their aide memoire can therefore be ignored.

6. A third possible point of criticism is that they may be taking an unduly alarmist view of the political situation in Trinidad and the West Indies generally. We

notice, for example, that the Governor of Trinidad's Intelligence Report for January says that Dr. Eric Williams denied some earlier inflammatory statements attributed to him in one of the local newspapers. The same report does not indicate that the Chaguaramas issue is receiving any great attention in the speeches of the politicians and also records that "there appears to be no anti-American feeling by the general public" despite the renewed interest in the capital site question. The State Department sources of information however are very much more up to date and detailed than our own, and we are in no position here to criticise their assessment of the position. They have shown us a number of extracts from the speeches of Dr. Williams which appear to support their point of view.

7. A fourth criticism could be that it is wrong of the Americans to have made an approach to us of this kind before the Commission has reported. We could argue that we should all suspend judgement until we have seen what the Commission has to say. The American reply to this would be that the West Indian politicians themselves have not suspended judgement or shown themselves willing to await the verdict of the Commission. Dr. Williams for example is on record as saying that they "have decided on Chaguaramas and it is nobody's business but the West Indies' where the capital should be". The Americans are confident that any objective assessment of the situation would leave them in possession of the base. It is in the light of such objective considerations that they intend to stand pat. All they are asking us to do is to take preventative action now in view of the situation which is obviously developing, so that we can avoid a head-on clash later and achieve a solution which would be in the best interests of all of us—the West Indies included. This is surely a sensible exercise of foresight and not a prejudgment of the issue.

8. There is one final point of criticism of the American position, which we have in fact made to the State Department, and which Dr. Eric Williams was equally quick to seize upon, when he said: "The Americans, who are the great anti-colonial nation of the world, should be the last to defend (the agreement of 1941)." This, however, though a good debating point, is not very relevant to the objective merits of their case for retaining Chaguaramas or to the situation which is now so clearly developing.

9. So much for the points of criticism. The fact remains that we have now been invited to make up our minds what our position is to be on the whole Chaguaramas issue, and to decide that this should be to support the American stand. We realise here, of course, that H.M.G. may well feel that it already has its hands full enough with disputes and arguments with the West Indian politicians over such things as increased U.K. aid and the Jamaica Regiment, and may be extremely reluctant to embark upon another. Nevertheless we feel that on the Chaguaramas issue, H.M.G. should now give serious consideration to supporting the American position despite any temporary hard feelings which this may cause with the West Indies. To give this support would, it seems to us, be in the best interests of all concerned. In the first place, quite apart from the obvious embarrassment for us, a head-on clash will do serious material damage to the West Indians themselves. It seems fairly clear from the recent talks which have taken place in Washington that the United States Government are sympathetic towards extending United States aid to the British Caribbean. I think that as far as officials are concerned this sympathetic attitude may well remain no matter what happens over Chaguaramas, but clearly for political reasons all hope of their translating this sympathy into concrete terms would disappear if too much bad feeling were stirred up over the base.

10. Secondly, there seems to be little argument about the fact that a base in that part of the world is of vital importance both to the defence of the Caribbean and to the defence of the Western Hemisphere. If the Commission reports as expected that there is no alternative site for the base, surely we have a responsibility to ensure that the West Indians do not act in a way which would be so seriously prejudicial to all our interests. After all we are not giving them complete independence at this stage. We retain control of their external affairs and have certain responsibilities for their defence. We also have a clear legal obligation to the Americans under the 1941 treaty. It surely behoves us to act up to these responsibilities in our own interests as well as theirs.

11. I realise that it may not be easy to decide what in practice we could do to damp down the flames of controversy during the election. Perhaps the Colonial Office could bring some influence to bear on the Governor-General and the local Governors, who, in turn, even in the changed constitutional situation, could have some influence on some, at any rate, of the local politicians. It might perhaps be possible to do something with the local press. These are matters which it is extremely difficult to judge from here, but on which London may have ideas.

12. We should be grateful if you would keep us fully informed of your reactions to this American approach.

68 CO 1031/2025, no 283, enclosure 21 Mar 1958
 [Federal capital]: letter from Sir F Hoyer Millar to Sir H Caccia¹
 (Washington) on how the UK should respond to the US request for
 support over Chaguaramas

We have been considering the American approach to us over the Chaguaramas affair which was the subject of Hood's letter to me, CA/7001/58 of March 1² and yours of March 8. In the process, we have felt it desirable in view of the political issues involved to submit the file to the Secretary of State. His personal comment is reflected in paragraph 10 below.

2. We too have heard from our representatives on the Commission that the report is likely to be unfavourable to the West Indian point of view. We fully share the concern felt by the State Department about the danger of an explosion of public feeling in the West Indies, and particularly Trinidad, when the Commission's findings become known. Quite apart from the desirability of avoiding a row on general grounds, we do not want repercussions of this problem to bedevil the celebrations for the inauguration of the Federation, which are due to begin on April 22 with the presence of Princess Margaret, and we should not like anything to happen which might prejudice the Federation's prospects of receiving American aid. In order to ensure the full success of the inauguration celebrations and the Royal visit, Lord Hailes has gone so far as to suggest that no announcement should be made by any of the Governments concerned of the Commission's findings until, say, the middle of May. But we do not believe that a leakage, at any rate from West Indian sources, could be avoided for so long. While, therefore, we agree with the idea

¹ UK ambassador, Washington, 1956–1961.

² See 67, enclosure.

underlying Lord Hailes suggestion, it is being proposed to him that, subject to his and Sir C. Arden-Clarke's views, the Governments concerned should agree to refrain from any public comment for only a fortnight after the Commission has presented its report. This would at least lessen the danger of immediate ill-considered expressions of opinion on the part of the West Indians, and would give us and the Americans a little time to prepare our own public reactions.

3. However, it is clear that you need, in answering the State Department, something more than a rehearsal of our good intentions. We need to dispel the illusion that we have not exerted ourselves sufficiently in restraining political agitation about Chaguaramas in Trinidad. One of the difficulties we have to face here is that the State Department are evidently not aware of some of the reasons why it is very difficult for the Governor and his staff to do more than they have done. However, I hope that the information with which we have been provided by the Colonial Office will help in giving the State Department a clearer understanding of the realities of the position.

4. I suggest that in your reply to Herter (which, subject to your views, we think need not be in writing) you should begin by emphasizing that we have always recognized the importance of the Base from the point of view of defence and have always acknowledged the validity of the United States' legal position. On these points our views remain unchanged, however great the political difficulties may be. Furthermore, it has always been our intention to abide by the agreed findings of the Commission (and until receiving Mr. Herter's aide mémoire we had always hoped that the Americans would feel bound to do the same). Should the Commission's findings indeed be unambiguously opposed to the siting of the capital in the Base, we shall do our best to persuade West Indian and Trinidad opinion to accept the inevitable and settle on another Trinidad site, probably, as we see it here, with as good a grace and as little delay as possible; above all we shall wish to avoid a reopening of the whole question of which island should have the capital. Obviously we are as concerned as the State Department over the dangers of serious political trouble arising over this question in the West Indies, and particularly Trinidad. At your discretion you may wish to illustrate this by the special considerations in paragraph 2 above; and at the same time request their views on the proposal that the Commission's findings should not be made public until a fortnight after they have been communicated to all concerned, and that no public statements should be made about them during that period.

5. You might then go on to say that, because of our anxiety that political emotions in the West Indies should be tempered so far as possible, we have done all we can to achieve this end through the Governors of the colonies concerned, and particularly Trinidad. Sir E. Beetham has indeed gone to the length of arranging and presiding over a meeting at which Wellings, the American representative on the Commission, gave a confidential talk to the Trinidad Executive Council about overall defence strategy in the Western hemisphere. We are in fact satisfied that the Governor and his staff have done all they reasonably can to exercise influence in the right direction, by personal contacts with the Chief Minister, Dr. Eric Williams, and the other principal politicians. Unfortunately, the position has not been made any easier by the genuine difficulty of explaining away the fact that construction of the guided missile tracking station was being pushed ahead while the Commission was sitting. Undoubtedly the assurances given from the United States side that the

continuation of work on the tracking station was not prejudicing the Commission had a beneficial effect. But the fact remains that the area which is being covered by the tracking station is a good deal larger than had at first been anticipated and is apparently not limited to a high ridge of ground which would be unsuitable for the capital site, as was at first stated. There are other difficulties in the way of tranquillizing opinion, of which the State Department may not be fully aware. The "Trinidad Guardian," the most widely-read daily newspaper in Trinidad and the Eastern Caribbean, appears unfortunately to harbour a violent antipathy to the United States activities in Trinidad. This newspaper, and others, have repeatedly misquoted statements made by the Chief Minister; and the press in general continues to fan public interest in the Chaguaramas affair. Yet it is no more possible for the Governor to muzzle the press in Trinidad than it would be for the Administration to do so in the United States—nor, presumably, would the State Department wish him to try. Another serious obstacle is the fact that, for security reasons which may or may not be well-founded, it has not been found possible (even at the meeting with the Trinidad Executive Council referred to above) to give the West Indians a full exposition of the defence considerations involved. (For your own background information I enclose a copy of a letter from Sir E. Beetham of February 19³ which gives further details; this letter was shown in confidence to the United States Embassy here, where we believe it had a very salutary effect).

6. A further point worth making to the State Department is that in our view it would be tactically unsound for the Governor to give strong support to the American case, at least until the Commission's report is available. The most critical moment, when the need for our restraining influence will be at its greatest, will presumably come after the Commission has reported, and when it becomes clear that whatever the nature of the report the Americans intend to remain inflexible; by coming out too strongly on the American side now we would, far from swaying the West Indians in the right direction, be undermining any possibility of influencing them when the crucial moment arrives.

7. There are certain ways, however, in which we believe the United States Government could assist us in our task. Much would depend, for example, on the manner in which the inevitable agitation in the West Indies is handled by official spokesmen and in the press in the United States. It would also help to make an unfavourable decision less unpalatable to the West Indians if the Americans could make some economic concessions which would be valuable to the Federation and the Trinidad Government; for example, an offer to forego some of their duty-free rights (paragraph 4 of your letter of March 8) would be very welcome in Trinidad (the Federation itself would not benefit but the most serious problem is in Trinidad); the opportunity might also be taken for the United States Government to make known locally, in a suitable manner, their offer of economic aid, although, in order to avoid the impression that a bribe was being offered, the timing of any announcement would have to be carefully co-ordinated with the Governor and Lord Hailes. Finally, it would also help if the Americans were to follow up Admiral Davis'⁴ suggestion that they should send warships more often to the naval base in order to show that it was in serious use as such; it would, of course, be important not to overdo this, especially

³ See 66.

⁴ Admiral Sir William Davis, c-in-c, Home Fleet and NATO c-in-c, Eastern Atlantic, 1958–1960.

during the difficult period immediately following the publication of the Commission's findings.

8. In reply to the American request that we should refrain from suggesting a compromise which would result in the partitioning of the Chaguaramas Base, you can say that we should certainly not ourselves put forward any such suggestion. Our information, however, does not confirm the American theory that partitioning of the Base would be unacceptable to the West Indians in the last resort. We had always hoped indeed that the Commission might be able to recommend a solution based on partition, practicable from the defence angle and not necessarily involving unacceptable expenditure by the United States. We do not know what shape the Commission's report will take. But if the report does not on defence grounds exclude a compromise solution based on partition, we could not justifiably resist an initiative from the West Indian side to invite the State Department to consider, with the Defense Department, whether the political advantages of meeting the Federation's wishes might not be worth the cost involved. It might be worth while reminding the State Department of these political advantages, which are in brief those of retaining friendly relations with the Federation in its early years; avoiding the danger of the Federation being seriously weakened by a revival of inter-island dissensions on the capital issue; and the desirability of not giving propaganda material to anti-American elements all over the world.

9. We regard it as inevitable that there should be more or less serious trouble in Trinidad if and when it becomes known that the capital cannot be sited at Chaguaramas. But I hope that this letter will give you enough material to satisfy the State Department at least that we have acted in accordance with our degree of responsibility for keeping the agitation within manageable proportions if possible, and that they can count on us not to let them down over the defence aspect of the problem. The American Embassy here have spoken to us in the same sense as Herter did to you, and the Ambassador has gone so far as to mention the subject to the Prime Minister; we are informing the Embassy therefore of the general substance of this letter.

10. As I mentioned above, this file has been seen personally by the Secretary of State, who has given his general approval to this letter. I think you should know his general feeling, which connects up incidentally with paragraph 8 of Sammy Hood's letter of March 1. He feels that the Americans want it both ways, in both encouraging anti-colonialism of all kinds and then lecturing us for not behaving as colonialists. Against this background, he feels that we are able to help much more if we can be rather detached and take the line that our good offices are always available in what is becoming a matter between the Federation and the United States. One realizes of course that you cannot apply this argument literally to every element in the case; the point, I think, is that if we go too far overboard on the American side now, any efforts on our part to exercise a moderating influence later will be quite useless.

11. Finally, with regard to Admiral Davis' suggestion (penultimate paragraph of your letter of March 8) that Sir C Arden-Clarke might travel back to London via Washington when the Commission has concluded its work. I entirely agree that this would be a good idea, and the CO have put the idea to him through the Governor of Trinidad. We will let you know the outcome.

69 Co 1031/2961, no 5

Mar 1958

'The West Indies': CO note for the War Office on the finances of the federation and the federal prime minister

[Extract]

... Finance and economic

12. The Federation will not have an easy passage economically or financially. For the first five years its own revenues will be chiefly in the form of a mandatory levy on the federating territories. The total revenue from this levy, which has a fixed annual ceiling of £1,900,000, and from other sources is little greater than the estimated Federal expenditure and leaves only a small margin for the building up of capital reserves. Economically the region as a whole is not wealthy, although better off than it sometimes thinks it is and West Indian leaders are very keenly aware of these difficulties an awareness [sic] which sometimes results in extravagant demands for financial aid from Her Majesty's Government. In fact Her Majesty's Government has given and will continue to give for some time grants to assist those territories within the Federation that cannot meet their own administrative expenses annually, assistance through Colonial Development and Welfare funds, through the Colonial Development Corporation, in the raising of loans etc. It is a fact that the West Indies have received proportionately more aid from Her Majesty's Government in the last twelve years than any other part of the United Kingdom Dependencies.

13. The maximum amounts payable annually by territories under the mandatory levy are as follows:—

	£
Antigua	25,400
Barbados	162,600
Dominica	20,900
Grenada	32,200
Jamaica	819,100
Montserrat	5,200
St. Kitts	32,800
St. Lucia	33,000
St. Vincent	24,900
Trinidad	733,900

(It should be noted that these sums do not represent merely the cost of "federation" to the individual territories, for they include elements in respect of annual contributions that the territories have been accustomed to paying since long before federation became an accomplished fact, towards the maintenance of regional educational and technical institutions and advisory and other services.) Under the terms of the Constitution the Federal Government is not permitted to levy income tax during the first five years; it may levy customs and excise duties (though it has not yet decided to do so) provided that the total revenue from these and the mandatory levy does not exceed £1,900,000 annually during the first five years.

The federal prime minister

14. There has been much speculation lately as to which, if any, of the three leading West Indian politicians would become Prime Minister. They are Mr. Norman

Manley, Chief Minister of Jamaica, Dr. Eric Williams, Chief Minister of Trinidad and Sir Grantley Adams, Premier of Barbados. All three not long ago announced their intention not to stand for the Federal elections, and had this been so the success of the Federation would have been greatly endangered for there are, so far, no other politicians of their stature on the horizon. Dr. Williams' decision was taken on the grounds of the need for Trinidad to improve her economic position as speedily as possible and in the light of his own fairly recent accession to the Chief Ministership of the territory. Mr. Manley's reasons are his concern that anti-Federal forces in Jamaica should not get the upper hand in his absence and the need for economic strength in Jamaica and Trinidad, the two biggest members of the Federation. After Mr. Manley's decision was announced, Sir Grantley Adams changed his mind and decided to stand for the Federal elections and there is very little doubt that, as the leading candidate of the stronger of the two Federal Parties, the Federal Labour Party, he will be returned and elected Prime Minister. If this proves to be so there will be some advantage in having a Federal Prime Minister who is backed in their Territories by both Mr. Manley and Dr. Williams. The fact that Mr. Manley remains in Jamaica as a pro-Federationist may hold Jamaica within the Federation, for there is little doubt that Mr. Manley's fears for his own territory are substantiated; the power of a Federation that lacked Jamaica's financial and economic resources would be sadly weakened. . . .

70 CO 1031/2026, no 315A

25 Mar 1958

[Chaguaramas Joint Commission]: chapter VII of the report, summary of the commission's conclusions

115. The principal conclusions are summarised as follows:—

Strategic and military considerations

- (1) Strategically the Naval Base in the Eastern Caribbean should be on the Gulf of Paria. (Paragraph 37.)
- (2) The site selected for such a base must be capable of conforming to the military requirements. (Paragraph 45.)

United States Naval Base, Trinidad

- (3) The present Base at Chaguaramas fulfils the strategic and military requirements for a naval base in the Eastern Caribbean. (Paragraph 60.)

Possible alternative sites for a naval base in the Eastern Caribbean

- (4)(i) The only alternative sites in The West Indies which fulfil the strategic requirements and can be made to conform to the military requirements for a United States Naval Base in the Eastern Caribbean are the Caroni Swamp, Waterloo North and Waterloo South, Savaneta and Irois Bay, all situated on the west coast of Trinidad on the Gulf of Paria. (Paragraphs 66–67.)
- (4)(ii) The cost of development to provide what exists at Chaguaramas today on these sites would vary from 226 to 425 million W.I. dollars (£47 to £88½ million sterling or U.S. dollars 132 to 248 million approximately) and the time required to

construct these facilities would vary from five and a half to ten years. (Paragraphs 75–77.)

(5) The United States and United Kingdom Naval Representatives agree that if the Governments concerned agree in principle to move the Base, and if the necessary funds are made available, from military considerations IROIS BAY would be the preferable choice of the alternative sites. But in their opinion Chaguaramas is the most suitable site for a naval base on the Gulf of Paria. (Paragraph 96.)

Investigation of possible release of portion of the United States Naval Base

(6) There is no significant portion of useable area within the Chaguaramas Naval Base that is not essential to the Base's mission. (Paragraph 100.)

(7) The release of any portion of the Chaguaramas Base as a prelude to its ultimate total release is impracticable. (Paragraph 104.)

(8) The partition of the Chaguaramas Base is not practicable. (Paragraph 109.)

71 CO 1031/2628, no 54

3 Apr 1958

[Federal elections]: letter from K D Law¹ to A R Adair² on the results of the March elections

You asked for a short piece about the results of the Federal Elections in The West Indies for circulation, confidentially, to Commonwealth Governments. The full results are annexed,³ and so far as we know they are accurate although they were compiled from various sources, not all official. The following briefly summarises the position.

The results of the Federal Elections held on the 25th March show that, apart from the possibility of further recounts in individual constituencies or of defection among the successful local parties (particularly in Grenada, where it has been rumoured that the two members elected are thinking of transferring their allegiance to the "Opposition" party), Mr. Manley's West Indies Federal Labour Party has gained 25⁴ of the available 45 seats and Sir Alexander Bustamante's Democratic Labour Party of The West Indies 19. The remaining seat has fallen to the Barbados National Party, which is not affiliated to either of the two Federal parties, but it seems probable that the candidate returned will side with Sir Grantley Adams' Barbados Labour Party and hence with the Federal Labour Party; if so, Mr. Manley's party would have a majority of seven⁵ in the Federal House of Representatives.

While the smaller islands have remained, in general, true to the Federal Labour Party, in both Jamaica and Trinidad, where both parties put up candidates in each constituency, there were stinging defeats for the parties locally in power (Mr. Manley's People's National Party and Dr. Williams' People's National Movement), both of which are affiliated to the Federal Labour Party. Only four members of the

¹ Higher executive officer, CO.

² Principal, CRO.

³ Not printed.

⁴ Subsequently reduced to twenty-three when the two Grenada members declared themselves independents.

⁵ Subsequently reduced to one, the member from the Barbados National Party also being regarded as an independent.

former Standing Federation Committee have been returned, and of these Sir Grantley Adams seems certain to be elected the first Prime Minister; if so, he will probably have as leader of the Opposition either Mr. Albert Gomes or Mr. Ashford Sinanan, both of Trinidad.

The Governor-General has issued a Proclamation summoning the Legislature to meet for the first time on the 18th April, when the Senate will elect a President and Deputy President and the House of Representatives a Speaker (either from among their members or from outside the House) and Deputy Speaker. Then, or shortly afterwards, the House will elect a person for appointment as Prime Minister.

I hope this will suffice?

72 CO 1031/2026, no 321

3 Apr 1958

[Federal capital]: letter from Mr Selwyn Lloyd to Sir H Caccia (Washington) on the American response to the findings of the Chaguaramas Joint Commission¹

The United States Ambassador called on me to-day.

Mr. Whitney said that the United States Embassy would be sending a note about the Chaguaramas dispute. The note would refer to their previous note of last June which had stressed the necessity for keeping the United States base at Chaguaramas. It would also cite United States participation in the conference and in the Commission as evidence of American recognition of the seriousness of the situation concerning both our Governments and the West Indies. The note would refer to the Commission's conclusions which supported the United States point of view about the impossibility of releasing the base. Finally, the note would ask Her Majesty's Government, in the light of the Commission's report, to advise the West Indies that Her Majesty's Government could not request the United States Government to release the base and that this request should therefore be withdrawn.

The Ambassador said that it was hoped this action could be taken before the report was released, since the United States Government at that stage would have to make a public statement of their position. He added that the recent elections in the West Indies has [sic] provided no evidence that there was any popular demand there for the release of the base.

I said that we were anxious to help in any way we could but the basic difficulty was that once people were given independence we could not then simply order them about. It might well make the situation more difficult if we were to tell the West Indies that they must accept the Commission's report.

I told the Ambassador that we had been very distressed to hear from the Chairman of the Commission that the United States members had made it quite plain that they thought the British members, including the Chairman himself, had orders from London to support the West Indian position. This was quite untrue. Our whole purpose was to have an objective study made and we were very conscious of the importance which the United States attached to the matter. The problem had been under constant review at the highest levels.

¹ See 70.

I said that before giving any formal reply we should of course have to study the United States note. My preliminary reaction was that our advice to the West Indians might well be that it would pay them to accept the Commission's report magnanimously. We had in fact been advised by Sir Arden-Clarke that an offer of substantial United States financial assistance for building the capital elsewhere might help to resolve the problem. Our advice to the United States Government must be that they for their part should act generously towards the West Indies and thus "sugar the pill."

73 CO 1031/2022, no 2

12 May 1958

[US bases]: letter from J E Marnham to Lieutenant-Colonel A Lovelace¹ on the functions of the various US defence facilities in the West Indies

Would you please refer to Wallace's letter to Luke of the 26th August, 1957, about the handling of questions connected with the United States Defence facilities in the West Indies?

2. The end of the enclosure to that letter mentioned the need to provide the federal headquarters with detailed background information about the U.S. facilities and the terms on which they are held, and the main object of this letter is to forward copies of a Memorandum² on the subject which is intended to present a comprehensive picture of the present position and to serve as a basic document for the Federation's future activities in this sphere. (We intend to supplement this with a set of printed copies of the various Agreements. Some of these are now difficult to come by but we shall do our best to provide a complete series which I will forward as soon as possible.)

3. The Memorandum is divided into three main parts. The first contains a survey of the different categories of bases which at present exist, their relative importance, and the Agreements which relate to them. The second part examines those Agreements in some detail: in the first place distinguishing between the provisions of the Leased Bases Agreement 1941 and those of the later Agreements; going on to discuss the most important provisions which are common to all the Agreements; and finally touching briefly on the administrative arrangements which supplement the terms of the Agreements themselves. The third main part lists the various matters on which action is outstanding.

4. You will see that the Memorandum is graded "Secret" only. This means of course that it can if necessary be shown to Ministers, or its substance quoted to them, although naturally we should not wish this to be done unless there were good reasons for doing so, and while Chaguaramas remains a matter of controversy you may well want to think hard before drawing attention to the question of the outstanding formal leases (see comment on Part IIA below). There is however additional information on one or two points which has been deliberately excluded from the Memorandum so that there would be no chance of Ministers seeing it. It

¹ Defence officer to the federal government.

² Not printed.

will perhaps be simplest if I discuss this additional information in relation to those parts of the Memorandum in which it would otherwise have appeared.

Part I(ii)

The Missile Tracking Station in Trinidad is regarded as a project of the utmost importance. It is an experimental station on which the development of a system of defence for the whole Western Hemisphere against Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles largely depends. The chain of stations which it is hoped to establish as a result of the work to be carried out in Trinidad will be very widely flung, e.g. including a station in northern Scotland.

The U.S. have recently shown signs of wanting another station in Grenada or Carriacou. If they present us with a firm request, they will of course be asked to demonstrate the need for it by giving some information about its function. Meanwhile they have hinted that it would have some connection with the work to be carried out in Trinidad.

Part I(iv)

The description of functions quoted in the Memorandum is that given for public consumption and deliberately conceals the real significance of these stations. The true purpose of the Oceanographic Research Stations is the detection at long range (sometimes hundreds of miles) of snorting enemy submarines by the use of very low frequency underwater sound techniques. The Stations in The West Indies form part of a chain stretching as far north as Bermuda. This defence activity, the high importance of which is obvious, has been given the code name "Caesar".

Part I(v)

The chief reason why little progress has been made in regard to Loran Stations at St. Kitts and Tobago is the unwillingness of the Governments concerned to enter into Agreements similar to those proposed for the South Caicos and San Salvador Stations. The St. Kitts Government stipulated conditions (especially in connection with jurisdiction) which were unacceptable to the U.S. The Trinidad Government, while prepared to allow the U.S. the usual powers and privileges, were unwilling to accept the publicity which would attend a formal cession of rights. (This was before the Chaguaramas issue arose: it seems doubtful whether the Trinidad Government would at present permit any new U.S. activity.)

Part IIA—Title to land

The area for which the lack of a lease is most significant is the Tucker Valley which forms part of the Chaguaramas Base. There is however an undoubted commitment to lease this addition to the original base and for practical purposes it must be regarded in exactly the same light as that part of the base covered by a formal lease.

Part IIA—Use of evacuated land

The fact that the former Bases can be reoccupied at short notice is a major deterrent to the development of the areas. This is particularly unfortunate in St. Lucia where the disused naval base occupies one of the few areas which are well suited to tourist development and one in which potential developers have shown considerable interest. Since the strategic need for the base has apparently disappeared, an approach has been made to the U.S. for its unconditional release. Their response is still awaited.

Part III

The original causes of the delay in executing formal leases and enacting comprehensive legislation were largely technical but the major obstacle today is a political one. It would for example clearly be impracticable at the moment to suggest to the Trinidad Government the execution of a lease covering the Tucker Valley and the introduction of legislation formally granting the U.S. special powers and privileges. Nor is the Jamaica Government likely to consider this an auspicious time to make such a public concession to the Americans.

5. The primary purpose of this letter and its enclosure is of course to give general background information, which would not otherwise be readily available to you, on all the U.S. defence activities in the Caribbean. As Wallace mentioned in his letter, however, it seems to us that the Federal Government must play a bigger and bigger part in these matters as time goes by; and we therefore hope that, given the background information, you will be able to give some consideration fairly soon to the way in which the Federal Government should assume responsibility. As a first step it has occurred to us that the Federal Government might be brought into the question of the new Granada [sic] station mentioned under Part I(ii) above. This project is of course only in the survey stage at the moment, but it is likely to be the first completely new U.S. Bases issue to arise in the Federal Government's lifetime. We have it in mind that, should the survey result in a formal request for a new station, H.M. Government (to whom the formal request will be addressed) should forward the information which the U.S. give to justify the request, together with a British assessment of the strength of the U.S. case, to the Governor-General in the first instance, asking him to consider, in consultation with the Governor of the Windward Islands, whether the request should be granted. Obviously the attitude of the Grenada Government would be one of the important factors to be taken into account and initially we expect that the Federal Government would not be able to do much more than transmit the correspondence and take a friendly interest, including participation in the local discussions. Even that however would be a start, and we would hope that as soon as possible the Federal Government would take over the complete responsibility for negotiations at the West Indian end. Later we must consider what part the Federal Government will play in tying up the various loose ends mentioned in Part III of the Memorandum. Though the time for this has not yet arrived, and for the moment we can confine ourselves to repeating to the Governor-General any correspondence about the more straightforward matters in which the knot is practically tied already, it may well be that some of the more difficult unresolved issues can in fact only be solved by the Federal Government taking over the sole West Indian responsibility for dealing with them, e.g. where legislation has to be passed it would seem to us not only constitutionally correct that it should be Federal legislation, as dealing with a matter of defence and international relations, but also that this would be the only possible way politically of getting the matter dealt with at all. However, that is looking a bit to the future, and to come back to the present, we propose to offer the Federal Government its second U.S. Base issue (the first being Chaguaramas!) by sending you in due course any formal request there may be for a new station in Grenada.

6. I am sorry to inflict all this on you in your first few days as Federal Defence Officer. However, as you will see, no immediate action is necessary. Perhaps when you have settled into your post you will be able to give some thought to the subject.

We shall be very interested to hear your views; and we shall of course be very glad to provide any additional information you would like, as far as we are able.

74 CO 968/563, no 3

4 June 1958

[Defence]: letter from A Campbell¹ to Major-General J R C Hamilton²
on the defence outlook in the West Indies

Now that Rogers has returned from the Caribbean we have discussed the long-term garrison requirements for the area, and I am able to give you our views on Gregson's letter of the 3rd April.

2. The minimum internal security and defence requirement of the Caribbean was assessed at two battalions in the joint Colonial Office/War Office memorandum of January, 1957. The proposed withdrawal of the British battalion in February 1960, as part of the planned reduction of the British Army to 165,000 men, was linked with plans for forming and training a two-battalion West India Regiment from amongst the West Indian territories. But since the decision was taken there have been changes of such a nature in our plans for the Regiment, and other developments in the area (particularly the unrest in the Bahamas),³ as to oblige us to re-examine the proposed withdrawal.

3. In our joint memorandum we envisaged a fully-trained two-battalion West India Regiment which would serve the requirements of all the West Indian territories (with the exception of the Bahamas); one battalion being primarily for use in the Western Caribbean whilst the other would operate in the Eastern Caribbean. It was not then envisaged that the Regiment would be solely a force of those territories which have now formed themselves together in the Federation of The West Indies: British Guiana had at that time agreed to participate, and we hoped that British Honduras would also. We, in fact, had seen this force as a regional force which would come into existence before Federation. But it now looks like becoming, at least initially, an exclusive force of the Federal Government. We certainly see no prospect of British Honduras participating at the moment, and British Guiana, although it agreed to participate in the Regiment in 1956, has since got cold feet. This is partly due to a change of government but chiefly, we feel, because Federation has preceded the re-formation of the Regiment so that there is a reluctance to identify the Colony with what everyone will regard in the West Indies as a Federal force. In the circumstances we judge that the wisest policy is not to force the issue, but to leave the door open for British Guiana to join at a later date, which may be subsequent to their possible inclusion in the Federation.

¹ Assistant secretary, CO, head of Defence Dept.

² Director of military operations, War Office.

³ Long standing dissatisfaction over labour conditions in the Bahamas led to a general strike in Jan 1958. The immediate cause was a union dispute over taxi services to the new International Airport. The nineteen-day long strike by the Taxicab Union closed the airport and affected the tourist industry. Sir Raynor Arthur, the governor, thought the situation so serious that he telegraphed Jamaica for British troops. A company of the Worcester Regiment arrived in Nassau on 14 Jan and remained there for the next year. The labour unrest prompted Lennox-Boyd to visit the Bahamas. The constitution was reformed and majority rule introduced.

4. The exclusion of these two territories and, even more important, the limited sum made available by the Federation for defence, mean that we cannot plan on the Federation forces consisting of much more than one full-strength battalion, which itself might not be fully trained by February, 1960. This itself is disturbing enough, although (with the possibility of reinforcement from the U.K., and the frigates on the West Indies station) I do not think that on that account alone we would have asked for reconsideration of your plans. We are however greatly concerned about the territories outside the Federation, and the Bahamas. None of these will be able to call on the West India Regiment.

5. The position in British Guiana has been quiet for some time, but although the local politicians might argue that the territory could well do without the present company of British troops or a company of the West India Regiment, we do not feel able to accept this view and we doubt whether the position will have changed much—for the better, at least—by 1960. We are further advised that, if the British Guiana Volunteer Force is to be kept up to its present standards, it will be necessary for it to have the assistance of British officers and NCOs for training purposes after 1960. In British Honduras, as recent events have shown, Guatemalan pretensions are still strong and liable to manifest themselves in various ways. We think that the need for a U.K. garrison there is likely to persist after 1960. In the Bahamas we cannot be sure how long the requirement for a company will last, but the situation has the ingredients of recurrent trouble.

6. We therefore think that we should ask you to plan on the assumption that detachments of British troops be made available to British Guiana, British Honduras and possibly the Bahamas after February, 1960, leaving the Federal area itself to the West India Regiment. We realize, however, the difficulties of maintaining detached companies of troops in such widely separated spots, and if from your point of view it was desirable to locate Battalion Headquarters in the area, we should be quite happy for it to remain in Jamaica, where facilities and accommodation already exist. But I should make it clear that, even if for convenience troops continued to be based within the Federal area, we would not consider it justifiable to approach the Federal Government for a contribution towards costs, except if British troops were called into action in the Federation. What contribution the outlying territories should pay for the detachments they need will be for consideration. As you know, at present the Bahamas are paying full excess costs and British Guiana excess costs as compared with Jamaica.

7. We would not propose at present to look beyond 1963 in our planning because by that time the position of the Federal Government is to be reviewed and it is possible that independence might not then be far away. By that time too the security situation may have changed.

8. I might perhaps mention that Mr. Profumo, our Parliamentary Under-Secretary, who has a special responsibility in the Colonial Office both for the West Indies and for defence matters, is personally interested in this whole question. He was in the Caribbean a short time ago and has heard at first hand how much importance the Area Commander and our Governors attach to an early and favourable decision by the War Office.

9. I have sent a copy of this letter to Gough in the Ministry of Defence.

75 CO 1031/2028, no 548 6 Aug 1958
[Chaguaramas]: letter from D Williams (Washington) to J E Marnham
criticising the behaviour of US officials in Trinidad

I have just got back from a fortnight in Trinidad. It was almost entirely taken up with work on the Caribbean Commission but I did have a chance to discuss the Chaguaramas issue with the Governor General, the S.L.O, and Orebaugh,¹ as well as with a number of other people. You may be interested to have my reactions on one aspect of the problem which concerns me most closely.

This can be very shortly summarised by saying that I am frankly appalled at the way the Americans are mishandling the situation locally. The fault lies, I feel sure, in the joint firm of Messrs. Orebaugh and Habib.² The latter I did not see since he was on leave in Barbados but I have met him in Washington. Orebaugh I have not met before and although I find him personally much more likeable a character than Habib, his whole background and approach to problems make him quite unfit for the present situation in Trinidad.

You may remember that in his letter of July 8th the Governor General referred to Orebaugh's "distinguished war record". The significance of this was lost upon me at the time but it now seems the clue to the whole situation. Apparently Orebaugh spent part of the war on "special operations" in Italy and was later with C.I.A. He has a mentality adapted to that sort of an approach and I think in his heart of hearts really sees the situation in Trinidad entirely in those terms. If he could take to the hills and organise an anti-PNM movement with Mr. Habib stowed away in some bazaar in Port of Spain as his local intelligence agent, he would be perfectly happy and would probably do a thoroughly good job. What he lacks is any idea of how to employ diplomacy, tact and patience in a situation where those are the only qualities which are ever likely to get him anywhere. He keeps on harping on the fact that "somebody must do something". He is not prepared to leave the situation to time and the influence of good personal relations and good sense. He thinks of it entirely in terms of fostering counter movements and of somehow trying to buy off the agitation. The effect of his efforts is in consequence always the very opposite of what he intends them to be, and the mistrust of him and of the whole American Consulate in Port of Spain is very considerable.

I propose to say all of this privately to my contacts in the State Department and do not suggest that you do anything about it in London. This background, however, may be useful to you because it now seems to me that Orebaugh's personal approach to the local situation in Trinidad is colouring the whole of the American attitude over Chaguaramas, with results which could be unfortunate for all of us.

¹ Walter Orebaugh, US consul-general, Trinidad, 1957–1958.

² Philip Habib, US consul-general, Trinidad, 1958–1959. Later special representative of President Reagan in the Middle East, 1981–1983.

76 CO 1031/2447, no 12

9 Aug 1958

'Abandoning us': editorial from the *Jamaica Times* on the question of UK financial assistance to the Federation

[Manley echoed the sentiments in the editorial reproduced here in his speech at Hailes's inauguration in Jan 1958. On that occasion he said: 'But you will forgive me if I complain about what is regarded throughout the West Indies as a parsimonious attitude towards this new Federation'. Recalling that the Jamaica delegation had asked for a loan at the 1956 conference (see 44), he continued: 'That request was rejected almost with scorn. And yet, already we find that such things as the University College of the West Indies and the West India Regiment are making larger claims on us than we can meet' (CO 1031/2447, no 9).]

Viewed with a practical eye, the trend of Colonial Office policy towards The West Indies, whether so intended or not, appears to be leading inevitably to eventual abandonment of United Kingdom interest and influence in the Area. It is a most peculiar fact that despite the unquestionable and traditional affection of West Indians for the Throne, despite our known and continuing objective of remaining in the British Commonwealth if and after Dominion status is achieved, British attitudes and actions toward us are by no means encouraging, while they should be increasingly preferential.

There is no greater fountain of goodwill in the Western Hemisphere for Britain than exists in The West Indies. Yet, on the economic side, what is the position? With the Launching of Federation, the United Kingdom promised a grant towards construction of the Federation Capital—money which we cannot spend since we haven't yet found a site. As one wit said, Britain was in a hurry to say we couldn't get Chaguaramas because her Treasury officials saw where they could save some money (the construction grant) if we had no place to build the Capital!

A very serious aspect of the matter, however, is that the Secretary of State for the Colonies has made the firm ruling that there will be no increase in CD&W grants-in-aid to the Units in the Federation, which means that Britain has not contributed a single penny of new money to the W.I., bearing in mind that the Capital site grant (the only proposed new contribution) is still in the British Treasury and will remain there for a long, long time. It is open to suspicion whether all this is not being deliberately done to delay indefinitely the final steps to full autonomy. It was only recently that the Secretary of State declared that before the granting of Dominion status, the W.I. would have to stand on its own legs, forgetting it seems, that in a way Britain is standing on America's legs and also using up some of the dollars being earned by The West Indies to keep up her hard currency position while we have to bear the hardships of restrictions.

Left as it were to paddle its own canoe, the fledgling Federal Government has to be oaring in other directions. At the moment the general belief is that the effort will not survive unless we can secure substantial assistance particularly from Canada and also from the United States. Naturally the more we strengthen our ties with these countries, the less the people will think of Britain. A great pity in view of what is happening in other parts of the British Caribbean Area. Britain may well be fighting a losing battle in British Honduras; reports are current that certain U.S. sources are secretly backing Guatemala's claim to the mainland territory. In the case of British Guiana, who can tell? Jagan at an opportune stage may well think of closer attachment to South America.

Even in Africa, Nkrumah¹ has talked of making Ghana a Republic, a course which in time would almost certainly be followed by vast Nigeria. So in the Commonwealth and Empire, in the way of loyalty and belief in a straight British future, few other territories can today equal The West Indies in sincerity. Yet we are the people that Britain, it appears, has chosen to leave to swim if we can, or sink if we can't.

¹ Kwame Nkrumah, prime minister of Gold Coast, 1952–1957, of Ghana, 1957–1960; president of Ghana, 1960–1966.

77 CO 1031/2064, no 41

27 Aug 1958

[Chaguaramas]: letter from D H T Hildyard¹ to J E Marnham on how best to approach the question of revising the 1941 agreement

[The federal government did not accept that the report of the Chaguaramas Joint Commission was the end of the matter. At the beginning of June it put out a statement insisting that there should now be a conference of the parties concerned to consider the issue further. It accepted the defence arguments about the necessity for a base in the Eastern Caribbean, especially in 'the present state of world tension', but it did not agree that a final decision should be taken which would effectively confirm the perpetuation of a lease for ninety-nine years even though during that time world tensions might disappear. The federal government would remain in its temporary headquarters in Trinidad until the matter had been resolved (CO 1031/2027, no 412, enclosure, Hailes to Lennox-Boyd, 30 May 1958). There was also the position of the government of Trinidad to consider. In Aug 1958 the CO informed the FO that Beetham was of the view that Eric Williams now realised the difficulty of his own position and that he was casting around for possible ways of retreating without losing face. Williams, it was suggested, might be prepared to make a public statement to the effect that the government of Trinidad recognised that it was impracticable to expect the US to relinquish Chaguaramas, at any rate for the next ten years, on condition that a conference, as was provided for under article 28 of the 1941 agreement, could be held to review the terms of the agreement. The justification now for a review was that conditions were very different from those existing in 1941. Account had to be taken, not only of political advances in the West Indies but also of the more recent, and far less stringent, agreements concluded between the US and other foreign countries for the provision of facilities for US forces. In the letter reproduced here, Hildyard is responding to a CO draft of how this proposal might be put to the Americans. Even before Hildyard's letter was received, the CO was aware of the FO position. Marnham had minuted on 20 Aug: 'The F.O. start from the basic assumption that it would be catastrophic in the present state of the world to do anything which appeared to "undermine the main pillars of Western defence", among which the 1941 Bases Agreement looms in their eyes, I gathered, as large as NATO and similar major undertakings. Any suggestion that we and the Americans were considering revising the Agreement would on this thesis be disastrous. I gather that this view is held with great vigour at at least Deputy Secretary level in the Foreign Office and that it would take a near-earthquake to shift it' (CO 1031/2064).]

In your letter to Hankey, WIS 37/881/01 of August 6, you suggested that we might seek the agreement of the Americans to a conference to review the provisions of the 1941 Bases Agreement on condition that Dr. Williams, the Chief Minister of Trinidad, agreed to shelve the Chaguaramas issue at least for the next ten years.

2. As you know, we have always been opposed to suggesting a conference to the Americans as a safety valve for the ill feelings aroused since the publication of the report of the Chaguaramas Commission. We are, moreover, particularly strongly opposed to anything which might give the impression that we were questioning one of the basic agreements for Western Defence at a moment when Anglo-American

¹ American Dept, FO.

solidarity on defence matters and a united front towards the rest of the world are vitally important. Nor, indeed, do we think that we can press the review of the agreement without at least a *prime facie* case that some of its provisions are anachronistic.

3. We appreciate, however, the advantages to be gained from a deal of the kind suggested by the Governor if it would lead to a *détente* in Trinidad. We have given considerable thought to the ways in which we might ask the Americans to assist us in securing such a *détente* and forestalling an outburst of feeling which might follow the publication of the report of the legal committee set up by Dr. Williams. Rather than make an approach on the lines which you suggest we think that the best procedure would be to discuss the state of affairs in Trinidad with the Americans and to suggest to them that they themselves should review the 1941 agreement in the light of comparable agreements concluded recently with other powers. If this review showed that some of the provisions of the 1941 agreement were both out of date and onerous we should hope to be able to persuade the Americans to agree to invite us and representatives of the West Indies to join them in revising the agreement. I enclose a draft of the letter² we would propose to send to Viscount Hood in Washington, if you agree. If, of course, the Americans' review concluded that Trinidad has no cause for complaint, we should have to stand out against Dr. Williams and the deal would fall through. I understand, however, that you believe that there are various provisions or at least regulations governing the status of United States forces which are in need of revision.

² Not printed.

78 CO 1032/196, no 123

24 Sept 1958

[Immigration]: circular letter from Mr Lennox-Boyd to Lord Hailes and West Indian governors and administrators on constructive measures to improve conditions for West Indians in the UK [Extract]

[Racial disturbances broke out in the UK in Nottingham on 23 Aug 1958. They were followed by outbreaks in London, mostly in the Notting Hill area. A number of West Indian ministers visited the UK where their presence was said by Lennox-Boyd to have restored 'confidence among the coloured community'. In discussions the CO realised that it would not be acceptable to West Indian ministers to ask them to 'turn off the passport tap completely', but Manley in particular recognised that the present employment prospects were dubious and that an 'uncontrolled flow of persons seeking work' would do a 'grave disservice' to the West Indians already in the UK, especially the 8,000 unemployed. Manley himself had explained that 'administrative measures' might be used in the West Indies to slow up the procedure for issuing passports, and the proposals now put forward for an increase in community development work stemmed largely from Manley's ideas (CO 1032/196, no 149, Lennox-Boyd to Hailes, West Indian governors and administrators, 25 Sept 1958).]

... 3. For some time before the disturbances broke out, Her Majesty's Government had felt some concern about the possibility of immigration from the West Indies territories continuing at its present scale, especially because there had recently been a marked change in employment prospects. Until very recently it has proved possible for most male immigrants, who come here to seek work, to obtain it within a reasonably short time after arrival. There are now, however, unmistakable signs that, for the present, saturation point for the employment of immigrant workers has been reached. There is of course no official quota system, nor, I am glad to say, is there evidence that the disturbances have led to any discrimination against immigrant workers by employers, Trade Unions or the general public. West Indian workers are indeed popular. Nevertheless, there has been for

some time an observed tendency for employers to set their own upper limit on the number of immigrant workers whom they consider it politic to employ; and the Ministry of Labour consider that, at present, prospects for the employment of further immigrant labour in the foreseeable future must be regarded as virtually nil. Indeed there are signs of a modest industrial recession in the United Kingdom during the autumn and winter which has already resulted in some increase of unemployment with more United Kingdom workers becoming available; thus some of the organisations which have hitherto been the biggest employers of West Indies labour are no longer so eager to have them. Furthermore, a larger number of women West Indians have been arriving here in 1957–58, and it has not been found easy to offer them jobs which they are willing to take. They will not as a rule go into such occupations as laundry work and domestic service, where there are still vacancies, but will only offer themselves for industrial tasks for which they are usually not equipped. At present the number of unemployed West Indians in the United Kingdom is estimated at some 8,000—that is about 7% of the total West Indies population or about one-third of the total West Indies immigrants into the United Kingdom in 1957. This figure compares with a national unemployed figure of about 2%. There is little prospect of this large number of unemployed being absorbed into employment in the foreseeable future, and even less prospect of further immigrants being successful. Indeed it would seem likely that the arrival here of West Indians seeking work, on the present scale, would add to the difficulties of the West Indians already here and as yet unemployed. The prospect of an increasing number of unemployed West Indians in this country is a disturbing one which it is in the interests of West Indies Governments, of Her Majesty's Government and of the West Indies peoples concerned to avoid. I therefore regard it as in the interests of the West Indians themselves that everything possible should be done to discourage from emigration at present those whose object is merely to seek work in the United Kingdom.

4. Our discussions with the West Indies Ministers have covered all aspects of the social welfare of the West Indies community as well as the employment situation, and I am glad to say that a substantial measure of agreement exists between us as to the main steps which should be taken, here and in the West Indies, to improve matters. Her Majesty's Government made it clear to the West Indies Ministers that they would be loth[sic] to take legislative steps to control immigration from the Commonwealth; such a measure, by interfering with the traditional rule of unrestricted entry into the United Kingdom of any of the Queen's subjects from any part of the Commonwealth, would be a serious departure from established principle. It was agreed that there were more constructive measures which might be taken, both here and in the West Indies, to improve the lot of West Indians in this country and strengthen inter-community relations, and, at the same time, to influence the rate of emigration so that it reflected more accurately the prospects of employment. The West Indies Ministers made the following proposals:—

- (1) That the British Caribbean Welfare Service should be expanded and strengthened by attaching to it trained Community Development officers who would, in turn, train West Indians in Community Development work in the various parts of the country where there are concentrations of West Indian people.
- (2) That the local authorities in these areas should take more active steps to foster inter-racial community development, and pay greater attention to those social problems which have shown themselves apt to cause friction.

(3) The West Indies Governments should, where necessary, extend and expand their publicity measures to bring home to intending emigrants the present grave unemployment situation for West Indians in this country.

(4) The West Indies Governments should, in considering applications for passports from persons intending to come to the United Kingdom to seek work, bring home to each individual the desirability of having reasonably confident prospects of a job and of suitable accommodation; and that such administrative action as is practicable be taken to regulate the pace of the issue of passports in such cases.

(5) It is already the practice of the Jamaica Government, and possibly of other Governments although I am not aware of this, to refuse passports to persons known to have been convicted of certain serious criminal offences. Police reports here suggest that a number of known criminals are however slipping through the net even from Jamaica, and I hope all Governments will agree that there should be rigorous examination of applicants to ensure that no one known to have been convicted of serious criminal offences, in particular those involving violence, should receive a passport to come to the United Kingdom.

5. These are the main steps which I commend to your Government. Her Majesty's Government are considering what additional educational and publicity measures can be taken here to emphasize generally the theme of inter-racial harmony, and the appropriate Departments of Her Majesty's Government are already consulting with local authorities concerned about the possibility of improving housing conditions and extending welfare arrangements in collaboration with the British Caribbean Welfare Service. The Deputy Prime Minister of The West Indies Federation assured me that the services of the Federal Information Service would be made available to co-ordinate publicity measures in The West Indies, and I am confident that this assurance will be given effect with thoroughness and imagination. I therefore commend these proposals to you as the main points of policy which our Government should begin to put into effect as early as is practicable, and I shall be glad to exchange views with you about their implementation. . . .

79 CO 1031/2039, no 3

16 Oct 1958

[Chaguaramas]: letter from P Rogers to H A A Hankey proposing an initiative on the part of the federal government as a means of lifting the general bases problem from the purely Trinidad level

[The earlier assumption that Dr Williams might be prepared to compromise over Chaguaramas proved false. Shortly after the federal government issued its statement on the conclusions of the Joint Commission (see 77, note), Orebaugh, the US consul-general in Trinidad, stated in public that the US could see no useful purpose in a further conference. In what was taken as a calculated insult because it seemed to emphasise the still colonial status of the federal government, he also said that the lease question was a domestic issue in Britain's relations with the West Indies; the UK, which was responsible for the foreign relations of the West Indies, had not put forward a conference request to the US. The situation was retrieved when the US, taking up a proposal which originated with the governor-general, offered to have the Chaguaramas question reviewed in ten years. Adams accepted the offer on behalf of the federal government but he did not consult Williams who regarded this as an act of betrayal. Williams's resentment was not only directed at the federal prime minister; as the Governor's Office in Port of Spain

reported, he was now 'very bitter ... and alleging insincerity' on the part of the UK. Moreover: 'The fact that no copy can be found in our records of the Principal Lease supposed to have been signed on 22nd April, 1941, between H.M.G. and U.S. Government, to give effect to the agreement, and of supplementary leases relating to Tucker Valley, have planted seeds of suspicion in his mind that even the administration is not anxious to assist' (CO 1031/2064, no 47, inward telegram no 63, acting governor to Lennox-Boyd, 20 Sept 1958). The proposal put forward in the letter reproduced here to remove the issue from the purely Trinidad level to a regional one was suggested by Ellis Clarke,¹ the attorney-general of Trinidad (CO 1031/2039, minute by J E Whitelegg,² 13 Oct 1958).]

May I refer to the correspondence resting with Hildyard's letter to Marnham of the 27th August,³ about the proposal that we should seek the agreement of the Americans to a conference to revise some of the provisions of the 1941 Bases Agreement?

2. Following that letter Whitelegg had a talk with Hildyard and Andrews,⁴ as a result of which it was agreed that in view of the apparent change of attitude on the part of Williams, the Chief Minister, Trinidad, as reported in the Acting-Governor's telegram Personal No. 57, the most that we could hope to ask the Americans to do would be to look at the Agreement in the light of subsequent agreements which they had concluded with other countries, in the hope that they would come to a conclusion that some revision was called for. To that end the draft letter to Hood in Washington was revised and a copy sent to us on the 11th September. Since then, however, Williams has again created difficulties in Trinidad, which we feel make it desirable to reconsider the whole matter. Briefly, he seems to have intensified his campaign in order to make things as uncomfortable as possible for the Americans. The Chaguaramas fruit plantation dispute,⁵ reported in the Acting-Governor's telegram Personal No. 66, has led the State Department to consider making representations to H.M.G.—see Leishman's⁶ letter to Andrews of the 3rd October—and it seems therefore that from Williams' point of view, his campaign may be achieving his aim, which as well as creating difficulties for the Americans, is to keep the whole Bases problem a live political issue in Trinidad.

3. Williams is an unpredictable sort of individual and it is difficult to assess with any certainty what his reaction may be to any particular set of circumstances. It is, however, all too clear that in this case he is distressingly consistent and is determined not to let the Chaguaramas issue drop during the next ten years. To some extent his campaign can perhaps be divided into two parts, in that he is seeking a general revision of the 1941 Bases Agreement, which would, he hopes, lead to the reopening of the Chaguaramas issue—in other words, to nibble away at the Agreement until the Chaguaramas questions is more or less isolated. Politically, too, it is quite unrealistic to leave things as they are and hope that all will blow over. In practice, so far from this happening Williams is continually finding new points with

¹ (Sir) Ellis Clarke (Kt 1963); attorney-general, Trinidad, 1957–1962; acting governor, 1960.

² J E Whitelegg, principal, CO, West Indian Dept 'A'.

³ See 77.

⁴ E G Andrews, American Dept, FO.

⁵ Williams argued that the concessions granted to the US in the 1941 agreement had never been approved by the Trinidad legislature and set up a legal commission to investigate. Pending investigation of US commercial activities in the base, a cheque for BWI \$25,700 payable to the base authorities by the government-sponsored Citrus Growers' Association for the delivery of citrus from Chaguaramas in 1957 was withheld.

⁶ F J Leishman, 1st secretary, British embassy, Washington.

which to upset the Americans and they, on their part, seem to be increasingly sensitive to his attacks. Sooner or later, unless H.M.G. are prepared to act in some conciliatory way, we shall be faced with an impossible position, with Williams pressing on the one side and the Americans on the other. The longer things continue as they are, therefore, the more difficult is the situation likely to become. So far as we in the Colonial Office are concerned, the United States Bases problem, and Chaguaramas in particular, is likely to have increasing repercussions on our general relations with the Trinidad Government, and we are therefore most anxious to find a solution before things become critical.

4. We fully agree that there can be no question of reopening the Chaguaramas issue at this stage, and, indeed, H.M.G. could not support any approach to the Americans designed either directly or indirectly to achieve that end. It seems to us most unlikely that the United States Government would be prepared to agree to a conference unless they were quite certain that in so doing they would not be confronted with Chaguaramas. Until that particular matter has been cleared out of the way therefore, there is no point in seeking a conference under Article 28 of the agreement since to do so would be to court a negative answer.

5. Nevertheless, we feel strongly that the time has come when H.M.G. should take some positive action, and it seems to us that an essential first step is to clear away the difficulty over Chaguaramas, which is the particular point Williams is labouring. That might best be done by lifting the general bases problem from the purely Trinidad level, by seeking to get Grantley Adams, the Federal Prime Minister, to take the initiative in requesting a conference under Article 28. The Federal Government earlier this year announced their acceptance of assurances that the Chaguaramas issue would be reviewed in 10 years time and that meanwhile H.M.G. and the United States Government would give sympathetic consideration to any representations for a conference under Article 28 of the agreement. A request from the Federal Government for a review conference could therefore be regarded as a logical next step. It would also have the advantage of virtually doing away with the Chaguaramas difficulty since the Federal Government have agreed that that problem should remain in abeyance for ten years and also get us away from the purely Trinidad aspects in that the review conference would not be limited to the Trinidad problems but would consider the 1941 agreement as it affected all the West Indian territories concerned. At the same time it would remove the initiative from Williams and increase the political prestige of the Federal Government in general and Adams in particular. I should perhaps mention here that if we get to the stage where an approach to the Americans is feasible we consider that, in addition to H.M.G. and the United States Government, the Federal Government would have to be directly represented, but not the other territories of The West Indies such as Trinidad, etc: the latter might however attach advisers to the Federal Government delegation. Indeed we think it quite possible that the outcome might be a new Agreement to which the Federal Government would be a party.

6. While we were glad to learn that the Americans have agreed that the review of the Chaguaramas question in ten years' time should be accompanied by a conference, we would prefer not to pass this on to The West Indies or Trinidad at present. It would, we feel, be undesirable to let them know the news at present since Williams might well conclude that the Americans were weakening and step up his campaign for a Chaguaramas conference as soon as possible.

7. We have accordingly drafted two telegrams in the personal series, to the Governor-General's deputy and to the Officer Administering the Government of Trinidad. These will, I think, explain themselves in the light of this letter. We should be grateful for your comments on them. I hope you will feel able to agree that they should issue very soon since we should like to discuss this whole question with you and with Lord Hailes and Sir Edward Beetham some time in the last week in October when both Lord Hailes and Sir Edward will be here. It is very desirable that we should have before then the views of their two deputies in Trinidad.

8. I would only add that while we do recognise that the approach we have suggested does raise very grave difficulties from the Foreign Office point of view, we are convinced that any less forthright approach to the Americans such as that envisaged in discussions referred to in paragraph 2 of this letter, will fail to meet the case. We believe that it is greatly in the Americans' own interests to agree to an approach on these lines. We hope the Foreign Office will feel able to agree with our drafts.

80 CO 1031/2311; no 20

28 Oct 1958

'West Indies': minute by Lord Home to Mr Lennox-Boyd expressing concern about the prospect of an early conference to review the federal constitution

I understand that early next week you are to have a talk with Lord Hailes about the desire of the Federation Government to review their present constitution with you next summer. The constitution provides in terms for a review within 5 years. But it came into force only in the spring of 1958, and the Governor-General is, I believe, of the view that there can be no question of "dominion status" for the West Indies within the next four years, and that the review now demanded can be confined mainly to the question of relations between the centre and the units.

If this is possible and if it can be made clear that the review now demanded is not the longer term review envisaged by the constitution no difficulty will of course arise. But in the light of past experience can we be confident that it will in fact be possible? The motion in the Federal Legislature calling for a conference next year specifically mentions as one of its purposes the achievement of the goal of "dominion status" at the earliest possible moment. Is there not the risk, therefore, that if we concede the request for a review as early as next year, unless in doing so we make the limitation of its scope quite clear, the West Indies politicians may, when the time comes, feel it necessary to press then for a date to be set for independence? Surely this would be embarrassing, particularly as we cannot yet be sure when the Federation will be able to do without our grant in aid, and so be economically self-supporting. It would arouse difficulties too in relation to the Rhodesian Federation, where the first review of the constitution is not due until late in 1960.

These issues are of some moment, and I think that, if you see any danger that the review could not be restricted to local matters in the way foreseen by the Governor-General, it would be of value if we could have an opportunity of considering the matter in the Colonial Policy Committee.

I am sending a copy to the Prime Minister.

81 CO 1031/2573, no 45

1 Nov 1958

[Powers of federal government]: inward telegram no 412 from Sir K Blackburne (Jamaica) to Mr Lennox-Boyd on a dispute between Sir Grantley Adams and Mr Manley over the authority of the federal government to levy income tax

In case questions are asked about recent statements here by Adams and Manley about the levy of income tax on Federation, following are statements as reported by the Gleaner:

(a) Prime Minister at press conference on 31st October made the following three points:—

(i) That notwithstanding any tax holiday granted by the unit governments the Federal Government can levy its own income tax after five years and make it retroactive to the date of Federation.

(ii) That the Federal Government will proceed at the earliest opportunity to free itself from restriction of mandatory levy on which it now operates by legislating independent tax revenue.

(iii) That the Federal Government must have an income and it must come from taxation either before the first five years are up, if the units agree, or after five years; and most equitable taxation is income tax.

(b) Manley, in statement released yesterday, has stated:—

(1) Federal Government has no power to levy income tax for the first five years and there can be no question of the Federal Government doing anything of the sort let alone making legislation retrospective.

(2) Policy of Federal Labour Party emphasises the fact that the Federal Government will devote itself to fostering economic and industrial development of all the units. Incentive legislation is a necessary part of that policy and income tax concessions are an accepted part of the incentive legislation.

(3) It is a matter of high policy that the Federal Government should honour all obligations entered into by unit governments in regard to matters which may now or subsequently come under the jurisdiction of the Federal Government.

(4) He would never under any circumstances be party to any policy that contemplated interfering with the development programme of Jamaica or Trinidad or any other unit, or repudiate arrangements made in unit territories under law properly passed, or dishonour agreements honestly negotiated between unit governments and investors.

(5) He gives the assurance that, if ever there should arise any possibility of the Federal Government contemplating policy outlined in (4), Jamaica would be forced to reconsider her position in regard to Federation itself.

2. Adams is reported as having since assured Manley that the Federal Government would not contemplate disavowing income tax or other concessions granted by existing tax law or exchange control assurances given in existing territorial legislation.

3. There has been considerable concern here, particularly in commercial circles, about Adams' statement and the Gleaner has warmly welcomed Manley's declaration.

It seems as so often happens undue emphasis has been given to extract from the press conference taken out of the context; but result is most unfortunate here having regard to the fact that federation may well be important issue for the next general election.

82 CO 1031/2573, no 46

4 Nov 1958

[Jamaica and federation]: letter from Sir K Blackburne to P Rogers on the feeling in Jamaica that the federal government is 'empire building'

With reference to my telegram of the 1st of November¹ about the stir created by the press conference given in Jamaica by Sir Grantley Adams, I think that you may like to hear something of the resulting difficulties and trends of thought here.

2. I gather that our Industrial Development Corporation is receiving enquiries from potential investors in the United States who are considerably shaken by the thought that the Federal Government can impose income tax retrospectively. I gather that Manley has been told in no uncertain terms by many people that it does not matter what assurances he may give to outside investors, since his policies can be overridden by the Federal Government. And I also gather that Manley has been under pressure from his own Party to announce the secession of Jamaica from the Federation. Wills Isaacs (who lunched here yesterday) was jubilant and told me that Federation was dead.

3. Manley had told me earlier in the day that he would not contemplate secession at present and, indeed, during this conversation he produced suggestions whereby more Jamaicans might be recruited for the Federal Service. Later in the conversation he commented, though not very seriously, that Trinidad and the smaller territories might make a very convenient national unit, adding "you would have been horrified by that remark a year ago, but no doubt you think differently now".

4. But, whatever views may be expressed at this moment of some indignation and excitement, the facts are that this matter may well have serious implications.

5. As you know, there has always been a school of thought in Jamaica that has resented the financial burden falling on Jamaica as a result of Federation; and it is not easy to find arguments to deal with those who ask why the taxpayers in Jamaica should help the smaller territories to exist and develop. Bustamante has not been slow to climb on this very comfortable bandwaggon, and there is good reason to believe that the J.L.P. will fight the next Jamaica elections in 1959 on this platform. As one commentator put it to me—"there is not much else that they can use with effect in their election programme"—because there is no doubt that there has been rapid progress and comparative prosperity under the present Government.

6. If the J.L.P. do fight the election on this basis, they will get great support from the public—both from businessmen and from workers—all of whom are far less interested in Dominion status through Federation than in the impact of further taxation and the possibility of the industrial development programme being slowed up. The J.L.P. will indeed be batting on an easy wicket in the present mood of Jamaica.

¹ See 81.

7. What then is Manley to do? As I have said, it is not easy to find good arguments as an academic exercise; and it is impossible to find arguments which will convince the electorate that Federation is in their interests. When one considers that he is up against increasing pressure from his own Party, it is difficult to see how he will be able to deal with the situation—even though he himself is personally still behind Federation.

8. I have naturally wondered what answer there can be to all this.

In the short term two things would seem to be of help:—

(i) The issue of a statement of economic policy by the Council of State, making it clear that the Federal Government will honour all commitments entered into legitimately by the Unit Governments in regard to investment, etc. I know that Adams issued a statement on these lines when he got back to Trinidad; but I think that a formal declaration of policy by the Council of State will carry much greater weight.

(ii) The convening of an early meeting of the proposed Council of Ministers. During his visit to Jamaica Adams agreed to do this, and I am sure that he appreciates the need for the meeting even more now.

It is perhaps not too much to say that there is some degree of antagonism between Manley and himself, as we all noticed when the two of them dined at King's House quietly together. I think that it may have some bearing on this point if I mention that there seems to have been a marked lack of Federal party activity ever since the Federation was established. In the case of the D.L.P., this may well be a deliberate omission on the part of Bustamante if he is sincere in his statements that Federation on its present basis must be brought to an end. (Incidentally Bustamante declined my invitation to meet Adams at lunch at King's House, though Sangster² did come). It should strengthen Manley's hand in Jamaica, (and perhaps Adams' position in the Federation) if the F.L.P. Ministers can now get together and iron out their differences in connection with the holding of a meeting of the Council of Ministers.

9. In the long term it has occurred to me that there may be three possible lines of approach:—

(a) The execution of some careful economic planning by the Federal Government in collaboration with the Units. Unless this is done I cannot help feeling somewhat apprehensive about the future. The impression in Jamaica—however wrong that impression may be—is that the Federal Government has concentrated rather too much on "Empire building" by searching for fields of activity which will show to the public that the Federation is really getting a grip on things. I cannot myself offer concrete examples, though Manley has mentioned to me one or two instances, including broadcasting. I can only say that this impression exists here. I can well understand that the Federal Government, being based in Trinidad, must be under the continued pressure of the press and of public opinion to produce results, because Trinidad has always regarded itself as the potential "mother" for the smaller territories of the Eastern Caribbean. If the headquarters of the

² D B Sangster, deputy leader of JLP since 1950; minister of social welfare, 1950–1953, of finance, 1953–1955; acting prime minister, 1965–1967; deputy prime minister and minister of finance, 1962–1967; prime minister, Feb-Apr 1967 (deceased).

Federation had been in Jamaica, perhaps a different approach would have developed since the Federal staff would themselves have had a different outlook. But, whatever may be the reasons, there is a feeling in Ministerial and official circles in Jamaica today that there is too much "Empire building" and too little thought for planning—particularly economic planning for the region as a whole. There is also the impression—however wrong this may be—that the Federal Government is attempting to undertake such economic planning as has been done without sufficiently full consultation with the Unit territories, and particularly with Jamaica. Several people have said to me that it is a great pity that the Federal Government did not start its operations by convening a meeting or meetings for the sole purpose of economic planning before doing anything else. If that had indeed been a possible approach, we here are as much to blame as anyone for not suggesting it at the time. But even now, it may not be too late to think in these terms, and I hope that such an approach may emerge from the proposed meeting of the Council of Ministers.

(b) The grant of substantial loan aid from the United Kingdom to the Federation so as to make it clear that someone else, besides Jamaica, (and Canada to some degree) is helping the smaller territories in their economic development. The promised Canadian aid has been much welcomed here as elsewhere, but there is some feeling that this aid will be devoted largely to Federal projects and that the richer territories will still have to continue to carry the smaller ones. I believe that a paper³ on this subject was handed to the Secretary of State by Manley at the last Federation Conference in London, and I have no doubt that it was fully considered. It is, I imagine, impossible to contemplate further financial aid from the United Kingdom in this way, and I only mention this possibility as it is one that has been ventilated here.

(c) The recognition that some completely new approach may be needed to the type of Federation which ought to exist—a Federation designed to accommodate territories like Jamaica which can go ahead on their own, and also the smaller territories which need help from the others. Manley talked on these lines to me yesterday, and I hope that we may yet get him to agree to the terms of reference of the proposed Constitutional Commission for this very reason. But he is up against strong opposition from his own Party at the present time—and that may make it impossible for him to go further than to agree to a Commission for the smaller territories only and to a separate expert investigation of the whole framework of Federation.

10. I am afraid that I have gone very much beyond my brief in this letter. I have done so not in any spirit of criticism. I have merely tried to reflect the views of those with whom I have discussed the developments of last week, and to put forward some ideas which are being ventilated here.

11. I myself continue to be a believer in Federation, and I still hope that the troubles which we are having at the present time are the normal, and necessary, teething troubles which always seem to beset the establishment of Federations.

12. I am sending a copy of this letter to Lord Hailes.

³ cf 42, annex.

83 CO 1031/2311, no 21

5 Nov 1958

'West Indies': minute (reply) from Mr Lennox-Boyd to Lord Home on the possible repercussions of early dominion status for the West Indies

Your minute of 28th October¹ referred to the possible repercussions of early "dominion status" for The West Indies.

2. The present Federal Constitution in the West Indies, and particularly the fixed Federal income of less than £2 million a year, means that the Federal Government is hardly worth the name. We knew this when agreement was reached to set it up; it was a price we knew we had to pay to get West Indian agreement. For the first year it does no harm when the Federal Government must concentrate on establishing its administrative machinery and finding its political feet. But unless we can increase the powers, and above all, the revenue, of the Federal Government very soon we run a grave risk of Federation failing, with all that that implies to our policy in that part of the world. The preponderance of political and financial power remaining with the unit territories means that some of them, and particularly Jamaica, may yet revive separatist tendencies.

3. The conference proposed for next year will, I hope and expect, concentrate primarily on relations between the Federal Government and the unit Governments, though the relationship of the Federal Government with H.M.G. is bound to come up, with a call for some changes. The conference will not only be the only way in which there will be a chance of increasing the powers of the Federal Government vis-à-vis the units, but it will also give H.M.G. an invaluable opportunity of making clear to all the delegates from the West Indian territories just how far they have to go before the Federal Government could be considered one that can properly be sponsored for full membership of the Commonwealth. I do not expect a demand for very early independence; the political sentiment on this in The West Indies is very different from that in say, West Africa. I have always made it clear, moreover, that there can be no question of independence for The West Indies until they are viable both financially and in other respects. I did this both during the 1956 London Conference² and when piloting the present Federal Constitution through Parliament. The West Indies are very conscious of the financial and other burdens that independence involves and none of the present members of the Federal Government are at all anxious to press for an early date for it.

4. As far as I can possibly foretell, therefore, I do not think you need be unduly concerned about the effects of this conference on the Rhodesian Federation. I will, of course, always have this in mind, but the extent to which we can control the pace of the movement towards independence in the West Indies by reason alone of possible reaction in Central Africa is very limited. I know there is some risk in having the conference but I do not believe it to be great; and the advantages of and indeed the need for it, are so great that I am sure we ought not to seek a postponement.

5. I have discussed all this with the Governor-General, who agrees with my assessment.

6. I would welcome a discussion in the Colonial Policy Committee if you wish but there is little I could add to what is in this minute.

7. I am sending a copy of this minute to the Prime Minister.

¹ See 80.

² See 47, annex.

84 CO 1031/2573, no 48

10 Nov 1958

[Federation]: letter from R Kirkwood¹ to Mr Lennox-Boyd on the importance of UK financial aid. *Minute* by P Rogers on financial aid and dominion status

You asked me the other night about Federation; how's it going. I told you I thought all would be well in the end—given men and measures.

Since we met, disturbing cuttings (a couple only are enclosed),² prompt me to write you about *measures*—which I now conceive to be urgent; having regard to next year's General Election—and the fact that Busta is sure to win it.

Positive. H.M.G. must make really generous direct grants to the Federal Government. An attempt to tax Jamaica etc for additional sums is political dynamite, and would probably bring about secession.

Negative, (and *very* confidentially) H.M.G. should make it as easy as possible for the Federal Government to borrow money—here, in Canada, or anywhere else—and as difficult as possible for the unit Governments to do so; for obvious reasons which I need not elaborate.

In other words, all financial assistance, and far more of it, should be channelled in through the Federal Government exclusively (so far as this can be done). This Federal ship may really sink without that proverbial ha'porth (read a million or two) of tar.

Thanks so much for a delicious and most entertaining dinner.

Minute with 84

Sir H. Poynton

On the evening of Wednesday the 3rd December the Secretary of State had a discussion with Sir Jock Campbell³ and Mr. Kirkwood about Federation, at which Mr. Amery, you and I were present. A number of issues affecting the Federation were raised and I have summarized these below. You will see from it that in fact all the ideas which have been put forward except that mentioned by Sir Jock Campbell of setting a specific date for the achievement of Dominion status had in fact already been raised in the Department and discussed with Lord Hailes. I did not however mention this in the discussion since frankly Mr. Kirkwood is not invariably discreet and it would be extremely unfortunate if there were to be any public talk in the West Indies at this stage about the lengths to which the Colonial Office had already carried these ideas. After the meeting I mentioned this point both to Sir J. Campbell and Mr. Kirkwood.

We were all concerned in the discussion with ways of strengthening the Federal Government both positively, i.e. by supplying it with additional funds, powers, or prestige, and negatively, i.e. by taking a deliberately narrow view of the extent to

¹ (Sir) Robert Kirkwood (Kt 1959); member of Legislative Council, Jamaica, 1942–1962; chairman, Sugar Manufacturers' Association, Jamaica, 1945–1974; chairman, West Indian Sugar Association, 1942–1962.

² Not printed.

³ Chairman, Booker Brothers Ltd.

which the unit Governments should have a separate standing in current issues. The particular points raised were as follows:—

(1) *Funds for the Federal government.* At present the revenue of the Federal Government is limited under the Constitution to £1.9 million a year derived either from a mandatory levy on unit Governments as at present or alternatively from certain limited and specific customs dues, also specified in the Constitution. In addition the Federal Government has been promised an annual grant of £1,750,000 from the U.K. from which to meet the grants-in-aid to unit territories which cannot balance their budgets. This is a relatively generous grant which should be ample to meet calls upon the Federal budget for this purpose in the quinquennium, as far as we can foresee, but it is, of course, limited to the specific purpose for which it was granted and cannot be used to strengthen the Federal Government in other respects. The Federal Government is also eligible, like the unit Governments, for assistance from the U.S.A. either from the Development Loan Fund or from the I.C.A., but experience so far suggests that little more than technical assistance is likely to be forthcoming from such sources. The Federal Government has also been promised aid of \$10,000,000 over five years by the Canadian Government, most of which will go in the purchase and operation of two ships for an inter-island service, and in the improvement of port and harbour facilities in connection with it.

As far as assistance from the U.K. is concerned, the Federal Government has been promised a grant of up to £1 million towards the cost of the capital (a considerable proportion of which has already been expended on buildings which will later be sold to the Trinidad Government when the permanent capital site is settled for the sums which have been expended on the building, and the proceeds used for permanent building). Short of a special grant from the Colonial Service Vote which is theoretically possible but for which I personally could see no sufficient justification, the only other source of U.K. assistance to which the Federal Government can look is the monies provided under the C.D. and W. Acts. The Federal Government has a small balance inherited from the Comptroller under the present Act but we cannot do anything really considerable in this sphere until the new Act is passed, we hope, in April. The proposal which we have discussed both with Lord Hailes and with Mr. Bradshaw is that the whole of the allocation to West Indian territories under the new Act should be allocated initially to the Federal Government. That Government would in turn allocate, subject to the Secretary of State's approval, between its own needs and those of the units. Furthermore, from the time the new Act comes into effect the Secretary of State would not propose to approve applications from the unit territories for schemes within their own allocations unless these applications were supported by the Federal Government (in this respect the Federal Government would therefore inherit the position of the Comptroller in respect of C.D. and W. applications). I have no doubt that this will cause a howl from some of the unit territories, particularly Jamaica, but I am convinced that it is desirable from the broadly economic point of view and essential from the political point of view. This will in fact meet what was discussed under this head.

(2) *The raising of loans.* We have again discussed both with Mr. Bradshaw and with Lord Hailes the proposal that in future the raising of loans in respect of any of the West Indian Governments should be done only by the Federal Government. The procedure would be that the Federal Government should be empowered by amendment of the Federal Constitution to raise loans on the security of the revenue

and assets of all the Governments in the Federation (it would not be in a position to raise any loans on its present revenues). A Loans Council, on the lines of that in existence in the Commonwealth of Australia, would be set up on which all Governments would be represented. This would be advisory to the Federal Government. The Federal Government would thereafter raise all loans whether on its own behalf or on behalf of the unit territories, the charges for any particular loan falling, of course, on the revenues and assets of the territory immediately concerned. A similar procedure is proposed for loans from the International Bank.

This proposed procedure is in any case necessary on strictly financial grounds. Firstly it is not normal U.K. policy that subordinate Government authorities should have access to the London Market (in this respect, for example, Jamaica would be in the same position as, say, the State of New South Wales). Moreover, the failure of the recent Jamaica loan shows that even the strongest of the West Indian units is not in a position to raise Market loans on its own security, and that there would be a better prospect for the raising of a loan based on the security of the revenues and assets of the entire West Indies. Politically, also, I am convinced that this step is necessary, for reasons which were obvious from the discussion, though it will be again a very difficult political matter to put across in The West Indies. We have agreed with Mr. Bradshaw and the Governor-General that in the first instance we should put this proposal formally by despatch to the Federal Government before raising it with any of the units, and a draft is now in preparation for this purpose.

(I have released the file in order not to delay the consideration of the drafts).

(3) *A promise of "Dominion status"*. We have known all along that the prime reason for Federation is the enhanced political status which it will enable the West Indies to obtain. Going right back to Colonel Stanley's despatch of 1945, from which the official consideration of Federation starts, we spoke then of "the ultimate aim of any Federation which may be established (being) full internal self-government within the British Commonwealth". That was as far ahead as we could look then and it meant a lot at the time. The Report of the Standing Closer Association Committee, which laid the foundations of the Federal Constitution, again declared forthrightly that the aim was Dominion status, and it may be useful to recall their words since they are the best definition of the political need for Federation and are words moreover signed by many leading West Indians of the day. The relevant extract from the Report is attached opposite.⁴ Going further ahead it will be recalled that this again was one of the most important aspects of the London Conference of 1956, and that the Secretary of State's Opening Address to the Conference on this subject contained a passage which had been very carefully weighed and approved by a Cabinet Committee beforehand.⁵ Again it may be useful to have the relevant passage available for reference, and it is quoted on the sheet opposite following the quotation from the S.C.A.C. Report.

What holds The West Indies back from full Dominion status is essentially not our reluctance to grant independence on political grounds, but the financial weakness of the Federal Government and the reluctance of many West Indians, a reluctance which is quite understandable, to assume the full burden of independence. Because there are a number of West Indians who claim that the idea of Dominion status is merely a device on the part of H.M.G. to avoid their financial responsibilities, we have

⁴ See 4.

⁵ See 47, annex.

always been careful, as for example in the extract quoted opposite, to avoid the impression that H.M.G. is urging the West Indies on this path faster than they themselves wish to go. It is for that reason that I am very doubtful about the wisdom of Sir Jock Campbell's proposal that we should ourselves propose a definite date as [a] target for independence. There is, moreover, the difficulty of the reaction of what we do here on the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland and the Secretary of State will recall his recent exchange of minutes with the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations on the subject.⁶ It is true that that correspondence was primarily concerned with the outcome of a revisionary conference next year and the embarrassment which that might cause to the negotiations with Sir R. Welensky⁷ in 1960. The setting of a target date for West Indian independence of say, 1963, would not be so embarrassing on that score, but I am inclined to think that it would still raise difficulties. Nevertheless the idea is one that needs further consideration and, I suggest, consultation with the Governor General.

(4) *Revisionary conference.* We cannot avoid a Conference next year to revise the Federal Constitution and in fact, despite the embarrassment vis-à-vis the Central African Federation, we do not wish to avoid such a Conference as the correspondence referred to in (3) above shows. There is, however, a new complication since that correspondence in the shape of a proposal within The West Indies that what one might call the Conference proper, at which the U.K. should be represented, should be preceded by a regional conference, which presumably means a Conference of West Indians alone. The date which has been suggested by the Governor General for that is April or May of next year. I am very doubtful about the wisdom of that Conference as it was originally proposed and had put my doubts on a purely personal basis to the Governor General the day before we had our meeting recorded in this minute. It may well be, however, that the principal doubt which I felt about the regional conference, namely, that the Federal Government would face the units without the U.K. as their ally, would be overcome and indeed turned to positive advantage by the proposal which emerged in the course of our discussion (the other doubt raised in my letter to Lord Hailes about the timing in relation to the advice of the expert on Federal matters is, I think, less important, particularly in relation to the matter mentioned below). The idea which the Secretary of State raised in the course of discussion was that he might himself visit The West Indies to open this regional conference and there make a public statement which would say in effect that only the West Indian reluctance to endow the Federal Government with proper powers was holding the region back from Dominion status. If I may say so I think that this would have a tremendous effect in The West Indies and indeed, I do not think it is going too far to say that it might transform the whole situation in respect of Federation.

I do not know how far the Secretary of State will feel able to commit himself now about a possible visit next year, but I suggest that as a next step he might write to Lord Hailes putting the idea to him. I submit a draft accordingly.

P.R.
8.12.58

⁶ See 80 & 83.

⁷ Prime minister and minister of external affairs, Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 1956–1963.

85 CO 1031/2573, no 58

26 Nov 1958

[Federation]: letter (reply) from P Rogers to Sir K Blackburne
(Jamaica) on the position of Jamaica within the federation

Many thanks for your letter of the 4th November¹ about Grantley Adams Press Conference and Federation in general. Your report of how things stand at the moment in Jamaica is most useful, but we are particularly grateful for the way in which you have gone on to make some very helpful and constructive proposals for furthering Federation. I know your own belief in it and I think you know how strongly we here feel about it. So far from feeling that you have gone beyond your brief, may I say at once with the Secretary of State's approval that it is most helpful when Governors put forward this kind of suggestion.

2. The first part of your letter about the situation in Jamaica does not really call for any comment from me except on what you say in paragraph 5 about the difficulty of finding arguments to deal with those who ask why the taxpayers in Jamaica should help the smaller territories to exist and develop. Surely the answer to that depends entirely on whether Jamaicans think of themselves as West Indians. If they do, then there is just as much reason why the richer taxpayers in Jamaica should help the poor in the smaller territories, as there is why they should help the poor in Jamaica itself. If they do not think of themselves as West Indians, and I quite understand that in fact most of them do not, then it reduces itself to a naked argument of self-interest of what Jamaica "gets out" of Federation. My own answer is that in material things alone I believe Jamaica has a good deal to gain, though one could not measure it. I am convinced that other countries, by which I mean the U.S.A. and Canada, as well as the U.K., will definitely be more inclined to help financially a West Indian Federation than they would Jamaica alone. Secondly, Jamaica needs security for its exports and there can be no doubt that it is in a much better bargaining position if it comes forward with other West Indian territories, whether it be for sugar, bananas or citrus, than if it comes forward alone. Of course, if Jamaica feels it can stand on its own in all these things, there is no more to be said, but I don't think it does. On the non-material side, again I do not think that Jamaica could look to be a full member of the Commonwealth by itself. Surely what the S.C.A.C. report has to say on this is a classic statement of the position as justifying federation, and cannot be bettered.

3. Naturally I accept that these are arguments which, however valid we believe them to be, are not very effective in the middle of an election: It is, as you say, difficult for Manley. The Secretary of State is writing to you separately about Manley's letters on the proposed Constitutional Commission, but it may be helpful if I say a little here on how we feel about Manley's present attitude, since this is the background against which your helpful suggestions must be considered.

4. First of all there is no doubt that, as you say, there is some degree of antagonism between Adams and Manley. This goes back at least to the 1956 London Conference when Adams considered (with some justice in my own view) that Manley let him down about the site of the Federal capital. Furthermore, I have always

¹ See 82.

suspected myself that while Manley gave up the Federal Prime Ministership, he has never really liked or been generous enough to accept gracefully anyone else holding the first Ministerial position in The West Indies.

5. We get the impression from your letter and from Manley's own letters about the Constitutional Commission that he seems to be thinking exclusively in terms of a slow start to Federation and of a considerable period ahead in which the Federal Government will be deliberately kept weak and relatively powerless. Eric Williams we know holds the same view, until the next Federal election when he hopes to become Federal Prime Minister himself. We are convinced that even if these points of view are sincere, they are totally misguided. If the Federal Government is kept an ineffective body for five years, it seems to us doubtful in the extreme whether it will survive. Certainly there can be no prospect whatsoever of it looking to Dominion status until it is radically transformed and becomes a much more powerful and financially stronger Government. If it is kept weak for five years I do not see the unit Governments agreeing suddenly to change their attitude completely towards it at the end of that time and endow it with the powers and money which will be necessary for a Government of Dominion status. We are convinced that we must seek to build up the Federal Government steadily and the complaints about the Empire building which we know are made in Jamaica seem to us quite misconceived. The Federal Government really cannot begin to tackle problems until it has built up an organisation to cope with them. Any such building up may be termed Empire building at the outset but surely it is because the Federal Government is rightly seeking to do its job. Certainly, to come now to your own suggestions, it cannot begin to do any kind of worthwhile economic planning until it has got the staff to do it with, i.e. built its Empire.

6. You suggest:—

(1) The issue of a statement of economic policy by the Council of State, making it clear that the Federal Government will honour all commitments entered into legitimately by the unit Governments in regard to investment. This of course is for the Federal Government itself to consider but for our part we agree that it would be very helpful as a formal declaration by the Council of State. But I would myself go on to say that I think there is great force in what Adams has already said about the ability of the Federal Government honestly to say this depending on the fact that unit Governments do not in the meantime enter into commitments which will make effective Federation impossible. In particular they must not make a Customs Union impossible. Surely it would only be right that the unit Governments should consult the Federal Government before undertaking commitments which come into this sphere if they demand that the Federal Government should honour them?

(2) The convening of an early meeting of the proposed Council of Ministers. I know Lord Hailes has this very much in mind and if I may say so we too agree that it would be very helpful. Again, however, it is surely fundamental that this Council should not attempt to usurp the functions of the Council of State in directing Federal activities, and I would not be surprised if Manley and Williams try and urge it that way.

(3) Some careful economic planning by the Federal Government in collaboration with the units. I entirely agree and I am sure Lord Hailes would too but it is

subject to three things. First the Federal Government must as I have already said have an organisation with which to do this. Secondly, they must have financial resources to use for their plans, and while the Canadian aid, and what we hope will be forthcoming under the next C.D. and W. Act will be a useful start, the units must not leave it *all* to outside aid! Thirdly any effective economic planning must surely be based on the existence of a Customs Union. Until such a union exists, I feel that economic planning cannot be fully effective.

(4) The grant of substantial loan aid from the U.K. to the Federation. I think you will agree that we have done the Federal Government pretty well over the agreement on the five year grant-in-aid. The possibility of other forms of aid from the U.K. depends of course on the passing, and on the form and size, of the next C.D. and W. Act. We all hope that that will provide the occasion for aid such as you have in mind.

(5) The recognition that some completely new approach may be needed to the type of Federation which ought to exist. Again I think we would all agree that a Federation containing a unit as small as Montserrat and one as large as Jamaica must differ in some respects from a Federation like, say, Australia. But frankly my own fear about what is meant by Jamaicans who urge this is that they contemplate a weak Federal Government with really no say about what Jamaica itself should do. That, for reasons which I have touched on in the first part of this letter, I regard as a profound misconception.

7. I am sending a copy of this letter to Lord Hailes. May I end by saying that I am sure that he would agree with me in saying that the kind of helpful suggestions you have made are most timely and that the continuance of this kind of approach to Federation on your part and that of Governors will make a major difference to the objective in which I know you believe as strongly as we do.

P.S. Since this was first drafted I have received your letter of the 13th November enclosing a copy of a note of your talks with Sealy² and Manley. I am sure there is a very great deal in what Sealy said about the attitude of Adams to Manley over the Prime Ministership, and again my sympathies are with Adams over this. For the rest, it is clear that Manley is pursuing the hint which you mentioned in your earlier letter about a Federation in the Eastern Caribbean alone. I hope you will agree that is quite essential to jump on this before Manley himself gets wedded to the idea or it spreads. I am convinced that it is not a starter. By way of background I think I ought to add that we here do not think Manley has ever really fully understood the Eastern Caribbean scene and I believe that this idea of his bears out our view. I do not think that either Trinidad or the small Islands would accept any such idea today. Moreover, even if such a Federation were to be possible, I do not think that either it or (and here is the important thing from Manley's point) Jamaica could possibly look to Dominion status. You have already made this point to him but I think it is worthwhile emphasising whenever you get the chance since I suspect that it may be the decisive factor in Manley's thinking.

² T E Sealy, editor of *Daily Gleaner* in Jamaica.

86 CO 968/563, no 10**2 Dec 1958****'West Indies garrison': minute by Mr Lennox-Boyd to Mr Duncan Sandys on the reasons why a UK battalion should remain in the West Indies until 1963**

The reasons why I asked for the retention of the U.K. battalion in the Caribbean until 1963 are rather stronger than you suggest in the second paragraph of your minute of 24th November.¹

2. Under the Federal Constitution the revenue which the Federal Government can raise, either as at present by mandatory levy from the Unit Governments or by specific taxation, is fixed at a maximum of £1.9 millions a year. The Federal Constitution must be reviewed by the end of the fifth year of its operation and in fact we hope for an interim review some time in the second half of next year. On both occasions we shall try and help the Federal Government to raise this ceiling on their expenditure but I certainly cannot say at present what prospect of success there is. Present omens are far from hopeful. In the light of this the Federal Government have agreed to provide £320,000 for defence expenditure for the quinquennium 1958/63, which is a very high proportion of their total budget. We obviously could not get them to provide any substantially higher sum and what they can do will be barely sufficient to pay for *one* full-strength battalion.

3. I hope that the West India Regiment, even at one-battalion strength, will be just capable of maintaining internal security within the Federation. The prospects of British Honduras and British Guiana joining the Federation before 1963 are remote; but even if they did, the West India Regiment would certainly not be capable of looking after the mainland territories as well.

4. We must therefore plan for a situation in February 1960 (which is after all only 14 months hence) which is not significantly different from the present; namely a Guatemala whose threats to British Honduras may at present be only verbal but which would certainly be likely to turn words to deeds if it saw any prospect of success e.g. through our disinteresting ourselves in British Honduras (and the withdrawal of the garrison might be taken as a sign of that in present circumstances) and a small but highly influential Communist group whose activities represent a standing threat to British Guiana. In the interests of stability and confidence in both territories, I must urge that a decision should be taken now to retain the British Garrison until 1963.

5. There is also the problem of Bahamas. Although it is hoped that the build-up of the Police Force there will enable the British company to be withdrawn next year, the knowledge that the British Garrison is still available as a long-step will be both a deterrent to agitators and an encouragement to the police themselves.

6. There is of course no question of the difference of opinion between certain unit governments and the Federation over the procedure for summoning military

¹ Duncan Sandys had suggested two reasons in his minute of 24 Nov which were (1) that although the federation intended to form two battalions of the West Indies Regiment, the first of which would start from Jan 1959, it would be some time before a second battalion could be raised, and (2) that some West Indies colonies would remain outside the federation (CO 968/563, no 10, Duncan Sandys to Lennox-Boyd, 24 Nov 1958).

assistance in aid of the civil power affecting the issue. The only relevance of this to the retention of the British battalion was that the Governor-General thought it would help him if the decision to retain the battalion could be announced sooner rather than later.

7. In the light of these considerations, I hope that you will be prepared to agree to the Governor-General announcing that the British battalion will remain until 1963.

8. I am sending a copy of this minute to the Secretary of State for War.

87 CO 1031/2039, no 21

3 Dec 1958

[US bases]: letter from H A A Hankey to P Rogers on the initial US response to the suggested review of the 1941 agreement

As we agreed at our meeting on November 26 I was eventually able to have a long talk with Dale¹ of the State Department about the possible revision of the 1941 Leased Bases Agreement on Friday November 28 at dinner. As you know Dale is the official in the State Department who deals, among other things, with the United Kingdom and the U.K. island colonies all over the world wherever they may be situated.

2. I need not perhaps go into too great detail of what I said to Dale. I began by describing our overall view of the problem, more or less in the terms which you had used at our meeting last week; I said that our main interest was to ensure that the Americans were able to continue to use all the facilities which they required in the West Indies for purposes connected with defence and security within the limits imposed by the need to observe the legitimate aspirations of the West Indies and to ensure that relations between the Americans on the one hand and the Federal Government and individual island governments on the other were as friendly as possible. I then spoke on the lines of the material contained in our several drafts in order to emphasize our belief that in the long run U.S. interests as well as those of the West Indies would be best served by an early meeting to consider the revision of the 1941 base agreement. I said that such a meeting need not necessarily be described as a conference, although it would be difficult to prevent this term being used in the West Indies. I then explained that the view was strongly held by those here best fitted to judge the situation in the West Indies, that it would be preferable for the initiative to come from the Federal Government, and I explained why. I admitted, however, that we were concerned least such a request, transmitted as it would be through the Foreign Office, might (a) be misinterpreted as an attempt on our part to wriggle out of one of the basic defence agreements between us for the defence of the West, and (b) be a less favourable method of approaching the problem than if, for example, the Americans were themselves to propose that the review took place. We had seen from the Chaguaramas affair that very strong views were held in Washington on the subject of the various agreements under which the Americans operated in the West Indies. We had therefore decided, before pursuing the matter any further, to take the opportunity of Dale's presence in London to ask him if he

¹ W M Dale, Bureau of European Affairs, US State Dept; deputy director, Office of British Commonwealth and North European Affairs, 1958–1960.

believed the various departments concerned in Washington would respond favourably to a request from us for a joint review of the 1941 agreement at which the West Indies Federal Government would be represented; in making such a request we should be able to say that the question had been raised with us by the Federal Government.

3. The answer was rather surprising. Dale first said that he agreed entirely with my statement of our long term policy, which he said sounded like an extract from a State Department policy paper. He said that the State Department had for some time been increasingly concerned about the serious discrepancies between, on the one hand, the 1941 agreement and the later agreements and the practices which had grown up in connexion with them, and on the other the principles and practices which had become standardised in the various agreements between the U.S. and other countries belonging to NATO. In their reply to our omnibus Note of May 22 last which was on the point of being delivered in Washington, they were in fact proposing that we should undertake a joint review of the jurisdictional clauses in the later (L.R.P.G. and O.R.S.) agreements (though not the 1941 agreement). As regards the 1941 agreement he agreed entirely with the arguments I had used to demonstrate the need for a review to take place soon rather than late when it might be more difficult than now for agreement to be reached with the West Indies politicians; he had only one reservation on this score, which I shall mention later. He confirmed our fear that the feeling in Washington on this whole subject was very sensitive, but believed that this being so we must not in fact expect that the initiative for a review of the 1941 agreement could ever come from the American side. Those concerned, particularly in the Pentagon, would never be able to defend themselves adequately against public criticism if they were to take such a step. However he thought that if the request came from our side, backed up with a sufficiently convincing display of arguments along the lines which I had followed, it should be possible to secure agreement in the State Department and Pentagon to the required review, and the fact that we had made the request would provide answer enough to any criticism from outside. He preferred to avoid the word "conference" if possible, but recognised that it would inevitably be given that name in the West Indies. He also recognised that however limited the terms of reference for such a conference might be, it was only too likely that the opportunity would be taken for all kinds of unacceptable proposals to be put up by the West Indies, for example completely re-writing the periods for which the leases would run etc. But he agreed that as these difficulties would have to be faced sooner or later, it was probably better to do so now rather than put off the evil day until independence was imminent. However, he pointed out that a good deal of preparatory work would still be necessary in Washington before a statement of the necessary facts could be compiled, and he could not say there and then whether it would be possible for them to inform us that they agreed to a review in reply to a request from our side until they had had time to go into the question in the necessary detail; he did not seem however to exclude the idea. He suggested that a suitable opportunity for us to raise the question of a review of the 1941 agreement might be in our reply to their Note to which he had referred. But he would like to think this question over and said that he would write a personal letter to me on the subject on his return to Washington, giving us his further views on the best way in which we might raise this question having regard to the circumstances in Washington. On this I said I had deliberately not put anything in writing myself, and

hoped that he did not in any way regard what I had said as a *démarche*; it really was only an attempt to use the opportunity of his presence in London to ascertain the best way for all concerned of raising this delicate matter. He understood this clearly enough and said that his letter would be an entirely personal one.

4. Dale's reservation to which I referred above was, that while recognising Williams himself as being in a fairly strong position in Trinidad, the State Department's impression derived from their Consul General's reports, was that a very much less strong feeling existed in Trinidad on the subject of the 1941 agreement than would seem to follow from what I had said. This, however, did not appear to have affected his views about the agreements which were evidently in much closer agreement with ours than any of us had thought likely.

5. I hope that Dale's promised letter is not unduly delayed, and that he does not have cold feet meanwhile. I should naturally have preferred to have nothing [sic] in writing. However, the conversation took place during drinks and dinner with a member of the American Embassy, and Dale could hardly be blamed for wishing not to commit himself too completely when he was clearly tired and preoccupied after his efforts to brief Mr. Nixon² for his radio and television interviews. If there is undue delay in my hearing from him (i.e. after the beginning of next week) I shall remind him through our Embassy in Washington. But it does look as though the way will very shortly lie clear for an approach along the lines which we have all agreed would be the most favourable from the angle of the Federal Government.

² Richard Nixon, vice-president of the US, 1953–1961.

88 CO 1031/2573, no 64

5 Dec 1958

[Jamaica and federation]: letter (reply) from Sir K Blackburne to P Rogers on the current state of anti-federation feeling in Jamaica.

Enclosure: note by the governor of his latest discussion with Mr Manley

Many thanks for your letter WIS 175/01 of the 26th November about Federation.¹ I have today also written to the Secretary of State in reply to his letter of the 25th November on the same subject.

I enclose for your information a copy of a note which I recorded after my last discussion with Manley on this subject. I think that three points emerge from this discussion and from other talks which I have had with people recently:—

- (a) Manley is still a believer in the idea of Federation, even though he is perhaps thinking, albeit mistakenly, in terms of a weak form of Federation,
- (b) Though Jamaican politics—through Bustamante—aggravated the present anti-Federation feeling, that feeling now represents popular opinion and cannot be lightly dismissed as “Jamaican politics”,
- (c) There is still every hope for the future of Federation, though we are not likely to see much change in the Jamaican outlook until after the elections.²

¹ See 85.

² A reference to the forthcoming Jamaican elections which were held in July 1959. Manley won 29 out of 45 seats, Bustamante 16.

I sense both in your letter and in the letter from the Secretary of State that it is felt that Jamaica is being un-cooperative, and that the fault lies at our door. I have no doubt that this is partly true. In the first place the great strides made by Jamaica in recent years have inevitably gone slightly to the heads of those responsible for them. Secondly, the ministerial and official teams in Jamaica are inevitably somewhat better than those in the Federation. This is no reflection on the Federal Government; the politicians decided (probably wrongly) to put their 2nd XI in to bat; and the Federal official organisation (although it has many top class men) cannot yet have the same background and general level of staffing as the larger territories. All this adds up to a strong feeling of superiority in Jamaica, coupled with great irritation (often over small and trivial details) when the Federal Government starts to make a move in any particular field.

But, in fairness to Jamaica, I do think that there is another side to the picture. The most vital target of the Federal Government (particularly as they were the 2nd XI) should surely have been to proceed in the first instance on the basis of close collaboration with the unit territories through the Regional Consultative Council. One can only assume either that Grantley Adams was determined to rule the roost by himself, or else that he does not appreciate the importance of carrying Manley and others with him. The second view is supported by the astonishing statement by Grantley Adams that he has had to postpone the first vital meeting of the Regional Consultative Council (proposed for December) because of a by-election in Barbados! Finally, one cannot help sensing that there is an absence of leadership on the part of the Prime Minister, which has resulted in what are sometimes unfairly felt here to be unrelated moves by Federal Ministries to justify their existence.

I am, of course, now a somewhat biased party, but I do most strongly feel that the fault is not all on the side of Jamaica, and that the Federation has not been given the needed leadership by its Prime Minister.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Lord Hailes.

Enclosure to 88

I asked Mr. Manley today for his thoughts on Federation. He confirmed that his recent statements about Customs Union and about Federation were designed with the objects of playing for time and of trying to remove the issue of Federation from Jamaican internal politics.

He hoped that he might persuade the opposition in Jamaica to join an all-party Committee of the House of Representatives to try and reach an agreed position in regard to amendments to the Federal constitution. He was afraid that he might not succeed and that the opposition might make a definite anti-Federation stand—simply to strengthen their position in the next Jamaica elections. He thought that, if they won the elections on this platform, they might later find a loophole through which they could still keep Jamaica in the Federation at the end of the five-year period; but he thought that it was equally likely that secession would be the outcome under a J.L.P. Government. (My own bet is that a J.L.P. Government will not readily secede from Federation; it is noticeable that even Sir Alexander Bustamante is at pains to say that he is not against the principle of Federation, but is merely opposed to the present system).

Mr. Manley went on to say that he felt that the close-knit form of Federation on the Australian model was not suitable for the West Indies, although he admitted that he was as much to blame as anyone for its adoption.

When questioned as to his ideas for the need for Federation he said that it was not only the road to nationhood, but was also needed for practical reasons of organisation and co-ordination, and he cited the U.C.W.I. as an example. He went on to say that it was probably a mistake for the Federal Government to have embarked on "economic planning and development" without adequate staff rather than to have concentrated on the task of regional organisation. He wondered what in fact the Federal Government could do in order to raise the levels in the smaller islands, and he quoted Antigua as an example of what could be achieved by local leadership.

In reply to questions he said that this state of affairs would probably not have happened if others had been at the helm of the Federal Government. There was a clear lack of leadership. Why had Sir Grantley Adams made no attempt to visit the Units and to "sell" Federation? Why had he wasted his opportunities on his only brief visit to Jamaica by not talking about nationhood and about the success of his visit to Canada? How could any leader with a grip on the situation permit such an incident as the attempt to unseat Mr. Cargill from the Federal Parliament?

In his view it was now "touch and go" whether Federation would survive. The tragic part was that no one outside Jamaica seemed to realise that the anti-Federation talk and the opposition to Customs Union as set out in the Commission's Report³ was *not* local politics; it was an expression of public opinion. (This was forcibly brought home to me later in the day by a talk with the Canadian Commissioner (Mr. R.G.C. Smith) who had just arrived from Trinidad and was obsessed with the political aspects of the Jamaica attitude. I have invited him to tell me his impressions after he has spent a week here and obtained the views of ordinary people).

Mr. Manley went on to say that it was astonishing that Sir Grantley Adams should postpone the proposed meeting of the Regional Consultative Council because of a by-election in Barbados. It showed clearly that he had no idea of the gravity of the situation.

³ A further commission on customs union chaired by Sir William Croft reported in Oct 1958. It examined the problem of how unit governments should be compensated for the loss of customs revenue under a common tariff and suggested that they should be given the right to levy consumption taxes on both domestic production and imports (*The West Indies: Report of the Trade and Tariffs Commission* in 2 parts, W.I. 1/58, Government of the West Indies, 1958).

89 CO 1031/2573, no 63

10 Dec 1958

[Federation]: letter from Mr Lennox-Boyd to Lord Hailes on the question of dominion status

Last week I had a very interesting talk with Jock Campbell and Bobby Kirkwood about the prospects for Federation, particularly in the light of opposition in Jamaica.¹ They had both "opened up" on this subject in an informal conversation a few days earlier and I thought it would be useful to have any ideas they might produce from

¹ cf 84.

their own position in the West Indian scene on the way in which the United Kingdom might strengthen the standing of the Federal Government. Most of the discussion turned on the question of financial assistance and in particular on C.D. & W. assistance being channelled through the Federal Government and loan raising power resting solely in the hands of the Federal Government. Nothing emerged here which went beyond the points discussed with you during your last visit; and I did not of course think it right to tell them just how far we had already gone in agreement with you to adopt a policy in these two matters which I think we all feel should strengthen your hand greatly.

The other major issue on which we touched was that of the prospect of Dominion status, which I know you feel as we do is the major political attraction for West Indians in the whole idea of Federation. At present it seems to me that it is not exerting its full force because Jamaica is dallying with the idea of separate political existence, and we discussed ways in which I might re-emphasise the aim of Dominion status in a way which would put the supporters of unit rights on the spot. Jock Campbell suggested that I might propose a date, say, 1962 or 1963, as that on which H.M.G. would be prepared to grant independence to The West Indies, and to sponsor its submission to full Commonwealth membership. This undertaking would, of course, be conditional upon the Federal Government having by then been endowed with the necessary powers and finance to make it able to stand among its peers at a Commonwealth gathering. I am a little doubtful about Jock's suggestion, partly because of our critics in The West Indies who maintain that the idea of Federation is a device on H.M.G.'s part to escape its financial responsibilities, and partly because the setting of a date by us might have the effect of arousing opposition on the score that this was something that West Indians should themselves suggest to us, and not one to be bustled into by H.M.G. However, it is certainly an idea worth thinking of and I should be grateful for your views on it. We should have to see how any date proposed fitted in with plans for other territories particularly Rhodesia and Nyasaland.

In the course of our discussion we touched on the forthcoming regional conference which your Government has proposed as a preliminary to the full revision conference next year. I have seen Philip Roger's letter to you of the 2nd December about the doubts which he felt. It occurs to me, however, that one might actually make use of such a conference to get across the main point which he makes in his letter (and which Jock Campbell raised in our discussion) if I were to visit The West Indies at the time on a general tour and in the course of it, perhaps open the conference or certainly make a speech at it, on the following theme. (I would not, by the way, suggest that I should take part in the conference but only that I should make a speech which would, I hope, put the opponents of Federation on the spot). I might recall what I said at the London Conference of 1956 and make it very clear that Dominion status was something to which The West Indies could look in the very near future (or perhaps mention a specific date) if they wished. It was not, however, a status which any of the units by themselves could obtain and even for The West Indies as a federal entity it would depend on the Federal Government being a Government which other Commonwealth Governments would accept as their peer. Independence is something which the United Kingdom can grant: full membership of the Commonwealth is a matter for all Commonwealth Governments. In other words, the Federal Government would have to have the attributes of power not only

vis-à-vis the United Kingdom, but also in its own house, and financial powers within the West Indies comparable with those which every other Commonwealth Government possessed in its own territory. The decision on that was something for West Indians themselves to take, but those who deny the Federal Government those powers must take the responsibility for holding the West Indies back from its goal of political independence as a full member of the Commonwealth.

I should be most grateful if you would let me know what you think about this idea, both of a visit at all at that time, if I can possibly get away, and of my speaking on these lines if I do so. You will, of course, understand that I could not yet say whether it would be possible for me to come out in April or May (I am firmly committed to a visit to Nigeria in mid-May) but if you think it would be useful, and if the Parliamentary situation here permits, I should very much like to.²

² The regional inter-governmental conference to undertake a preliminary review of the federal constitution, which was scheduled to be held in Trinidad, did not take place until the autumn of 1959. In May 1959 Hailes and the CO exchanged views over what might be said in an opening statement. Hailes submitted a draft which followed closely the arguments put forward by Lennox-Boyd in his statement to the 1956 conference (see 47, annex) and which reiterated dominion status as the goal to which all concerned were aiming. However, 'Since independence within the Commonwealth means at once burdens as well as privileges, let me repeat that H.M.G. would not think it right to urge the West Indies towards this status faster than West Indians themselves wished to go'. The Hailes draft added: '... in the wider international sphere a nation state has to have certain minimum attributes of statehood if it is to be an acceptable member of the community of nations and to play a worthy part in the United Nations Organisation. I must say frankly that the Federal Government of the West Indies has not yet got those attributes and that the major obstacle in the way of its attaining them is not its constitutional ties with the U.K. but its Governmental weakness within the West Indies itself' (CO 1031/2311, no 36, enclosure, Hailes to Rogers, 9 May 1959). In the event Lennox-Boyd did not attend the Trinidad review conference. Hailes opened the proceedings and spoke along the lines of his May draft.

90 DO 35/8061, no 7

23 Dec 1958

'Some observations on the Jamaican economy': despatch no 403 from R G C Smith to the Canadian Ministry of External Affairs, Ottawa

[Smith was commissioner for Canada in Trinidad and DO 35/8061 contains copies of the reports he sent to Ottawa between Apr 1958 and Aug 1960. The reports were sent to the CRO by F E Cumming-Bruce, deputy UK high commissioner, Ottawa, 1958–1959. The CRO decided not to forward them to the CO on the grounds that the latter would send them to West Indian governors, that this might come to Smith's attention and that in consequence Smith would be more inhibited in his reports (DO 35/8061, no 2, G W StJ Chadwick to Cumming-Bruce, 1 July 1958). Chadwick, an assistant secretary at the CRO, found the reports much more informative than anything received from the CO: 'In fact this is virtually the only news which we are receiving about Federation, since, despite earlier promises, the Colonial Office have so far sent us nothing of value' (*ibid*, minute, 14 Jan 1959). Deputy undersecretary of state, Sir H Lintott, at the CRO agreed: 'The Canadian Commissioner in Trinidad is indefatigable. We learn much more from him than from Church House' (*ibid*, minute, 22 Apr 1960).]

This despatch is not intended as an economic review of Jamaica, but rather to give some general observations based on my brief visit to that island. Because Jamaica is so different from the rest of the colonies making up the Federation, such a cursory review may be useful in setting the economy against the background of the West Indies as a whole.

2. In the first place, Jamaica has not developed economically, politically or socially as a partner of the other islands. It is, of course, a partner in several of the commodity agreements—sugar, fats and oils for example—but because of its isolation and its nearness to the United States, it had tended to look northward and westward rather than eastward to a considerable degree more than do the other islands. Moreover the discovery and exploitation of bauxite and the development of the tourist trade have both tended to intensify this northward drift. It is also said that ethnically the Jamaicans are different, springing from war-like tribes in Africa that have little connection with the more peaceful tribes that made up the forebears of the eastern islanders. Necessarily that is part conjecture, but there is no conjecture in the fact that many of the most prominent business leaders are of Assyrian, Lebanese, Jewish or other Middle East origin with little natural affiliation to the United Kingdom—elsewhere the great families and estate are almost entirely of British origin and ownership.

3. In common with the other islands, but to a greater extent, Jamaica is experiencing a remarkable economic development. Although there are grounds for questioning if the direction of the development is sound in all respects, there can be no doubt that it is booming—gross domestic product is reported to have more than doubled from 1950 to 1956, sugar exports have increased four-fold by volume since the pre-war average (although other agricultural production, such as bananas, coffee, pimento, ginger are considerably below pre-war standards, these crops compared to sugar are relatively insignificant except for bananas), alumina and bauxite production (and exports) have shot ahead yearly, so that in 1957 exports of the two combined were nearly eight times the 1955 figures and now make up about 44 percent of total domestic exports. Industrialization is “rampant” and the tourist trade has become one of Jamaica’s major industries—although the past season was relatively poor reflecting the recession in the United States.

4. Jamaica has developed an interesting method of attracting greater tourist expenditure. Behind its high tariff protection under normal circumstances the tourist would not regard Jamaica as a suitable hunting ground for “goods”. However the island has set up a widespread system of “in bond” shops, whereby anyone may buy a wide assortment of imported goods—clothing, perfumes, accessories and so on—at duty and tax free prices, the goods being delivered at the port of export. This would seem to be an ingenious way of having one’s cake and eating it, and it is strange that others of the islands have not followed suit—unless it is that the relatively lower tariffs would not support the cost of the operation of the scheme. (Some time ago I suggested a similar plan for Canada in order to reverse the adverse balance of tourist expenditure. I wonder if it might be useful to study in detail the results of the Jamaica scheme?)

5. I had a brief insight into what appears to be a most intelligent and far-sighted agricultural programme. Strangely this part of the Government programme seems to have been much less publicized than the more “flashy” and spectacular industrial development or tourist trade. Yet it would appear as if the agricultural policies, particularly in relation to the beef and dairy cattle industry, surely must be of the profoundest importance to the future of the colony.

6. Jamaica has almost succeeded in developing new cattle breeds that are thought to best suit local conditions. In the dairy field there is the Jamaica Hope, a cross between the Jersey and the Sebu. These small animals need little care, stand

the heat well, and go on producing satisfactorily over a long period of years—all prime requisites to a cattle industry that is still based to a considerable extent on peasant agriculture rather than on herd management (although there are some properly organized herds in Jamaica, notably by the Aluminum Companies). In beef cattle there is the Jamaica Red, a cross between the Red Poll and the original “Spanish” cattle found on the island. It is a fine looking animal, that now strikes almost true to form, hardy, heat resistant and capable of being brought into condition on a diet of pasture alone. Similarly the Jamaican Black, a more recent cross between the black Angus and the Sebu, shows great promise. In both of these breeds the hump and dewlap of the Indian cattle (through the “Spanish” cattle in the Red) have been almost bred out, but the stamina and hardiness evidently retained.

7. It would be interesting to find out why Jamaica has started out on its own instead of adopting the Santa Gertrudis breed from Texas, which has shown such remarkable [sic] results under fairly similar conditions—I propose to explore this question further.

8. Coupled with this breeding programme Jamaica has gone in for a systematic pangola grass pasture development. For example, all lands strip mined in the bauxite operations must be put back with pangola grass, or payment made to enable the Government to convert other similar acreage to pasture. This grass has proved to be all but immune to drought and to support such an increased number of head of cattle (without any auxiliary feed or concentrates) that this policy is bound to have important long term results for Jamaican agriculture.

9. There is also a programme of production subsidies, helped out by Colonial Development and Welfare grants, in exchange for the introduction of approved agricultural practices. The Department of Agriculture carries on vigorous fertilizer programmes, although statistically there does not appear to be any increase in fertilizer use.

10. All crops are sold by marketing boards in an effort to improve quality and grading. Jamaica is, of course, the largest banana producer in the Federation, but production is only increasing very slightly (in contrast to the Windward Islands where production is coming ahead by leaps and bounds). It also produces superb quality coffee, but its export is relatively small and has fallen rapidly since 1953. Smaller crops that are Jamaican specialties [sic] are pimentos and ginger, both of which are world famous.

11. Perhaps the most interesting development in recent years, apart from bauxite mining, is the industrialization of Jamaica. It is of interest because it is the result of a deliberate programme for attracting foreign investment in manufacture and in encouraging local capital to manufacture by a policy of high protection, through import duties, quotas or outright prohibition of imports, tax concessions and help by the Industrial Development Corporation which will build factories and lease them under favourable terms. The results are quite spectacular, but the price [sic] paid in increased living costs [sic], high production costs, and the elimination of the basic competitive urge are [sic] much more questionable.

12. The increase in manufacturing may be illustrated by considering the increase in the gross domestic product produced by manufacturing—21 million in 1956 against 8 million in 1950. Industries have included textiles [sic], shoes, soap, condensed milk (monopoly), cement, cigarettes and cigars, beer, and others of minor importance apart from the natural products such as sugar, rum, alumina. Although

there appears to be a continuing interest in investment from abroad, the present rate of increase can hardly be continued indefinitely.

13. There is cause for some alarm at the development of this policy. Jamaicans in general seem to be over-confident that they can solve their problems of unemployment by “more and more of the same”. No figures of numbers of persons employed in secondary manufacturing are available, but they probably make only a dent in the steadily growing work force. In the meantime the rapidity of development has undoubtedly out-run the availability of skilled man-power, so that costs of production are high and maintenance poor. It is not encouraging that, so it seemed in this cursory examination of the problem, Jamaican industrialists do not seem overly concerned with their higher costs, but tend to seek solutions through the maintenance of unassailable protection or other Government hand-outs. They do not appear to be interested in solutions that lie in greater markets (through customs union for example) or by increased efficiency—they just do not want competition, and one wonders how far such a policy can be pushed successfully.

14. In many respects the structure of the economy appears to resumble [sic] a South America rather than a North America (or other British West Indian) pattern. It is anomalous that under a socialist government the pattern seems to have been devised to benefit a few influential and very wealthy people. It is claimed that wages have been raised and that standards of living improved by these policies. It is open to question if real wages have been increased significantly (except in a few cases such as in the bauxite and alumina industries), and certainly not to the same extent that the “capitalists” have been able to add to their already considerable fortunes.

91 CO 1031/2603, no 42

17 Feb 1959

[British Honduras]: letter from Governor Sir C Thornley to P Rogers proposing a statement to the effect that the colony is free to choose whether it wishes to join in a relationship with Guatemala. *Minutes* by Rogers, H T Bourdillon, Sir J Macpherson, Mr Amery and Mr Lennox-Boyd

[Guatemala claimed to have inherited sovereignty over British Honduras from Spain but in 1859 it signed and ratified a treaty with Britain recognising the boundaries between the two countries. The treaty contained an article calling on both parties to use their best efforts to build a means of communication between Guatemala City and the Caribbean coast. Claiming that the UK had not fulfilled its obligations under this article, Guatemala denounced the 1859 treaty in 1939.]

Thank you for your letter of the 19th of January about our telegraphic correspondence on the broadcast which I was considering making following the debate in the Legislative Assembly on the dispute with Guatemala.

I fully realise that I was asking a great deal of Ministers to give me an answer on so important a matter at such very short notice and I perfectly understand the difficulty in which Ministers were placed. It was however only during the meeting of Executive Council on the morning of the day on which I sent my telegram No. 14 that I realised the line which the People's United Party were probably going to take in the debate and it seemed to me then that the point which I put to you was of sufficient importance to try and obtain your reactions to what I had in mind to do. I also had

at the back of my mind discussions which I had with you and the Secretary of State himself when I was in London with one of the Delegations at the end of 1957 or the beginning of 1958 when your reactions did not seem to me to be so strongly opposed to the idea as they clearly are now. The line which the Secretary of State then took was that any such statement about British Honduras could not but run the risk of unfortunate repercussions in Malta, Cyprus and elsewhere where for other reasons not applicable in British Honduras, H.M.G. could not adopt a similar approach. However, I appreciate that I did not press the matter then as it did not seem to me then to be as important as I believe it now is—and it might well be that had I done so the Secretary of State's reactions would have appeared as strongly opposed to it then as they clearly are now. This was however a factor in my mind when thinking that you might be prepared to go with me on this even with the short notice which I was able to give; and I do hope that I shall be forgiven of any intention deliberately to rush something through about which more time should have been given to Ministers to consider all the various factors involved.

I was however sorry to learn from your telegram No. 33 that the more the Secretary of State has thought about it the more convinced he has become that a statement on the lines which I recommended would be a mistake. Frankly, and with the greatest respect, the more I think about it the more convinced have I become that it is really important that such a statement should be made and that it should be made before we reach the anniversary month of the signing of the disputed Treaty 100 years ago in 1859. The purpose of this letter is therefore to ask that further consideration may now be given to this matter in the light of the reasoned arguments which follow.

In the first place, I honestly believe that most thinking people here have it in mind that one day, however far ahead in the distant future, this country will be able to make the choice as to whether it remains within the Commonwealth or goes outside. I do not therefore think that it would come as a particular shock to them if such a statement were to be made in Parliament or by myself, always so long as it was at the same time made perfectly clear that we cannot yet foresee the day when the country will be firmly on its own financial and economic feet and resting on equally firm democratic foundations; and always so long as it is made equally clear that H.M.G. has no intention of giving up its responsibilities towards this country until that time arrives and we have fully discharged our obligations under Article 73 of the United Nations Charter. After all, we are all agreed as you made clear in your telegram No. 33 that strategically and economically the British Commonwealth has nothing to gain from continued association with British Honduras, and we are all agreed that there can be no question of our handing over our responsibilities to any other country or group of countries even after financial and economic self-sufficiency and the build-up of democratic institutions have been satisfactorily accomplished so long as the great majority of the people here desire to remain associated with the Commonwealth. If all these facts are made perfectly clear I cannot see how a statement on the lines which I have proposed could possibly be interpreted in any way as an intention to abandon this country.

I believe also, with respect, that the fear that such a statement would discourage even further private investment in this country is being rather exaggerated. There has after all been precious little private investment here over the past few years with the notable exception of course of the activities of the Sharps and others associated

with them in the sugar factory, the citrus factory and the Hummingbird cocoa development. Furthermore I see no prospect whatsoever of the situation in this respect improving if we are simply to go along as we are doing at present. The main reasons for this are, I feel almost sure, the hotting up of Guatemalan propaganda on the subject of their claim and the ambiguous position of Price¹ and the P.U.P. towards this issue. Anything therefore that we can do to take the heat out of this issue will of itself be an encouragement to private investment which is not likely to be scared off by the highly unlikely contingency that the day will ever come when the substantial majority of the people of this country will ever choose to join up with Guatemala in preference to maintaining the Commonwealth link. In this connection it is, I think, of some significance that the Chamber of Commerce, on which is represented people with a fairly large stake in this country and to which many potential overseas investors come for advice, have themselves sought an assurance from H.M.G. the implication of which is that a plebiscite should at some stage be held. It seems to be a reasonably safe conclusion from this that these people whom it was suggested in your telegram No. 13 would be dismayed by a statement on the lines I have proposed, do not in fact have any fears about what the peoples' decision on this issue would be and that they could presumably be relied upon to reassure any potential investors who might have doubts on this score. The best thing I am convinced that we can do to encourage private investment short of persuading the Guatemalan Government to give up their claim (which is obviously impossible) is to take whatever measures we can to take the heat out of this issue now.

There is also a hint in your telegrams on this matter that what I am proposing would amount to a reversal of present policy. I cannot honestly see it in this light. I have myself never understood our policy here to be that never in any circumstances will we be prepared to grant this country the same sort of independence as has been granted to the great dominions. When a few people associated with George Price here have doubted the sincerity of H.M.G.'s policy towards dependent territories I have roundly charged them with paying no regard whatever to the historical facts of the development of the Commonwealth and asked why in the face of these incontrovertible facts of history they should have any doubts about the intentions of H.M.G. to fulfil their obligations under the United Nations Charter. Up to now I have not been pressed to go beyond this point but I may be asked the direct question at any time, or it might be asked in the Legislative Assembly, as to what the position will be when those obligations have been fulfilled. I would not of course ever say bluntly that H.M.G. could simply not foresee that the time would ever come when they would be prepared to relinquish charge of this country. Were I to do so all the political parties would most certainly unite in condemnation of us. But it will not be easy to go on stalling on this question particularly during this very important year in our relations with Guatemala.

On the other hand the advantages of a statement on the lines which I have proposed seem to me to be great and urgent. The supporters of Price might come to see that he really might one day be able, if allowed to pursue his course unrestrained, to lead them into the arms of Guatemala which I am absolutely certain the great

¹ George Cadle Price, former city councillor and mayor of Belize City; founding member of PUP, 1950; party secretary, 1950–1956; leader from 1956; elected to National Assembly, 1954; first minister under ministerial system, 1961; prime minister under 1964 self-government constitution.

majority of them would detest. The many loyal people who at present stupidly declare themselves uninterested in politics would, I hope, come to realise that in the interests of their own future and the future of their children it was time that they began to play a part in politics and to play their part in steering the future destiny of the country along the path of their own choosing. It would completely undermine the position which has been taken up by President Ydigoras² by cutting the ground from under his feet; and it would become very difficult for the Guatemalan Government to find much support either in Guatemala itself or in the other Latin American countries or indeed in the United Nations Organisation for any aggressive measures which Ydigoras may be contemplating in this year of the recovery of Belize. There is also, I feel, a good chance that if such a statement is made we shall find the Americans on our side as allies on this issue instead of adopting the role which they now do of neutrality in the dispute; and it might even provide an avenue of escape for President Ydigoras from the prison in which he has incarcerated himself by his outspoken public statements of his intentions towards this country during this fateful year which has now dawned. In the discussions which I had with Wikeley³ here a fortnight ago he mentioned to me that the President may quite possibly be casting around for some means of extricating himself from the stand which he has publicly taken and that he might possibly see in such a statement just the escape route which he was seeking. It seems to me also that such a statement would put us in an impregnable position in the United Nations if the Guatemalan charges are pressed this year in that particular forum.

In short I do not know of anyone here who is capable of independent thought on this matter who would not regard such a statement of long term policy as entirely consistent with the policies which have been adopted in other parts of the Commonwealth and, as such, entirely reasonable.

Both the American Ambassador to Guatemala and the American Consul here have both mentioned to me in conversation that it must be a great many years before this country will be able to stand on its own feet but that neither of them doubt that when the time comes H.M.G. will act true to form and allow the people to chart their own course as they think best for themselves. They have both told me that some such statement as I have suggested would be much the best answer to the impetuosity of the President and some members of his Government in Guatemala towards their claim to sovereignty. This also is the very strong view held by Wikeley as was indicated in his telegram addressed to the Foreign Office as No. 9 of the 13th of January last. In our talks while he was down here as my guest a little over a fortnight ago he stressed even more strongly the importance which he attached to a statement on these lines being made from his own view-point in Guatemala City.

I am enclosing⁴ with this letter leading articles which have recently appeared in the "Belize Billboard" and in the "Belize Times" which show that both the principal political parties take it for granted that the day will come when these people will have freedom of choice in regard to their future destinies. As I have already mentioned the Chamber of Commerce are clearly of the same mind in requesting the assurance of H.M.G. that they will reject any attempt by any country to alter the present status of

² Gen Miguel Ydígoras Fuentes, president of Guatemala, 1958–1963.

³ T Wikeley, HM minister and consul-general, Guatemala, 1957–1960.

⁴ Not printed.

British Honduras against the will of the people as expressed through a plebiscite. I have also, without of course mentioning that I have had any correspondence with you on this matter, in private discussion with Macmillan⁵ led him up to the point at which he has told me that in his judgement it would be quite a good thing if the people were now told something of the kind by myself or by the Secretary of State. He, as you know, is my most valuable unofficial adviser and it was interesting that without any direct lead from me he should have come to the same conclusion as I do.

I should add that I had a long talk with Montgomery Hyde⁶ and Llewelyn Williams⁷ before they saw the political parties last Friday afternoon when I gave them as an aide memoire the statement included in paragraph 1 of your telegram No. 33 without of course indicating to them that we had had any other correspondence in the matter. They replied that it correctly recorded the views expressed to them in their talk with you. For the reasons given in this letter you will appreciate that I could not bring myself to stress to them the "disadvantages" attaching to my own proposition to you. I was however extremely careful in what I did say not to indicate anything of my own thoughts as set out in this letter. But they did ask me what reply I thought they should give if they were asked a direct question arising out of a suggestion in the "Times" leading article. This was a difficult one for me in the circumstances. I suggested, and they accepted, that much the best line was to invite reference to H.M.G.'s wonderful record in the development of the Commonwealth and to stress the need for faith. This, I felt, was the least that I could do. In fact no such direct question was raised with them at the meeting with any of the political parties.

I am sorry that I have felt the need to write at such length about this and to press you so hard to have this question reconsidered by Ministers. I have done so because I believe that the time has come when it is urgently necessary to make a statement on the lines which I have suggested as giving us much the best chance of taking the heat out of the Guatemalan dispute in this important year and restoring a measure of stability into the political scene here.

I hope you will not feel, because it would not be correct, that I am being unduly influenced by American opinion in this matter. No one feels more strongly on the point than Wikeley and myself; but situated as we are in the middle of this continent it is, as I am sure you will realise, of considerable importance to us that we should have American opinion on our side. At the moment it is correctly neutral. I believe that a declaration in such terms as I have recommended might well tip it over on to our side in the influence which the United States is undoubtedly able to exercise on the Guatemalan Government.

I believe that the best time to have made this statement would have been over the broadcast on the evening of the day on which the debate took place in the Legislative Assembly. But I perfectly understand that it was asking too much to expect the Secretary of State's authority to make it at such short notice. I do however feel that it is important that a statement on these lines should be made not later than the end of March before we enter the centenary month of April.

⁵ J W Macmillan, nominated member, Executive Council, British Honduras.

⁶ MP (Unionist), North Belfast, 1950–1959.

⁷ MP (Labour), Abertillery Division of Monmouthshire, 1950–1965.

Feeling as strongly as I do on this matter I should greatly appreciate the earliest indication from you of the Secretary of State's view in the light of the arguments put forward in this letter.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Wikeley.

Minutes on 91

Sir J. Macpherson (through Mr. Bourdillon)

Sir Colin Thornley in his letter at (42) makes a strong plea for the reconsideration of the attitude which we have taken so far about his saying publicly that the people of British Honduras will eventually be free to decide to join up in any relationship they like with Guatemala. You will recall that Sir Colin proposed that he should make this statement in a broadcast in January and that we declined to agree, primarily because we feared the effect of such a statement on investment in British Honduras. On your instructions I followed our telegram up with a personal letter about the short notice which Sir Colin had given us on so major an issue.

There was a further exchange of telegrams about what might be said by and to the M.P.s which you also saw.

Sir Colin presents a forceful and closely reasoned argument for reconsideration on this point in a letter which is typical of the integrity and honesty of purpose with which throughout he has approached the difficult political issues arising from the activities of Mr. Price. I think you and Ministers should read it in full, the more especially since I much regret that I find myself in disagreement with it.

To clear first the question of the short notice given us by Sir C. Thornley, the second paragraph of his letter explains the circumstances in which he was placed. It is very understandable that in these circumstances he felt bound so to put the matter to us, and I think we should accept this unreservedly in our reply. I would add as far as the passage marked X in that paragraph is concerned, that while the minutes of the meetings with the Secretary of State at that time do not record this point in detail, my recollection accords with that of Sir Colin that the point we were primarily concerned with then was the risk of repercussions in Malta, Cyprus and elsewhere. On that I would only add that while we need not presumably consider the effect on Cyprus, the possibility of repercussions elsewhere must still be borne in mind. We might well find it embarrassing that anywhere where a foreign country lays a claim to a British Colony, we should have the precedent of saying that of course the people of that Colony will be free to choose in due course whether they should join the foreign country in question. Such repercussions would be still more damaging if any question of a plebescite [sic] were to arise and I deal with this point in respect of British Honduras below.

As far as British Honduras alone is concerned, and Sir Colin quite rightly restricts his own arguments to that field, the following are the arguments which he puts forward:—

(1) Provided it is made clear that H.M.G. has no intention of giving up its responsibilities until the country is "firmly on its own financial and economic feet and resting on equally firm democratic foundations", he believes that most thinking people in British Honduras believe that the country would be able to make a choice as to whether it remains within the Commonwealth or goes outside, and that a

statement to that effect now would be no "particular shock to them". This may be so, but I do not think that even from the internal point of view it is the full story. Firstly, when statements such as this are made, the qualifications embodied in them, such as that proposed by Sir Colin, tend to be forgotten or ignored and only the nub of the statement publicised. That can well be used by ill-intentioned political leaders such as Mr. Price for their own purposes and constant reiteration of the theme could in my view well have an important effect in weakening confidence both within and without British Honduras that the Colony will stay in the Commonwealth, particularly if one is at any time driven to further stages such as a plebiscite [sic] (I comment further on this later). Furthermore it seems to me that this statement of Sir Colin's rests on the unspoken assumption, which indeed I think has dominated so much of his thinking about the future of the Colony, that one day it could hope to have an independent existence. I just do not see this as a possibility and while obviously no one can be absolutely certain about what may be possible in this respect in 50 or 100 years time, I believe that it would be a most dangerous course to base our statement of policy now on an assumption which we do not ourselves believe.

(2) Sir Colin then goes on to contest our view that private investment would be deterred by a statement such as he proposes. He points out firstly that there has been little private investment except for that of the Sharps and that, moreover, private investment is already deterred by the uncertainty arising from the dispute with Guatemala. He suggests that a statement about the ability of British Honduras to join Guatemala at some later date will "take the heat out of the issue" and therefore be an encouragement to private investment, and as evidence and support he quotes the fact that the local Chamber of Commerce have themselves "sought an assurance from H.M.G. the implication of which is that a plebiscite should at some stage be held". I am not sure of the details of the latter but I surmise that what is sought by the Chamber of Commerce is an assurance that British Honduras would not be handed over to Guatemala without a plebiscite—a proposal which is different from Sir Colin's in a subtle but still very important way. Sir Colin is right in saying that there has been little investment apart from that of the Sharp group, but they are, after all, about to invest a further £1 million in British Honduras, which is in itself a very sizeable sum for so tiny a place and my belief is that they would certainly be upset by a statement of the kind contemplated. Furthermore, I do not believe such a statement would, as Sir Colin surmises, "take the heat out" of the Guatemalan issue. My own belief is that it would have the contrary effect, for the reasons in paras 4 and 5 below.

(3) Sir Colin then reverts to his favourite theme, which I have mentioned in (1) above, that he has never himself "understood our policy here to be that never in any circumstances will we be prepared to grant (the Colony) the same sort of independence as has been granted to the great dominions". For the reasons given above I certainly think that that in fact is our policy as long as a totally independent existence is in question. As part of the West Indian Federation, on the other hand, British Honduras could certainly look to independence in the sense of independence from U.K. control.

(4) Sir Colin believes that a statement such as he proposes would arouse those in British Honduras who value the British connection from their present indifference towards the antics of Mr. Price, by making them realize that they must

fight to defend their future. I wish I could be so optimistic, but while one can never be certain either way on such an issue, I would at least add that there is no evidence to show that it will have this effect in any greater degree than the manner in which it might well strengthen the hands of Mr. Price in harping publicly on the theme of eventual union with Guatemala. My own fear is that it would enable Mr. Price to make much important play with this than he can at the moment and that it might well dismay many of those who are our friends.

(5) Sir Colin then suggests that a statement such as he proposes would cut the ground from under the feet of the President of Guatemala, and would make it very difficulty for the Guatemalan Government to find support either in Guatemala itself, or among other Latin American countries, or in the United Nations, for any aggressive measure which he may contemplate this year for the "recovery" of Belize. He suggests that such a statement might bring the Americans on to our side as allies on this issue, instead of adopting the role of neutrality as they do at the moment, and furthermore that it might provide "an avenue of escape" for the President from the impasse he has created by his public statements. Mr. Bourdillon, through whom I am passing the file, will be in a better position than I to judge about all this, but subject to his views I do not myself believe at the moment that the statement will produce all, or indeed, any, of these advantages. I do not believe that the attitude of Latin American countries is dictated primarily by the merits of the case, and in any case we already have so much material on this, including the two debates in the House of Assembly about the wish of British Honduras not to associate with Guatemala, that I do not feel the statement would add substantially to our case. As far as the Americans are concerned, I believe that privately they recognise the overwhelming strength of our case but that they have never been willing to come down on our side in it because of their quite understandable, though from our view very tiresome, need to stay on good terms with Guatemala. That need would in no way be lessened by the statement. Finally, as far as Guatemala itself is concerned, I frankly do not see how such a statement would cut the ground from under the feet of the President. I would have expected that his next move would be to make great play with the statement, claim that Guatemala should be allowed opportunities to advance its case in British Honduras, and perhaps then demand a plebiscite. While we could, of course, in the face of that fall back on the qualifications to the statement to which I referred in (1) above, I would have thought that this would not stand in the way of quite an effective little campaign by Guatemala for such a plebiscite.

The rest of the letter does not add to the reasons for the course Sir Colin advocates, but sets out something of the local background and ends up by saying that he thinks it important that a statement on these lines should be made not later than the end of March.

I regret that my own view remains that for the reasons I have attempted to explain above, such a statement should not be made. I propose that subject to Foreign Office concurrence we should reply accordingly.

?So proceed.

P. R.
6.3.59

Sir J. Macpherson

Sir Colin Thornley argues his case very well, and this is a matter on which he obviously feels deeply. It is difficult to go against the view of the man on the spot

when he clearly feels that the local situation makes a certain course of action overwhelmingly necessary. All the same, I am bound to agree with Mr. Rogers that the statement suggested by Sir Colin should not be authorised.

2. The fatal flaw in the case advanced in No. 42 seems to be that the proposed formula, while it would make a definite reference to ultimate self-determination and would thus arouse all sorts of expectations, would not foreshadow self-determination for British Honduras in the immediate or even the near future. On the contrary, it would link the exercise of self-determination specifically with the attainment of financial viability (see paragraph 3 of No. 27)—a happy state which British Honduras may not achieve for a very long time. I do not dispute that this connection between viability and independence is right and proper, but I am afraid it would rob the proposed statement of almost all of its political advantages. I concede that the initial effect of the statement might be to embarrass our adversaries (a term which is meant to include President Ydigoras and George Price), but they would not take it lying down. They would be bound to regard it as a challenge, and I am afraid they would quickly see the opportunities for counter-attack which a statement on these lines would offer. They would surely fasten on to the offer of self-determination implied in the statement and would challenge HMG to prove the sincerity of their intentions by arranging for an early plebiscite. I am afraid they would have an easy answer to the argument that British Honduras cannot choose its own future until it is financially viable, since they could say that the present inability of British Honduras to pay its own way need be no obstacle to a choice between the United Kingdom and Guatemala. President Ydigoras would no doubt improve the occasion by making lavish promises of aid from the Guatemalan Treasury—promises which he would doubtless have no intention of keeping but which would nonetheless have their immediate effect. By these means HMG would before long be forced back on the defensive, and the fact that the offer of ultimate self-determination had been specifically made would only add to our embarrassments.

3. I am the more reluctant to reach this conclusion because I see great force in Sir Colin Thornley's contention that the many loyal people in British Honduras will not bestir themselves until they are faced with the possibility of the British connection coming to an end. I also think—this is a point on which I do not quite agree with Mr. Rogers—that the Americans might welcome a chance to come out somewhat more openly in our support and to fend off the inevitable onslaught of President Ydigoras by telling him that they would have been only too happy to support Guatemala but that they could not resist the obvious justice of the British case. I am afraid, however, that the absence from the statement of any *early* promise of self-determination would prevent the achievement of these objectives just as surely as it would prevent the achievement of those mentioned in the preceding paragraph. The initial effect of the statement might be to galvanise the loyalists into some kind of activity, but they would relapse as soon as they discovered that the Colony was not going to be required to choose its own destiny either at once or even within a set period of years. As for the Americans, the initial reaction in their case might also be favourable, but how long would this last? Would they not find it difficult, before very long, to avoid being caught up in the counter-attack? In other words, would we not soon find the Americans joining the Guatemalans in urging us to institute an early plebiscite in order to demonstrate the sincerity of our intentions?

4. The truth is, I am afraid, that Sir Colin Thornley has made a number of extremely good points but that his proposal will not work unless it is driven to its logical conclusion. Either it goes too far or else it does not go far enough. If the display of the prospect of ultimate self-determination is to have the desired effect on all concerned, it must be accompanied by a definite forecast of the actual exercise of choice, preferably at the end of a stated (and quite short) period of years. Given the complete strategic unimportance of British Honduras, one is sorely tempted to advocate that course; but this would at once land us in the familiar difficulty that we can hardly offer an early plebiscite in British Honduras without making the same offer for other places whose strategic importance is considerable.

5. We seem, therefore, to be driven back to the conclusion that Sir Colin's proposal is a non-starter. On the other hand we must not conceal from ourselves the dilemma with which he is faced. In No. 42 he drives home the point that everyone in British Honduras in fact assumes "that the day will come when the people will have freedom of choice in regard to their future destinies." He cannot directly deny this, since to do so would create a storm and would play straight into the hands of the Guatemalans and George Price. On the other hand he is not authorised specifically to confirm that the day of choice will come, so he has to take refuge in references to the past record of British Colonial policy (references which must, incidentally, reinforce the general belief every time they are made). It seems to me that this is a most dangerous position which cannot be held indefinitely or indeed for very much longer. Unless we are to do what Sir Colin wants (with knobs on), it seems to me that the only possible answer is to devise for British Honduras and for other territories in a broadly similar position a new status short of independence which will nonetheless satisfy nationalist ambitions and remove the taint of "Colonialism". A new study of the future of the "Smaller Territories" is fortunately just about to be inaugurated by a Working Party under Sir Norman Brook's chairmanship, on which I am to be the Colonial Office representative. I will keep you and Mr. Rogers fully informed of developments in the Working Party, and I am not unhopeful that something of interest to British Honduras will emerge. Meanwhile I can only suggest that Sir Colin Thornley should be given a reasoned rejection of his present proposal, coupled with the assurance that his dilemma is fully appreciated here and that we shall be giving further urgent thought to the future of British Honduras in the context of the Smaller Territories generally. I am afraid he will regard this last assurance as cold comfort, but it is the best we can do for the present.

H.T.B.

11.3.59

Mr. Amery

... 2. I agree with Mr. Rogers and Mr. Bourdillon that we cannot give the Governor the green light on this. But Mr. Bourdillon raises a very important point in para 5 of his minute—touching on A & B of Mr. Rogers' minute—as to whether we can contemplate British Honduras ever becoming independent on its own. We hope that in time B.H. may see the advantages of joining the West Indies Federation (and achieving independence in that way). If their objections to this are sustained there are only three choices:—

- (i) continued dependent status which is not in line with our declared policy, or

(ii) independence—but this would not be viable and would be swallowed up by neighbouring countries, or

(iii) some new status, short of independence, within the Commonwealth.

3. The first meeting of the Working Party referred to at C of Mr. Bourdillon's minute is being held as I write & we will follow this up.

Approve (subject to F.O. concurrence), reply as proposed by Mr. Bourdillon?

J.S.M.

11.3.59

S. of S.

I agree with Mr. Rogers and Mr. Bourdillon; though I do not think the Governor's position is quite as awkward as Mr. Bourdillon suggests at para. 5 of his minute.

We should, therefore, reject the Governor's proposal on the lines suggested.

J.A.

13.3.59

P.S. I only burden you with this because the Governor feels strongly & has, I think, a right to appeal to the summit.

I agree, reply as suggested by Mr. Bourdillon. I'd like to see the draft.

A.L.B.

17.3.59

92 CO 1031/2326, no 13

8 May 1959

[Canadian–West Indian relations]: letter from G W St J Chadwick to P Rogers on the Canadian attitude towards the federation

Francis Cumming-Bruce has been over here on a very brief visit from Ottawa. I took the opportunity of having a few words with him about Canadian/West Indian relations generally.

Cumming-Bruce said that, broadly speaking, the present Canadian attitude towards the Federation was one of conscious big brother with a suspicion that grandma was not quite doing her job on the financial front, and should be written down as the continuing major influence in the area. This was *not* an opinion held at the expert desk level in the Department of External Affairs, but one which had been expressed in rather vague but by no means unfriendly terms by politicians who were far from familiar with the overall situation. Otherwise there was little to report about relations between Canada and the Federation generally save that we might at a later date be in for some difficulties in regard to the proposed free trade area.

On the question of political misunderstandings of our continuing financial contributions to the Federation, I suggested to Cumming-Bruce, and he agreed, that it might be useful to our Office in Ottawa to have a statement showing what in fact Her Majesty's Government had done since the end of the war through grants, loans and assistance of all kinds to help the development of the British West Indies. This would be of value from time to time in refuting the grosser misapprehensions of inexperienced Canadians. Do you think it would be possible for us to be supplied, on behalf of the High Commissioner, with some talking points along these lines?

93 CO 1031/2574, no 103**28 May 1959****[Jamaica and federation]: letter from Sir K Blackburne to P Rogers.****Enclosure: Jamaican Ministry Paper No 5, 'The Federation of the West Indies'**

[Over the twelve months before Manley put forward the proposals reproduced here, Jamaica had been in dispute with the federal government and Trinidad over the measures intended to protect a new oil refinery which it was proposed to build in Jamaica. The Jamaican government insisted that it should have the power to levy a consumption tax which would then be refunded to Jamaican refiners. The proposal contradicted Manley's previous insistence upon free movement of goods within the federation and was clearly designed to protect local production against competition from Trinidad oil, hitherto the traditional supplier. In 1958 the Jamaican government entered negotiations with the Esso Corporation to build a refinery which would attract capital investment of about \$5 million to the federation's key territory. Aware of the still unresolved issue of a customs union and also of the controversy over income tax (see 81), Esso insisted that the federal government approve the refinery project from the outset. The matter was not resolved until May 1959 when the federal government approved the concession but made clear at the same time that it would view with disfavour any attempt to apply similar expedients to other industries in the federal area. Williams protested, arguing that if a customs union was to be delayed until the requirements of every vested interest had been met, Trinidad would retain its freedom to safeguard its own interests in relation to freedom of movement. In the event the refinery was built after 1962 and the referendum which took Jamaica out of the federation. John Mordecai, *The West Indies: the federal negotiations* (London, 1968), pp 124–150 records the details. See also, CO 1031/2750, 2751.]

Please refer to your letter of the 19th February about Federation. I now enclose a copy of the Ministry Paper laid on the Table of the House of Representatives on May the 27th by Manley, setting out in detail the proposed changes in the Federal Constitution which he proposes to advocate at the forthcoming Conference. I expect that he will give his views on the timing of the Conference early next week.

It is possible that these proposals are partly framed with an eye on the forthcoming General Elections. I doubt whether Manley really expects to obtain all the points which he has put forward, though I expect that he will strongly urge the revision of the Concurrent List as specified in "B" of the proposals. In any event, the proposals may be modified before they go forward in final form from Jamaica, as it will be seen that it is suggested at the end of the Ministry Paper that the proposals should be debated at a later date.

I am sending a copy of this letter and the enclosures to Lord Hailes.

Enclosure to 93

The establishment and the Constitution of the Federation of the West Indies were planned, devised and agreed at all stages with the joint agreement of both parties represented in this Honourable House.

2. All the major elements in the Constitution itself were decided in 1953 when the Jamaica Labour Party was in power and the delegation, a joint delegation of both parties, that went to England in 1956 had a mandate by unanimous vote of this House to approve of those agreed measures which were necessary to enable the Federation to come into actual being.

3. In November 1958 this Government gave the country the following assurances:—

First, that it does not contemplate and will not agree to any review of the Constitution except in the manner provided by the Federal Constitution itself.

Second, that it will not agree to any proposal in regard to taxation which would interfere with the economic development of Jamaica and demands that all agreements made in good faith with investors and all laws passed granting concessions to investors should be honoured at all times by the Federal Government.

Third, that in regard to any proposal which may be made for the establishment of a Customs Union this Government will insist on a policy that preserves and encourages economic and industrial development for the West Indies as a whole and for Jamaica and all the Unit territories.

4. It is right and proper now that proposals for amending the Federal Constitution should be placed before this Honourable House in the belief that, as in the past we were able to resolve all differences and proceed on a common ground, so in the future Jamaica will present a united front in regard to those matters which experience has proved require to be done.

5. The underlying assumptions on which this Ministry Paper is presented are as follows:—

First, it is assumed that we agree that Federation itself should be preserved.

Second, it is assumed that this Honourable House will seek to achieve unanimity on all proposals that are to be made.

Third, it is assumed and understood that there will be a conference of Unit Territories this year, and not later than August or September when the Federal Constitution will be reviewed.

Fourth, it is assumed that it is our common desire to ensure that Federation shall in no way injure or impede the development of Jamaica.

6. *Constitutional matters*

The Federal Constitution is unsatisfactory in two respects.

The Constitution of the Federation is colonial in character and does not accord with the political development of the peoples of the West Indies.

On the other hand, the Constitution gives the Federal Government too large a power to interfere with the industrial development of each Unit and with its powers of taxation, and does not take note of the unique character of the Federation in regard to the relative sizes of the different territories.

7. The West Indies is not yet and will not in the foreseeable future be able to avoid dependence on the vitality and progress of its major Units and they must be free to develop themselves both in their own interest and in the interest of Federation as a whole.

8. The concrete proposals for change in the Federal Constitution follow directly from the foregoing statements.

9. *Proposals*

A.(1) That the Federal Government seek to achieve Dominion Status as soon as is practicable and possible.

The precise timing will depend on when the Units can achieve a substantial measure of agreement on Constitutional changes and on the period that will necessarily be occupied in negotiation with Her Majesty's Government.

(2) Representation: Subject to ensuring that each small Unit preserves its present representational rights, representation should be on the basis of population. The present arrangement is not fair to the people who are to be represented in the Federal Parliament and does not do justice to Jamaica which has more than half the population of the area.

B. The Concurrent List in the Federal Constitution must be revised so as to exclude from the possibility of Federal control and leave in the control of each Unit the following matters which are all interrelated:—

- (i) The development of Industry;
- (ii) The power to levy Income Tax;
- (iii) The power to levy Excise Duties and Consumption Taxes.

C. Aside from all the foregoing, in regard to specific items on the Concurrent List this Government further considers that an entirely new concept should be introduced in regard to Federal Affairs and Federal development.

It should be possible for a group of territories to establish a closer relation with the Federal Government and to entrust the Federal Government with a greater range of Federal powers, leaving a Unit like Jamaica or any other Unit free to have a looser association with the Federal Centre.

This will involve a detailed examination of the Concurrent List removing all those items which a Unit like Jamaica can take care of for itself.

The existing Constitutional provision whereby a Unit can agree to transfer any power if and when it wishes so to do to the Federal Government would then be left to operate over a wider range of matters and services in the future.

D. So long as there is a common policy in foreign affairs, a common range of services which can best be provided for all by the Federation itself and a policy for economic development which is bold and imaginative and recognises that this Federation is not like any other to be found in history and that we should seek to find unique and creative solutions to our problems, there is no reason to doubt that Federation can achieve Nationhood and a place in the world for all our people and a growing and developing economy and at the same time impose no undue burden on and in no way hamper the development of each and every one of its Units.

E. *Customs Union*

(1) The Government of Jamaica has always, and as far back as the London Conference in 1956, made it clear that while it agrees that a Free Trade area should at an early date be a part of Federation it is not possible to achieve Customs Union without proceeding slowly and carefully and taking care not to allow theoretical ideas to override practical considerations. This stand was repeated and confirmed when the Croft Commission¹ came to Jamaica at the invitation of this Government over a year ago.

(2) It is the view of Government that the following basic proposals must be accepted if the general plan for ultimate Customs Union is to be a real benefit, as it can be, to the West Indies as a whole:—

- (i) A larger measure of free trade within the area can be achieved in advance of Customs Union;

¹ See 88, note 3.

(ii) It should be our aim to increase free trade as much as possible. in regard to agricultural and manufactured products originating within the Federal area.

(3) It is in the interest of all the Units that each Unit should be allowed now and hereafter to protect particular industries which are designed for and dependent on their own home market. The rest of the area would be left free to admit the products of such industries from the outside world with different tariff levels to suit their own convenience. There will always be a hard core of industries that will have to exist entirely outside the range and scope of Customs Union.

(4) It is the view of this Government that Customs Union should be reached in stages by agreement between the Units and the Federal Government. This Government rejects, as it has always rejected, the proposal that the Federation should enact laws in regard to customs duties or take over the business of Customs collection throughout the area.

(5) It should be basic policy:—

- (a) that a main objective is to secure the largest measure of Free Trade in the area;
- (b) that the main purpose of Customs Union is to aid industrial development;
- (c) that no undue loss of revenue must result from Customs Union;
- (d) that no worthwhile industrial development in any Unit should be damaged or impaired by Customs Union.

10. At the proper time it is expected that the House will wish to discuss fully the proposals that are to go forward from Jamaica to the conference which, as already stated, is expected to take place in August or September this year.

94 CO 1031/2541, no 12A

2 June 1959

[Immigration]: Home Office record of a meeting of ministers chaired by Mr Butler to discuss the situation in the Notting Hill area of London

[Extract]

[This meeting, chaired by Butler, the home secretary, was held in the aftermath of the murder of a West Indian in Notting Hill. Other ministers in attendance were those for housing, education, pensions and national insurance and health. Sir Joseph Simpson, commissioner of the metropolitan police, also attended.]

...

Inquiry into racial tension etc

Mr. George Rogers, M.P., had proposed the appointment of a Select Committee or other ad hoc body to examine the problems of the areas which had received large numbers of coloured immigrants. It was agreed that a Select Committee would be inappropriate for this purpose. A possible alternative might be to set up an independent body, associated with a steering committee of officials, to examine the problems and make recommendations. Such an inquiry might, however, make recommendations unacceptable to the Government; alternatively it might indicate that there was little or no scope for Government action. Ministers were also informed that the Government of the Federation of the West Indies would probably dislike any form of inquiry unless it should enjoy the status of a Royal Commission.

In further discussion it was agreed that the existing machinery within the Government was sufficient to give adequate consideration to the problem. This machinery could be referred to in Parliament in general terms; and the case for setting up any independent inquiry might be reviewed later.

Ministers:—

(2) Decided that there was no adequate case, at the present time, for setting up an independent inquiry into the situation.

Housing

*The Minister of Housing*¹ said that this was the crux of the problem in the Notting Hill area. The main difficulty was to find lodgings for single men. Lack of suitable accommodation had led to gross overcrowding and exploitation by unscrupulous landlords. In his view the ultimate solution lay in controlling immigration, although he recognised that this was out of the question at the present time. Urgent interim measures should be taken, and efforts had been made to persuade the Federation Government to set up a housing association to provide hostel accommodation. These efforts had failed, and it was now for consideration whether funds should be provided for this purpose by the United Kingdom Government. A sum of the order of £200,000 to £250,000 would be required.

In discussion it was argued that a scheme of this kind might have the effect of increasing the attractiveness of this country in the eyes of prospective immigrants from the West Indies, and might be resented by the white population living in the Notting Hill area. On the other hand, the Government could not remain indifferent to the squalid housing conditions in the area. It was generally agreed that any project for providing hostel accommodation should be established under West Indian auspices, and that if financial assistance was required it should take the form of a loan from Colonial Office funds.

Ministers:—

(3) Authorised officials to explore with the Treasury the possibility of the United Kingdom Government making an advance to assist in the provision of hostel accommodation for coloured immigrants in the Notting Hill area.

Law and order

The Commissioner of Police reviewed the problems confronting the police in Notting Hill in maintaining law and order. He recalled that the area was traditionally disorderly, and the concentration of Colonial immigrants had aggravated existing problems. The police were regarded as enemies; intimidation was common; sources of information were elusive; and the coloured people were suspicious of the police and regarded them as hostile to their own interests. Despite these difficulties, the resources and capability of the Metropolitan Police were sufficient to maintain law and order unless there were to be widespread simultaneous outbreaks of racial strife in other parts of London. He was opposed to the recruitment of Special Police in the area, nor was it desirable to recruit coloured policemen. Efforts were being made to establish some sort of liaison between the police and the agents of the Commissioner for the West Indies Federation,² which might lead to better understanding.

¹ Mr H Brooke.

² Mr Garnet Gordon, who attended a meeting at the CO chaired by Rogers on 21 May 1959 to discuss the situation in the Notting Hill area and related issues (CO 1031/2541, no 11).

The Commissioner quoted figures illustrating the incidence, as between the white and coloured population, of crimes involving personal violence. These figures indicated that crimes of violence involving white persons only vastly out-numbered those involving black persons only; and there were still fewer such crimes recorded which involved a white and coloured person.

Ministers:—

(4) took note of this statement.

Immigration control and deportation

In discussion it was recognized that there was a case for taking power to deport undesirable Colonial immigrants. It was, however, clear that the Opposition would oppose such a measure and there was no question of introducing it during the present Parliament. A case could also be made out for taking powers to control the influx of Colonial immigrants to this country, and there were indications that such a course would command fairly widespread support, particularly in the areas in which Colonial immigrants had chosen to settle in substantial numbers. This question had been thoroughly reviewed from time to time by a Committee of Ministers under the Chairmanship of the Lord Chancellor, and the Cabinet had recently re-affirmed their decision to take no action at the present time. There was reason to think that the public were misinformed about certain aspects of Colonial immigration. Irritation that coloured people should enjoy the full benefits of the social services, for example, tended to obscure the fact that such immigrants were necessary to our labour force—for example, for employment as nurses or by the British Transport Commission.

Ministers:—

(5) re-affirmed that no action should be taken at present regarding the deportation of undesirable Colonial immigrants or the control of Colonial immigration to this country.

95 CO 1031/2956

15 June 1959

‘American bases—Chaguaramas’: minute by Mr Amery on how to ‘soften up’ the Americans

Mr. Rogers

Mr. Carstairs

I was struck during my recent visit to the West Indies by the strength of feeling, particularly among members of the Trinidad Government, about the American bases and particularly Chaguaramas.

2. One of the troubles of West Indian politicians is that none of them have had to fight in any serious sense for constitutional progress and none have therefore had much opportunity of becoming national figures as distinct from local bosses. The American bases would seem to offer just this kind of opportunity; and I would judge therefore that the agitation against them will not lightly die away.

3. The Americans have, of course, a strong legal title to Chaguaramas; and I imagine that it is of some importance to them both for the protection of their Venezuelan oil interests and for global war purposes. It has also a routine value for missile tracking and anti-submarine purposes and even more perhaps—or so my

private enquiries suggest—as a leave centre for the American Navy. It seems to me unlikely that the Americans will agree to get out of Chaguaramas. At the same time, if they make no concessions to West Indian opinion, they may have to face a good deal of trouble particularly when the Federation becomes a Dominion.

4. I have accordingly been wondering whether the time is not coming when we might begin to 'soften up' the Americans and persuade them to some compromise which would be to our own and the West Indian advantage as well as to the American.

5. Would it, for instance, be possible to persuade the Americans to associate the United Kingdom and the Federation with Chaguaramas? I am increasingly of the opinion that if the Federation is to hold together once it has obtained dominion status it will have to have some kind of fleet, however rudimentary. You can't run an island state without a navy. The West Indian Regiment and British West Indian Air Lines will not be enough. It is too easy to obstruct airfields. In the ordinary way the cost of building and running a West Indian Navy would be prohibitive. Were this Navy however to be trained by us and based on the American installations at Chaguaramas the cost would be immensely reduced and the scheme might become practical.

6. I put this idea to the Governor-General and the Governor of Trinidad. Both thought it would be attractive to the West Indians and have advantages for us, though the Governor-General was inclined to doubt whether the Americans would accept it.

7. I would be grateful if you could examine this idea in the Department and advise me whether you think it could usefully be taken further.

96 CO 1031/2039, no 96

15 June 1959

[US bases]: letter from J E Marnham to H A A Hankey urging the FO to support the federal government's request for a review of the 1941 agreement¹

You will by now have had a copy of despatch No. 392 of 5th June from the Governor-General of The West Indies, asking H.M.G. to consider the Federal Government's request for the holding of a conference with representatives of the Governments of the United Kingdom and the United States of America to discuss revision of the 1941 Leased Bases Agreement between the Governments of the U.K. and U.S.A. This clearly overtakes my letter of 8th June, which, except in so far as some of the ideas in it may still be relevant, can be disregarded.

¹ The FO had earlier, in Mar 1959, suggested that the Americans would have to choose between three courses of action: (a) having considered what their real defence interests were in the area and compared the 1941 agreement with more recent agreements concluded with other countries, they could themselves draft a new agreement which the West Indies would find hard to reject; (b) they could provide the UK with material from their more recent agreements and leave it to the UK to produce an acceptable new draft; (c) they could wait until the federal government produced its own proposals or registered its objections to the present agreement. The FO was anxious to avoid the second course and much preferred the first (CO 1031/2039, no 39, Sir P Gore-Booth (deputy under-secretary of state, FO, 1956–1961) to Lord Hood in Washington, 3 Mar 1959).

2. In the light of developments in recent weeks the despatch comes as no surprise to us or, I think, to you. Once the Trinidad request had been made officially to the Federal Government it was virtually impossible for them to refuse to forward it in some form even if they had wanted to. They have in fact done so with studied moderation and with, it seems to us, scrupulous regard for the proprieties. They recognise the position of British Guiana and Bermuda without trying to drag them in; much more important, they have declined to endorse the Trinidad request for a *four*-power conference, which it must have taken some political courage to do; and they sensibly propose a preliminary conference of their own to do their homework.

3. We ourselves think that besides being correct in form the West Indies request is from their point of view eminently reasonable in substance. Even if one accepts that the 1941 Agreement was a fair bargain in the circumstances of the time, and accepting in any case that, hard bargain or no, it must be honoured, the West Indies can fairly point out that it is now 1959 and peacetime, and that some of the terms of the agreement accepted 18 years ago in circumstances which ruled out lengthy negotiation may well call for review to-day in the spirit of good-neighbourliness stressed in the Preamble. And it is not on the face of it unreasonable of them to suggest that such review can best be done in a conference in which they could take part, particularly when it is common knowledge that they hope to become an independent member of the Commonwealth in the not too distant future.

4. We therefore think not only that it would be politically almost impossible for us to refuse to put this request formally to the Americans, but that on straight merits it is a perfectly reasonable thing for us to do. Admittedly the Americans will not like it, but we have taken considerable trouble to warn them that it was likely to come and to give them the chance to take the initiative themselves, and if they are now going to refuse it we think it right that the onus of doing so should be placed squarely on them, where it belongs, rather than on the U.K. We therefore hope that you will agree to forward the request to the Americans. We also think that in doing so it would be right to make a really serious effort to get them to agree. We could stress once more the arguments we used in our earlier approach (which may have more force now that the request has actually come than when they may have thought that by standing pat they could head it off); we could point to the very real effort which the Federation have made in rejecting separate Trinidad representation; we could re-emphasise that we have no intention whatever of reopening the Chaguaramas question; and we could rub in the disastrous effect on Federal-U.S. relations (as well, if you thought it would be any use, as the effect on the U.S. reputation in the eyes of the "emergent" world) which would result from a refusal. It might well be desirable to warn the Americans not to under-estimate the strength of feeling on this issue, particularly in Trinidad. Mr. Amery was made very conscious of this on his recent visit; he thinks that West Indian politicians are beginning to take themselves seriously as figures on the international stage and he is quite sure that the Americans would be wrong to think that this agitation will die down easily.²

² See 95.

5. If the Americans reacted adversely, as they probably would, we would hope you could urge them at least not to slam the door. They might, for example, reasonably take the line that they could not commit themselves to a conference until they knew in some detail what it would be asked to discuss. They could note that the Federal Government propose to convene a preliminary conference with representatives of the unit governments concerned and thereafter to forward a full statement of the matters arising out of the Agreement which it is desired to discuss. If the Americans were to say that they would prefer to see this statement before considering what would be the best method of discussing it, then *provided* they said it in terms which did not preclude an eventual three-power conference I think we could put this to the Federal Government with some hope of acceptance. I am less sure that this would do more than buy time, and it would be infinitely better if the Americans would accept the idea of a conference straight away, bearing in mind the Governor-General's view that if they did so there would be far less urgency about the timing of the conference itself. But at least the compromise would be better than a flat refusal.

6. You mentioned orally that if you did agree to put the request to the Americans you would want to let them know unofficially that it was coming. We should naturally have no objection at all to this, though we hope you would do so in a way which left them in no doubt that coming it was!

7. We ought to let the Governor-General know fairly soon what we are thinking of doing, at least for his personal information and that of the Governor of Trinidad; and we think it desirable to send at least an interim official reply to the despatch saying that the request is being earnestly considered. May we do the latter straight away?

8. I enclose a duplicate of this letter in case you want to send it to Washington. We didn't send you a spare of the despatch as we thought it better not to delay to make one; but we should welcome your copying it also to Washington if you thought that would help to keep the Embassy abreast of the news.

97 CO 1031/2040, no 103

18 June 1959

[US bases]: minute by P Rogers reporting a meeting with Mr Rose on the difficulties caused by the 'secretiveness' of the federal prime minister

Mr. Rose, the Federal Minister of Communications, came to see me this morning. He spoke most frankly and in confidence about the difficulties in Trinidad between the Federal Government and the Trinidad Government, particularly over Chaguaramas. He began by making it clear in terms which were entirely proper in such a private talk, but which I am here recording in terms which make it clear what he obviously had in mind, that much difficulty was caused by Sir G. Adams' secretiveness, unwillingness to work closely with his ministerial colleagues, and frequent changes of mind. He also said that difficulties were caused by the way in which the Prime Minister conferred so closely with the Governor-General and from time to time appeared to commit the Federal Government and the Council of State to a view, or a line of action, without consulting his colleagues.

2. Mr. Rose also referred delicately to the difficulties between the Governor-General and the Governor of Trinidad, and between Lady Hailes and Lady

Beetham, which he regarded as being very natural in the circumstances, but nevertheless unfortunate in their repercussions on the relations between the two *Governments*, each of which regarded it as a point of loyalty to support the Governor-General or the Governor as the case might be.

3. This emerged from the midst of considerable talk about the details of what happened between the two Governments over the proposal to revise the 1941 Bases Agreement, but I have set it out separately for purpose of convenience. As regards the revision of the Agreement, Mr. Rose told me that the following was briefly the course of events.

4. The Trinidad Government had raised with the Federal Government a proposal for a conference between them on the revision of the Agreement without the issue of the release of Chaguaramas being raised, and had indeed gone so far as to appoint their own delegation for this purpose. The Federal reply had been somewhat evasive, and had suggested that certain matters mentioned by the Trinidad Government should be raised in the current talks between the U.S. Authorities and the Trinidad Government. The Trinidad Government had then proposed a Four-Power Conference to revise the Agreement, and had not, as in their first proposal, expressly excluded the release of Chaguaramas as a basis of discussion. There had been a meeting of the unofficial members of the Council of State (Mr. Rose referred to this as a "Cabinet" Meeting), without the P.M. being present, since they could not get at him, and after much discussion, and indeed dissension, the Cabinet had agreed to accept the proposal for a Four-Power Conference. When the Prime Minister had been informed of this by Mr. Richards of Antigua, one of the Cabinet Members, he had purported to accept it and had so informed Dr. Williams, but at the meeting of the Council of State the next day to consider it, the Prime Minister took a completely different attitude, and the Council of State had rejected the idea of Trinidad having a seat at any conference as well as the Federal Government.

5. Mr. Rose made it clear that he was not in any way expecting me to do anything about all this, but he wished me to know the facts, and how difficult things were. He then proceeded to discuss the question of the U.S. Government releasing Chaguaramas and building a base elsewhere, and of Trinidad's right to an equal seat at a conference table to revise the Bases Agreement.

6. I spoke at some length in reply, but what I said may be boiled down to:—

(i) I did not regard it as being practical politics to accept for one moment that the U.S. Government would be willing to build another naval base elsewhere in Trinidad and give up Chaguaramas; and

(ii) The United Kingdom could not accept the view that if there were any international conference to revise the Bases Agreement at which the West Indies were represented, it would be possible for Trinidad to have separate and independent representation as an equal party with the Federal Government. I said that in the case of such a conference our view was that only the Federal Government would represent The West Indies, though it was of course open to the Federal Government if they so wished, to include representatives from Trinidad in their delegation. That would be quite acceptable to us provided they recognised that they were Federal and not separate Trinidad delegates. For the rest I made use of the same arguments as I used in speaking on the same subject to Dr. Solomon yesterday, and the record of them need not be repeated here.

98 CO 1031/2311**26 June 1959****'Dominion status': minute by G W Jamieson on the growing tide of opinion in the West Indies in favour of early dominion status***Mr. Rogers*

I have had a number of conversations in the last ten days with members of the Federal Delegation to the Leewards/Windwards Constitutional Conference,¹ with a view to discovering how things might go at the Federal preliminary Constitutional Conference beginning on 28th September.

2. There is, as you know, a Federal Committee sitting at present, to consider how the constitution might be improved comprising half-dozen of the most senior Federal Ministers, and the three senior Federal officials. The Prime Minister is a member, but rarely attends.

3. The Committee has made very slow ground, as much of its time has been spent in examining the present Federal Constitution line by line with extensive and time-consuming reference to various other constitutions, including those of Ghana and Singapore, as well as those of the older Dominions, which are Federations. It was, however, apparently decided by this Committee at the outset of its life, that it would work on the assumption that the task of the Federal Constitutional Conference was to produce a constitution for The West Indies as a Dominion, and furthermore that this final step would be taken with all speed, after the conclusion of the Conference with H.M.G.

4. I have been told this in conversations in the last few days with Mr. de Freitas, Acting Federal Attorney-General, who is on the Federal committee and Mr. Phillips, the Federal Secretariat officer who deals with constitutional matters in his government, and who is very close to Federal thinking on this subject. It only reinforces, moreover, the view I formed during the visit with Mr. Amery to the Federation last month that West Indians now have a greater sense of urgency than hitherto about full independence. Lord Hailes does not appear to doubt that Dominion status will be called for at the Federal Constitutional Conference. As we know, Mr. Manley has condemned the present Federal Constitution as "colonial in character"² and Dr. Eric Williams has been going about saying that independence ought to be proclaimed on the 22nd April next year, the second anniversary of Federation.

¹ The establishment of the federation in 1958 stimulated feeling in the Leewards and Windwards that when the federation achieved independence the constitutional status of all units should be equal. To facilitate the transition to independence, it was felt that the constitutions of the smaller territories should be brought as quickly as possible into line with each other and with those of the three major units. A conference in Trinidad in Mar 1959 made recommendations for constitutional changes and this was followed by a conference in London in June attended by representatives of the Leewards and Windwards and the federal government over which Amery presided. Agreement was reached on a number of constitutional changes in both groups, including the appointment of chief ministers and ministerial systems of government in each territory, which were intended to be implemented by Jan 1960. The posts of governor for the two groups were to be abolished, so that the individual units would stand in direct relationship to the federal government as did the other units. The new constitutions were not as advanced as those of the three major units, but the gap would now be narrower (*Report of the Leeward and Windward Islands Constitutional Conference held in London, June 1959*, published by the West Indies Federal Government, 1959).

² See 93, enclosure.

5. Our view in the Department has been hitherto that Dominion status is nothing like as close as the above would make it seem. This view—which I shared—was based in part on the recongnition [sic] by us that it *ought* not to be rushed; it was furthermore reinforced by Sir Grantley Adams' near distaste for the subject when we tried to discuss it with him in April. He, I am sure, is no sound guide at present to feeling on this subject. His views are markedly more moderate than those of most of his government, and I submit that he will shortly have to come into line with the thinking of others on the subject in The West Indies, or risk being left out on a limb.

6. We should, I suggest, be prepared at least in our own minds for the worst. This could be a demand for Dominion status in Trinidad in September, repeated here a few months later, together with a demand that full independence be achieved within perhaps a year or eighteen months. It could indeed mean a demand for the introduction of Dominion status before the end of 1960, or perhaps early in 1961, which is a good deal earlier than we are geared to.

7. Such a demand would of course ignore the need to prepare the administrative structure of the new Dominion, enlarge its diplomatic apparatus, and build up its military forces, and it might be possible to delay it on such arguments. On the other hand, we are on something of a runaway train, the brakes of which are not very powerful.

8. I suggest that apart from simply taking the aforesaid into account in our calculations, the time has come to speed up action on the following questions, on the first two of which we have made a little progress, on the third none.

(a) the training of a Diplomatic Service and agreeing on interim foreign representational arrangements, should Dominion status overtake the Federation's ability to establish its network of missions;

(b) the examination of the need for Armed Forces including the question of a Navy as well as the terms of such defence agreement as we and The West Indies may jointly require for our purposes.

(c) an examination of what forms of financial assistance H.M.G. can consider after Dominion status, and of what sums.

9. I hope this does not sound all too alarmist. On the other hand I feel that we will do best to start early with these preparations. If our predictions prove unduly pessimistic, we will have a bonus of time at our disposal. We must in any case have firm views on all three matters in para. 8 in advance of the main Federal Constitutional Conference in London, probably in January: and it would be desirable to have got the main lines sorted out before the September conference.

10. A major unstated assumption in the above is, of course, that the Federation will survive the September conference. This is being discussed separately on WIS 175/01.

99 CO 1031/2956, no 4A July 1959 **'Chaguaramas': memorandum by Mr Amery for Mr Lennox-Boyd** **reviewing the history of the dispute and suggesting a possible solution**

I. Background

In July 1957 the U.K. and U.S. Governments and the Federation Standing Committee of the West Indies held a conference in London to discuss the issue of Chaguaramas. This led to the appointment of a fact-finding Commission on which the Governments of the U.S., the U.K., the West Indies and Trinidad were all represented to enquire

into the question whether the U.S. naval base at Chaguaramas could be moved to an alternative site. The Commission found that no equally satisfactory alternative site for a base could be found and that the cost of moving would in any case be prohibitive. These findings were accepted by the U.S. Government and by H.M.G. The Federal Government accepted them with some reluctance; the Trinidad Government refused to accept them. The Americans, however, gave an assurance that the continued need for the base would be reviewed after ten years.

2. On the 28th November 1958 the Trinidad Government approached the Federal Government and asked that a conference should be convened, consisting of Federal Government, Trinidad, U.K. and U.S. representatives, to revise the 1941 Agreement. The Federal Government accepted the idea of a conference but considered that Trinidad should not be represented separately but simply as part of the Federal delegation. The Colonial Office has supported this view.

3. At the beginning of March 1959 the Foreign Office made an informal approach to the State Department, through the Embassy in Washington, suggesting that the Americans themselves should propose a review of the Agreement.¹ The American reactions were distinctly negative.

4. The formal request for a conference in which the Federal, U.K. and U.S. Governments should take part was received from the Federal Government on the 9th June 1959. This request has since been forwarded to the British Ambassador in Washington, with instructions that every effort should be made to persuade the Americans to agree to a conference. A reply from the Americans is now awaited.

5. Since then a further cause of friction between the Americans and the Trinidad Government has arisen as a result of the operation of a high-powered radar tracking station in Chaguaramas.

II. *My talks with Dr. Williams on Chaguaramas*

6. When I visited Trinidad during the Whitsun recess, Dr. Eric Williams spent several hours expatiating on the Chaguaramas problem. His observations then were of a general character and called for no action. More definite proposals on the subject both of radiation and of a revision conference were made by Messrs. Solomon and O'Halloran² when they came to the Colonial Office in June. When I returned to Trinidad my early discussions on the control of the police³ were interspersed by

¹ See 96, note 1.

² John O'Halloran, minister of industry, commerce, tourism and external communications, Trinidad, 1956–1961; minister of agriculture, industry and commerce, 1964–1970.

³ Control of the police was one of several controversial issues in the protracted discussions over the reform of the Trinidad constitution which preceded the introduction of internal self-government after the elections in Dec 1961. Governor Beetham supported the transfer on the grounds that it should take place while the UK still had responsibility and could act to check any abuses. The opposition Democratic Labour Party opposed the transfer, as in 1958 did the CO. Rogers minuted in Oct: 'Dr. Williams is showing all too many signs of the paranoia of a dictator. (I use the word loosely, not in any precise medical sense.) He runs his own spy service (the term is not an exaggeration) and it is commonly said by really responsible people in Trinidad, Mr. Ellis Clarke included, that the telephone operators are mostly P.N.M. supporters and relay to Dr. Williams important conversations. Furthermore there can be no doubt that the racial situation in Trinidad is a tense one and though it may have improved somewhat since the Federal elections, there has been a general increase of tension over the last few years' (CO 1031/2287, minute by Rogers, 21 Oct 1958). In the face of determination on the part of Williams and the PNM over control of the police, and continued support for the transfer from Beetham, the CO relented. For reform of the Trinidad constitution, see CO 1031/2286–2292, 3220–3222; also *Report of the Trinidad and Tobago Constitutional Discussions held in London in November, 1959, and in Trinidad in June, 1960* Cmdd 1123, 1960.

diatribes from Dr. Williams about Chaguaramas. Dr. Williams indeed affected to believe—and may really have believed—that our attitude over the control of the police was somehow connected with the problem of Chaguaramas.

7. After the police issue had been settled, I had a more formal discussion of the Chaguaramas problem with Dr. Williams and some of his colleagues. Our talks ranged over the composition, location and agenda of the conference. Dr. Williams also discussed ways of bringing the U.S.A. to agree to such a conference. I will summarise his views under these four heads.

(i) *Composition*

Discussion between the Trinidad Government, the Federal Government and the Colonial Office about the conference has so far concentrated on the question of its composition. The Federal Government want the West Indies to be represented by a single Federal delegation. Williams wants separate Trinidad and Federal delegations. The Department has leant strongly to the Federal Government's point of view.

One at least of Dr. Williams' arguments in favour of separate representation seemed to me worthy of consideration. He claims that any revision of the Agreements will raise two different sets of issues. There are the major issues of policy which belong properly to the Federal Government, e.g. should American troops be stationed in the West Indies at all? How long should they remain? What control should the Federal Government have over their operations? Then there are the detailed administrative issues, including the extent of the leased areas, the means of access to them, the revenue and jurisdictional provisions, and the reservation of mineral rights. Dr. Williams claims that these are matters on which the Federal Government is not competent to negotiate and that they must be dealt with by a separate delegation of the Unit Government concerned. Since Chaguaramas is now the only activated base, apart from the tracking stations in St. Lucia and Antigua, Dr. Williams concludes that Trinidad at least deserves separate representation.

In the 1957 conference Dr. Williams really wore two hats. He sat as a member of the single West Indian delegation—this was before Federation—but he attended with his own advisers and was recognised as enjoying a distinct position from the other West Indian leaders. It may be that some such compromise could be worked out to turn the present difficult corner.

(ii) *Location*

Dr. Williams insists that the conference be held in Trinidad. He claims that neither the Trinidad Government, nor the Federal Government can spare their top men for long enough to hold a successful conference in London or Washington. He also argues that it is only in Trinidad that the delegates can fully understand what the different local issues mean. If in doubt they have, as he puts it, only to jump into a car and see for themselves. No doubt he also hopes to put pressure on the conference by organising demonstrations of public feeling for their benefit.

(iii) *Agenda*

Dr. Williams has so far been very coy about the agenda of the conference. I explained, however, that the Americans were very unlikely to agree to come to a conference unless they had a good idea of what was likely to be discussed. After some argument on this point Williams provided the following as at any rate the main topics, which he would like to see discussed:—

- (a) The duration of the leases.
- (b) The extent of the leased areas.
- (c) The provisions relating to de-activated areas.
- (d) The revenue provisions.
- (e) The enforcement of the conditions of the agreement.
- (f) Jurisdiction.
- (g) Terms of the lease, e.g. restriction on use of radio-active equipment, and the exploitation of mineral rights.

Dr. Williams also suggested—and this may prove a useful suggestion—that the underlying purpose of the agreement should be re-examined. The bases had originally been regarded as part of the defence of the United States. Had not the time come when they should be seen in the wider context of general Western defence? If so, perhaps the West Indies should be associated with the agreements. For example, the West India Regiment might train in the Chaguaramas area and the Federal Government might have some say in the uses to which the bases were put.

(iv) *How to bring the U.S. to the conference*

Dr. Williams recognised that it may not be easy to bring the Americans to attend a conference. He believes, however, that we are on good grounds in calling for one, seeing that most of the agreements governing other American bases overseas are very different from, and much less “colonial” in type than the 1941 agreements. He also argues that we can put considerable pressure on the Americans. He claims, for instance, that they have no right under the agreement to instal a tracking station in Chaguaramas. The advice of the Departments here is far from clear on this issue. He also believes that American planes have no right to land at Piarco airport and could be stopped from doing so at any moment.⁴ Here, I understand, he is probably in the right. Dr. Williams in any case maintains that if we are not prepared to bring pressure to bear on the Americans to bring them to a conference, he will seek to do so himself. To this end he could search their aircraft, impound American goods in transit to the base, and set up a check-point at the base boundary to obstruct traffic between the base and the rest of the island. With the transfer of control over the police it will be easier for him to do all these things.

III. *Dr. Williams' motives*

8. Now that Dr. Williams has achieved a Cabinet system, including control of the police, he has to look for a new “cry”. He knows that social and economic issues are more easily exploited in opposition than in power, and he sees in Chaguaramas a political platform which can carry him through the next couple of years. It is politically an attractive platform. For one thing there is a good deal of local resentment against the Americans. For another, the American bases afford a target

⁴ The US never had the specific right to operate military aeroplanes into and out of Piarco, although since the war there had been a general UK-US understanding that the US could make ‘occasional’ use of British airfields in the Caribbean. In fact US traffic at Piarco had been much more than occasional; over 2,000 American military aircraft landed at Piarco in 1958. The Americans were also said to have ignored both traffic control and immigration procedures and generally to have behaved ‘as if they owned the place’. With effect from 1 May 1960, Trinidad closed Piarco to US American military transport planes (CO 1031/3025).

for "anti-Colonialist" emotions such as we no longer present. Above all, an anti-American campaign offers Dr. Williams a chance to become a West Indian national leader instead of just a local boss. His ambitions undoubtedly extend beyond Trinidad and a successful campaign against the Americans would probably make him something of a hero in the other islands. At the very worst, he can hope to extract a sizeable sum from the Americans for calling off the campaign.

9. How far does Dr. Williams mean to go against the Americans? He claims that his purpose is to get them out of Chaguaramas and to build the Federal capital there. He also says that the time has now gone by when it would be possible to get Trinidad opinion to accept the construction of an alternative American base elsewhere in the island. Whether his real objects are as extreme as this is hard to tell. He certainly has a strong anti-American bias of his own derived from his experiences in the U.S.A. For what it is worth, however, my own hunch is that Chaguaramas is first and foremost a political cry for him. He will press it as far as he profitably can but he is probably quite prepared for some compromise at the end of the day.

IV. *The U.S. interest in Chaguaramas and ours*

10. I had a short briefing in London on the strategic importance of the base by representatives of the Admiralty and the Ministry of Defence. Later during my visit to Chaguaramas I had a fuller briefing from Rear-Admiral E.C. Stephan, U.S.N., COMSOLANT, (Commander, South Atlantic Forces, Trinidad). I drew the following conclusions from these briefings.

11. The Gulf of Paria is one of the very few good natural harbours on either side of the South Atlantic. In the last war it proved a very valuable assembly area for convoys. Whether convoys will be practicable in another war is hard to say; but the Soviets have built up a very large submarine fleet; and an area like the Gulf to Paria which can be insulated against submarine attack may again prove to be of considerable strategic importance to the U.S. It would also be of importance to us in so far as we depend in another conflict on supplies—including oil—from South America and the Caribbean.

12. Chaguaramas is also important to the Americans for another reason, which they seldom mention. It provides them with a base from which, in time of crisis, they could probably control events in Venezuela and the Venezuelan oil fields. It is probably to our interest that they should retain this capability.

13. The United States Air Force showed me over the new tracking station which has caused the increased radiation discovered by Dr. Williams.⁵ From what I was told, the station appears to have an important role in the American development of anti-missile techniques. They say it is the biggest of its kind in the world. To move it and re-erect it elsewhere would put their anti-missile programme back two years, with all that this could mean for the general defence of the West as well as of North America.

14. Chaguaramas is thus important to the United States on three main grounds—as a harbour, as a means of influencing events in Venezuela and as a site for an anti-missile development station. Other things being equal, it is in our general interests that the U.S. should continue in Chaguaramas for these purposes. West Indian opinion, however,—in Trinidad and outside—is growing increasingly

⁵ See 100, note 2.

resentful of the 1941 agreements and of the American insistence on the letter of these agreements. We have to avoid getting into a position where we might seem to be ganging up with the U.S. against a member of the Commonwealth.

15. The Americans have a choice. They could stand pat on the 1941 agreements and resist any major revision. If they do this they will certainly be subjected to considerable inconvenience. There is no airfield within the base perimeter and all goods and personnel, unless seaborne, have to come through Trinidad territory. Williams would thus be in a strong position to apply a policy of pinpricks and pressures.

16. Williams could not, of course, drive the Americans out of Chaguaramas; but a long drawn wrangle over this question could create a running sore between the U.S. and the whole West Indies Federation. This in turn would give an opening to Communist and neutralist influences which are already beginning to spread through the Caribbean.

17. If the Americans decide to stand firm and "sweat it out", we could not oppose them. They would be standing on the letter of the 1941 Agreement. We should, however, make it clear that we could not publicly support them. Still less, could we use our reserve power and suspend the constitution of Trinidad simply to keep the Americans comfortable in their base.

18. The alternative course open to the Americans is to accept a conference to consider the revision of the agreements. This course also has its dangers for the Americans; and the Pentagon may well fear that it would lead them down the slippery slope of concessions to final abandonment. On the other hand, a conference might well result in bringing the 1941 agreements closer into line with more modern agreements. This might for a time at least make the American presence more acceptable to West Indies opinion.

19. Such a result could be the avowed aim of the conference. I rather doubt, however, whether it would produce a lasting solution. Whether such a solution can be found at all is questionable; but the following suggestion is perhaps just worth examining.

V. *A possible long term solution*

20. The United States have a major interest in retaining Chaguaramas for reasons which we have already considered.

21. Britain has cut her defence establishments in the Caribbean to the bone. Nevertheless if we are to protect our interests there and if we are to influence U.S. policy and strategy in the area, it will be to our advantage to "be in on" the major American projects, provided we can do so at little cost to ourselves.

22. The West Indies Federation need a navy. You cannot have an island state without ships. Without them they will not be able to overawe dissident units and impose the authority of the Central Government. The West India Regiment and the British West Indian Airways are not enough. It is too easy to block runways and prevent troops from landing. The Caribbean, moreover, seems to be in for "troubled times"; and the British West Indies territories may well feel the need of some local naval capability over and above what we can provide there. But the cost of maintaining a fleet, however small and simple in design, is very great.

23. Could we kill two birds with one stone? Could we solve the political issue of Chaguaramas and overcome the economic obstacles to a West Indian Navy by

associating Britain and the West Indies with the U.S.A. in the control of the Chaguaramas base? The Royal Navy could have access to the base on the same terms as the U.S. Navy. We might provide the West Indies with one or two ships and the necessary training staff. The Americans could maintain these ships in the base, partly or wholly at U.S. expense

24. The Americans would have to accept some British and West Indian control over the uses to which they put the base, just as they do with their bases in the U.K. We are unlikely, however, to disagree with them in the Caribbean. The Federal Government meanwhile would find itself committed to the Western Alliance.

25. Nor should there be any problem of security for the Americans. Most of Chaguaramas is strictly conventional and there seems to be little to hide. The secret installations are relatively remote and access to them is already forbidden to most American personnel in the base.

26. I doubt whether the time has yet come when we should speak on these lines to the Americans. The right moment might be if a conference were held and ended in deadlock. I cannot help thinking, however, that a proposal on these lines might still be acceptable to the West Indies, and even to Dr. Williams, today. Later on it may no longer command enough West Indies support.

27. The Department are looking into the implications of these ideas.

VI. *Postscript*

28. As you know, I had hoped to visit Washington on the way back from Trinidad to let the State Department have my impressions on developments concerning Chaguaramas. The Foreign Office supported this project (F.O. telegram 129 of 27th June to Washington). On the 2nd July, after making arrangements for me to visit the base at Chaguaramas, the Embassy telegraphed to say that the Americans would like to see me and they had made a appointment with Mr. Robert Murphy.⁶ Murphy is an old friend; and the opportunity seemed a good one. I then received your telegram (No. 144 to Trinidad) sent on the same day urging me not to go to Washington.

29. I was not clear whether the purpose of your telegram was to bring me back to London or to keep me away from Washington. Nor was I sure whether you had seen a copy of the Washington telegram to me about the arrangement for a meeting with Murphy. I accordingly rang up and spoke to John Moreton.⁷ It was at the weekend, and you were on your boat. John Moreton seemed to think that you had seen all the relevant telegrams and that you thought it better that I should not go to Washington just now. I accordingly telegraphed Caccia⁸ cancelling my proposed visit. From something you said the other day I think all this may have been a misunderstanding and that had you known of Murphy's invitation you would have wished me to go to Washington.

30. I have spelt this out in detail as I think there is just a chance, after all the fuss Dr. Williams has made about Chaguaramas, that the Americans may attribute some sinister motive to my change of plans. The risk of their misinterpreting my action

⁶ Deputy US under-secretary of state for political affairs; under-secretary of state of political affairs, Aug-Sept 1959.

⁷ Principal private secretary to Lennox-Boyd.

⁸ See 68, note 1.

has, I fear, been slightly increased by my twice having to cancel lunch with their Minister here on account of our African pre-occupations.

VII. *Conclusion*

31. The question arises—what should we do now? The matter is beginning to be urgent. Williams has been talking to all and sundry about Chaguaramas for some months and has now made formal representations to us as well as to the Federal Government. He has also committed himself in public. American interest has likewise been stirred. We have made a formal request to them for a conference and they are doubtless expecting some follow-up. It is, accordingly, important that we should make up our minds (i) whether we want a conference; (ii) if so, how far we are prepared to press the Americans on this issue; and (iii) what we would like the outcome of the conference to be.

32. My own view is that (i) we do want a conference; (ii) we should advise the U.S. that it is only at a conference held before the West Indies get Dominion status that we can help them; (iii) that we want to aim at the kind of result suggested in paragraphs 20–26 above.⁹

⁹The CO consulted the FO about Amery's proposed solution. The FO thought it unlikely that the US would object, provided the security of their secret installations could be ensured, to the use of the Chaguaramas base by Royal Navy and West Indian ships. The Americans might even agree to maintain West Indian naval vessels at US expense. But joint control of the base was a much more difficult question, involving two aspects, jurisdictional and operational. It was highly unlikely that the US would accept joint operational control, although they might be brought to recognise the need for some form of UK and West Indian veto power over the use of the base in an emergency (particularly if the use of nuclear weapons were ever envisaged) along the lines of the Attlee–Truman understanding of 1948 covering US bases in the UK. Over the question of jurisdiction, events in Japan in 1958 and in Turkey in 1959 had shown strong Congressional and public feeling in the US against concessions which would leave US servicemen at the mercy of foreign courts. With regard to the point made by Amery in para 17 of his memo, the FO argued while the UK should not use its reserve powers 'simply to keep the Americans comfortable in their base', if local agitation developed to the extent that its actual operation were imperilled, HMG would find itself under strong US pressure to go to their aid. As long as HMG was still responsible for defence and foreign affairs, the UK was under an obligation to see that the terms of the 1941 agreement were fulfilled (CO 1031/2040, no 3, Hildyard (FO) to Whitelegg (CO), 2 Sept 1959).

100 CO 1031/2065, no 132

31 July 1959

[US bases]: inward telegram no 249 from Sir S Hochoy¹ to Mr Lennox-Boyd on the measures contemplated by the Trinidad government should the US persist in its refusal to review the 1941 agreement

Your secret telegram No. 180 of 21st July.

Radiation at Chaguaramas.

Premier has asked me to communicate to you the following views with which O'Halloran and Solomon are in full agreement.

¹ Acting governor, Trinidad.

In the light of your statement regarding H.M.G.'s interest in this matter in view of similar installations elsewhere, he is prepared to agree that Evans² should arrive by direct flight leaving 6th August, notwithstanding the reports of dismantling of the station and shipment of installations, for example on 24th July (?of) two special containers of electronic tubes each valued at \$30,000. But he is of the opinion that the cost of Evan's [sic] visit or visits should be shared between both Governments, a copy of his report being naturally made available to us.

He wishes however, to impress upon you that the urgency and gravity of the entire situation far transcend visit of Evans. For exactly two years now United States Government has maintained its adamant stand on his request for a revision of 1941 Agreement. Its role had been one of uncompromising resistance to the request, and the direct discussions which it agreed on what it is pleased to call euphemistically day to day difficulties in his opinion serve no useful purpose whatsoever. The open allowance of inept interference of American domestic politics by seeking to apply pressure on Trinidad to waive its claim to direct, equal and separate representation at the Conference prohibits a serious examination and resolution of the problem. In the meantime abuses continue to multiply and he wishes to bring to your attention the fact that time has now arrived when we can refrain from taking action within our legal and moral rights to correct these abuses only at the cost of prestige of the Government, not only in the eyes of those abroad but in the eyes of the party and people at home.

He has so far refrained from any overt act which might interfere with delicate process of inducing a more reasonable attitude on the part of the Americans, but their attitude has made it impossible for the present situation to continue. It is unreasonable for the Americans, in the position in which they find themselves today as persistent and contumacious violators of an agreement whose validity in the present altered circumstances is challenged by us, to continue after two years to refuse to get around a table to negotiate issue. It is the Americans who have rejected our offer of a new site for the base. It is the Americans who have unilaterally decided they will be prepared to review the need for Chaguaramas after say ten years. It is the Americans who claim the privileges which lack the sanction of Trinidad law required by the Agreement. It is the Americans whose planes land at will in defiance of any agreement with Trinidad and in contravention of the informal arrangements with the United Kingdom. It is the Americans who use the leased areas for purposes for which they were never intended and contrary to the very specific conditions laid down by the Foreign Office as far as tracking station is concerned. It is the Americans who may even now be using or be planning to use the base for the purposes and for weapons with respect to which the recent revelations have created the present state of grave uncertainty and even apprehension among the population which should be a matter concerning not only Trinidad Government but also H.M. Government and even to the Americans themselves.

² Evans was a physicist from the UK Ministry of Supply who visited Trinidad after Williams raised a radiation scare over the working of the high-powered radar tracking station which the US had built at Chaguaramas. He reported that no radiation hazard existed to the population of Trinidad, except perhaps in the Morne Pierre area which was itself within the boundary of Chaguaramas. Even there, however, the report concluded that the risk was remote because of the difficulty of the terrain and the density of the vegetation (CO 1031/3025).

It must be clearly understood by all parties concerned that a definitive agreement concerning the revision of the 1941 Agreement must now be reached. Failing such agreement it will not be possible for him to postpone further the necessary steps to maintain self-respect of his Government and protect the rights of the Trinidad people. These steps will include, but will not necessarily be restricted to:—

- (a) a control point outside of Chaguaramas for checking of all vehicles and persons entering or leaving the base, including controls of immigration, health, currency, customs, fire-arms, narcotics, animal and plant quarantine, licences of drivers and cars, registration of cars;
- (b) the fencing of Piarco Airport with the necessary precautions against unauthorised entry or exit;
- (c) the boarding and rummaging of all planes, without prejudice to Trinidad's protest against the practice whereby these planes have (corrupt grp. ?boldly) arrogated to themselves the right to land at will and act as they please;
- (d) the immediate resumption of Waller Field, Carlsen Field and dock site, with implementation of the plans for their full and permanent incorporation in the development programme of the country;
- (e) the immediate cessation of all duty-free imports into Chaguaramas and the institution of rigid customs inspection and examination of all materials consigned to the base;
- (f) a ban on all non-licensed and non-registered vehicles on the roads of the country.

In his discussions with McGregor Grant, the out-going Acting Consul General, the latter requested to be advised of any action with respect to (a) and (c) before the new procedures are instituted, and Moline,³ the present Consul General, has expressed to O'Halloran his opposition to (b). The Premier considers this attitude of the American authorities an unwarranted interference in the clear responsibilities of his Government and he has made it clear that he will entertain no protests. No self-respecting Government can indefinitely be expected to turn the other cheek and manifest continued forbearance in the face of what amounts to complete contempt for authority of the Trinidad Government.

The Premier has thought it best to deal in detail with the issue as he sees it so that you will be advised in advance of measures on which his Government and his party are unanimous and on which he is confident that he will have the unreserved support of the majority of Trinidadians and West Indians. You will note from the above that the Americans have not been left in the dark as to his intentions and he has taken other measures to advise them of what he considers to be his inescapable duty.

If this intransigence and disregard for all accepted courtesies and procedures of civilised relations between peoples should continue, the ultimate result will inevitably be the total rejection by the population of Trinidad and Tobago of any compromise with the Americans such as this Government has consistently advocated in spite of the immense provocations it has had to endure.

³ E G Moline, US consul-general, Trinidad, 1959–1961.

101 CO 1031/2311**6 Aug 1959**

[Independence]: minute by Mr Amery on why at present it would be 'absurd' to embark on independence

[The CO warned the CRO at the end of July 1959 about the likelihood of a much earlier demand for independence in the West Indies than the CO had hitherto thought likely. Eric Williams had already spoken of '22nd of April 1960 at 11 o'clock in the morning': this in itself need not be taken seriously but it remained true that many West Indian leaders were now thinking of 1960 or 1961 as dates to be aimed at. It was conceivable that a demand for early independence might be put forward at the Trinidad conference to review the federal constitution which was scheduled to open on 28 Sept. The conference would not commit the UK in any way (observers only would be sent) but if the demand was made, and repeated at a conference in London which might follow next year, HMG would find it very difficult to resist. The CO was mindful of the difficulties such an outcome might pose for the CRO on Central Africa and admitted that the anxieties expressed by Home in Oct 1958 (see 80) were more justified than the CO had thought at the time or until very recently. However, repeating the argument that it had used then to the effect that the UK's ability to control the pace of the movement towards independence in the West Indies by reason of the possible reaction in Central Africa was very limited (see 83), the CO now asked the CRO to consider sounding out Commonwealth governments about eventual West Indian membership. One problem in this respect was the trade ban imposed by Jamaica against South Africa which made the present an inauspicious moment for any approach to South Africa (CO 1031/2311, no 43, Marnham to Sir C Dixon, assistant under-secretary of state, CRO, 27 July 1959). Home responded with a minute to Lennox-Boyd expressing concern. His earlier exchange with the CO had led him to believe that the earliest date for independence would be 1964. The CO's latest assessment would be awkward for other parts of the Commonwealth. A conference to review the constitution of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland was contemplated for Oct 1960. It would be embarrassing if a date had already been fixed for West Indian independence. The South African difficulty would become that much greater if other West Indian governments followed Jamaica's line and imposed trade embargos. While not wishing to delay West Indian independence unduly, Home therefore felt there was 'a strong case for playing for the maximum time' (*ibid*, Home to Lennox-Boyd, 31 July 1959).

I return Lord Home's minute and the file.

2. In view of Lord Home's minute the question will now have to be dealt with at Ministerial level. I should, therefore, be glad of a discussion with the Department—say, next Monday afternoon, with perhaps a further talk next day with the Department, plus Lord Hailes. We can consider how best to reply to Lord Home after these talks.

3. Meanwhile my first reactions are:—

(1) It would be absurd to embark on independence when:

- (a) there are no means of defence,
- (b) no provision for finance for the central government,
- (c) even no freedom of movement for goods or persons within the Federation, and
- (d) no provision yet for staff for overseas representation.

(2) It would be very difficult to "sell" this one to the rest of the Commonwealth.

(3) The West Indies and Central Africa must each be judged on its merits. Central Africa could be independent in the sense that it's got the ships (guns and planes), it's got the men, it's got the money too. There are good reasons for withholding independence in Central Africa but we must be careful not to make the contrast with the West Indies absurd, by giving the latter a purely fictitious Commonwealth status when they have none of the means of supporting it.

(4) If faced with a demand in January for independence within twelve months; I should have thought we should be prepared to counter with a planned programme which would give the West Indies the chance of achieving the necessary criteria of independence by 1965. In practice we might be able to settle for 1963 or 1964; but I do not think that we should consider a further fall back position at this stage. The West Indies themselves still have plenty of hurdles to jump at the Conference and may not be in a position to put a united demand for full dominion status, quite so soon as some fear.

(5) Meanwhile I would be against sounding other Commonwealth Governments at this stage. The Commonwealth has become a great whispering gallery and consultations are sure to get back to West Indies' ears. This will only encourage them in their demand. If the C.R.O. feel they must consult their High Commissions, they should be asked to do so in the strictest secrecy.

4. These are only provisional and first reactions but the Department may like to take account of them before we hold our meeting.

102 CO 1031/2311, no 47

14 Aug 1959

'The West Indies: independence and Commonwealth status': CO record of a meeting between Mr Amery and Lord Hailes on 11 Aug. *Minute* by Sir H Poynton

The discussion centered around possible means of reconciling the likely desire of The West Indies for independence as early as is practicable (a desire that cannot be withstood on grounds of social or political immaturity, but only on the grounds of financial inability and the unsuitability of the present internal powers of the Federal Government in relation to the units) with the need to avoid embarrassment in relation to the discussion of full independence for the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland which would inevitably be raised at the next constitutional conference for Central Africa due to be held in October, 1960. *Mr. Amery* was anxious that no date for West Indian independence should be announced or even, if possible, publicly proposed before then. The possibility of embarrassment on this score would lessen somewhat after 1960, but it must be remembered that the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland already possess [sic] the physical attributes of independence. He thought it doubtful whether, taking into account the need for the West Indies to achieve the basic requirements and the time required for bringing new constitutional instruments into operation, independence could be granted to The West Indies before 1964 or 1965.

2. *Lord Hailes* accepted that H.M.G. must pay due regard to the situation in Central Africa, but felt that independence for The West Indies could not be withheld for as long as 5 or 6 years. The Central African argument would cut no ice with The West Indies and could not even be whispered to them. Nor was it much use to point out that other territories that had recently been granted independence had had greater resources with which to meet the obligations of Commonwealth status. There had been the greatest admiration in The West Indies for the achievement of independence of the Gold Coast, but this had diminished considerably when certain

individuals had visited the new State of Ghana and found how less advanced it was in many respects than The West Indies.

3. As far as the obligations required of The West Indies were concerned—control of Defence, External Affairs, revenue raising powers and freedom of movement of persons and goods—*Mr. Rogers* expressed the view that it would just be possible for them to accomplish these things by 1961, provided that the larger territories were prepared to give way on Customs Union and movement of persons and to assume the burden of recurrent financial assistance to the smaller territories. If Jamaica were agreeable, the first stage of Customs Union could be introduced within two years, and this could be regarded as satisfying the obligation, even though the full stage might have to last for five years (as recommended by Sir William Croft). On movement of persons some measure of relaxation of the present restrictions could be reached within that time. On defence it would be possible to have in existence one fully trained battalion of The West India Regiment possibly with the second being formed and some sort of embryo naval force, even if it consisted only of vessels and trained personnel made available by H.M.G. during the time required for the training of West Indian personnel. But mere promises by The West Indies to be able to stand on their own feet in these respects eventually, or even before independence was granted, would not be adequate security for a firm offer of independence by H.M.G; it would be necessary for them to show that the required legislation in all these fields was in force and that some steps at least had been taken to implement them before independence could be granted. As to the demands to be put forward as a result of the September conference, we could not control these (though the UK observers would naturally counsel common-sense) and if these demands were to be published, uninstructed opinion in the West Indies would view them as virtually having already been achieved, a fact which would make it very difficult for the delegates at the London conference to withdraw very far from them.

4. *Mr. Amery* hoped that every endeavour would be made to avoid naming a date for independence within the next year or so. It had to be accepted, however, that Dr. Eric Williams had already spoken of the 22nd April, 1960, and that he might well announce this publicly, perhaps even at the opening of the September Conference, without warning the Federal Government, or even his own Government, in advance. If this happened, it would be difficult for H.M.G. to expose the announcement to ridicule, the more so because they would be represented at the Conference only by observers and not by delegates. Mr. Manley might oppose Dr. Williams, since Jamaica was in no particular hurry for independence, and he might get some backing in doing so from the other territories on the grounds that Dr. Williams' date would have to be discussed again at a London Conference some time between January and March, 1960, and that it would be impossible then to achieve independence within one or two months and impossible to complete the necessary constitutional processes before a further year, say by April, 1961. Accordingly, a compromise date might be reached which might fall not far short of acceptance by H.M.G. If, however, there was pressure for very early independence, or for the fixing of a date at the September Conference, and if this was subsequently put forward at the Conference in London, H.M.G. would have to enumerate the obligations that would be required of The West Indies before independence and ask for a precise statement of how soon The West Indies expected to be able to assume each of them.

5. Three further possibilities were discussed. Firstly, The West Indies might go

for independence alone to start with, leaving the question of Commonwealth status until a little later, in the hope that the United Nations would recognise its independence more easily than the Commonwealth members would admit it to their club. Secondly, The West Indies might not take lying down suggestions that if such and such were not done H.M.G. could not put them up for the club. Their answer to this might be to canvass for sponsorship by Commonwealth countries whom they believed to be sympathetic to their cause, such as Canada (Mr. Diefenbaker¹ might lend a willing ear), Ghana, Malaya or Ceylon. In the latter case H.M.G. would no doubt be informed of the move by the Commonwealth governments concerned, but there was no precedent for such a happening, which would cause an extremely difficult situation. Thirdly, we could not assume that our "minimum criteria" for sovereignty would be accepted by the West Indians who might not agree that all the steps we thought desirable were essential. These criteria would require careful consideration.

6. It was agreed that it could not be foreseen just which way events would turn, but that the U.K. observers at the September conference should do all they could by private persuasion to discourage any early announcement of a target date for independence, and if possible to postpone the announcement of any date until after the Central African conference was due to take place. It was also agreed that the Department would prepare a draft reply to Lord Home² in the light of the above views and of the briefing exercise now being undertaken for the U.K. observers and discuss this with the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State and Lord Hailes as soon as possible.

Minute with 102

...

Independence of the West Indies

We [Poynton and Hailes] did not discuss this in any great detail but Lord Hailes was extremely anxious that we should not hold back longer than was necessary on purely practical grounds. He was evidently a little disappointed that Mr. Amery had not been more encouraging at the meeting yesterday. He thought that The West Indian Ministers themselves were almost certain to announce a date as their goal during the preliminary Conference in the autumn, and it would be very difficult for H.M.G. to put the brakes on for any other than purely practical reasons. If we wanted to play it a bit slowly the best hope was that Dr. Williams would advocate so early a date as to be ridiculous (e.g. April 1960, which he has already mentioned) and that this would bring Mr. Manley into opposition and result in some compromise that might be more reasonable. He was aware of the timing difficulty with the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland but while he seemed to appreciate the difficulty of The West Indies attaining independence (or having a date fixed) ahead of Rhodesia and Nyasaland he could not really see why it should be damaging in the Rhodesian context if The West Indian constitutional conference were held before the Central African Conference, the latter, I understand, being due for the autumn of 1960. He thought it would be

¹ Prime minister of Canada.

² ie to his minute of 31 July, see 101, note.

impossible to defer The West Indian Conference later than March or April, i.e. pretty well immediately after the Princess Royal's visit if that took place in January or February. I reminded Lord Hailes that in the case of Nigeria the date of independence had been fixed almost exactly two years ahead of the final constitutional conference, that the working out of independence was, in fact, quite a long drawn out process, not only in the preparation of constitutional instruments but in a whole lot of preparations that have to be made in the international field, including the training of diplomatic staff and the getting ready for the C.R.O. and a United Kingdom High Commissioner to take over. Anything less than two years seemed to me to be rushing it unduly, even if we should get reassured that the Federal Government would be sufficiently in control to take over. I instanced one or two examples including Chaguaramas, of the difficulties we found at this end over the perpetual jealousy between the Federal Government and the Unit Governments. On this latter point Lord Hailes expressed complete agreement. . . .

A.H.P.
13.8.59

103 CO 1031/2040, no 185

Aug 1959

[US bases]: CO aide memoire for Mr Amery in discussions with US representatives on 20 Aug

[Extract]

Mr. Amery is of course fully aware of the strong feeling aroused in Trinidad by the American reluctance to agree to a Conference to revise the 1941 leased Bases Agreement. He may, however, wish to make use of some of the following points to reinforce our plea for an early conference:—

(a) We had recently reached the stage where two agreements (the Antigua Missile Station and the Antigua Satellite Station Agreements) and an exchange of notes defining the extent of the privileges enjoyed by United States Military aircraft at airfields in the Caribbean, could be completed. In each case the drafts had been cleared with the local governments concerned and with the United States' authorities. Recently, however, the local governments concerned have had second thoughts and with the strong support of the Federal Government have requested the postponement of signature until the wider questions of the United States bases in general and the revision of the 1941 Agreement in particular have been settled. It will of course be necessary to inform the Americans through diplomatic channels of our intention not to proceed with these Agreements and exchange of notes for the time being, but the Foreign Office have agreed that this action should be delayed so that Mr. Amery may, if he wishes, make use of this in his talks with the Americans.

This attitude of the local governments is indicative of the strong feelings aroused in The West Indies over the bases issues generally and illustrates the difficulties the Americans may have in the future in obtaining concessions from The West Indies unless and until a revisionary conference is agreed to.

(b) The Federal Government and through it the Trinidad Government have not yet been informed of the unfavourable American reply to the formal request for a revisionary conference. Unless the Americans can be persuaded to change their

minds we shall have to inform the local governments of this and the Americans should be left in no doubt that if and when Dr. Williams has to be informed of the American rejection of the request, he will almost certainly feel that the gloves are off and proceed to make life as difficult as possible for the Americans in Trinidad. In point of fact he has already outlined some of the steps he proposes to take in such circumstances; these include: . . .¹

Some of those actions would probably amount to no more than the strict observance of the legal position, but it is quite possible that in the heat of the moment the Trinidad Government would contravene the terms of the 1941 Agreement.

(c) The Americans on several occasions have implied that if, in fact, matters got out of hand in The West Indies they would look to and expect H.M.G., as ultimately responsible for Trinidad's foreign relations and for the observance of the Treaty, to take suitable measures to maintain public order and to protect their position. At the same time the Americans have given as one of their reasons for not agreeing to a revisionary conference now that when The West Indies achieves independence they are confident that they will be able to negotiate satisfactorily without our assistance. The first part of this seems to us only too likely to make the second impossible. Our position vis-à-vis the Federation (which it seems the Americans do not fully understand) is that although H.M.G. are fully conscious of the need to fulfil their obligations under the 1941 Agreement, it is not possible at this stage to treat the Federal Government or the Unit Governments as though they were at a much earlier state of development; nor can we proceed on the basis of keeping them in complete tutelage in so far as Defence and Foreign Affairs are concerned right up to the date on which Independence is achieved. They have to be put increasingly into the picture in these matters. Many of the spheres in which they might take action to embarrass the Americans are moreover internal matters under purely ministerial control e.g. control of civil airfields, customs etc. The Americans should not assume that H.M.G. would be prepared to suspend the Trinidad Constitution, for example at the request of the United States Government, unless they were completely satisfied that the vital defence interests of the United States and the Western Hemisphere would otherwise be gravely prejudiced. H.M.G. would require the very strongest and compelling reasons before suspending the Trinidad Constitution or indeed using any of the remaining reserved powers, since to do so would precipitate a crisis probably necessitating the landing and maintenance of British Troops in the Island—this moreover would take place in the face of strongest adverse public opinion locally and, perhaps to a lesser extent, in this country also. Furthermore, even if the constitution were suspended, it could not remain suspended indefinitely and the position in Trinidad and the West Indies of the Americans, and of ourselves too, would be likely to be much worse when it was eventually restored.

(d) The Americans are under the impression—and this is another of their reasons for refusing a Conference—that nothing could be worse than to hold a Conference which failed. While it is true that a “failed” conference would lead to a deadlock with consequent ill feeling in The West Indies, ill feeling would be much greater if

¹ The steps proposed are not repeated here. They are itemised in points (a)-(f) in 100.

Williams could accuse the Americans of having been so unreasonable that they had actually refused to discuss the questions at issue. If, on the other hand, a Conference was held and broke down because of Dr. Williams' intransigence, the Americans would be in a much stronger position in that they would be able to claim that they had bent over backwards in order to meet West Indian wishes. Thus, they would be in the best position to enlist the sympathy of all reasonably minded opinion in Trinidad and in the Federation. It is just such opinion which is at present in danger of being alienated by a refusal to confer with the West Indies.

(e) The American offer to consider specific proposals through diplomatic channels for the revision of such articles of the Treaty as H.M.G. may wish to put forward does not in any way meet The West Indies request for a conference with the prospect of their being a party to a subsequently revised agreement. Moreover, no conference could be held at which Dr. Williams was not present in one capacity or another and to try to do so would only encourage dissensions inside the Federation and weaken the position of the Federal Government. This latter point is of particular concern to H.M.G. although the Americans will doubtless appreciate the importance of doing nothing to lessen the stature of the Federal Government. If Dr. Williams continues to be unreasonable, the only prospect of holding him is by meeting the reasonable wishes of the Federal Government and other members of his own Party, so that they can overrule him. At present they are being driven to side with him.

(f) It is the considered view of H.M.G. that until and unless the Americans agree to a revisionary conference at which the Federal Government will be a participant, their relations particularly with the Government of Trinidad will go from bad to worse and life will become increasingly difficult for them in Chaguaramas and perhaps elsewhere in the Federation, in Antigua and St. Lucia for example. There seems to be a fundamental difference of opinion between H.M.G. and the United States Government in that the latter seem to believe that if they continue to do nothing, the strong feelings aroused over the 1941 Agreement will eventually die down. We, however, are convinced that the opposite is true and it is doubtful whether even now the Americans appreciate the full significance of the mess they are landing themselves in. We have had many years experience of affairs in The West Indies and our representatives on the spot have had very considerable experience of reporting and assessing events. The Americans on the other hand have to depend on reports received from a Consul-General in Trinidad who is new to the area and on their service experts in Chaguaramas who have not the necessary political background to enable them to read the local signs right.

(g) The Americans may mention their concern over reports in Trinidad newspapers about their Radar Tracking Station activities. The local press are apparently running a story that the visit of the British expert² is being delayed so that the Americans may remove from Trinidad certain incriminating equipment. This, of course, is very far from the point which is that the expert's visit has been delayed until such time as the Americans can tell us when the station is resuming low power operation—now expected about the 25th August. Arrangements are accordingly being made for the expert to arrive in Trinidad on the 21st August. It

² See 100, note 2.

is not improbable that much of the difficulty which has arisen over the tracking station could have been avoided if the Americans had not been so completely ingenuous when we first asked whether there was any radiation from Chaguaramas. Then they answered that the only source of radiation they could think of would be from hospital equipment and domestic appliances—this at a time when the Trinidad Government were fully aware that the Radar Tracking Station was operating and indeed since it is situated on a hill in Chaguaramas, it is plain for all to see. It is just this kind of action which ruins the Americans' position with West Indians—and seriously embarrasses H.M.G. too.

104 CO 1031/2311, no 50 27 Aug 1959
'The West Indies': minute by Mr Amery to Lord Home responding to CRO concerns over the prospect of early independence

As Alan Lennox-Boyd is away until the end of this month I am replying to your minute of 31st July about the West Indies.¹

2. The position is that the Federal Government has invited all the units of the Federation to take part in a preliminary constitutional conference in Trinidad on the 28th September. Subject to the agreement of the unit governments (and Trinidad has already expressed its opposition) the Federal Government has invited Her Majesty's Government to send two observers.

3. The relevant resolution of the Federal House of Representatives describes the purpose of this conference as: "to achieve the goal of self-government and Dominion status (sic) within the Commonwealth at the earliest possible moment". It is the present West Indian intention that this September conference, which is to be a purely West Indian affair, should lead up to a full dress constitutional conference with Her Majesty's Government in London early next year. The present Federal constitution provides that such a conference should be held within five years of the inauguration of the Federation; and although 1960 is rather on the early side we do not think it would be politically possible to refuse a request for a West Indian conference on this ground alone.

4. The West Indian delegations to the September conference will have to deal with the highly contentious question of how power is to be distributed between the Unit and the Central governments. They will also have to resolve the differences that have arisen between Jamaica and the rest over customs union. We cannot foretell what the outcome of their discussions will be. It is possible that the conference will break down, in which case the request for a constitutional revision conference may be postponed for some time. It is equally possible that the degree of agreement reached may not be sufficient to justify the West Indian delegations in asking for Dominion status by a fixed date. My advisers, however, and the Governor-General, consider that the September conference is just as likely, if not more likely, to end in a demand for independence at once (by which they will mean as soon as the necessary legal and legislative steps can be taken) or by a definite date. We do not take the Premier of Trinidad's statement about independence by April 1960 very seriously. We

¹ See 101, note.

would not, however, be surprised if the date proposed were 18 months or two years from the Constitutional Review conference in London. Assuming this conference was held in the spring or early summer of 1960, this would mean independence some time in 1962.

5. Our observers at the September conference will not have the same status as the other delegates. Assuming, however, that they are invited it is our intention that they should in so far as the opportunity presents itself, make it clear that Her Majesty's Government cannot agree to sponsor the West Indies for Commonwealth membership unless they have fulfilled certain conditions with regard to the weight of powers and revenues in the hands of the Central Government, the progress towards customs union, the provision of certain military and naval forces, and the strengthening of their administrative and diplomatic apparatus. These criteria are being worked out in greater detail in the brief for the United Kingdom observers at the September conference, and an advance copy will shortly be sent to your Office in case you wish to comment. This approach is in keeping with the Report of the 1956 London Conference on British Caribbean Federation, which said, in reference to the eventual independence of the Federation: "a country must be able to stand on its own feet economically and financially . . . finance its own administration and (be) able and prepared to assume responsibility for its own defence and its own international-relations to the extent that was involved by its geographical or international standing".

7. I recognise that early independence for The West Indies would not make our task easier in relation to Rhodesia and Nyasaland. This factor is being given due weight in our thinking. But you will appreciate that it will not count for much with West Indian opinion. The West Indies are in many respects (not least their standards of political life and internal stability) in advance of the general run of Latin-American states in their immediate neighbourhood who already enjoy full international status. This is the criterion that counts most with them.

8. I also appreciate what you say about the views of South Africa and how this might affect the reception of West Indian candidature for the Commonwealth. I made this point firmly to Mr. Manley and his ministers when I discussed the boycott of South African goods with them last May in Jamaica. The United Kingdom observers at the September conference will naturally lose no opportunity to reiterate Her Majesty's Government's views on the undesirability of any extension of the boycott by the rest of the West Indies. I doubt, however, whether the fear of a South African "blackball" will do much to restrain the West Indians. They are more likely to put their faith in Ghanaian and Indian support and if necessary even turn to them to sponsor their membership of the Commonwealth.

9. I agree with you that there is much to be said for playing for time in dealing with any demand for West Indian independence; and as you will see from the line we are proposing to take, we shall certainly do nothing to hasten the process. Our power of putting on the brake, however, is now very limited. Moreover, even where we still have it, we have to be very careful how we use it. The Federation is still a delicate plant and any excessive check at this stage to West Indian aspirations could have grave repercussions on the standing of the Federal Government and even compromise the existence of the Federation. While, therefore, we shall not neglect reasonable opportunities for delay, I am sure you would not wish us to pursue these to a point which risked injury to the Federation itself.

9. [sic] The September conference is due to meet in less than a month from now. I would, accordingly, submit that we should review the whole problem again as soon as the outcome of that conference is known. I do not know whether you will wish, meanwhile, to let our High Commissioners know our preliminary views. It might, however, be wiser not to discuss the problem at this stage with other Commonwealth Governments. Any leakage of such discussions which reached the West Indies would only spur them on in their quest for early independence.

105 PREM 11/2880, pp 25–27

28 Aug 1959

[US bases]: FO record of a meeting between Mr Selwyn Lloyd and Mr Herter on the question of a revision conference

Mr. Herter said that as he understood it the West Indies regarded the whole bases agreement as outmoded and would like a revision conference to be held before the Federation became independent. The West Indian bases were of first-class importance to the United States and they were doubtful about making concessions to pressure, particularly from Dr. Williams in Trinidad, since they thought that his real aim was to get the United States out altogether. *Mr. Gates*¹ explained that the West Indian bases were the focal point for the whole United States naval defence of the South Atlantic. They felt that if the agreement were seriously called into question it might radically affect United States bases elsewhere, *e.g.*, Argentina [sic].

The Secretary of State said that we had the fullest sympathy with the American position and completely understood the importance of the bases to them. The question was of how best to play the hand. We had ourselves had unhappy experience of foreign bases, *e.g.*, in Ceylon, and in general we thought it was impractical to attempt to bind in advance a Government which was about to become independent. In the case of Malaya we received only an oral assurance from the Tungku before independence and were then able to negotiate a defence agreement with the new Malayan Government after it became independent. In the West Indies we thought that there was a risk that if the United States refused to discuss revision now, they might enable Dr. Williams and other extremists to put pressure on the Federal Government so that it would be almost impossible for internal political reasons for them to negotiate a reasonable agreement when the Federation became independent. We would not necessarily concede the point that the existing agreement would not be binding on the Federation; indeed, we would make the best case we could for this. But in practice we could not prevent the new Government from denouncing the existing agreement almost immediately after they became independent.

Mr. Amery said that he hoped the Federal Government on attaining independence would make a statement accepting existing obligations. We ourselves intended to negotiate a defence agreement with the new Government after independence, but this did not involve major issues comparable to those of the United States bases. In answer to a question from Mr. Herter about the powers which the Federal Government would have over the Government of Trinidad, *Mr. Amery* said that the Federal Government could suspend the Constitution in Trinidad. It also controlled

¹ T S Gates Jnr, US deputy secretary of defence, 1959 (June-Dec).

the armed forces, but control of the police was in the hands of the Trinidad Government. Although Dr. Williams had initiated the present pressure the Federal authorities had taken it up to a considerable extent, partly at least because of genuine pressure of public opinion.

The Secretary of State said that Mr. Dulles had used the argument that if the Americans were to negotiate now and to make certain concessions, these would be pocketed and they would then be asked to make further concessions in new negotiations after independence. He saw the force of this, but the other argument was that if the position was allowed to deteriorate too badly it might become impossible ever to get a satisfactory new agreement. *Mr. Amery* said that the Colonial Office view was that if talks were refused now, public opinion would back Dr. Williams. If, however, there were talks and his attitude was seen to be unreasonable moderate opinion in the West Indies would be strengthened. The Colonial Office thought that it would be better to agree to talks now and that this course incurred less risk of building up Dr. Williams' prestige. The request for talks had come from the Federal Government, and if the request were accepted there would be a single Federal Delegation, though it would of course include representatives from Trinidad. Before approaching the Federal Government formally we had asked the Acting Governors of the Federation and Trinidad what agenda they thought would be proposed and we should get their answer in about a week.

Mr. Herter said that the United States Government were not encouraged to accept a conference, since the discussions they were already having on day-to-day matters had virtually reached an *impasse* owing to the unreasonable attitude of the West Indian authorities. They would prefer to negotiate with us rather than have a conference with full publicity. *Mr. Amery* said that United Kingdom control was passing very rapidly and he thought that it would already be almost impossible for us to negotiate with the Americans without bringing in the West Indians.

The Secretary of State said that it must be a matter of judgment whether it would be best for the United States to negotiate direct with the Federation after independence, or to negotiate now while we would be there to help. If independence was to come in six months, he would advise waiting, but in fact the period was to be two to five years. The Secretary of State thought that there were four questions:—

- (i) What would be the legal position as regards the existing agreement when the Federation became independent?
- (ii) Would it be better to postpone a revision conference until independence or to agree to one now?
- (iii) Would negotiations now increase or decrease Dr. Williams' prestige?
- (iv) If there were to be a conference, what would it be about?

The Secretary of State said that he thought the United Kingdom could take the line at a conference that the existing agreements should bind the Federation after independence. In practice, however, the legal position was probably less important than the political, since whatever the legal position at the time of independence, if the new Government was unfriendly it could denounce the agreement almost immediately afterwards. *Mr. Amery* explained that no date had been set for independence, but the West Indians could ask for a review of the constitutional position within five years and were likely to make such a request next year. Independence might be achieved at any time from the beginning of 1962.

Mr. Herter said that he thought it would be very helpful if the United Kingdom Government took the position that the existing agreement should remain legally valid after independence. The United States Government always required that any new Government should accept the international obligations of its predecessor before recognition was granted. He thought that this was not an unreasonable position to take.

The Secretary of State said that one possible course for us would be to make the acceptance of the existing agreement a condition for the grant of independence. He doubted, however, whether this was wise since such a condition was not likely to endure. *Mr. Herter* agreed that it might be better for the United Kingdom to assume that the agreement would remain in force rather than to insist on it doing so.

The Secretary of State suggested and it was agreed that a United Kingdom statement on the legal position would be produced. We should also wait for the West Indian suggestions about the agenda for the proposed conference. The Colonial Office should produce a political appreciation of the tactics to be pursued and of the effect of such tactics on Dr. Williams' prestige. The Colonial Office should also consider the arguments for and against making acceptance of the existing agreement a condition for the grant of independence. In conclusion the Secretary of State said that he thought the United States Government should not assume that the outcome of a review conference would necessarily be adverse or that the majority opinion in the West Indies was against the United States. The United States were in a strong position to bring economic pressure to bear, and the more moderate elements in the West Indies might appreciate the necessity for the Federation to remain on good terms with the United States.

106 CO 1031/2956, no 26

22 Sept 1959

'Military implications of the attainment of independence by The West Indies Federation': COS memorandum for Mr Duncan Sandys (COS (59)227 (Revise), annex B)¹

Introduction

In a recent letter the Colonial Office assess that the Federation of the West Indies will almost certainly achieve independent status within the Commonwealth by 1963 and possibly even as soon as 1961. The colonies of the Bahamas, British Virgin Islands, British Guiana and British Honduras will remain outside the Federation and their status will not change.

2. The Colonial Office state that a conference to review the Constitution of the Federation of the West Indies is to be held in September, 1959 and suggest that it is important that the United Kingdom representatives who are likely to attend that conference as observers should be briefed on United Kingdom military interests and obligations in the West Indies. The Colonial Office request that in order to guide them in determining their policy, a study should be made of the military implications of an independent Federation.

¹ The CO had requested that the COS prepare an assessment before the opening of the Trinidad review conference at the end of Sept 1959.

Aim

3. The aim of this paper is to consider United Kingdom defence interests and obligations in the Caribbean area and to review the military implications of independence of the Federation of the West Indies.

United Kingdom aims in the area

4. We assess the main United Kingdom interests in the Caribbean area as:—

- (a) The maintenance of stable governments friendly to the United Kingdom.
- (b) The peaceful evolution of the Federation and of the United Kingdom territories outside the Federation.
- (c) The protection of the Federation and the colonies against external aggression.
- (d) The maintenance of internal security in the British colonies.
- (e) The continuance and protection of trade.

There might also at some future date be a requirement to disperse components of the United Kingdom's deterrent forces in the territories.

5. The forces now in the area consist of two frigates based on Bermuda, Army Headquarters Caribbean Area in Jamaica and one British infantry battalion of five rifle companies deployed among the territories. In addition the West Indies Regiment, consisting of one battalion which is under strength and non-operational, is based on Jamaica.

*The threat**Internal security*

6. Possible threats to internal security are:—

- (a) Political differences which may be exploited by communist or other outside influences.
- (b) Unrest caused by industrial grievances.
- (c) Unrest fostered by neighbouring countries.
- (d) Communist attempts to disrupt the newly formed Federation.

Limited war

7. Although we cannot discount the possibility of a Latin American dictator being tempted to embark upon hostilities against a neighbour, we can see no threat of limited war involving the United Kingdom. We consider that the presence of United Kingdom and United States forces in the area coupled with United States political and economic influence would discourage such adventures. We therefore discount any limited war threat in the area.

Global war

8. The only global war threat is that posed by possible submarine operations. However, United States influence would be predominant and the United Kingdom government would not attempt to reinforce the area. At some future date the United Kingdom might wish to disperse components of her deterrent forces in the area.

*Federation defence requirements after independence**Federation defence forces*

9. The risk of interference or unrest in the West Indies Federation is liable to increase unless an efficient minimum security force is maintained by the Federation government.

10. *Navy.* The Federation has no navy but will need a force of a small number of armed launches and patrol boats based on Jamaica and Trinidad for local harbour defence, patrol of territorial waters and anti-smuggling and fishery protection.

11. *Army.* After independence the Federation forces will be responsible for internal security within the Federation. For this task we consider that the battalion of the West India Regiment must be maintained at at least one full strength battalion and be suitably trained. Since it is at present administered by the United Kingdom Army Headquarters in Jamaica, early measures will be necessary to ensure that the West India Regiment is completely self-administering by the date of independence.

*United Kingdom defence requirements after independence**United Kingdom forces*

12. *Navy.* After West Indian independence there will be a need, for as long as can be foreseen, for two Royal Navy frigates to be maintained on station in the West Indies to assist in internal security in the unfederated colonies, for trade protection and for politico-naval duties in the area.

13. *Army.* United Kingdom troops will still be required for internal security duties in the remaining British colonies. We assess this requirement at a [sic] infantry battalion. At present the battalion HQ and two companies of the United Kingdom battalion are stationed in Jamaica. We should prefer to leave the battalion in Jamaica after independence, but must face the possibility of having to move out of the Federation at some future date. Furthermore from the moment of independence there will be the risk of our forces in Jamaica being prevented from undertaking operations elsewhere if the operations meet with the disapproval of the Federal Government. We consider the best alternative location would be the Bahamas. There is no plan for the accommodation of a United Kingdom infantry battalion in the Caribbean in the long term. The United Kingdom have undertaken to make available to the Federation for their forces the accommodation now occupied in Jamaica. New building will therefore be required whatever the location decided upon for the battalion.

14. *RAF.* The RAF's immediate interests are mainly concerned with staging and overflying rights which are discussed separately in paragraphs 15 and 16 below. There is also a requirement for occasional deployment of Coastal Command Shackleton detachments in this area. However, a long term requirement exists to retain a maximum capability to disperse components of the deterrent forces for which the Caribbean area is considered to have a potential.

Staging and overflying

15. After independence the United Kingdom will no longer have the automatic right to overfly or stage through Federation territory. However, the remaining colonies in the area i.e. Bahamas, British Honduras and British Guiana, will still provide a reasonable chain of British airfields from which to operate should the

occasion arise. Nevertheless, it would be desirable to seek staging and overflying facilities within the Federation.

16. If, after independence, the use of Jamaica for staging purposes should be denied to us, other arrangements will have to be made. Adequate fuel stocks and facilities for Britannias and Comets at British Guiana, and for Comets, Britannias and Hastings at Nassau would have to be assured. The development of Belize to Britannia standards though ideal, is not essential, since reinforcement to this Colony could be undertaken from Nassau by Hastings aircraft, for which fuel and facilities must also be assured.

Reinforcement

17. A plan exists for reinforcing the area with a battalion by air from the United Kingdom. Under present timings and without prior warning troops would begin to arrive in about eight days from the time the executive order to move was given. Commander Caribbean Area's concept of operations is that in the event of serious disturbances or aggression requiring theatre reinforcement, he would in the first instance concentrate the local United Kingdom battalion at the trouble spot, using local civilian aircraft. After independence the Federation may refuse to allow British troops to be carried in local civilian aircraft for internal security operations with which the Federal government is not in sympathy. Arrangements must therefore be made to provide R.A.F. lift for one company as quickly as possible. These aircraft could leave the United Kingdom within 24 hours of the receipt of a request. The timing of their availability for onward movement in the Caribbean will depend upon the type of aircraft used. Whilst overflying and staging facilities are not essential for the reinforcement plans for the remaining colonies, it is clearly desirable from the military point of view to retain the right to have such facilities.

Command and military advice

18. After independence there will be no local officer of sufficient experience to command the new Federation forces. It would be in the United Kingdom interests to have British Officers appointed in command of both naval and land forces and in any military advisory capacity which may be required.

Defence agreement

19. We suggest that the United Kingdom Defence requirements listed above should be incorporated into a Defence Agreement with the Federation. They are not however so important or so irreplaceable that the United Kingdom should insist upon them in the face of strong political opposition.

Conclusions

20. We conclude that:—

- (a) After Independence it will remain a United Kingdom interest to foster stable and friendly governments in the Caribbean.
- (b) The main danger to the area after Federation [sic: independence] will be political unrest.
- (c) To maintain internal security the Federation will need a small naval force and at least a battalion of infantry. It would be desirable for the United Kingdom to be associated with the development of these forces.

- (d) The United Kingdom will require to maintain two frigates in the area and a battalion for use in the remaining colonies.
- (e) If we cannot rely on retaining our existing headquarters and troops on Federal territory, which would be preferable, then the Bahamas, where good staging facilities exist, would offer the most suitable alternative.
- (f) Plans which rely on the chartering of local civil aircraft for movement of reinforcements within the area would have to be revised.
- (g) We should seek staging and overflying facilities within the Federation.
- (h) A Defence Agreement should be concluded to incorporate the United Kingdom's defence requirements in the Federation.

107 CO 1031/2326, no 31

6 Oct 1959

[Federation]: letter from P Rogers (Port of Spain) to Sir H Poynton on the failure of the Trinidad inter-governmental constitutional review conference

[Rogers was one of the UK observers at the Trinidad conference. Forwarding a copy of his letter to Poynton to the CRO, Jamieson commented that the CO was now 'filled with gloom about the prospect ahead' because the chances of Jamaican secession had increased considerably. Manley would try to counter the tendency but he might not be strong enough to control it. Jamieson concluded: 'Perhaps the greatest danger at the present is not precipitate secession by Jamaica but a loss of the Federal Government's confidence and a kind of Marxist withering away of its influence with Federation making less impact on the region resulting in a growing sense of that insularity which is never far below the surface in the West Indies' (CO 1031/2326, no 31, Jamieson to Chadwick, 19 Oct 1959).]

We are due to have one more meeting of the Conference tomorrow to discuss terms of reference for the committees to be set up. But effectively the Conference is ended, indeed broken up, as the Trinidad Guardian puts it with its occasional apt quotation, "not with a bang but a whimper". Yesterday morning's and afternoon's meetings of the Conference were squalid in the extreme and reached rock bottom in my own experience of conferences anywhere. This report may well be coloured by gloom as reaction, though I hope not unduly so. However, to go back to the beginning.

The Secretariat will be sending a complete set of the records of the Conference which indeed will already be reaching the office in the shape of the daily issues of the Trinidad Guardian and the Jamaica Gleaner, which with their usual efficiency secured very full and by and large accurate reports of what happened throughout, so that the minutes of the morning's conference were available to delegates in the afternoon in the local newspaper. This was much more than the usual overhearing of gossip in hotel lobbies—it was a technically admirable piece of reporting by at least one member of the Conference. Ken Hill¹ of Jamaica, who sat as one of the Federal Opposition members, is generally regarded as the most likely source.

The Conference opened in a very bad atmosphere. Manley had been manoeuvred by Bustamente into being on the defensive about Federation during the Elections, partly at any rate through the effect of Grantley Adams' ill-judged remarks about

¹ K G Hill, journalist, associate editor of *Daily Gleaner*, member of Federal House of Representatives for Surrey constituency.

retroactive taxation in Jamaica sometime ago.² The Jamaica paper prepared for the Conference was written solely with an eye to Jamaican opinion and had much the same effect in the Eastern Caribbean as some of the late Mr Dulles's more unfortunate speeches to American audiences had on us. Even in that context it was a badly drafted paper for I found in discussion with Jamaican delegates that it even did not mean what it appears to say. Moreover, it resulted in Manley coming with very little freedom to manoeuvre at all, especially on the issue of representation.

Eric Williams, on the other hand, who, as you know, produced an impressive paper and speech on the economics of nationhood and the need for a strong Federation, had overdone it politically. Although his paper is in my own view an admirable academic statement, it was politically ill timed and frightened not only the Jamaicans but quite a few others and left only the impression that it was part of a bid for power by Eric Williams in the Federation, i.e. he was striking an attitude over independence in a bid to attract widespread West Indian support. I do not believe this view to be the whole truth and I am sure he is sincere in his wish for early independence, but again the effect on the Conference was unfortunate.

Very few of the other islands had done much work (except that Barbados had done a lot of solid homework but produced no papers). St. Lucia however circulated an early paper to the Conference which I can only describe as astonishing. It advocated what was practically a unitary state and the impression it gave was that this was advocated so that St Lucia should get doles from the richer islands to bring its standard of living up to theirs. This frightened the Jamaicans at least as much as the Trinidad paper.

Even so, all this might well have been overcome if the Conference had not started off in an atmosphere of bitter political antagonism, both personal and insular. It had been preceded by a meeting of the West Indian Labour Party which had apparently gone very smoothly and in which Williams had, I understood, promised to support Manley over the issue of representation. In a sense he did, but obviously he had left too much unsaid for Manley regarded Williams's attitude at the outset of the Conference as a double cross and reacted accordingly.

The row started, as so frequently at conferences, over the order of items on the agenda. The Jamaicans demanded that representation be put first and said that they were unwilling to discuss any other items at all unless they got satisfaction over representation. I gather that in the Steering Committee the Jamaica representative, Glasspole, put this across moreover in a very bullying manner. The other delegations quite naturally wanted to know, to use their own words, "representation for what?"; in other words they wanted to know that if they met Jamaica on representation, Jamaica would meet them in giving adequate powers to the Federal Government and in particular agree to a customs union. A not unusual dilemma open to be met in any one of half a dozen ways well known to all of us who have the misfortune to attend conferences, but it went astray. There was a long debate in plenary session on this with Jamaica adamant and the other islands opposing. Finally, in an intervention which was absolutely masterly in timing and tactically successful, but strategically disastrous, Eric Williams accepted, and got the Conference to accept, that representation be discussed first in a speech which reserved his right to talk about

² See 81.

anything on the very first item. The effect on the Jamaican delegation was not only one of profound resentment at Eric Williams's tone, but also emphasized their feeling that the other islands were ganging up against them and would do everything that Eric Williams told them.

All this was reported in the pages of *The Daily Gleaner* in the most poisonous manner by Simmonds,³ the *Gleaner* correspondent, and inevitably the attitude of the Jamaicans over representation stiffened under a barrage of letters, telegrams, and telephone calls from Jamaica to all its delegates. Jamaica's own paper proposed a formula for representation which gave Jamaica about 49 per cent of the seats on the basis of each island keeping its present number of seats as a minimum, but accepting one seat for each 50,000 of the population as the basis of representation subject to that. Manley had told me privately on the first day that he would be prepared to compromise on one seat for each 60,000 of the population which would have effectively reduced Jamaica's representation to something like 46 per cent. I myself felt fairly sure that one could have got a compromise on that basis after some discussion, if it had been talked over amicably. After three days hard talking the other delegates, most of whom had come quite unprepared for this, had come a very long way to meet Jamaica's demand and I believe would have accepted one seat for 60,000. By that time however, Manley told me, when I asked him again privately if this could not be put forward as a compromise, that it was no longer possible for him to accept it because of a terrific build up of pressure in Jamaica. Moreover, by this time the Jamaican delegation were scared of compromising over representation because of the demands with which they thought they would then be faced over taxation powers for the Federal Government. In fact I know that the Jamaican delegation discussed the compromise at length amongst themselves, and Manley at any rate would almost certainly have been prepared to accept it but he could not get the other members of the delegation or rather, in particular, Wills Isaacs and the two Opposition members to do so. Because of the build up in Jamaica Manley could not afford to break with them.

It seemed already as if the Conference was about to break down and we were talking privately at that stage about the idea of at least saving face and doing some useful work by setting up a series of committees (what has in fact proved to be the eventual outcome of the Conference) when Eric Williams came forward with an ingenious formula that each island should have one basic seat in the House of Representatives and that the whole of the rest of the seats should be on the basis of one for each 50,000 of the population or any additional fraction thereof over half. This seemed to me a most admirable way of meeting Jamaica's principle about a strictly proportionate representation, in the sense that it could have been presented as such and given Jamaica in practice about 46 per cent of the total seats. Unfortunately again, Eric Williams mishandled the discussions. It was only after considerable pleading with him that I got him to mention it to Manley at all before he put it in plenary conference and he would not agree to talk privately with Manley and get him to accept it before it ever came out in the open. Even so, it was a very reasonable way of meeting Jamaica, and, had relations between Williams and Manley and the atmosphere surrounding the Conference been better, I believe it would have

³ U D Simmonds, political and industrial relations correspondent of *Daily Gleaner*.

gone through. The other islands could have been got to accept it particularly as it gave one or two of them an extra seat as a sweetener. But Manley came back with a formula that there should be no extra seat for any fraction of 50,000 over half. The effect of this was to take away the extra seat for one or two of the islands and to bring back the percentage to 49.5 of the seats for Jamaica. This very understandably infuriated all the other delegates (except Antigua and St. Vincent), and it was only one or two calming speeches at the end (one from Lightbourne⁴ of the Jamaica delegation in a reply to an attack about "money-lenders" after a very fortunate intervention by Cato,⁵ the Chairman of the Conference) which reduced the temperature and enabled the Conference to adjourn on the Friday evening on a note which left some ground for optimism as the Governor-General's telegram No. 171 Personal had stated.

Williams had arranged to have private talks with Manley and Adams, bringing in a little later Cummins of Barbados and one or two others of the Jamaica and Trinidad delegations, on Sunday. It was at these that the Conference finally broke down. I do not know the details of what happened, but I gather that the Trinidad delegation felt that they were not going to get adequate satisfaction from Jamaica on other issues like customs union and therefore their own attitude towards representation stiffened in turn. With an ineptitude which characterised his performances throughout the Conference, Grantley Adams failed to turn up at this meeting on the score that he had had a telephone conversation with Eric Williams the previous evening and had agreed everything with him, so that there was nothing left to discuss. It was most unfortunate that there was no mediator at this meeting. I cannot believe that, if one had been present, it would have been impossible to reach compromises on something effective as regards the other very difficult issues in dispute. The personal feeling between Manley and Williams must have undoubtedly been a factor. Manley told me that he had spoken to Williams the previous evening on the telephone and that the latter had then been in a most friendly mood, but by the Sunday morning Williams had read some of the *Gleaner* articles and was in one of his very worst moods and quite impossible. I expect there is something in this, though I think Manley must probably be held to blame too for being uncompromising. Anyway the outcome was undoubtedly disastrous. In the meantime Cato and I had been discussing with other delegates a compromise based on the Trinidad principle but with one seat for each 55,000 of the population, and no seat for fractions thereof. This would have given Jamaica about 48 per cent of the seats. Manley told me that Jamaica would accept it and pretty well all the other islands would have accepted it except that Dominica would have reserved its position (which need not necessarily have mattered very much). Cummins of Barbados was, after a long talk with Cato, Grantley Adams, and myself, prepared to put it forward, but Cox⁶ of his delegation was adamant. Nevertheless we reassembled on Monday morning with just a prospect

⁴ R C Lightbourne, lived in England; chairman, Juney Iron and Steel, Birmingham; returned to Jamaica, 1951; managing director, Jamaica Industrial Development Corporation, 1951–1955; entered politics, 1958, and elected to Federal House of Representatives as member for St Thomas; resigned 1959 and elected to Jamaican House of Representatives in same year; minister of trade and industry in Bustamante government after 1962 election in Jamaica.

⁵ Dr A S Cato of St Vincent, president of the West Indies Senate, 1958–1962.

⁶ M E Cox, minister for trade, industry and labour, Barbados.

that the compromise formula might get through. In the meantime, however, pressure in the other islands, particularly Barbados, to resist Jamaica's demand had been mounting, and as I have said, the Sunday morning meeting had really destroyed the prospect of agreement based on a compromise between Jamaica and Trinidad. Eric Williams came to the meeting determined to put Jamaica on the spot by producing a clarion call for independence and withdrew his own proposal of the previous week over representation.

There then ensued a whole day's discussion in which Eric Williams never quite succeeded in getting his point about independence launched. No one quite knew what they were supposed to be talking about and at one point the Conference found that it would have to settle a matter by voting when it had not yet settled how it should vote if the need arose. The dispute was over whether to set up a series of committees or whether to bypass representation and go on to discuss other matters as Eric Williams wanted. There was then a sordid scene of uncertainty ending with a ruling from the chair that voting should be on the standing Federation Committee principle on this occasion (three votes for Barbados, Jamaica, and Trinidad, and one for the rest, leaving the Federal Government out of it). I am sure it was totally inappropriate as a ruling, but anyway it produced the astonishing spectacle of the big three abstaining and pretty well all the smaller islands voting for the Federal Government's proposal to appoint a series of committees.

We have now adjourned while the Federal Government drafts terms of reference for the committees, and the Conference reassembles tomorrow to discuss them. I should not be in the least surprised if there are more fireworks then, more especially as Jamaica, in order to avoid getting drawn by Eric Williams into discussion of "principles", has withdrawn pretty well all of its delegation, leaving only an adviser, to discuss the terms of reference.

The only other thing I should add about the Conference is to comment on the performance of Grantley Adams. It is true that today's Guardian credits him with having saved the Conference from break-down and that it was his motion for the appointment of the committees which succeeded in doing this. I am bound to add, however, that that proposal is not his own idea, but was put to him by others, that he put it across very badly as far as any conciliation of the Trinidad delegation is concerned, and that every other one of his interventions in the Conference has been unfailingly inept and irritating to all the delegates. His own Ministers are murmuring very loudly. Cato has worked terribly hard as Chairman trying to conciliate everyone and behind the scenes has done admirable work in trying to work out compromises, but he has lacked firmness in the chair and has missed several occasions of bringing the Conference on to right lines.

There is now a real danger that the Federation will split up. There is certainly strong pressure in Jamaica for it as we all knew before. But what has surprised me is the strength of the pressure in certain groups in the Eastern Caribbean to "go it alone". It is difficult to know just how the strength of this pressure has grown as it has. There is certainly the sentiment of which we have been aware for some time among the Indians in Trinidad that they will be better off with Jamaica out and British Guiana in. There is also misunderstanding on the part of many about the absence of advantage in having Jamaica in and the economic advantage of having British Guiana in on the score that the latter, unlike Jamaica, can provide an outlet for surplus population. This, to my astonishment, was put to me by someone as

intelligent as La Corbiniere [sic]. I find it difficult to believe that this is his real motive for putting this point of view. Finally, there is the sentiment among some of the small businessmen who, as we know from elsewhere, always form effective pressure groups and who may fear competition from Jamaican industries. Finally, perhaps the most important of all, is the plain exasperation of those with strong nationalist sentiments at what they consider to be the delaying tactics of Jamaica.

It is difficult to gauge just how great this danger is. I had an hour's talk with Manley this morning in which I spoke very frankly about our wish to keep it together, the investment we have made on the basis of a Federation of the West Indies as a whole, and the influence I was sure any U.K. Government would continue to exert to maintain it, and I asked him if he would tell me frankly what his own views now were. I believe that those views have not basically been affected by the failure of the Conference, i.e. that he is still a Federationist and though he thinks in terms of a weaker Federation than we believe to be practicable, he is prepared to discuss the degree of power to be given the Federation. When I put it to him that it would be impossible for foreign policy to be conducted by a Federal Government without control of those aspects of internal affairs which are the raw material of foreign policy, he said frankly that he did not know about this side but was very willing to discuss it with those who did. I found much the same sentiment among the very able group of Jamaica officials with the delegation. On the other hand the Conference will undoubtedly have stimulated the anti-Federation forces in Jamaica and there is certainly no doubt that Manley will never now either forgive or trust Eric Williams.

Federation, for immediate purposes at any rate, has had a big setback. (Lord Hailes feels that the word "shock" would possibly be a better word than "setback"). It is important that we should indirectly stimulate all those forces in the West Indies which favour Federation, which I believe to be very powerful potentially and get them to come out in the open. Indeed, I put this equally frankly to Manley and he agreed. To the extent that he is politically able I believe that he will try to do this. He said, for example, that the Jamaica Agricultural Society, which is a very influential body, had come out strongly in favour of Federation, and he thought would continue to do so. This Society is just about to join with that of Trinidad and some others in the West Indies to form a West Indian Agricultural Society. I think this is one source that can be used and I talked with Harold Robinson⁷ this morning about it. He feels, like nearly all the big agriculturists in the West Indies, that they have much to gain from Federation and he is quite prepared to see if those with like minds can be induced to say this through the Agricultural Society or otherwise. I also had a long talk with Hochoy and Ellis Clarke on this and put it that it is essential firstly to prevent Eric Williams and his Ministers saying things which will exacerbate the situation and secondly to counter those of the Eastern Caribbean who for one reason or another are not unwilling to see Jamaica leave the Federation. They will do their best to stimulate to public utterance those who are prepared to say that there are great advantages to the Eastern Caribbean in their remaining in the Federation in conjunction with Jamaica.

⁷ Sir Harold Robinson, company director, managing director, Woodford Lodge Estates, Trinidad, 1944–1961; president, Agricultural Society of Trinidad and Tobago and British Caribbean Citrus Association; vice-president, West India Committee; member of Legislative Council, Trinidad, 1946–1961.

There are two other issues which I think we ought to consider although, after sleeping on them overnight, I would recommend that we take no action. The first is the C.D. & W. Allocation to the West Indies. This was made on the assumption that Federation would continue at least as it is now, and almost certainly grow in strength in the next five-year period. If there should be a break-down of Federation, we should have to look at the C.D. & W. Allocation again in theory, but by then it would be too late to withdraw any allocations made to the Eastern Caribbean in order to review the allocation to Jamaica. However, I think it would be quite wrong for us to raise this point now and I think we are bound to continue in the hope that Federation will in fact grow.

The second, and in some ways more difficult point, is that of whether or not we should continue with the abolition of the governorships of the Leeward and Windward Islands.⁸ Our agreement to the abolition of the posts at the Leeward and Windward Islands Conference was expressly made conditional upon the outcome of this Conference not so weakening the Federal Government that it would not assume those functions in aid of the Leeward and Windward Governments which were at present performed by central staffs of those Governments. Our Ministers were insistent on this reservation. The outcome of the conference has not explicitly weakened any of the powers or resources of the Federal Government, but it has certainly weakened its standing and its ability to function effectively. I doubt however if it has done this to an extent which will justify reversing our provisional decision about the abolition of the two governorships. It certainly would be extremely embarrassing and very harmful to Federation for us to say this openly, as we could not avoid doing if we were to try to change the decision. Moreover, I doubt if we could in fact now re-establish the effectiveness of the two governorships once their death sentence has been even provisionally decreed, particularly in view of the attitude of Bradshaw. Here again, therefore, I recommend that the decision of the Leeward and Windward Islands Conference should be confirmed.

10 Oct 1959

P.S. There was no time to revise the above letter and have it typed before Wednesday's Bag, so I am adding this to complete the account of the now adjourned Conference.

It reassembled on Wednesday expecting fireworks by Eric Williams. He made an able speech suggesting that the Federal Government's paper went further than the Conference had agreed to go (as indeed it did—deliberately in order to provide the basis for the completion of the discussions). He then asked:—

- (i) that the next Conference should be with H.M.G. (i.e. should not be the present one reassembled) and should be held before 31st March, 1960. The point of this was to give him the opportunity of re-launching his "independence by the 22nd April, 1960, at 11 a.m."
- (ii) that there should be no committees but that the Federal Government should "collate the views of other governments on the items on the agenda".

I had some sympathy with his first point, except for timing. I think it might well be more effective if there could be a U.K. Minister in the chair who could act both as a

⁸ See 98, note 1.

mediator and as a tougher chairman than Cato. As I have already said, the latter has worked tremendously hard and had been admirable as the conciliator behind the scenes, but his weakness in the chair has been so marked that at one moment one of the delegates appealed (justifiably) to the chair to bring some point to the proceedings.

However, the obviously political manoeuvre over dates brought a strong attack from Antigua. The Conference then went on to a further spell of futile debate and we adjourned until Thursday. Two delegations then produced papers (one fair and the other admirable) to resolve the difficulty over drafting the conclusions. After further confused debate the Conference eventually adjourned.

The one bright spark in the last few days has been Manley's forthright statement on his return to Jamaica that he did not intend to lead them out of the Federation. I got the impression that this had a considerable effect on the last day of the Conference in making some of the delegates from the smaller islands take a more responsible line.

I am seeing Eric Williams this morning and will report separately on that, but there will be no time to record it before the Bag closes.⁹

⁹The Trinidad conference appointed two inter-governmental committees to examine the contentious issues. In turn the committees appointed two working parties of officials—ALPHA, to examine the political and constitutional aspects of federation (for the proceedings of which see CO 1031/3334), and ORION—to examine the customs union and financial policy, including CD&W allocations and concessions and incentives to industry (see CO 1031/3335–3336).

108 CO 1031/2574, no 121

20 Oct 1959

[Federation]: minute by P Rogers to Sir H Poynton on the measures needed to generate support for federation

[Upon his return from the Trinidad conference Rogers took the lead in suggesting that the CO should mobilise behind-the-scenes support for federation in a discreet campaign. His ideas are set down in this minute. They involved enlisting Canadian support, not by way of further financial aid to the West Indies—that would not solve the immediate problem—but by means of formal and informal contacts during which Canadian ministers and officials would point out to West Indian leaders the dangers that would result if federation broke down. This idea was discussed with N Robertson, the Canadian high commissioner in the UK, at a meeting at the CRO in Nov 1959. Rogers and Poynton represented the CO and explained the background. While agreeing generally that Canadian support would be desirable, Robertson argued that he could not commit his government, felt sure that it would be unwise for Canada to link itself too closely with constitutional issues in the West Indies, and questioned whether any arguments which might now be put forward to forestall a separate application by Jamaica for Commonwealth membership had not been weakened by the recent moves made by the UK to associate Cyprus with the Commonwealth. CRO officials were adamant that Cyprus was in a unique position because of its relations with both Greece and Turkey; it was not the intention to extend to any other small territories the Cyprus precedent (CO 1031/2574, no 124, note of meeting, 3 Nov 1959). Hailes was not informed of this meeting until after the event. His reactions to this, and to the proposals outlined in Rogers's minute to engage the expatriate business community, were entirely negative. He stuck to his view, reported by Rogers in his account of the Trinidad conference (see 107), that the outcome was a 'shock' and not a 'setback'. To the governor-general, Rogers's proposals sounded like panic measures which were unnecessary; West Indian politicians had seen the 'abyss' opening up before them and they were now pulling back and determined to put federation on the right road. Hailes believed that discreet lobbying was a

contradiction in terms and he argued that West Indian politicians were far too advanced to be influenced by outside advice. Indeed they would resent pressure being brought to bear by persons who would be identified as belonging to 'the same class as the 19th century power group or West Indian lobby in London'. He therefore advised that Rogers's policy should be reversed; the future of the federation would be decided by the West Indians themselves (CO 1031/2574, no 139, Hailes to Rogers, 25 Nov 1959). Hailes's comments were received awkwardly in the CO. Poynton defended Rogers. Amery, while admitting that it had been wrong not to keep Hailes informed, was anxious not to make 'a mountain out of a molehill'. Macleod, new to the department and unable to read the West Indies Federation 'tea-leaves', fell back on the suggestion that if somebody wrote a long letter of complaint 'it is a good thing to send a long reply in return' (*ibid*, minutes by Poynton, 23 Dec 1959, Amery, 30 Dec 1959, and Macleod, 31 Dec 1959). Rogers therefore wrote again to Hailes, making it plain that the CO did not claim to know more about the local situation than the governor-general. However, reports arriving in London suggested that opinion in Jamaica was hardening against federation and Rogers repeated his concerns about the weakness of the federal government and the federal civil service (*ibid*, no 144, Rogers to Hailes, 7 Jan 1960). Hailes was not persuaded. The important question was not the situation at the end of 1959 but what would happen in coming months. On this he declared there was 'some ground for sober optimism' (*ibid*, no 3, Hailes to Rogers, 5 March 1960).]

Since my return from the disastrous Federation Review Conference in Trinidad I have been giving some further thought to the issue which I touched upon in my report¹ to you at the time, i.e., how to repair the damage which has been done and in particular how to encourage the supporters of federation and stimulate them to greater activity.

2. The core of the matter is the inefficiency of the Federal Government and here, I am afraid, we can do little. It stems essentially from the appalling inadequacy of Sir Grantley Adams. We can ourselves do nothing to displace him and although his colleagues are only too anxious to do so, they may well be stultified by the absence of a generally acceptable alternative Prime Minister. Mr. McPetrie² and I discussed with the Governor-General and his Attorney-General before we left the question of what discretion he had under the constitution if it came to a question of a dissolution. The Governor-General is bound to act in accordance with U.K. conventions and it is not open to him therefore to take arbitrary action to force a dissolution. We agreed however that at any time after the next month or two, when we hoped the position in Jamaica would have shaken down somewhat, a dissolution would be in the public interest if it could be brought about constitutionally e.g. by the Governor-General persuading the P.M. to advise one.

3. Another difficulty is the relative weakness of the administrative machine of the Federal Government. Essentially this stems from the lack of leadership on the part of the Prime Minister but there are certain weaknesses among Civil Servants also. Mr. Mordecai has been a very able political adviser to the Governor-General and is a very likeable officer. He is not however a clear-headed or incisive administrator. I discussed his position with the Governor-General and we agreed that if, as seems quite likely, Federal Ministers decide that Mr. Garnet Gordon should be replaced as Commissioner in the U.K., Mr. Mordecai would be a very good successor to him on merits. Such a move would moreover afford an opportunity of bringing in someone who on the Civil Service side would be abler if such an officer could be induced to make the move when the future of the Federal Secretary's post is very much in

¹ See 107.

² J C McPetrie, assistant legal adviser, CO.

doubt. One officer who would, I think, do it very well and whose move would be a great contribution to federation generally is Mr. Arthur Brown³ of Jamaica.

4. A much more marked weakness in the Federal Government is the inadequacy of Mr. Blache Fraser as Financial Secretary. I fear we must admit that, basing ourselves admittedly on the reports from Trinidad of his work, we made a bad appointment there. He again would be a very honourable and suitable representative of The West Indies overseas in a post which did not demand great initiative. Lord Hailes and I agreed that he would not be up to what is needed in either Canada or the U.K. In a lesser post overseas should one be created he would however be very good and so would his wife. He would not, however, in my view, be a suitable Administrator of one of the Leeward and Windward Islands, which is what Lord Hailes originally had in mind. If he is moved there is the ideal replacement available for him in the shape of Mr. Frank Williams, at present Permanent Secretary to the Prime Minister.

5. The other ranks of the Federal Service need strengthening in quality though not yet in numbers, but one of the great difficulties will be to keep even the good men there, let alone bring in others, in view of the discouragement produced by the Federal Conference. I had long talks both with Mr. Mordecai and Mr. Maynier⁴ about "pep" talks to keep up morale, particularly through the Civil Service Association, of which Mr. Maynier is Chairman, but we cannot hope to do much here until there is a change of the political scene.

6. The next issue is how we can encourage the supporters of federation to greater activity, both vocal and otherwise. I suggest that we should first consider whether there is anything which outside governments can do. This means essentially the U.K., Canada and the U.S.A.

7. I do not think there are any steps which the U.K. Government can take at present other than those proposed in this minute, i.e. I do not think that any talk about financial assistance, greater assistance in respect of markets and so forth can or should be made. Some time early next year it is possible that a ministerial tour of The West Indies might be useful but I suggest that on this we should wait and see how the situation develops, and then consult the Governor-General about the possibility. For the rest I think that for the time being we must confine ourselves to supporting the Federal Government wherever this is politically possible and to stimulating indirectly support for federation.

8. As regards Canada, Lord Perth suggested in discussion, and if I may say so, I very much agree, that it would be useful for a Minister to have talks with the Canadian High Commissioner here (presumably after consulting the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations) about the attitude of the Canadian Government. They are already very well disposed towards federation and I think there will be no difficulty in getting the Canadian Government to agree that they should continue their present line in assisting the Federal Government wherever possible, both directly and indirectly, e.g. by emphasising its status whenever possible in their own dealings. I suggest that a report of such discussions with the Canadian High Commissioner should go to the U.K. High Commissioner in Ottawa for him to take

³ G A Brown, director, Planning Unit, Jamaica Secretariat.

⁴ E A Maynier, permanent secretary, Federal Ministry of Trade and Industries.

similar action there. I should also add that Sir Saville Garner⁵ is contemplating a tour of The West Indies in about February of next year and I suggest that we should ask him specifically to look out for ammunition then for further approaches on these lines to the Canadian Government.

9. Since I began this minute I have also seen Sir Stephen Luke and had a long talk with him about the position generally. He agreed generally with the ideas mentioned in this minute but himself independently proposed an approach [sic] to the Canadian Government and added some further thought on it which I think is most useful. He suggested that we try and induce the Canadian Government to press the advantages of federation through their own official and semi-official contacts with The West Indies, e.g. through visiting Ministers and otherwise. He said that he thought the Canadian Government might be very ready to do this and also that in some respects at any rate their advice would be more acceptable to West Indians than advice direct from us. I suggest that we discuss initially with the Canadian High Commissioner here accordingly, subject to the consent of the C.R.O.

10. I do not think we can expect more of the U.S.A. than benevolent neutrality at this juncture but I think we should emphasise to them the importance of doing nothing which will disturb or weaken the position of federation. I have already had a preliminary attempt at this in a talk with Mr. Moline the U.S. Consul-General in Trinidad and with Mr. Galbraith of the U.S. Embassy here. I suggest that, subject to consultation with the Foreign Office, we should now send copies of my letter to you reporting the outcome of the Conference and of this minute to Mr. Douglas Williams at Washington asking him to take all possible opportunities for talking in this strain to the U.S. Government. If at any time they themselves can offer suggestions for strengthening the position of the Federal Government, I think we should be very much on the look-out for ways of following them up.

11. As regards stimulating unofficial support for Federation in the U.K. our potential field of activity is inevitably restricted. Lord Perth suggested that a suitable leader from time to time in the "Times" would be helpful. It so happens that Mr. Oliver Woods has just left on a tour of The West Indies and this should provide an admirable opportunity for such press articles. I was able to have a short talk with him just before he left and found him most sympathetic. In so far as he feels he properly can, I am sure we can rely on him to publish articles favourable to federation and make it clear that the U.K. is very much in support of it.

12. There will also be tours of The West Indies this Autumn by Mr. Roy Lewis of the Economist and Mr. Clark of the Observer. Mr. Clark is now in the U.S.A. and we cannot get hold of him but I propose to see Mr. Lewis, who I know fairly well, and talk to him in the sense in which I talked to Mr. Woods.

13. The British Caribbean Association can, I think, be relied upon to be generally helpful but I doubt if it would be wise to stimulate it to particular activity in this connexion. The only other organised body of importance in this connexion is, I think, The West India Committee and I believe that it would be best that they should be asked to be active primarily through the organisations in The West Indies with which their individual members are concerned, rather than as a body. I am lunching with Sir J. Campbell in a week's time and I shall shortly see Mr. Barton the Secretary

⁵ UK high commissioner to Canada, 1956–1961.

of the Committee. I propose to ask if both of them will agree to stimulate such action.

14. The remaining field, (and the most important one, of course) is The West Indies itself. Here I think we must concentrate primarily upon stimulating organisations which have a real interest in federation to vocal support of it instead of leaving the field open to pressure groups opposed to it. I think it is particularly true to say that the biggest West Indian economic interests all support federation as being in their view of economic advantage to them. This group comprises the West Indian producer associations and some of the bigger insular associations. The Agricultural Society in January has already been stimulated to such activity and can I believe be stimulated again. I suggest that we should work primarily through such persons as Sir Robert Kirkwood, Sir Harold Robinson, Sir Jock Campbell, Mr. Hugill⁶ and perhaps one or two more such as Mr. Sharpe.⁷ I have already spoken with Sir Harold Robinson in Trinidad as recorded in my report to you of the time. By great good fortune Sir Robert Kirkwood is over here at the moment and invited me to lunch with him on Friday 16th October. I took the opportunity to enlist his sympathy in this project and found, as was to be expected, a very ready response. Naturally and properly he wishes to clear his path with Mr. Manley first and indeed the campaign might be more of an embarrassment than otherwise if he did not, but from my talks with Mr. Manley in Jamaica I believe he would be sympathetic. Subject to that Sir Robert is prepared to try and initiate resolutions in favour of federation both through the agricultural associations in Jamaica and in The West Indies as a whole and probably also to campaign more widely in Jamaica. He discussed various points that might be made in such a campaign, and I have asked him to lunch with me in about a fortnight to discuss them further.

15. The only remaining field which I think we might possibly influence is the Press, i.e. particularly the Daily Gleaner in Jamaica, and the Guardian in Trinidad. It is possible that Lord Hailes might be able to influence Mr. Hitchens of the Guardian but that would have to be done most discreetly in view of the latter's attitude towards the P.N.M. As regards the Daily Gleaner, Mr. Simmonds is the political reporter who did all the damage at the Federal Conference but he is a nasty little twerp who is subject to the views of his masters. Mr. Sealy is the Editor and is, I believe, favourable to Federation, but at present he has little say in the editorial policy of the paper. Mr. Fletcher, the Managing Director of the Gleaner is, Sir Robert tells me, also favourably disposed to federation but has not been allowed a free hand in any such policy. The real villain is Mr. Ashenheim,⁸ the Chairman of the Board and one of the leaders of the Kingston Group of merchants who look at their narrow interests and think that these are best served by Jamaica isolation. I discussed with Sir Robert whether or not Mr. Ashenheim might be influenced to change his views. Mr. Ashenheim is closely connected with the Jamaican rum and cigar interests and I suggested to Sir Robert that the argument could be put to him that while Jamaican rum interests might be scared of competition from other West Indian rums it was far

⁶ J A C Hugill, director, Caroni Sugar Estates Ltd, Trinidad.

⁷ A S Sharpe, managing director, Sharpe Construction Co Ltd, Jamaica.

⁸ (Sir) Neville Ashenheim (Kt 1963); chairman, The 'Gleaner' Company, 1946–1947; chairman, Jamaica Industrial Development Corporation, 1952–1957; Jamaican ambassador to US, 1962–1967; leader of government business in Senate and minister without portfolio, Jamaica, 1967–1972.

more important to them in the long run to retain and increase their market in the U.K., and perhaps even to extend it in the U.S.A., if the U.S. duty on rum could be lowered (Sir Robert told me that some recent soundings there offered just the possibility that this might be done). It might be made clear to Mr. Ashenheim that any efforts which the U.K. Government made to help either in the U.K. or vis-à-vis the U.S.A., would be much greater for West Indian products as a whole than for Jamaica products alone, particularly if the Jamaica interests concerned were to try and break up the federation. In short I suggested to Sir Robert that we might, as it were, show Mr. Ashenheim which side his rum and cigars were buttered on. Mr. Ashenheim visits the U.K. from time to time and I would suggest that when we see him we might talk to him in similar fashion. I have also considered whether we should attempt anything with Sir A. Bustamante through the Governor or otherwise, but this seems to me too dangerous a game to be worth the risk of the very doubtful prospect of success. If Sir Alexander were to visit the U.K. it is just possible that we might get Members of Parliament of both parties to urge on him a change in his political line, and to work on his vanity to that purpose.

16. For the rest I have no suggestions to offer at present. I believe that Ministers wish to discuss this. Subject to your views and to theirs I suggest that action proceed in the light of this minute and that we consult Lord Hailes and Sir K. Blackburne about the possibility of any further action, and in particular, the advisability of action in respect of the proposals in paragraph 15 of this minute. We should, of course, make it clear in writing to them that any approaches we make will be done with the utmost discretion.

17. To sum up, the specific action now proposed is:—

(a) Ministerial discussion with the Canadian High Commissioner, subject to the approval of the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations which should be sought in the first place. It is suggested that the discussion should be on the lines of paragraphs 8 and 9 of this minute;

(b) a letter to Mr. Douglas Williams at the Washington Embassy, subject to prior consultation with the Foreign Office, on the lines of paragraph 10;

(c) an approach to Mr. Lewis of the "Economist" as in paragraph 12;

(d) discussions with various persons prominent in West Indian life as in paragraphs 13 and 14;

(e) letters to Lord Hailes and Sir K. Blackburne informing them generally of the action which we are taking as above, consulting them about the possibility of action as in paragraph 15, and asking if they have any further ideas about action which they or we can usefully take.

109 CO 1031/2326, no 34, enclosure

29 Oct 1959

'Question of Jamaica's candidature for membership of the Commonwealth': CRO memorandum

[The CO had asked the CRO to provide material on the significance of Commonwealth membership, explaining: 'The school which believes that Jamaica can go it alone is certainly pretty vocal at present, and there is a very real danger of the pro-Federation case going by default owing to the belief that Jamaica could seriously expect "to make a go of it" as a Dominion on her own'. Blackburne, the governor, had been asked to encourage

those in favour of federation to speak out but his ability to bring direct influence to bear was limited because under a new constitution, which came into force in July 1959, Jamaica was now internally self-governing (CO 1031/2326, no 33, Marnham to Chadwick, 19 Oct 1959).]

The grant of independence to a United Kingdom dependency is a matter for decision by the United Kingdom Government alone in view of its administrative responsibility for the territory concerned. But, if, when a date for independence has been fixed, Ministers of the future independent state should express a wish for it to remain within the Commonwealth and for it to be recognised as a Member country, the United Kingdom Government can do no more than agree to sponsor the territory for Membership. The decision whether or not to accept the newly independent State as a Member rests not with the United Kingdom alone, but with all existing Members, and convention demands that their decision should be unanimous.

2. The hallmark of Membership is the right of the Member country to be represented at meetings of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers. But Membership also carries with it the benefits, as well as the obligations, of consultation with all other Member countries on the whole range of international affairs insofar as they affect the Members either jointly or severally. Equally a Member country must be ready to inform, if not to consult, other Members at any time where policies which it intends to follow are likely to affect or to conflict with the policies of those other Members. It is equally an accepted convention that no Member country will in any way interfere or involve itself in the domestic policies of another Member.

3. Thus Membership, which is in the collective gift of all the existing Members, is not a lightly given prize. Not only will the countries concerned wish to satisfy themselves that the new candidate for Membership will be ready and able to adhere to the above unwritten rules. They will also need to be convinced that the prospective Member is both politically and economically viable and that by its size and weight of population it will be capable of playing its role in international affairs and of assuring its internal and external defence.

4. No attempt has yet been made to define these criteria for Membership. Indeed, since the strength of the Commonwealth lies in its flexibility, it would be unrewarding to set forth any precise definition. Nor, of course, could the United Kingdom Government alone purport to express the general Commonwealth view in this matter.

5. The fact remains, however, that New Zealand with a population of 2½ million is the smallest Member country in terms of population and that the one instance of a territory of lesser size achieving "Dominion Status"—Newfoundland—ended in failure. Again Singapore, a wealthy territory with advanced administrative and social standards, but with a population of less than 1½ million, has neither claimed nor been considered for Membership of the Commonwealth—and this despite the fact that her new Constitution makes the State of Singapore virtually self-governing.

6. While, in modern times, independence can only survive through interdependence, and newly independent countries need not hesitate to accept help for capital development projects from international agencies or from nations wealthier than themselves, the fact remains that all existing Member countries are in a position to finance unaided their annual budgetary programmes. Indeed, they could hardly have attained the stage of independence if this were not the case. And the United Kingdom Government itself would not feel able to relinquish control

until it was satisfied that the emerging territory would be able to stand on its own feet without grants-in-aid of administration and contributions from C.D. Funds and other Colonial types of aid. It is certain that other Member Governments would equally wish to satisfy themselves that the country which they were being asked to accept as a fellow member was in a position to satisfy those minimum requirements.

7. The criterion of "international personality" is more difficult to define. The United Nations, which may be taken as the yardstick in this context, has admitted to membership countries as small as Iceland (population 160,000) or as unstable financially and politically as certain of the Central American Republics. But these analogies would not necessarily satisfy the Commonwealth. While the Commonwealth is bound together by no formal treaties, alliances or obligations and eschews all thought of a common foreign policy, each Member is expected to be ready and able to play a constructive role in international affairs and to be able to add its contribution of experience and advice to the inter-Commonwealth discussions and consultations which are continually taking place. Thus, a prospective Member country must not only be ready to assume this international role but must be seen to be in a position to assume it. In other words the Government concerned must, as from the date of its independence, have at least the nucleus of a trained and competent External Affairs Department and Foreign Service, and must at once be in a position to set up missions in a minimum of important foreign capitals and at United Nations Headquarters.

8. Viewed against the above arguments, any claim from Jamaica for membership of the Commonwealth in her own right must be marginal. With her population of 1.6 million and a national income of about £165 million (cf Ghana £270 million and Malaya £780 million) she would scarcely measure up to the standards of existing Member countries.

9. But there are above all, important political and constitutional factors which would weigh in the minds of other Commonwealth Governments if Jamaica's candidature were ever to be referred to them. Hitherto United Kingdom policy has been to lead the West Indies islands (and it is hoped eventually British Honduras and British Guiana) towards independence as a Federation. That policy has been stated on many occasions. Other Commonwealth Governments are well aware of it, and it may be taken that it has their support; they might well be critical of action by the Jamaican Government to break up the Federation and be unwilling to appear to condone—and perpetuate—it by accepting Jamaica as a Member. (Canada is, of course, very closely interested in and well informed about the West Indies and would almost certainly be distressed at the breaking up of the Federation.) Further, should Jamaica secede from the Federation and seek Membership of the Commonwealth in her own right, other Commonwealth Governments might quite properly ask whether they would then be faced not only with Jamaican candidature, but successively with those of even less viable independent units of the previous whole and by demands from British Honduras and British Guiana for similar treatment. This in itself would make Jamaica's candidature a very doubtful starter.

10. Finally, it must be borne in mind that through her unilateral action in boycotting South African goods, Jamaica is now in the black books of the Union Government. If asked tomorrow to admit the Federation as a whole to Membership, her attitude could not safely be forecast. If pressed to admit Jamaica alone, it is almost certain that she would refuse. And, by this present Commonwealth

convention, our [?one] refusal would be enough to bring Jamaica's ambitions to naught.

110 CO 1031/2326

3 Dec 1959

[Jamaica]: minute by P J Kitcatt¹ disputing the views of the CRO on Jamaica's eligibility for Commonwealth membership

I am afraid that I don't think this paper² is suitable for its purpose. To my mind it fails to get to the heart of the matter, but rather to consist of a few random shots round an ill-defined target. Despite its rather pretentious atmosphere (as if it had originated in a cloud on Mount Sinai or Delphi), it seems to me badly drafted and badly argued. Frankly, I feel that it reveals a depressing absence of clarity of thought on a subject which I would have thought of fundamental importance to the C.R.O.

2. Perhaps I might make some detailed comments:—

(i) I agree that paragraph 1 should be amended as proposed; I have no comments on paragraph 2.

(ii) Paragraphs 3 and 4 appear to harbour the idea that H.M.G. might grant full independence to a territory which was not politically and economically viable, and at least as capable of looking after internal security and defence as, say, the Federation of Malaya. Surely the only useful assumption to make in this context is that H.M.G. will not grant independence until they are satisfied that the basic criteria for independence are satisfied?

(iii) Paragraph 5 read with paragraph 8 appears to suggest that Jamaica is too small in terms of population and national income to qualify for membership of the Commonwealth in her own right. But the comparisons on which this conclusion is apparently based do not necessarily support it. New Zealand with a population of 2½ million is described as the smallest member country. But this was not the population of New Zealand when she *became* a member. For example the population of New Zealand in 1911 was just over 1 m., in 1921 it was 1.2 m and in 1935 it was 1.5 m—smaller than Jamaica now. In 1935 the population of Newfoundland was 277,283. That may have been too small for Dominion status, but they were in fact given it; and in any case the figure is hardly comparable with Jamaica's 1.6 m. As for the national income figures quoted, that for Jamaica works out at about £100 per head; that for Ghana at about £60 per head, and that for Malaya at about £140 per head. Again, I don't think any very significant argument can be based on this. Finally, I cannot see the relevance of the example of Singapore, for whose defence and external affairs H.M.G. are still responsible.

(iv) Paragraphs 6 and 7. As I have said above, I do not think that H.M.G. would grant independence to Jamaica unless these criteria were satisfied.

(v) Paragraph 9. I am very doubtful of the validity of the argument that Jamaica might be denied membership of the Commonwealth to punish her for seceding from the Federation.

(vi) Paragraph 10. I don't see much force in this argument, the more so as India was admitted while just such a ban was in operation—as it still is. Possibly

¹ Principal, CO, West Indian Dept 'A'.

² See 109.

S. Africa might maintain a refusal to accept Jamaica for this reason while the rest of the members wanted her in. But it would be foolish for the U.K. to take up a false position. Personally, if forced to choose, I would rather belong to a Commonwealth that included Jamaica than South Africa.

3. I can very well understand the feeling that Jamaica is too small for full Commonwealth membership, and that if Jamaica comes in others, even smaller, will have to come in too. The question of where the line should be drawn is a very important general one which H.M.G. must obviously face pretty soon. Equally I understand and share the feeling that it would be infinitely preferable for Jamaica to achieve Dominion status within the Federation rather than that we should be faced with granting Jamaica independence, and sponsoring her for Commonwealth membership, outside the Federation. But I do not believe that Jamaican individual membership must be ruled out categorically.

4. Given reasonable luck, within, say, the next four years, Jamaica will operate the "full internal self-government" constitution with a fair degree of competence. At the end of that time Jamaican Ministers will have been responsible for internal security for some years, and local public service commissions will have had responsibility for the public services. There is no prospect of a painful transition from an expatriate to a local civil service, since the transition has already been made. The economic picture is reasonably healthy, and should continue so if proportionately more is earned by the bauxite and tourist industries as compared with agriculture. I would expect Jamaica to be able to build up a competent, if small, Foreign Service, for which the nucleus already exists among those who have served in the Commissioner's offices in London and Canada, and also to be able to raise a one or two battalion defence force—for which, again, there is a nucleus. In about four year's [sic] time, therefore, Jamaica might well have quite a good case for independence, and it would not be unreasonable for them to raise the subject with H.M.G. in about two year's [sic] time, so that H.M.G. could say in what circumstances they would be prepared to consider such a step.

5. The question of independent membership may therefore become a live one if the Federation is not making visible progress towards Dominion status within the next two years, or if Jamaica leaves the Federation, or if it is seriously claimed, as Sir A. Bustamante has done—that Jamaica can achieve Dominion status just as easily outside the Federation as within it. This last seems to me a particularly difficult argument to counter. For example, I doubt whether one could say that the additional *financial* burdens of independence would be greater *for Jamaica* outside the Federation than inside it. I have a hunch that there would not be much in it either way. The best argument, I think, is that The West Indies can exercise greater influence in world affairs collectively than singly.

6. I suggest that we should deal with this situation as follows. Firstly, we should neither raise the question nor give any hint that we have been considering even the possibility. But if asked whether Jamaica could achieve Dominion status on her own, we should say that this was a hypothetical question with far-reaching implications which would be of concern to all the members of the Commonwealth; and that it would throw into the melting-pot the whole political future of the West Indian territories. I would contrast these difficulties and this obscurity about the future with the much clearer (relatively) path to independence and Dominion status within the

Federation. And I would say quite positively that, assuming for the sake of argument that an independent Jamaica could be admitted to full Commonwealth membership, it should certainly not be assumed that Jamaica would progress towards that goal more quickly outside the Federation than inside it. Indeed, I would indicate pretty plainly that the reverse could be expected to be the case.

7. I would rather take this line than say that Jamaica on her own could never achieve full Commonwealth membership. (Never say "never"). First, I don't think the arguments so far advanced in support of this conclusion are valid. Second, I think that if this really must be our considered view we should not state it unless all the other members of the Commonwealth share it, because of the very awkward situation that would arise if we refused to sponsor Jamaica, but some other member were prepared to do so. Third, although this might tend to keep Jamaica inside the Federation I don't think it is better argument than that independence and Commonwealth membership would come more quickly inside the Federation than outside. And it could have the very dangerous consequence that Jamaican Ministers might decide that if they couldn't have independence inside the Commonwealth they would jolly well have it outside, and the sooner the better. In other words we might find ourselves having to concede independence prematurely, earlier than we would have to if we could hold out the prospect of eventual Commonwealth membership. The consequences of granting premature independence in such an atmosphere could be serious, not only for Jamaica, but elsewhere in the Caribbean. Indeed they could be serious for the Commonwealth if it began to be thought that small white countries were welcome, but not small coloured ones.

8. Finally, we ought not to forget that we have quite a strong card in our hand. The advantages to Jamaica of remaining within the Commonwealth are greater than they are for some other potential members. Apart from the importance of the U.K. market for Jamaican exports, there is the important fact that Jamaican immigrants can now enter the U.K. freely, and could not do so if Jamaica were outside the Commonwealth.

9. Personally, I would be inclined to scrap the C.R.O. paper; to draft a letter to Sir K. Blackburne on the lines suggested in this minute, including such parts of the C.R.O. paper as are of general validity; and send it to the C.R.O. for concurrence, explaining our doubts about their own paper.

I apologise for the length of this minute, and for the time it has taken to produce it.

111 CO 1031/2311, no 63

11 Dec 1959

[Dominion status]: letter from Lord Hailes to Mr Macleod on Sir G Adams's resolution

At the Council of State last Tuesday, 8th December, Adams came out with the suggestion of making an immediate declaration of intent with regard to Dominion status. I used all the obvious arguments against this, pointing out that the substance of such an intent was already contained in paragraph 67 of the Report of the Intergovernmental Conference. The feeling of the Council was against Adams and I thought the matter was settled. However he no doubt lobbied and returned to the attack yesterday with a form of words, which he got the Council to accept in spite of

very strong opposition from the Jamaican Members and myself. Da Costa¹ also made a strong plea not to anticipate the deliberations of the Intergovernmental Committees.

2. Adams however made the following announcement yesterday evening in the House of Representatives amidst general applause:

“Consistent with the motion that I have just moved in this Honourable House I should like Honourable Members to know that the Federal Government proposes to approach Her Majesty’s Government as early as possible in 1960 with a view to considering the fixing of a date for the inauguration of Dominion status in The West Indies.”

3. As you know, Adams has always been an apostle of “make haste slowly” in this matter and contemptuous of Williams’ target of Dominion status next April. The reasons for this *volte face* are not clear but it seems likely that it is due to one of the following considerations or a mixture of all:—

(a) It has seemed to be an easy and popular way—though obviously short term—to restore his own position. He is I think really shaken by criticisms, and has arranged to pay visits to the Windward Islands next week—for the first time since he has been Prime Minister.

(b) It may be that he wishes to out-flank Williams.

(c) He may have been made to feel during his recent travels in Australia, etc., that West Indians are taking far too long to advance in comparison with other countries.

4. None the less, this is irresponsible. I used every argument I could privately and in the Council. He was at his most mulish!

5. While it would not be helpful to me for the Secretary of State to return a reply which, in view of my strong opposition to him, might appear to have been inspired by myself, I think the time may have come to make a firm blunt statement of fact on the matter of Dominion status. I did this myself in opening the Intergovernmental Conference; but this has clearly not been enough, and in any case is not the same as a statement from yourself. Will you kindly think this over and let me have your view in due course?²

¹ H L Da Costa of Jamaica, attorney-general, West Indies Federation.

² Hailes sent another letter on 18 Dec explaining that Adams had changed the wording of the resolution. As amended, the resolution was now in two parts, the first of which requested ‘the introduction of a complete Cabinet system of Government at the earliest possible date in 1960’. The second part transposed the clause ‘at the earliest possible date in 1960’ in the original resolution so that it now read ‘to approach Her Majesty’s Government with a request to consider the fixing of a date for the inauguration of Dominion status in The West Indies as early as possible in 1960’. This, according to Hailes, made the resolution ‘worse’, and it remained to be seen how the other units—especially Jamaica—would react. Adams was ‘quite irresponsible’ in his disregard of Jamaican and other reactions. The governor-general concluded: ‘One does feel more than ever what a pity it is that Manley is not at the centre of things at this juncture in the Federation’s history. He seems to be the only leader whose attitude to Dominion status is not charged either with emotion or political manoeuvre’ (CO 1031/2311, no 65, Hailes to Macleod, 18 Dec 1959). The government of Jamaica lodged a protest against the resolution in Jan 1960, describing it as ‘premature’ and declining to be associated with it until such time as the committees appointed by the inter-governmental conference (see 107, note 8) had reported. With regard to the proceedings of the committees, the Jamaican government also warned that Jamaica would have ‘to consider whether it is worthwhile to continue to take any further part in these activities which the Federal Government, having initiated and planned, is now flouting and ignoring’ (CO 1031/3258, no 1, inward tel no 10, Blackburne to CO, 7 Jan 1960).

112 CO 1031/4233, no 1**23 Dec 1959****[Defence]: letter from Sir K Blackburne to P Rogers on the special defence risks to Jamaica**

[The enclosure to this letter, entitled 'Defence problems of Jamaica', is not reproduced here. Assuming that the US, as the dominant power in the Caribbean, could be expected to take responsibility for the defence of the region as a whole from external attack in the event of global war, Blackburne's analysis concentrated on local defence problems. Troops were needed for internal security purposes, although there was as yet no reason to anticipate disorders in Jamaica which would require military assistance. More pressing was the potential external threat; Jamaica and to some extent the whole Federation were in a vulnerable position. 'A glance at the map shows that the Federation (and particularly Jamaica) is "between the jaws" of far larger independent Republics, all of which are to some degree in a state of political unrest'. Venezuela lay to the south; Cuba, Haiti and the Dominican Republic to the north. Cuba and Haiti were, respectively, 90 and 125 miles away from Jamaica, 'trifling distances in terms of jet flight'. The danger, peculiar to Jamaica and its former dependencies (the Cayman and Turks and Caicos Islands), was that they might 'become embroiled in internal revolutions in the three Republics to the north, and may become similarly embroiled in the event of hostilities breaking out between these three Republics'. Even before the accession to power of Fidel Castro in Cuba, several hundred of his supporters had sought refuge in Jamaica and attempts had been made to steal weapons. The Turks and Caicos Islands were especially vulnerable; there were many deserted and isolated islands in the Turks and Caicos group which could be used as arms dumps or as observation points. The Dominican Republic had made attempts early in 1959 to purchase the deserted island of West Caicos—140 miles off Cuba. Blackburne then examined the defence forces currently available and recommended (1) the re-establishment of the Jamaica Regiment, possibly on a territorial basis; (2) the retention of a British Battalion in Jamaica at least until the 2nd Battalion, the West India Regiment, had been formed and was operational; (3) the negotiation of a defence treaty between the UK and the dominion of the West Indies. In the sense that there was a long-term threat arising from a clash of political ideologies in the region, Blackburne concluded: '... the only action needed now is for Jamaica and the West Indies to continue with their programmes of development and of education so as to strengthen the belief of the peoples of the West Indies in the democratic way of life. The existence of the problem may indeed result in material assistance being given from the United States to the West Indies, both for economic development and for such institutions as the University College of the West Indies, since the present instability of the Caribbean Republics presents a direct threat not only to the West Indies but also to the United States'.]

When Manley first wrote to me to suggest a visit to England he included in his letter a somewhat cryptic statement to the effect that he would like to raise with the Secretary of State the Special defence risks to which Jamaica is peculiarly exposed in the interval until an adequate Federal defence force has been built up.

I discussed this matter with Manley and ascertained that he personally was not the originator of the idea, but that it had been included in the draft of the letter to me by the officials who had prepared the draft—Richardson¹ (Financial Secretary) and Arthur Brown. I then had a talk with Richardson and Arthur Brown to find out exactly what was in their minds. I gathered that they were concerned (as indeed are all of us) about the situation in the Caribbean Republics.

I told Manley that I would prepare a paper for him on this subject, and I have now done so, and I enclose a copy for your information. The paper has been prepared in consultation with the Area Commander.

I am, of course, aware from the Area Commander and from various military visitors from the War Office about the discussions which have been going on in

¹ E R Richardson, financial secretary, Jamaica (for Brown, see 108, note 3).

London about the future of the British battalion in the West Indies. The Brigadier and I thought that the preparation of this paper would provide a good opportunity with which to enlist the interest and support of Manley in the idea that a British battalion should be maintained in Jamaica for some time to come. I have not, of course, disclosed to Manley that the British Government may well of its own volition be wishing to approach the Federal Government in regard to this matter. It seemed better that I should encourage him to think that the initiative comes from this side.

Manley has not yet had an opportunity of commenting on the enclosed paper, and I shall not be seeing him again until the 5th of January. If he then has anything further to say, I will let you know. But I thought that I ought to let you have the paper at once as you may wish to consider with the War Office the best way of handling the discussions with Manley on this subject of defence.

I am sending a copy of this letter to the Governor-General. The Area Commander and the Senior Naval Officer, West Indies, are also, of course, being given copies of the paper.

113 CO 1031/3264, no 2, enclosure 2 Jan 1960
[Jamaica and federation]: resumé by the government of Jamaica of points to be raised with the CO by a Jamaican government delegation to London

[Blackburne commented that para C was the most significant part of this resumé; it raised the possibility of Jamaica 'going it alone'. The governor also reported that Manley had been 'thoroughly depressed' about federation when he discussed it with him on 5 Jan. Popular support for secession was growing in Jamaica and the actions of the federal government were making life more difficult. Manley described the dominion status resolution (see 111) as 'little short of lunacy'; the federal government was playing into the hands of Eric Williams. Blackburne was convinced that Manley remained personally committed to federation but some of his Cabinet colleagues were 'hardening against it' (CO 1031/3264, no 5, Blackburne to Rogers, 5 Jan 1960).]

A. Constitutional and political points

(1) The Government wishes to know what are the tests which are applied in determining whether a Government which is a Federation would be accepted:—

- (a) by other members of the Commonwealth as a Dominion;
- (b) by the United Nations and other international organisations as a sovereign independent Government.

Do the tests applied by outside parties relate to the internal constitutional arrangements which are agreed between the Federal Centre and Units.

Would there be a difference in approach if Units already independent had decided to federate and reached agreement as to the range of powers which should be taken over by the Centre, compared with the situation where the Units being federated are not sovereign nations but would hope that the Federation being set up would become sovereign.

Finally, there will be a presentation of Jamaica's views as to why it considers that a Federation with a minimum allocation of powers to the Centre should not on this account only be barred from obtaining independence.

(2) The Government wishes to discuss the practical problems which flow from

the geographical and cultural factors which are peculiar to the West Indies Federation. It will wish to show that the Federation in these circumstances is a unique experiment to which very few precedents can be found.

The separation of Units by large stretches of water not only makes communications difficult but has acted as a powerful divisive force and as a result there was a minimum of contact between the Units which it is now sought to bring close together.

In view of these circumstances, any attempt to proceed too hastily with a close welding together of these units could set up stresses and strains which could imperil the existence of Federation itself.

Apart from this such a process could, it is believed, so disrupt the Development programme in Jamaica and other Units that the area as a whole would suffer.

A full statement of the local political problems arising from Federation and the attitude of the Jamaican people to Federal affairs will be made as it is considered essential that any discussion of Jamaica's point of view on Federal-Unit relationships must of necessity take into account the views and desires of the Jamaican people.

(3) A statement will be made as to the sort of Federation which in these circumstances Jamaica envisages—a Federation commencing with the minimum of powers necessary to enable it to function as an independent political unit, providing for great flexibility and differences in the relationship between particular Units and the Federal Centre and leaving it to the historical, political and economic forces to shape its change and growth in the future.

B. The views of the Colonial Office on this structure will be invited. The Government would wish to have the views of the Colonial Office on the financial, economic and other implications of independence for the Federation touching on such matters as external financial aid, special trading agreements, etc.

C. The Government will ask the Secretary of State to consider the possibility that Jamaica may find itself in the position of having to seek early independence apart from the rest of Federation, because of failure to reach agreement with other units about the form which the federation should take after the first five years.

114 CAB 134/1630, DP(60)4

6 Jan 1960

'Financial assistance to the West Indies Federation after independence': CO note for Cabinet (Official) Committee on Development Policy. *Enclosure*

The political leaders of the West Indian Federation are studying the implications of independence in the near future. Mr. Norman Manley, Premier of Jamaica, is visiting London from the 9th–14th January, with the approval of the Federal Government, to discuss with the Colonial Office the financial and economic consequences of independence. He is certain to ask searching questions as to what assistance Her Majesty's Government is prepared to give the Federation after independence.

2. The discussions to be held during the four days of Mr. Manley's visit may well be crucial to the development, and indeed to the very continuance in its present

form, of Federation. There is already a serious danger of Jamaica seceding, and this will be much increased if Mr. Manley feels that too much of the burden incurred by the Federation on independence will fall on the shoulders of Jamaica. Secession, if it came about, would be a serious misfortune to The West Indies as a whole, but it would also be a considerable disadvantage to Commonwealth interests and to United Kingdom interests.

3. The financial implications of West Indian independence are set out in the accompanying paper. The broad conclusion is that the only problem likely to stand in the way of independence is that of financial self-sufficiency; on every other score it is as much in the interest of the United Kingdom as it is in that of The West Indies that independence should not be withheld or postponed. Financially, the granting of independence in two or three years' time would mean that The West Indies would lose assistance from Her Majesty's Government on their recurrent and development budgets to the extent of about £6 million per annum. We see no chance, within that time, of their absorbing such a loss through their own resources, especially since the additional costs arising through independence will amount to at least a further £1 million a year.

4. If, as is likely, The West Indies wish for independence and provided that they can agree among themselves to give the Federation the political and economic powers which are necessary for it to sustain sovereign status and improve their financial viability, we think the advantage lies in agreeing to independence and affording them some temporary financial aid. Obviously we cannot determine at this time what order of assistance may be needed so far ahead, but we believe it necessary at least to promise to consider it sympathetically when the time comes.

5. It is therefore proposed to recommend to Colonial Office Ministers that when they discuss with Mr. Manley the implications of independence they should speak on the following lines. The West Indies on becoming independent will continue to be eligible for assistance from international bodies, including the projected International Development Authority when established. In addition they will become eligible for Commonwealth Assistance Loans. We realise however that even so they are unlikely to be able to assume at once the whole weight of the financial burdens which would normally fall to an independent member of the Commonwealth. If this proves to be so, Her Majesty's Government will consider sympathetically ways of helping them over the transitional period.

6. Some ways of help would of course be easier than others. For example The West Indies could reasonably hope to get the unused balance of the current five years' block grant-in-aid and of their allocation under the Colonial Development and Welfare Act. Her Majesty's Government would also be prepared to provide a substantial share of expenditure required for rehabilitation in the event of a natural disaster. Other ways, involving something corresponding to the present forms of assistance over a longer period, would be much more difficult. If however it were clear at the time that there was still a shortfall, Her Majesty's Government would, in consultation with the United States and Canadian Governments, consider how it could be met, possibly with a tapering grant for a limited period. This would of course require Parliamentary approval and the amount and manner of any such assistance that might prove to be required could only be determined at the time.

Enclosure to 114

The West Indian Federation was established in January 1958 with independence and Dominion status as its avowed aim. It had long been clear that the small territories comprising the British West Indies could only advance towards independence in association; and in the years after 1945 their degree of political maturity made prolonged colonial status both unacceptable and undesirable. The Federation has suffered the teething troubles which seem to beset all new federations. There have been jealousies between the Federal and Unit governments, and between the Units themselves, while the domination and aloofness of Jamaica has provoked much resentment in the Eastern Caribbean. It was decided to give the Federal Government very limited powers and tightly restricted financial resources and this has made it hard for the Federal Government to make its mark. The result has been that the Federation has made slow progress to its goal of independence during the first two years. It is certainly in no condition now to take up the burden of sovereignty, and clearly a number of problems will have to be solved before it can be independent. There will have to be a considerable shift of taxing powers to the centre; a start, at least, on the introduction of Customs Union; time is needed for the organisation and training of a foreign service; and some additional defence forces will have to be established. Her Majesty's Government has always taken the line that they would not be justified in agreeing to independence until these "minimum conditions" are met. Political pressures have now begun to build up and the drive behind demands for independence has begun to have more urgency behind it than hitherto. Because of this the West Indians are now preparing to tackle these practical "minimum conditions" with determination. It must therefore be assumed that Her Majesty's Government will shortly be faced by a demand from the West Indies for independence. The advantages to the U.K. of granting this and the dangers of withholding it are detailed in paragraph 12 below. There are however serious financial implications in that the Federation would not be able to pay its way at least for the first few years.

2. As a dependent territory the Federation¹ has received considerable financial assistance from the United Kingdom. This is now running at the following annual rates:—

	£ millions
Colonial Development and Welfare	3.25
Grant-in-aid for the small islands who cannot balance their budget	1.75 ²
Ad hoc disaster relief (average last 5 years)	1.0
	<hr/> £6.0 millions

3. In addition to these direct subsidies to governments the West Indian sugar growers benefit to the extent of £600,000 per annum from their entitlement to Colonial Sugar Preference Certificates. The citrus and banana growers also benefit by the existence of price support schemes, financed by Colonial Development and Welfare funds. Prices for these products have for some time been high, and because of this no actual payments out of the schemes have had to be made. The high prices have been due in part to \$ discrimination, which has provided a further concealed supporting factor, and if as a result of present consideration \$ discrimination against these prod-

¹ "Federation" meaning Federal and Unit Governments taken together.
² 1/5th of amount provided for 5 years.

ucts comes to an end, there may be a sharp fall in price. It is difficult to estimate the call that may be made for U.K. assistance in this eventuality but it could well amount to as much as £1.5 million in a very bad year. An average future liability of £500,000 per annum over the next five years would probably be a reasonable estimate.

4. None of the forms of assistance set out in paragraphs 2 and 3 are given to other independent Commonwealth countries. Colonial Development and Welfare assistance has not previously been given to members of the Commonwealth on independence beyond allowing them to complete schemes already started or to spend allocations already made. There is no precedent for Grant-in-aid to an independent member of the Commonwealth. There would not be the same moral obligation to give such substantial assistance as in the past in respect of hurricanes and other disasters. It is difficult to see how the Colonial Sugar Preference Certificates could be justified, likewise the citrus and banana and price support schemes hitherto underwritten by Colonial Development and Welfare funds. Although however, it has always been the U.K.'s policy that political independence necessarily involves financial independence there have been occasions in the past when Her Majesty's Government has agreed to give financial assistance to an independent power. Sometimes there has been a strategic interest behind this as in the cases of Libya and Jordan, though in the latter case it has been found necessary to continue the subsidy after the original military reason has ceased to apply because we could not discontinue it without putting the stability of Jordan in hazard. We have given Malaya a considerable measure of defence assistance but this has been accounted an exceptional step due to her involvement in the Cold War. A more clear departure has been the case of Somaliland, which is grant-aided to the extent of about a third of its budget. This territory is overwhelmingly poor but at the same time there are fairly generally recognised special circumstances which make it necessary to give them independence prematurely. It has therefore been publicly stated that Her Majesty's Government would give "sympathetic consideration to the continuation of U.K. financial assistance within the limits of the amount at present being provided". But nowhere else has it been necessary to grant or promise independence to a territory which has not been financially self-sufficient. It is possible that in the case of Sierra Leone, likely to be independent in the next few years, there will have to be some exceptional treatment, though here again we have a strategic interest in Freetown.

5. At the same time as she loses the aid formerly received from the U.K., the Federation will have to meet additional financial burdens. Some of these will be "once for all" items, such as the cost of their independence ceremonies and the essential minimum subscription for membership of the I.M.F. and I.B.R.D. (approximately £0.8 millions). But apart from these there will unavoidably be the following additional *recurrent* burdens:—

	£.millions
diplomatic services	0.5
additional defence forces ³	0.6
membership of international organisations	.16
TOTAL	£1.26 million

³ She has at present one battalion but a second battalion is to be formed. A small navy will also have to be built up.

6. The total net worsening of the financial position of the Federation on recurrent account if all Her Majesty's Government's present forms of assistance cease is likely therefore to be in the neighbourhood of approximately £7 to £7½ millions a year. There will also be a further loss from the end of the sugar, citrus and banana arrangements. The total governmental revenues of the Federation including its units was [sic] estimated at £66 million in 1959. These revenues are unlikely to increase fast enough to bridge the gap resulting from the termination of United Kingdom aid. Taxation is already high and most expert opinion is that it cannot be further increased without adverse effect on overseas investment.

7. Apart from the assistance set out in Paragraphs 2 and 3 above, the Federation can expect, so long as it remains dependent, to receive development assistance through exchequer loans under the Colonial Development and Welfare Acts, and to benefit from the activities of the Colonial Development Corporation. The Exchequer loans arrangements are intended to provide loan finance to Colonial Territories who find difficulty in borrowing on the London market. No fixed allocation of the total sum available for this purpose (£100 million) has been made to individual territories, but it has been expected that the Federation as a whole might receive loans of about £8 million in the next three years. Over the last three years, the Colonial Development Corporation has invested an average/capital sum of £0.95 millions a year in the Federation. Apart from the completion of projects already initiated by the C.D.C., both these forms of assistance end at independence.

8. If we treat The West Indies as generously as we can but still on the basis of the precedents of what has been done for other emergent territories we can justify assistance after independence as follows:—

(a) *Colonial development and welfare.* Practice has varied somewhat and the decision in each case has been governed to some extent by the point in the period of the then Colonial Development and Welfare Act at which the territory became independent. The West Indies is likely to become independent somewhere towards the middle of the duration of the forthcoming Act. Her allocation for the period is £9 millions and it is estimated that a balance of about £3.5 millions will be carried over from the previous period giving a total sum of £12.5 millions. She is likely to have between £6–£7 millions still to her credit, which would not all be committed to specific schemes though it would certainly have been earmarked for the development programme of the Federal and Unit Governments. It would not be politically possible to do anything other than agree to make this sum over to the Federation at independence. Indeed if we did not do this the West Indian Governments would naturally make haste to embark on as many schemes as possible to get as much as possible of “their” money, with probable waste of resources and little saving to us as the outcome.

(b) *Technical assistance.* The United Kingdom is already providing this for other newly independent members of the Commonwealth and it will also be available to The West Indies. Ghana is receiving assistance of approximately £75,000 in the current year from this source and The West Indies might expect a somewhat larger annual sum.

(c) *Commonwealth assistance loans.* These loans were introduced at the Commonwealth Economic Conference in Montreal in 1958 and are intended to be available for Commonwealth countries for development purposes. Nigeria has

been promised a loan of £12 millions from this source and we could make a similar commitment for The West Indies though probably of a somewhat smaller sum. The loans bear interest at about the market rate and are usually for medium term periods (10–20 years). They could not in West Indian budgetary circumstances be used to finance other than revenue earning projects. For the purpose of this paper Commonwealth Assistance loans can be regarded as replacing Exchequer Loans when the Federation becomes independent.

(d) *Colonial preference sugar certificates*. Neither South Africa nor Australia, the only major sugar producers who are full members of the Commonwealth, receive this form of assistance. It is possible they will object if The West Indies continue to receive such preferential assistance. On the other hand they might agree that an immediate withdrawal of this arrangement would cause undue disturbance to the West Indian sugar industry. We might therefore be able to continue it at least for some years.

(e) *Disaster relief*. Because of its geographical position the Federation is peculiarly liable to very destructive hurricanes, earthquakes and, in addition, its towns have frequently been devastated by severe fires. Although no commitment could be made the United Kingdom should, we suggest, still be ready to consider *ad hoc* assistance if the Federation was sorely stricken by any such natural disaster, though we could not underwrite virtually the complete bill for repairs as has been our practice hitherto.

(f) *Defence*. We have already agreed to consider assistance for the capital cost of constructing barracks for the Federal Army. We are also considering the possibility of assisting the formation of a navy by the presentation of absolescent [sic] warships. Assistance of this kind is unlikely to total more than £1½–£2 million, which would be for capital and not recurrent purposes.

9. But even if we take all these steps, which are the most we can do without breaching our present principles governing forms of assistance to dependant [sic] and independent territories, the independent Federation will be in receipt of much less external assistance than at present. She will, of course, be eligible to raise loans on the London and other markets. Jamaica recently succeeded in raising a loan at New York. These sources of credit are unlikely to prove particularly easy to tap. Independence will itself tend to make West Indian stocks less attractive, and the proposed legislation to allow United Kingdom trustees to enter the equity market will reduce demand for public stocks as a whole. Apart from this, public borrowing cannot be regarded, granted the budgetary position of The West Indies, as an adequate substitute for grant assistance. International organisations, such as the I.D.A., can be expected to help, but their resources are small in comparison with the demands likely to be put upon them in coming years by other undeveloped countries. There is, indeed, something of a danger that the Federation may tend to fall between these two stools, being neither lush enough to attract a great amount of private capital, nor dramatically poor enough to coax soft loans or grants out of the international organisations. Compared with most tropical countries the Federation is relatively rich. Gross domestic product per head was £130 in 1958 compared with £22 in India (1957), £25 in Nigeria (1958) and £85 in Mauritius (1958). On the other hand The West Indies is a neighbour of much richer territories and it would be impossible for them to return to the standards of a subsistence economy.

10. This relatively high standard of living may indeed be something of an albatross round the necks of her leaders in the future, for while economic appraisal may show that she has in some sense less "objective" claim to priority in assistance compared to those countries whose economies teeter on the starvation level, this kind of criterion ignores the larger reality. Despite their colour, and aura of calypsos, the West Indians are a sophisticated Western people, who take their standards from North America and Europe. The problem her leaders have to face is not so much that of absolute dire poverty (though there are certainly large patches of this especially in the small islands) but the economic and social expectations of a population long accustomed to semi-European standards and attitudes. The premature withdrawal of the United Kingdom aid will almost certainly make it impossible to retain the standards achieved with the help of our assistance, and the rate of development will certainly slacken. The present level of aid has indeed barely averted decline in some of the smaller islands, and their future would be in real hazard.

11. The cumulative effect of a decline of social standards because of governmental impoverishment, together with a falling off in the rate of economic development, would almost certainly be disastrous. The democratic institutions now working so relatively maturely might not survive. The existing distrust and animosities between the units would grow and it would be very doubtful if the Federation would hang together in such circumstances. If it were to break up it would be in much greater danger of involvement with the nearby independent republics. Venezuela still has irredentist aspirations towards Trinidad. Cuba, Haiti and the Dominican Republic are unpredictable neighbours whose activities have even now to be watched in the Turks and Caicos Islands. The Federation is almost free of serious Communist activity at present but this could not be relied on if conditions worsened. Communism is a danger in nearby British Guiana and there is some evidence of Communist influence in Fidel Castro's [sic] government.

12. The United Kingdom has, of course, undoubtedly an interest as well as a moral obligation to ensure that independence is achieved only in conditions which make collapse unlikely. We would certainly be widely criticised if the Federation collapsed or got into serious difficulties because of the termination of U.K. aid. World opinion would not appreciate the argument that political independence necessarily involves the end of financial aid. It would be disadvantageous to attempt to defer independence for the Federation. The Federation is already so politically advanced that what power we have left can almost never be effectively exercised. On the other hand the nominal existence of that power makes it possible for local political leaders to explain away their failures by reference to our continued power. This gives us the worst of all worlds. In the eyes of the world we are still responsible, while in practice decisions are made locally. There are hardly any advantages to the U.K. in continuing sovereignty over the Federation; in particular there are no strategic reasons to hang on. At the same time, we have to support them with heavy subsidies. Even if it were necessary to give them substantial assistance as an independent country this would almost certainly be cheaper than at present, though we should have to weigh this against any repercussions of continuing to give the independent Federation forms of assistance hitherto only given to dependent territories. Finally there is the argument that unless Federation can successfully move into independence fairly soon there will be a danger that the larger territories, such as Jamaica and Trinidad, will grow impatient and as they, in any case, will have to carry the burden of the other small

Islands, they might in the end decide they would “better go it alone” and secede from the Federation. On the positive side, a successful Federation would continue to represent an achievement of British colonial policy and an example of successful multi-racialism, which would be valuable not only in Commonwealth Councils, but also in the wider international sphere. It would be particularly valuable for this to be created in a traditionally anti-colonial area, i.e. in close proximity to the United States and Latin America; and to have two independent members of the Commonwealth in the Western Hemisphere.

13. The conclusion which we draw from this analysis is that the Federation will have to be assisted after independence to a greater extent than the “normal” assistance set out in paragraph 8 above. It must however, be fully realised that this may involve a break with our present policy regarding financial assistance to independent members of the Commonwealth who are expected to be self-supporting political entities at least in regard to their budgetary finance. It could have repercussions in relation to other dependent territories since:—

- (a) those who are granted independence might use it as a precedent for claiming forms of assistance hitherto reserved for dependent territories;
- (b) in territories to which we are at present unwilling for other reasons to grant independence it would tend to undermine arguments based on the need for financial viability.

14. If the United Kingdom has no real alternative but to accept an element of contingent liability for the financial and economic stability of the Federation for some years after her independence, obviously this obligation must be reduced to the smallest extent consonant with its being effective and our assistance be framed in such a form that we can be sure it is a diminishing burden. Moreover, we should, if possible seek to associate others in sharing it. The needs of the Federal Government have to be looked at under two heads:—

- (a) the *budgetary difficulties* likely to arise immediately after independence;
- (b) the longer term need for *development finance* to expand her economy. The problem here is essentially a question of how to replace the present capital assistance given by C.D. & W. and other existing sources by some other form of assistance which, in view of the Federation’s probable inability to service any large additional volume of “hard” loans, would inevitably have to be in the form of “soft” loans or grants.

15. The most immediate financial strain will result from the cessation of Grant-in-Aid, C.D. & W., and the other forms of assistance set out in paragraph 2. The resultant gap cannot be closed immediately, or quickly from local resources. The Act of Parliament⁴ which authorised Her Majesty’s Government to pay the Federal Government an annual sum for the purpose of Grant-in-Aid to the small islands provided for a period of ten years but this Act will no longer be in force after independence. From a legal point of view, there is no reason whatsoever why we should continue such payments and, from the point of view of general policy, it would be most undesirable for us to do so. On the other hand we know that although

⁴ British Caribbean Federation Act 1956, section 3(b).

the Federal Government realises that there is no actual obligation on Her Majesty's Government to continue Grant-in-Aid after independence they believe they have a very strong moral claim to the outstanding balance of the £8.75 millions already negotiated for the first quinquennium of the 10 year period (1959–63); and probably a somewhat lesser but still arguable claim to the money they might have received during the second quinquennium (1964–8) due to be negotiated in 1963. It would be certainly possible to pay over the outstanding balance of the £8.75 millions already negotiated without forming an undesirable precedent. The amount involved would be about £2 millions if independence was attained in 1962.

16. This amount of budgetary assistance would almost certainly be inadequate and we believe that in addition a tapering grant for the remainder of the 10 year period will be necessary. This might start at a figure in the sixth year not far short of their present annual £1.75 million but it should be reduced yearly on a sharply sliding scale. The total period of this grant should not continue beyond the end of the period of grant-in-aid envisaged in the British Caribbean Federation Act, 1956, i.e. December, 1968. This arrangement would enable the Federation to assume gradually the obligation of financial self-sufficiency. A further advantage would be that an agreement to pay them a subsidy for a number of years would make it difficult for them to importune us while this agreement lasted, and that by the time it was ended they might to some extent have lost their present habit of looking to the U.K. for assistance, and found it possible to tap other sources of bounty, either international organisations or possibly the United States, as a *quid pro quo* for the continued use of bases. Precisely how the total of this grant should be calculated, and at what rate it should be disbursed, are questions which would have to be the subject of careful study. For political reasons and in order to deal with the unfolding situation it would be necessary to let The West Indians know well in advance of independence that we are prepared to give a measure of aid of this kind but we would be fully justified in refusing to discuss its quantum until a much later date probably not until quite close to independence and in the light of the then financial situation.

17. The proposal in the previous paragraph could make a substantial contribution to the financial problem but it would not (and is not designed to) cater for the provision of development funds, particularly soft loans and grants. This is a longer term problem. In order to minimise the burden on the U.K. and increase the funds available to The West Indies, we should attempt to associate the United States and Canada with this form of aid. This would certainly appeal to the West Indians and a recurrent theme in their political discussion over the last few years has been that there is a need for some kind of international plan to deal with their development problems. Mr. Manley, in particular, has strongly supported this suggestion. In the course of the 1956 London Conference (at which the final decisions leading to the establishment of the Federation were taken), we agreed to explore with the Americans and Canadians the possibility of some joint assistance arrangements. Our approaches at the time were not well received; but since then, the Canadians have given the Federation a gift of ten million Canadian dollars (£3.7 millions) and the U.S. have agreed a £160,000 programme of assistance through the I.C.A. Assistance to The West Indies has, therefore, developed bilaterally and not on a joint basis as originally hoped, and indeed requested, by The West Indians. We propose, however, to seek once again to associate the Americans and Canadians with the development

needs of the Federation; and it is suggested that an approach should be made to these Governments on the lines that the development assistance requirements of the Federation are considerable, for various reasons are unlikely to be met, and that we suggest that it would be in the interest of all of us to deal jointly with this problem. There is a fair chance that the Canadians would be ready to give their future assistance as part of a joint effort while the Americans, faced with the probability of serious difficulties over their occupation of their important bases in the Federation after independence, may be more ready than hitherto to devote money to such a purpose if they thought it could have the effect of doing something to secure their occupancy and yet be done without any suggestion that they would be having to pay some kind of rent for the bases. An opportunity to test American and Canadian reactions to this suggestion may arise at the time of the quadripartite discussion which we are to propose should be held between these governments, the Federal Government and ourselves on the problem of the effects of U.K. import liberalisation on West Indian exports. (It is not however proposed that the Federal Government should take part in these discussions as distinct from those on liberalisation). In the light of these discussions we shall also have to consider whether further price support schemes are necessary for West Indian exports of bananas and/or citrus, and whether they should be continued after independence.

115 T 220/941, ff 3–8

6 Jan 1960

[Aid to the West Indies after independence]: Treasury minutes by L Pliatzky¹ and A W Taylor² on the CO proposals³

... 3. At such short notice I have not attempted to form a judgment on the merits of the case but have addressed myself solely to the problem which would arise if a precedent on the lines of these proposals were set for aid to the independent Commonwealth. To the best of my knowledge the position about United Kingdom aid to other territories which have recently become or are about to become independent is as follows:—

Ghana received an ad hoc grant of £350,000, more or less in lieu of a carry-over of C.D. and W. assistance, and otherwise nothing so far.

*Malaya*⁴ has been given aid since independence in four forms:—

- (a) Carry-over of C.D. and W. allocation, about £4 million in total, spread over a period of years. See Item 6 of Table 1 of the Draft White Paper, and the note on this item.

¹ Assistant secretary, Treasury.

² Under-secretary, Treasury.

³ Both minutes are commenting on the proposals put to the Development Committee by the CO, see 114.

⁴ On the financial settlements with Ghana and Malaya at independence, see BDEEP series B, vol 1, Richard Rathbone, ed, *Ghana*, part II, chapt 9 and, in the same series, vol 3, A J Stockwell, ed, *Malaya*, part III, chapt 12.

(b) Military assistance, which is to continue for a few more years, subject to a fixed total limit. See Item 2 in Table 4 of the Draft White Paper and the note on it.

(c) Military assistance, for internal security, which is to come to an end in 1961. See Item 4 of the same table and the note on it.

(d) A Section 3 loan of £2¼ million for telephone equipment.

Nigeria is to have a Section 3 loan of £12 million on becoming independent, and there may be some small C.D. and W. carry-over.

Cyprus will certainly be given some aid after independence. The details are now being considered. Something more than a straight Commonwealth assistance loan is quite possible, but we hope that anything special will so far as possible take the form of, and be presented as, payments for services rendered or facilities provided under the Treaty with Cyprus.

4. It is true that the security assistance given to Malaya is regarded as being on the generous side, and thus concealing an element of special economic assistance, and the same may prove true in the case of Cyprus. Nevertheless it seems clear that the Colonial Office proposals, especially if the amounts were substantial, would involve an important new departure in the matter of straight-forward economic assistance to an independent Commonwealth country. This would clearly set a precedent for future cases of colonies achieving independence, and could react on questions of aid to Commonwealth countries already independent. Divisional responsibility for such expenditure lies with I.F. if it is from Votes, and probably the whole of what the Colonial Office envisage would have to come from Votes. But I.F. have brought us in on the basis that there is an O.F. interest, as well as a Committee interest, and from this point of view the desirable outcome for the time being would be:—

(a) That the Colonial Office should for the time being commit H.M.G. to nothing going beyond a C.D. and W. carry-over or the equivalent, and consideration of a Commonwealth assistance loan in whatever form may be appropriate under general policy when the time comes.

(b) Commissioning of a further and more general paper about future aid to newly-independent Commonwealth countries and the financial implications. This should bring out whether we have to anticipate merely a switch of disbursements from the Colonial Office to some other Department, or an addition to the total bill. It should also discuss the extent to which it is practicable to give newly-independent Commonwealth countries aid in forms which would not be extended to other existing members of the Commonwealth.

L.P.
6.1.60

We have persuaded the Colonial Office to agree that this question should be considered by the Development Policy Committee tomorrow, 7th January.

2. The Colonial Office will be circulating a paper, the gist of which will be that the West Indies Federation is at present benefitting very substantially from the various forms of help available to Colonial territories and that it would be politically and economically impracticable to discontinue this help as soon as the Federation becomes independent.

3. This special financial assistance is made up broadly as follows:—

Colonial Development and Welfare grants	£3¼ m. a year
Additional grants for the Budgets of the smaller islands	£1¼ m. „ „
“Disaster Relief” Grants (average)	£1 m. „ „
Colonial Sugar Preference Certificates	£600,000 „ „
Special arrangements for Citrus Fruits and bananas costing nothing at the moment, but potentially involving C.D.C.	£500,000 „ „ £1 m. „ „
Prospective loans under the recent extension of the Colonial Development & Welfare Acts (i.e. “Commonwealth Assistance Loans” under the procedure adopted for the Colonies)	about £8 m. over the next 3 years.

4. Any cut in these forms of assistance would come at a time when, as a result of independence, the Federation is incurring additional expenditure, put by the Colonial Office at about £800,000 non-recurrent, plus £1¼ m. a year.

5. The Colonial Office proposals are:—

- (a) An annual financial grant to the Federation after independence on a declining scale for 5 to 10 years, the amount to be negotiated later.
- (b) Assurances that the Federation will be eligible for Commonwealth Assistance Loans under the terms available to independent Commonwealth countries.
- (c) An approach to the United States and Canada to help in the provision of development funds on “soft loan or grant terms”.
- (d) Early and encouraging assurances to the West Indians to the effect that H.M.G. has decided, in principle, to make special arrangements.

5. [sic] Looking at these proposals individually:—

- (a) It is probably inevitable that there will be transitional grants to the Federation in some form, and the responsibility for keeping the period and amount of such grants within proper limits and for having regard to the precedents that will be created, rests primarily with I.F.
- (b) Prima facie, it is quite proper that, on becoming independent, the Federation should be entitled to apply for a Commonwealth Assistance Loan in the form of a credit under Section 3 of the Export Guarantees Act. On the other hand, they ought not to be given too much encouragement. The amount they are likely to expect will be embarrassingly large when compared (by tests of population, poverty, scope for economic development, position in the Cold War, etc.) with what we are able to do for other territories.
- (c) I see no objection to seeking the help of the United States and Canada on behalf of West Indian development, though we ought not to take the initiative in suggesting that such help might be given in the form of soft loans.

6. Viewed on broader lines, however, the proposals carry some unwelcome implications. We have been trying hitherto to maintain certain distinctions in our

financial policy between Colonies and independent countries. It is true that the distinction has become a bit fuzzy at the edges. The broad idea has been, however, that when a Colonial territory becomes independent it can no longer expect as a matter of course any of the grants, or other special aid, extended to the Colonies, but in return it can apply for credits under Section 3 of the Export Guarantees Act. In one sense it does not matter whether any particular territory receives a loan under the Colonial Development and Welfare Acts or under Section 3. The change means, however, an additional demand on the inadequate margin of funds available for lending to independent countries—India, Nigeria, Ghana, etc.—with no reduction in the overall figure which the Colonial Office have by statute at their disposal for loans to territories still remaining dependent. Where such a change is accompanied by the termination of colonial grants, we are (through the I.F. side) getting something in return. But, if the grants are to go on and in a round about way there is to be an effective addition to the allocation for lending to the Colonial Office's protégés, the Treasury is getting the worst of both worlds.

7. There is here an important general problem calling for fuller consideration—i.e. what transitional arrangements are required when Colonial territories become independent. The Colonial Office ought to avoid commitments meanwhile. I should have thought that on purely tactical grounds, it would be undesirable to begin passing encouraging messages to the West Indies at this early stage. In particular, we might try to dissuade the Colonial Office from the desire they are said to cherish to say something pretty definite to Mr. Manley on his visit here within the next week or so.

A.W.T.

6.1.60

116 CAB 134/1629, DP 2(60)1

7 Jan 1960

'Financial assistance to the West Indies Federation after independence': Cabinet (Official) Committee on Development Policy minutes¹ on the CO proposals² [Extract]

... In discussion, there was general agreement that Ministers must be able to offer some encouragement to Mr. Manley. But some doubts were expressed about the form our assistance to the Federation after independence should take and the extent to which we should be committed to it now. The following were the main points made:—

- (a) The continuance of grants to the West Indies after independence might create an awkward precedent, even though some assistance was likely to be given indirectly to Pakistan in connection with the Indus waters scheme. On the other hand, assistance for non-military purposes had already been given to Somaliland;

¹ The meeting was chaired by Sir D Rickett, 3rd secretary, Treasury, 1955–1960, and attended by officials from the Treasury, CO, CRO, FO, Board of Trade and the Bank of England.

² See 114; not printed here is that part of the minutes in which Gorell Barnes summarises the proposals put to the committee by the CO.

and the proposed assistance to the West Indies up to 1965 represented no increase on what had already been budgeted for. Assistance after 1965 might be regarded as a special case in view of the political problems involved. It might be possible to prevent existing independent members of the Commonwealth from using the precedent set by continued assistance to the West Indies to justify grants from the United Kingdom by presenting it as applicable only in the transitional stage immediately after independence.

(b) Assistance under the Colonial Development and Welfare Acts should be related to particular projects, perhaps by tying it to the new development plan which was likely to be prepared by the Federation after independence. In any case it might be preferable that our share of any assistance given jointly with the United States and Canada should be confined to the balance of the Colonial Development and Welfare Acts allocation. In addition, we should start negotiations with the West Indies from the position that any grants should be tapered from the date of independence, not from 1965.

(c) The United States and Canada might be willing to provide the West Indies with disaster relief when the need for this arose after independence.

(d) Since the Montreal Conference,³ when Commonwealth Assistance Loans had been inaugurated, there had been a considerable improvement in the economic position of the West Indies, who had been generously treated in the past. At the same time our own balance of payments position had deteriorated, and it was doubtful whether the recent increase in our rate of assistance to less developed countries could be maintained. So far as possible this assistance should be confined to commitments to Colonial territories and lending through international organisations. Independent members of the Commonwealth should not assume that they would qualify automatically for Commonwealth Assistance Loans, and the Treasury considered that Exchequer assistance to colonies in general should be reduced if Commonwealth Assistance Loans were made to newly independent countries. The Colonial Office reserved their position on this point.⁴

(e) Though it was desirable that the West Indies Federation should achieve independence quickly, because we would gain greater goodwill from this and might be able to reduce the burden on our economy, it was doubtful whether the proposed formula for use by Ministers in their discussions with Mr. Manley, which was set out in paragraphs 5 and 6 of D.P. (60) 4, was altogether appropriate, especially as there would be no more than a moral obligation on us to provide assistance after independence. Mr. Manley represented Jamaica, not the Federation, and we should be careful not to go too far in our discussions with him. In particular, we could not commit the United States and Canada to any particular

³ 1958 had been, in the words of a CO circular letter to colonial governors, an 'annus mirabilis'. For the first time for a century, the UK had a surplus on its visible trade account, and this enabled the reserves to be strengthened by as much as £284 million. This was the climate in which, at the Commonwealth Trade and Economic Conference in Montreal in Sept 1958, the UK announced its intention to introduce a new system of Exchequer loans to the colonies and Commonwealth Assistance Loans for independent Commonwealth countries. But 1959 witnessed a sharp down turn on both visible and invisible trade accounts. Imports increased by £275 million but exports by only £119 million. At the same time the overseas aid budget continued to rise, from £86 million in 1955–1957, to £95 million in 1958, to £130 million in 1959 (T 296/62, Gorell Barnes to colonial governors, 10 June 1960).

⁴ On CO-Treasury differences, see 117, note and 132, note 3.

form of assistance, and the reference to a tapering budgetary grant might be omitted.

The Chairman said that the Colonial Office, in consultation with the Treasury and the Commonwealth Relations Office, should re-draft the statement to Mr. Manley in accordance with the views expressed by the Committee. A note embodying the revised formula and bringing out the main points made in discussion should then be submitted to Ministers by the Departments concerned.

The Committee:—

(1) Invited the Colonial Office, in consultation with the Treasury and the Commonwealth Relations Office, to revise the formula, for use by Ministers in their talks with Mr. Manley, on the lines indicated in discussion.

(2) Instructed the Secretaries to prepare a note incorporating this formula, and taking account of the points made in discussion, for submission to Ministers by the Departments concerned.

117 T 220/941, pp 48–49

11 Jan 1960

'Financial assistance to the West Indies after independence': Treasury note on the proposed statement by CO ministers to Mr Manley

[Following discussion in the Development Policy Committee (see 116), a revised version of the CO note on financial assistance (see 114) was drawn up by the Treasury after consultation with the CO and CRO. The revised version is not reproduced here in its entirety, only that part on the proposed statement to Manley. In arriving at this formula, the Treasury and the CO continued to disagree about how the provision of a Commonwealth Assistance Loan to the West Indies would affect loan arrangements for the colonies more generally. Their disagreement was explained thus in the revised version of 114: 'The Treasury consider that if in the event the West Indies receive a Commonwealth Assistance Loan after early independence, the total amount devoted to Exchequer loans for the colonies generally should be reproduced by a corresponding sum; and that in general it would be wrong for the total originally envisaged to be distributed to a reduced number of colonies in spite of an increase in our liabilities for independent Commonwealth countries. The Colonial Office do not agree with this view and consider that the total available is in any case inadequate to meet the needs of the colonies' (T 220/941, p 39; also CAB 134/1630, DP(60)6, 11 Jan 1960).]

1. The West Indies on becoming independent will continue to be eligible for assistance from international bodies including the projected International Development Association when established (on the assumption that, as we hope, the West Indies join the International Monetary Fund, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the International Development Association). In addition, they will become eligible for Commonwealth assistance loans or any such system as may be generally in operation at the time, on the same footing as other less-developed independent members of the Commonwealth within the sterling area.

2. We realize that even so the West Indies may not be able to assume at once the whole weight of the financial burdens which would normally fall to an independent member of the Commonwealth. If this proves to be so, H.M.G. will consider ways of helping over a transitional period and will be ready to approach the United States and Canadian Governments (though, of course, we cannot speak for them) with a view to considering with them what assistance could be given.

3. The West Indies may be faced both with a budget problem and with a development problem.

4. As regards development, one contribution which H.M.G. might be expected to be willing to offer would be to continue to make available to the West Indies the substantial amount still likely to be unspent in their C.D. and W. allocation at the time of independence.

5. Again, as a contribution towards meeting immediate budget difficulties the West Indies could reasonably hope that H.M.G. would be willing to continue to make available the unused balance of the current 5 years bloc grant-in-aid and to consider some continuation of this grant-in-aid on a tapering basis for a further limited period. The outside limit in time would have to be the 10 year period mentioned in the British Caribbean Federation Act and we would hope that this form of assistance would cease to be necessary in a shorter time than this.

6. Any proposal to continue to make available the unspent balance of the C.D. and W. allocation or to provide grant aid after independence would require Parliamentary approval.

118 CO 1031/3264, no 18

16 Jan 1960

[Jamaica and federation]: joint memorandum by the CO and a delegation from the Jamaican government summarising talks on federal matters in London

The Premier and Minister of Finance¹ of Jamaica, accompanied by officials, visited London between 9th and 16th January, 1960 for discussions with the Secretary of State and officials of the Colonial Office. The object of the Jamaican Delegation's visit was to discuss the special problems of Jamaica in relation to Federation and certain other problems arising from the approach of the Federation to independence. The visit was undertaken with the knowledge and concurrence of the Federal Government and the opportunity was also taken by the Jamaican Delegation to assemble data for those portions of the work of the Inter-Governmental Committees which had been assigned as their task. Certain matters of purely Jamaican concern were also discussed during the visit.

Statement by the Jamaican delegation

2. The Jamaican Delegation explained the nature of the Federal problem in relation to Jamaica as follows:—

It was only at the West Indian level, between the Unit Governments of The West Indies and the Federal Government, that the basic problem which concerns the character and structure of the Federation, after it achieves independence, could be resolved.

It was well to bear in mind that Federation started on the basis that for the first four years, or so, policy should be devoted to the building up of the idea of Federation and West Indian nationhood, and to an examination of the practical problems involved in working together. A beginning would also be made with the fundamental matter of Customs Union. However, no sooner had the Federal Government been

¹ V L Arnett.

constituted than there arose a demand for an immediate review of the Constitution, with the object of achieving Dominion status as early as possible.

It was this demand which led to the early calling of a Conference of the Units of the Federal Government for deciding on the changes needed in the Federal Constitution to achieve independence, before a beginning had been made with such fundamental problems as Customs Union, or before any significant contribution had been made to the development of the idea of Federation and West Indian nationhood.

In the meanwhile, important events had been taking place in some of the Units, and in particular tremendous changes had taken place in Jamaica since the beginning of 1955. Jamaica has embarked on a long term economic policy, designed to modernize her economy and to tackle the enormous problems of unemployment (greater in Jamaica by far than in any other territory), and social need, which are involved. This policy is to a large extent summarized in a ten-year plan of development and the institution on every level of national life of the things which were required for the putting of this plan into effect. The development of the necessary institutions, the evolution of economic and fiscal policies, were all geared for the effective implementation of this long range programme, which had put a maximum strain on the country's internal resources and its capacity to borrow in the world markets. The Jamaica Government was very strongly of the view that any policy which would cause a disruption of this programme would have disastrous consequences, not only for Jamaica itself but also for the Federation. In fact, it would be impossible for Jamaica to continue in this situation in the Federation, and indeed it would be wrong to launch an independent Federation on such a basis as might lead to its own destruction by disrupting Jamaica's economy.

It was in these circumstances that two diametrically opposed views on the future character and structure of the Federation, conceived as a Dominion, have emerged.

On the one hand there is the view put forward by Trinidad that full control over the economy of the entire Federal area should be vested in the centre, on the Nigerian pattern; this view asserts that only a powerful and centrally directed economic coordination and interdependence can meet the needs of The West Indies at this time.

On the other hand, there is the Jamaican view that the Federation should start with the minimum powers needed to gain recognition as an independent political entity, acceptable to international agencies, such as the United Nations and the International Bank, and more particularly acceptable to the Commonwealth. Such a Federation would have built into the Constitution, machinery to enable it to grow, so that it could expand as convenience and necessity dictates, and as regards some Units, take over the administration of special services where it can be demonstrated that such administration can be carried out more efficiently and economically, and the Units concerned so agreed.

The principal purpose of the visit to London was to examine the requirements that must be fulfilled by the Federal Government claiming to be recognised as an independent political entity in the Commonwealth. In addition to this purpose of fact-finding, the Jamaica Delegation wanted to make it clear that Jamaica's policy was to use every honest endeavour to reach agreement with the Federation and other Units as to the nature of the Constitution which should be in force after independence, but that, in no circumstances, would it agree to enter an

independent Federation with large central powers of direction over the general economic development of Jamaica, and with the power to disrupt the Jamaican policy for economic development.

It was the Premier's view that no country in the Colonial Empire was more fit for independence than The West Indies, on the basis of any of the tests which could be applied, and in the event of failure to reach agreement Jamaica could therefore be no party to holding back the demands of The West Indies for independence. If, however, it was impossible to reach agreement on the character and structure of an independent Federation, Jamaica would insist on withdrawing from the Federation and would seek independence as a Dominion on her own, leaving Trinidad and the other islands free to form a smaller, but perfectly logical and viable Federation by themselves.

The Jamaica Delegation further undertook that in these circumstances they would at once seek, by negotiation, agreement and treaty, to preserve all the levels of common action, and all the common institutional activities now existing or that might hereafter be desirable for The West Indies as a whole. It was the view of the Jamaica Delegation that quite apart from political federation, it has been proved that the West Indies can, and must, work together on many levels.

In this connection, it was emphasised that both British Guiana and British Honduras have found it necessary to continue to be associated with the rest of The West Indies, and it was impossible to conceive of a West Indian future without that association continuing, bearing in mind, however, that that association does not depend upon, and indeed it does not need, to be backed up by the existence of a political Federation as such.

Questions arising

3. The Jamaica delegation therefore posed two questions on which they sought the views of Her Majesty's Government:—

(A) What were the minimum powers and capabilities which the Federal Government of The West Indies should have in order to satisfy the requirements of effective sovereignty and achieve membership of the Commonwealth?

(B) What in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government were the financial implications of independence for the Federation?

Essential attributes of sovereignty

4. A clear distinction was drawn in discussion between the powers which it might be thought desirable for the Federal Government to possess and the minimum powers which it must possess to qualify for independent membership of the Commonwealth. Her Majesty's Government naturally had their own views as to the range of powers and distribution of Federal resources between the Federation and its Units which were likely to prove most suitable in the circumstances of The West Indies. It was however for West Indian Governments themselves to determine these. Before Her Majesty's Government could sponsor the Federation for independent membership of the Commonwealth they would however have to be satisfied that the Federal Government possessed at least the minimum powers necessary to sustain sovereignty.

5. These, in the view of Her Majesty's Government, could be defined as:—

- (i) the possession of a defence force capable of keeping the peace within the Federation's boundaries and posing at least a deterrent to any minor incursion by an outside aggressor;
- (ii) a diplomatic organisation capable of maintaining the external relations of the Federation with the United Nations and the more important friendly and neighbouring countries, especially of course the Commonwealth;
- (iii) an effective central administration capable of executing the policy of the Federal Government within the field of activity given it by the constitution;
- (iv) adequate financial resources, based on independent taxing and loan raising powers, sufficient to enable it to finance its own recurrent expenditure and obligations as those develop;
- (v) a start with a workable programme for a Customs Union;
- (vi) central control of the currency;
- (vii) Freedom of Movement of peoples within its boundaries;
- (viii) the constitutional right and ability to negotiate and implement international treaties and agreements in the principal fields in which sovereign states normally negotiate with one another. These include the regulation of overseas trade; tariffs and other restraints on trade such as quantitative restrictions; commodity agreements; arrangements whereby the Federation would receive economic and financial assistance from international agencies including the I.M.F. and I.B.R.D.; postal matters, shipping, civil aviation and telecommunications; and double taxation agreements.

Financial and economic implications of independence

6. As a dependent territory the Federation (meaning Federal and Unit Governments taken together) was now receiving financial assistance from the United Kingdom at the following annual rates:—

	£ million
(a) Colonial Development and Welfare (including carry over funds and allocations from central funds.)	3.25
(b) Grant-in-aid for the small islands who cannot balance their budget	1.75
(c) Ad hoc disaster relief (average last 5 years)	1.0
	<hr/> £6.0 million

The grants shown at item (b) above are paid under the British Caribbean Federation Act, 1956, which makes provision for a period of ten years if the Federation remains as a colony, but this Act will cease to be in force after independence. A total of £8.75 million has been negotiated for payment under these arrangements over the five years 1959–63, but no amount has yet been negotiated for the subsequent five years.

7. The Federation could also expect, so long as it remains dependent, to receive development assistance through Exchequer loans (under the Colonial Development and Welfare Acts) which are intended to provide loan finance to Colonial Territories who find difficulty in borrowing on the London market.

8. In addition to these forms of direct assistance to governments the West Indian sugar growers benefited to the extent of £600,000 per annum from their entitlement to Colonial Sugar Preference Certificates. The citrus and banana growers also benefited by the existence of price support schemes, financed by Colonial Development and Welfare funds; no actual payments under these schemes have had to be made so far, but they might become necessary in the future.

9. Her Majesty's Government expected that it would be possible to continue the increased preferences that had been introduced in the United Kingdom for the benefit of colonial territories on bananas and lime oil, and that which it was hoped to negotiate for fresh grapefruit, though there was no precedent either way for such a situation in the G.A.T.T. The possibility of any future preferences being negotiated under the colonial waiver would however cease on independence. Her Majesty's Government undertook to examine the questions which would arise with regard to the timing of quota restrictions on dollar imports competing with West Indies products, and to inform West Indian Governments of this position.

10. The Secretary of State had been informed that the Jamaican section of the official Working Party set up by one of the Intergovernmental Committees had been charged with the task of enquiring what forms of financial assistance the Federation might expect from Her Majesty's Government after independence. He took the occasion of the presence at the talks of the officials concerned to make the following statement. . . .²

11. The Jamaican Delegation, in taking note of this statement for the purposes of the Working Party, emphasised that they were not, as a delegation, seeking to deal with this question. This would be for the Federal Government to pursue in due course. The delegation, however, recorded the view that there was an obligation on Her Majesty's Government to continue the Grant-in-Aid payments for the remainder of the ten-year period specified in the British Caribbean Federation Act. The commitment entered into at that time by Her Majesty's Government was not in any way conditional on continued dependent status. It was rather the recognition of a hard economic fact which was that the area did not yet have enough resources to take over this responsibility and was unlikely to be able to remedy this deficiency for some years. The Jamaican Delegation also considered that there would be need for a further measure of special assistance to the Federal Government to enable it to fulfil its obligations and responsibilities for the first few years of independence.

12. The Secretary of State explained that Her Majesty's Government did not intend to allow the Federation to begin as an independent state without the means to avoid any danger of collapse. On the other hand it was not possible to measure what the Federation's financial position would be until much closer to the time of independence, and in the light of the financial arrangements then subsisting between the Federal and Unit Governments.

² Not printed here is that section of the memo which repeats the formula on financial aid, see 117.

119 CO 1031/3264, no 19

19 Jan 1960

'Consequences of Jamaican secession': CO note of a discussion with the Jamaican delegation in London

1. The Jamaica Delegation sought a frank expression of view from H.M.G. as to what might take place in regard to H.M.G. itself, the Commonwealth and International bodies, if after the Inter-Governmental Conference Jamaica found it impossible to continue within the Federation.

2. H.M.G. explained that in their view international conditions and the circumstances relating to membership of the Commonwealth made it necessary for sovereign states to be of and have a reasonable size, population and resources. Jamaica by itself was perhaps in a marginal position in this respect but in addition other aspects of the situation in The West Indies must be borne in mind.

3. A decision by Jamaica to leave the Federation would be a severe disappointment to all those who had hoped that its formation would result in The West Indies coming forward to take its proper place as both an independent nation and member of the Commonwealth.

4. H.M.G. could not, of course, anticipate what the attitude of the other members of the Commonwealth would be to a proposal that Jamaica should be admitted into full membership but the concern of those members at the break up of the Federation was a factor to be taken into account.

5. Furthermore in considering the admission of Jamaica, the other members of the Commonwealth would be bound to ask whether this foreshadowed a series of applications for membership from the smaller states whether within or outside the West Indies, and the progressive dilution of the effectiveness of intra Commonwealth consultations.

6. The Jamaica Delegation stated that Jamaica would be prepared to face whatever difficulties might then exist and was satisfied that it was accepted that no threat, undue pressure or punitive action was contemplated. It repeated its assurance that every honest effort would be made to reach agreement with the Federation and the other Units.

120 CO 1031/4270, no 6, enclosure

3 Mar 1960

[Antigua]: CO record of a meeting between A R Thomas and Mr Bird and I G Turbutt¹

Mr. Bird opened by referring to the difference of view between Jamaica and Trinidad, as to what should be the scope of the powers of the Federal Government. He feared there were elements in Trinidad who would not be sorry to see a worsening of this conflict leading to Jamaican secession. He wished, however, to point out that Antigua had only agreed to enter the Federation because it knew Jamaica would also be a member. In the present Federation Jamaica acted as a balance to Trinidad. Furthermore, the ways and habits of thought of the people of Antigua were much more similar to those of Jamaicans than to those of Trinidadians. It was, in fact,

¹ Administrator of Antigua.

widely felt in Antigua that their ways were very different from those of Trinidad. This feeling was not a new one but of long standing. Because of all this Antigua would not wish to be compelled to remain in any Federation from which Jamaica had seceded. Such a Federation would inevitably be dominated by Trinidad and this would be inimical to Antigua's economic interests. Some years ago the Trinidad Economic Mission had urged that Antigua should abandon sugar and other industrial efforts and concentrate instead on cattle rearing for supplying the larger islands. It was also the Trinidad view that Coolidge Field² should not be regarded as an international airport but should be served by feeder services linking to the international routes at Piarco. These views showed what would be the fate of Antigua in a Federation controlled by Trinidad. If Jamaica were to secede, there would be no effective barrier to a near-unitary state of the kind advocated by Trinidad. Antigua would not accept this. Another point influencing Antigua is the growing similarity of certain communal conditions in Trinidad to the situation in places like Fiji where special measures have to be adopted to protect the people of that Colony; this was true also in Mauritius and to an extent in British Guiana. Without the balancing effect of Jamaica, Antigua fears before long that the same state of affairs as in Fiji would exist in Trinidad and that Trinidad would then wish that same pattern to be followed throughout the Federation. Antigua would instead prefer to be associated with Jamaica. In reply to a question from Mr. Thomas, *Mr. Bird* said that he would not welcome the admission of British Guiana to the Federation as he did not consider it to be in the interest of the West Indies even if Jamaica remained a member. On the other hand, a Federation without Jamaica but with the addition of British Guiana would be totally unacceptable to Antigua. Further he did not believe that British Guiana is in fact desirous of entering the Federation.

Mr. Bird said he was pleased by the agreement of the Inter-Governmental Committees regarding the question of further representation in the Federal Parliament. He thought agreement would be reached on a form of customs union and also on the question of what independent taxing power should be given to the Federal Government. He believed that the right solution of this was to give the Federation a percentage of the Customs duties, this percentage being subject to periodic review. He sympathised with Jamaica's determination to keep industrial development in her own hands. Unlike some of the small Units who seemed eager to share in the revenues of the richer territories, Antigua agreed that income tax should not become a federal responsibility.

Mr. Bird said that Antigua supports the form of Federal Constitution as envisaged by Jamaica and insists upon equality of constitutional status for all units as originally agreed upon when entering the Federation.

Mr. Thomas thanked *Mr. Bird* and *Mr. Turbott* for their frank expression of opinion. It was now in the hands of West Indians themselves to determine the precise form they wished the Federation to take. It was not for H.M.G. to intervene in this debate except in order to be satisfied that the Federal Government was going to have adequate powers to assume effective sovereignty. The points made by *Mr. Bird* would, however, be brought to the attention of Ministers.

² Coolidge Field in Antigua was an airfield built by the US army airforce as a military airfield in 1942. A civilian airfield in 1960, it was used mainly by Pan American, British West Indian Airways and Air France with direct services to other West Indian islands and to the US.

121 DO 35/8061, no 105

7 Mar 1960

'Prospects for federation': despatch no 96 from R G C Smith¹ to Canadian Ministry of External Affairs, Ottawa

After my return from a most informative trip to Jamaica and after discussing the progress of the committees that have been working in Port of Spain on the various aspects of Federation, I am more than ever confident that Manley has no intention of taking Jamaica out of the Federation unless he is driven to it by the intransigence of Trinidad and unless he is convinced that the other small islands are unalterably anti-Jamaica. Unfortunately, I was not able to see Manley himself since he was in Trinidad attending the Regional Council of Ministers. However, I did see a number of Cabinet Ministers, including [Vernon] Arnett, Minister of Finance; Wills O. Isaacs, Minister of Trade and Industry; Keeble Munn, Minister of Agriculture; and Jonathan Grant, Minister of Labour. I also saw Bustamante, the redoubtable Leader of the Opposition; and Sangster, his heir-apparent and former Minister of Finance. Of the officials, Brown, the Head of the Planning Unit, and Richardson, the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Finance, were most helpful. On the civilian side I saw Sealy, Editor of the *Gleaner*, Abrahams, Editor of the *Jamaican Economist*, and Sir Robert Kirkwood of the Jamaica Sugar Producers' Association. I also called on the Governor and his Chief Secretary, Mr. Lawrence Lindo who, until recently, was Administrator in Dominica. From this wide coverage I was able to obtain a much clearer conception of what I believe is Mr. Manley's intention with regard to Jamaica's future role in the Federation.

2. I was particularly struck with the number of people in Jamaica who suggested that Manley's ultimate objective was a Federation not far different from the strong centralized government visualized by Dr. Williams of Trinidad. However, this is not to say that Manley is prepared to back Dr. Williams' demands for this kind of Federation now. He is, on the contrary, looking to a loose Federation to begin with that will gradually accumulate power as it puts on weight and experience. It is possible that he visualizes the ultimate objective being as far off as fifty years. He argues that there are historical precedents for Federation starting out in this way and gradually accumulating power as it grows older. In suggesting that that is Manley's ultimate objective it should be clearly understood that this in no way diminishes his uncompromising opposition to a strong Federation in the early stages of its life.

3. When Manley went to the United Kingdom his objective seems to have been to find out from the United Kingdom how loose a Federation would be accepted in the Family of Nations as making up an independent nation. In his report to the House of Representatives in Jamaica at the end of February he is said to have reached agreement with London on the following eight essential points:—

- (1) The possession of a defence force capable of keeping the peace within the boundaries of the Federation and imposing at least a deterrent on any minor incursion by an outside aggressor.
- (2) A diplomatic organization capable of maintaining the external relations of the Federation with the United Nations, the more important friendly neighbouring countries and especially with the Commonwealth.

¹ See 90.

(3) An effective central administration capable of executing the policy of the Federal Government within the fields of activities given to it by the Constitution.

(4) Adequate financial resources based on independent taxing and loan-raising powers sufficient to enable it to finance its own expenditure and obligations as these develop.

(5) A workable programme for a customs union.

(6) Central control of currency.

(7) The freedom of movement of its peoples within the Federation's boundaries.

(8) The constitutional right and ability to negotiate and implement international treaties and agreements in the main fields in which sovereign states normally negotiate with one another.

These latter include arrangements whereby the Federation would receive economic and financial assistance.

With these he is entirely satisfied.

4. He also seems to have wanted to satisfy himself that the Colonial Office was not ganging up with Trinidad and the eastern islands against Jamaica. It seems as if he has resented bitterly the apparent grouping of the rest of the Federation against Jamaica and to have suspected that the Colonial Office was aiding and abetting such a union. Apparently he came away from London convinced that there was no such support by the Colonial Office for any such plot against his Jamaica.

5. I suppose that one can say that Manley has three basic objectives that he must achieve as the conditions for continuing to support Federation:—

(1) Representation by population, which he has already achieved to all intents and purposes.

(2) A gradual approach to customs union, taking into account the necessity for recognizing the need for protection of Jamaica's nascent industrialization. (As I shall explain later, there would appear to be a more than even chance that a solution to this problem will be found.)

(3) That most taxation should remain the exclusive prerogative of the units. (Again, there is at least a hope that this will be achieved.)

6. I have not listed a gradual approach to Dominion Status as one of the objectives since this is implicit in the working out of the second and third conditions I have mentioned above. Perhaps one should add to these three basics the fact that Manley will not accept the Trinidad proposal for Dominion Status now and Constitution later.

Customs union

7. Jamaica's fears of customs union logically appear to be unjustified. It has always seemed to me that Jamaica stands to gain most from customs union, if they will accept the fact that such a union will provide a breath of competition, to which, it may be admitted, the Jamaican industry might be peculiarly vulnerable. Moreover, big business in Jamaica, which has waxed sleek and rich in the hothouse climate of almost unbridled protection has been unalterably opposed to allowing draughts to wither or weaken their hothouse plants. It is probable that people like Arnett and his officials are well aware of the danger of continuing to build up Jamaican industry in such an enervating climate. They argue, however, that there are certain special considerations that apply to Jamaica and that tend to nullify the

more conventional types of protectionism. For example, nearly all of the big merchants in Jamaica control both the import and the retail trade. They know that at this point in history the Jamaican public tends to regard Jamaican-made products as of inferior workmanship. They believe, therefore, that these merchants will always advise their foreign connections of the prices being quoted by Jamaican manufacturers and use this information to obtain minor price concessions from foreign manufacturers that will be sufficient for them to under-cut the Jamaican manufacturer.

8. In short, these more liberal-minded members of the Jamaican Government are prepared to risk the consequences of over-protected industry in order to sustain and build up a Jamaican manufacturing industry.

9. On the other side of the fence remains the super-protectionists such as Wills O. Isaacs who is not concerned with economics and not much concerned with the future. He has a powerful political following and is obsessed with the idea that unless he provides jobs for Jamaicans through industry, no matter how inefficient that industry may be, he cannot justify his existence. Isaacs goes so far as to say without qualification that Jamaica will have nothing to do with customs union and that at the end of the five-year period Jamaica will pull out of the Federation. It does not appear to worry him that when he makes such statements he is clearly going against the policies of his leader. (As an aside, I might also say that Grant, the Minister of Labour, and Keeble Munn, the Minister of Agriculture, are similarly opposed to Federation.) It is interesting to find that a man like Munn, who is intelligent and who, by the way, served in the Canadian Forces during the War, should not be more scrupulous in following the party line.

10. In trying to work out a policy for customs union, therefore, Manley must keep in mind that he is heading a basically anti-Federation and anti-customs union party. He can count on the support of few of his senior Ministers. Glasspole, Minister of Education, will support him and, of course, Arnett. [W M] Seivwright, the former Minister of Agriculture and now Minister of Public Works will also support Manley but he is not generally regarded as a particularly powerful influence.

11. In the face of this, Manley and Arnett have sent their teams to the committees² working on this problem with a fairly inflexible proposal. Arnett admitted that the Jamaican proposal provided for full customs union at the end of ten years but that they might settle for a period of seven years. At the last meeting of the committee dealing with this question, which has just concluded its session in Port of Spain, the Jamaican delegation agreed to recommend to Cabinet a formula that will provide for customs union on a great majority of the items that are not large revenue earners or that do not directly compete with local industry, within two years. Thus, items that are large revenue earners but which still do not compete directly with local industry, would be brought into the scheme within another three years. Finally, those items which are regarded as threatening local industry would be introduced in another four years. Thus, there would be complete customs union in nine years. We do not know how the Jamaican Cabinet will accept this formula but both Richardson and Brown, the two members from Jamaica on the committee exercise considerable influence on their Ministers and in the Cabinet.

²ie the committees appointed by the Trinidad constitutional review conference in Sept 1959, see 107, note 9.

12. In addition, Jamaica has agreed to the principle that a Federal Government no matter how weak, must have the right to bargain for the territory as a whole and consequently to amend rates of duty for the customs union.

Taxation

13. The Jamaicans will not agree that at this time income tax should be surrendered to the Federal Government. They recognize, however, that a Federal Government must have a source of revenue other than the levies now provided for under the Constitution. They have therefore agreed that the customs revenues should be surrendered to the centre to the extent that they are necessary to meet the functions that the central government will exercise.

General

14. It is interesting to note that Manley has agreed to these concessions in the face of what he regards as continued provocation from the islands and, particularly, from Trinidad. There is no doubt that he resents bitterly the attacks by Dr. Williams, whom he still regards as his pupil. He is particularly resentful of the ridicule that Dr. Williams is so fond of aiming at him and others in the Federation in his performances at the "University" of Woodford Square. The little Doctor seems to be particularly adept at antagonizing those from whom he should be looking for support. In a clumsy attempt to bypass the Government of Jamaica he published in the Jamaica *Gleaner* a summary of his efforts in Woodford Square when he suggested that Jamaica was being too emotional over the question of Federation and not sufficiently trustful of its partners. Apart from the fact that the printed version of his speech did not include the asides and innuendoes which are the particularly irritating features of any speech made by the little Doctor, Manley undoubtedly resented this invasion of Jamaican politics by trying to get at the public through the use of the press.

15. Moreover, Manley is also reported to be furious at the decision to establish an agricultural school and subsequently an engineering school of the University College of the West Indies, in Trinidad. Here again the Jamaicans tend to see the University as a personification of the ganging up of the other islands against Jamaica. The new principal of the U.C.W.I. is a St. Lucian and the registrar is a Barbadian. Now, Trinidad is to receive two of the new and important schools of the University. This is resented, particularly since the decision to establish these schools in Trinidad followed on the offer of a heavy financial contribution by Trinidad to the U.C.W.I. Although this was made without strings, it is generally believed that the Trinidad contribution was made on the supposition that these two schools would be set up in Trinidad.

16. I have discussed in this despatch the attitude of Jamaica towards these problems. I do not mean to imply that all the Federation needs is for Jamaica to agree to a policy for it to be acceptable to the others. Such a course is very far from the case. However, the Jamaicans have been working hard and intelligently and appear to have convinced most of the small islands, if not Barbados and Trinidad, that their approach to these problems is not only fair but logical. The small islands tended, at the start of this controversy, to back Trinidad's point of view without much thought as to the effects of customs union, Dominion Status now, etc. The Ministers and officials that the small islands have sent to these meetings have been educated to a surprising extent with the result that Trinidad may find itself virtually in isolation

when the plenary constitutional review conference meets. (It is unlikely that the committee's work will be finished by March 31st and it is doubtful if the plenary session will now be convened before May.)

17. The Trinidad officials appear to have cooperated well in the committees and recently Dr. Williams has remained surprisingly silent and in the wings. Indeed, he is seldom seen in public and one can hardly help but wonder what surprises he is "cooking up" in his fertile brain. We have heard nothing more recently about Dominion Status on April 22nd and there is no doubt that this date will come and go before the plenary session has been able to consider the reports of its committees on this question.

18. It may be that Dr. Williams' silence and general withdrawal from the battle is nothing more than his preoccupation with his budget, but I do not think that there is much doubt that if the plenary session runs into difficulties it will be because of Trinidad rather than of Jamaica. Certainly Dr. Williams has gone out on a limb to the point where it would be difficult for any normal person to climb back safely and without losing dignity and prestige. We have seen enough of his method of working, however, to know that this is precisely the sort of operation at which he is particularly clever. The Jamaicans seem to feel that the committees will have worked out so much evidence in support of the gradual approach to these problems that Dr. Williams will have no alternative but to agree.

19. I cannot find any suggestion that Manley has any firm ideas for the timing of Dominion Status. I rather imagine that once the questions of representation, customs union and taxation are decided Jamaica and the other islands will then take into account the various problems that independence will present to them—economic and political—and set about trying to make the necessary adjustments with the United Kingdom that will enable them to bring Dominion Status to the Federation as soon as possible. I am sure that Manley, and others of a conservative turn of mind, must be well aware of the danger of holding off too long, even though there may be good economic reasons for doing so.

20. As a matter of interest I have obtained a copy of the Report on the Ministerial Working Party of Ministers that agreed on the formula for representation by population. You might like to have a copy of this for your files and it is attached.³

³ Not printed.

122 CO 1031/3505, no 19

28 Mar 1960

[US financial assistance]: CO record of a meeting with I White¹ on the question of US financial assistance to the federation [Extract]

... 15. *Mr. Gorell Barnes* set out the future economic problems of The West Indies as now seen by H.M.G. There would be both a budgetary and a development aspect and the financial gap to be covered would be larger than the U.K. was likely to be able to deal with single-handed. We had had in mind to suggest to the U.S. and Canadian

¹ Ivan Bertis White, US deputy assistant secretary of state for European affairs, 1959–1962. White represented the US in the negotiations over bases and it was envisaged that he would be appointed US ambassador to the West Indies Federation when it achieved independence.

Governments that we should examine this problem together, and the Canadian Government had asked to be informed of the outcome of the present talk. Any multi-lateral aid which it might be agreed to provide would presumably have to be on the basis that the budgetary deficit would be solved by The West Indies within a reasonably short time.

16. *Mr. White* said that the region was viable in the long run. It was not starting from scratch. His Government hoped that the U.K.'s development programme would continue. They were, however, anxious lest the appurtenances of sovereignty, particularly in the field of defence, which could make almost limitless demands, should consume a disproportionate share of the Federation's resources.

17. *Mr. Marnham* explained that it had always been intended to provide a two battalion land force of which one battalion had already been formed. It had now become accepted that they would also need a small Navy to patrol their waters and ferry troops. This would be very small consisting of minesweepers or similar craft. We had never expected they would provide more than a trip-wire defence force, and we had in mind a U.K.-West Indies Defence Agreement which would safeguard them and at the same time give us the continued use of facilities needed for our continuing commitments in the non-federated territories. *Mr. White* said it would be interesting to know if the Federation intended to join the Organisation of American States, and assume the complicated defence applications of membership of that body.

18. *Mr. Gorell Barnes* asked what economic assistance the Americans might give. *Mr. White* said it would be supplementary to what the U.K. gave and on the same lines as now. For reasons of Congressional control it could only be given from year to year: no longer-term commitments would be possible. *Mr. Gorell Barnes* said it should not be assumed that it would be easier to get money out of the U.K. Parliament than out of Congress; in this respect both of us were in the same position. He asked, however, whether it would help *Mr. White* if we were to send him a Note on the emerging West Indian financial problem. *Mr. White* said that it would, particularly if it could indicate what our plans were for future aid. The U.K. had a long tradition of association with The West Indies and had considerable achievements in recent years. His Government hoped we would continue our efforts in this direction, while they would be glad to assist in a supplementary role. *Mr. Gorell Barnes* said we should certainly play our part but that it would be wrong to assume that we would be able to continue help after independence on the present scale. *Mr. White* said his Government did not want to give budgetary assistance. *Mr. Marnham* said that the budgetary problem was probably soluble in the long term if political decisions led to the re-mobilisation of the resources of the Federation. We, however, were certainly in for difficult negotiations in the period leading up to independence. *Mr. Gorell Barnes* asked if further U.S./U.K. discussions on this matter could usefully proceed. *Mr. White* thought that they could if carried out unostentatiously. . . .

123 CO 1031/3521, no 21

[Mar 1960]

'Colombo Plan for the Caribbean': CO note for Sir J Martin

At a special session of the West Indian Conference in 1959, held under the auspices of the Caribbean Commission, a resolution was passed recommending that "the

Council of the Caribbean Organisation (when it is established) consider . . . ways and means of developing for the Caribbean area a plan similar to the Colombo Plan". The moving spirit in getting this resolution adopted was Dr. La Corbiniere, the Deputy Prime Minister of the Federation. He reverted to the subject at the 30th meeting of the Caribbean Commission in 1960 and succeeded in persuading the Commission to give an instruction to the Secretary-General to make "all possible preparations . . . as a matter of urgency . . . for consideration at an early date of ways and means" of developing a Colombo type plan for the Caribbean area. A resolution to the same effect was also adopted by the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association Atlantic Regional Conference meeting in Trinidad in April 1960 and the matter has also been the subject of consideration in Parliament.

Under arrangements made by the Secretary-General of the Caribbean Commission the subject is to be further discussed at a meeting of the Working Committee to be held in Washington on March 28th and 29th and at a meeting of the Working Group (which represents the island governments) in Puerto Rico in April. The Secretary-General has asked Metropolitan Governments to indicate at the Working Committee meeting:—

- (a) whether they would be prepared to participate as donors in a Caribbean plan;
- (b) whether they would like to invite other Governments to join them as donors in such a scheme, and
- (c) whether they would agree to appoint experts to the Secretariat of the Commission to work out the type of scheme which would meet the needs of the area and the wishes of the Governments concerned.

The idea of a Colombo type plan in the Caribbean has never been welcomed with any enthusiasm in the Colonial Office. In the Caribbean itself Governments have only imperfectly understood how the Colombo plan itself works. Undoubtedly in the minds of Dr. La Corbiniere and others it would be a device for pouring into the area technical assistance and financial aid which would otherwise not be available.

In a telegram which we have addressed to the Governor-General and the Governor of British Guiana we have referred to the paper produced by the Secretary-General and invited their comments. A copy of this telegram is attached.¹

In any discussions with them on this subject the line to take is that we should have no objection to a Colombo type plan in the Caribbean provided that the following conditions were satisfied:—

- (a) any aid we gave to the West Indies would have to be on a bilateral basis. We are not prepared to contribute to yet another international organisation which might pass aid to the West Indies on a multilateral basis;
- (b) the condition at (a) however is compatible with a Colombo type organisation. In fact this is the way the Colombo plan works. The West Indians however must understand that we should not be prepared to increase our aid to the Caribbean area simply because a new organisation was set up to channel it. It might simply mean that the aid which we were prepared to give to the West Indies might have to be shared around the Caribbean area generally. As compensation the West Indies of course might gain access to aid coming from other sources, e.g. France or Holland and it is for them to decide whether on balance they would be the gainers;

¹ Not printed.

(c) it is in our view an essential feature of the Colombo plan that all Governments should be donors as well as receivers. The West Indies might have something to offer to the other territories in the Caribbean (e.g. through the facilities of the University College of the West Indies or the Imperial College of Tropical Agriculture). They themselves already draw upon some of the facilities of Puerto Rico and may in future draw upon other facilities in the French and Dutch Islands. We however should like to know what are their views on this point;

(d) it would hardly be possible to operate a Colombo type plan in the Caribbean unless this task were either made the principal job of the Secretariat of the Caribbean Organisation or given to a separate secretariat. Is this what the West Indies want? (From our point of view it might not be a bad thing if the principal task of the new organisation did become the running of a Colombo type plan. It would give them something specific to do which might prevent the organisation sinking to the level of an international debating society passing resolutions on all kinds of subjects embarrassing to the Metropolitan Powers).

124 CO 1031/3058, no 11

9 Apr 1960

[Chaguaramas]: letter from Sir E Beetham (Trinidad) to Dr Williams urging caution over the proposed demonstration for the return of Chaguaramas

[A PNM convention in Mar 1960 decided on a public demonstration to dramatise Trinidad's demand for the return of Chaguaramas. Militants wanted a march on the base itself or perhaps an 'invasion' launched from a fishing fleet. Instead it was decided to march to the US Consulate. The date chosen was 22 April. Vast crowds, estimated at between 15,000 to 35,000, one of the largest demonstrations ever seen in Trinidad, assembled in the rain in Woodford Square. The Trinidad flag was raised and the 'seven deadly sins', documents symbolising colonialism and including the 1941 lease agreement, were ceremonially burnt. From Woodford Square, Williams led a procession to the US Consulate where he read and presented a petition demanding the release of Chaguaramas. Despite the vast crowds and a heavy police presence, the demonstration passed without incident.]

I feel that I should write to you personally about the enclosed letters¹ regarding the proposed demonstration on the 22nd April, and let you have my own personal views.

Let me say at the outset that there can, in my view, in a democratic country, never be any objection whatever to public demonstrations, provided that they do not lead to a breach of the peace or to other citizens being caused to apprehend that there may be a breach of the peace. I am sure that so far we are on common ground.

I am sure also we are on common ground in desiring that any demonstration that may take place should not cause any injury to persons or property—in other words that the demonstration should be “peaceful”.

I understand that a very considerable number of people are likely to take part. I do not know whether it is the intention that the demonstration should take place in Woodford Square or other large space, or whether there will be a march to the United States Naval Base or to the United States Consulate-General. In the case of a demonstration, say, in Woodford Square, I see no difficulty in view of the peaceful

¹ Not printed.

and orderly manner in which the P.N.M. have held meetings attended by enormous numbers of persons in Woodford Square for over four years.

If, however, the intention is "to march", I think I must point out the difficulty there must inevitably be in ensuring that a very large crowd of people who are "on the move" all behave in an orderly manner. It is certainly not impossible to keep order and discipline, but it is not nearly so easy, and I would hope therefore that it might be possible for the demonstration to be held in Woodford Square and for small delegations to be despatched from that meeting to present themselves to the United States Consul-General or any other person or persons.

There is something else I feel that I must add. It is to endorse the remark of the Consul-General that any disorderly conduct directed at the United States Government must have the effect of nullifying to a great extent the efforts being made to settle amicably the problems which confront us vis-à-vis the United States. Having worked in the States you will know Americans far better than I, but I personally believe that little could be more calculated to make them "stick their toes in", so far as Trinidad is concerned, than an unfriendly demonstration directed against them. And this would make our task of reaching agreement on our outstanding problems a hundredfold more difficult. I realise that the question of holding a demonstration and whether it will be static or "on the move" and where it will be held is solely a matter for your Party, but I should not feel at all happy—for as you know, I am a great believer in the future of Trinidad and Tobago—if I did not take the liberty of giving you such advice and counsel as I am able.

I know full well that you and your colleagues are worried about the position vis-à-vis the Americans. I share fully your anxieties and appreciate the weighty and difficult problems with which you are faced. I am off for the week-end to Tobago to get some of my own belongings sorted out and packed up, but I shall be returning on Tuesday evening, and I shall be only too glad to give any advice that I possibly can.

Finally, should it be decided that a march should take place, may I ask you—as you did so effectively on the night of the 1956 General Election—to use all the influence at your command to ensure that the demonstration is orderly and peaceful?

125 CO 1031/3261, no 43

15 May 1960

[Federation]: outward telegram no 248 from Mr Macleod to Lord Hailes on the introduction of Cabinet government in the federation and the question of financial assistance over a transitional period

Constitutional Proposals.

Following is text of despatch which I am sending on this subject.

Begins. I have the honour to inform you that in the course of discussions with the Prime Minister of The West Indies during his recent visit to London I undertook at his request to join with your Government in drawing up a statement, in terms agreed by us both, which could be made to the Federal Legislature and which would indicate the position now reached in regard to the introduction of Cabinet Government and the achievement of independence. This despatch, in the terms of which your Government has concurred, reflects that undertaking.

2. It will be recalled that in January I agreed in principle and indeed welcomed

the introduction of Cabinet Government subject to the concurrence of the governments of the federated territories and to agreement on the details of the Federal Government's proposals. I understand that the governments of the federated territories have agreed to the proposal. I received an advance copy of the Federal Government's detailed proposals earlier this month. These are now being urgently studied and I hope to send you my comments in the near future. I fully appreciate the importance attached by the Federal Government to an early settlement of this matter, and will do my utmost to facilitate an early implementation of the decisions.

3. The final constitutional goal of the Federation is, of course, the achievement of independence within the Commonwealth. However, the Conference of West Indian Governments which was held last autumn in Trinidad disclosed considerable differences of opinion between the political leaders of The West Indies on the constitutional framework of the Federation. These problems were remitted to Inter-Governmental Committees which I understand have made steady progress towards their solution. I greatly hope, therefore, that when the Conference of West Indian Governments meets again it will be possible to reach agreement on all the outstanding issues including the proposal of a date for independence. I assume that the next step—and one which need not be long in following—would be to convene the Constitutional Conference provided for in Article 118 of the Federal Constitution. The concern of H.M.G. at this Conference will be not to urge that the Federal constitution should take one form rather than another, which is a question for West Indians to determine, but rather to satisfy themselves that the chosen form of federation is one capable of assuring effective sovereignty and that the date proposed for independence is practicable in the light of the time required to carry out the legal and other steps necessary for the transfer of sovereignty. I have informed your Government of the criteria which would enable H.M.G. to be so satisfied.

4. The question of admission to membership of the Commonwealth is, of course, one which must, as in all previous similar instances, be decided by the existing members of the Commonwealth as a whole. As soon as a date for independence has been agreed, H.M.G. in the U.K. is willing and ready to sponsor the federation for membership.

5. I am aware of the concern which is felt in some quarters in The West Indies lest independence should be delayed by the financial problems to which it may well give rise. On becoming independent The West Indies will of course continue to be eligible for assistance from international bodies, and they will also become eligible for Commonwealth assistance loans or any such system as may be generally in operation at the time, on the same footing as other less-developed independent members of the Commonwealth within the sterling area.

6. While independence implies an ability to stand on one's own feet financially as well as politically, and it is understood to be the intention of the Government of The West Indies to do so as soon as possible, H.M.G. recognise that The West Indies may not be able to assume at once the whole weight of the financial burdens which would normally fall to an independent member of the Commonwealth. If this proves to be so, H.M.G. will be ready to consult with the Government of The West Indies and to consider with them ways in which help might be given over a transitional period.

Ends.

126 CO 1031/4269, no 26/27

2 June 1960

[Federation]: outward telegram no 138 from Mr Macleod to Lord Hailes on how the secretary of state proposes to respond to questions during his visit to the West Indies¹

[At the Jamaican elections in July 1959 (see 88, note 2), Bustamante made federation an election issue and threatened secession if he won. Manley took the line (a) that seats in the federal assembly should be allocated according to population, and (b) that federal control should not extend to economic development or taxation. In Nov 1959 Manley rejected a call for an immediate referendum in Jamaica on federation which he said would be 'a betrayal of responsibility'; a referendum would be held only if the Jamaican government decided to 'get out'. Manley urged Hailes in May 1960 to resist any move to dissolve the federal assembly and to hold new elections. This he said would mean the end of federation as eighty per cent in Jamaica would vote for secession. Matters came to a head in Jamaica on 31 May 1960 when Bustamante announced his resignation as president of the FDLP, the withdrawal of his candidature for a federal by-election and his 'irrevocable decision' to take Jamaica out of federation. On the same day Manley announced in the Jamaican House of Representatives his government's decision to introduce a bill to provide for a referendum in Jamaica (in 1961) after the inter-governmental conference had completed its business. Manley argued that the opposition's decision to oppose federation had created a new situation in Jamaica and it was now appropriate that the issue should be put before the people (CO 1031/4269, CO summary of events leading to the Jamaican referendum, nd). A Jamaican intelligence report for May-June 1960 commented on the decision to hold a referendum: 'One thing is certain—for those who believe in the future of Federation it is a gamble. It is stating the obvious to say that a referendum held now could only have one result, a vote against continued participation, and almost certainly by a wide margin' (CO 1031/3708, no 28). In the debate on the referendum bill in July 1960 Manley made it clear that his party would not regard the referendum vote as one of confidence and that his government would not resign if the decision were in favour of secession. Before the referendum was held, he promised that he would place before the country a statement on the estimated cost of independence for Jamaica alone compared with that of membership of the federation and he ended with 'a rousing call for the establishment of a West Indian nation' (*ibid*, no 34, Jamaican intelligence report for July 1960).]

My immediately preceding telegram.

After saying that I am anxious to see for myself how things are going on in West Indies and also to resume discussions on Trinidad constitution I would continue on following lines.

Begins. One thing I should like to make clear, particularly in view of developments in last few days, is that I have not (repeat not) come in any way to urge any particular view about shape of Federation or pace at which it should advance to independence. That is something for you in West Indies to settle. I and my colleagues are of course concerned that any country which we are asked to sponsor for membership of the Commonwealth should have at least the essential attributes of sovereignty for it to be recognised by the Commonwealth and the world as a sovereign nation. But if those conditions are met, as I am quite sure they can be, then as soon as you in The West Indies are agreed on the kind of independent Federation you want you will find us ready and willing to help you achieve it. *Ends.*

2. Supplementaries would be dealt with on following lines.

Q.1. Does this apply to Jamaica if it decides to secede.

A.1. U.K. Ministers are notoriously reluctant to answer hypothetical questions.

¹ Macleod visited the West Indies in June 1960.

- Q.2. Does this mean you will not discuss future of Federation at all.
 A.2. It looks as if a good deal of discussion among yourselves is needed before I take a hand. But if any of those whom I shall be meeting want to tell me what they think I am sure you will not (repeat not) want me to refuse to listen.
 Q.3. What do you think of proposed referendum.
 A.3. That is decision for Jamaica and not one for me to question.
 Q.4. What are essential attributes of sovereignty.
 A.4. See Jamaica Ministry paper No. 3 of 22nd February.²
 Q.5. Will H.M.G. help financially after independence.
 A.5. See despatch read in Federal House by Prime Minister on 16th May, (my telegram No. 248).³

² cf 118, para 5.³ See 125.

127 CO 1031/4269, no 35

4 June 1960

[Jamaica and federation]: CO record of a meeting in Jamaica between Mr Macleod and a JLP delegation led by Sir A Bustamante

The Secretary of State said that he had no agenda for the meeting. He wanted to hear the views of the J.L.P.

2. Sir Alexander Bustamante invited Mr. Lightbourne to speak on behalf of the J.L.P. with special reference to Federation.

3. *Mr. Lightbourne* said that the smaller Islands seemed to regard Federation as a means of solving their problems overnight. The J.L.P. did not believe in Federation while the smaller Islands lacked the means of self-development. There was nothing inconsistent between earlier support of Federation and opposition now that this essential pre-condition had not been met. They would need to see a phased programme of help after independence with strong support from the U.K. as well as any possible help which might be forthcoming from the United States or Canada.

4. *Sir Alexander Bustamante* said that the failure of Federation went right back to 1947. When Mr. Creech Jones was asked¹ how the Federation was to be financed he had said that he had not come to discuss financial but political Federation. The same attitude had been maintained by successive governments in the U.K. The U.K. appeared to have more interest in Federation than Jamaica did. It looks as though England expected 3,000,000 hungry people to make a success of Federation without financial help, and nothing substantial had been done to make Federation a practical possibility. He was loyal to the U.K. but his first loyalty must be to Jamaica.

5. Professor Lewis² had said that £50,000,000 would be needed in the first ten

¹ ie at the Montego Bay conference, see 6, note 2.² (Sir) W Arthur Lewis (Kt 1963); economist; born St Lucia; taught at London School of Economics, 1938–1947; temporary principal, Board of Trade, 1943; CO, 1944; Stanley Jevons professor of political economy, Manchester University, 1948–1958; consultant to Caribbean Commission, 1949; economic adviser to prime minister of Ghana, 1957–1958; principal, UCWI, 1959–1962; vice chancellor, University of West Indies, 1962–1963; professor of public and international affairs, Princeton University, 1963–1968.

years to get the smaller Islands on a basis of economic advance and not merely on a basis of maintenance (which was all that was possible on existing funds). But the money was not there, and Jamaica and Trinidad, already poor, could not finance the development of the smaller Islands. Their people were already forced to emigrate to the U.K. even though food and housing were difficult to come by. As Sir Alexander saw it, Trinidad and Jamaica would have to find £3,000,000 a year for the smaller Islands as a result of the argument [sic] of the grant-in-aid. It was true that the U.K. Government had said, and the Governor-General had confirmed, that independence would come only when the Islands were economically sound, but on this sort of basis there would be an indefinite delay.

6. *Mr. Lightbourne* said that the main point was that the people of Jamaica must be given faith that the smaller Islands would be got on their feet before Federation could be made to appear worthwhile to them.

7. *The Secretary of State* said he would like to make it clear that Federation was something which should be decided about in the West Indies. He read the text of the short broadcast which he had recorded that morning, including the following passage:—

“I have not come in any way to urge any particular view about the shape of Federation or indeed about the pace at which it should advance to independence. That is something for you in the West Indies to settle. Now, naturally, I and my colleagues in Her Majesty’s Government are concerned that any country which we are asked to sponsor for membership of the Commonwealth should have at least the essential attributes of sovereignty for it to be recognised by the Commonwealth and the world as a sovereign state. But if those conditions are met, and indeed I am quite sure they can be, then as soon as you in the West Indies are agreed on the kind of independent Federation you will find us ready and willing to help you achieve it. But the first decisions are, let me emphasize again, for you.”

8. He was not here to reproach, or to approve, what Sir Alexander Bustamante and Mr. Manley had said. He accepted that the people of Jamaica would deliberate on these questions. He was, and would remain, a genuine neutral.

9. The Secretary of State asked whether, supposing money to meet the status outlined by Sir Alexander were available, the J.L.P. would support Federation politically.

10. *Sir Alexander and Mr. Lightbourne*, in consultation and after some hesitation, said that their thought on this was not settled; but the availability of the funds might affect their view. There were, however, other difficulties in connection with Federation:—

- (a) A Customs Union would present difficulties because Trinidad could produce more cheaply than Jamaica, owing to lower taxes, etc.
- (b) There was a fear that the powers given to the Governor-General in relation to essential services and emergencies would take the control of internal affairs in Jamaica out of local hands.
- (c) Jamaica was the most advanced country politically in the Caribbean (also one of the most advanced countries in the Commonwealth). She had had more than half the people in the Federation, but she would not have a majority of seats and

would be subject to the dictates of the smaller Islands which “had not even learnt to put on their nappies”. Furthermore, representation on a population basis would not solve the problem because, as Mr. Tavares³ pointed out, the population of Trinidad was increasing much more quickly than that of Jamaica, and the time is coming when she would be outnumbered.

(d) Federation would not make for economic strength. The U.K. could always obtain more cheaply elsewhere any of the products which she imported from the West Indies. This would be true even if (as Sir Alexander expected) British Guiana became willing to join Federation.

11. In these circumstances it was difficult to see what advantages there would be for Jamaica in Federation. The Secretary of State asked what would happen if Federation did not go ahead. *Mr. Sangster and Sir Alexander Bustamante* explained that they would hope for the achievement of complete self-government within the Commonwealth. Jamaica was a small unit, smaller in population and resources than some present or immediately prospective members, but they thought that she was worthy of membership. Mr. Manley had been reported as saying that such a solution was Jamaica’s for the asking and they would like to know if the Secretary of State agreed with this.

12. The Secretary of State pointed out that membership of the Commonwealth was not a matter within the individual decision of Her Majesty’s Government. The Secretary of State in summing up the discussion asked whether it was the view of the J.L.P. that because of the representation in the Federation, and the economic burdens which would follow, they did not feel that they could advise the people of Jamaica to go ahead in present circumstances. *Sir Alexander Bustamante* agreed that this represented their views. Mr. Sangster said that this was so, and that they were fortified by the absence of British Guiana, difficulties over the site of the capital, possible damage to the economy of Jamaica and the burden of administrative costs.

13. The Secretary of State thanked the J.L.P. representatives for expressing their views.

³ D C Tavares, honorary secretary, JLP.

128 CO 1031/3261, no 60 15 June 1960
 [Federation]: CO record of a meeting in Trinidad between Mr Macleod
 and federal ministers [Extract]

...
Item 2 – Continuation of grant-aid and C.D. & W. assistance after dominion status
 The Minister of Finance opened the discussion on the matter of continuation of grant aid and C.D. & W. assistance after Dominion Status. He referred to Section 3 of the British Caribbean Federation Act, 1956, which made it permissive for the Secretary of State to make to the Government of the Federation “a grant of such amount as he may, with the approval of the Treasury, determine, for the purpose of enabling the Federal Government to make grants to the governments of colonies for the time being included in the said federation whose resources are, in the opinion of the Federal Government, insufficient to enable them to defray their adminis-

trative expenses". The Minister of Finance wished to know whether it was the intention of Her Majesty's Government to extend to the Federal Government after Independence such necessary financial aid as has been normally accorded to other newly independent states. The Secretary of State in reply referred to the statement in his telegram of 15th May¹ which he read to the meeting, and said that there was no change in the position. He said however that it was not in his view possible to determine the precise form and amount of financial assistance until the final Independence Conference since this would inevitably depend on the circumstances of the time and in particular to [sic] the nature of the Federal constitution which would emerge from the adjourned Inter-Governmental Conference. While "Colonial" types of aid must, of necessity, cease on Independence, there were sure to be new avenues of assistance from which the new Federation could draw: and it might well be that the total amount of such assistance would be no less than at present.

The Minister of Finance then spoke of development capital aid. He said that statements such as those made by the Governor-General at the opening of the Inter-Governmental Conference² had raised doubts in peoples' minds as to H.M.G.'s real intentions regarding financial aid to The West Indies for development after Independence, and this matter had been the subject of frequent references by the Opposition. He said that a forthright statement by the Secretary of State would go a long way towards meeting these doubts and criticisms with which Federal Ministers had to deal. The Minister also referred to the emigration of West Indians to the United Kingdom, which was regretted by Federal Ministers as much as by the United Kingdom since it deprived the area of much of its best material. He said that this reflected an urgent need for development in the territories, especially those with a shortage of labour such as Montserrat and Dominica.

The Secretary of State in reply referred to his statement made to the Jamaica delegation to London in January 1960,³ which he thought was sufficiently reassuring, but promised to make a further statement to the same effect at his Press Conference on 18th June. He said that while he had no doubt that The West Indies would eventually achieve financial independence, this would inevitably take time, and Her Majesty's Government would certainly not abrogate their responsibilities to The West Indies when political independence (which must take place in advance of financial independence) was achieved.

Referring to the Secretary of State's remark that decisions on the precise nature and amount of United Kingdom aid must await the results of the Inter-Governmental Conference one Minister pointed out that customs union would inevitably entail a loss of revenue for the Units. Taken together with H.M.G.'s original undertaking to allocate grants in aid for a 10 year period, he felt that this justified a continuation of such grants in aid for the full period. Another Minister stressed that it was important to dispel the impression being created by the anti-federation group in Jamaica that all financial aid would be lost to The West Indies on Independence.

One member referred to the amount of C.D. & W. assistance which had been granted to Jamaica for the current five-year period and said that grave concern had been caused by the smallness of this amount, and that this had done harm to the

¹ See 125.

² cf 89.

³ See 117.

cause of federation in Jamaica.⁴ He pointed out that Jamaica was faced with serious financial and economic problems, and mentioned the much higher degree of unemployment compared with other territories. He urged that everything possible should be done to help Jamaica in view of its special difficulties. The Secretary of State replied that he felt it was important for the Federal Government to retain responsibility for the allocation of C.D. & W. monies to The West Indies, and in discharging this responsibility to assess priorities for development capital as between the various Units. Another member said that there was general dissatisfaction in The West Indies over the tapering of C.D. & W. monies and suggested that there should be an increased allocation. The Secretary of State said that he feared there was no prospect of this.

Item 3 – United Kingdom assistance for West India Regiment accommodation at Longdenville

The Secretary of State said that a draft despatch had already been prepared in the Colonial Office to the effect that H.M.G. would be prepared to assist towards the cost of the construction of barracks, subject to certain conditions such as that the estimates should not exceed a ceiling of £1.2 millions and that the largest practicable Federal contribution should be made towards the cost.

The Minister of Finance said that he welcomed the Secretary of State's statement and would look forward to receiving the despatch. He referred to certain reports from the "Jamaica Gleaner" to the effect that Russia was building a base for jet aircraft in Cuba, and that Cubans were believed to be implicated in the Henry treason⁵ case in Jamaica. He said that because of the disturbed state of affairs in Cuba and certain

⁴ The West Indies were awarded £9,000,000 under the 1959 CD&W Act. The federal government's allocation to Jamaica was £250,000. Only Trinidad (£100,000), the Cayman Islands (£50,000) and the Turks and Caicos Islands (£100,000) received less. The main beneficiaries were the federal government (£2,115,000), Dominica (£1,000,000) and St Lucia and St Kitts (£900,000 each). It had been deliberate policy on the part of the CO to make the whole allocation to the federal government; this was intended 'to strengthen its power and authority and status vis à vis the unit Governments' (CO 1031/2955, minute by Macpherson, 23 Apr 1959). When details of the sub-allocations to the units reached the CO, Marnham minuted: '... the Federal Government proposes to be far more drastic towards Jamaica and Trinidad than we in even our fiercest moments had ever contemplated. This is undoubtedly a justifiable and indeed praiseworthy application of the pure milk of economic doctrine, and if after full consideration the Federal Government want to stick to it and face the flaming row which it is practically certain to provoke in Jamaica and Trinidad I think we should probably agree. But I doubt whether we ought to do so without spelling out the consequences officially. ...' (*ibid*, minute by Marnham, 7 Sept 1959). Jamaica did lodge a protest (*ibid*, no 65, Blackburne despatch no 499 to Hailes, 27 Oct 1959) but the allocations remained unchanged.

⁵ C V Henry was a fifty-seven-year-old Jamaican who left Jamaica for the US in 1956 but who returned a year later to lead the Rastafarian 'Back to Africa' campaign which threatened violence if its demands for government assistance were not met. With thirty-eight followers, Henry was arrested in Apr 1960 and charged under the Treason Felony Law. He had been found in possession of home-made weapons and correspondence from his son, Reynold Henry, containing references to plots and risings. At C V Henry's headquarters the police claimed to have found a letter to Castro inviting him to take over in Jamaica but Reynold Henry was not one of the letter's signatories (CO 1031/3708, no 18, Jamaica Intelligence Report, Apr 1960). C V Henry and fourteen of his followers were found guilty and sentenced to varying terms of imprisonment (*ibid*, no 41, Jamaica Intelligence Report, Oct 1960). In June 1960 Reynold Henry was arrested with four others and charged with the murders of three Rastafarians and two soldiers from the Royal Hampshire Regiment. He was found guilty, sentenced to death and executed (*ibid*, nos 38 & 39, Jamaica Intelligence Reports, May-June & Aug-Sept 1960).

other non-British territories in the Caribbean, the defence of The West Indies must be a matter which was already claiming H.M.G's urgent attention, and that he felt it called for early discussions between Her Majesty's Government, the United States of America and the Federal Government. The Minister also referred to Her Majesty's Government position vis-à-vis British Guiana and British Honduras and to the possibility that a small sea force might also be required as well, particularly for the protection of Jamaica, Trinidad having already taken steps to obtain some patrol vessels for its own use.

The Secretary of State agreed that the provision of accommodation for the West India Regiment was only one aspect of the overall defence situation. He said that H.M.G. would be willing to have discussions with the Federal Government as soon as the latter were ready. Such consultations could take place separately from the negotiations connected with the Inter-Governmental Conference and the final Independence Conference. The Minister of Finance felt that it might be necessary to hold such discussions even before the resumption of the Inter-Governmental Conference. . . .

Item 5 – Protective devices for West Indian commodities in United Kingdom market consequent on dollar liberalisation

At the invitation of the Secretary of State the Minister of Trade and Industry introduced these matters and suggested that they be taken together. He said that at the outset he wished to make clear two points:—

- (a) that the Federal Government was fully aware of the difficult position in which Her Majesty's Government were placed vis-à-vis the special trade situation in Europe and world trade as a whole;
- (b) that, while it was generally agreed that some form of continuing financial assistance would be needed by The West Indies on the attainment of Independence, it was often not fully realised, even in the United Kingdom, that it would be equally important to have assurances as to the marketing of West Indian products in the United Kingdom. Otherwise the whole stability of the Federation would be threatened.

The Minister then turned to the effects of dollar liberalisation on West Indian trade and said that he had constantly pointed out to the Colonial Office and the Board of Trade that dollar liberalisation would affect The West Indies considerably and would lead to severe competition from the United State. Owing to the size of the American citrus industry, and the advantages which it enjoyed of a large domestic market and a government subsidy, American citrus was able to undersell West Indian citrus even in The West Indies although the West Indian product was in no way inferior. The American surplus for export was only a small fraction of the total production but even this represented a much larger quantity than the whole of The West Indies production. In these circumstances it was not possible to invoke the provision under GATT for unfair treatment and some other way must be found of dealing with the problem. He felt that it was a responsibility of Her Majesty's Government, having encouraged development in The West Indies, to assist in keeping open the markets for West Indian products. This constituted The West Indies case against complete dollar liberalisation on the part of the United Kingdom.

The Minister also pointed out that dollar liberalisation would also have serious effects in respect of The West Indies banana industry, in that it would enable

American fruit to be imported more freely, and although such imports would not include bananas their effect would be to depress the consumption of West Indian bananas in the United Kingdom. From all angles, therefore, dollar liberalisation presented a serious challenge to the economy of The West Indies.

He then referred to the European market, and said that it was appreciated that the United Kingdom Government had been concerned to avoid becoming involved in a manner which would prejudice the position of Commonwealth producers. However, it now appeared uncertain whether the United Kingdom would be able to remain outside the European association. The West Indies were accordingly anxious to know what Her Majesty's Government would be able to do in respect of these two problems which he had described. This led to the suggestion contained in Item 4, namely, that consideration should be given to the establishment of a Free Trade Area with the United Kingdom. The Federal Government had no authority from any unit territory to pursue this matter, but they would like to examine the possibility with Her Majesty's Government on a purely exploratory basis as a possible way of meeting the problems which he had mentioned. They would also like consideration to be given to a similar proposal for Canada.

The Secretary of State said that he fully agreed with the Minister as to the importance of the matters which he had mentioned to the economy of The West Indies. He referred to the United Kingdom Government's original attitude towards the proposal for a Common Market and the efforts which had been made to widen the scope of the proposal into one for a Free Trade Area. Unfortunately it had not proved possible to gain acceptance of this wider proposal. The present situation was admittedly very serious, and it was likely to prove most difficult to reconcile the United Kingdom's desire not to lose its share of the European market on which it was to a large extent dependant [sic] with the maintenance of Commonwealth interests. As regards the suggestion of Free Trade Areas between The West Indies and the United Kingdom, and The West Indies and Canada, he was inclined to doubt whether this could present a full answer to the problems. In point of fact he did not think that the Common Market represented a really significant danger to The West Indies. There was comparatively little trade between the countries concerned at present and The West Indies, apart from the special connection between France and the French territories. Moreover, the position of sugar was safeguarded by the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement and that of oil by international understandings, neither of which would be affected by the establishment of the Common Market in Europe; and indeed in some cases the position of these industries might be strengthened. Bananas and citrus were at present protected by dollar quotas, and although Her Majesty's Government had gone a long way towards liberalisation they would not remove these quotas unless alternative arrangements could be made. In this connection the Secretary of State said that the position of the West Indian industries concerned had constantly received special consideration by the British Cabinet whenever this question had come up. He mentioned that in the case of bananas the preference had already been increased in anticipation of liberalisation.

The Secretary of State concluded by saying that his answers to the Minister's remarks could be summed up as follows:—

- (a) he agreed with his analysis of the situation and the increasing difficulty presented to The West Indies, and that it was essential to safeguard the interests of Commonwealth producers;

(b) as regards the dangers posed by the establishment of a European Common Market, he and his department would gladly engage in talks with representatives of The West Indies as to the possible establishment of a Free Trade Area, but although there was no objection in principle it did not appear to him that this would provide the right approach to the difficulties; and

(c) it seemed to him more important to consider the position of specific products such as citrus and how they could best be protected.

The Minister of Trade and Industry, in reply, thanked the Secretary of State for his remarks and stressed that it was essential to think ahead in this matter to the attainment of Independence. He pointed out that apart from the products mentioned by the Secretary of State The West Indies had embarked on a programme of industrialisation which might well “snowball” into a considerable development, when entry into the United Kingdom markets for a number of other products would become increasingly important. He felt that no single solution could provide a complete answer to the various problems involved, and that a combination of measures would be necessary. The Secretary of State accepted the point made by the Minister, agreeing that this was of great importance. . . .

Item 8 – Other matters

Senator Byfield raised the question of migration of West Indian labour to Britain. He said the Government were grateful to Her Majesty’s Government for the fine work they were doing to assist the migrants, and that the territories were not unmindful of their responsibility in the matter and were doing their best in the screening of emigrants. Another Minister stressed that until The West Indies were able to produce more and thus raise standards of living, migration would continue. He felt that the basic need was for increased production and guaranteed markets.

The Secretary of State said that he was not in any sense critical of the migrant problem and had indeed not initiated any discussion on it in any of the territories visited. He wished only to make two observations:—

(i) The state of the economy in Britain must be constantly borne in mind. It had been shown that there was a definite relation between the graph of economic activity and that of immigration. The trend was therefore not due only to economic factors in The West Indies.

(ii) He was a great believer in Britain continuing its open-door policy.

The Secretary of State was sure, however, that the Federal Government and other Governments in The West Indies would take note of some of the economic clouds on the horizon in Britain. The indications were that economic circumstances would shortly be less favourable for immigrants in view of a lower level of economic activity and the operation of the established “last in, first out” policy of employers and trade unions. In answer to a question from a member, the Secretary of State replied that the employment record of West Indians was good, and that there was no evidence of discrimination on the part of employers. A member referred to reports of political pressure being brought to bear on West Indians, but the Secretary of State said that if there was anything of this kind it was confined to very small political groups of no real significance.

129 CO 1031/3932

20 June 1960

[Immigration]: minute by Miss M Z Terry¹ arguing that the problem is one for the UK government, not local governments in the West Indies

[Extract]

Last December the Ministry of Labour made strong representations at our Committee on West Indian Immigrants about the unfavourable long-term prospects for the employment of unskilled coloured immigrants in this country and it was agreed that warning noises should be made to West Indian Governments. The Ministry of Labour considered the position to be potentially dangerous because employment prospects at present are exceptionally good and (probably because of this) there has been a sharp increase in West Indian immigration to this country in recent months. They feared that this might lead West Indian Governments to conclude that there was no need for the time being to discourage emigration to this country. The Ministry of Labour therefore thought it very important to draw attention to the less favourable long-term prospects and to suggest that because of them, local administrative measures to reduce the flow of migrants to this country should be maintained and if necessary strengthened. As a result of these representations we sent a despatch to all West Indian Governments on the 14th March.

2. The Governor of British Guiana now tells us in his S. and P. letter at (46) that when our despatch was discussed by his Executive Council it emerged that the measures on which local Ministers had agreed towards the end of 1958 had not been implemented by them: and the attitude was taken in regard to our current despatch that not only would Ministers not take the discouraging action which we have now suggested but that some of them at least would deliberately encourage would-be immigrants to come to the U.K. in order to relieve unemployment in British Guiana. The reactions of the Executive Council are summarised in paragraph 3 of (46). In short there is to be no local publicity by the B.G. Government about the unfavourable long-term prospects for the employment of unskilled immigrants in the U.K.

3. This attitude is regrettable but not disastrous because taken on its own emigration from British Guiana to the U.K. is not greatly significant. I have not checked whether the figures quoted by Sir Ralph Grey in paragraph 4 of (46) tally exactly with our own records but they must be approximately correct and as such form a fairly negligible proportion of the total (the total excess of arrivals over departures was 23,016 in 1957, 15,023 in 1958, 16,393 in 1959 and 9,804 for the first four months of 1960). It would be very unfortunate if there should be a sudden sharp increase in emigration from British Guiana, but for the present I do not think that there is very much further that we can do to forestall such a development. . . . There is no U.K. I.O. in British Guiana itself but the U.K. I.O. in Trinidad covers inter alia British Guiana. I am sure that he could not be asked to distribute publicity material about the unfavourable long-term employment prospects for unskilled coloured immigrants in the U.K. because it would obviously be dangerous to U.K. trade and

¹ CO from 1949; temporary principal, 1951; principal, 1961.

employment generally for U.K. Government officials to make public statements to this effect. In any case I understand that the possibility of using U.K. I.O.'s to discourage Colonial emigration to this country has been carefully examined and rejected in the past on other papers. For this and also other reasons the idea of distributing information through British shipping companies seems equally unacceptable.

4. It is particularly difficult for us to press this further with British Guiana at present because the position is not (as Sir Ralph Grey suggests) that employment prospects here are *already* worsening. On the contrary, current reports from the Ministry of Labour show that unskilled coloured male immigrants are still finding jobs with relative ease (although the same is not unfortunately true of women). The real problem lies in the future. What is feared is that if the employment position should deteriorate in the future (and a significant deterioration is not anticipated until 1961 or even 1962, when the country will be faced simultaneously with the bulge in school-leavers and the end of National Service) not only will it then be difficult for new immigrants to find jobs, but those already in employment may very likely lose their jobs. In such circumstances there would very probably be a pressure campaign to the effect that "the blacks should be the first to be sacked" and this could easily spark off more intense racial friction than has so far been experienced. It is precisely because of this potential danger that the Ministry of Labour and other Departments are anxious to avoid the building up of an over-large coloured population now when times are good, which would become a potential source of racial friction later on. But it is still a potential rather than an actual danger and to this extent we are inhibited in our dealings with the Governments of non-self-governing territories.

5. In general it seems to me that there are considerable limitations to the extent to which West Indian Governments can help to solve this problem and accordingly to the extent to which we can usefully press local Ministers to adopt locally unpopular policies. The existence of large numbers of unskilled coloured immigrants in the U.K. is after all primarily a U.K. problem and as such it will in the long run almost certainly have to be faced by the U.K. Government itself. If U.K. Ministers should become convinced that the coloured population here is becoming too large for safety and that it is essential that the numbers of such immigrants should be substantially reduced, then I feel pretty certain that we shall have to take our courage in our hands and openly take powers to restrict the intake of coloured or other immigrants from within the Commonwealth. I do not think that any amount of persuasion by ourselves or by the local Governments is likely to have a really major effect on the scale of emigration from the West Indies to this country in the foreseeable future—because of the strength of the natural incentives to emigrate from the West Indies. If therefore U.K. Ministers should at some future date decide that it is essential to bring about a really big reduction in immigration from the West Indies I think that legal powers will be required. I also think that it would be necessary for such legal powers to be taken by the U.K. Government itself because legal measures to restrict emigration to this country could not be made locally without the willing cooperation of local Ministers and it seems highly unlikely that such willing cooperation would be forthcoming, either now or after the West Indies become independent. The whole situation in regard to emigration is so very different in the West Indies from that in India and Pakistan that I very seriously doubt whether, even after independence, the

West Indian Governments would be prepared to adopt the same kind of restrictive measures as in India and Pakistan.

6. Although we understand that U.K. Ministers are watching the situation very carefully they have not yet decided that the situation is so dangerous or potentially dangerous that legal measures to restrict immigration from within the Commonwealth must be taken. That being the case, our efforts for the time being must be limited to explanation and persuasion, to explaining the present difficulties and future fears and to seeking the cooperation of West Indian Governments in bringing similar explanation and persuasion to bear upon would-be emigrants. So long as our efforts are limited in this way there seems little that we can do in the face of refusal to cooperate by any given Government such as British Guiana. . . .

130 CO 1031/3724, no 7

22 Aug 1960

[Industrial development and income tax]: letter from Sir S Hochoy (Trinidad) to A R Thomas on the Antigua talks between Mr Manley and Dr Williams. *Enclosure*

You may have heard that Manley and Williams met in Antigua a couple of weeks ago. This stemmed from their talks in June last during the Secretary of State's visit to Trinidad and the somewhat better understanding on Federal Constitution Reform which they reached at that time. This last meeting was to review the developments which had since taken place, chiefly the problems of the Working Committees of the Inter-Governmental Conference and to evolve some new agreed approach to close the gap which separates Jamaica and Trinidad.

You will recall that there were four major subjects at issue namely:—

Representation;
Customs Union;
Industrial Development, and
Income Tax.

The problem of Representation seems to have been settled and there is a fair chance that the difficulty over Customs Union may be resolved. The two remaining questions i.e. "Industrial Development" and "Income Tax" still provide serious obstacles. On these two points Manley remains firm acknowledging that he would otherwise forfeit the support of his people.

Williams has returned from these talks more convinced than ever that unless some means can be found to meet Manley, there is every likelihood that Jamaica would secede. He is equally satisfied that Manley desires to have Jamaica remain in the Federation. He realises also that it is for Trinidad to find a way to assist Manley if Federation is to remain intact and I would say that Williams is quite sincere.

Manley and Williams are thinking of an additional list to the present Exclusive and Concurrent Lists. I would call it a "suspense" list. They feel that both these subjects can be transferred to this new list. Manley goes further to suggest that they should not be removed unless by majority recommendation of the Council of Ministers and at least a two-thirds majority of Parliament.

Williams and I have since discussed this new approach with Solomon and O'Halloran who are most sceptical. They feel that a two-thirds majority, having

regard to the present or envisaged composition of Parliament is quite impossible and that the industrial development of the other territories would be exposed to Jamaica's whim and caprice. Solomon was very strong. He declared it would mean destruction of Trinidad's future with which he could never be a party. His view was supported by O'Halloran. However, they are all to think it over and I shall let you know how this matter develops.

The discussions were held in a very friendly atmosphere and generated no heat whatever. They are all hoping that the results of these friendly Working Committee meetings would clear the air.

I enclose my aide-memoire of the talks between Williams, Solomon and O'Halloran. This was dictated from memory and is not intended to be a verbatim report. It just includes the highlights.

I have copied this letter to the Governor-General and am supplying him with a copy of my aide-memoire.

Enclosure to 130

H.E.: Well, I suppose you have some good news for us?

Williams: You all are aware of the developments regarding the Federal Constitution talks. Our "Economics of Nationhood"¹ was badly received by Manley who protested vigorously against the ideas Trinidad put forward. He now finds himself out on a limb and appreciates that he cannot get back easily. When we met in May last he admitted to me that he would welcome some overture from Trinidad which would assist him to keep Jamaica in the Federation. In June last he confirmed this in his talks with Mr. Macleod, making the point that there were only two subjects which are the real obstacles. These were the questions of "industrial development" and "income tax". Manley expressed the view that they should remain within the discretion and the authority of the unit territories. At that time Manley and I reviewed the position when he suggested that the solution may be found in the provision for a third list to which these two subjects could be transferred. In that way they will be preserved to the territories. I had been giving this suggestion serious thought and I felt that it was a most valuable contribution by Manley and would provide the escape which Manley was seeking without alienating the support of Jamaica. I had been trying in my way to accommodate Manley and had instructed the Trinidad representatives on the working committees to explore every means by which common agreement could be reached with Jamaica. A snag arose, and still exists, when Trinidad officials at one stage proposed with regard to Customs union that the items which were causing difficulty from the Jamaican standpoint should be put on a separate list and that a maximum period of seven years be agreed, by which time the items on that list would be removed. The Jamaica team was not prepared to accept any proposition which defined a time limit.

In my most recent talks with Manley in Antigua this month which lasted over three hours, Manley repeated this view and appeared to be more anxious than ever for every help Trinidad could give. Manley emphasised that he would be unable to carry Jamaica if the subjects of "industrial development" and "income tax" were to

¹ *The Economics of Nationhood* (Office of the Premier, Trinidad and Tobago, Port of Spain, 11 Sept 1959).

remain on the Federal list. Manley expressed his belief that Customs revenue was quite adequate to meet all foreseeable Federal expenditure and in elaborating his proposal stated that these two particular subjects could eventually be transferred to the exclusive or concurrent list on the recommendation of the Council of Ministers to which Manley attaches the greatest importance, *and* the agreement of a majority of not less than two-thirds of the population of the Federation. Manley considered that the maximum expenditure of the Federation could not possibly exceed \$30 million and he had every feeling that the actual figure would be substantially less. Manley added that in his view "education" and "external borrowing" could also be conveniently transferred to that special list. I promised Manley that I would discuss this with my colleagues.

Solomon: I cannot agree with Manley's proposal. It is impossible for there ever to be a two-thirds majority. It is tantamount therefore to Jamaica saying that they will be able to do what they like for as long as they like. Trinidad will in these circumstances be unable to withstand the competition which could come from Jamaica, if that territory enjoyed full freedom to grant concessions and in addition safeguard their local industries by a high protective tariff and even quantitative restrictions leading towards total prohibition. Jamaica was not a member of the GATT while Trinidad is. The position in which Trinidad will find itself will be unwarranted.

O'Halloran: This is a very serious matter, even dangerous. Jamaica would be able in those circumstances to promote industrial development at the expense of the remaining territories within the Federation, as there would be no limit to the attractions she could offer in complete disregard to the interests of the other units. Trinidad must expect more and more other West Indians coming in. This will not obtain in Jamaica. There will be nothing to prevent pioneer industries after enjoying the concessions in Trinidad shifting the operations to Jamaica to enjoy another life of concessions. Further Jamaica wants a uniform freight tariff within the region. This could not but mean that Jamaica's manufactured goods could flood the other territories and undersell those territories. Trinidad may not have any outlet for her products. Trinidad proposed a ton mile freight formula with which Jamaica disagreed. Already Jamaica has a domestic market of 1½ million people. Trinidad has only half of that figure. Trinidad cannot count too heavily on the other Eastern Caribbean islands as a market, as the purchasing power of those islands is low. There is also the question of Customs Union. It is true that Jamaica has advanced that 78% of the items can be harmonised, but Trinidad is yet to learn of the items which comprise the remaining 22% which, it claims, call for some kind of special treatment. Even so, Jamaica has indicated that there are some items in this group which from their point of view could never be harmonised. Manley refers to external borrowing. If the West Indies were to become independent it would be a normal requirement by lenders that loans should be underwritten by the Federal Government as is now done by Her Majesty's Government. On assuming independence, will the Federal Government not be required to underwrite all external debts due at that time by the unit territories? How will it work?

Williams: These are all valid observations, but we are faced with one real issue. Either Trinidad goes more than half-way to meet Manley and so make it possible for Jamaica to stay in the Federation, or risks a complete breakdown. Once the future of the Federation is assured, time, public opinion, and the growth of a favourable Federal climate could all serve to lessen the dangers which you now seek. Manley is

anxious to stay in the Federation. Perhaps he has now seen, he has not disclosed it to me, the new pattern of external trade and regional groupings which are being formed in other parts of the world. I think that Manley is aware of Puerto Rico's position. This island has done well over the last decade or so but seems to have nowhere further to go. Perhaps Manley is aware of the school of thought in Jamaica which voices the hope that Jamaica will become the 52nd State. We must take the risk, if we want Federation to survive.

H.E.: I agree with the Premier. I feel that in the course of time all these inequalities will even themselves out. I cannot appreciate the fear that Trinidad would be placed in such a dangerous position. After all, Trinidad is sufficiently strong economically to match Jamaica's concessions. Manley could wish to do so but there is a point or ceiling beyond which Jamaica would not find it worthwhile to go by way of concessions to industry. I admit that, until freedom of movement of goods becomes a reality, we may be at a disadvantage insofar as trading within the West Indies is concerned, but I am hoping that there would be an agreement on this point. I thought also that too much importance was being attached to this question of industrial development and that wise statesmanship in the future would prevail.

Williams: That is the way that I look at it. It is also a question of saving Manley's face. In the process we may be ridiculed, even told that Manley has got everything he wanted, but I am willing to put up with this to save the Federation.

Solomon: I cannot agree with you nor Manley. If the facts are put fully now to the Jamaican people, I am sure they will see it our way. How can Trinidad agree to a suggestion which is not feasible? How can we ever get a two-thirds majority? In fact, by agreeing with Manley's proposition, we are saying that Jamaica could have all the benefits that Federation could offer but at the same time the liberty to safeguard her own interests at the expense of the other unit territories.

Williams: I cannot agree with you. The Jamaicans today are still suspicious of Federation. It is as you all know most difficult for politicians to back down. They must find some avenue which will not give that appearance. That is Manley's position. He hit the ceiling when he was faced with our "Economics of Nationhood". Up to today I do not know with what he agrees and with what he disagrees. I do not know what are the precise items which Jamaica is finding it difficult to harmonise. As regards the two-thirds majority I envisage British Guiana joining the Federation, in which case Manley's two-thirds proposal will then be not so difficult, but I am relying on the change of climate which will follow a new Federal Constitution. A change of climate which will alter the Jamaican attitude. Manley and I are thinking whether it will not be possible to obtain the substantial grant from Her Majesty's Government to the Federal Government, as well as some assurance that exchequer loans will be available to the unit territories.

Solomon: We can never secure that margin even if British Guiana joined the Federation and I cannot agree with such a proposal. The furthest I can go is for Jamaica to agree that within a certain specified period, say five years, the subject of "industrial development" will be restored to the Federal list.

H.E.: Is it impossible to find a formula within the boundaries of these two thoughts? Could Manley's two-thirds be whittled down to some figure with more realistic meaning to Trinidad?

Solomon: Manley is still thinking as a Jamaican and I do not trust him. Trinidad

can find itself in the disastrous position from which the Government may be unable to extricate it and I would have none of it. I cannot agree to destroying Trinidad.

O'Halloran: I feel likewise.

Williams: Let us think it over. I am merely reporting my talks with Manley in Antigua. I also am not out to destroy Trinidad. Perhaps it may be better to await the result of the next meeting of the working committees.

Solomon: I agree that we should do that. I am not so sure that Manley is not playing a game. Otherwise why should he fix the referendum to take place after the inter-Governmental conference?

O'Halloran: All that I am prepared to say now is that we have to think this over quite seriously. There is too much at stake and Trinidad, if we are not careful, will lose out. The only two territories affected by this are Jamaica and Trinidad.

H.E.: Perhaps then it may be better for us not to force any decision but to keep these working party talks going, no matter for how long until the air becomes clearer. It would be disastrous to the Federation to make any precipitate or firm declaration which would tend to drive Manley further away from us. I am a bit confused. Admitting that we cannot agree on a complete uniform external tariff, do you say, Dr. Solomon, that complete freedom of goods will not be possible?

Solomon: Quite so. There will be restrictions of imports of certain items into Jamaica from the other units. Those items which Jamaica claims cannot be harmonised. As an example: shoes, the importation of which is now not permitted, will remain on Jamaica's list of prohibited imports whether or not they are manufactured in one of the unit territories.

O'Halloran: Take an actual example. Trinidad crude cannot now enter Jamaica.

Williams: If we accept Manley's view that Customs revenue will more than meet Federal needs, will that not mean that our envisaged contribution to the Federal Government would be substantially reduced? We had proposed a figure of over \$130 million, while Manley feels that Federal expenditure will not exceed \$30 million. I realise that this new thought will involve Trinidad maintaining those services which it had advocated should be transferred to the Federal Government. But could not this offset some of the disadvantages? I think that we should take time and think this over fully. I quite agree with what H.E. has said that we should avoid forcing any issue.

Solomon: I agree.

H.E.: That would suit us all. But let us try to find a formula which could help Manley.²

² On 19 Aug Hailes wrote to Macleod explaining that Adams was incensed by the Antigua talks to which he had not been party; the federal prime minister was not only resentful but 'rather scared' for his own position. Hailes did not take this seriously and was rather more concerned about the other federal ministers who were 'jumpy about their own futures' and who might try to influence Adams 'in the wrong way for selfish reasons'. The governor-general added: 'It would help if Manley and Williams were a little more considerate to Grantley. It would cost nothing and I will try to put that idea over' (CO 1031/3724, no 10). On 3 Sept Hailes wrote again to the effect that the storm had not blown over and that there was 'some sort of anti-Manley move' in the federal Cabinet, with Adams's resentment being fanned by Bradshaw and De La Corbiniere. Adams and his colleagues 'do not see why everything should be done to suit Jamaica at the expense of others'. Adams was quite capable 'if his position is assailed, of trying to pull down the pillars of the temple. In his muddled head he flirts with the idea of a Federation without Jamaica, in which—so he thinks—he could more easily hold his own'. Hailes suspected that Bradshaw, the finance minister, saw Williams, 'whom he hates', as a personal threat; Bradshaw had made 'sneering references in public to the "proposed Finance Minister"'. It had been, according to Hailes, 'short-sighted of Manley and Williams not to play, at least superficial ball, with Adams. . . . A simple message from Antigua might have prevented all this. They are a little too contemptuous to appreciate the wrecking potentialities' (*ibid*, no 14).

131 CO 1031/3708, no 39

Aug–Sept 1960

[Jamaica and federation]: Jamaica intelligence report on the creation of a ‘reserved list’ and the prospects for the referendum [Extract]

...

2. Federation

In July officials of the Jamaica and Trinidad Governments held lengthy discussions in an attempt to narrow the differences between these two Governments on what should be the division of powers between the Federal and Unit Governments. Early in August the Premiers of both territories met in Antigua, accompanied by these officials, to examine the remaining points of disagreement. The agreement reached at this meeting reflects the principal objectives of the Jamaican Government. The most important feature of the understanding arrived at was that, in addition to the Exclusive and Concurrent legislation lists, there should be a third, described as the “Reserved” list, consisting of two items only, industrial development and income tax. It is proposed that either item on the Reserved list should be transferable to one of the other two only by agreement of the Council of Ministers representing the Unit territories and then only if Ministers representing territories comprising two-thirds of the total population of the Federation concur in this transfer.

It was proposed also that the Federal Government should have a single source of revenue and that this revenue could expand only as that Government took over services more efficiently operated at that level than by the units themselves. Further, express provision for full consultation between the Units and the Federal Government is contemplated.

The above is merely an outline of the agreement reached at these meetings and the mass of detail involved is not immediately relevant. It has been endorsed in principle by the Cabinet, with the modification that an attempt should be made to ensure that the transfer of a subject on the Reserved list should be conditional on the legislatures of the Unit territories expressly ratifying, on the same basis, the agreement reached in the Council of Ministers. But this endorsement was secured with some difficulty and only after much discussion. It seems clear that, certain public statements notwithstanding, the Ministers of Trade and Industry¹ and of Education² at least still have deep-seated reservations on the whole subject. Judging from some public utterances of the former, he seems often to forget essential points of this Government’s attitude towards the revision of the Federal Constitution on which the Cabinet has already agreed: it is probable that he regards this agreement as less important than his own prejudices. At the end of September the details of the approach in Committee I had still to be settled.

In spite of a number of lofty sentiments to the contrary which were expressed shortly after the Premier’s announcement of the Federation referendum, it has always been clear that the issue would be decided on party lines. No one is better aware of this than the Premier; and no one recognises more fully the need of raising his Party’s morale before the referendum is held. In the pressure of Government’s business after last year’s General Elections many of the Party leaders have, inevitably, lost some touch with the middle and lower ranks. This has been most apparent in the

¹ Mr Isaacs.

² Mr Glasspole.

deterioration of the Government's relationships with several local Government bodies, to which some political and administrative ineptitude has contributed. In an attempt to correct this situation Mr. Manley has held one major meeting with delegates from Parish Councils. The danger is that, as occurred at the time of the elections to the Federal Parliament, large numbers of the People's National Party's supporters will abstain from voting in the referendum, while the adherents of the Opposition will turn out in force. The annual Party Conference will be held shortly after the meetings of the two Ministerial Committees on the development of the Federation and the Premier hopes, assuming the successful results of these meetings, to be able on that occasion to do much to ensure sufficient support for Jamaica's continued membership of the Federation. . . .

132 CO 1031/3724

3–7 Oct 1960

[UK financial assistance]: minutes by G W Jamieson, H A Harding¹
and A R Thomas

[Referring to his account of the Antigua talks (see 130), Hochoy reported to the CO in Sept 1960 that Manley and Williams now felt that their differences could be overcome if HMG made a substantial grant to the federal government for the economic development of the region. Williams believed that a suitable opportunity to raise this issue would be at the bases talks with the Americans in London (CO 1031/3724, no 15, Hochoy to Thomas, 6 Sept 1960).]

The draft opposite is self-explanatory but Mr. Harding will have views about my suggestion that we could give Mr. Manley and Dr. Williams a hint about a Commonwealth Assistance loan when they come over for the Bases Conference next month. If he feels that we have not in fact got Treasury authority to go this far, I would be glad if he could say whether it would be possible to approach the Treasury to try and get their agreement to making this hint.

2. It seems to me that it may make our discussions with them a good deal easier if we can say something positive in addition to the Statement of Intent (copy at (21A))² made to Mr. Manley, in January. This is beginning to look a bit dusty and it seems to me that the time has come when we ought, if possible, to try to be a little more forthcoming.

G.W.J.
3.10.60

Mr. Thomas

I fear we cannot say anything about a Commonwealth Assistance Loan.

There are two difficulties. First, the Treasury have just circulated a paper³ which takes the line that the demands for overseas aid are bigger than we can afford to

¹ Assistant secretary, CO, head of Finance Dept.

² See 117.

³ T 296/1, 'Problems of the emergent territories', draft Treasury paper for Cabinet (Official) Committee on Development Policy, Oct 1960. This paper was an attempt by the Treasury to resolve its difference with the CO over eligibility for Commonwealth Assistance Loans (see 116, note 3, and 117, note). As a result the CO appealed for restraint in its explanation of the UK's financial position to colonial governments (T 296/62, Gorell Barnes to colonial governors, 10 June 1960).

meet, that the Colonies get too large a share of the aid which can be made available and that to remedy this situation *inter alia* any Commonwealth Assistance Loans granted to emergent territories shortly after independence should be offset by a corresponding reduction in the Exchequer Loan finance available to the Dependent territories. The time is therefore most inopportune for an approach to the Tsy on a Commonwealth Assistance Loan for the West Indies.

Second, the W. I. area contains the only dependencies which have some prospect of meeting their requirements for external loan finance by borrowing on the open market in London and in the U.S. Federation should strengthen their position in this respect. Public borrowing on their own credit is likely not only to be cheaper than Commonwealth Assistance Loans but also to lead to a larger supply of finance; the Federation should therefore be encouraged to look to public borrowing rather than U.K. Govt. Loans for external loan finance.

H.A.H.

4.10.60

Sir Hilton Poynton

I think you should see No. 15 and the draft reply.

During the meeting which Dr. Williams had with Mr. Manley in Antigua he appears to have gone very far to meeting Mr. Manley's point of view on the form of federation. On his return he got into trouble with two of his own leading supporters, namely Mr. O'Halloran and Dr. Solomon for going too far to meet Jamaica. This in itself was an interesting development as we had pictured Dr. Williams as something of a dictator. In No. 15 the Governor warns us that the West Indies leaders, when they come to London for the Bases talks, are likely to raise the question of securing a substantial grant from H.M.G. for the economic development of the area. The S. of S. has already given assurances in general terms both to Mr. Manley when he visited London early in the year and at various meetings when he (the S. of S.) was visiting the West Indies to the effect that the West Indies will be able to count on continuing financial assistance from H.M.G. after independence although the form in which it is given must necessarily be different from what it is at present. He had in mind that C.D.W. and grant aid assistance could continue for a transitional period only and that Commonwealth Assistance loans and various forms of technical assistance (some by the U.K. Government, others from international bodies) would be available to replace "Colonial" types of assistance.

Although it would be nice to be more specific in this reply I do not see that this is possible. I think however that you should see since the proposed reply holds out no hope of our being able to meet the request of Dr. Williams and others that at the London Bases talks we should get down to promising specific sums of money.

It is a pity that we cannot refer to Commonwealth Assistance loans but I quite appreciate the difficulties of doing so at present, explained in Mr. Harding's minute. It would however be very serious if for the reasons given it in fact proved necessary to withhold this type of assistance from the West Indies after independence, not least because it would involve going back on a specific reference by the S. of S. to these loans as a type of help they could expect to receive.

A.R.T.

7.10.60

133 CO 1031/3505, no 64

7 Oct 1960

[US financial assistance]: letter from D Williams (Washington) to G W Jamieson on US policy towards financial assistance for the Federation

Will you please refer to your letter WIS, 121/1174/02 of September 26. On October 6 I called on Adam Foster at the State Department to discover whether the State Department had yet reacted to Colonial Office paper¹ of July 1960 on the economic and financial implications of independence for The West Indies, and also to try to discover the implications of Mr. Dillon's² inclusion of The West Indies in the Bogata Social Development Program for Latin America.

Foster explained that the State Department did not consider the inclusion of The West Indies in the Social Development Program as their sole response to your paper. The West Indies had been included in Mr. Dillon's remarks purely on the merits of the case—that is to say, on the ground that they are geographically located in the Latin American area and should be approaching independence about the time when the Social Development Program might be expected to come into effective operation. (Indeed Mr. Dillon's speech had been made before your paper had been received.) Although, therefore, monies made available under the Social Development Program might be used to deal with some special aspects of the financial problems of The West Indies after independence, they were not to be regarded as the sole source of assistance for this purpose.

Before going on to discuss your paper and the American reactions to it, we had some further discussion about the Social Development Program and the mechanisms through which assistance from it might be made available. No final decisions on the point have yet been taken by the Americans; but the trend of their present thinking is that the bulk of the money would go into the Latin American Development Bank for the purpose of making soft loans. Under present United States legislation The West Indies, given their present constitutional position, would not be eligible for any funds which went through this channel. It is, however, proposed in addition to make a portion of the funds available to the I.C.A. The I.C.A. in turn will be empowered to make grants—not loans—from them for development purposes. This is the part of the scheme under which The West Indies would qualify and—if Mr. Foster's section of the State Department have their way—so would British Guiana, British Honduras and the British Virgin Islands. Nothing however, should be said on this point to the Governments of these territories at this stage since it may only arouse false hopes.

We then went on to discuss the problems raised in the Colonial Office paper of July 1960. The State Department have carefully considered the paper and what follows represents their present reactions.

The first point is that they stand by their previous proposal that there should first be informal private talks between the United States, the Canadians and ourselves on the whole problem, to be followed later by joint talks with the West Indians. On

¹ The CO paper of July 1960 was a revised version of the paper submitted by the CO to the Development Committee in Jan (see 114). It was entitled 'Economic and financial implications of independence for the West Indies' and circulated to the US and Canadian governments (CO 1031/3505, no 345).

² C Douglas Dillon, US under-secretary of state for economic affairs.

present thinking they would prefer the three-power talks to take place in Ottawa and on their side would propose that they should be represented by Ivan White. The reason for holding them in Ottawa would be that it should serve to stimulate Canadian interest and could be expected to attract less attention than if they were held in Washington since Ivan White frequently goes to Ottawa on other business. I said that this proposal seemed reasonable to me.

We next discussed the question of the timing of these three-power talks. We agreed that your paper was drafted on the assumption that the Federation would continue to exist in its present form and that Jamaica would not secede. There seemed, therefore, to be little point in having talks with the Canadians until the Jamaican issue was definitely settled one way or the other, since the economic problems of The West Indies would be very different if Jamaica were excluded. This suggested a date as soon as possible after the Jamaican referendum, which would also have the advantage of postponing the talks until a new United States administration was in the saddle.

The third point to emerge was that the Americans did not consider that their Congressional procedures would make it possible for them to provide any form of budgetary support for The West Indies. This aspect of the problem would have to be primarily our responsibility and perhaps that of the Canadians. As they saw it at present, the Americans envisaged that their help would take the form of an increased flow of development capital, preferably in the shape of soft loans, if possible made through existing agencies. They would also hope to increase their flow of technical assistance but would prefer that this should be related to their loan programs or to any capital programs which we or the Canadians might be prepared to undertake.

I told Mr. Foster that as far as I could see at the moment this approach seemed very sensible, though of course much would depend upon how much additional capital would be forthcoming and the extent to which the "existing agencies" could adapt their lending criteria to suit West Indian needs. I said, however, that I thought we ought to consider how any discussions we were having on aid (whether with or without The West Indies) should be related to the discussions on the bases; since, as the State Department already knew, The West Indies themselves were linking the two things. Foster said that it would be quite contrary to American policy to come up with any positive aid proposals during the course of the bases talks; they would not be prepared to offer a definite increased sum of aid in return for West Indian concessions over bases. I said that I fully appreciated that point. I was sure it was appreciated in London and nobody would expect anything so crude. Indeed, I added, in view of Dr. Eric Williams' statements in the past that he was not prepared to sell the sacred soil of Trinidad for American dollars, he might himself react adversely to any such direct linking of the two issues. Since The West Indies themselves, however, were apparently going to raise the question of aid during Stage I of the talks,³ it did seem to me desirable that the Americans should be ready on their side at that stage to make some positive reaction. This might take the form of indicating that they would hope that considerably more U.S. aid should flow into this region in the future than had flowed in in the past. As evidence that this was not just a pious hope, they might then go on to say that they felt, however, that the whole question of aid to The West Indies should be discussed jointly by them with the United Kingdom and Canadian Governments as well as with The West Indies, so that a coordinated

³ For the various stages envisaged in the forthcoming bases talks, see 134.

program of assistance might be worked out. Foster replied that the Americans had themselves been thinking on similar lines. He said that if the idea of a four-power approach to the aid problem proved attractive to The West Indians, then the Americans could perhaps go on to make a definite proposal that, if all else went well, such discussions might start co-incidentally with Stage III of the bases talks. Before a proposal on these lines could be forthcoming, however, it would be necessary to clear it with the Canadians. We decided that this was a point to which we should give further consideration though, of course, if it is to be taken up in Stage I of the talks and put by the Americans in the form suggested immediately above, then we must clear it with the Canadians within the next three weeks.

I should be interested to have your reactions and to learn whether you have heard anything from Ottawa showing how the Canadians have reacted to our paper and whether *prima facie* they would be prepared to participate in three-power conversations to be followed by joint talks with the West Indians.

I am sending three copies of this letter so that you can send one to the F.O. and C.R.O.⁴

⁴ The CO replied to Williams declaring itself to be encouraged by US readiness to assist the federation and sharing US reluctance to see the question of financial aid entangled with the bases conference. 'We do however question wisdom of linking start of financial talks with stage III Bases. We think financial talks should, and will inevitably, run their course at different tempo. It would also be unfortunate if such a suggestion was interpreted as hint of "no bases, no aid"' (CO 1031/3505, no 66, outward tel no 116, Marnham to Williams, 28 Oct 1960).

134 DEFE 7/1475, no 26

19 Oct 1960

[Defence]: minute by C E F Gough¹ to Mr Watkinson² on the base negotiations and defence arrangements

The approach of independence for the West Indies Federation has brought to the fore two important issues. In the first place, the Leased Bases Agreement of 1941 gave the United States, for a term of 99 years, a number of naval and air bases, some of which will be within the future West Indies territory and some of which (in British Guiana, the Bahamas and Bermuda) will remain outside. It follows, therefore, that the Americans will have to re-negotiate the lease and the West Indies will, in effect, become the new "freeholder". In the second place, the West Indies have told the Colonial Office that they will hope to receive help from the United Kingdom in building up their own armed forces, and we are at present in the process of discovering whether there are any reciprocal benefits which it would be wise for the United Kingdom to secure in a Bilateral Defence Agreement with the West Indies.

2. The immediate problem is the re-negotiation of the Leased Bases Agreement of 1941. For well over a year the Colonial Office and the Foreign Office have been trying to persuade the United States Government that it would be to their advantage to join in a conference with the United Kingdom, with the West Indies as observers, with a view to re-negotiating the Bases Agreement in advance of independence. In theory, this will be a conference between the United Kingdom and the United States

¹ Under-secretary, Ministry of Defence, 1958–1964.

² H A Watkinson (1st Viscount cr 1964), minister of defence, 1959–1962.

but, in practice, it will be a conference between the West Indies and the United States, with ourselves as honest brokers. The United States were slow to appreciate that they are themselves about to be in much the same position as we were with Cyprus. They have, however, been persuaded that this is a real issue and have agreed to participate in a series of tripartite discussions. The series will be as follows:—

Stage I. The three parties will state their various points of view and the issues for discussion will be identified. This session will begin in London on the 2nd November and will probably be opened, on our side, by the Lord Privy Seal and wound up by the Colonial Secretary. On the West Indian side, there will be representatives of the Federal Government and of the Prime Ministers of the Unit Governments. Prominent among the representatives will be Doctor Williams, Prime Minister of Trinidad, where the most important American base is (Chaguaramas).

Stage II. A series of discussions to be held in the West Indies, in the course of which the 1941 Agreement will be examined and re-negotiated in detail, clause by clause and base by base. This is expected to take place in February 1961.

Stage III. The final stage, at which a revision of the Leased Bases Agreement of 1941, in some appropriate form, will be finally negotiated.

3. In parallel with these preparations for revising the Leased Bases Agreement of 1941, work is beginning on our side in preparing ourselves for the negotiation of a Bilateral United Kingdom/West Indies Defence Agreement. The Chiefs of Staff are shortly to be invited to say what facilities, if any, we shall require from the new West Indies Government. We shall not require anything so specific as we have in Cyprus, Malaya or even Nigeria, but no doubt we should be prudent to try to reserve some general right of staging the passage of troops, and so on. In essence, however, this will be a negotiation in which the West Indies will be asking something from us—i.e. assistance in building up the West Indian forces. The financial cost of this will fall, presumably, on the Commonwealth Relations Office, and from the defence point of view our contribution will be physical rather than financial. This bilateral negotiation is going forward, however, at a slightly slower pace than the Bases Agreement.

4. This morning I was invited to attend a meeting at the Colonial Office, at which an entirely new aspect of the problem was put to us. It appears that as long ago as last June the West Indians were turning their thoughts to how to justify to their own people the continuance of the American bases, in whatever form and to whatever extent will be justifiable in the strategic circumstances of 1960. This has apparently led the West Indian leaders to toy with the idea of a rather ambitious regional defence pact, the signatories to which would be the West Indies, the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, France and the Netherlands.³ The principal contribution of the West Indies would be making available base facilities to the United States, but the West Indian leaders would hope to be able to demonstrate to their population that they would be receiving, in return, all the benefits of a regional defence pact. I was surprised to learn this morning that the Colonial Office were warned, as long ago as last June, that the thoughts of the West Indian political leaders were turning in this direction, but they have only just realised that we may

³ Eric Williams had raised the question of a 'Caribbean NATO' during Macleod's visit to the West Indies in June 1960 (CO 1031/3040, minute by Thomas, 24 Oct 1960). In Nov 1960 the Cabinet Defence Committee recommended that any proposals for a regional defence organisation in the Caribbean should be resisted (DEFE 7/1475, no 33, D 11(60)1, 2 Nov 1960).

hear a lot about this aspect of the problem during the course of the first stage of the Bases Agreement early next month,

5. I suggested at this morning's meeting that our objectives should be as follows, viz:—

(a) The United States should be encouraged by us to work towards a Bilateral Agreement with the West Indies in which the United States would, in return for the continued use of bases (on modified terms), commit themselves perhaps in very general terms to assisting in the defence of the West Indies.

(b) We should also keep our Defence Agreement with the West Indies on a bilateral basis.

(c) If possible, we should leave it at that, on the grounds that the West Indies would be able to present to their people two Bilateral Agreements, each of which would be of benefit to the West Indies.

(d) If, however, the West Indies want something more, we should aim in the first instance at a tripartite declaration of common purpose, to be signed by the West Indies, the United States, and the United Kingdom, referring ("whereas etc.") to two Bilateral Agreements and reiterating our common interest in the preservation of peace, mutual defence in the area, and so on,

(e) If the West Indies are not satisfied with this as a *quid pro quo* for continuing the grant of bases to the United States, we should then have to consider turning the declaration of common purpose into treaty form.

(f) We should resist any form of regional pact which entailed the setting up of formal machinery (Secretary-Generals, Command Structures, and so on) or the commitment of forces and detailed military plans.

6. I also suggested that it was high time that the Colonial Office and Foreign Office recommended to their respective Ministers that they should jointly circulate a note to their colleagues telling them that this issue might come up at the forthcoming talks and suggesting what line should be taken. My recommendation was that the line to be taken should be that sketched out in paragraph 5 above.

7. The meeting concluded with a promise by the Colonial Office and Foreign Office officials to recommend to their respective Ministers that a note in this form should be circulated to other Ministers as soon as possible, so that other Ministers would know what is going on and have a chance to express their views.

8. I am sending you this minute so that you may be given good notice of what is coming along, and to recommend to you that you could go along with the line suggested in paragraph 5 above. I do not think at this stage we need make a detailed study of the pros and cons of a regional defence pact. If in Stage I discussions this becomes a real issue, it will suffice if there is clear agreement on the United Kingdom side that we would discuss terms with them but enter into no commitment.

135 CO 1031/4276, no 9

24 Oct 1960

[British Guiana]: letter from Sir R Grey to Lord Hailes on relations between British Guiana and the federal government

[The Robertson Commission (see 17) recommended an indefinite period of 'marking time' in British Guiana's advance towards self-government. For the next two and a half

years the territory was governed by an interim administration consisting of the governor, officials and nominated members on both the executive and legislative councils. It failed conspicuously in its efforts to command public support, to generate economic growth or to reduce the PPP's political influence. Under Sir P Renison, who replaced Savage as governor in July 1955, consideration was given to the gradual restoration of constitutional government. The split in the PPP and the emergence of moderate parties capable of challenging the PPP, were identified as favourable circumstances. Elections were held in Aug 1957. The pro-Jagan PPP won 9 of the 14 elected seats with 47.50 per cent of the vote. The pro-Burnham PPP won 3 seats with 25.48 per cent of the vote. The NLF and UDP each won 1 seat with 11.51 and 8.18 per cent of the vote respectively. It was after the election that Burnham broke with the PPP and formed the PNC, from which point politics in Guiana divided increasingly on racial lines. Jagan returned as minister of trade and industry in a government in which officials held the key portfolios and the governor exercised extensive reserve powers. Pressure grew for internal self-government and this was reflected in the proceedings of a constitutional committee which sat in 1958. This was then advanced by the PPP to a demand for independence within the Commonwealth by Aug 1961. The opposition suggested that the movement to independence should be in measured stages. A constitutional conference, held in London in Mar 1960, revealed significant differences between the PPP and the opposition over such issues as the voting system, the number of chambers within the constitution and control of the police. Agreement was eventually reached on a form of internal self-government, with first past the post as the voting system, a bicameral legislature, and a bill of rights. The governor would retain responsibility for defence, external affairs and law and order. The leader of the majority party would become premier and ministers would be appointed on his advice. Elections to give effect to the new constitution would be held in 1961. After six months the police would be transferred to ministerial control but not before a Police Council, consisting of the governor, members of the majority party, the chief secretary and chief of police, had been appointed to advise on the administration and maintenance of the force. Upon this basis Macleod accepted the principle of British Guiana's independence at the London conference and issued a statement which the conference endorsed to the effect that 'if at any time not earlier than two years after the first General Election held under the new Constitution or upon it being decided that the West Indies Federation should attain independence', HMG would be prepared to convene another conference to fix an independence date. The provisos were that the grant of independence should command support in both houses of the British Guiana parliament and that the existing constitution of the territory had been in force for not less than one year (*Report of the British Guiana Constitutional Conference held in London in March 1960*, Cmnd 998, Apr 1960).]

On October 19, I returned to my office after a meeting of Executive Council to find a telegram saying that Dr. LaCorbiniere [sic: throughout] proposed to arrive in Georgetown that day. He had in fact already arrived. He listened to a debate in our Legislative Council that afternoon (and later spoke to me in well-justified criticism of the style of what he heard) and had discussions with Dr. and Mrs. Jagan thereafter. On the following morning, October 20, Dr. Jagan telephoned me and said that Dr. LaCorbiniere [sic] was returning to Port of Spain later in the morning but wished first to make a courtesy call on me. This was arranged.

Dr. LaCorbiniere [sic] told me that he had come to Georgetown in order to secure from Jagan an invitation for your Prime Minister and LaCorbiniere [sic] and Bradshaw to come to British Guiana "to discuss matters of common concern". Federal Ministers had, he said, come to the view that their plans should, if possible, be based on a strong Federation of all British territories in this area—the present Federation, British Guiana, British Honduras and (to my surprise) the Bahamas. Discussions with Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom were imminent; it would be ridiculous to suppose that Her Majesty's Government would evolve one Defence policy for an independent Federation of the West Indies and another (or others) for fringe areas like British Guiana and British Honduras outside the Federation—Defence was not planned in that way. British Guiana was already

sharing in some common services with the West Indies—the University College, the Commissioners' Offices in the United Kingdom and in North America, etc. These could not go on after West Indian Independence just precisely as they were now—changes ought to be planned now, not later. He and his colleagues were not asking British Guiana to enter into negotiations about such matters now; but they were asking British Guiana to exchange views at Ministerial level. Dr. and Mrs. Jagan showed by their reactions that they had never thought of these things. Dr. Jagan had promised to consult his colleagues and to write to Dr. LaCorbiniere in a few days but the latter wished me to impress on Jagan that a decision was urgent. The Federal Ministers had their plans to make: they wanted to come here first, but if they were not to come here they would have to go to British Honduras.

I asked my visitor frankly what his relations were with the Jagans. Were they personal friends? He said that he was very friendly with Dr. Jagan and implied that he was even more friendly with Mrs. Jagan. They had been very frank with him. They had told him that the time for a visit was inopportune as they were preoccupied with attacks on them by the Roman Catholic Church, the development of the "Third Force" and so forth. He had replied that these were no concern of his, these were internal problems that they had to solve for themselves; he was concerned with external affairs, with the maintenance of close relations between British territories throughout the Caribbean that had interests in common. I asked whether he thought that Jagan really intended to consult his colleagues and come to an objective decision or whether he might not think that this was just a polite brush-off. It was not unusual for Jagan, who was not, as LaCorbiniere very readily agreed, one readily given to taking a decision in any matter of difficulty, to say he would consult his colleagues and decide later, when in fact he wanted to say "No" but could not bring himself to it there and then. LaCorbiniere said that he thought it much more likely that the formula used meant that Jagan would *not* send the invitation, but he wanted me to secure a decision one way or the other quickly. He stressed, somewhat to my mystification, the immediate urgency of the matter, said that it must be within the next ten days, and added that if the British Guiana Ministers said "No", then the Federal Ministers would wash their hands of them, let it be known that they had offered friendship but had been spurned and there would be no further opportunity. This seemed an unjustifiably hasty line to take but I did not comment on it.

An opportunity occurred at a social function on October 21 for me to ask Jagan what he intended to do about it. With me too, he was frank enough. He said that he intended to write and say that it was impossible for him and his colleagues to give any formal invitation to a party of Federal Ministers to come at this time. The PPP were busily engaged in preparing themselves for a stiff electoral campaign. They would not be advocating Federation during that campaign. If three Federal Ministers came to Georgetown on the invitation of the Government of British Guiana or of the PPP members of that Government, the PPP would be accused of having changed their stand on the issue of Federation. The whole thing was a racket by Grantley Adams and LaCorbiniere [sic]; they were in trouble over Jamaica—Wills Isaacs was going to split the PNP and lead a wing against Manley; the Federal Ministers were looking for something to show how strong and successful they were; they wanted to capture British Guiana. If all that was needed was an exchange of views about Defence, the University College and so forth, that could be achieved in Port of Spain or in London. (Trouble over Jamaica would certainly supply the explanation for

LaCorbiniere's insistence on the need for action within ten days, which otherwise has no meaning for me.)

I said to Jagan that I appreciated his political difficulties over inviting a party of the leading Federal Ministers to come here just now. If Grantley Adams, LaCorbiniere and Bradshaw all came, it could hardly be claimed that they were not coming for "negotiations" of some sort, but only for an exchange of views. On the other hand, I thought it would be sensible of him to reply saying that he would welcome a visit by Sir Grantley Adams. It is reasonable for the Prime Minister of the Federation, with which British Guiana has so many ties even if it is not at present seeking to join, to visit this neighbouring British territory—it would be reasonable even if we were not British. And although Jagan might suffer political disadvantage if he invited a party of Federal Ministers to come, he could also suffer political disadvantage if it became known that he had declared himself and his Party unwilling even to receive a friendly visit from Sir Grantley Adams. (I admit to some doubt in my own mind whether if Jagan asked Sir Grantley alone, the latter's colleagues would think this satisfactory and if a visit would result from it; but it would at least avoid a slamming of the door.) Jagan said he would think over what I had said. No doubt this is much the same treatment as LaCorbiniere was to get—however, we shall see.

By pure chance, I had raised with Jagan on the morning of LaCorbiniere's arrival my wish to return a little of your hospitality by inviting you to Georgetown for a private visit. Jagan had welcomed the idea. Lest he should think that my enquiry of him had anything to do with the LaCorbiniere [sic] visit, I raised the matter again on October 21 and he laughingly acquitted me of any sinister plans and again said that he would be very pleased if you and Lady Hailes would come.

On September 13, MacKintosh¹ wrote to me (WIS 1381/20/02) about Eric Williams's remarks to the Secretary of State and in Woodford Square in June about the need for British Guiana to join the Federation. He said:

"I take it that you would agree that our own attitude should be to hope that British Guiana will come in to the Federation (on the ground that independence will make better sense on that basis than in isolation) and to do nothing which would prejudice that aim, but to avoid saying anything ourselves in favour of it which might produce an opposite reaction among British Guiana politicians, and hope that the advantages of Federation may come increasingly to be seen spontaneously by the latter."

I agree that the C.O. should do as MacKintosh says; and, as I have told you, and as I told LaCorbiniere, [sic] although I think that British Guiana will have a pretty sad future if it does not join the Federation, I can not do much to preach the advantages of Federation lest I defeat my own cause. It will be a pity, however, if the issue goes by default. Jagan purports still to believe in the advantages of Federation ultimately—"when we both are free and there has been a referendum"—but is keeping well away from it now; the PNC have abandoned Federation as a plank in their platform for the next election; and even conservatives like Robin Davis see some lessening of such popular support for Federation as there was. (Eric Williams's pretensions do not always commend him to Guianese as a desirable associate and a potential master.) There is little "hope that the advantages of Federation may come increasingly to be

¹ A M Mackintosh, private secretary to the secretary of state.

seen spontaneously by" Guianese politicians: the realities of next year's internal self-government are still largely ignored here and, as LaCorbiniere told me he had heard for himself in one afternoon in our Legislature, schoolboyish debate and the exchange of personal vituperation substitute for serious planning for the imminent switch of responsibility. A visit from Grantley Adams would not damage the chances of Federation, however ill he was received—and I do not think that he would be ill received: and it might improve them.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Ambler Thomas.

136 CO 1031/4270, no 25, enclosure 25 Oct 1960
[Montserrat]: minute by Mr Bramble to D A Wiles¹ on the financial and economic concerns of Montserrat

[E G Donohoe, principal, CO, West Indian Dept 'A', had earlier minuted on Montserrat: '... in Montserrat, perhaps more than any other of the small islands, the idea of living on the dole is most firmly implanted. I can trace this to the days when Sir Kenneth Blackburne had to fight hard to overcome Mr. Bramble's opposition to schemes for self-help ("Do it yourself") housing. At that time Mr. Bramble played on the popular notion that it was for Her Majesty's Government to do things for Montserrat rather than help it to help itself. The remaining Federated Leeward Islands—St. Kitts and Antigua—perhaps because of better resources, have in recent years tried much harder to be self-sufficient. This year when Mr. Bramble became Chief Minister his illusions have grown. His megalomania and inefficiency have hindered the territory from making any plans for a C.D.&W. programme. There is moreover a risk that C.D.&W. expenditure already approved will be misapplied on the departure of the virtually sacked Director of Agriculture. At some time or other Mr. Bramble will have to realize (perhaps made to realize) that a "public assistance" outlook is incompatible with constitutional advance but we have not yet made up our minds who is to tackle this job or when' (CO 1031/4270, minute by Donohoe, 12 Oct 1960).]

I have the honour to refer to your letter No. P/C.15, dated 18th October, in which you informed me of the Secretary of State's reply to my telegram concerning apprehension here with regards to the financial and economic conditions of this colony upon the attainment of West Indies Independence.

I do agree that there may be some substance in what the Secretary of State has said. He considers "that the right place to discuss the problem, in the first instance, is at the Inter-Governmental Conference, and at the Independence Conference, which it is hoped will follow next year". With regards to the meeting² of the Secretary of State with Premiers and Chief Ministers and my own meeting with him, in my view, nothing more was extracted from the Secretary of State than what could possibly be expected from a trained English diplomat. The vague promises that the West Indies will get help, regardless of what it is called, did not in any way answer my questions as to what will become of this grant-in-aid colony after Independence, or whether it was consistent with British policy to grant Independence to people whose economy is of [sic] such, that they are unable to pay for their essential public services.

I deliberately muffled myself on the subject of Independence at all past conferences, and have been determined to continue doing so until I have had the full opportunity of putting certain proposals before the Colonial Office, for the simple reason that my

¹ Administrator, Montserrat, 1960–1965.

² See 128.

own views are exactly the same as those of Sir Alexander Bustamante, namely, that the British Government is smartly throwing off the burden of these exploited and neglected colonies on the shoulders of Trinidad and Jamaica, under the guise of Independence. Things will go very well for a short time until the elation of being an Independent nation has subsided, then the people of these poor grant-in-aid colonies will hear from their two wealthiest partners, "We are not the ones who have exploited you. We cannot carry you." The British Government, at such time, will tell us, "You are the ones who have asked for your Independence." The Right Honourable P. Gordon Walker,³ writing in a Commonwealth review in 1955, hinted this when he said *inter alia*: "The British Government has certain selfish aims in Federation." Mr. D. J. Morgan⁴ of Manchester University made it clearer in his letter to "The Economist" (November 21st, 1959) when he spoke of Jamaica's unreadiness to take over from the United Kingdom the subsidization of those units still unable to balance their budgets.

From the short discussion in your office, I believe you should be fully aware of the fact that members of the Chamber of Commerce and leading people of this community are quite conscious of what is coming. In the absence of any further opportunity to put the views of this colony before the Colonial Office, and in the light of what the Secretary of State has said, I take it that I am free to state my views publicly.

I do not know what was the nature of your covering telegram in this case, but I will not hesitate to say that this system of covering telegrams is rank colonialism, and fully reveals the insincerity of the British Government while pretending that we are granted internal self-government.

I am enclosing a copy of this minute to be forwarded to the Secretary of State.⁵

³ P Gordon Walker, formerly S of S for Commonwealth relations, 'No easy path of Caribbean Federation', *New Commonwealth*, 17 Oct 1955, copy in CO 1031/1695, no 281.

⁴ D J Morgan, author of *The official history of colonial development*, in five volumes (London, 1980).

⁵ Bramble had wanted to visit London but he was told that ministers could not find the time to see him. A R Thomas visited the West Indies in Nov-Dec 1960 and had a meeting with Bramble which he recorded in a diary of his stay. Upon being told that if Montserrat were to continue as a subsidised British colony its constitutional status might have to be revised, Bramble surprised Thomas by saying 'he wouldn't mind that!' 'Bluff called', Thomas played his 'second card' to the effect that HMG could not contemplate colonial status indefinitely for a territory which could conveniently group itself with others in an independent federation. If Montserrat stayed out and then had to reapply, it would be in a far less favourable position. Federation would bring benefits in the form of greater outside aid; secession would lose benefits such as shipping and air services. 'Bramble protested but I said that Montserrat must grow away from a dole economy. Bramble said that this was tantamount to forcing Montserrat to join some other Power—U.S.A., Spain, etc.! Not easy, but I got a lot of points across' (CO 1031/4270, no 29, extract from Thomas's diary).

137 CO 1031/4234, no 90

25 Oct 1960

[Defence]: letter from R J Vile¹ to C W Wright² on the question of stationing British forces in the federation after independence

At our request, the Chiefs of staff last year considered U.K. defence interests and obligations in the Carribean area in the light of the approaching independence of the

¹ Assistant secretary, CO, head of Defence Dept.

² Assistant secretary, Ministry of Defence.

Federation of the West Indies (COS(59)227).³ They concluded *inter alia* that a battalion of U.K. troops would still be required for the British territories outside the federation (Bahamas, British Guiana, British Honduras) after The West Indies became independent; that the most convenient location for the battalion HQ and 2 companies would be in Jamaica, where accommodation was available; that staging and overflying facilities in the Federation were desirable, although not essential; and that these U.K. requirements should be incorporated in a Defence Agreement with the Federation.

2. In recommending that our troops should remain in Jamaica after the Federation becomes independent, the Chiefs of Staff drew attention to two disadvantages viz, that we must face the possibility of having to move out of the Federation at some future date (possibly at short notice), and that there was a risk that our freedom to use our troops outside Jamaica might be inhibited if the operations met with the disapproval of the Federal Government (e.g. racial troubles in Bahamas).

3. Since then, a number of other difficulties have become apparent. The most important of these is the fact that the continued presence of British troops in Jamaica after independence will inevitably lead the Federal Government (consciously or unconsciously) to rely on their assistance in maintaining internal security or essential services. Within the last twelve months, U.K. troops have assisted in the Rastafarian operations and have been asked to man the fire brigade services in the event of a strike of the fire brigade. The performance of duties such as these after independence by British troops might in some circumstances be politically embarrassing, and the situation would be even more delicate if the Federal Government wanted either to intervene in an internal security crisis in a unit territory against the advice of the local government, or (to take an extreme case) prevent a unit territory from seceding. The temptation to the Federal Government to call in British troops, and the political embarrassment to the U.K. if such aid was granted or refused, would be avoided if no British troops were stationed in the Federation. This question is discussed further in paragraph 7 below.

4. The other difficulties arise over the Defence Agreement, which will have to be far more detailed and complicated if British troops remain. It would in fact have to be on the Malayan or Cyprus model (complete with a Status of Forces Agreement, which always leads to lengthy negotiation) rather than on the shortened Nigerian or Sierra Leone pattern. The fact that we required this major concession would put the West Indians in a far stronger bargaining position with regard to financial assistance for their forces. In addition, the West India Regiment have been counting on taking possession of the barracks in Jamaica at present occupied by our troops, and we might well be faced by a request for capital assistance towards alternative accommodation for the Jamaica battalion.

5. These various considerations have led us to examine afresh the need for the British Battalion, which has been retained since 1960 at the request of our Secretary of State. Added point is given to this examination by the heavy costs of stationing this battalion in the Caribbean, estimated at some £600,000 a year above its normal cost, which will doubtless be even greater if the base is moved to the Bahamas. The situation in the non-Federal territories is as follows:—

³ See 106.

(i) *Bahamas*

Until July 1960, the company garrison was found from the Caribbean battalion. It is now found from a U.K.-based battalion, on a six-months tour basis. The Commander Caribbean area has now recommended that a garrison of platoon strength should be found from the Caribbean battalion. The Governor would like to retain a small garrison.

(ii) *British Guiana*

As a result of the Constitutional Conference held earlier this year, British Guiana is due to have elections before August 1961, which will give British Guiana full internal self-government; and independence may follow within as little as two years after that (i.e. by mid-1963). The Governor has recommended that the British garrison should not be withdrawn until the elections had been held and the new Government has shown that it will function adequately.

(iii) *British Honduras*

In contrast to the other two territories, the threat to British Honduras is external, not internal, and at least for so long as Ydigoras remains President in Guatemala, there is a possibility that he may use force to achieve his aims (JIC(60)46, Appendix D). We therefore see an indefinite requirement for a company here.

6. To sum up, the essential requirement is two companies (one each for British Guiana and British Honduras) until after the British Guiana elections (autumn 1961), and one company in British Honduras thereafter. Bearing in mind also that the battalion costs £600,000 in excess costs to maintain in the Caribbean area, there is a case for considering whether from the point of view of strict U.K. military requirements our commitments after The West Indies achieves independence can be met without stationing a full battalion, with extensive military backing, in the Caribbean area.

7. There are wider political considerations which may point to a different conclusion. As you know, the Governor-General has warned us that we may be faced with a definite request to assist the West Indies, by special agreement and for a limited period after independence, in carrying out internal security responsibilities and to relieve the Government of responsibilities for external defence. It is our general object to be as helpful to the independent West Indies in their early years as we reasonably can, bearing in mind that independence is likely to come about before they are fully equipped to shoulder all its burdens. Provided that it was at the direct request (made known publicly) of the Federal Government, on terms freely negotiated with them, the political difficulty of meeting such a request even for internal security purposes (cf paragraph 3 above) should not be insuperable and it may be that, if it is pressed, it will be less embarrassing to accede than to refuse. The question will then arise whether we should keep troops stationed in the Federation for this purpose or whether we could rely on bringing in troops from outside when we agreed to give such help. The former arrangement would no doubt be more convenient for the West Indies, as would similarly be the latter for the U.K. We should of course make it clear that any extra cost would be a liability on The West Indies, and this would have to be taken into account in the overall financial settlement which we shall in any case have to negotiate with them.

8. This question will call for Ministerial decision, but in considering if it will be

important to know whether, as suggested in paragraph 6 above, our commitments in the area after The West Indies achieves independence could in the absence of such a request be met without stationing a full battalion with its administrative backing in the area; and if so, what forces would in fact be necessary. We should be grateful if you could arrange for this examination to be carried out.⁴

⁴ The view of the Joint Planning Staff on this, as submitted to the Chiefs of Staff, was as follows: 'Militarily we would like to maintain our land forces at about their present strength and to continue to station Headquarters Caribbean Area and part of the garrison in Jamaica, if we could be assured that there would be no restrictions on their use elsewhere. If, for political reasons, it does not prove practicable to retain United Kingdom troops in the Federation, the alternative with the least political and military disadvantages appears to be the Bahamas. However, since overseas expenditure is likely to be an overriding consideration and the cost of building and living in the Bahamas is particularly high we would accept the disadvantages of having no locally available and acclimatized reserves, relying on reinforcement from the United Kingdom. The Caribbean garrison would then consist of an under-posted battalion with battalion headquarters and at least one platoon in the Bahamas, one company in British Honduras and one company in British Guiana' (DEFE 6/65, 'Military implications of the attainment of independence by the West Indies', Annex I to JP(60)116(Final), report by JPS to COS, 4 Nov 1960).

138 CO 1031/3505

27 Oct 1960

[Planning]: minute by G W Jamieson on the case for UK financial assistance put forward by the Trinidad government

[Extract]

[Jamieson is commenting here on *Economic Development of the Independent West Indies Federation: Part I The Case for United Kingdom Assistance* (Trinidad: Office of Premier and Minister of Finance, Oct 1960, copy in CO 1031/3505, no 69).]

I have now gone through the Trinidad Government's publication "Economic Development of the Independent West Indies Federation. I—The Case for U.K. Assistance".

2. This is a clear and well written document. It is persuasive. It is only when one reads it carefully that one realises the shaky foundations on which it is written and the quite unfounded assumptions which it makes.

3. The paper has a pervasive atmosphere of mercantilist thinking. There is hardly any reference to the fact that economic progress (in the free world at any rate) has come about by the force and vigour of natural economic forces. Although it is never explicitly stated there seems to be an assumption that economic progress and development depends primarily upon governmental activity and "planning". Planning is indeed "a blessed word". If it is true as the sociologists argue that every society needs its irrational myth to provide it with a dynamic it very much looks as though this will be provided for the West Indies by a mystical reverence for "planning". This major unspoken postulate is to my mind a far more serious deficiency in the document than the further faults with which I deal below. The report also assumes that British Guiana will be a member of the Federation. There is no foundation at present for the assumption. The present state of play is that British Guiana is if anything drifting away from the Federation having been already virtually promised separate independence while because of Dr. Jagan's links with Castro he is becoming increasingly suspect to the rest of the West Indies.

4. The paper assumes quite uncritically that a proper aim of policy is the

development of the small islands up to a point when they are more or less on a level with the larger islands. This has indeed been an assumption in West Indian political thinking for some years past. Whereas I have formerly regarded this as nothing more than an illusion which would one day be shown to be false I have not until hitherto realised just how dangerous a fallacy this assumption is. If it were applied to the case of the United Kingdom it would mean that H.M.G. would accept that it was obliged to develop say Denbighshire or Ross-shire to the same level of economic activity as Yorkshire or South Wales. To make this comparison seems to me enough to demonstrate the complete folly of this argument, which would obviously require enormous sums of money and, in the end, almost certainly not achieve its objective. This would be equally true in the West Indies. It is feasible to pour large sums of capital into the small islands to provide the basic public utilities—roads, harbour facilities, electricity, etc. There is of course no guarantee whatever that these facilities would tempt private enterprise to invest in the islands. Entrepreneurs will inevitably see the solid advantages and facilities available in Trinidad and Jamaica, and, other things being equal, will go to these islands. The end result will be that money which could have achieved real ends if spent in Jamaica and Trinidad will be largely wasted if poured into an attempt really to develop the small islands.

5. The time has therefore come, I suggest, when we must make it clear to the West Indians that we do not share the view that the proper aim of policy is to seek to develop the small islands to the position of the large ones. This does not mean that we think that there should be no further development of these islands. There will inevitably have to be social investment (schools, hospital, etc.) because of the population [increase] in these territories. The population is likely to rise 50% within the next fifteen years unless some new factor, falling birthrate or rise in emigration, offsets this. We should put it quite clearly to the West Indians that we regard the position of, say, Montserrat as no different in principle from that of our own poorer counties. It is because Montserrat and the other small islands are separate political entities that their poverty and dependence is shown up. If some of our counties in the less developed parts of the U.K. were in the same position constitutionally as the small West Indian islands, the same would be shown to be true of them. This, indeed, is of course inevitably the case in *any* country. It is true of some of the poorer states in the United States. It is true of the smaller provinces of Canada. No country can avoid having richer parts and poorer parts and it has to be faced simply as one of the facts of life that the richer will have to support the poorer. If one compares Tables VI and VII in the paper (one is tempted to ask whether the use of different units of account is an attempt at camouflage) it is clear that several of the units of the Federation are within striking distance of the standard of living of European countries. It is clear that Trinidad's gross domestic product per capita of \$W.I.822 is not at all bad compared with France's figure of \$U.S.741. I think we might find (and I intend to set in train some research towards this end) that the Trinidad figure might be as high as several European countries, e.g., Portugal or Greece.

6. This problem has of course two aspects to it. On the one hand there are some kinds of objective standards in that India is so obviously so very much poorer than, say, the U.K. On the other hand (as we argued in our paper¹ for the Americans and

¹ See 133, note 2.

Canadians) the new problem is not so much one of absolute need or otherwise as of *expectations*. The West Indies have near-European expectations and do not compare themselves so much with Africa or Asia as with Europe and North America. Nevertheless, it is not necessarily the case that we must go along with them in these expectations. My own view is that when it comes to the negotiations on the financial settlement we must talk out quite plainly and remind them of the fact that the U.K.'s responsibilities are worldwide, that there are many countries much worse off than they, and that when it comes to splitting up the cake of available U.K. assistance they must expect to get a relatively small slice. I am convinced that we must meet head-on this attitude of self-pity which creeps through documents such as this with a forthright assertion of the fact that the West Indies are at least lower middle class in the nations of the world and not, as this paper tends to argue, among the under-paid and underprivileged. . . .

139 CO 1031/3505, no 79

3 Nov 1960

'Visit of West Indian ministers: financial assistance at independence':^(a)
CO memorandum for UK delegation on the 'most important single question' still to be answered in relation to West Indian independence

The West Indian leaders who are coming to London for the Stage 1 United States Bases Conference opening on 3rd November have asked for a general discussion of United Kingdom financial assistance after independence. We have replied as in telegram No. 594 attached.¹

2. This settlement is almost certainly the most important single question still to be answered in relation to West Indian independence. Our political position vis-à-vis the West Indies is now such that there is little else constructive that we can still do. They still look to us for advice and assistance in the defence field, with the creation of their diplomatic machinery, and in various other directions. But none of these matters has the same importance, or arouses the same emotional response, as that of what direct aid the U.K. will still give them after independence.^(b)

3. Many West Indians suspect that the U.K. wishes to get rid of them as an embarrassment and cause of expense. Inevitably the period around independence will give further grounds for these suspicions. We may have to tell them before long that the last British battalion in the Caribbean is to be withdrawn, leaving a single company in British Honduras. They have already seen the strength of the Royal Navy gradually diminish. There are now only two frigates in the area. They already know that we have told the Americans and Canadians that we do not regard the problem of ensuring a continued flow of development capital after independence to the

^(a) The Treasury and C.R.O. have agreed this brief at official level.

^(b) One complication is that several of Dr. Williams' ministers remain opposed to his intention of "a deal" with Mr. Manley, which would produce a Federation which would at least initially be on the weak Jamaican pattern. The Governor of Trinidad believes that their fear can only be allayed, and their support obtained for the "deal" by a generous financial settlement by the U.K. which would assure them that the new federation will have sufficient resources [see 130 and 132].

¹ Not printed.

Federation as solely a U.K. responsibility. Our approach to the financial settlement should take account of these suspicions.

4. Naturally the West Indians will pitch their claims high. In 1956 a meeting of the political leaders of the West Indies concluded that the new Federation would need a "float" of £100 million from Her Majesty's Government but they subsequently doubled the figure! Our only indication so far of their present hopes for post-independence aid has been the publication of a Trinidad Government memorandum (copy attached)² which argues that the U.K. should provide a ten-year programme of development grants totalling £66 millions, or an average rate of approximately £6.6 millions a year. The Federal Government have not yet said what they think of the Trinidad proposals, but it is safe to assume that they will not regard them as unreasonable and they can argue that such a volume of assistance could be profitably used, especially if a serious attempt is to be made to float the small islands out of grant-in-aid. There seems no prospect that the U.K. will be able to give anything approaching these sums, as is shown by the following table of economic aid expenditure already incurred in recent years for *all* overseas countries including the colonies:

	£ Million's		
	Average 1955/57	1958	1959
Current grants to Governments	50	51	53
U.K. Government lending	19	21	50
Subscriptions to International lending Agencies.	8	17	23
C.D.C. Loan's	7	5	5
Total:	84	94	131

Apart from claims for general development assistance, there may also be requests for further help with the cost of the Federal capital (particularly if the Bases Conference raises any likelihood of release of part of Chaguaramas). There may also be suggestions that the Federal Government needs a cash reserve to weather the early years of independence.

5. The following statements have already been made:—

(a) *The Statement of Intent* made by the Secretary of State to Mr. Manley in January (copy attached).³ This envisaged that, subject only to proof of need nearer the time and Parliamentary approval where necessary,

(i) we should hand over at independence the entire balance of their Colonial Development and Welfare allocation. Generally, emergent territories have only been given the balance on schemes already approved, and what is proposed for the West Indies is therefore an improvement on what has been enjoyed in earlier cases.

(ii) we will continue grant-in-aid until the end of the 1959/63 quinquennium. This means honouring the figure of £8.75 millions (£1.75 millions per annum) which we negotiated with them in 1958. We shall also be prepared to consider continuing this assistance for the further quinquennium 1964/68, but on a

² See 138.

³ See 117.

tapering scale. (The West Indians will argue that, as the 1956 British Caribbean Federation Act envisaged grant-in-aid for ten years (i.e. the two quinquennia) after the federation came into being, H.M.G. are under a moral obligation to continue the payments without any attempt at tapering despite the fact (which has already been put to them) that the items of that Act could only relate to the period before independence. This question is one we shall have to negotiate with them in due course.)

(iii) We agreed to discuss with the Americans and Canadians the possibility of a joint programme of development assistance. This is dealt with more fully in paragraph 6 below).

(b) The Secretary of State took the opportunity to give *assurances during his visit to the Federation at Whitsun*⁴ that independence did not mean the end or even necessarily any reduction in the volume of assistance from the United Kingdom.⁵ The Secretary of State did not speak in concrete terms or go beyond what he had already said in the Statement of Intent, and these assurances were necessary at that point to assist in restoring political confidence in Her Majesty's Government's good intentions. On the other hand the publicity given to these public assurances (the Statement of Intent was circulated only to governments on a confidential basis) may have built up a climate of greater expectancy than previously existed.

(c) A despatch issued in June informed the Federal Government that H.M.G. were willing, on certain conditions, to provide up to *£1.2 millions for the construction of barracks* in Trinidad necessary for the expansion of the West India Regiment to its planned two-battalion strength.

Although the West Indians will no doubt regard all this as small beer, in fact considerable sums are involved.

6. In pursuance of our undertaking to seek to associate the Americans and Canadians with a joint programme of development assistance (paragraph 5(c) (iii) above) we have already provided these governments with a memorandum⁶ setting out the probable financial and economic situation of the Federation after independence (NOTE: This should not be disclosed to the West Indians.) The Canadians have not yet reacted, except to seek some additional statistical information, and it is possible that their own domestic financial difficulties are acting as a restraint. They are already operating a \$10 million aid programme to the Federation, which they had announced as aimed to cover the period up to the end of 1962. They are however anxious to maintain their close links with the Federation and are unlikely to refuse to enter into discussions. The Americans, on the other hand, have already announced that their \$500 millions Social Development Programme for Latin America will also benefit the Federation, though this decision was in fact taken before our memorandum was received.⁷ The Americans have also indicated that this is not necessarily their sole response to the needs of the Federation, but *we are not free yet to disclose this* (except on a private basis to the Prime Minister and the Premiers).

7. The Americans anticipate that they may be faced with demands for assistance during the Bases Conference. Neither we nor the Americans wish to see the Bases

⁴ Emphasis throughout in original.

⁶ See 133, note 2.

⁵ See 128.

⁷ See 133.

Conference entangled within the aid issue. It is probable that some of the West Indians will feel likewise; Dr. Williams has gone on record as refusing to consider any suggestion that he might sell "the sacred soil of Trinidad". The Americans propose to deal with any such intrusion of this subject by reference to the probability that there will be discussions between the three donor countries to consider the West Indian needs. We agree with this. It is, however, possible that the Americans may also wish to go on to say that "if all goes well" they may propose to the other governments concerned that a start on the aid discussions might be made concurrently with the Stage III Bases Conference. We think (and have told the Americans) that this is suspiciously like the "No bases, no aid" approach, that we are all agreed would be undesirable.⁸ In any case we believe the two sets of talks will each have its own tempo, and that it would not be desirable, and may not be possible, to attempt to dovetail them together.

8. In addition we hope to obtain Treasury agreement to giving a further measure of assistance to the Federation either before, or shortly after, independence, including,

(a) A Commonwealth Assistance Loan.⁹

(b) Technical Assistance (though the Treasury have agreed up to now that this should not come into effect until they have used up their Colonial Development and Welfare balance (paragraph 5(a)(i)).

(c) *possibly* further capital assistance for defence. They will require further barracks in Jamaica and we may either have to assist this construction financially or make a gift of the existing War Department barracks when the United Kingdom battalion is withdrawn. In addition they aim to form a Navy and we may have to assist them to acquire one or two small *warships* (e.g. minesweepers or similar vessels).

(d) assistance in training diplomatic staff and in providing training facilities for their armed forces.

They will almost certainly benefit in most of these ways *but these questions have not yet been considered or approved by the Treasury and nothing can be said to the delegation on them.*

9. *We are in no position to make any additional concession or promises at this juncture. It is therefore suggested that the Secretary of State should take the following line:—*

(a) Repeat his general assurances of the United Kingdom's continue readiness to help the Federation, adding that to this end we shall try as energetically as possible to persuade Americans and Canadians to join us in a common endeavour.

(b) Seek West Indian agreement that it will be best to discuss this in detail when the shape of the Federation is clearer after the Inter-governmental conference and perhaps also after the Jamaica referendum. (The West Indians might be asked for their views on the last point: we could begin to discuss confidentially before the referendum on the assumption that Jamaica still stays in, but if this leaked it might affect the referendum in some way. Mr. Manley's views would be welcome). We could then aim to complete our discussions by the time of the London independence conference.

⁸ See 133, note 5.

⁹ But see 132.

(c) Meanwhile it will be valuable to us to know the lines of West Indian thinking. Mr. Williams has given a stimulating impetus to all our thinking with his recent paper, which we and no doubt his colleagues will want to study much more closely than time has allowed so far. He might be asked to talk about his paper (and his colleagues might be asked for their own ideas bearing in mind that Mr. Bradshaw does not like Dr. Williams and may be disposed to regard it as a piece of interference).

10. The main aim, in short, should be to draw the West Indians. But it will do no harm if the realities as seen by the “givers” begin to be realised by the West Indians. The Secretary of State might therefore, if it seems propitious, make some of the following points also:—

(a) The United Kingdom has world-wide responsibilities, among which is her cardinal duty to maintain the stability of Sterling. What assistance we can give the world is largely dependant [sic] on our balance of payments. In any case the amount of aid is limited, and there inevitably has to be a choice of priorities between claimants.

(b) The Federation is in fact one of the middle class countries of the World (Trinidad's Gross National Product per head approaches that of the poorer European countries). While we appreciate that the problem cannot be seen solely in these terms—it is as much one of *expectations*—it must nevertheless weigh with us.

(c) The West Indian problem does not seem to be so much one of general overall financial difficulty as a question of the position of the small islands. To a point this is a problem in every country. If some of our poorer counties (e.g. Denbighshire, Ross-shire) were separate political entities like the Leeward and Windward islands they too would become problem territories living on some form of grant-in-aid. In a federation this problem is simply revealed by separate accounting, whereas it is concealed in a unitary country. Our hope is therefore that the richer units will accept an obligation to assist the poorer ones.

140 CO 1031/3506, no 86

22 Nov 1960

[Finance]: CO record of a meeting with West Indian ministers at Lancaster House on 8 Nov¹

Lord Perth referred to the communique issued at the conclusion of the Bases talks, in which the U.K. and the U.S. reaffirmed their continuing interest in assisting towards the economic development and stability of The West Indies during the difficult period following the attainment of independence. The West Indies had already had an indication of the U.K.'s position from the statement² made to Mr. Manley by the Secretary of State in January, 1960, in which he said that subject to proof of need and Parliamentary approval where necessary:—

¹ The meeting was chaired by Lord Perth and attended by officials from the CO, CRO and Treasury. Delegations from the federal government and from the governments of Antigua, Barbados, Jamaica, St Lucia and Trinidad represented the West Indies.

² See 117.

- (i) Her Majesty's Government might be expected to hand over at independence the entire balance of the Colonial Development and Welfare allocation,
- (ii) H.M.G. would be willing to continue to make available the unused balance of the current five year block grant-in-aid and to consider continuing this assistance on a tapering basis for the following quinquennium.
- (iii) H.M.G. would discuss with the Americans and Canadians the possibility of a joint programme of development assistance.

In addition, the Secretary of State had made statements during his Whitsun visit to the West Indies which reaffirmed this position.

With regard to point (iii) H.M.G. were anxious to enlist the interest of the Americans and Canadians, since the U.K. could not hope to provide all the Federation's needs in the years following independence. The U.K. would stretch itself, but there were, of course, many other claimants for aid among the undeveloped countries. Financial assistance would have to take different forms from that given before independence. For instance, exchequer loans under the C.D. and W. Act would no longer be available, but Commonwealth Assistance Loans could be considered. The U.K. would be willing to help as far as possible in trade matters, e.g. with sugar, citrus and bananas. This was often as important as direct financial help.

Consideration should also be given to the question of timing. He hoped that it would be possible to hold a conference with The West Indies, Canada and the U.S., but it would be difficult to have this before The West Indies had held their Inter-Governmental Conference, planned for January or thereabouts. Bearing this in mind, it might be possible to hold a meeting of Ministers or officials early next year, but it would be necessary to do some thinking about the agenda. We knew that the Americans, in principle, would be ready to come, and we hoped the Canadians would also be willing to be present.

2. *Sir Grantley Adams* said he could speak not only for the Federation, but for Jamaica, Trinidad and the other units, when he said that he hoped the meeting would set the general policy for post-independence aid. Assistance should be of a substantial order, as the position of The West Indies was a special one: they were poorer than any of the dependent territories which had so far achieved independence, most of which, such as Malaya and Ghana, had substantial resources. They needed something over and above what had been done for them. He did not wish to go into details, but The West Indies had a particularly strong claim on the United Kingdom. Unlike the African territories they had no tribal tradition, or indeed any national tradition different from that of the U.K. Although The West Indies were poor agricultural countries, they did not have to worry about revolts, etc. They hoped for generosity. If they seemed to be asking for more than other emergent territories, they were not asking in the dark. Trinidad had probably studied the problem in more detail than the other Unit governments, and if the broad principles set out in the Trinidad memorandum³ could be accepted, that would be the minimum The West Indies expected to get. If they succeeded in convincing H.M.G. that the Trinidad figure was the one to work to, he did not think they could expect to get very much further at the present meeting.

3. *Dr. Williams* said that, without prejudice to what the Prime Minister had just said, he would like to put forward on behalf of Trinidad and Tobago certain ideas

³ See 138 and 139.

which perhaps the U.K. might like to consider. He was happy to know that the U.K. were thinking of handing over the entire balance of the C.D. and W. allocation, and would be prepared to provide grant-in-aid until 1968, and he was interested in the proposal to provide joint aid with the United States and Canada. Trinidad and Tobago would, however, like to see assistance from the U.K. separated from that from the United States and Canada. The question of grants should be kept distinct from that of exchequer loans, and the emphasis should be on grants rather than loans. Mr. Bird would wish to speak about the necessity for providing cheaper money. The West Indies needed loans at reasonably low rates of interest for unreasonably long periods. He wished to suggest that in addition to the Prime Minister's statement, certain general principles should be accepted:—

(i) U.K. assistance to the Federation and its constituent territories over the 10-year period after independence should be not less than the U.K. assistance given to The West Indies for the ten-year period 1950 to 1960. This would be of the order of £25.6 m. (\$123 m. W.I.).

(ii) Any assistance from the U.K. should follow as closely as possible the quantum given to other emergent territories.

(iii) Assistance should be on a scale which would enable The West Indies, especially the smaller territories, to make up the deficiencies in their essential services, which the present governments had inherited from their predecessors. For instance, Antigua had put a 5-year development programme amounting to \$4½ m. which, however, excluded the cost of the deep water harbour, sewerage scheme and electricity distribution. The St. Lucia allocation of just over \$4 millions over a 5-year period was no more than a drop in the bucket. What was likely to be available was a mere 20% of what was required. The deficiencies were an obstacle to social progress and economic development. He had been closely concerned with development and welfare planning and was convinced that it was not sufficient to say that education and the provision of hospital beds were social services—they were primarily aids to production.

(iv) The emphasis should be on the provision of further employment facilities, which was related to the question of migration both in and outside the area. The efforts made in Puerto Rico had not been sufficient to give them the higher standards at which they aimed. In any case this was not a cure for migration. It would be a great mistake to attempt any restriction of the urge to migrate. He hoped the capital of the Commonwealth would not accept the backward emigration concepts of some other parts of the Commonwealth. Territories were being denuded rapidly of their manpower.

In addition attention must be paid to the prospects of the European Common Market which he assumed the U.K. would join. This would inevitably disrupt the West Indian economy. Without in any way attempting to state what U.K. policy should be, he wished to emphasise that the U.K. had a direct responsibility for ensuring the least possible economic disruption to The West Indies. It would be useful if the meeting could have some positive reaction from the U.K. to those four basic principles.

4. *Mr. Manley* said that at some stage they would have to have the reactions of the U.K. to the ideas which had been put forward. He welcomed the Prime Minister's and Dr. Williams' statements. These set out principles, which it was necessary to put

into a framework of purpose and scale, the latter being perhaps the more important. The West Indies had made a great effort to develop its own economy, but as a force in the world economy it had barely begun.

Jamaica had committed itself to a programme which had been carefully worked out, but which was not large enough. It would strain their own resources to the limit and for years to come they would require aid, in the shape of exchequer loans, Commonwealth loans and a special approach to the London market. This latter point was a special concern of Jamaica.

The need for special assistance to the whole area was tremendous. The figures quoted by Dr. Williams were the minimum required. It would be disastrous if The West Indies failed to achieve economic stability; political instability would follow. At some stage, all West Indian Governments would have to collaborate in a more general study requiring greater detail. He was however anxious to get the whole question of financial assistance after independence put on a new basis of thinking applicable to The West Indian scene.

He wished to keep these discussions with the U.K. quite separate from those with the U.S. and Canada. The West Indies was about to become a member of the Commonwealth and had a special position vis-à-vis the U.K. over the first few vital years. Discussions between the U.K. and The West Indies and between The West Indies and the U.S. and Canada were not inter-dependent in any way.

5. *Mr. Bird* said he was fully in accord with the principles enunciated by Dr. Williams. The question of loans and cheaper money was especially important to the smaller territories. Jamaica had a sizeable local market, but the smaller territories could not compete in getting such investment [sic]. He would like the needs of the Leeward and Windward Islands to be borne in mind, with a view to their getting loans at a cheap rate of interest.

6. *Mr. Charles* said he would like to support Mr. Bird's plea for greater development of the smaller islands.

7. *Dr. Cummins* said he wished to mention the movement of population to the U.K. He was sure more than half of the migrants would prefer to stay in Barbados, but conditions prevented them from doing so. He would like to see more done to keep people at home, especially the skilled workers.

8. *Mr. Bradshaw* made two points:—

(i) he wished to know whether any approach had already been made to the Governments of the United States and Canada with respect to the proposal put forward in the Chairman's opening address.

(ii) What would be the future of the Colonial Development Corporation after independence? They had several schemes operating in The West Indies, e.g., electricity in Grenada, St. Vincent and Dominica. Would their operations cease on independence?

9. *Lord Perth*, in answering Mr. Bradshaw's queries, said:—

(i) whilst no specific proposals had been made to the U.S. and Canada, there had been an approach suggesting the possibility of a discussion.

(ii) Schemes on which the C.D.C. was engaged would continue after independence, and new capital might be available, if demanded for their extension. But generally there would be no new C.D.C. projects after independence.

He thought there was room for doubt whether The West Indies were really worse off than other territories. For example, the Gross Domestic Product per head for 1958 in The West Indies was £130, but in Nigeria it was £25.

10. *Lord Perth* emphasised that the amount of aid the U.K. could give under-developed countries was limited. Too much would threaten the stability of sterling, and the amount we were at present making available was stretching our resources to a greater extent than was comfortable. Despite our particular regard for The West Indies, we were reluctant to accept the suggestion that U.K. aid should be separated from any other aid. The U.K. Government would be bound to take into account what might be available from outside sources, including Canada, the U.S. and international institutions. If this were not done, other U.K. dependent territories could justifiably complain. He agreed what was needed was a programme which would enable The West Indies to stand on its own feet, but each country's assistance could not be given in a vacuum. With regard to Dr. Williams' points:—

- (i) on his question of the volume of aid in the period 1950–60 H.M.G. hoped, subject only to proof of need and Parliamentary approval where necessary, to hand over the entire C.D. and W. balance and to continue grant-in-aid at its present level till the end of 1963; and they would be ready to consider the necessity of further grant-in-aid for 1964–8 on a tapering basis,
- (ii) the U.K. were ready to draw up a paper for early circulation concerning the “quantum” given to other territories, although comparisons with Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Malaya, would not be encouraging,
- (iii) the distribution of aid among the territories of The West Indies would be for the Federation itself to work out,
- (iv) emigration was a mutual problem, which we all recognised,
- (v) as regards sugar, the arrangement concerning the Commonwealth Agreement would continue. On the European Common Market, Mr. Bradshaw had attended the meeting of the Commonwealth Finance Ministers, and it was well-known that in any future negotiations with “the Six” the U.K. would consult with the Commonwealth beforehand. It would be wrong to say there might not be some change, although The West Indies could be sure they would come off no worse than other Commonwealth territories. Furthermore, over a period of time, a wider market of goods for the Commonwealth could be envisaged.

Dr. Williams and Mr. Bird had mentioned the question [of] loans at low rates of interest. If grants and loans were put together, and not considered separately, it would be seen that U.K. assistance to the overseas territories would stand comparison with anything from other sources.

11. *Mr. Manley* said that to compare the “national incomes” of different countries would be fallacious. The relevant comparison must be between countries which had reached the same stage of economic development. A country with a low national income might still have a self-sustaining economy. It was right to ask how far The West Indies had strained itself in developing its own resources, and what were the results of the efforts made. It would be found that even so there was more poverty in Jamaica than Nigeria. Without aid, there was a danger The West Indies would fail to take off, which might lead to total economic collapse, which would be inevitably followed by widespread social disruption.

12. *Lord Perth* agreed that comparison of the National Income with other territories was not conclusive. Nevertheless it was not an entirely irrelevant consideration. He would be prepared to produce a paper on the subject. *Sir Grantley Adams* said that Committee I and the Inter-governmental Conference would benefit from a statement about financial aid given to other emergent territories.

13. *Mr. Bradshaw* said that the Canadians expected their \$10 million aid to last till 1963. When he discussed the question of the residue with them in September, they were very unwilling to commit themselves to the \$400,000 contribution towards the Antigua harbour project. Their experts, too, were expensive. The West Indies should not expect too much aid from Canada.

On the "limited cake", he asked whether there would not be more cake for the West Indies to cut, after so many territories had become independent. *Lord Perth* agreed that the Canadian experts were expensive. He drew attention to the possibility of The West Indies obtaining U.K. experts by special arrangements which would not effect their main C.D. and W. allocation.

On the "limited cake", as more peoples had become independent, the demand for money for big development programmes has increased, and there was if anything an even greater pressure on the limited resources available.

14. *Mr. Manley* said that assistance given for the West India Regiment, which had been discussed now for 8 years, should not be in the context of financial aid. *Lord Perth* said he would ensure that the question was taken during the discussion on defence the following day. (The meeting then adjourned at 12.45 p.m., and resumed at 2.30 p.m.)

15. *Lord Perth* said that if those present agreed, he might say something more now about the question of U.K. assistance towards the capital costs of the West India Regiment. In a despatch to the Federal Government in June, the Secretary of State had said that Her Majesty's Government were prepared to contribute on certain conditons[sic] towards the cost of constructing barracks in Trinidad, such cost to be limited to £1.2 million. In the absence of a reply to this the Federal Government had been asked at the end of October whether allowance would need to be made in the coming U.K. budget for any part of the proffered assistance. The reply from the Federal Government indicated that construction was expected to start in 1961/62 and that they wished to discuss the matter in London. *Mr. Bradshaw* explained that the Federal Government had replied, and that there would be a contribution from Federal reserves, with a suggestion that unit Governments should also contribute. *Mr. Manley* said that The West Indies could not go ahead with the expansion of military forces until barracks had been built in Trinidad. He said that when the U.K. troops moved out, The West Indies would welcome the gift of the barracks in Jamaica. They were also interested in the procurement of supplies such as naval vessels, a helicopter, landing craft and other equipment. He understood the present re-equipment of the U.K. forces, and their reduction in strength, might lead to the availability of much serviceable equipment which he hoped would be going at knock-down prices. *Lord Perth* suggested that the question of equipment should be discussed at the defence talks on the following day.

16. *Lord Perth* said he had given further thought to the question of possible 4-power talks in the light of views expressed at the morning session and he did not wish to press the suggestion. He was bound to emphasise however that a programme of what the U.K. could do after independence could not be worked out in a vacuum.

Sooner or later what came from other sources would have a bearing and importance. No doubt The West Indies would wish to work out their overall requirements after independence; he understood a comprehensive tabulation of their needs was still to be made. He did not want to press our services, but if The West Indies required assistance in this field the U.K. had experts who could assist in the formulation of programmes. In any case, when the overall programme was ready we could put our heads together on it and consider what should be done. There was however no certainty that all that was wanted would be forthcoming; these programmes were like jigsaw puzzles and the pieces were never quite complete.

17. *Mr. Manley* asked if note could be taken of certain important aspects. We were all united in wishing at some time to explore a programme of U.S. and Canadian aid. Jamaica had proposed as far back as 1956 a Colombo-type plan based on U.S., Canadian and U.K. participation. It had been left for the U.K. to explore the idea but nothing had happened. The West Indies were just as keen on this as formerly. The Jamaican position on federation was not yet finalised and as the U.S. and Canada could not yet be informed of the date of independence, we should wait until the actual date was known and we should then be in a better position to talk. This did not mean that the time between now and the Inter-Governmental Conference could not be used to explore whether the U.S.A. could be persuaded to alter the type of aid they had so far given. At present there were two types of aid:- (a) Colombo-type plan, which provided technical assistance and (b) financial aid for a specific project, such as that given by the Development Loan Fund. The provision of an adequate amount of assistance for general development purposes was vital to the needs of the Federation. He did not think the United States or Canada would wish to talk, until they knew the scale of U.K. aid. Canada would not talk so far ahead on aid without considering trade first. If the United States and Canada knew that the United Kingdom had given special consideration to the needs of The West Indies, this might spur them on. The United States was likely to insist on aid by way of technical assistance and special projects, but nothing could take the place of the basic requirement of The West Indies for long-range aid for development. This was not likely to be forthcoming except from the United Kingdom, which had special knowledge of the type of aid provided by C.D. and W. (the value of which lay in the method by which it was given). After the job of building up basic facilities had been completed, it would be possible to turn to other people for supplementary aid. For these reasons it was essential for the U.K. and The West Indies to talk first, in order to provide a framework for talks with the U.S. and Canada.

18. *Lord Perth* said that in view of these statements he would not press the question of an early 4-Power Conference. It might however still be useful to make discreet inquiries to the U.S. about the type of aid given. Meanwhile the Federal Government might aim at producing a programme or plan, in the preparation of which the U.K. would be very ready to help. But there must be some regard to what may be possible from other people.

19. *Dr. Williams* said he wished to reinforce the point of view put by Mr. Manley. The West Indies could not agree to any suggestion that there should be a combination of what they considered to be two quite separate claims for help, that from the U.K. and that from the U.S. The British Government had a direct responsibility to The West Indies; defence and external aid were U.K. problems and the U.K. must accept responsibility for current markets in The West Indies. But the

U.K. connection with the Common Market, and their concern with banana/citrus trade, had nothing whatsoever to do with the U.S. The insularity and parochialism of The West Indies were the result of British policy over several centuries. All assistance the U.K. could give would be welcomed, but The West Indies did not agree to such assistance being related to what had been done for other emergent territories, e.g., Nigeria and Ghana. He could not agree that deficiencies that had been inherited from the U.K. should be met by aid from the United States. The hands of Trinidad and Tobago were tied in dealing with the United States by military considerations and the Chaguaramas question, as they would also be when they came to discuss the question of joining the Organisation of American States. He would, however, welcome U.K. help in improving their relations with the U.S. and Canada.

20. *Lord Perth* said the meeting had been most useful; indicating the programme to which they should work and giving us all a chance to think out loud on the economic problems of the Federation at Independence. The special responsibility of the U.K. to The West Indies had already been recognised in the Statement by the Secretary of State in January. He was, however, pleased that it had been recognised that the possibilities of assistance from other sources should continue to be explored.

141 CO 1031/3506, no 98c

20 Dec 1960

[Finance]: minute by A R Thomas to W L Gorell Barnes clarifying the US position on financial aid

Following the talks which we had with West Indian Ministers on financial aid at the Stage I Conference on U.S. Bases in London,¹ and the subsequent meeting in your room on the 14th November, I was charged with discussing the matter further with Mr. Ivan White during the Stage II Talks in The West Indies, and, if possible, ascertain more of U.S. intentions in the matter.

¹ Stage I of the talks on bases opened with a conference (3–6 Nov 1960) in London attended by delegations from the UK, US, the federal government and the governments of Jamaica, Trinidad, St Lucia and Antigua. In December Stage II talks were held in the Caribbean, first in Tobago, where an agreement over US installations in Trinidad was negotiated, and then in St Lucia, Antigua and Jamaica. The release of the base areas in these latter three islands was a formality as they had long been deactivated and in St Lucia and Antigua the US agreed to contribute to local development projects. Stage III completed the process when a new base agreement was signed in Port of Spain in Feb 1961. The US agreed to release unconditionally most of the unused land surrounding Chaguaramas (some 21,000 acres). US facilities at Chaguaramas would be retained until 1977 although provision was included for a review at the end of 1967 and then at five-year intervals to determine if modifications were necessary. Facilities were to be made available for federal marine forces and a Trinidad marine police at Teteron Bay, an inlet of the North West Peninsular, and the US agreed to provide vocational training in machine shops at Chaguaramas. Agreement was also reached that the US would participate in the improvement of Trinidad's port, road, rail and air facilities and in the development of an arts faculty of the Trinidad branch of the University of the West Indies. US withdrawal from Trinidad in 1977 would not be automatic but contingent on the state of global tension. In the event the US closed its operations in mid-1967. See CO 1031/3034, no 19, *Agreement between the Government of the Federation of the West Indies and the Government of the United States of America concerning United States Defence Areas in the Federation of the West Indies* (Cmnd 1369, June 1961). Also CO 1031/3039 (whether agreement is legally binding in West Indies after independence); CO 1031/3040 (joint control and question of regional defence organisation); CO 1031/3041 (UK representation at bases talks).

It was in fact extremely difficult to get an opportunity to raise this matter since we were all concentrating exclusively and intensively on the Bases question. I also felt some hesitation in raising it with Mr. White in view of the hard bargain which was being driven by West Indian delegates to the Bases talks with the Americans, who were feeling rather rueful about the extent of economic aid which was being wrung out of them! At one stage I heard Mr. White telling a Trinidad representative that they had "taken the shirt off his back" and I think the Americans were forced in the course of the negotiations to put their hands deeper in their pockets than they had expected.

The extent of U.S. assistance promised in the course of the Bases negotiations is shown in the attached press communiques.² Their general approach—or at least their "end position"—was a three-pronged one, viz:—

- (i) they made it clear that the West Indies would receive their share of I.C.A. assistance which was generally available to under-developed territories (N.B. in fact quite a number of I.C.A. schemes have already been implemented, or are being implemented under I.C.A. agreements with West Indian Governments);
- (ii) as a result of discussions with the four Governments concerned, they singled out particular projects which would receive special and sympathetic consideration, generally on a grant basis. (N.B. although these are not commitments there is clearly a very strong obligation on the Americans to treat them as such, e.g. the I.C.A. representative assured me that they would see to it that Mr. Bird got the whole of his deep-water harbour in Antigua);
- (iii) more particularly, the Americans undertook specifically to allocate funds in their current fiscal year to the end of June, 1961, for particular projects in St. Lucia, Antigua and Jamaica. The sums amount respectively to \$.U.S.350,000, \$.U.S.350,000 and \$.U.S.500,000.

The Americans emphasised repeatedly and strongly that these forms of economic aid were in no sense a quid pro quo for the past and future services of the West Indian islands in respect of Bases. The connexion between the two was however very thinly veiled!

During our last night in Jamaica I was able to discuss the question of future financial aid with Mr. Ivan White. I recapitulated our own intentions as follows. On Independence The West Indies would qualify for the normal C.R.O. treatment to under-developed Commonwealth countries, viz. Commonwealth Assistance loans and Technical Assistance schemes. In addition, because of their special needs, they would be allowed to keep the balance of their present C.D.W. allocation and I hoped, (although this had not yet been confirmed) that we should be able to give them corresponding development aid on a tapering basis during the following quinquennium. Grant-in-Aid would continue on the present basis for the present quinquennium and on a temporary basis for a further 5 years. We had already committed ourselves to the grant of £1.2 millions for the Longdenville Barracks and might help in other aspects of Defence, e.g. the provision of mine-sweepers. We should also be providing diplomatic and service training facilities.

Mr. Ivan White commented that this sounded pretty good.

² Not printed.

I then told him of our meeting under Lord Perth's chairmanship at Lancaster House³ and the preference there expressed by the West Indian Ministers for having separate talks with us and with the Americans and the Canadians rather than arranging a quadripartite Conference. I told him that quite frankly I thought there were two elements in this, namely, that they thought the U.K. Government had a special first duty towards them and that they had a right to see what "Daddy" could do first before taking the hat round to wealthy Uncles. Secondly, they no doubt thought that they would do better by dealing with us separately. Nevertheless, we clearly could not press them into quadripartite talks and we ourselves had no strong views. Indeed, we understood the Canadians to be in favour of separate approaches. I explained that you had recently visited Ottawa and had been intending to sound out the Canadians. Meanwhile, I told Mr. White that we had emphasised to the West Indians that the U.K. cake was limited in view of our balance of payments problems, and our other widespread commitments, and that it was necessary for us to take U.S. and Canadian contributions into account in finally deciding what we could do.

I said that so far as we were concerned the ball was with The West Indies but that we nevertheless were trying to get our own ideas straight. It would probably not be possible to reach any final conclusions until we were better informed about W.I. defence needs and nearer the time of Independence: there would clearly be no question of further talks with the West Indians until after the Inter-Governmental Conference in January but we thought we ought to be ready to meet a request for talks sometime between January and May and in any event not later than the Independence Conference which might be about the middle of next year.

Mr. White seemed to agree that the idea of quadripartite talks should not be pursued. He confirmed that the U.S. Government expected to be able to help but made it clear that this would have to take the form of project assistance, either under I.C.A. or through one of the Lending Agencies. There was no prospect of general budgetary or developmental assistance unrelated to particular projects. Within this range Mr. White thought that U.S. assistance might run to the amount of \$U.S.3½ million per annum to The West Indies as a whole, of which \$U.S.2½ million might be in the form of I.C.A. project assistance and \$U.S.1 million in the form of enquiries, loan of experts, technical assistance etc. In addition, he envisaged that up to \$U.S.8 million might be available in loan form to the "key units" viz. Trinidad and Jamaica but he emphasised that this was very much of a guess. (Stupidly, I did not get clear from him at the time whether this meant \$U.S.8 million per annum or *in toto*).

In addition to the above Mr. White thought they might be able to help in building up and training a West Indian Navy and Marine Force but emphasised that they would not be able to provide any ships, in the absence of a Military Assistance Agreement. (N.B. we have in any case to be a little careful about this since there is a risk that The West Indies Navy will not develop along the right lines if it is regarded as largely a U.S. responsibility).

I hope that the above is of some help in clarifying the American position.

³ See 140.

142 CO 1031/3932, no 184

Dec 1960

'West Indian immigration': minute by Miss M Z Terry on the current situation

West Indian migration to the United Kingdom became fairly heavy by 1955, the total for that year being 27,551 and for 1956 29,812. In 1957 the total fell to 23,016 and in 1958 it fell even lower (to 15,023) following racial disturbances in August and the recession in United Kingdom employment which set in about the same time. The figures remained relatively low for the first seven months of 1959, but (presumably because of the improvement in the employment position which became apparent in the late spring) the numbers began to increase in August and the total for the year was 16,395. The increase has continued very much more strongly throughout 1960. The total for the first ten months of 1960 was 43,450 and seems likely to be of the order of 50,000 for the whole year. It is estimated that there are at present about 180,000 West Indians living in the United Kingdom of whom roughly 155,000 are classified as "working population".

2. The Home Secretary has recently drawn the attention of the Cabinet to the sharp increase in West Indian immigration. In his paper he particularly drew attention to the following:—

(i) Employment difficulties

Out of an estimated total West Indian working population of about 155,000 only 8,000 were registered as unemployed on the 1st November, and the most striking feature of the present figures is the comparative ease with which the very large number of new arrivals from overseas are finding employment. However, the Ministry of Labour are seriously concerned about the longer term prospects. Because of a number of general factors (which have nothing to do with immigration) the Ministry of Labour consider that the demand for coloured immigrant labour in the relatively near future will fall significantly. They are specially concerned about the deteriorating prospects for unskilled labour, the category into which most West Indians fall.

(ii) Housing difficulties

West Indian immigrants have not created new housing difficulties but have undoubtedly considerably aggravated the acute housing difficulties which already exist in London and in some of the large industrial towns of the Midlands where West Indians tend to congregate.

(iii) The increase in the coloured population of the U.K.

The Government Actuary has recently estimated (on the basis of a number of arbitrary assumptions) that the coloured population of this country could reach 800,000 in 1970 and 1,520,000 in 1980 representing 1.6 per cent and 2.7% respectively of the total population and a far higher percentage in those towns where they are concentrated.

3. A recent reassessment of the position by the Colonial Office in consultation with West Indian Governments has indicated that (failing a serious recession in employment) migration is expected to continue at the present or even increased

rate. Most West Indian Governments take active steps to make known to intending migrants the kind of difficulties respecting housing and employment which they are likely to encounter in the United Kingdom. They also restrict the issue of passports to those convicted of crimes of violence and (in some territories) to unaccompanied juveniles and the elderly and infirm. These measures have however been found to have relatively little effect so long as U.K. employment remains buoyant.

4. It is clear from the latest information that there are only two ways in which the present flow of migration could effectively and substantially be reduced. The first would be by restricting the issue of passports in the country of origin and the second would be by imposing restrictions on entry to the United Kingdom. For the former to be effective it would be necessary to restrict the issue of passports in respect of persons travelling to any destination outside the home territory and no West Indian Government would be prepared to contemplate such a drastic infringement of individual liberty. It would be unreasonable to ask them to do so in order to serve directly United Kingdom interests and it would almost certainly be politically impossible for any West Indian Government to introduce such unpopular restrictions at a time when it was known that the U.K. door remained wide open.

5. The Home Secretary has recently proposed and the Cabinet have agreed that the Cabinet Committee on Commonwealth Immigrants (which last met in July, 1959) should be reconstituted with the following terms of reference "to consider and keep under review the problems caused by the uncontrolled entry into the United Kingdom of British subjects from overseas".

6. It is now recognised that there are only two courses of action available: either to allow the flow to continue unchecked or to introduce restrictions on entry into the United Kingdom. The Home Secretary is known to be very reluctant to introduce such restrictions because of the importance which is attached to the principle of free entry into the U.K., which is the heart of the Commonwealth, for all Commonwealth citizens. Inter alia, there are the following objections to U.K. restrictions:—

- (i) However disguised, such restrictions would be interpreted as anti-colour measures and this would weaken the Commonwealth and damage the reputation of the U.K. internationally;
- (ii) Such restrictions would cause political and economic difficulty to the West Indian territories, and
- (iii) Such restrictions would run counter to the concept (embodied in the British Nationality Act of 1948) of a common citizenship for the United Kingdom and Colonies.

7. The merits and demerits of introducing restrictions were considered very fully on an interdepartmental basis some years ago and two draft Bills are ready on the stocks (one of which would introduce general restrictions and the second which would make it possible to deport undesirables etc). At that time it was felt that the objections to introducing restrictions were stronger than the arguments in favour and it was decided to continue the traditional open door policy.

8. There is little that can be said at this stage to the West Indies Commissioner in London. There are obvious dangers in mentioning either publicly or on a

confidential basis to West Indian Governments the possibility of legal restrictions on entry to the U.K. because this in itself may reasonably be expected to lead to an immediate increase in the flow (since many intending migrants would come as quickly as possible before the door was shut). The Commissioner (Mr. Garnet Gordon) is however an intelligent and well informed person and knows full well that in present circumstances the U.K. Government must be considering the possibility of introducing restrictions. There can be no harm in confirming to him that the whole question is now under close Ministerial consideration.

143 CO 1031/3315, nos 47 & 51 18–20 Jan 1961
[Jamaica and federation]: minutes by D Williams and Mr Fraser on
Wills Isaacs and his three conditions for Jamaica remaining in the
federation [Extract]

I had an interesting conversation this morning with Mr. Wills Isaacs.

On the question of the referendum he said the delay was caused entirely by Sir Grantley Adams who had put Dr. Cummings [sic: Cummins] up to creating difficulties. Jamaica firmly believed that the reason for this was that Sir Grantley wished to hang on to power as long as possible. It now seemed most unlikely that the Inter-governmental Conference would take place until May and the best estimate that he could give for the Jamaican referendum would be in October. This, he said, was very disappointing. His party, with his concurrence, had worked out a timetable in which the Conference would take place in January; the Jamaican budget would be introduced in April and would be such as to create a good deal of employment and a generally favourable atmosphere to Mr. Manley's party, in which the referendum could be held.

I questioned him at some length about his own attitude now towards Federation. He said that he had originally been opposed to it because support for the idea had come from members of his own party whom he regarded as Communist or Communist sympathisers. These were the people active in the Caribbean Labour Congress who, he claimed, saw in the idea of Federation an opportunity to extend their activities to the whole of the British Caribbean. He had however now reconsidered the matter and was prepared to support a scheme for Federation provided three conditions were met. The first was that the Federation should have no power to interfere with Jamaica's industrial development. The second was that the arrangements in the Federal constitution for the admission of new members should be such that Jamaica would have a right of veto. He himself was particularly anxious to keep British Guiana out because of the menace of Communism. On the other hand he was extremely anxious to try to bring British Honduras in; and in this connection he told me in the strictest confidence that the Jamaica Cabinet had agreed that after he got back from his present trip he should leave on a visit to British Honduras to talk to Mr. Price in an attempt to persuade him to bring British Honduras in. (He had been selected for this role because he was the only Catholic in the Jamaica Cabinet and he claimed that the plan had the support of the Catholic Bishop of Jamaica who would try to bring influence to bear upon the

Catholic Bishop of British Honduras). His third condition for supporting Federation was that the Federal Government should have no powers over income tax. He thought the Federal Government should derive its revenue from having exclusive control over customs duties and he envisaged that the Federal area should move fairly rapidly to a Customs Union.

He made the point several times that the referendum in Jamaica could not hope to succeed without his support and he said that unless his conditions were met he would break with his party and oppose it.

He several times reverted to the question of communism in the Caribbean. He said that he was convinced that the Communists were gaining control of the Rastafarian movement and he said that if he became Premier of Jamaica (as he clearly had every expectation of doing) he would take a very much tougher line with the Rastafarians and with the communist element than had been done in the past. . . .¹

D.W.
18.1.61

I agree that the delays over the intergovernmental conference are very trying. I have however discussed this at some length with Ellis Clark whose views about what is going on are rather different from those expressed in earlier minutes.

2. Ellis Clark believes that Manley and Williams agreed at their Antigua meeting that Jamaica should receive protection for her goods, c.f. Wills Isaacs' first condition, and that afterwards Eric Williams' Cabinet forced him to get concessions about barring free immigration into Trinidad from Manley. On the basis of this an alliance of the two big powers has been created.

¹ Sir R Grey was sent a copy of Williams's note of his meeting with Isaacs and replied that if British Guiana were kept out of the federation or made this decision for itself (no local politician would advocate joining until the federation's own future was more certain and the question mark hanging over Jamaica was removed), then the UK might have to implement and not just consider granting British Guiana independence in 1963. The moves by federal politicians to advance the federal cause (see 135) had come to nothing. Grey concluded: 'What future can this country have as an entirely "independent" country—and how long would its "independence" last? I fear that Communism is much more likely to prosper in the Caribbean pace Mr. Wills Isaacs, if there is an impoverished and unsuccessful British Guiana (by whatever name then known) that is denied admission to the West Indies Federation, than if British Guiana, even under its present political leadership, is freely admitted if she wishes to join' (CO 1031/4276, no 20, Grey to Mackintosh, 3 Feb 1961).

Comment was also invited from British Honduras and M S Porcher, the chief secretary, replied: 'The situation here is very different to British Guiana where at least one section of the population, those of African origin, were actively and vocally in favour of Federation although the East Indians were not. Here virtually no one, except possibly a few of the better educated people of African origin, appear to have the least interest in developing closer political association with the West Indies. The people of Spanish origin are actively opposed to the idea. George Price of course forms the spearhead of this school of thought. It is quite likely that his opponents . . . would accept the idea of Federation if they thought that by doing so they could upset Price. But . . . for any political party to advocate Federation with the West Indies is to invite political suicide and I believe that lesson has been well and truly learnt and digested'. Porcher concluded that Isaacs should concentrate on improving trade relations. He also suggested that if Isaacs used his influence to induce BWIA to provide a better, cheaper and more frequent air service between British Honduras and Jamaica, the inhabitants of the former would have more access to schools and hospitals in Jamaica and more opportunities would be available for the creation of a better understanding between the two countries (CO 1031/4277, no 5, Porcher to MacKintosh, 7 Feb 1961).

3. Grantley Adams and the small islands are aware of this alliance (though possibly not of its terms) and are anxious to break it. This they think they can do by holding out on the intergovernmental conference until after the Jamaican referendum. Once the referendum is out of the way Manley will they hope be no longer able to claim that he has to tread so softly with the Jamaicans and might then be susceptible to pressure for concessions to the Federal conception which Williams might be forced to reciprocate.

4. Whether this is all true is another matter but I have considerable confidence in Ellis as an observer and his view of Grantley's motives seems to me more plausible than Wills Isaacs'. Whether, if it is true, Grantley and the others have much prospect of success I would doubt; if Manley stands firm I believe it might be possible to get the others to agree to hold the intergovernmental conference earlier than May. It is less certain that this would be altogether a good idea—these two protectionist dictates by the major islands could go far to wreck the realities of federation.

5. As I see it, our aim remains to get things moving as swiftly as possible and some final form of federation established. I do not think Ellis' ideas are the sort of thing we could send out to Hailes and Blackburne etc. for their views; the only thing I think is for me to speak to the chief actors in Port of Spain next month and see whether we can get ahead on the conference and jockey the leaders into some form of federation which will not be completely gutless. Once established I hope that a first eleven, as opposed to the second eleven team we have at the moment in office, can make federation work. But for a long time to come I fear it will be a weak federation and not the sort of federation the theorists would desire. Our main card at the moment is that I think we have an atmosphere in which no one wants to be responsible for wrecking federation.

6. I would like a meeting on this before I leave for Trinidad. I do not think any telegraphing at this stage would be wise: we must find out in Port of Spain what the political situation really is.

H.F.
20.1.61

144 CO 1031/3506, no 108

7 Feb 1961

[Finance]: letter from A W Taylor to Sir W Gorell Barnes urging the Treasury view that no further commitments should be made to the West Indies beyond 1964

I am glad that we reached agreement at our meeting yesterday on the general lines of the brief which Mr. Hugh Fraser will be taking with him for the discussions on U.S. financial aid to the West Indies. Some of the points which I mentioned are, however, of considerable importance from the Treasury angle and I should therefore like to set them down specifically.

I recognise that we cannot ask you to go back on the "Statement of Intent" given to Mr. Manley in January 1960.¹ Nevertheless, if the West Indies are to get additional

¹ See 117.

U.S. assistance on the scale now under consideration² (with just possibly something more from Canada) it will mean, as the brief says, that for at least a few years the West Indies will be receiving a generous and preferential share of the total volume of U.K./U.S. resources available for all under-developed countries.

There is also the danger that they will become accustomed to a disproportionate level of aid and that it will be more difficult to adjust the position after 1964, without on the one hand political disappointment in the West Indies or dissatisfaction in other territories whose deserts may well be greater.

We feel, therefore, that it is important that no fresh commitments should be entered into, or hopes raised, beyond what has already been promised, without our having a further opportunity to go into the implications with you. In particular:—

- (a) on any proposal for additional aid, whether before 1964 or thereafter, we should want to maintain the position propounded by Lord Perth at the Lancaster House meeting on 8th November, 1960³ that “the U.K. Government would be bound to take into account what might be available from outside sources, including Canada, the U.S. and International Institutions”.
- (b) the U.K. aid to the West Indies after 1964 should, in any case, be tapered down.
- (c) the West Indies should be given no reason to expect aid for “natural disasters” on anything like the scale of the past; the scale for independent Commonwealth countries generally is very much lower.

I am aware that you wish to keep open the question of giving part of the post-1964 aid in the form of grant; equally I explained that this is a proposition which presents a good deal of difficulty for us on general grounds, and we must therefore ask that nothing should be said to exclude a switch from grant to loan after present commitments expire. Here again, it is a matter of holding on to what Lord Perth said at the November 1960 meeting, i.e. that “financial assistance would have to take different forms from that given before independence”.

I have already suggested to Hugh Harding that the minutes of the meeting last November, which contain a statement of the U.K. position in very apt wording, should be treated as part of the brief for Mr. Fraser.

² See 141. Briefing Macmillan for the prime minister's visit to the West Indies over Easter 1961, the CO revealed that the US government had pledged, up to 1964 and provided the necessary appropriations were forthcoming from Congress, to ‘match whatever assistance the U.K. gives the Federation on a pound-for-pound basis’. For the present the Americans did not want this formula divulged to West Indian politicians. The CO confessed to being ‘frankly surprised’ at the volume of aid the US had now decided to give. ‘The reason clearly is their unease about the whole situation in the Caribbean. They obviously reckon that an independent West Indies, as yet untainted by Communism and unimpressed by Castro, may be one of the few stable countries in the area’ (CO 1031/4189, no 4, brief WIT(61)4, 14 Mar 1961). In a similar brief for the prime minister on Canadian aid to the federation, the CO explained that Canada was the largest market for the West Indies after the UK and US and that the bilateral assistance programme, announced at the Commonwealth Economic Conference in Montreal in 1958, would provide 10 million Canadian dollars for the federation between 1958 and 1963. This was a tied gift, of which two-thirds would be spent to build two ships in Canada for the inter-island shipping service. The brief added: ‘One cause of the Canadian interest in The West Indies may be that they look forward to the time when there will be two independent Commonwealth countries in the Western hemisphere, though clearly The West Indies, like themselves, cannot avoid falling under considerable American economic, military and cultural influence. . . . It is in the United Kingdom's interest to encourage the Canadian-West Indian relationship. It will be easier for us to disengage from the burden we now carry in the Caribbean if Canada takes a greater share of the responsibility’ (CO 1031/3574, brief WIT(61)10, 20 Mar 1961).

³ See 140.

145 CO 1031/4282, no 4, enclosure

21 Mar 1961

'The constitutional position of the British Virgin Islands': memorandum by G J Bryan¹

1. Present position

The British Virgin Islands has opted definitely and uncompromisingly not to join the Federation of the West Indies (cf Resolutions of the 14th September, 1951 and the 19th September, 1955 (copies attached as Annexures A and B)).² Principal reasons being:—

- (i) fear of prejudicing
 - (a) existing social and economic ties with the United States Virgin Islands
 - (b) possible closer associations in future
- (ii) opinion that direct contact with the Colonial Office would be more advantageous than control by other West Indians, especially in regard to the provision of grant-in-aid funds (which presently amount to 73¢ in every dollar).

From 1st January, 1960, the Colony has been administered direct from London through an Administrator having the powers usually assigned to a Governor.

2. Courses open

There are only three courses which apparently merit consideration at this stage. They are:—

- (i) to continue as at present on the analogy of St. Helena, the Falkland Islands, etc.
- (ii) to enter into closer association with either:—
 - (a) the United States Virgin Islands
 - (b) the Federation of the West Indies.

3. Relevant factors

(i) Before the Americans acquired the United States Virgin Islands from Denmark in 1917 there was complete freedom of movement between the British and Danish Islands and there is hardly a family in the British Virgin Islands today which does not have close relatives living in the United States Virgin Islands. The former free association between all the Virgin Islands irrespective of nationality strongly influences the present desire for the re-establishment of a similar situation.

(ii) A decision having been taken in 1951 not to join the Federation, confirmed in 1955 and re-confirmed by representatives of the Legislature in London In July, 1959, there is no reason to suppose that local opinion would favour any change in this regard in the absence of compelling factors which were not apparent when the earlier decision was arrived at.

(iii) No fresh factors have arisen which would cause re-consideration of the decision not to join the Federation. The position might be affected if services presently provided by the Federation were to be denied the British Virgin Islands after independence unless she federated. Attempted coercion of this sort would however be more likely to cause a violent reaction away from Federation and might

¹ Administrator, British Virgin Islands, 1959–1962.

² Annexures not printed.

well cause an embarrassing and widespread demonstration in favour of early union with the United States Virgin Islands. A sustained attempt to encourage the British Virgin Islands to join the Federation by offering assistance on beneficial terms might ultimately (but not in the foreseeable future) cause reconsideration of the earlier decision, especially if it could be clearly shown that by joining the Federation the British Virgin Islands could be offered recognisably greater financial and other aid.

(iv) In the absence of any declared policy by Her Majesty's Government in regard to the constitutional future of the British Virgin Islands the aggregate of a series of administrative actions (or inaction) might produce a definite reaction on the part of the people of the British Virgin Islands, in favour of one or other of the courses mentioned in paragraph 2(i) and (ii)(a) above e.g. greater attention given to the British Virgin Islands by United Kingdom agencies and institutions such as the United Kingdom Trade Commissioner, British Council, Colonial Development corporation, etc. plus a sympathetic and helpful attitude on the part of the Colonial Office including the provision of an adequate grant-in-aid and allocations of Colonial Development and Welfare funds would tend further to consolidate the present position. Inactivity and neglect would undoubtedly reinforce the desire for closer association with the United States Virgin Islands and if carried to extremes could produce a marked reaction on the part of the people away from the British towards the Americans.

(v) The influx of American capital has and will continue to produce pressure for political stability which from the point of view of the investors can best be obtained by increased American control. Though there is no reason to think at this stage that the Americans would wish to add to their overseas commitments and indeed it has been suggested that because of the cost of the United States Virgin Islands to the American tax payer in the past proposals to add to their obligations in the Virgin Islands would not be well received at present.³

(vi) Tax concessions and low rates of estate duty for which Americans qualify at present in the British Virgin Islands (and which are likely to be made more attractive before long) may however influence American capitalists to try to ensure that the British Virgin Islands remain outside the American tax area.

(vii) British Virgin Islanders have undoubted loyalty to the Crown resulting from very nearly 300 years of uninterrupted British associations and there is an element especially among responsible and established persons which would probably resist change either for sentimental reasons or because:—

- (a) they appreciate and prefer the British system of Government, or
- (b) they fear that a change would adversely affect their personal status.

Nevertheless the American influence is a factor which must be fully recognised. The contrast between development and living conditions in St. Thomas and Tortola is constantly before the people. It is obvious that the people in the United States Virgin Islands enjoy a much higher standard of living than those in the British Virgin

³ But on this see CO 1031/4282, no 1, minute by Williams to Thomas, 24 Jan 1961 in which Williams reports a conversation in Washington with J D Merwin, governor of the US Virgin Islands. Merwin is reported to have raised the question of the US taking over the British Virgin Islands with Herter, the secretary of state, who thought it would a sensible solution but who wanted the UK to make the first move.

Islands and the projection of this fact to the assumption that if the British Virgin Islands were to become American they would obtain similar standards of living is understandable (but of course not necessarily correct).

(viii) There is a determined desire by a substantial part of the community to obtain American nationality. Mothers try to ensure that their babies are born in St. Thomas so as to confer American citizenship on them which is later used to obtain entry to St. Thomas or the States. There are large communities of British Virgin Islanders living in North America at a standard which far exceeds anything they could hope to attain in the British Virgin Islands. There is constant pressure to emigrate to North America. The quota of permanent entry visas (100 a year) is competed for fiercely and others obtain entry by other means e.g. marriage. Emigration to North America is on a sufficient [sic] large scale at present, even with immigration restrictions, as to keep the population at about the same level i.e. the relatively high birth rate is offset by emigration. A referendum held in 1960 by the Anglican Church gave a majority in favour of transferring from the diocese of Antigua to the diocese of Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands.

(ix) Subject to the influences referred to at paragraph (iv) above a referendum at this time would almost certainly indicate a majority in favour of becoming American, if the opportunity presented itself and other conditions of continued financial aid and political representation were favourable. Local opinion might however be affected by the results of political changes in the United States Virgin Islands during the next few years, but could probably be influenced at this stage especially if additional economic aid was made available from the United Kingdom.

(x) Any deterioration in relations between the United States Virgin Islands and the British Virgin Islands could have serious consequences on the latter and could be used as a bargaining point by the Americans if they ever wished to press for the transfer of the British Virgin Islands e.g. refusal to admit British Virgin Islanders for work in the United States Virgin Islands could seriously affect the economy of the British Virgin Islands which is at present so much dependent on the large number who find work in the United States Virgin Islands (estimated at more than 1 in 10 of the overall population) and would bring an immediate reaction for union with the United States Virgin Islands.

146 CO 1031/3315, no 132

11 Apr 1961

[Mr Macmillan in the West Indies]: minute by Sir J Martin to Mr Fraser on issues raised during the prime minister's tour of the West Indies

In preparation for tomorrow's discussion on The West Indies it may be helpful if I circulate this brief note recording general impressions of the Prime Minister's tour and the principal points raised with him.

2. The tour was a great personal success. In spite of his preoccupation with other responsibilities, especially the situation in Laos which involved his interruption of the Trinidad visit to fly up to Florida to meet President Kennedy (surely the first time anyone has gone 1300 miles for lunch), Mr. Macmillan gave himself unsparingly to the heavy programme of engagements arranged for him, involving meetings with

Federal and Territorial Ministers, the press and many other people. He was received everywhere with the greatest friendliness and sometimes enthusiasm and, apart from a few isolated demonstrations by extremists demanding the release of Kenyatta¹ and a critical letter in the *Gleaner* from Sir Alexander Bustamante (who refused an invitation to meet the Prime Minister), there was no hostile note anywhere.

3. The principal points raised with Mr. Macmillan were:—

(1) *Financial aid after independence*

There seemed to be widespread fears lest United Kingdom aid may cease or be seriously diminished and more than once the suggestion was made that it was in order to be relieved of the burden of supporting them that H.M.G. were thrusting independence on The West Indies. The Prime Minister's reply was to the effect that, although the existing machinery of C.D. & W. and C.D.C. would no longer be appropriate, H.M.G. would certainly continue their support after independence and the precise arrangements for this would be worked out in discussions in London following the Constitutional Conference. Where appropriate, he also referred to the intention to continue grants in aid to the smaller territories for a period. He pointed to the example of the generous assistance we had continued to give to other countries after independence, but also sounded a note of warning about the load falling on the United Kingdom and mentioned the importance of securing the cooperation of other countries, such as the United States and Germany, in sharing the burden. There is no doubt that anxieties on this subject colour the attitude of many people to independence, especially in the smaller territories, which fear that their interests will be neglected by the Federal Government, but also in Jamaica, where there is a fear that the responsibility for supporting the less viable islands will bear more heavily on Jamaican resources. It would, I am sure, be helpful in securing agreement to go forward to independence if the extent of the aid which will then become available from the United States Government could be announced and publicised.

(2) *Migration*

There is general fear that the door may be closed against free entry into the United Kingdom. On this point, although indicating a sympathetic attitude, the Prime Minister generally confined himself to a reference to the Ministerial statement in the debate in the House of Commons on the 17th February,² to which he indicated that he was not prepared at present to add. He was repeatedly asked to take the opportunity of his meeting with President Kennedy to urge the free admission of immigrants from the West Indies in the United States. This he undertook to do and, although I do not know what was actually said on the subject in the Washington talks, I know that a discussion of West Indian affairs was arranged for Saturday morning and it was the Prime Minister's intention to leave an aide memoire with the President with a view to further discussions through the diplomatic channel. I attach at Annexe A³ a minute recording a talk I had with Mr. McGregor, the United States Consul General in Jamaica, on the possibility of extending to The West Indies the exemption from the quota system at present enjoyed by the independent countries of

¹ Jomo Kenyatta, imprisoned president of the recently formed Kenya African National Union.

² *H of C Debts*, vol 634, 17 Feb 1961, cols 1929–2024.

³ Annexes not printed.

the Western Hemisphere. I was told, when I raised this point in the State Department on the 7th April, that the first problem, on which they were now working, was to ensure legislation to prevent reduction of the present quota of 100 for each Unit Territory to 100 for the whole Federation, which would apparently be the effect of independence under existing legislation. One specific suggestion made to Mr. Macmillan was that the United States Government might be persuaded to arrange a special system for domestic servants similar to that under which temporary farm workers are at present admitted. The Prime Minister was also asked to take up with the Canadian Government the possibility of relaxation of restrictions in Canada.

(3) *Sugar*

Many representations were made about the importance of securing the continuance of the United States purchases from The West Indies which have followed the cessation of purchases from Cuba. It was suggested that the United States Government should be asked to grant a permanent quota, but on this Mr. Macmillan gave the reply (suggested to him by Sir Solomon Hochoy) that the United States could not be expected to write off Cuba entirely for the future as the grant of permanent quotas would imply. During our visit there was a flurry about a suggestion in the relevant Senate Committee that United States purchases should in future be at the world price instead of the special subsidy price (as previously allowed to Cuba and in the recent purchases from the West Indies), but before leaving Jamaica we heard that this proposal had been dropped. I was told in the State Department that it would be politically impossible to secure extension of the special quotas to Commonwealth countries outside the Western Hemisphere.

4. As regards the prospects of agreement on independence in 1962, I hesitate to express a firm opinion. Clearly Dr. Eric Williams and Mr. Manley are in agreement and ready and anxious to go forward, but there are considerable hesitations in some of the smaller islands; Sir Grantley Adams has probably not yet exhausted his delaying tricks and there is considerable doubt about the prospects of the referendum in Jamaica. On the latter the Governor's view was that the result of a referendum at the present time would be against independence, but Mr. Manley seems hardly to have started his campaign and no doubt much depends on the outcome of the two Conferences. As regards the smaller islands, something could probably be done by clearer undertakings of future financial support. As for Sir Grantley Adams, Mr. Manley threw out, in his first conversation with the Prime Minister, the suggestion that if he could be told that he would be the first West Indian Governor-General that might go a long way to help towards a solution. The Prime Minister indicated that he thought there was no insuperable objection from the point of view of H.M.G. and promised to speak about this to the Secretary of State. I interjected a reference to the alternative suggestion that Sir Grantley might be offered the governorship of Barbados. Mr. Manley indicated that he thought this might be attractive to Sir Grantley and that it was worth considering. It appears from Mr. Manley's recent letter to the Secretary of State that the Prime Minister must in a subsequent conversation have thrown out the idea of an honour for Sir Grantley, but I was not myself present on that occasion. Lord Hailes later told me that Mr. Manley had informed him that he had mentioned the idea of the Governor-General appointment to the Prime Minister but that the Prime Minister had not seemed to be very responsive. Mr. Manley also mentioned the Barbados idea. (Lord Hailes told me

that he himself was not anxious to stay on after independence.) Although Mr. Manley himself professed confidence, there seemed to be some uncertainty in the general atmosphere of Jamaica. Perhaps it is partly the proximity of Cuba (less than 90 miles away) though there is little evidence of direct intervention from there. Perhaps the recent rapid industrial development with the very unequal distribution of its benefits has paradoxically increased political instability.

5. For some more general impressions you may care to glance at the draft (at Annex B) of material I prepared at the Prime Minister's request for a letter he proposed to address to The Queen.

6. I am sending copies of this minute to Mr. Pearson (for the Secretary of State), Lord Perth, Sir Hilton Poynton, Sir William Gorell Barnes, Mr. Thomas and Mr. Williams.

147 CO 1031/4274, no 5

Apr 1961

'Jamaican secession from the West Indies Federation': draft CO memorandum for Cabinet Colonial Policy Committee

[Document 148 and its second annex explain the origins of this memo. It was drafted by Jamieson who minuted: 'Somewhat regretfully I have marked the draft "For C.R.O. concurrence". Obtaining such concurrence to this paper may be a greater task than getting it approved by the C.P.C. The C.R.O. line 18 months ago was that Jamaica simply could not be allowed to go it alone [see 109–110]. Since then the emergence of Cyprus and Sierra Leone have made it impossible to support this view but I am sure the C.R.O. will have many alarmed noises about Commonwealth relations. I understand their difficulties but I just do not see what we can do to help them. They would just have to make it their business to explain to other members of the Commonwealth why the present federation failed, and try to drum up as warm a welcome as possible to the unexpected twins' (CO 1031/4274, minute by Jamieson, 7 Apr 1961). In the event this draft was not submitted to the Colonial Policy Committee, nor sent for comment to the CRO.]

After a series of constitutional conferences in May and June of this year in Trinidad and London I hope that it will be possible for The West Indies Federation to achieve independence about April 1962. (Annex shows those Caribbean territories which are members of the Federation and those which are non-federated).¹ There is, however, still a possibility that Jamaica might secede from the Federation. This danger can arise at several stages:—

- (a) the form of Federal Constitution that emerges from the May/June conferences may not be acceptable to the Jamaican Government, who may decide to secede;
- (b) Mr. Manley has promised that the final decision on Jamaica remaining in the Federation must be by a referendum. This will take place after the May/June conferences, (probably in September). Thus, even if the Government of Jamaica is satisfied with the results of the May/June conferences the electorate may decide against federation;
- (c) there is such deep suspicion of federation in Jamaica that any new political crisis *at any stage before independence* could generate a wave of popular hostility that could force the Jamaica Government into secession.

¹ Not printed.

2. At present there seem at least even chances that the form of Federal Constitution chosen by the May/June conferences will be acceptable to Mr. Manley's Government, and that they will be able to win the referendum by making it a vote of confidence in themselves. Moreover once the referendum hurdle is over there is much less chance that some political crisis could force secession on the Jamaican Government. Jamaican secession, however, remains a real possibility during the next year, and we must prepare in advance to deal with the situation that would follow it.

3. It would not be possible for the United Kingdom to insist that Jamaica remained in the Federation against her will. The West Indian territories agreed voluntarily to federate and we could hardly insist that it was not permissible for them to change their minds, even at this late stage. An attempt to do so would probably be met by an outright declaration of secession which we would be unable to contest without precipitating a serious security situation in a territory which is exceptionally friendly to the United Kingdom and whose constitutional advance hitherto [has] been remarkably painless. Nor, after the examples of Cyprus and Sierra Leone, can it be seriously argued that Jamaica is not capable of maintaining independence on her own. With a population of 1.6 millions, a budget of £31 millions (as large as Kenya's) and a very considerable economic potential, she could well manage as a separate state. We have therefore no alternative but to accept that Jamaica can in fact "go it alone", and be prepared to grant her a separate independence. We should also have to agree to sponsor her for Commonwealth membership.

4. We do not however exactly know how the other members of the Federation would react to Jamaican secession. Possibly they do not even know themselves for sure. They might close ranks and simply decide to struggle on without Jamaica. On the other hand many of the small units undoubtedly fear that a Federation dominated by Trinidad, without any make-weight by Jamaica, would lead to their becoming virtual dependencies of Trinidad. If this fear were uppermost at the point when Jamaica seceded there might be widespread defections and a virtual disintegration of the Federation into its component parts. On present information the most probable result of the secession of Jamaica would be the defection of Antigua who we understand would then seek some kind of "Channel Islands" relationship with Jamaica; that Montserrat might then follow Antigua; that Barbados might also secede, though not with the intention of joining Jamaica but of keeping out of any residual grouping; but there would be a reasonable chance that the remaining units would probably be willing to remain in an Eastern Caribbean Federation. This too, would be viable enough for us to grant independence and sponsor for the Commonwealth. In place of the existing federation the following pattern might therefore emerge:—

Population

Jamaica (plus Antigua & Montserrat)	1,714,000
Eastern Caribbean Federation	1,417,000 (1,180 if without Barbados)
Barbados (if she stayed outside the Eastern Caribbean Federation)	237,000

This would enable us to grant independence to two separate states in place of the existing Federation, and leave us with Barbados which might eventually graduate to a Singapore or Malta type constitution.

5. I must however emphasise that it is in fact quite impossible to predict how the

territories would react in this situation. The result could be a more or less complete break up of the existing Federation, with only Jamaica and Trinidad going forward to independence. This would be a major failure of our colonial policy, and it would be open to Castro and the Communists to accuse us of imperialist machinations to retain our colonial position. In fact the Caribbean is an area of the world where there are no vital United Kingdom interests and few strategic considerations, and where our fundamental aim in the area since 1945 has been political disengagement. This being so our principal objective following secession by Jamaica must be to avoid any situation which results in our being left with any of the present federated territories on our hands for which we can see no obvious future except as colonies. Of the ten territories only two (Jamaica and Trinidad) are really viable with economies which are within sight of "take off" into self-sustained growth. None of the others are in this position. Barbados is grossly over-populated, and depends almost entirely on sugar. The other seven are small, poor, and incapable of development from their own resources. Almost all depend on grant-in-aid even to balance their budgets. We must therefore at all costs ensure that as many as possible of the federated territories remain in some way grouped with either Jamaica or Trinidad who alone have the resources and sophistication of governmental apparatus to "carry" pensioner territories as satellites.

6. A more serious situation would be if none (or perhaps only one or two) of the smaller territories were willing to remain grouped with Trinidad and at the same time we were faced by a demand from Trinidad (as we almost certainly should be) that because of the impending independence of Jamaica she too should be allowed to achieve early independence. The result of this would be that whereas both Jamaica (perhaps with Antigua and Montserrat in train) and Trinidad (with or without one or two satellites) became independent we might be left holding Barbados and several of the remaining Leeward and Windward Islands. Theoretically this residue of territories could be grouped together into some fresh grouping. There would however be no hope that this grouping could achieve any kind of economic or financial viability that would enable it to achieve independence in the foreseeable future, though like Barbados it would probably be quite suitable for a very "advanced" colonial constitution. We could, therefore, be left with this residue of territories on our hands for a very long time to come.

7. The danger is that a very confused situation might develop very rapidly following the announcement of secession by Jamaica. A great deal might depend on our being able to intervene rapidly in order to stop the rot and try to prevent a chain reaction of further secessions in the Eastern Caribbean. It is impossible at this stage to predict in what form I might have to intervene but it might be necessary in this situation that I should make one or all of the following pronouncements on behalf of Her Majesty's Government:—

- (a) Jamaica can become independent.
- (b) the present Federation (less only Jamaica and such territories as go with her) or any lesser Eastern Caribbean grouping which includes Trinidad can become independent.
- (c) Trinidad alone can become independent (I would of course hope to avoid this one).
- (d) in each of the above cases Her Majesty's Government would sponsor for Commonwealth membership.

(e) no one of the smaller territories or any grouping of smaller territories could expect to achieve independence for some time to come; but that nevertheless such a grouping could be accorded a pretty "advanced" constitution.

8. I therefore seek the authority of my colleagues that I should as and when necessary be prepared to make appropriate statements on the basis of propositions (a) to (e) in paragraph 7 above.

148 CO 1031/3316, nos 139 & 140

Apr 1961

'West Indies Federation: a political appreciation': memorandum by Mr Fraser on the prospects for federation. *Annexes Minute* by Sir W Gorell Barnes

Below I have divided the approach to Independent Federation into five or more steps or sequences. For our discussion it would perhaps be best to proceed by considering what action we can or should take at or before each sequence.

But before doing this I think it is worth making a general appreciation. In spite of reports of mounting pessimism I still believe that Federation has a more than fair chance of succeeding. Firstly, because the two men who can make the concessions to make it work want it. Manley, because he is conservative enough to see that Jamaica's best chance of identity and survival is within a Federation and because he is generous enough to see that a Federation without Jamaica could be a disaster, and Williams because he is radical enough to see Federation as a dynamic and expanding force to which he is publicly dedicated.

Secondly, because the alternatives to Independence within Federation are inferior and in the course of debate will become even more clearly so.

Thirdly, because the world climate favours the larger unit.

Fourthly, because the post-Castro Caribbean climate in particular must force good men to combine and the U.S.A. to finance such combinations.

And, fifthly, because we still have power, influence and skill in the area.

Not only are we committed to action, our chances of success with a Manley still on the scene will never again be higher, nor will inaction by us mean for the West Indies a continuance of a gentle drifting sideways in a para-federal political twilight. 1962 will either see an independent West Indies Federation or a series of independent explosions for independence within these Colonies with troublesome, if not grave, results. We are therefore totally committed to Federation and must be prepared to take all reasonable risks, even if most of those risks are the unglamorous ones of the back seat driver. Presentationally this may have advantage; vitally it will probably have none.

The future steps in the independence process for the West Indies Federation fall into five or more sequences:—

- (1) The Inter-Governmental Conference to be held in May in Port of Spain to attempt to define the final shape of Federation.
- (2) H.M.G.'s conference to be held in London in May/June to ratify or complete the final shape of Federation and to fix a date for Independence.
- (3) This will be followed by debates in various legislatures and by a referendum in Jamaica, probably about September.

(4) A final London Conference to be held in the late Autumn to deal with finance, trade, defence and Commonwealth matters.

(5) Depending on the nature of the agreements achieved, a general election for the Federal Parliament prior to an official ceremony of Independence in the West Indies.

This sequence of events and subjects, except for the fifth item, was agreed at the instance of Manley when I was in the West Indies in February. Williams may try and raise detailed financial matters in London but I think in general the subjects and their sequence should be preserved, clumsy and complicated though they are, with the exceptions, first that if things start going badly in London we should be prepared to make some financial statement in very general terms to satisfy the smaller islands, and that secondly, at an appropriate moment we should ask the Americans to let something be known of the extent of their proposed aid for an independent Federation.

The inter-governmental conference

Most reports received prophesy that the atmosphere is unlikely to be salubrious. The recent debates in the Federal Houses have pin-pointed the hostilities of individuals and of the islands and the ideological differences between the hard and soft federal schools, indeed only one possible consolation can be drawn from the exercise and that is that Sir Grantly's [sic] power and influence seems to have suffered an even further diminution. More serious perhaps are the Federal Cabinet's machinations reported by Lord Hailes and the fact that the Grenada March election was won on a straight "freedom of movement" anti-Williams ticket.

In view of the portents it might seem probable that the I.G.C. would either explode or achieve nothing whatsoever. Providing we do not interfere directly and leave honour, onus and discussion entirely to the West Indians I do not believe we will be faced with either eventuality. For various reasons I think the West Indians want to come to London and will be forced to come in some sort of order by the lure of Independence. I would suggest therefore that at the I.G.C. this Office's activities be limited to:—

- (a) the sending of a message by the Secretary of State (attached);
- (b) the sending of observers to keep this Office informed, to act as assistants to the Conference if called upon, and to explain the established facts of H.M.G.'s promised obligations to the West Indies after Independence especially to the smaller island delegations;
- (c) to advising by letter the Governor-General and Sir Solomon Hochoy, in determined and optimistic tones, of our general aspiration for the I.G.C. and through them the Chairman of the Conference, namely that maximum progress should be achieved to the point of the avoidance of total breakdown;
- (d) the judicious use of the U.K. press to emphasise that at this stage success or failure is squarely on the shoulders of the West Indians themselves;
- (e) a letter to Manley suggesting that whilst the appointment of Governors will essentially be a matter in which the Independent Government's wishes would be paramount we would be of every possible assistance in getting Sir Grantly [sic] a Barony.

If of course at the I.G.C. a total breakdown is engineered by the opponents of

Federation a perhaps irremediable position would have arisen. Even though failure would be more at the West Indian's door than our own, and for that reason unlikely to occur I think that in these next few weeks it would be appropriate to submit a paper to C.P.C. for information on the cost and dangers of a breakup of the Federation.

During this same period I suggest it would be advisable to enter into discussions once again with the Americans as to their influencing West Indian politicians and as to the timing of some announcement on representation and aid. Providing the I.G.C. survives in fairish order I suggest a suitable moment might be immediately before the delegates set out for London whilst the Federal Cabinet was still available in Port of Spain. In the context of British Guiana and Eric William's [sic] threat to merge with Jaganland, which will probably in some form emerge during the I.G.C. by highlighting a double trouble we might make them not too unamenable.

The Lancaster House Conference

This and the Jamaican referendum seem likely to provide the two most critical passages of the negotiations.

As adjuncts and preliminaries to the arrival of delegates special care should be taken with hospitality (public and private), press, and T.V. programmes about the West Indies (Rediffusion are already active). The opportunity might also be taken for making the announcement of a Trade Mission to the Federation, and negotiations should be speeded to this effect.

How many total deadlocks will be weighing down the West Indian delegates' luggage from Port of Spain and the I.G.C. it is impossible to predict. But amongst them are likely to be four or five.

- (1) The Reserve list as it concerns the freezing of income tax and industrial development to unit territories.
- (2) Freedom of movement.
- (3) Sources of Federal revenue.
- (4) Customs Union, and possibly
- (5) Federal representation.

Innocent sounding in themselves, seemingly resolvable problems, these have become more than the rallying cries of factions and politicians; they have almost become the entrenched clauses of island constitutions. These or other apparently more trivial issues will be used by the three factions—the strong federation group, the loose federation group and what in reality will be a wrecking, or no federation group, to bend the Conference to their will.

At this distance and to such an able Chairman it would be an impertinence and a folly to recommend action. Nevertheless three thoughts arise. The first is that there will be plenty of comparatively trivial matters for ratification to enable these major problems to be played long. The second that the "Alliance" of Trinidad and Jamaica may have to be publicly a little broken, and both manoeuvred into giving a little ground on freedom of movement and taxation. And, thirdly, that the smaller islands may have to be given assurances as to grants-in-aid which would go some way beyond the so-called "declaration to Manley" made by the Secretary of State in January 1960.¹

¹ See 117.

Seen from this distance, detailed negotiation apart, two major problems of judgement and policy are likely to arise.

The first as to what degree of weakness and unreality in Federal conception we are prepared to countenance.

The second as to how far we are prepared to push Manley and Williams. The latter's card of a Southern (British Guiana/Trinidad) federation is probably weak and would favour men like Mahabir and James² more than Doctor Eric, but Manley's hand is a poker hand, strong and very difficult to estimate.

The Jamaican referendum

This is impossible to predict. Recent estimates have grown pessimistic. There is always some danger that some of his Cabinet colleagues could desert Manley but with a Premiership about to go begging it is doubtful. There are local issues and promises on Federation which are supposedly infrangible.

There is the possibility of some untoward political event, riot, rising, or some sort of grumbling violence of social origin. In the West Indies anything is possible. But the more probable facts are that Manley will not be diminished by playing the major role at a London conference, and so long as Bustamante [sic] stays alive his personalization of the opposition to Federation must play into the superior master's hands. Equally nothing is impossible. Perhaps Manley has left his campaign a little late. But providing the balance of the Lancaster House agreement is presentable and providing we and the Americans can give some general economic assurances and spell out a little more how Commonwealth assistance loans, etc., function Manley after a two month campaign should win.

Between now and then we might perhaps study whether some defence matters could be induced or leaked into the Lancaster House conference which might be of some use to him.

Economic and general conference

To forecast so far ahead would be largely worthless but I attach a short note by Douglas Williams showing the sort of sums the United States and ourselves could offer. It is not a bad showing, and if the Canadians would come in, and at the moment they are not very attentive, it would be very good indeed. Nevertheless, I feel we may have to go marginally higher and longer in grant-in-aid. Sir William Gorell Barnes entirely disagrees with me, but I believe a study should now be made of how much further we could reasonably go. American aid is too much tied to individual projects to be of use to small island deficits. If we fail on federation, individual demands for "independence floats" will be even more exorbitant and grant-in-aid for the smaller islands will be round our necks not for ten years but for eternity.

Rewards and fixings

I have made no mention of this matter. As Federation approaches its moment of truth I very much doubt whether its opponents are fixable, or if fixed, of value. Whether they have created the forces of opposition or the forces them I am not sure.

² Dr W Mahabir, minister of health, water and sanitation, Trinidad; C R James, author, lecturer and political scientist; editor, PNM weekly, *The Nation*; secretary, West Indies Federal Labour Party, 1959–1960; left PNM, 1960. Mahabir and James were left-wingers who broke with Williams over the issue of the bases agreement.

But in the few weeks ahead it is the forces which will be in control. Sir Grantly [sic] is a special case and no one knows his weaknesses better than Manley. It could perhaps be left to his advice. For the rest, it is a weapon which now, I believe, should be reserved for special and individual situations.

Conclusion

On reading this inevitably incomplete aide memoire and analysis I am struck that on a merely political assessment of known individuals, not only the arguments but the men of ability are on the side of Federation. This encourages me but it also tends to produce too strong an atmosphere of optimism. The opposition to Federation is deeper, slower and more powerful than I have given credit for. It is not unlike Sir Grantly [sic] himself. It is basic, lazy and inarticulate to the point of silence, but it is there. Because it has defied my analysis let it not take us by surprise.

Annex [1] to 148: Draft message for the secretary of state to send to the inter-governmental conference

On the occasion of the resumption of the Inter-Governmental Conference, I should like to express to all of you my very best wishes for a successful outcome.

It is never easy to set up a Federation. To do so successfully always requires compromise and adjustment. The time which has elapsed since your last meeting has been well used. The problems which it is now for you to resolve have been clearly defined. I trust that you will bring to your present meeting such goodwill and such a spirit of accommodation that solutions to the major points outstanding can be found.

I look forward to seeing you at Lancaster House later this month. I hope you will bring with you a substantial measure of agreement on the kind of constitution which you want, so that together we can decide upon the final steps which will bring The West Indies to its long-sought goal of independence.

Annex [2] to 148: Note by D Williams on financial assistance, 12 Apr 1961

Mr. Thomas

In preparation for our meeting this afternoon I have prepared a note of items which are likely to prove contentious at the Inter-Governmental Conference. This note is attached.³ We have also prepared in the Department the first draft of a Colonial Policy Committee paper on Jamaican secession from the West Indies Federation.⁴ One of the things we might consider at this afternoon's meeting is whether a paper on these lines should be submitted to the C.P.C. forthwith. In my view we should recommend the Secretary of State to make this submission without any further delay. We have marked the paper "for C.R.O. concurrence" and this is not likely to be easy to obtain, but I think we ought to try to get C.P.C. views on this problem before you go to the Inter-Governmental Conference.

As Sir John Martin's note makes plain the question of aid after independence is a

³ Not printed.

⁴ See 147.

crucial element in persuading this reluctant West Indian horse to tackle the Federation fences. The present position is that the amount of aid that has been or is likely to be made available to the West Indies in the present quinquennium is as follows:

	£ millions					
	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964
Grant in aid	1.5	1.8	2.0	1.8	1.6	?
C.D. & W	3.25	3.25	3.25	3.25	3.25	?
	4.75	5.05	5.25	5.05	4.85	?

In addition disaster relief has been running at the average of £1 million a year. The firm promises so far made to the West Indies are that at independence H.M.G. would:

- (a) hand over the unspent balance of their C.D.& W. allocations. This might be somewhere between £5 million and £7 million;
- (b) continue the present rate of grant in aid until the end of the 1959–63 quinquennium (i.e. about £1.75 millions per annum) and consider some continuation of this grant in aid on a tapering basis for a further limited period but in any case not later than 1968 (i.e. the 10 year period mentioned in the British Caribbean Federation Act). In addition H.M.G. has promised £1.2 millions towards the construction of the barracks in Trinidad. The Americans have said that given a U.K. contribution of some \$14 millions a year on grants and economic development they believe “that in terms of magnitude U.S. economic assistance should parallel the U.K. effort” up to 1964. The Americans have so far insisted that this information should be withheld from the West Indies. If they would agree to make some announcement on the subject, say, early in the proceedings of the Inter-governmental Conference and say that this aid will start to flow once a firm date has been fixed for West Indian independence it might have a healthy psychological effect.

We have no idea so far how much aid the West Indies are going to ask for. The figure which was banded about in the recent debates in the Federal Legislature, however, was \$(BWI)300,000,000 over a 10-year period. This is approximately £60,000,000 on an average of £6,000,000 a year. If we can point out that with the U.S. and U.K. aid combined the West Indies have fairly firm promises of some £10,000,000 a year over the first four years (always provided they get a move on to independence) this surely ought to change their tune considerably. If in addition we could persuade the Canadians to make some promises in similar terms (they need not be too precise) then the bandwagon might really start moving. Perhaps we can discuss this possibility further this afternoon.

Minute on 48

Secretary of State

Mr. Fraser has very kindly sent me a copy of his memorandum about the West Indies Federation.

I am sorry to be in this context “Der Geist der stets verneint”.⁵ But:—

⁵ Literally, ‘I am the spirit that always denies’ (Goethe).

(1) We have for nearly two years now been running a balance of payments deficit in the region of £500 million per annum, which has only been covered up by an inflow of capital, mainly short-term, which we must expect certainly to dry up and perhaps to be reversed.

(2) Government assistance to undeveloped countries has pretty well trebled and it will be difficult to hold it at about £200 million per annum from this year onwards.

(3) The various territories of the West Indies have national incomes per head varying from about £75 to getting on for £150 as compared with African and Indian figures of £20 to £25.

(4) The West Indies attract far more private capital from overseas than any of our other charges except perhaps the Bahamas.

(5) In spite of all this the West Indies will, under existing policies, receive from us, the Americans and the Canadians between £10 m. and £12 m. per annum up to 1964 without taking any account of the subsidies they receive from the U.K. consumer, certainly large but of an unascertainable amount, through the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement, or of anything we may eventually decide to have to do for bananas and/or citrus.

(6) Strategically the West Indies are so important to the United States that we can be certain that they will do anything necessary. In Africa, on the other hand, particularly East and Central Africa, our strategic and political interests are much more involved than the American and we are bound to have to play the major role.

If in spite of all this Ministers feel that we shall at the right moment have to improve on our undertakings to the West Indies, I would still hope that they would not try to persuade the Treasury that we should improve on our already very generous offers for the period up to 1964. I must admit however that there would be considerable difficulty (in my view rightly so) in making any further promises in regard to the subsequent period. Firstly the Treasury are bound to be reluctant to look so far ahead. Secondly, whilst it is development grants for the smaller islands after 1964 rather than loans which the West Indies will want, an undertaking to make such grants so long after the attainment of independence would be inconsistent with Ministers' recent decisions about the terms of aid. If absolutely necessary we could perhaps try to persuade the Treasury and C.R.O. that we should undertake to extend development grants, like budgetary aid, on a tapering scale during a limited period after 1964. But I must confess that I myself would be against even an undertaking of this kind so far in advance, at any rate except as part of a bargain under which the Americans would continue or increase their aid after 1964.

I am afraid that the truth may be that we went too far in putting our goods in the shop window in the undertakings already given to Mr. Manley but at that time it *was* thought vital to say as much as we possibly could to get Mr. Manley's support for federation.

I am sending copies of this minute to Lord Perth, Mr. Fraser, Sir H. Poynton, Mr. Thomas, Mr. D. Williams and Mr. Harding.

W.L.G.B.
17.4.61

149 CO 1031/3316, no 175

2-16 May 1961

[Freedom of movement]: record of the proceedings of the Trinidad inter-governmental conference. *Appendix IX*

[Extract]

...

188. *Dr. Williams* stated that he wished to deal with the matter in some detail as it was of very special interest to Trinidad and Tobago. He began with three basic facts:—

- (i) the rate of population growth in Trinidad and Tobago was approximately 3% per annum over the past few years—about double the rate in Jamaica and much higher than the average for the Federation.
- (ii) the most rapidly expanding section of the population was the five to fifteen age group.
- (iii) of the migrants who entered Trinidad in 1958–1959, 88% of the males and 84% of the females were under 40 years of age.

189. He wished to draw attention to the possible effects of these facts. The upper and lower limits of the migration possibilities were 5,000 and 12,000 per year and he proposed to work therefore on an average figure of 7,500 migrants per year—a figure representing 1% of the total population and 33% of the natural increase of the population of Trinidad and Tobago.

190. The labour force of Trinidad and Tobago as at May, 1960 was 290,000 persons and this force increased at the rate of something like 8,000 persons per year. If it was assumed that about 75% of the migrants were additions to the labour force, the result was an addition to the labour force of about 5,600 persons from migration as against the natural addition of about 8,000. The unemployment figure of Trinidad and Tobago varied from 50,000 to 38,000 depending upon the definitions used. The latter figure comprised people actively seeking work within the last few months before the survey and constitutes 13% of the labour force. Under-employment totalled some 20,200 or 9% of the labour force employed. The public Development Programme and the rapid increase in private investment over recent years have been adding to the sector of the economy relating particularly to manufacturing enterprises employing more than ten persons (excluding agricultural enterprises except sugar estates) and as a result the employment fields have increased on an average by about 4,000 persons per year over the past four years.

191. The Government had reckoned that it would require a capital investment of \$7,500 per year to employ an additional person in manufacturing industry. Thus to provide jobs for the 5,625 migrants annually joining [the] labour force it would require a private capital investment of \$422 million over a ten year period.

192. An important aspect of a Territory's development programme was the improvement of housing standards. By 1965, 107,000 new houses would be required and 43% of all accommodation units in Trinidad and Tobago were grossly overcrowded. The Government had embarked on an extensive programme of rehousing on the basis of large-scale incentives to private investment to come to Trinidad and Tobago, under a Government guarantee to provide the necessary mortgage finance. On this basis and on the basis of such Government funds as were available the elimination of slum areas and the construction of new blocks of flats

had commenced. The Government could not consider providing a standard of housing for immigrants different from that provided for the rest of the population. The cost of building two-bedroom blocks of flats in slum areas worked out at approximately \$7,000 per family unit. Thus, assuming 75,000 migrants over a ten year period—or approximately 15,000 families—two-thirds of whom, it may be assumed, would have to be provided for, the total cost of providing two-bedroom flats for this additional population would work out at \$70 million.

193. As regards school places, free secondary education recently introduced in the heavily congested area of St. George and to be expanded to the rural areas, was super-imposed on a primary school pattern which was itself deficient and inadequate for existing needs. In 1956, when the present Government took office, there were 760 school places for every 1,000 children of five to fourteen years. Notwithstanding the considerable expansion over the past four years and the increase in school places by about 16,000 there were now only 770 school places for every 1,000 children. Assuming that 10% of the migrants (that is, 750 per year) were children requiring educational facilities, the provision of school places for them would involve a capital provision of approximately \$1,300,000 over a ten year period, not to speak of the substantial increase in recurrent expenditure.

194. The same problems confronted the Government with respect to water and health services. It was in view of these facts that he had always insisted that the essential requirement of the Federation was economic development programmes for the Unit Territories. Jamaica, Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago and, possibly, Antigua had been able for the past few years to find a sufficient part of the money required for economic development from their own resources. This was not so in the smaller Territories and the Development and Welfare grants on the pattern existing since 1945 have been totally inadequate to carry out the development programmes needed. The Government of Trinidad and Tobago had practical experience on this matter. The mere expenditure of \$10 million in capital works in Tobago with less than 33,000 people had virtually stopped migration from Tobago to Trinidad and in fact migration had begun from Trinidad to Tobago.

195. Certain fundamental conceptions advocated by Trinidad and Tobago as to the form the Federal structure of The West Indies should take had been rejected by the Conference. By way of compromise the Conference was now hammering out a Federal structure which was a mere patchwork of various Federal ideas. The Conference was not engaged in trying to establish some sort of structure which, however unsatisfactory, and whatever the compromises involved, would permit the Territories to see [sic] together and to develop, however gradually, over the next few years. In that period an indispensable requirement would be a large scale investment of capital principally from the United Kingdom but also from the United States and Canada. In the meantime, the migration to the United Kingdom would have to continue. Latest statistics indicate that when Trinidad and Tobago was available as a port of entry the migration to the United Kingdom from the smaller Territories was particularly small. Since 1960, the Trinidad and Tobago position, being what it is, migration to the United Kingdom had shot up sharply.

196. It was important to differentiate between the position in the United Kingdom and that in Trinidad and Tobago. In the United Kingdom the outstanding vacancies in the second quarter of 1960 were 244,376. The West Indian migrant arrivals in that quarter of 1960 were 14,899.

197. The Government of Trinidad and Tobago proposed a modification to the recommendations of the Working Party. The Government proposed that the subject of control of movement of people should be on the Exclusive List but that the actual exercise of the power should be deferred until such time as the Federal Government obtained jurisdiction over customs, industrial development and income tax; and the Government of Trinidad and Tobago, in collaboration with the Governments of the other Territories and the Federal Government would approach the United Kingdom Government on the question of external aid for the West Indies (including aid in respect of housing accommodation for migrants flowing into Trinidad as a result of freedom of movement).

198. *Dr. Cummins* pointed out that if the facts and figures presented by the Trinidad delegation to the Conference were correct then Trinidad would not be able to accept migrants for as long a time as we could foresee, and would be in no better position at the expiration of the five year moratorium proposed by ALPHA.

199. Barbados was not concerned with the question of figures. They were concerned with the basic principle that a Federation must involve freedom of movement of peoples—involving, he stressed, the right to settle anywhere in the Federation. The United Kingdom Government had made it clear that freedom of movement was an attribute of sovereignty. This was ... acknowledged in the Constitution of Nigeria and other recent Federations. Restriction of movement between Territories was as objectionable as restriction of movement within a nation from rural to urban areas. It was the general feeling of the people of Barbados that Federation was unthinkable without freedom of movement of persons. Barbados was the only delegation that brought along a member of the Opposition. Mr. Brancker¹ would demonstrate to the Conference that the Opposition there felt as strongly on this matter as the Government. This issue was not one on which Barbados could compromise.

200. *Mr. Bird* drew the attention of the Conference to the migration problem in Antigua. The 1960 report showed that there had been quite an invasion by migrants from every Territory of the Federation and a problem would be created if the existing pace of development were not maintained. However, a nation was being formed and it was to be expected that every citizen would feel that he is part of the nation. In the same way that West Indians said to the United Kingdom that they could [?not] agree to the restriction of West Indian migration into the United Kingdom since The West Indies is part of the Commonwealth and West Indians are British citizens, so West Indians expect that as difficult as it may be Territories will endeavour to accommodate the citizens of any other Territory. Once delegates accepted that The West Indies must become a nation then he felt sure that they will be able to come to an understanding and to reach a solution which should involve the economic development of the Territories.

201. *Mr. Le Blanc* stated that he could not conceive a Federation without free movement of persons and that free movement should come together with Independence. If the West Indies had no free movement of persons how could it take a stand against a proposal by the United Kingdom to restrict West Indian immigration.

¹ J E T Brancker, QC; member, Barbados House of Assembly since 1937; speaker, 1961.

202. *Mr. Collymore*² considered it anomalous to create common citizenship and to provide for a West Indian transport service and yet deprive citizens of moving freely within the area. He was aware of the immediate problems involved for Trinidad but this merely constituted a sacrifice which it was essential for Trinidad to make in the interests of the Federation as a whole. He appealed to the delegation of Trinidad and Tobago to reciprocate the spirit of compromise which had been shown by other delegations at the Conference.

203. *Mr. Joshua* expressed his concern over possible restrictions on freedom of movement within our new nation, having regard to the West Indian migration problem in the United Kingdom. He pointed out that there would be internal free trade which would mean that the people of one Territory would have to buy goods at a fairly high price from another Territory but would be unable to take part in the manufacture of those goods. Freedom of movement was a matter of national prestige and restrictions within the nation would put a stigma upon the people when they went abroad. He supported the proposal of ALPHA and deplored the suggestion from the Trinidad and Tobago delegation to postpone freedom of movement indefinitely. He was fully alive to the problems confronting Trinidad and was anxious to find a solution which would avoid injury to the economy of that Territory. He would agree to any reasonable compromises that did not involve an indefinite postponement of freedom of movement.

204. *The Prime Minister* stated that every one at the Conference, including the Premier of Trinidad and Tobago, must agree that the principle of freedom of movement is part of independence. The mere citation of statistics indicating the problems of migration in Trinidad did not constitute an argument against this principle. Similar figures had been cited in the House of Commons in February of this year to demonstrate the problems of West Indian migration to the United Kingdom. He suggested that it might be possible, in order to meet the Trinidad problem, to devise a provision in the Constitution which would permit a Territory in special circumstances to impose a quota on the admission of certain people for a limited time. He drew attention to the increasing pressure which certain groups in Britain were bringing to bear on the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom to restrict West Indian immigration to that country. Any such restrictions would have catastrophic results on the Territories of The West Indies. Nothing should be done out here which would make it more difficult for the United Kingdom Government to resist that pressure. He advocated the immediate removal of all immigration restrictions between the Territories subject to the working out of some formula whereby any Territory with special problems could be protected against undue injury. He warned the Conference against playing into the hands of the pressure groups in Britain anxious to restrict West Indian immigration. The United Kingdom Government had declared that it had at present no plans to restrict West Indian immigration. However, that Government had the situation continually under review and would be forced to reconsider its policy if any economic recession occurred in that country. . . .

207. *Mr. Manley* stated that he was able to approach this problem with complete detachment as Jamaica had no special problem with regard to freedom of movement. Freedom of movement was an essential part of nationhood; however, the special

² H B Collymore, minister of trade and industry, St Lucia.

problems of Trinidad had to be recognised and it was foolish for a new nation building itself to do anything, for purely theoretically reasons, which might inflict serious injury or dislocation on any Territory—particularly one on whom a major part of the success of the Federation depended.

208. Having said that, he wished to say how profoundly disturbed he was over the note injected into the discussion by the Premier of Trinidad and Tobago—in his proposal that freedom of movement should be postponed until the Federation takes over control of customs as well as industry and income tax. This only confused the issue and placed Jamaica in an utterly impossible position. Even if it were true that industrial development and income tax were proper ultimate subjects for Federal control, this will have nothing to do with the problem of freedom of movement during the first few years of Independence. The West Indies had no spare money to throw about. Even if industrial development were to be put under Federal control tomorrow, the Federal Government would not be able to develop one single industry in the area. He was prepared to join in a genuine effort to find a solution to this matter which would take into account the special problems of Trinidad. He could not, however, accept a proposal which would tie freedom of movement with other matters which would take a long time, so that a state of bitterness and grievance would be built into the Constitution and Jamaica would be the target of indignation. . . .

213. *Mr. Bramble* supported the point of view of the Trinidad and Tobago Government, acceptance of which, he contended, would not weaken the case for migration to the United Kingdom. West Indians had helped to make the British Empire what it was and the United Kingdom Government would be committing a great misdemeanour in the eyes of The West Indies and the world if she closed the doors to West Indians.

214. *Dr. Williams*, in reply to the debate, restated the position of Trinidad and Tobago.

215. The present Government had taken no part in working out the proposals for the Federal Constitution in 1956. Anxious as that Government was to make profound changes in those proposals at the Jamaica Conference of 1957, nothing could be done without unanimous agreement and the Trinidad and Tobago Government was helpless.

216. The preamble of the Constitution declared that there should be freedom of movement of persons and goods, but it also declared that there should be an integrated trade policy and as quickly as practicable a customs union, including internal free trade. Further, the Conference proposed by article 118 was to review, in the light of progress towards the Customs Union, the Federal powers in respect of taxes on income and profit. It was extraordinary, therefore, that certain delegates should talk about an unreasonable attachment when he linked freedom of movement with such matters as customs union, industrial development and income tax.

217. The Trinidad and Tobago Government, in the *Economics of Nationhood*,³ had presented a detailed plan of the kind of Federation which it considered would meet the needs of the West Indies. That Government advocated a tightly knit Federation adequately empowered at the centre to shape and direct the future of the nation. A wide range of powers relating to loan raising, customs, trade, industry,

³ See 130, note 1.

economic and social planning, price and production controls, were to be allocated to the Federal Government. There was to be freedom of movement of persons and capital among Units as a necessary corollary of free trade.

218. The Government of Trinidad and Tobago then declared what it considered to be the essentials of nationhood. Certain of the delegations of the Conference seemed to believe that nationhood meant the ability of people to move about the place. The Conference had repudiated the structure of Federation proposed in the Economics of Nationhood. They had accepted a Reserve List and rejected economic planning as a Federal responsibility. But the same people who did so now said that the Federal Government must control population. Freedom of movement was an essential part of the Federal plan of the Economics of Nationhood but it did not make sense for anyone to suggest that it must be an essential part of the patchwork Federation, which was emerging at the Conference.

219. It had been acknowledged by all delegations that the problem of emigration from the Territories was due to underdevelopment. Listening to the speeches of the delegates, one would have thought that Trinidad and Tobago was responsible for that. The strictures of the delegates should properly have been directed at Britain who was responsible for the exploitation and underdevelopment of the smaller Territories.

220. The whole approach of the smaller Territories to the problem of migration was wrong. Those Territories were being rapidly denuded of their population (Grenada lost 9,100 people between 1958 and 1960). The development capital available to these Territories was totally inadequate. The Government of Trinidad and Tobago spent \$4 million on Tobago's capital development—a sum equal to the capital expenditure in Dominica over a period of three years. The road was clear; the United Kingdom Government must be approached for economic aid on an adequate scale.

221. It had been suggested in argument that Trinidad's problem might be met by developing her agricultural industry. But why not develop the agricultural industry of Grenada and other Territories? Delegates should remember that nothing would be gained by jeopardising the economic stability of Trinidad and Tobago. They had overlooked the pressing social and economic problems with which migration would confront Trinidad and Tobago. Trinidad and Tobago had compromised throughout the Conference even on matters they considered to be fundamental. Trinidad and Tobago was not in a position to accept the liabilities and responsibilities unrestricted freedom of movement would place upon her. . . .

Appendix IX to 149: Statement on freedom of movement⁴

1. Freedom of Movement is an attribute of Sovereignty and the right of every citizen, but there is no unqualified freedom of movement in any country just as there is no unqualified freedom of speech.

⁴ This was the statement which emerged from the conference. A single vote was taken on the number of years stipulated in para 8(iv) and on the amendments indicated in paras 11 and 12. Delegates from Antigua, Grenada, Jamaica, Montserrat, St Vincent and Trinidad voted in favour; those from Barbados, Dominica, St Kitts, St Lucia and the federal government voted against.

2. In all countries there is power to pass laws restricting freedom of movement—in a country where freedom of movement is not specifically entrenched in the constitution this power is completely unfettered.

3. Even in countries, such as Nigeria, Malaya and Sierra Leone, with written constitutions specifically protecting freedom of movement, this freedom can in fact be restricted in such a wide range of public interests, that in practice there is virtually full power to restrict freedom of movement whenever it is necessary to do so in the public welfare.

4. Thus it is a reasonable proposition that in any sovereign country, whether unitary or federal and whether a centralised federation or a loose-knit federation, the power to control the movement of persons in the public interest is an essential one.

5. The principal motive leading the majority of persons to desire to move from one part of a country to another is the absence of jobs in the exporting part and the existence, or imagined existence, in the receiving part.

6. Large-scale movement for this motive in The West Indies will do harm to the exporting Territories, and will bring social problems in the receiving Territories. This situation will be inimical to the interests of the Federation as a whole.

7. During the time that these problems are being solved, chiefly by economic development in the various Units, it would seem reasonable that not only should these Units have legislative power to control freedom of movement but that the overriding Federal power should be subject to some qualification to protect Territorial interests.

8. The conclusion to which the foregoing propositions point is that the principle therein should be recognised in the Constitution in the following way:—

(i) The Constitution will contain a declaration of freedom of movement.

(ii) The declaration of freedom of movement would not invalidate laws reasonably necessary in the public interest of the Federation or of any Unit.

(iii) Control of the movement of persons would appear on the Exclusive Legislative List.

(iv) The exclusive powers of the Federal Government would not during a period of nine years after Independence be exercised except with the concurrence of the Unit Governments. (Or alternatively, there would be a formal undertaking that the Federal Government would not exercise its powers in relation to any particular Territory without that Territory's consent during this agreed period. N.B. This alternative was not adopted).

9. The question of shortening this special agreed period will be reviewed at the end of the fourth year by the Federal Government in conjunction with all Territorial Governments.

10. During the agreed period, no Unit Territory would legislate to increase or expand any restrictions upon migration now obtaining without the consent of the Federal Government.

11. [After the agreed period, each Territorial Government would have the right to consult the Federal Government regarding appropriate remedial measures required to deal with any economic disruption that results in a Territory from inter-Territorial migration.]

After the expiration of this period, each Territorial Government would have the right to determine, with the concurrence of the Federal Government, the appropriate

remedial measures required to deal with any economic disruption that results in a Territory from inter-Territorial migration.

12. The Federal Government will undertake to discuss at once with those Territorial Governments that are most immediately concerned as a matter of the highest priority the establishment of a development programme aimed at increasing employment opportunities; [and to this end, at the conference with the United Kingdom to discuss economic aid special emphasis is to be placed on the need to obtain immediate interim aid to commence such a development programme. A similar approach is to be made to other aid-giving countries such as Canada and the United States and international lending institutions.]

and to this end should without delay approach the United Kingdom Government for economic aid for the implementation of an interim development plan to be put into operation on 1st January, 1962, and to be agreed upon at the London Independence Conference next month—the interim plan to be without prejudice to the overall development plan for the whole area which it is proposed to draw up. As regards economic aid for the overall economic development plan for the whole area, the approach to the United Kingdom Government should be made about October or November of this year, and the approaches to appropriate foreign countries and international organisations should follow as soon as practicable thereafter.

N.B. The words in brackets⁵ were in the paper as presented by the Chairman⁶ and were modified by the Conference by being replaced by the words immediately following the bracketed passages.

⁵ ie the square brackets in paras 11 and 12.

⁶ Dr A S Cato.

150 CO 1031/4271, no 53

9 May 1961

[Inter-governmental conference]: letter from A R Thomas (Port of Spain) to D Williams on discussions with observers from the Cayman Islands and Turks and Caicos Islands at the Trinidad conference

[Extract]

[The Cayman Islands and the Turks and Caicos Islands originally entered the federation as dependencies of Jamaica but their relationship with Jamaica changed as from July 1959 by virtue of UK legislation enacted in 1958. Both now came under the jurisdiction of the governor of Jamaica who exercised authority through two administrators and the government of Jamaica had no responsibility for or power over them. They were thus in the anomalous position of being in the federation but not units of it; they were not represented in its legislature, nor did they contribute financially. The local legislature in the Caymans had since passed a resolution to the effect that the Caymans wanted to remain a British colony, an attitude attributed by the CO to two factors. First, about one third of the population of 8,000 was white and in a dominant position, especially commercially. Secondly, the islands were self-supporting and not grant-aided. Their prosperity was based on remittances sent home by seamen (the majority of the adult male population worked on American-owned, Liberian-flagged tankers) and a growing tourist industry. They were developing an economy similar to that in Bermuda and the Bahamas, without income tax and with a law encouraging overseas companies to register in the islands. The Caymans feared that federal legislation would prejudice this development. The CO considered whether the Caymans might be persuaded to accept a relationship with the federation similar to that of the Channel Islands with the UK, a relationship which had recently been proposed for Malta. They would have sovereignty over their internal affairs, the federation would be responsible for their defence and external affairs and their connection with Britain would be only as part of an independent West Indian

Federation which was a member of the Commonwealth (CO 1031/4271, no 41, Poynton to Sir A Clutterback (CRO), 20 Mar 1961, enclosing a draft letter to Blackburne). Local representatives in the Turks and Caicos islands also had reservations about being part of the federation and feared in particular the loss of British passports. Blackburne found their attitude 'moving': 'No one like me who has had to compete with nationalism for over thirty years can fail to be touched when some people say that they want to remain British!'. But by contrast with the Caymans, the governor was convinced that the Turks and Caicos Islands should be persuaded and even told that they had no alternative but to remain in the federation. The islands were grant-aided and dependent on the federation for their external trade; they had no other outlet for their exports of fine salt. The CO did not agree with Blackburne that the islands should be told that they could not remain a colony. Not only would this be difficult to defend in parliament in the UK; it would also feed suspicions in the West Indies that the UK was anxious to disengage from the region because of the expense. The CO did, however, agree with Blackburne that every effort should be made to convince the Turks and Caicos Islands that it was in their own interests to remain in the federation (*ibid*, no 42, Blackburne to Thomas, 10 Apr 1961 & no 47, Thomas to Blackburne, 25 Apr 1961). Discussions were held with representatives of both the Cayman and Turks and Caicos Islands at the reconvened inter-governmental conference in Trinidad in May 1961 which are reported in the document reproduced here. Thomas attended the conference as one of the UK observers. The solution proposed for the Caymans was put by Macleod to the Cabinet Colonial Policy Committee (CAB 134/1560, CPC (61)13, 30 May 1961) but in the event, and after the referendum in Jamaica, it was decided that if both the Cayman Islands and the Turks and Caicos Islands wanted to remain colonies, their wishes should be respected (CAB 134/1561, CPC(62)10, memo by Maudling, 16 Mar 1962; *ibid*, CPC 6(62)1, 30 Mar 1962 records the Colonial Policy Committee's approval.)

I am writing to amplify the very brief report we sent you about the Caymans and the Turks and Caicos Islands in Barbados telegram No. 22.

2. We held meetings early last week with the observers (the people whom they have sent here are observers like ourselves) from both groups. The Turks and Caicos islanders were very simple, sincere folk who wanted no more than an assurance that we honestly believed that it would be in their own best long-term interests to remain within the Federation. They said that they would place themselves in our hands and would accept whatever advice we gave them. Such responsibility was not altogether welcome, but, having swallowed hard, we told them that we felt sure that they would be unwise to break with the Federation. We explained that if they did not continue in the Federation now, there must be some doubt whether they would be able to join it later on as favourable terms as now seemed possible. We also sought to dispel some of their ignorance and, as it seemed to us, misconceptions about the Federation and its future prospects and attitudes. After very full discussion they accepted our advice. So it was agreed that they should in due course start negotiations for special treatment on the basis that they would stay in the Federation if their anxieties could be met.

3. The Caymanians were altogether tougher nuts to crack. It was immediately apparent that they had a thoroughgoing distrust of and distaste for the Federation. They knew very little about most of the other islands. They were afraid that federal taxation might undermine the foundations of their economy. They were worried lest the arrangements for a special visa waiver which they have negotiated with the United States, (so making it much easier for their seamen to find work aboard American ships), would be terminated if they were part of a Federation within which there was freedom of movement. They wanted nothing to do with Customs Union. And so on, down to their insistence on retaining the identity of the Caymans on postage stamps. In short, they could see no advantage and every possible danger in any continuing connexion with the Federation.

4. We put to them fully the same sort of considerations that we had put to the Turks and Caicos people and, while we did not press them to modify their attitude, asked them to consider the matter carefully before resolving to sever their links with the Federation. After our first meeting, they left with one doubt—if they were to opt out of the Federation now, and if after a few years they had, for whatever reason, (perhaps because the United Kingdom would then no longer agree to their remaining a Colony), to seek to re-enter the Federation, would not a Federation which they had spurned be in a position to dictate terms to them? They requested a second meeting to explore this question further. Before this second meeting with us they had some private discussions with Brown,¹ from Jamaica, who made a number of suggestions to them. The basis of these was that the Caymans should have full internal self-government; that they should enter into a form of association with the Federation under which the latter becomes responsible for their external affairs and defence; and that this association should be reviewed after five years, at which time H.M.G. should accept the Caymans back as a Colony if the Caymans then so wish.

5. These suggestions were discussed at a second meeting which we had with the Caymanians. We thought that essentially they were very similar to the proposal we had considered in the office, (what I might call the “Channel Islands” proposal), with the added complication that H.M.G. would be asked to commit themselves in advance to receiving the islands back on request after five years. Their readiness to consider these propositions seriously represented a substantial softening of the islands’ earlier attitude, as expressed in the resolution passed by their Assembly. So we told them that, whilst we naturally could not commit H.M.G., there was in our view sufficient chance that these suggestions would be acceptable to justify pursuing these further. And it was agreed that the Caymanians, like the Turks and Caicos islanders, should start negotiations in the hope of securing the kind of association with the Federation which I have described.

6. The next move we made was to suggest to Ricketts, (the Federal Minister with special responsibility for both these groups of islands), that two official Working Parties, each with Federal, Jamaican and Colonial Office representatives, as well as representatives from the Caymans and the Turks and Caicos respectively, be set up to consider the islands’ special problems. He agreed to this. The suggestion was then put to the Conference, on the basis that, as it had decided already that these islands should not be represented in the Federal Legislature in the immediate future, it would be necessary to examine their positions; and that Working Parties should do this and report, making recommendations. No mention was made of whether they should report to the Inter-Governmental Conference or to the Lancaster House Conference: we quite deliberately left this open.

7. The Working Parties have now met and made recommendations. I enclose copies of these.² They do not, of course, cover every point which will arise—and in particular they make no attempt to examine the problems which will have to be faced should a decision be taken as proposed to give the Caymans full internal self-government—but I think that they do set out the principles involved in sufficient detail for a decision to be taken about whether these are, or are not, acceptable.

8. We understand that Manley will support the recommendations. The Federal Cabinet is soon to consider them and there seems to be a reasonable chance that it,

¹ See 108, note 3.

² Not printed.

too, will support them. If it does, we would judge that they will probably be accepted, in the main at least, by everyone in The West Indies.

9. This raises the problem of whether H.M.G. can also accept them. We do not think that there should be any difficulty over the Turks and Caicos: the recommendations contain nothing that is particularly unexpected or unusual. And the Caymans' recommendations, too, should probably be acceptable insofar as everything except the provision regarding their possible return to Colonial status is concerned. This last matter, however, will set a real problem. Our discussions with the Caymanians have convinced us that they will accept no compromise on this issue: any statement that we would in five years' time "consider" taking them back as a colony would just cut no ice at all. We shall have to be quite specific—or they will back down now and ask to be cut off from the Federation in all respects, remaining a Colony.

10. We shall thus have to choose between the undesirability of making an unorthodox arrangement, perhaps setting an unfortunate precedent, (although I doubt whether in fact it would embarrass us, as I cannot think of any other territory which is ever likely to be in a similar position), and the undesirability of allowing the Caymans to break their present connexion with the Federation. My personal view is that we might be wise to agree to the unorthodox arrangement. If we do, I feel that the Caymans will gradually be drawn into the Federation; if we do not, I fear that they may stay out indefinitely, perhaps forever and remain a permanent U.K. Dependency....

151 CO 1031/3319, no 8

10 May 1961

[Federation]: inward telegram no 107 from A R Thomas (Port of Spain) to Mr Fraser on the 'thunderous atmosphere' at the reconvened inter-governmental conference in Trinidad

Begins. Atmosphere here remains thunders and further squalls probably lie ahead, but the Federal ship is still afloat and looks more like weathering the storm.

2. Adams is quieter and temporarily appears a chastened man: he clearly feels his influence waning. Bradshaw has raged tempestuously on a personal issue, but has shown no wish to break up the Conference. Other Federal Ministers are mostly silent. Barbados and small islands' delegates seem increasingly anxious to preserve Federation and so readier to compromise: latter often voice dissent but appear satisfied to proceed once their protests are on record. Southwell always asks for his dissents to be recorded in red ink. Williams is more relaxed and effective. Manley has at last accepted that items can be deferred for further consideration at Lancaster House.

3. Most of Monday was spent in unproductive and indecisive but happily unimportant squabbling. Unit rights to operate air services and broadcasting stations were discussed at great length with much confusion. Former matter was finally resolved but latter has been referred to a committee to report back to this Conference. Problem of taking subjects off the reserve list was reached in the late afternoon. Manley made Jamaica's position clear—having promised his people to

create this list, he could never agree that subjects be removed from it without Jamaica's consent. This he wished to secure by providing that no item could be taken off the list without, *inter alia*, either the consent of all units or alternatively agreement of two thirds of the population (or electorate) of the Federation. Barbados and some of the smaller units indicated opposition in principle to Jamaica veto before the day's session ended.

4. On Tuesday morning it became clear although no Federal delegate had spoken, that majority opinion was against Jamaica. Williams then spoke for 45 minutes immediately before lunch most clearly and impressively. He recalled Trinidad's earlier differences with Jamaica and the way he had compromised to resolve these and he urged that to avert breakdown, Jamaica accept the ten year prohibition on the removal of any subject from the reserve list and the provision that thereafter subjects be removable provided, *inter alia*, majority of the population of the Federation consent. (Even this might not in fact be acceptable to the majority of small islands.)

5. After lunch interval Jamaica delegation returned to the Conference 30 minutes late. Manley, much moved, reiterated the reasons for his stand and finally asked that in order that he might, on return to Jamaica, examine whether generally acceptable formula could be worked out, this matter be deferred to Lancaster House. He undertook to take into account the views expressed by the smaller units and the "wise" speech by the Premier of Trinidad. This was agreed.

6. Manley has since explained privately to me that his delegation was divided on this issue.¹ He personally thought that the Eric Williams formula (which includes the requirement of two thirds majority of the Federal Legislature) was satisfactory but he had no mandate to accept it and must put it to party conference in Jamaica. He naturally cannot forecast the outcome but has good hope of getting agreement. He knew that if as alternative he had said "no" to any compromise formula yesterday it would not have been politically possible for him to have varied this stand later. He also judged that Trinidad would have refused to the adjourning of the Conference.

7. Later in the day, on Manley's own suggestion, (made before the subject had provoked any serious controversy and in order to give Constitutional lawyers time fully to examine the matter and to obtain the benefit of Colonial Office Legal Advisers' opinions) question of how unit constitutions should be amended was also deferred to Lancaster House.

8. Other potentially difficult subjects resolved were amendment of Federal Constitution and two external affairs points previously deferred. Question of Regional Council of Ministers was raised again but opinion was still evenly divided so the matter was once more shelved.

9. So we carry on. Nothing gets through without the utmost difficulty and opposition, but we are progressing slowly. *Ends*.

¹ Blackburne subsequently explained in more detail Jamaica's position on the reserve list at the IGC. Manley's delegation had suggested that no item should be transferred from the reserve list without (a) an absolute majority in both houses of the federal parliament, and (b) absolute majorities in a majority of the legislatures of units representing at least two-thirds of the federal population. Other delegations objected to (b) in particular and Trinidad urged acceptance of a formula based on half of the population instead of two-thirds, on the additional understanding that the reserve list would remain untouched for an initial ten years. Manley personally thought this an acceptable compromise and withdrew to discuss it with his colleagues, Isaacs, Glasspole and V L Arnett, the finance minister. Isaacs and Arnett were adamant that

Jamaica should adhere to its original position, the former arguing that the balance in the federal house of representatives would be upset if British Guiana joined the federation. Faced with this opposition Manley reported back to the conference that he would have to consult more widely in Jamaica. The issue was then discussed in the Jamaican Cabinet and also at a PNP conference which resolved that the items of income tax and industrial development should not be removed from the reserve list without the consent of not less than two-thirds of the federal population or two-thirds of the federal electorate. Manley told Blackburne that the referendum result would be placed in jeopardy unless Jamaica took this stand; the governor doubted this on the grounds that 'very few people know what all this is about'. Immediately after the PNP conference Manley broadcast a talk on federation in which he said: 'After all—who can tell—may be in 10 or 15 years we will have reason to join closer with Trinidad and share some of the benefits of her economic strength which is greater than ours. People forget when they talk about the Small Islands being poor that by comparison with every other unit Trinidad is well off. The combined economy in terms of National Income of Trinidad and the eight smaller islands is much larger than the National Income of Jamaica although our population is greater than the total of all their populations'. Privately Manley confided to Blackburne that he was 'extremely unhappy' at his failure to carry his own Cabinet and party executive. He attached little importance to the inclusion of industrial development on the reserve list and thought there might even be a need to review the position of income tax in a few years' time. On the referendum Manley also told the governor that his party would need to work really hard to win (CO 1031/3319, no 14, Blackburne to Thomas, 23 May 1961).

152 CO 1032/304, no 222

June 1961

[Immigration]: CO brief no 55 for UK delegation at the Lancaster House conference on West Indian immigration into the UK

Introduction

This brief is concerned only with the immigration of West Indians into the United Kingdom and not with the movement of residents of The West Indies between the different units of the Federation. The latter subject will be discussed at the Conference (Brief No. 22 refers). The former has no bearing whatever on the constitution of the Federation or of its units and is not a subject for Conference discussion. This brief is prepared solely to provide members of the U.K. delegation with background information which may be useful if the question should arise in informal discussions with members of the West Indian delegations to the Conference.

Extent of West Indian migration to the U.K.

2. The migration movement from the West Indies to the U.K. in recent years reflects the facts (a) that the West Indies have a very long tradition of overseas migration and (b) that all doors other than the U.K. have progressively been closed to them in recent years. West Indian migration to the U.K. first started its upward turn in 1953, following the passage in 1952 of the McCarran-Walter Act¹ which almost stopped West Indian migration to the U.S.A. (Under the present arrangements each unit of the Federation is entitled to a U.S. immigration quota of 100). Table I below shows the total intake into the U.K. of coloured people from all parts of the Commonwealth and the numbers within this total who have come from the West Indies. All figures are net (i.e. excess of arrivals over departures):—

¹ See 23.

TABLE I

<i>Year</i>	<i>Estimated net intake of coloured people from the Commonwealth (approx.)</i>	<i>Estimated net intake from the West Indies</i>
1955	39,400	27,551
1956	43,000	29,812
1957	40,500	23,016
1958	27,100	15,023
1959	22,000	16,395
1960	58,000	49,674
First 4 months of 1961	30,300	18,554

The latest monthly figure for net intake from the West Indies (8,332 in April, 1961) is the highest on record.

3. It is estimated that there are probably about 210,000 West Indians in the U.K. at the present time, although no precise statistics are officially available. The West Indians tend to concentrate in a few areas, the largest concentrations being in London (about 60,000) and Birmingham (about 26,000). There are also sizeable concentrations in Manchester (7,000), Nottingham (nearly 6,000), Huddersfield (4,000), and Leeds, Staffordshire and Wolverhampton (3,000 each).

4. As indicated in Table II below the majority of the West Indians who come to the U.K. are from Jamaica:—

TABLE II

<i>Year</i>	<i>Jamaican Total (net)</i>	<i>West Indian Total (net)</i>
1959	10,367	16,395
1960	31,438	49,674
First 4 months of 1961	11,013	18,554

5. As indicated in Table III below, increasing numbers of West Indian women have been arriving in the U.K. since 1960, mostly to join their menfolk (there have also been increasing numbers of children arriving but the official statistics give a breakdown only as between male and female):—

TABLE III

<i>Year</i>	<i>Male</i>	<i>Female</i>
1956	17,604	12,208
1957	12,215	10,801
1958	7,143	7,880
1959	9,159	7,236
1960	29,752	19,697
First 4 months of 1961	10,532	8,022

Employment

6. Table IV below gives details of unemployment among West Indians. It shows that the large majority of West Indian immigrants have been absorbed into employment. The number of unemployed West Indians has risen during the past six months, but there is good reason to believe that the higher figures for November, 1960, and February and May, 1961, do no more than reflect the increasing rate of intake (since the first thing which most immigrants do on arrival is to register for employment). This belief is supported by the results of a special count taken by the Ministry of Labour at the beginning of February, 1961, of the *duration of unemployment* among West Indians. This showed that, of a total of 9,545* West Indian unemployed on that date, almost a half (4,334) had been unemployed for less than one month: only 1,496 (15 per cent) had been unemployed for more than three months and only 418 for more than six months.

TABLE IV

<i>Month</i>	<i>Unemployed Males</i>	<i>Unemployed Females</i>	<i>Unemployed Total</i>
Nov. 1958	4,701	3,627	8,328
Feb. 1959	4,724	3,778	8,502
May 1959	3,217	3,301	6,518
Aug. 1959	2,261	2,516	4,777
Nov. 1959	2,899	2,441	5,340
Feb. 1960	2,930	2,614	5,544
May 1960	2,481	2,787	5,268
Aug. 1960	2,911	2,573	5,484
Nov. 1960	4,098	3,926	8,024
Feb. 1961	5,129	4,774	9,903
May 1961	5,069	5,614	10,683

7. The majority of West Indian immigrants are employed on unskilled work. A few of the better educated immigrants can be found in some professional positions and also in nursing and various forms of clerical work. A small percentage of skilled men have been placed as draughtsmen, laboratory assistants, chemical process workers, electricians, boilermen, tool fitters, centre lathe turners, welders, building and civil engineering tradesmen, freight lift drivers, warehouse men and catering workers. Women with any previous experience of nursing, typing or the needle trades are usually placed quickly in employment.

8. Otherwise West Indians are employed mainly in unskilled work. The public transport undertakings are probably the largest employer of coloured labour and have their own schemes to train men and women for permanent work in various occupations. (London Transport have special arrangements with the Government of Barbados to bring over workers on a sponsored scheme). Others are employed in heavy labouring jobs on roadways, building or well paid but uncongenial work in coalmining, iron and steel and chemical works, etc. Some are absorbed in mills and clothing factories where men and women have been successfully trained on some routine machine operations, while others have found work in the engineering and

* There is a discrepancy between this figure and the corresponding figure in Table IV. The latter includes 358 workers "temporarily stopped".

technical trades and in public utility undertakings. Nearly all the women need training, and light factory work with time rates is the most popular occupation. Laundries, transport, food processing and preserving, icecream manufacture, baking and catering, tobacco manufacturing, cutlery, boots and shoes, wire, rope and clothing trades have also engaged unskilled women workers. Very few have been willing to do domestic work in private houses but some have settled down in cafes, hospitals, canteens and institutions.

9. The Ministry of Labour report that recent arrivals are on the whole of lower standards mentally and educationally than previous arrivals. They are said to come mainly from agricultural backgrounds, to have no useful experience to offer and often to be illiterate and difficult to understand. Many of these are proving slow to learn and unadaptable, and are said to resent correction. Nevertheless, they tend to expect high rates of pay as a result of information received from earlier arrivals. There is also a tendency for workers to leave after a short time if they hear of another job with a slightly higher wage or more overtime, and employers find the training and wastage expensive.

10. Recently, many of the West Indian women have been in the older age groups and unsuitable for training in industry. Single women with young children to support have great difficulty in finding work for the limited hours they are available unless they have some previous skill which is in demand. Those who have been machinists are not used to power and piece work and cannot normally make the grade required. The fact that many of the West Indians tend to settle in certain areas (notably London and Birmingham) also makes it difficult to place them in work, while another factor which causes difficulties is that some employers impose a limitation on the proportion of coloured staff which they are prepared to employ.

11. In general, however, although the placing of West Indians in suitable employment is said to be becoming increasingly difficult—due partly to the lower quality of the more recent arrivals—the vast majority of the immigrants although unskilled have found employment and are undertaking work—in various fields—which is essential to the U.K. economy.

Other difficulties

12. *Housing.* The main difficulty encountered by West Indians in the U.K. is in connexion with housing accommodation. There is already severe over-crowding in many of the areas in which they tend to settle and the difficulties are aggravated by the barriers which are frequently raised against coloured people as such. There is a pronounced tendency for West Indians to be housed in large multi-occupied houses owned by unscrupulous landlords, often of foreign and sometimes of West Indian extraction. The official view of the Ministry of Housing and Local Government is that the conditions of over-crowding and congestion of which complaints are so often heard would have existed in any case without West Indian immigrants; but that their presence has aggravated the problem in certain areas to some degree. Attempts to relieve the problem by establishing a West Indian Housing Association have so far failed but it is hoped that legislation which the Government have in mind for the current session to give local authorities greater powers to control conditions in multi-occupied houses may help to eradicate some of the worst abuses. Housing difficulties are of course a potential source of social friction, which in the circumstances could easily involve racial friction.

13. *Public order.* In general, however, since the so-called race riots in Nottingham and Notting Hill in the summer of 1958,² there have been no serious outbreaks of racial violence although isolated cases of racial friction have come to light. In some areas there is reported to be growing racial friction simmering not far below the surface.

14. *Health and crime.* According to the evidence available these have so far presented no special problems.

West Indian restrictions on emigration

15. Following the disturbances in August, 1958, the Secretary of State invited West Indian Governments to seek to reduce the flow of immigrants to this country by imposing certain administrative controls on immigration. About a year ago the Ministry of Labour expressed fears concerning the long-term prospects for the employment of unskilled coloured immigrants in this country due to (a) the bulge in school-leavers expected between 1961 and 1963, (b) the ending of National Service and (c) the progress of automation. The West Indian Governments were therefore asked once again to enforce such administrative measures as they could adopt locally to reduce the rate of emigration to the U.K. and to impress upon intending migrants the difficulties regarding employment and housing which they were likely to find in this country. All of the West Indian Governments refuse passports to persons known to have been convicted of crimes of violence and the Government of Jamaica (from which most of the immigrants come) also place restrictions on the issue of passports to the elderly and infirm and to unaccompanied juveniles. Many of the Governments (including Jamaica) take active steps to ensure that intending migrants are fully aware of the kind of conditions and difficulties which they are likely to encounter over here. Despite these measures the rate of emigration has increased sharply during the past 18 months. The main reason for this is thought to be the knowledge that employment prospects in the U.K. are at present good. Intending migrants are seldom deterred by forecasts that employment may become more difficult in the indefinite future but they are impressed by letters from friends and relatives already here reporting that jobs can be obtained without much difficulty. (The rate of emigration is in fact very susceptible to changes in the U.K. employment market as was confirmed by the sharp falling-off in emigration between the autumn of 1958 and the middle of 1959, when there was a slight employment recession in the U.K.) In addition, emigration to the U.K. has undoubtedly been given a special boost very recently by the public discussion, in press and Parliament, of the possible imposition of controls by the U.K. Government.

U.K. restrictions on immigration from the Commonwealth

16. As a result of the recent sharp increase in immigration from the West Indies, and to a lesser extent from India and Pakistan, pressure has been brought to bear on the U.K. Government in recent months to impose controls on the entry of immigrants from the Commonwealth into the U.K. This pressure has been led by a small group of Conservative M.P.s and backed by certain organs of the Press. An inter-departmental Working Party under the Home Office has examined the whole

² See 78.

question of coloured immigrants in the U.K. and has reported in full to Ministers on the present position, on the difficulties which are being encountered (and those likely to arise in the future), and on possible methods of controlling immigration. U.K. Ministers have in the past been reluctant to depart from the traditional open door policy of the U.K. as the centre of the Commonwealth, but there has recently been a growing feeling among Ministers that the volume of immigration is reaching a scale which will oblige the Government to introduce legislation to enable them to restrict it. No final decision to legislate has yet been taken, but the possibility of introducing restrictive legislation on the basis of an ingenious scheme devised by the Ministry of Labour to work with sufficient flexibility to provide the U.K. employment market with such immigrant labour as it requires is being actively examined. Ministers have, however, decided that in any event no public announcement of an intention to legislate should be made until after the Jamaica referendum has been held, after which it is hoped that the future survival of the West Indies Federation will be assured. But the Secretary of State has told his colleagues that the question is bound to be raised while the West Indian leaders are here for the Conference and that if it is so raised it might be disingenuous for him to refrain from warning the Premier of Jamaica, and possibly other senior West Indian Ministers, privately that the Government were considering the introduction of restrictive legislation later in the year.

17. The question whether such a private warning should be given, and if so when and to whom, is very much a matter for the Secretary of State's personal judgment in the light of developments during the Conference. It is, however, very important that, apart from any private warnings which the Secretary of State may decide to give, no indication should be given either in plenary session or in informal discussions with West Indian delegates that the U.K. Government is likely to introduce restrictions. In any such discussions we should not go beyond the position taken in numerous recent Ministerial statements in the House that the Government is keeping the whole question of immigration into the U.K. under constant review but has not yet reached any conclusion. West Indian opinion is, naturally enough, highly emotional on this subject and West Indian Ministers would therefore be bound to react very strongly indeed to any suggestion that restrictions might be introduced. If the idea were to gain currency that the price of independence was the closing of the U.K.'s open door to West Indian migrants it would certainly gravely prejudice the chances of reaching agreement at the present Conference on the early establishment of an independent Federation. It would also certainly make it even more difficult, and perhaps impossible, for Mr. Manley to obtain a vote from the people of Jamaica in favour of joining the Federation. It is abundantly clear from speeches made both by Sir Grantley Adams and Mr. Manley since their arrival in the U.K. this week that this is how they would react to any suggestion that the present policy of free entry might be changed. There is therefore a special need for caution in what is said about U.K. policy, either in plenary session or in informal discussions. There is not of course the same objection to frank discussion of the difficulties in the U.K. to which West Indian immigration at the present rate gives rise. Indeed, this could be a useful preparation for what may come later.

153 CO 1031/3321, nos 8 & 17

11–15 June 1961

[Federation]: outward telegrams nos 175 (personal) and 1 (federation personal) from G W Jamieson to M S Staveley¹ on the proceedings of the Lancaster House conference in London

[On the contentious issues, the Lancaster House conference adopted the formula on freedom of movement suggested at the IGC in Trinidad (see 149) and, on the reserve list, it adopted the compromise put forward by Macleod which is reported in para 6 of tel 175 reproduced here. On representation, the conference adopted the formula, again suggested at the Trinidad IGC, that each territory would elect one member to the federal house of representatives plus an additional member for each complete unit of population in that territory. With agreement reached that the unit of population should be 55,000, the federal house would consist of 64 members (5 elected from Barbados, 30 from Jamaica, 16 from Trinidad, 1 (with provision for an alternate member) from Montserrat and 2 from each of the other territories. On the issue of a customs union, it was agreed that internal free trade should be phased in and a common external tariff adopted within a maximum of nine years. It was also decided to abolish the mandatory levy and to give the federal government independent taxing power from import duties on customs, excluding those on petroleum products. With the addition of taxes on federal incomes and other miscellaneous receipts, it was estimated that this would provide federal revenues of approximately \$30 million in 1961 (*Report of the West Indies Constitutional Conference, 1961*, Cmnd 1417, 1961, paras 11, 20, 21, 26 and 27).]

No 175 (personal)

London Conference.

Conference has now completed its first full week. Items dealt with have been Freedom of Movement, Interim Economic Aid, Sources of Federal Revenue, Procedure for Amendment of Reserve List and International Treaty Obligations.

2. No improvement was made on I.G.C. compromise on Freedom of Movement and there is danger this may still be breaking issue for Barbados.² Federal Government tabled paper requesting £5.8 millions interim aid. Fraser (in chair as S. of S. was sick) made deliberately discouraging initial response but we know we will almost certainly have to produce something though probably only a fraction of sum mentioned will be possible. Discussion ended on curious note with Williams having made detailed critique of Federal paper. He doubted capacity of territories to spend at such a rate, warned them of the heavy recurrent burden that would follow some of their projects, and pointed out that shortage of trained technical staff was likely to make it impossible to accelerate development at rate envisaged. Naturally this did not endear him to small islands.

¹ Secretary to Lord Hailes.

² Governor Sir J Stow had reported considerable dissatisfaction in Barbados after the Trinidad IGC. Adams and premier Cummins condemned what they described as 'a negation of Federation, a determination to make the Federation unworkable and an attempt to create an unworkable confederation'. The Barbados delegation in Trinidad had been defeated on 'practically all it sought to achieve' and feelings were running particularly high over freedom of movement. Barbados's case at Trinidad had been inadequately represented and it was 'obvious' that Adams was ill-equipped to match the debating powers of Manley and Williams. There was much press speculation that Barbados would make freedom of movement a breaking point and that without it 'too high a price would be paid by Barbados for "Independence"' (CO 1031/3319, no 13, Stow to Thomas, 27 May 1961).

3. Long debate on sources of federal revenue did not alter I.G.C. position. Adams continued to press for Federal control of income tax. He was directly answered by Manley whose closely logical reply he did not attempt to dispute.

4. Up to this point atmosphere of conference was curiously lifeless. Few delegations seemed to have really understood vital nature of proceedings and that Federation would be made or broken at this conference. They wearily repeated all old arguments. On Thursday Secretary of State told conference he had grave doubts about the possibility of its success if delegates continued to take up rigid positions. He reminded them of what was at stake, that continuation of the Federation must be the supreme objective and that a new spirit must appear if this was to be ensured.

5. This appears to have sobered them for they approached next item, Procedure for Amendment of Reserve List, in chastened spirit. Manley explained he had been unable to change his position in face of overwhelming opinion in Jamaica that formula could not be eased. He pointed out that there was no real problem at issue and appealed to conference not to break federation.

6. Following discussion S. of S. submitted alternative proposal that there should be no Reserve List. Instead income tax and industrial development should be on Concurrent List but would not become federal subjects until such proposal approved by 2/3rd majority of each Federal House and by absolute majority of each Unit Representative House. There would be review after nine years.

7. Manley welcomed this and said he would accept simple majority of Federal houses. Conference accepted compromise with visible relief except Williams who recorded dissent. This however may be largely tactical move.

8. Highlight of coming week likely to be Secretary of State's reply on interim economic aid on which final decisions have not yet been taken. We will also have to hear them out on Emigration to U.K. We hope to fix date of Independence on Tuesday or Wednesday.

9. Aim is to produce report of conference which all heads of delegations will sign by end of week and thus (we hope) commit their governments to seeking subsequent legislative endorsement to package deal. This may be tricky stage and Adams (who has made little impact hitherto) may make last stand. He has already warned conference that Federal Parliament is unlikely to ratify unsatisfactory decisions.

10. There is however now atmosphere among some delegates that we may be over the hump. Barbados is possibly most immediately dangerous risk.

11. Will telegraph again next week. Conference documents will be in Monday's bag.

No 1 (federation personal)

London Conference.

We are now considering Draft Report. The Secretary of State has proposed independence date of 31st May, 1962, to be followed within six weeks by Federal Elections; the economic conference to start in London on 8th January, 1962.

2. On interim aid Secretary of State has proposed small Anglo-American Economic Mission should visit West Indies in immediate future to consider "any particular short-term projects (in the Leewards and Windwards) which are of special urgency or importance to the smaller islands but which for one reason or another

have not found a place within the existing approved development programmes . . . the mission would, of course, have to limit its scope to a relatively small number of short-term projects”.

3. State Department agreed to participate at very short notice and have in mind matching U.K. contribution up to limit of about \$(U.S.)3 million. We are also informing Canadians in case they may wish to be associated with mission.

4. We hope to finish Friday depending on how we work through draft report. This will offer further opportunity for delegations to reopen issues, but at least they appear to have agreed that the published report should not spell out individual territorial reservations.

5. We think this Conference is probably in the bag. Adams repeats that Federal Parliament is unlikely to ratify and clearly certain territories (particularly Barbados, Grenada and St. Lucia) remain risks until ratification complete. Some territories will delay ratification until after economic conference.³

³ Reporting on the Lancaster House conference to the Cabinet Colonial Policy Committee, Macleod explained that the main problem would be the likely insistence of the small islands on prior discussion of an interim plan for economic development as the price for their continued support for an independent federation. In discussion in committee it was suggested that an independent federation would not necessarily reduce the financial burden on the UK; it might be less expensive to keep the small states and to give independence to Jamaica and Trinidad than to give considerable financial and economic help to an independent federation. However, this was not advocated as policy. The committee recognized that the US had a vested interest in the launching of a strong and independent federation and was prepared to donate considerable financial aid for that purpose (CAB 134/1560, CPC 7(61)2, 2 June 1961).

154 CO 852/2060, no 11

15 July 1961

[EEC]: report by Lord Perth on his discussions with West Indian ministers in Trinidad and Jamaica. *Annex C*

I first had a meeting—easy and relaxed—with Grantley Adams and the Federal Cabinet; then, over two days, three long sessions with the Federal and Unit Governments—40 delegates, weak, ignorant of the subject and hostile to each other. The final outcome was the Press Communiqué on the lines of the New Zealand communique (Annex A)¹ which states that they would understand if the United Kingdom decided to enter negotiations provided their interests were fully protected! Even this took an hour to achieve because they were afraid lest some day this “understanding” would be held to be approval of the fact that the United Kingdom could not expect to join without some changes in the present Trading arrangements! The list of their interests (vital?!) range from Arrowroot to Tonka Beans (Annex B) and with it there is a memorandum stating their requirements (Annex C).

2. Subsequently I had meetings with Eric Williams and his Trinidad Cabinet and then travelled to Jamaica to do the same with Manley and his Cabinet. Both were concerned that I should again hear of their islands’ interests. Otherwise the meetings passed happily. I spoke at a Trinidad Chamber of Commerce lunch, 150 strong, and had a meeting with the leading Jamaican business and agricultural groups.

¹ Annexes A and B not printed.

3. I believe the visit, and the chance it gave me to explain what it was all about, was very worthwhile as there was no knowledge and deep concern that the United Kingdom was to give up the Commonwealth and sacrifice the West Indies. When I left there was I think appreciation that we hadn't even started to negotiate, that the choice for us was not Commonwealth or Europe, that we would seek to protect vital West Indies interests and that we would consult. The local Press were very helpful.

4. What are the conclusions from the visit?:—

(a) Above all that uncertainty be removed and that we decide soon whether to enter negotiations and if so the shorter the negotiations the better. As long as they are looked after the West Indies are quite content with whatever the United Kingdom may do.

(b) The West Indies would (I think rightly) like A.O.T. status—about which there was a very full discussion. I warned them I could not tell whether they would be eligible as being sufficiently undeveloped but hoped so. In this connection there is a point we need to watch vis-à-vis their Independence next year—if they thought Independence would make them ineligible some might seize on this excuse to postpone its happening and jeopardize Federation (incidentally Manley's campaign for Federation on which he shortly has a referendum is going well).

(c) Preservation of the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement is vital to the West Indies and British Guiana, and of course Oil is an even greater money spinner; citrus and bananas are also very important and lastly bauxite and alumina are of great value to them (the investment in Jamaica alone is £120 million) and British Guiana. The export of these ores is in the main to Canada and so there is deep concern about any arrangements made for Canada's aluminium.

(d) The West Indies are extremely anxious that they (Federal and Unit Governments) should be adequately consulted on those items in which they are interested and I gave appropriate assurances.

(e) In general the only concern of all the West Indians is that their United Kingdom markets and their special privileges therein are unaffected or if affected that they be compensated. Perhaps for the first time they are beginning to realize how much we do for them!

5. I had two hours with Jagan of British Guiana who flew over to see me. He had given the question more profound thought than any of the West Indians and felt that if we went in, the Commonwealth over a period must feel the change. He had decided that for us to do so would be a mistake. After our talk, which was friendly and objective, in a Press interview he said he was afraid we might be choosing the shadow and losing the bone—so my talk appeared slightly to have raised doubts in his mind. I deliberately did not develop the question of A.O.T. status with him—Dutch Guiana has not got it. I said I was well aware of his country's main interests—Sugar and Bauxite—and that we would keep in touch.

Annex C to 154

Safeguards required by The West Indies if the United Kingdom decides to enter into negotiation with the Six with a view to joining the European Economic Community.

- (a) The West Indies would wish to secure A.O.T. status.
- (b) The United Kingdom should ensure that the level of trade between The West Indies and E.F.T.A., EEC, and itself should not be less than the average of 1958–60.
- (c) The reality of Canadian trade must not be given up for the prospect of increased trade with E.E.C. and our Canadian trade must be maintained.
- (d) Existing quota restrictions maintained by many E.E.C. countries against manufactured goods from the under-developed countries (e.g. textiles) in contravention of GATT would have to be dismantled. This is a general Commonwealth problem rather than a specifically West Indian problem. Also high tariffs on manufactured goods of interest to the under-developed countries should be reduced.
- (e) There must be no involvement of the West Indies in world politics (especially in Africa) consequent on A.O.T. status.
- (f) The West Indies must have complete freedom in fixing the level of their tariffs including the levying of duties for fiscal and development purposes.
- (g) As regards freedom of movement between the West Indies and Europe the normal type of disability which usually faces West Indians should not exist, but there should be the right of freedom to seek employment in the Community.
- (h) Consultation on a bilateral basis is unsatisfactory since a commodity may concern more than one member of the Commonwealth, e.g. Petroleum concerns Nigeria as well as Trinidad. Multi-lateral consultation would seem to be preferable and if any Commonwealth Conference is convened on the question of United Kingdom entry into the Common Market no constitutional technicality should preclude West Indies representation and in particular representation by Territorial Governments such as Trinidad and Tobago. In the discussion of particular commodities e.g. Aluminium, it would also be desired that other Commonwealth countries such as Canada who had an essential interest in the product should also be associated with the discussions.
- (i) If the West Indies were to be given A.O.T. status their participation in control and management of the Development Fund (Art. I Con.) should be ensured.
- (j) The West Indies should be free to negotiate commercial treaties with third countries subject to any international obligation such as GATT.
- (k) W.I. present trading arrangements in the sense of the long term contracts and negotiated prices for exports which the W.I. now enjoy (e.g. Commonwealth Sugar Agreement and contracts relating to Citrus) must in no way be affected. Moreover, this must relate not only to existing contracts but also to the renewal of such contracts from time to time.
- (l) In the event that the United Kingdom joined the E.C.M. without being able to achieve for the W.I. the status of an A.O.T. with the safeguards requested by the West Indies, the United Kingdom would undertake to have discussions with the Commonwealth and the West Indies (as a member of the Commonwealth) on the question of compensation for any loss of preference that might ensue from Britain joining the Common Market.

155 CO 1032/305, no 280

28 July 1961

[Immigration]: brief by R J Vile for Mr Fraser on the report of the inter-departmental working party for the Cabinet Commonwealth Migrants Committee

The Cabinet considered on the 30th May a recommendation by the Commonwealth Migrants Committee that legislation should be introduced for the control of Commonwealth Immigration and deferred a final decision until they knew what form of control would be practicable. Mr. Butler has asked the Committee to report to the Cabinet before the Summer Recess. The report by the Interdepartmental Working Party discusses the reasons for imposing control and suggests a method of doing so.

2. The first section of the report (paragraphs 3 to 18) sets out fairly enough the arguments of principle. It is interesting to note that the Ministry of Labour now recognise, as they did not before, that in present circumstances there is no case for restriction on employment grounds. The economic arguments in paragraphs 7 to 17 which were prepared by the Treasury show that Commonwealth Immigration is of positive benefit to the United Kingdom, both in the short and in the long term.

3. Later in the report (paragraph 58) it is argued that a case for restriction cannot at present be related to health, crime or public order. The positive grounds for recommending restriction relate to the intensification of housing problems and the difficulties of assimilating coloured people. It is a pity that the report does not take the point that the restriction of coloured immigrants only would not necessarily ease the housing situation if the demand for labour were met by other immigrants, such as the Irish. It is also a pity that the report does not examine at all carefully the problem of assimilation. Much successful work has already been done in encouraging assimilation and there is no reason to suppose that more cannot be accomplished provided that everything possible is done to strengthen the already existing goodwill and to encourage firm action to uphold the law whenever it is challenged.

4. It does not therefore seem possible to make out a convincing case on practical grounds for restricting Commonwealth immigration or to avoid the damaging charge that restrictions have been imposed because of colour prejudice. Even if these risks are accepted by Ministers, there is reason to believe that the method of restriction proposed in the report may not be sufficiently effective and may, in itself, create difficult political and administrative problems. In this connection, the effect on Commonwealth relations must be borne in mind. The right of free entry of Commonwealth citizens into the U.K. is of long standing, and its removal is bound to cause disturbance in Commonwealth relations in varying degrees according to the strength of the Commonwealth interests which are affected. Although the C.R.O. appear to believe that no serious strain need be expected in our relations with already independent Commonwealth members, it is already abundantly clear that the introduction of restrictions would damage our relations with The West Indies. If legislation were introduced before West Indian independence it might destroy our hopes of an independent Federation. If, however, legislation were delayed and provided that the restrictions were seen to be not too severe, and not directed against West Indians, the long term damage to relations might not be too serious. It is possible that other colonial territories might also be brought to accept the

introduction of restrictions, if, in fact, it is necessary to impose restrictions on U.K. and Colonies' citizens.

5. The possible methods of control are discussed in paragraphs 20 to 40 of the report. The recommendations in paragraphs 20 to 32 appear acceptable. The recommendations in paragraphs 33 to 38 and Appendix "B" describe the method of control proposed by the Interdepartmental Working Party. Briefly, the report proposes the admission of two categories of immigrants without restriction, namely, those having a specific job to go to and those having qualifications accepted as likely to be useful in the U.K. For other immigrants seeking work, there would be a general quota fixed for a period for the whole Commonwealth and not sub-divided for individual countries.

6. The proposal to admit people with specific jobs is acceptable and fits in with schemes organised by Colonial Governments (e.g., transport workers from Barbados and hotel workers from St. Helena and the Seychelles.)

7. The proposal in respect of skilled workers does not seem to be sufficiently worked out to enable a final judgment of its merits to be reached. It would seem necessary to have some clearer idea of the skills which would make a person eligible for entry and to know rather more about the procedure for checking on individual applications. It would not seem to be possible, for example, to leave intending migrants in doubt about the kind of skills which will be acceptable. Is it intended, for example, to restrict this category to those with professional qualifications and the more advanced technical qualifications, or will the category include all skilled workers? If there is any intention to allow skilled workmen to come in in this category, then there would seem to be considerable difficulty in checking on their applications. Because of the general level of corruption in many overseas territories it is to be expected that many applicants would make out claims to much greater skills than they in fact possess, and that they could easily acquire supporting evidence to prove this. The only worthwhile check would be a certificate from a Government Department, but in many cases the Governments concerned might have to create additional facilities and employ additional staff for the issue of such certificates.

8. It would therefore seem to be desirable that entry in this category should be restricted to those with professional and comparable qualifications which could be easily proved by the possession of certificates issued by a recognised authority. There would seem to be every disadvantage in trying to widen this category.

9. The report does not give very much guidance about the way in which the total quota for other immigrants would be fixed. It seems clear that the report is mistaken in thinking that the total could be kept secret. In arriving at a figure Ministers would have to consult with local authorities, industries, trade unions and other interested parties and there would seem to be plenty of scope for disagreement and for bringing pressure to bear on Ministers to reach one conclusion or another.

10. It is proposed in paragraphs 42 to 45 of the report that the restrictions should be applied to migrants from colonial territories. When this question was last considered in 1958 the position of the Colonial Secretary was reserved on the grounds that H.M.G. are directly responsible for the well-being of colonial territories and that it is not necessarily appropriate to treat the colonies in the same fashion as independent Commonwealth countries. These considerations do not seem to have lost any of their force. Indeed, if legislation is not introduced until after West Indian independence they would seem to have more force than before. The links binding certain colonies with

the U.K. are exceptionally close and of particularly long standing, e.g., Bermuda, the Bahamas, the Falkland Islands. Because of the smallness of their populations migrants from them to the U.K. could never cause any significant social problems. It is true that some problems in connection with migrants from Aden or Hong Kong would arise, but there is no good reason to suppose that such problems could not, in fact, be met by administrative action taken by the Colonial Governments themselves. It is therefore recommended that we should continue to press for the exemption of colonial migrants from any system of control.

11. If the exemption of colonial migrants is agreed then we need not object to the proposal not to apply restrictions to Irish immigrants, and we could support a specific exemption in the Bill itself.

12. The passage in the report dealing with the enforcement of immigration control (paragraphs 49 to 52) does not seem entirely satisfactory. While there is every reason to impose an obligation on carrying Companies to take unacceptable migrants back to their territory, this does not get over the difficulty of migrants who arrive by other means and are found to be unacceptable. The hope in the report is that repatriation of such people at Government expense would stop most would-be immigrants from trying it on. In practice, serious difficulties might well be encountered if, for example, people turned up in this country a short time before the end of one quota period and the beginning of another, and if the only reason for refusing them entry was that the quota had already been filled. Another difficulty is, of course, that under the proposed procedure the decision of the Immigration Officer would be final. It is expected that from time to time Immigration Officers may well be faced with particularly difficult decisions. Would, for example, a West Indian author be admitted? Or a Gambian painter? Or a private student hoping to secure admission to an educational institution after arrival in this country? Or a Mauritian who had resided continuously in this country for 15 to 20 years?

13. It is a fair general criticism of the Interdepartmental Working Party's Report that because the principles governing restriction are not clearly defined the practical methods proposed are open to serious objection. If Ministers consider that, nevertheless, some restrictions must be imposed, there would seem to be strong reason for urging that colonials should be exempted from those restrictions. If this is not acceptable to Ministers it seems certainly very necessary to have a much more fully worked out plan of control before any final decision can be taken. In particular, it is of fundamental importance in the West Indian context that legislation should not be introduced until after West Indian independence. This need not, however, preclude consultations with Colonial Governors on a Secret and Personal basis about the kind of scheme which is to be introduced.

156 CO 1031/3329, no 9A

4 Aug 1961

[Federation]: circular letter from A R Thomas to West Indian governors and administrators on the outlook after the Lancaster House conference

I apologise for not having written to you earlier about the Lancaster House Conference. As you know it ran its course without a breakdown and in the end produced a report the text of which is unanimous; though as you will have seen from

paragraph 44¹ there were many points of dissent. The substance of the conclusions was far from unanimous, and it is open to each delegate publicly to explain the stand which he took on particular points when presenting the report as whole to Legislatures. Subject however to confirmation by the various legislatures (and in the case of Jamaica a referendum) the conference agreed "to request H.M.G. in the United Kingdom to take the necessary measures to revise the Federal and Unit Constitutions on the basis set out in this Report". The Secretary of State gave an assurance that subject to such confirmation "H.M.G. will take the necessary steps to introduce legislation to grant the West Indies independence on the 31st May, 1962".

A further complication is that though it had always been contemplated that we should need a separate conference to deal with financial and economic aid after independence and a number of other matters such as defence, this Conference has now been deferred from the autumn until January 1962. It is possible that some of the Unit Governments, particularly the poorer ones, may feel inclined to defer putting the Lancaster House Conference conclusions before their Legislatures until after the January Conference when, to put it crudely, they will have seen the colour of our money.

Against this background we need to consider what if anything we can do to try and reach finality in sufficient time to enable us to bring about independence on the 31st May, 1962 on the basis of the Lancaster House Report.

Those of us who sat through the Conference were inevitably depressed by the many reservations which were made by the delegations in regard to various items and the lack of enthusiasm which marked the fashioning of this Constitution for Federal independence. Although no delegation went so far during the Conference as to say that it would advise its legislature and people to reject the scheme as a whole because of its disappointment over particular items, equally they would not commit themselves to supporting it. Paragraph 44 was the best we could get in this direction, and it is clear therefore that there are hurdles ahead. In particular the Trinidad delegation blew unexpectedly cool over the formula of Freedom of Movement which they had accepted in Trinidad (their change being occasioned, it appears, by the acceptance at the London Conference of a revised formula for the Reserve List); Barbados went very near to saying that they would prefer to remain out of a Federation rather than go into one which did not introduce Freedom of Movement immediately; and several of the smaller Islands showed dissatisfaction over Freedom of Movement and some other issues. Manley will no doubt be watching carefully for any signs of weakening in the Eastern Caribbean before finally making up his mind on the timing and possibly even the holding of his referendum.

In these circumstances it seems to us that all our influence should be directed to getting Governments to indicate publicly their support for the scheme as a whole, and their readiness to commend it to their legislatures and to secure its acceptance by the legislatures, with such imperfections as they may see in it, in the hope of working out improvements by proper constitutional methods later on. After all, it would be a mir-

¹ Which read: 'With so many delegations present at the Conference it was inevitable that certain delegations should find themselves not in agreement with some of the conclusions set out in Chapter III of the Report. Many indeed recorded dissent on particular items. It was recognized that the conclusions reached at Lancaster House were ad referendum to Legislatures. The Secretary of State made it clear that, in accepting the scheme as a whole for the purpose of presentation to legislatures, delegates would be fully entitled to explain the stand which they had taken on particular matters during the Conference' (*Report of the West Indies Constitutional Conference, 1961*, Cmnd 1417, 1961, para 44).

acle if the Founding Fathers got this right in every detail first shot! In the case of the grant-aided Islands we would hope that the visit of the Economic Aid Mission might give some encouragement to action and we would in any case hope it need not wait till after the January Conference. In general the danger is that the various Governments and legislatures will hang back and wait to see how other Units are going to jump. In this context it is satisfactory that Bird and Clyne at the last session of the Windward/ Leeward Islands Conference² declared that they intended to recommend the scheme as a whole to their legislatures and this sentiment seemed to be shared by other delegations. This was certainly an improvement on the general attitude at the full Conference when paragraph 44 was put into the draft Report. A fairly rapid endorsement by Unit Governments and legislatures of the Lancaster House scheme seems likely to be infectious, just as a reluctance so to do might be equally infectious.

It was of course made clear to the delegates at the Windward Islands/Leewards Islands Conference (although not in such crude terms) that the schemes which resulted from the Lancaster House Conference and the Smaller Islands Conference formed a package deal which they would have to treat as a whole. In other words the benefits of constitutional advance resulting from the smaller Conference were contingent upon the scheme for Federal independence which emerged from Lancaster House going through.

We know that some of the smaller Islands fear that after Independence they may find themselves financially worse off than they are now since whatever arrangements are made at the January Conference they cannot expect to continue indefinitely to receive grants in aid from the U.K. We do not believe, however, that this fear is well founded. Experience has shown that once a territory becomes independent it attracts economic assistance from outside sources other than the metropolitan country which naturally enough before that stage is regarded by the rest of the world as being primarily responsible for external aid. We have already seen the beginning of this outside interest in the West Indies in the help being given by the United States and the association of the U.S. and Canada in the Aid Mission. We have no doubt that this interest will grow. Apart from these and possibly other countries which may become interested in giving help to the West Indies, it is likely that there will be increasing interest shown in the West Indies after independence on the part of international economic and financial agencies. Furthermore, it is to be expected that the Federation as a whole will be in a far better position to attract outside help than would the Islands on their own and that each unit is therefore likely to gain more financially by membership of this larger association than if it faced the world alone or continued to depend almost entirely on the U.K.

² A constitutional conference of the Leeward and Windward Islands took place in London after the Lancaster House conference. The purpose was to consider changes designed to ensure (as had been the case at the 1959 conference, see 98, note 1) that all units had parity of status when the federation became independent. It was agreed that the Leeward and Windward Islands should have full internal self-government. Delegates from the islands pressed that the changes should be implemented forthwith but the CO insisted that they could not be implemented until the federation had achieved independence. The CO took the line that the changes were not compatible with HMG having continued responsibilities, that HMG had first to be sure that an independent federation would survive, and that if federation failed, HMG reserved to itself the freedom to review the situation anew. The CO was not saying that the changes could not be made, simply that they could not be made before 31 May 1962, the projected date for an independent federation (CAB 134/1560, CPC(61)23, memo by Macleod, 10 July 1961).

We fully realise that it is primarily for Premiers and Chief Ministers to determine the course and timing of events but anything that you, the Governors and the Administrators can do to influence them along the lines of securing early commitments to the new Federal scheme on the part of their Governments and legislatures would, in the opinion of our Ministers, be of the greatest value.

157 CO 1031/3329, no 22, enclosure 22 Aug 1961
[Trinidad]: note by J A Craddock¹ on Dr Williams and his attitude
towards federation

Dr. Williams lunched with me on 15th August, 1961, to meet two British Foreign Office officials. Before the meeting I let him see the latest J.I.C. Paper on Cuba, and as soon as the preliminaries were over, I asked what he thought of the paper. He said that it was good and that he was grateful for the opportunity of seeing it, but that he doubted whether the dangers posed by Cuba to the British territories, and in particular Jamaica, had been sufficiently appreciated.

2. He added that he was worried about Cuban influence and even more worried that the British and American Governments had put their support behind a weak Federation which was unlikely to be strong enough to resist a Cuban subversive attack, if one were seriously mounted. This onslaught on the proposed Federal constitution, and the part played in its creation by the British and American Governments and by Mr. Manley, then became the central theme of his discourse. The principal ways in which this theme was developed were:—

(a) that although the British and Americans had deliberately helped Jamaica create a weak Federation, they were now trying to weaken Trinidad by trying to give to the Federation powers that properly belonged to Trinidad; in addition, the Federal Government and its incompetent politicians were being encouraged to meddle in what were essentially matters for Trinidad.

(b) that Dr. Williams himself was now only concerned with the future of Trinidad; in his present term of office Trinidad had under his leadership achieved a stability and prosperity that no-one would have thought possible five years ago. He was now only concerned with maintaining and consolidating the gains that he had made in Trinidad and was no longer interested in the Federation. He implied that he would not press his objections to it, provided that Trinidad's interests or stability were not threatened; but he was worried at the prospect of Trinidad associating in a weak Federation with Jamaica, if the security position of that territory were to deteriorate with unhappy results in Trinidad.

(c) that the proposed Federal constitution had been supported by the British and American Governments solely to satisfy Mr. Manley, and that in this approach to the problem the true needs of the area had been sacrificed to expediency; he referred to a recent personal letter that he had received from Mr. Manley, which had not apparently affected his thinking.

3. I do not think that our polite efforts to refute Dr. Williams' views had much effect, although we pointed to the even greater security dangers inherent in a fragmented Caribbean, and to the strength which a truly multi-racial nation could

¹ Security liaison officer, federal government.

bring to the area. Ultimately we turned the conversation to relations with Venezuela. The same anti-Federation theme ran through Dr. Williams' response, and he seemed to believe that H.M.G. was deliberately encouraging the Federal Government to interfere in what he regarded as legitimate Trinidad negotiations with Venezuela, notably over the surtax on those Trinidad products that enter that country. He also made it clear that he thought that the attitude of the Government of Venezuela was unsatisfactory and that the British Embassy in Caracas had done nothing to help Trinidad's case, and indeed he suspected that it was conniving with the Venezuelan authorities; in the course of this part of the conversation he said that Trinidad had turned down a Venezuelan suggestion that she should join O.P.E.C.

4. I think that we had more (although limited) success in persuading Dr. Williams that neither H.M.G. nor the Embassy in Caracas were conspiring against him, either with the Federal Government or with the Venezuelans; he asked for a paper to be prepared on the Venezuelan attitude towards Trinidad and was told that this would be done.

5. I asked him directly about his Indian trip, and it was apparent from his reply that although he was satisfied with his reception, he did not think either that he had made much impression on the Indian leaders or that he could expect much help in his present political troubles from that quarter.

6. To conclude I propose to attempt some assessment of this talk, which lasted for two hours and which was conducted in an entirely friendly way. Throughout, my own approach was that I was only interested in security intelligence in its widest sense. Moreover, both my colleagues and I made it clear that we were not there to discuss the policies of H.M.G., the American, or indeed the Federal, Governments; our task was to introduce and to offer that part of the product of the British intelligence effort which might be of value to Dr. Williams; we added that it was up to him to decide whether to accept it or reject it. Dr. Williams seemed to accept this approach, and I think it accounted for his friendliness. I have no doubt, however, that he expected his talk to us to be reported and that to some extent he deliberately sought to create an impression. That impression was of a man thoroughly disillusioned with the proposed Federal set-up, and entirely hostile to the politicians now operating it. His disillusionment also extended to Mr. Manley, to the British Government, particularly in the person of the Secretary of State for the Colonies, and to the American Government; indeed, he particularly stressed his disquiet at recent manifestations of American policy in the area. Because of his disillusionment he proposed to take no further part in Federal affairs, but to devote himself to Trinidad. He also made it clear that he would work against the present Federation wherever it appeared to conflict with the good of Trinidad, and he implied that he did not rule out the possibility of Trinidad leaving the Federation if it proved inimical to the interests of Trinidad.

7. In my own view this impression may not be too far away from Dr. Williams' real feelings at the present time. In the first place he seemed to speak with conviction, but more important, there is no doubt that his whole approach had changed since the London Conference. Before that date, although bitterly critical of some of the steps being taken, and notably of Federal Ministers, he has always seemed to be determined to press on to independence with the best compromise at a Federation that could be achieved. I have met him three times since his return from London and on each occasion have been struck by how listless and disillusioned he seemed; I do not think that it is a pose.

158 CO 1031/3270, no 43A**22 Sept 1961****'The West Indies': minute (PM(61)73) by Mr Macleod to Mr Macmillan on the Jamaican referendum**

[The referendum was held on 19 Sept 1961. Voters were asked: 'Should Jamaica remain in the Federation of the West Indies'. The symbol on the ballot paper for a yes vote was a tree, for a no vote a bell. 217,319 voted yes, 256,261 voted no (CO 1031/3273, nos 6 and 11).]

Prime Minister

The Jamaica referendum has resulted in a defeat for Manley on the Federation issue. We expected and hoped for a narrow but clear affirmative. The result is a narrow but clear negative.

2. This is a most grievous blow to the Federal ideal for which we and enlightened West Indian opinion have striven for so many years. It is certain that the Federation cannot continue in its present form and must be doubtful whether it can survive at all.

3. The decision of Jamaica to quit the Federation must be taken as final. We may expect a demand that they should be allowed to go forward into Independence as a separate member of the Commonwealth. In view on the size, population (1.6 millions) and economic viability of Jamaica this will be a demand which, with the precedents of Sierra Leone and Cyprus before us, we could not resist.¹ Whether there will have to be a General Election in Jamaica or whether Manley will successfully maintain that an adverse vote on this single issue does not constitute a vote of no confidence in his Government remains to be seen.²

4. The question whether a Federation of most or all of the East Caribbean Islands can survive the defection of Jamaica depends more on the attitude of Trinidad and Tobago than on any other single factor. Dr. Williams (Premier of Trinidad and Tobago) made it clear during the West Indies Conference that, if Jamaica left the Federation, Trinidad would follow suit since she would not be able or prepared to take on the financial burden of "carrying" the Federation. (Jamaica and Trinidad

¹ Briefing Macleod, the CO reminded the S of S of the joint memo agreed with the Jamaican delegation in London in Jan 1960 (see 118). The memo did not state that Jamaica would be free to secede but made it clear that the UK would not put any obstacles in Jamaica's way and would consider the implications, including separate independence. The CO also provided the following (approximate) comparisons, requested by Macleod, of per capita incomes of the populations of Jamaica and independent or nearly independent countries: Jamaica £130, Greece £115, India £25, Tanganyika £20, Sierra Leone £20–25 (CO 1031/3200, no 25, 'Jamaica independence', CO brief for S of S [Sept 1961]).

² On 20 Sept Blackburne reported that Manley was in 'remarkably good heart' despite the referendum result which the premier viewed with 'complete astonishment', the PNP having been confident of victory. Blackburne advised Manley to hold an election in Jamaica as the country needed a government with a mandate to steer the country to independence. Manley, mindful of the stand he had taken when he called the referendum (see 126, note), responded that this would be 'political suicide' for his government unless it could first demonstrate some success in the field of independence for Jamaica alone. The following day Blackburne reported statements made by Manley and Bustamante. Manley asked the S of S to receive a Jamaican government delegation to fix the earliest possible date for independence, before the achievement of which a general election would be held. Bustamante stated that Manley had no mandate to hold discussions with the UK on his own; the premier should either hold immediate elections or place the issue before parliament. Describing Manley's statement as 'unconstitutional, unparliamentary, a breach of public faith, and political trickery at the lowest level', he demanded a joint delegation (CO 1031/3200, nos 1 and 5, inward tels nos 90 and 380, Blackburne to S to S, 20 and 21 Sept 1961). The CO resolved to receive Manley first, leaving Bustamante to lead a delegation later if he so chose, a decision which the latter hotly contested.

contribute about 85% of Federal revenues in roughly equal shares.) If he maintains this line, we can expect a demand from Trinidad and Tobago that they too should be allowed to "go it alone" into independent membership of the Commonwealth. This would be as difficult to resist as a similar demand from Jamaica.

5. If Trinidad takes this line, it is difficult to see a "rump" Federation of Barbados and the smaller islands surviving. Antigua has always taken a pro-Jamaica line and is unlikely in any case to continue in a Federation which does not include Jamaica. She may well seek some form of association with Jamaica (though whether Jamaica after the referendum would be in a position to accommodate her is doubtful). Barbados is not very likely to press for independence and is more likely to want to continue as a separate self-governing Colony, possibly with some special status. This would leave us with six small Windward and Leeward Islands which have no prospect of "making independence" alone and all but one of which are budgetarily in the red and supported financially by the U.K.—a most dismal prospect.

6. It is, however, just possible that Trinidad might be prepared to lead an East Caribbean Federation—on her terms. Eric Williams has always disliked the present loose form of Federation which has been a condition of Jamaica belonging. The defection of Jamaica will give him the opportunity to press for the tighter form of Federation which he has always advocated, with strong central powers over taxation, development planning etc. In return for that he might be prepared to make a concession over his earlier stand against the early introduction of freedom of movement. This might overcome the prejudice of other Islands against continuing in a Federation dominated by Trinidad, since it is on this issue that they have been most bitterly critical of Trinidad. On this hypothesis we might salvage a viable Federation which could go forward to independence without Jamaica—and relieve us of the prospect of having the smaller islands indefinitely on our hands. But Eric Williams will in that case make full use of his strong bargaining position and no doubt demand a handsome financial contribution over the early years from H.M.G. on balance. However, it seems more probable that he will want to "go it alone."

7. We cannot, of course, express publicly our regret at the result of the referendum since that could embitter our relations with Bustamante if he returns to power in Jamaica. Our immediate line with the Press is that it was recognised that the Lancaster House Agreement was dependent on the Jamaica referendum and the endorsement by Legislatures in other Islands; that we have always regarded the form of Federation as a matter for West Indians themselves to settle; and that the referendum result is a new factor in the situation the effects of which we are studying.

8. The Americans will be extremely concerned over this development and the Foreign Office are sending an assessment to the Foreign Secretary in Washington. The Commonwealth Relations Office are also sending guidance to their High Commissioner in Ottawa.

9. I have asked for immediate assessments from the Acting Governor-General and Governors and Administrators. Hailes has broken his holiday in Scotland and I have held discussions with him. The Jamaican leaders and the Federal Prime Minister Sir Grantley Adams wish to come to London at a very early date to confer with me. I will report again in a few days on the situation as I see it.

10. I am sending copies of this minute to the Lord Chancellor, the Chancellor of

the Exchequer, the Foreign Secretary, the Commonwealth Secretary, and the Minister of Defence.³

³ Macmillan minuted to Macleod in reply: 'I am so sorry that with all your other worries Jamaica has voted wrong. I had a word with Hailes who tells me that he is in close touch with you. When things are a bit clearer perhaps you could let me know how you see the future. Meanwhile I suppose this has some bearing upon the Immigration Bill on which the Cabinet has still to make a final decision' (CO 1031/3278, no 44, PM's personal minute M284/61, 22 Sept 1961).

159 CO 1031/3200, no 35A 25 Sept 1961 [Jamaican referendum]: letter from Sir K Blackburne to A R Thomas on the local situation following the referendum

With reference to my personal telegram No. 97 of the 23rd of September, I write to give you a little background to the proposed visit to London by Manley and his Ministers. The position changes so rapidly from hour to hour as the P.N.P. seeks a way to re-gain the initiative that some of what I now say may well be changed before the delegation reach you; but this little piece of background information may perhaps be of some use.

2. In the first place, there is absolutely no possibility at all of any change in the decision to leave the Federation. Apart from the political impossibility of disregarding the verdict of the electorate, Manley is himself quite reconciled to the thought of "going it alone". But he has certainly not given up all idea of close association. In the short term he recognises that the common services must be retained for at least a time¹ on the basis which existed prior to 1958. In the long term he has told me that there can be no change of heart until *both* political parties have "reasonable" leadership, and that it may now take many years to establish a Federation.

3. Secondly, Manley has assumed from the outset that Her Majesty's Government would grant independence to Jamaica on her own. In this connection please see the public statement which he made on the 20th September—my en clair telegram No. 380 of the 21st September refers.²

4. Thirdly, as to *timing* for independence, Manley at first recognised that it just would not be practicable to secure Jamaican independence by May, 1962, but he told me a day or so ago that it might just be possible to stick to this date. He recognises that Her Majesty's Government may well say that Jamaica cannot have her independence until the position in the Eastern Caribbean has been cleared up; but he hopes that this will not be so and may press this point very hard. He has been thinking in terms of an agreement whereby Jamaica would continue to pay its annual contribution to the Federal Government for about a year, and would also agree to support certain common services thereafter. It is most important that you should remember in your talks with him that the J.L.P. have firmly stated their demand of independence by the 23rd May, 1962, and that Manley cannot afford to be represented in Jamaica as having been a party to slowing the process up.

5. What *is* essential in Manley's view is that urgent steps must be taken to remove Jamaica from the Federation at the earliest possible moment.

¹ Blackburne added the marginal comment: 'and possibly for ever with B.G. and B.H. coming in with Jamaica on a "treaty basis" '.

² See 158, note 2.

6. Fourthly, Manley accepts the need for a *bipartisan approach* and will do his very best to secure one when he has established by his visit to London that his Government is in control. But it will not be easy. He is very bitter about the J.L.P., and I must confess that he has fairly good grounds. Some of the J.L.P. leaders are not in fact opposed to Federation, and the whole campaign has been fought because Bustamante and his followers could see no other way of getting back into power. Their tactics in the election have not been above reproach, even by local standards. Very wild and irresponsible things have been said by J.L.P. leaders and they have allowed themselves to lie in the same bed with the racialists like Millard Johnson,³ and with the Communist group. One of their efforts has been to spread a whispering campaign (which was seriously believed by the gullible country people) that the "Federal Maple" (the first Federal ship) had arrived in Jamaica loaded with chains to re-impose slavery. It may seem incredible to those outside, but the Manley supporters in western Jamaica had to deal with this fantastic story quite seriously in their meetings. It can all be summed up in words which Manley has written to me:—

"We would not have to deal with Sangster alone who is in a matter of this sort by comparison an honourable man. We would have to deal with some of the most ruthless and cynical personalities that have emerged in Jamaican politics."

I think that he refers mainly to Lightbourne and Seaga⁴—the latter a young member of the Legislative Council, recommended to me by Bustamante.

It is also just worth noting that after the last general election, when the J.L.P. lost, there was a tremendous uproar about bogus voting. This time, when their views prevailed, there has not been a single suggestion of bogus voting.

7. The best hope of a successful bi-partisan approach lies in the fact that the public of Jamaica may now once again generate some enthusiasm for independence. There has been a most marked lack of enthusiasm ever since Jamaica gained internal self-government, and indeed the morale and spirit of the country has been on the decline for the past few years. There has been little sign of the "national" spirit and pride of the years when they were still "fighting" for independence. It is the hope of all of us that the new challenge of independence on their own will once again unite the country and promote more public spirit and more enthusiasm. As Manley said to me yesterday—"Perhaps we can even have a row with the British Government over some issue; that will do us all a lot of good out here."

8. Fifthly, I do not think that Manley will make up his mind finally about the date for a *general election* until he knows the possible date for independence. Many of us thought immediately after the Referendum that the P.N.P. would be returned with a big majority if they went to the country at once; and I advised Manley to have a general election as soon as possible. At first he seemed prepared to face a general election this year, but he now thinks otherwise, and is rather more confirmed in his views since meeting all his Members of the House of Representatives. He thinks that time must be allowed to let the enthusiasm for the victory of the J.L.P. die down.

³ A local barrister and leader of the People's Political Party which espoused an extreme form of black nationalism. Johnson conducted a fiery campaign for a no vote in the referendum (see 163). The PPP subsequently attracted 5,000 votes at the general election in Jamaica in Apr 1962 but all of its candidates, including Johnson, lost their deposits.

⁴ E P G Seaga, assistant secretary, JLP, 1960, secretary, 1962; minister of development and social welfare in the Bustamante government elected in Apr 1962.

Much will depend on the extent to which a bi-partisan approach to the independence plans succeeds. So I now feel that he is right to wait a little. Although the "Gleaner" made an outright demand for a general election as soon as the results were known, and although Bustamante made a somewhat half-hearted demand, public opinion seems to be divided; two of the leading Press commentators expressed exactly opposite views on this point in the Sunday Gleaner.

9. Sixthly, I turn to the practical problems—which will obviously be mentioned, though only in general terms, when the delegation comes to London. There have been virtually no plans made here for Jamaica "going it alone". But working parties and committees have already been set up to deal with various issues. Of these the most pressing is the *future of the West India Regiment*. The Brigadier (as always) has been most helpful, and he (and Laurence Lindo)⁵ is now serving on a committee in Manley's Ministry to deal with the many urgent problems which arise, such as confirmation of the recruitment of staff and the despatch of stores from the United Kingdom. As you know, the Federal Government (without consulting the Brigadier) has directed a suspension of all these things which means that we may lose the United Kingdom staff already earmarked for despatch to the West Indies. By the time you receive this letter, I may already have telegraphed to you about this problem. For now it is sufficient to say that it is recognised that the aim must be to have one local battalion operational and ready to take over when the British troops leave Jamaica. If it were possible to take over lock, stock and barrel the existing establishment of the West India Regiment that aim could be easily achieved; but if the eastern Caribbean component of the West India Regiment were to be required to form the nucleus of a force for that area we should be faced in Jamaica with a shortage of more than 300 men which it would not be possible to correct for a year or so. That shortage would have implications for internal security which must be faced and which are being brought to the attention of the Cabinet.

The new situation has made more urgent the formation of a Territorial Regiment and plans to push ahead with this are being actively considered.

10. I fear that this letter is already too long, and some of it may be out of date when you receive it. I would only add that we here are all deeply sympathetic with the fearful problems which you are facing, and that we recognise (including Manley) that our actions in Jamaica will have to be regulated to some extent by developments in the eastern Caribbean. How lucky I am not to be working with Eric Williams!

⁵ H C Lindo, chief secretary, government of Jamaica.

160 CO 1032/306, no 316

27 Sept 1961

[Immigration]: minute by Miss M Z Terry on the discriminatory nature of the proposed scheme of control

I do not propose to comment on the general proposition that immigration from the Commonwealth and colonies should be restricted in some way but will limit my comments to the proposed scheme of control recommended to Ministers by the inter-departmental Working Party. The proposals are designed to meet two separate points:—

(a) *the intention* is to restrict the numbers of coloured immigrants from the Commonwealth and colonies without restricting the numbers of immigrants from the white Commonwealth;

(b) at the same time it is desired to make it publicly apparent that the restrictions imposed are *non-discriminatory* as between white and coloured people and as between different Commonwealth and colonial territories.

The conflict between these objectives is directly responsible for the grave weaknesses of the proposals now under consideration.

2. Were it is not for the desire to make it appear that the policy is non-discriminatory it would be possible to apply a system of fixed numerical quotas for each Commonwealth and colonial territory (linked with a system of short term permits for visitors and others not intending to seek employment or take up permanent residence). Such a system would be relatively simple to operate in practice (on a first come first served basis for each territory with a quota) and there would be little difficulty in explaining publicly how it operated. This solution has, however, been rejected by the Working Party on the ground that it would make clearly apparent the discriminatory intentions of Government policy and would thus fail to meet the objective in paragraph 1(a).

3. Another practicable and effective method of applying restrictions would be by applying to immigrants from the Commonwealth and colonies the same system of control as is applied to aliens. This is based directly on employment permits. This has, however, been rejected by the Working Party (against the expressed preference of Home Office officials) on two separate scores:—

(i) because it is desired to avoid any measures which would require immigrants from the white Commonwealth to submit themselves to the kind of restrictive controls involved; and

(ii) the Ministry of Labour have argued strongly against such a system which they say would result in the essential labour needs of this country not being met.

4. The scheme of control recommended by the Working Party is open to strong objections both of principle and of practical application. These are set out in Mr. Vile's minute of the 20th July and in the brief which he prepared for Mr. Fraser on the 28th July¹ which I have brought to the front of the file. These present the criticisms with a completeness and a lucidity on which I cannot attempt to improve so I will not waste time by recapitulating them here.

5. In addition to the various criticisms enumerated by Mr. Vile, I would draw attention especially to the following weaknesses (which were incidentally touched on in my minute of the 22nd September):—

(i) the definition of category (b) which is drawn so wide that it is practically meaningless. I criticised this definition at the meeting of the Working Party on the 25th September and suggested that a more restricted definition should be substituted (e.g. the possession of technical or professional qualifications vouched for by certificates issued by a recognised authority). This was opposed by the rest of the Working Party, the reason being that category (b) has been included simply in

¹ See 155, which explains the three categories discussed in para 5 of the minute reproduced here.

order to enable the Ministry of Labour to grant entry permits to immigrants from the white Commonwealth who do not fall into category (a), so that they do not get “swallowed up” in category (c) with the mass of coloured immigrants. If the definition were given greater precision this would defeat its purpose. I should perhaps explain that the existence of category (b) would not be publicly disclosed and that there would, of course, be no indication on the entry permit as to whether it had been granted under category (a), (b) or (c). Despite this the existence of category (b) on the basis of the present very vague definition seems objectionable on the following grounds:—

(a) unless the category is used simply as a “blind” for admitting only immigrants from the white Commonwealth and for admitting them without further question, it will place the Ministry of Labour officials in very obvious difficulties in assessing the merits of claims which will be received through the post without the corroboration of a local check. The system would make it advantageous to individuals to make dishonest claims about their qualifications etc. provided they did so with sufficient plausibility;

(b) again unless the category is used simply as a “blind” for admitting only immigrants from the white Commonwealth and for admitting them without further question, it will place virtually dictatorial powers in the hands of the officials dealing with individual applications—because they will have been given no guidance by Parliament as to the precise interpretation to be placed on the definition;

(c) because the definition is so vague as to be almost meaningless (the members of the Working Party at the meeting on the 25th September admitted that they did not know what it meant and that “it could mean different things at different times”) it would be very difficult indeed for Ministers publicly to defend decisions on individual cases which might be challenged either by questions in Parliament or by representations from the Commonwealth and Colonial Governments concerned.

(ii) the Working Party recommend that immigration officials should be given powers to admit (or to refuse admission) *at their discretion* all persons arriving without entry permits. These will include the self-employed, bona fides visitors and students etc. The Working Party also recommend that no system of conditional landings should be adopted in respect of such persons. This seems open to great objections:—

(a) it will put a premium on dishonesty on the part of immigrants arriving in this way;

(b) it will place the immigration service in a most invidious and difficult position;

(c) it will risk bringing the law into disrepute by allowing it to be broken with impunity; and

(d) in theory it could operate in such a way as to drive a coach and horses through the scheme of control though this is admittedly unlikely.

6. I do not wish to make unduly heavy weather of the following point but one of the gravest objections which I see to the proposed system of control is that it will operate not on a basis of clearly defined principles sanctioned by Ministers who are answerable directly to Parliament but on the basis of ad hoc decisions given on a host

of individual cases by officials operating behind closed doors and not directly answerable to Parliament for the decisions given. This kind of procedure seems to me extremely distasteful. Even if abuses do not occur there will always be suspicions that they do exist. There is an obvious parallel here with the principle that justice must not only be done but must be seen to be done. The Home Office representatives at the Working Party meeting on the 25th September said in reply to my criticisms that there was "no gain without loss" and that one could not achieve the stated objectives without getting involved in some difficulties. Some might share my feeling that the price of this particular system of control, designed as it is to do one thing while publicly claiming that it is doing something rather different, is too high a price to pay.

7. It seems moreover highly questionable whether the recommended system of control would in fact achieve both the stated objectives. It would certainly reduce the numbers of coloured immigrants coming to this country from the Commonwealth and colonies but I do not think it could possibly do this without its becoming apparent that the restrictions were directed against "coloured" rather than against "white" immigrants. By the end of even the first year it will presumably be apparent that the numbers of immigrants from coloured territories have been reduced and that the numbers of immigrants from the white Commonwealth have not been so reduced. After two or three years this fact would be even more glaringly apparent. Ministers would therefore be confronted with precisely the charge (of having adopted a discriminatory policy) which it is the main object of this particular scheme to avoid. This means that we shall have got ourselves involved in the recognised difficulties and weaknesses of the recommended system (plus its relatively high cost) without avoiding making it apparent that the policy is discriminatory—which is the sole objection to the administratively simpler "fixed quota" system.

8. A further difficulty is that even within the coloured territories of the Commonwealth and colonies the recommended system would not impose cuts on even a roughly proportionate basis. If as stated applications for entry permits from those in category (c) are dealt with on a "first come first served" basis, the results might well be to impose much heavier percentage cuts on one territory than on another. Mr. Vile commented on this point in his minute of the 20th July and suggested that it might be difficult for Ministers to explain the reasons for the disproportionate nature of the cuts imposed.

9. Recent developments in the West Indies have made it highly undesirable that there should be any public announcement during the next two or three months (and until the future of the Eastern Caribbean has become more settled) of the intention of Her Majesty's Government to impose restrictions on immigration (see paragraph 6 of my minute of the 22nd September). This in itself would be an argument for postponing any announcement of a decision to adopt the system of control recommended by the Working Party. However, because of the very grave weaknesses of the recommended system I would hope that we might take the line that any restrictions which it may be decided to impose should take the form of some less objectionable system e.g. a "fixed quota" system or a system based strictly on employment permits as in the case of aliens. A theoretical alternative would be to seek the decision that the controls should be applied only to the independent Commonwealth and not to the colonies; this seems to me a non-starter however since it is primarily immigration from the West Indies which it is desired to reduce.

10. The attitude of the Ministry of Labour to the present proposals seems equivocal. Having originally said that they were worried about the possible effect of large scale coloured immigration on the employment position in the United Kingdom, they now seem anxious to ensure that controls are not imposed in such a way as to deprive this country of much needed labour. Accordingly there seems a risk that if it were decided to impose the recommended system of control the Ministry of Labour would subsequently press for the issue of entry permits on a relatively large scale. The Treasury seem likely to oppose the proposals, judging by their recent paper (the only one in recent months with any hard facts in it) about the economic benefit to the United Kingdom of immigration at the current high levels. The C.R.O. on the other hand seem anxious that restrictions should be imposed without delay and do not appear to harbour any anxieties about the difficulties to which the recommended system of control seems likely to give rise.

161 CO 1013/3278, no 75 28 Sept 1961
 [US policy]: inward telegram no 153 from J D Hennings¹ to CO on
 'bewilderment' in the State Department at the referendum result and
 the implications for US financial aid

Foreign Office telegram No. 4081 to New York.

Following from Colonial Attaché.

I have spoken to State Department as in paragraph 4 of telegram under reference. They are both disappointed and bewildered by result of referendum and, beyond identifying the various permutations set out in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the telegram under reference,² have for the moment no suggestions to make but will wait on developments. It is likely, as you will probably have surmised, that Americans may not be willing to be so forthcoming on matters of aid to the West Indies if the unit territories go two or more separate ways to independence since it was the political content of Federation that was attractive, particularly to Congress (even though the West Indies without Federation will probably require more rather than less aid). State Department have already received enquiries from the aid agencies whether \$7 million loan recently granted Federation is now available for reallocation to other areas. They have resisted this but the position is that they are on defensive to preserve such aid as has already been granted rather than on offensive to secure more money.

¹ UK colonial attaché in Washington, 1960–1963.

²A reference to the options which Macleod had outlined in his minute to Macmillan, see 158.

162 CO 1031/3280, no 8 29 Sept 1961
 [Trinidad]: letter from Sir S Hochoy to Mr Fraser on Dr Williams's
 reaction to the Jamaican referendum

In order to bring you up to date with developments at this end as promised, may I say firstly that it is with regret that I feel that Mr. Macleod may be waiting in vain for

some promising reaction to his message to Dr. Williams?¹ The most I expect is a reply that the result of the Jamaica referendum calls for careful study and that now and for the next few months he and his ministerial colleagues will be occupied exclusively with a general elections [sic] campaign.

Williams' Party held a convention last week-end to consider mainly its candidates for the next elections, general and municipal. Without any debate whatever, a Resolution relating to the West Indies Federation was adopted in the following terms:—

“Be it Resolved

That this Special Convention expresses its complete satisfaction with the handling of the question of a West Indian Federation by its Political Leader up to the present moment, and entrusts the future handling of this matter to its Political Leader in consultation with such units of the Party as he may see fit, and requires him to report to the Party in this matter as soon as it is politically proper and wise or in the best interests of the Country so to do, and further that there should be no discussion on the topic of Federation until after the General Elections.”

All the inference was that the Resolution was in line with Williams' present thinking. Indeed Williams is understood to be reading from the Resolution more than a few of his closest colleagues. He regards it as an entrustment to him in his sole discretion to make decisions on the question without consulting in advance even his Cabinet ministers and other Party leaders.

Williams, as you know, returned in June from the London Conference a very sullen, disappointed and bitter man. He was, with much difficulty, restrained from making public his account of the Lancaster House deliberations, and his personal views also on the conclusions. It was hoped that time would have mollified him, but unfortunately this has not been the case. The indication that the United States Government was unwilling to finance the College of Arts and Sciences to the full extent proposed by him under the Leased Bases Agreement served only to worsen this mood and in my personal view the inept handling of this matter by Ivan White tended to aggravate a deteriorating situation.

With his customary flair, Williams has succeeded in convincing himself and some of his closest colleagues that the U.S. Government's attitude towards Trinidad has altered to accommodate the British policy which is to exert pressure, economic and otherwise, on Trinidad and Tobago, the purpose being to compel the acceptance of the sort of Federation which resulted from the London talks. Thus there lurks in the background of his mind, influencing his every thought, the belief in the revival of the conspiracy to keep him in check.

Now that the Jamaica decision has virtually put an end to a Federation of the West Indies, Williams will not forget the criticisms, if not castigations, hurled at him by most of the political leaders of the remaining units, if any propositions emanate from them, singly or collectively, for some new form of association.

If I were to hazard a guess, Williams will use his Party's Resolution to shy away

¹ Macleod had sent a message to Williams asking for his views on the referendum result.

from consideration of any questions on Federation. It will be only after his return to power that he will appear to be prepared to give some thought to that question.

But, in the meanwhile, he will have determined his course. And to hazard a further guess, I think that he will decide to seek Independence for Trinidad and Tobago at the earliest possible date and, for appearances only, leaving it open for the other territories to make the approach.

This brings to mind what I understand Williams to have expressed in an aside to Mr. Macleod last June. His view was that these Caribbean territories may ultimately split into three distinct and independent parts—(1) Jamaica, (2) Trinidad, (3) Barbados, the Windwards and the Leewards.

But let me advert to the moment. While Williams is content to refrain from any public statements, he is not insensible to the full implications of the Jamaica decision. He feels that the Federal Government should accept the fact that its powers have been extinguished and that it could no longer determine policy for the future, so much so that he will refuse to participate in any further conferences sponsored by the Federal Government; he holds that the Federal Government should not even regard itself as a caretaker Government but at the most [as] “liquidators” and his attitude may well be that Trinidad will no longer regard itself as being bound in any respect or form to a Federal Authority.

I trust that I have been able to convey to you the delicate climate which prevails here at the moment. It requires very little for the situation to be pushed to the point of no return. The china shop has contracted, but unfortunately the bulls are still as numerous, at a time when the utmost discretion is imperative.

I now end on a personal note. I am once more looked upon as a tool of the conspirators.

163 CO 1031/3709, no 97

Sept 1961

[Jamaican referendum]: Jamaica intelligence report analysing the result

[Extract]

Summary

The generally unexpected vote in the Referendum against Jamaica's continued membership of the Federation has rendered necessary a great deal of re-thinking and re-adjustment. There is a mass of urgent work involved in arrangements for secession and independence at the earliest possible date.

Although there were some incidents of hooliganism in the final stages of referendum campaign the country is now quiet.

The Jamaica Labour Party, with others, is pressing for early General Elections. The Premier has made it clear that on his return from his present visit to London, intended primarily to secure general undertakings with regard to secession and independence, he will initiate bi-partisan consideration of constitutional changes and of all related matters and that General Elections will be held before independence.

2. The referendum

(1) In the final three weeks before the referendum the campaigning became most intensive. The Premier drove himself hard, devoting three or four days of each week

to visits to rural areas and often speaking five times a day. The "Daily Gleaner's" section on Federation was filled each day, there were numerous debates and talks broadcast by the two radio stations, and certainly there was no lack of expressions of views from all sections of the community. It was clear that, generally, the Federation cause was supported not only by the People's National Party but by the more intelligent and substantial members of the community and that, on the other side, it was the rural element which supported the Jamaica Labour Party in its opposition.

(2) The result came as a surprise to most observers, not excluding many prominent members of the Jamaica Labour Party. While it might have been argued that the majority against continued association with the Federation would not have been sufficient if that majority had appeared on the other side, with 60% of the electorate turning out to vote it was certainly enough to make it clear beyond argument that the country would have nothing more to do with Federation. It is significant that of the 45 constituencies no more than 14 voted in favour and that of those 14, 7 were in the urban areas of the parishes of Kingston and St. Andrew. It was clear that the rural voters had been finally swayed by lack of knowledge of the subject and by fear of the unknown. Further comment on the implications of the result on the political scene is made below.

(3) Sir Alexander Bustamante and his party were elated at the result and obviously regarded it as a vote of confidence in themselves. Bustamante himself reacted with a great deal of bad taste and his threat to tax the rich who had contributed largely to the P.N.P. campaign cannot have done any good in the outside world. The Premier, on the other hand, behaved with admirable restraint. Recognising the imperative need of securing unity on fundamental issues in the country as early as possible, he delivered a most effective broadcast talk a few days later. Shortly before the end of the month he left for London, with two other Ministers, for preliminary discussions with the Colonial Office.

(4) The Government has been under considerable pressure from the Opposition party and other groups not only to associate them with the present mission to London but to hold general elections at an early date and there has been much talk of the People's National Party's loss of the people's mandate. The Premier has made it clear that as soon as he returns from London he will approach the House of Representatives with proposals for bi-partisan consultation on the form of the constitution on independence and on all related matters.

(5) In the closing weeks of the campaign there were several instances of disorder at public meetings and there was a good deal of tension in the country. There is now, inevitably, a good deal of uncertainty on the future and it is fair to say that the changed situation involved in the prospect of early independence in Jamaica on her own is by no means yet fully appreciated. But it is also fair to say that, by and large, there has been a good deal of settling down and there are responsible voices which have been raised in emphasizing the need for deliberation, unity and hard work. The Government itself is under no illusions on the magnitude of the task involved in the completion of arrangements for secession and for independence itself and a great deal of work on the preliminary planning has begun. While it recognises the desirability and the need of the preservation of the important links which have been already established with the rest of the West Indies it cannot, for political considerations, be too forthcoming about these. It has had, for instance, to withdraw from the conference proposed for this month on the future of the British West Indian

Airways, although it is represented at the Rice Conference. Much will depend on the result of the present talks in London.

(6) As was to be expected, one of the first fears was whether the result of the referendum would have an adverse effect on the flow of overseas investment. The Premier has been at pains to reassure potential investors that there will be no change in the stability of the country. A most encouraging development which occurred only a few days after the result was the announcement by the Caribbean Cement Company of plans for a large increase in their investment here; negotiations on this had been proceeding with the Government for some time. The Industrial Development Corporation has emphasized that there is no apparent cause for alarm on this score. It is inevitable that there should be some doubts and fears about the future but, generally, confidence continues high.

(7) Bustamante has issued a statement saying that his party is about to prepare detailed recommendations on the form of constitution which should be adopted on the attainment of independence. It is not impossible that in the present mood of confidence on the part of the leading members of the Jamaica Labour Party they will seek to make these suggestions on their own and will decline to be associated with the bi-partisan consideration which the Premier plans, but it is greatly to be hoped that this development will not occur.

(8) The referendum has had a marked effect on the internal political situation. Some months ago, when there was a split in the Jamaica Labour Party at its annual general meeting, followed by the resignation of the Chairman (Mrs. Rose Leon), it seemed possible that the Party might rapidly become a spent force. Indeed, there seemed to be a danger that the absence of an effective opposition would provide a favourable climate for the development of an extreme left-wing group, backed by our handful of Communists, which would absorb those people who had hitherto drifted between the P.N.P. and the J.L.P., buoyed up by the election promises of both parties over many years past. The absence of an effective J.L.P. might in particular result in disgruntled supporters of the P.N.P. in the last general election joining any group which preached racial and class hatred. This was in fact what did occur to some extent, and it accounts for such small degree of success as had been attained by Millard Johnson and his extreme People's Political Party.

(9) There are varied opinions as to the part played by the People's Political Party in the referendum. It is said (and this is undoubtedly correct) that the pro-federation vote in the Kingston area was due in some measure to the fear of the middle and upper classes of the effect of the preaching of Millard Johnson and his followers; and there is no doubt that during the last few weeks a large number of business and prominent people swung in favour of federation as a possible safeguard against people like Millard Johnson securing power in Jamaica. It is said that Millard Johnson had a considerable effect on ignorant people in the country districts, not so much because they supported his racist and class attacks but because he generated a fear of the unknown.

(10) The preliminary assessment of the internal political changes as a result of the referendum may be summarised as follows:—

The Jamaica Labour Party has gained tremendous prestige, particularly among the working people of the country. Once again Bustamante has been shown as the almost magical and infallible master figure of the country. Once again the Party has

shown that it is a force of which serious account must be taken. At the same time the Party has lost its previous influential position with many capitalists who previously supported it because of their fear of the leftish policies advocated by the P.N.P. before they came to power. Discouraged by the failure of the J.L.P. to provide an effective opposition for a long time past, frightened by the fact that the J.L.P. and the P.P.P. were campaigning on the same anti-Federation theme, and reassured by the actions of the P.N.P. over the past six years in power that the P.N.P. does not represent a threat to capitalism and individual enterprise, capitalists have come to realise that their future will be far safer in the hands of the P.N.P. In short, the J.L.P. has become the main outlet for those who are unemployed, without houses, and without hope for the future—for the underdogs.

(11) *The Peoples [sic] Political Party* under Millard Johnson had some successes before the referendum; it claims to have some 5,000 paying members. But there is every reason to suppose that the main reason for their existence will vanish if the J.L.P. fulfills its present promise of being the champion of the underdog. Moreover Millard Johnson has made little impact on the Rastafarians, and there are signs of a split in the leadership within his party. Although he will undoubtedly continue to make a great noise, and although he is a potential source of danger inasmuch as he may prompt violent action which would not be countenanced by the leaders of the two main parties, in the long term his movement is unlikely to develop greatly if the J.L.P. maintains its present strength and comparative unity.

(12) *The Peoples [sic] National Party* now finds itself in a very different position than when it came to power in 1955 on a strong socialist ticket. Because of the fear that a J.L.P. government under Bustamante would not be able to provide efficient government, because of fear of the racialist and class movements started by Millard Johnson (and accepted tacitly by Bustamante during the referendum campaign), and because of respect for the work of the present government, and particularly of Manley himself, nearly all thoughtful people in the country now support the P.N.P., including most leading businessmen. This movement can in fact harm the P.N.P. which is being criticized by some as being "the party of the rich." Indeed, considerable harm was done to the cause of the P.N.P. and of Federation by the widely publicised efforts of the Hon. Abe Issa¹ to secure a pro-Federation vote. Bustamante has not been slow to take advantage of this trend.

(13) The P.N.P. also suffers from two other disadvantages which undoubtedly had an effect on the referendum and will have an effect in the coming general election.

(14) In the first place there is a widespread fear among the thinking members of the community that Mr. Wills Isaacs, the stormy and unpredictable Minister of Trade and Industry, would become Premier if Manley is no longer available. There is no doubt that some people voted against Federation because they did not wish to see Manley leave Jamaica. In the long term the P.N.P. is undoubtedly vulnerable since so much depends on the personal leadership of Manley, and one of the reasons which has prompted Manley to remain in politics after the loss of his referendum campaign is undoubtedly his fear that the party might well lose considerable support if he is not available to lead it.

(15) Secondly, there is no doubt that the P.N.P. has lost contact with the poorer members of the population. Their policy has been to promote development as quickly

¹ A E Issa, industrialist and financier; member of Jamaican Legislative Council, 1958–1961.

as possible and to encourage outside investment in the hope that the rise in the general economy would automatically raise the standard of life for all. They have therefore devoted much attention to wooing the capitalist and to undertaking grandiose projects at the expense of neglecting the problems of the under-privileged. There has been widespread criticism, for example, of the Negril Development Scheme (£1,600,000) and of the National Stadium (£855,000) which were undertaken before an all-out drive was made to tackle the slum problems of Kingston and elsewhere. At the end of last year the P.N.P. belatedly realised the effect of their policies and drew up an emergency plan of campaign for unemployment relief and housing; but progress has so far been slow since, mainly owing to Manley's preoccupation with Federation, the programme has not been pursued with the necessary energy.

(16) There is no doubt that, if the P.N.P. is to be assured of winning the coming general election, it will have to make clear by a re-orientation of its policy and by positive action that it is not merely the supporter of the rich but still represents the interests of the underdog. An active policy of closer association with, and possible migration to, Africa is one possibility which the P.N.P. leaders have in mind. But they will almost certainly have to take positive steps—at the risk of temporarily antagonizing the upper segment of the community—to lower the cost of living for the poor, and to speed up the slum clearance and housing programme. . . .

164 CO 1032/306

4 Oct 1961

[Immigration]: minutes by Sir H Poynton and Mr Macleod on the timing of the proposed legislation

Secretary of state

I have now seen the minutes of the Commonwealth Migrants Committee recorded at (323). I suppose it is inevitable that legislation of this kind should be introduced and I must say at once that I am not at least worried about the provisions which relate to deportation of Commonwealth citizens convicted of certain offences. I am not indeed all that worried about the introduction of control of immigration in itself but there are frankly two points which worry me very much about the pattern of the legislation and its timing. So far as the pattern is concerned I realise that legislation on the lines of the Bill at present in draft can be defended against any charge of discrimination, either as between "dependent" and "independent" Commonwealth citizens or as between white and coloured, but the method of control proposed puts enormous powers of administration discrimination into the hands of the officials of the Ministry of Labour in the issue of permits for jobs and I fear that we shall never escape criticism that a piece of legislation ostensibly non-discriminatory is being operated in a discriminatory manner. It reminds me very much of the long and difficult history we have had about the control of Indian immigration into East Africa where the legislation on paper is impeccable but its whole purpose is to discriminate against Indians.

As regards the timing I fully accept the point made in your manuscript note at (322) that a Bill of this importance would have to be mentioned in The Queen's speech. We shall I think have to inform all the Colonial Governments confidentially

in advance about this but I should not expect it to provoke a great deal of excitement except in regard to the West Indies and possibly Malta.¹ The telegrams which will have to go to the West Indies will have to be rather specially drafted and I am sure that we ought to tell the Federal and all Unit Governments quite apart from what you might say orally to Mr. Manley in the next day or two.

In the minutes of the Ministerial Committee you are on record as saying that it was no longer necessary to hold up the Government's decision on account of constitutional developments in the West Indies and you referred to the Jamaica decision to withdraw from the West Indies Federation. I am not quite sure what you had in mind when you said that Jamaica would soon be able to cooperate as an independent country in the working of the proposed scheme since, as I see it, the scheme will be worked entirely by the United Kingdom Government. But what is worrying me more than this is the likely effect on the possibility of preserving an Eastern Caribbean Federation built around Trinidad. I think we have all felt that on present form Trinidad would be reluctant to shoulder the burden of the smaller territories without Jamaica's help and that the smaller territories would be unwilling to come into a Federation dominated by Trinidad unless Dr. Williams can be knocked off his perch about freedom of movement between the islands. It will be even more difficult to persuade him to change his heart on this matter if some three weeks before the Trinidad elections it has been announced in The Queen's speech here that the U.K. Government is for the first time intending to introduce restrictions on immigration from other parts of the Commonwealth. I would have thought that this was an important factor in reaching a final decision whether to go ahead with this legislation or not.

I imagine that Ministers will be hard pressed during the Conservative Party Conference to make some announcement of Government policy in this matter. I do very much hope that this can be avoided particularly as the Cabinet have not yet taken a decision because obviously it would be quite impossible to catch up any such statement by telegrams to the West Indies and other Governments before the damage was done.

So far as the immediate problem of your talk with Mr. Manley is concerned the suggested synopsis in Mr. Watt's minute of the 3rd October seems about right.

A.H.P.
4.10.61

1. I will talk privately to Manley after the meeting tomorrow on the lines of Mr. Watts' minute.

2. Mr. Butler will be speaking at the Conference. He is bound to say that the Government is not averse to legislation, but will not I imagine actually say that the Bill will be in the Queen's Speech. If he tried to say less than this he would certainly be defeated by the Conference, and the legislation would then appear to have been produced in response. That would be far worse.

3. The point about Jamaica and the Federation generally is that now the referendum is over no new event of final significance is going to arrive before the Queen's Speech.

¹ Ministers were considering cuts in defence expenditure in Malta which, if implemented, would lay off a considerable number of Maltese workers. The CO anticipated that Anglo-Maltese relations would be 'aggravated greatly' if, at the same time as the defence cuts were announced, the Maltese became aware of the UK decision to control immigration (CO 1032/306, no 329, 'Commonwealth migrants', CO brief for S of S, Oct 1961).

4. I detest the Bill and am painfully aware of its imperfections. But it is wiser to do it now than to wait.²

I.M.
4.10.61

² Under the Commonwealth Immigrants Act, 1962, intending immigrants to Britain from the Commonwealth and colonies had to be in possession of a job voucher in one of three categories: A. those with specific jobs to come to, B. those having specified skills, and C. those coming to Britain to seek work.

165 CO 1031/3200, no 51 9 Oct 1961

[Jamaica]: letter from D Williams to Sir K Blackburne on the discussions in London with Mr Manley on secession and independence

[Briefing Macleod for his meetings with Manley the CO explained: 'Our main object in the discussions with the Jamaican ministers must be to gain time to enable the other West Indian islands to formulate plans which will keep the rest of the Federation in being. The principal unknown factor is the attitude of Dr. Eric Williams . . . and he has made it plain that he will not make known his views on Federation until after his elections which may be held some time in November, but which constitutionally he could delay until February 1962. We should aim to secure that nothing emerges from our talks with the Jamaicans which might stimulate Trinidad—or indeed any other territory—to follow Jamaica's lead. It is suggested that, with this object in view, Ministers in dealing with Mr. Manley can take a pretty tough line. Many months have been spent in negotiating a form of Federation which might be acceptable to Jamaica, and Jamaica has now rejected it, thereby raising serious problems for its partners in the Federation. Jamaica ought therefore to appreciate that we and the others must be given ample time to solve the difficulties her action has caused' (CO 1031/3200, no 34, draft brief for S of S, Sept 1961). Prior to his meetings with Manley, Macleod held discussions in London with Adams and federal ministers. Adams maintained that federation would continue and that now was the time to press for a more acceptable formula on freedom of movement. He thought that Williams would be able to keep Trinidad in if he could point out that the new federation would be modelled on his *Economics of Nationhood*; this would appeal to Williams's 'vanity'. The federal prime minister's advice to the CO was to give Trinidad no grounds for assuming that it too could secede and achieve separate independence. He felt sure that Williams would try to avoid federation becoming an issue at the forthcoming elections in Trinidad. Replying Macleod doubted that federation could be avoided at the Trinidad elections; Williams would be forced to declare himself. The secretary of state also argued that no one should cherish any illusions about Trinidad's inability, on financial or any other grounds, to go it alone. Trinidad might be prepared to consider a closer knit federation but Macleod questioned whether this would be acceptable to the other islands. If Trinidad was prepared to contemplate such an arrangement, it might be possible to persuade Trinidadians to modify their stand on freedom of movement as part of the price (CO 1031/3278, no 66, record of meeting, 26 Sept 1961).]

You will have seen the records of Manley's first meeting with the Secretary of State and the officials' discussions which I sent you last week and, no doubt, Manley will have given you an account of the outcome of his visit to London. There is, therefore, but little new I can tell you; this letter will of necessity be largely concerned with the position as seen through our eyes.

In the first place, as the communiqué makes clear, there was no dispute at all regarding Jamaica's withdrawal from the Federation and its ability to "go it alone". Manley, with local political considerations in mind, did propose that a firm date—31st May—should be agreed upon for independence but I doubt whether he ever thought that a really feasible proposition. In the event he agreed to independence as

early as is practicable in 1962, the actual date being agreed upon at the independence conference in January or February. The avoidance of naming Jamaica's independence day at this stage is very satisfactory to us since it avoids prejudicing events in the Eastern Caribbean. Had a date been decided upon it might have stimulated Williams to "go it alone" also, so as not to be left behind by Jamaica. As it is, we still do not know whether Trinidad will continue with the Federation (although Hochoy is at present of the opinion that Trinidad may follow Jamaica's lead) and the Manley talks have done nothing to upset the present status quo (if I may call it that) in the Eastern Caribbean. It would be less than fair to Manley if I did not mention that he appreciates our difficulties there and is genuinely concerned to do or say nothing that might increase the problems.

It would perhaps be true to say that in exchange for giving way on the independence date point, Manley sought and got an assurance that Jamaica secession would be achieved as soon as possible. This boiled down to a fairly firm undertaking by the Secretary of State that the necessary legislation would be passed by the end of March. We are naturally anxious not to present the secession Bill to Parliament until we have some indication as to whether any other units wish to follow Jamaica's example since clearly Parliament would look with displeasure on a series of secession Bills! We hope, however, to know with some certainty what the other units intend to do by January or at the latest February and draft the necessary legislation accordingly.

We reached agreement at the official level on the interim arrangements for the regional services and at the meeting between the Secretary of State and Manley last Thursday those were confirmed. I should, however, mention one matter—defence. This is a problem to which Manley attaches considerable importance, as do we, and he is clearly concerned that Jamaica should have an adequate force at independence. He did ask that the British garrison should if necessary remain in Jamaica for a short period after independence while the Jamaican force was being built up to full strength and trained. We were fairly non-committal on this and suggested that he discuss the future of the West India Regiment with the Federal Government to see whether suitable arrangements could be made for a division of the Regiment between Jamaica and the Eastern Caribbean. If, however, it proves impossible to make suitable arrangements for Jamaica's security by independence day, then we shall have to consider the matter further. For the present however we would prefer that it should not be assumed that the British garrison will remain; indeed there would be very considerable difficulties in agreeing to such a course.

This brings me to the practical problems involved in Jamaica's secession and how they might best be resolved. The Federal Government have not yet been told formally of the Jamaica decision and Manley has agreed to arrange for this to be done and, at the same time, to propose that the effects of Jamaica's secession should be considered by working parties on which Jamaica, Federal and, possibly other Unit Governments should be represented. The chances are that there will be two or possibly three working parties: one concerned with defence arrangements which could most conveniently meet in Kingston since the Caribbean Area Headquarters are in Jamaica, and second to consider the immediate and perhaps long term future of the regional services and reach agreement on them which in the case of any long term solutions proposed would be subject to the confirmation of the Jamaica Government after the coming general elections. There is a possibility that there

might be a third working party to consider the future of the U.C.W.I. and its proposed charter. Manley said he was most anxious to retain the regional character of the University College and we for our part will certainly do all we can from here to assist in this aim as, indeed, we shall in respect of the other regional services. We should be grateful if you could arrange for a formal despatch to issue to the Governor-General as quickly as possible containing the formal notification of Jamaica's wish to withdraw and proposing the joint consultative machinery to sort out the resulting problems. In view of Federal susceptibilities we think it desirable for the Jamaica Government to make as few public statements as possible about secession and its consequences.

We hope to send you by tomorrow's bag the record of the second and final meeting with the Secretary of State so I will not attempt to record here the other points on which agreement was reached. To sum up the discussions, however, I would say that it is clear to us that Manley is determined to carry out the wishes of the electorate as expressed in the referendum and withdraw Jamaica from the Federation as quickly as possible. On the other hand, there is no doubt but that he is very disappointed at the result and is still, at heart, a firm believer in Federation. While his aim may not now be achieved for many years he is anxious not to do anything that might tend to isolate Jamaica from the Eastern Caribbean and make it more difficult than it need be for Jamaica to join with the other territories. To that end he is determined to maintain as many as possible of the present links with the Eastern Caribbean in the form of continued Jamaican participation in the regional services. Politically it would however be impossible for him to attempt to take any steps at present that could be interpreted as a wish to continue any form of association, however tenuous, with the remainder of the Federation. Bustamante will doubtless be on the look out for any such moves on Manley's part and will not fail to use such evidence in the forthcoming general elections.

Harking back to the present uncertainty in the Eastern Caribbean and the doubts as to the future of the Federation without Jamaica, you are, I am sure, very conscious of the repercussions that the Jamaican decision may have, particularly on Trinidad. As it is, from what we have heard, it is apparent that the Federal Civil Service is generally apprehensive about the future and an outright statement by Jamaica to give employment to Jamaican Federal civil servants would have a further unsettling effect. Manley has undertaken to make a reassuring statement to the effect that the Jamaica Government, with the other Governments, will ensure that Federal servants, non-Jamaicans as well as Jamaicans, are fairly treated. This should go a long way to relieve uncertainty and at the same time do nothing to encourage Jamaicans to desert the Federal Service while the future is admittedly uncertain. It is important that Jamaican Ministers should be restrained from saying or doing anything that might tend to aggravate an already delicate situation. I hope that you will do your utmost to exercise a restraining influence on them and, in particular, prevent any provocative statements or actions on their part. It is vital that during the next few months nothing should be done that in any way assumes or implies that the future of the Federation—or indeed its dissolution—is a matter for anyone other than the territories concerned or is in any way a foregone conclusion.

166 CO 1031/3374, no 1

31 Oct 1961

'Federation in the Caribbean: predictions and possibilities': memorandum by G W Jamieson

[This was the first of what became several attempts by the CO to assess what arrangements might be made in the East Caribbean following the Jamaican referendum. A further assessment, prepared for Maudling, the new S of S who visited the West Indies in Jan 1962, argued that there were more possibilities for the small islands than those described by Jamieson in the memo reproduced here. These were (1) a federation of eight (or seven or six, according to how many became satellites of Trinidad) comprising Barbados and the Leeward and Windward Islands; (2) a federation of the Leewards and Windwards without Barbados; (3) a reversion to the pre-1960 administrative grouping, with Barbados on its own and the Leeward and Windward groups under their own separate governors, each of the two groups federating or even forming unitary states; (4) complete balkanisation with the only common factor being an official appointed from the UK to exercise political oversight over the small islands but with provision also being made for the maintenance of regional services; (5) under options 1–3 Barbados might seek independence but would probably be satisfied, at least for a time, with an internal self-government arrangement along Singapore/Malta lines (none of the individual Leeward or Windward islands should be allowed to proceed this far). The advice of the CO was to pursue a federation of nine but if necessary to accept a federation of eight on condition that much greater powers and resources were given to the central government than those envisaged under the Lancaster House agreement. Whatever option was adopted, the UK would have to subsidise it 'for a very long time ahead . . . this burden will have to be faced whatever political solution is found for these territories. It is a choice between (i) feeding the beggars and being ultimately responsible for their total condition (and misdeeds) and (ii) feeding the beggars' (CO 1031/3374, no 2, CO brief for Maudling, Jan 1962).]

Attitudes in the West Indies

1. Now that Jamaica is out, any forecast of whether the Nine are likely to agree to any future political association must be based on what is known, or can be surmised, about the attitude of the various parties:—

(a) *Federal Government*. Most of the federal ministers are hostile to Trinidad. They are now simply clinging to power for its own sake and are fearful of losing their positions in a Trinidad-dominated association of the Nine. They are much more likely to support and work for a federation of the Eight.

(b) *Trinidad*. There are two points of view within the P.N.M. (which we assume will win the election in December). One view is that Trinidad should "go it alone"; she could then enjoy a prosperous and stable future without the burden of poor, importunate and troublesome satellites. Others believe that Trinidad has a duty to the rest of The West Indies, and that anyway the other islands might prove markets for Trinidad's industries. Both these forces are believed to be present in Dr. Williams's [sic] own thinking. He must also be calculating whether he could still count on winning a majority of the votes in a wider grouping. This is likely to be a crucial factor in his calculations. If Dr. Williams does negotiate, we understand he will insist on a unitary or near-unitary state. He will also insist that the United Kingdom should underwrite the economic development of the small islands. In any event Dr. Williams may well take the view that as any federal negotiations are likely to be lengthy, and as there is in any case no guarantee that they will succeed, Trinidad should therefore proceed to separate independence about the same time as Jamaica without prejudice to the continuation of the negotiations. This would, of course, give Trinidad considerable bargaining and psychological advantages.

She would treat with the United Kingdom as an equal, and with the small islands as a superior.

(c) *Barbados*. It is hard to imagine the parochial Barbados Government, already suspicious and fearful of Trinidad domination, agreeing to any serious diminution of their local autonomy. Sir Grantley Adams' baleful influence is strong and Barbados is to a considerable extent still his pocket borough.

(d) *The Leewards and Windwards*. Their political leaders are undoubtedly determined to cling to as much autonomy as possible. They have already seen the promise of the happy land of full internal self-government. They are most unlikely to agree to anything less. Most of them are largely swayed by calculation of their own positions. Certainly some will reckon it better to stay as colonies, enjoy internal self-government (which they believe is altogether in the bag) rather than be cut down to size in a new association dominated by a devil they don't know in the shape of Trinidad. Some at least would look more favourably on a federation of the Eight than an association, or union, of the Nine.

The probability is that the Nine will fail

2. Weighing all these attitudes it seems extremely unlikely that the Nine will be able to agree on a new political association. Even if Trinidad negotiates (which is in itself doubtful) her terms are likely to be rejected by most, if not all, the others.

The problems this raises for us

3. If the above analysis is correct the following questions have to be considered:—

- (a) How vital a United Kingdom interest is it that there should be an association of the Nine?
- (b) What can Her Majesty's Government do to bring it off?
- (c) Alternatively, if this fails, should we encourage the Eight to federate?

How vital a United Kingdom interest is it that there should be an association of the Nine?

4. Clearly it would suit us if the Nine came together and became independent. In this way we could honourably and decently cut our colonial commitment in the Caribbean (which is an aim in itself in a world where the control of colonies daily becomes more unfashionable and embarrassing). It would please the Americans and Canadians and such other Commonwealth countries as take an interest in the West Indies. But it cannot be claimed that any really vital United Kingdom interest is at stake. It would be irritating, but not disastrous if Barbados and the small islands are left on our hands. We could reasonably claim that we did our best to give them independence in the federation, the break-up of which was not our fault.

What can Her Majesty's Government do to bring it off?

5. There seem to be three main kinds of approach that are possible:—

- (a) *Mixture as before*. Our line with the Ten was benevolent readiness to give advice, issue suitable if rather anodyne exhortations and encouragement, hold the necessary conferences at times and places to suit them, and act generally and, on request, as ringmaster. Such an approach is unlikely to achieve anything in the present situation.

(b) *A promise of unpleasantness to the small islands.* We might seek to convince the small islands that if they remain colonies Her Majesty's Government will be so beastly to them that they would be better off under Trinidad. We could give them to understand that full internal self-government was not now going to come for a very long time, if ever; that the financial screws were to be tightened till they hurt; and that their administrations were to be subjected to a much greater scrutiny and direct oversight than in recent years. This, however, would involve convincing the small island politicians, who see the Colonial Office as a "paper tiger", that Her Majesty's Government "means it". This might be difficult. But if Her Majesty's Government did follow this policy and show them that we meant business we might soon reap a harvest. We would probably be faced very quickly with security situations. There would be widespread accusations that we were turning back the clock in the Caribbean. We would find ourselves in danger of seriously damaging our posture as an enlightened colonial power at the United Nations. The present political leaders, horrors though they are, might be replaced by new men even worse, and probably more extreme. One would not know quite where it would all end. Finally, Dr. Williams is unlikely to want unwilling or restless satellites. There is the recent sad fate of the United Arab Republic; and press-ganged small islands are unlikely to want to keep him in power. He might not therefore at all welcome our resorting to such a policy. United Kingdom ministers, who would have to have all these considerations put before them before it was applied, would be unlikely to endorse such a potentially dangerous policy.

(c) *A promise of long term aid.* We could make an offer of continuing aid over a period of years (both block-grant and development) which would make it worth Trinidad's while to have the small islands and convince the small islands themselves that they will be "looked after". This might have to be accompanied by hints (not threats!) to the small islands that this was the only way to get such a volume of aid. If we could associate the Americans and Canadians this offer could be made that much the handsomer. Unfortunately it would be optimistic to reckon on the continuation of pound-for-pound formula from the Americans in the new situation. On the other hand it will be impossible for the United Kingdom alone to come up with any offer remotely approaching Dr. Williams' figures. We had envisaged a financial settlement with the Ten on the following lines:—

Grant-in-Aid

The balance of the £8.75 millions block grant for 1959/63 plus further block grant tapering from about £1.75 millions for 1964 down to £0.5 millions for 1968.

Development

The Colonial Development and Welfare balance and a promise of a Commonwealth Assistance Loan of £5 millions. This would enable development spending to run at about £3 millions a year until about 1965/66.

But even this might have proved vulnerable to Treasury pressures in the present balance of payments situation and external aid ceiling. Even had we been able to make our offer as we hoped Dr. Williams would have regarded these sums as totally inadequate. He has argued that the United Kingdom should guarantee the West Indies much larger sums. For the first ten years he would expect £71 millions

(development and grant-in-aid) which is several times what we hoped to be in a position to offer.¹ It is, therefore, impossible that we can make any offer that has any chance of being effective unless we can associate the Americans and Canadians with it. Whether we should work towards a joint approach on these lines is a vital policy question.

Alternatively, should we encourage the Eight to federate?

6. Once it becomes clear that there is no chance of there being any association of the Nine, we may be faced with proposals for a federation of the Eight. (Though the pattern may repeat itself; it might then be Barbados who felt she was being made to carry the small islands and, following Jamaica's and Trinidad's example, refuse the honour.) What should our attitude be? Apart from the great inconvenience we would suffer if we had to start from scratch and rebuild completely new political arrangements in the Eastern Caribbean (some of which e.g. the re-introduction of a Governorship for the Leewards and/or Windwards, could be politically difficult), I suggest that the main consideration must be whether such a federation would be able in the foreseeable future to achieve independence. One should not assume that this is impossible. The population of the Eight (700,000) is larger than that of Cyprus (550,000) and British Guiana (558,000) and not much less than that of Trinidad (780,000). Their total annual governmental revenue (£12 millions) is higher than that of Sierra Leone (£11.2 millions) and British Guiana (£10 millions). Their national income per head is considerably larger than many other territories which have already achieved, or are reckoned to qualify for, independence. It is perhaps not so much their size, poverty and lack of revenues that would prevent the Eight from going on to independence, as lack of political will to sacrifice for this end and run their affairs on less Heath Robinson lines than at present.

7. An independent federation of the Eight would, of course, not be financially self-sufficient for a number of years, if ever. This, unfortunately, is likely to be the position of other territories coming up for independence (e.g. in East Africa) and one simply cannot say that financial viability is the same *sine qua non* for independence as it was a few years ago.

8. Even if we continue to give them grant-in-aid and development aid at the present level, could the Eight afford to run a federal machine? The annual expenditure of the present federation is about \$13 millions, but the contribution of the Eight is only about \$2 millions.² However, under the arrangements agreed at Lancaster House for the independent Ten, the Eight would have had to contribute approximately \$4–5 millions a year after independence. An examination of the present federal estimates points to it being possible for the Eight to meet the cost of a much reduced federal budget within this sum. They would, of course, have to be content with a much smaller central administrative machine than the present one; they could not afford any full-time defence force; their overseas posts would be very small; but they would nevertheless be able to make pro rata contributions to such regional services as University College of the West Indies, the teaching hospital, the shipping corporation and the meteorological service.

¹ The composition of this figure is set out in detail in the paper "Dr. Williams [sic] probable conditions for an Eastern Caribbean Federation" being separately circulated.

² Figure based on their share of levy being \$1.64 millions plus element of currency profits.

9. Looking further ahead to independence they would eventually have to provide for the cost of defence and external affairs. This need not be too much; possibly not more than an additional \$1 million a year. The lack of any regular military force does not seem to be delaying early independence for British Guiana. I gather Dr. Jagan hopes to depend on the O.A.S. for defence. The Eight might do the same. For internal security their existing volunteer units, a very small full-time gendarmerie (say, one or two companies) and a few patrol boats would be ample. Their external affairs service would have to be correspondingly modest.

10. It is arguable that there is no point in trying to launch such a frail barque upon the international seas, especially as we shall have to continue supporting it financially at pretty well the same level as had they remained colonies. I suggest that there may be political advantages in giving independence even if it does not save a penny. The point has already been made that the position of colonies will become increasingly difficult in the years ahead. We are already having a rough time at the United Nations. Moreover, these particular colonies are likely to be troublesome, importunate and a source of all kinds of minor scandals which will have to be explained away as long as Her Majesty's Government retain sovereignty. Although it may at first sight sound cloud cuckoo-land to talk about an independent Eight I suggest it would be unwise to rule this out completely as a possibility. If there is not to be a Nine, it might be possible to achieve an Eight. If this grouping could, a few years hence, achieve independence, it might be in the United Kingdom's interest to foster it.

167 CO 1031/3278, no 129

1 Nov 1961

[Small territories]: letter from Lord Hailes to A R Thomas on the need for a 'much tougher line' with the small territories

I did not write last week because there was really nothing to report. A stillness pervades everything. However, Arthur Lewis returns from his tour of all the territories today, and then we shall have something to bite on. There is much gossip but there are no real straws in the wind. The only activity needless to say, is that Adams is shooting his mouth in a manner not to please Williams, and La Corbiniere [sic] is secretly—as he thinks—canvassing the merits of "The Eight" solution. Looking into the crystal it seems to me that a much tougher line will have to be taken with the small territories in the future if anything is to be salvaged. They clearly think that whatever happens, they will be comfortably cushioned by the United Kingdom, and this is more important to many—including Adams—than Independence. Perhaps they may have to be threatened with United Nations Trusteeship? That would make them sit up, and perhaps make them think more kindly of association with Trinidad.

I attach a copy of a broadcast I made on Sunday to "The Nine".¹ It went down well I hear. I longed to be much more outspoken, but there is no point in throwing caps to fit anyone—at this stage.

¹ Not printed.

168 CO 1031/3278, no 145A

10 Nov 1961

[East Caribbean]: letter from Lord Hailes to Mr Maudling on
 Professor A Lewis's proposals for a unitary state in the East Caribbean.
Annex: note by Lewis of his meetings with Dr Williams

Lewis who has now returned to Jamaica has produced his Report, and I enclose a copy.¹ Yesterday he discussed it with the Federal Cabinet. Attached also is a note of his talks with Williams over the period 22nd September–8th November.

Lewis' scheme was drawn up after he had visited the Leeward and Windward Islands and Barbados. He thinks that apart from Barbados, where attitudes are confused, it will be generally acceptable to Units. The scheme departs radically from anything previously put forward. In essence it suggests a unitary type of constitution—though to use this label would be little short of lethal as far as the small units are concerned—with a measure of devolution to local legislatures in a limited field of matters, chiefly Medical and Educational—both with heavy central subsidies—Agriculture and Social Services. Centralised services include Customs Excise and Inland Revenue, Post Offices, Ports, Police, Courts, Prisons, Broadcasting etc. The central Government would be financed from 70% of customs duties collected, and a 3/- in the £ company tax. It provides for a Customs Union with both a free trade area and a common external tariff, freedom of movement—possibly on a graduated basis—and representation in the Central Parliament based on the IGC formula. Territorial Governments and establishments are to be cut down, with the abolition of governorships and restrictions on the number of Ministers.

You will see that this is a surprisingly tough business to have sold to the Units, for all Lewis' ability and charm; but I have subsequently seen Bird, Joshua, and LeBlanc who have been here on grant-aid business, and nothing they said appeared to be at variance with the Lewis plan.

There has of course not been time to study Lewis' report in detail, and there are features of it about which opinion may differ—not least the net cost to Trinidad—although in general it will serve as a basis for discussion.

2. Yesterday Lewis discussed the Report with the Federal Cabinet, who accepted it whatever the mental reservations of some members; but the important and encouraging outcome of this meeting was that Adams and his Ministers agreed to drop the idea of a Conference of units in The West Indies, which Adams had intended to convene early in January and to go straight to one Conference in London. This was a considerable achievement, for Williams would never have agreed to attend any Conference of Units summoned by Adams in The West Indies; and in any case such a conference would I am sure only have been used by Adams and Co. as an occasion to sabotage any likelihood of a Federation of Nine. But as you will see from Lewis' note, we have good grounds for hoping that Williams would attend a meeting in London even if Federal representatives were present, if you were the Chairman, and provided that it is made clear to him that H.M.G. does not intend to oppose his view that the Federation will de facto be broken up the moment Jamaica secedes. Williams' attitude on this point, as Lewis records, has become absolutely inflexible. Hochoy confirms this. There can be no continuation of any Federation of Nine, without

¹ Not printed.

Williams' agreement, and we feel it is essential to meet him on this point if his co-operation is to be secured in discussions about the future.

3. What then do we suggest should be done now? I suggest that you should write a line to Williams on December 5th congratulating him on his election (if he wins!) and say that it is becoming urgent to discuss what happens after March when a Bill of Secession is to be passed by the House, thus bringing the present Federation to an end, and that for this reason you yourself propose to summon a Conference in London early in the New Year. The tidiest arrangement would be to complete the dissolution conference (in which the Jamaica Government is of course involved) before the Independence talks with Manley to which you are committed in January/February. You could explain to Williams that you are leaving it as late as possible to give him time to study the issues, but that you cannot leave it later than early February for the above reasons. We feel it to be most important, as I say, that you should make it quite clear that you accept the fact that a Conference is necessary in view of the dissolution of the Federal Government on Jamaica's secession, also indicating to him that legislative effect will have to be given to this.

You could go on to say that it is important therefore to plan as soon as possible the positive measures relating to the maintenance of services which will need to be continued until decisions are reached about permanent arrangements for the future, whether this implies some form of Federation or not. Simultaneously the Conference will afford an opportunity for preliminary discussions on Federation on the basis of the Lewis plan, or any other plan which may be put forward.

4. At the proposed Conference one would hope at least to reach agreement in principle on the establishment of a Federation of the Nine, and get some idea of its general character. In any event however, the requirements of constitutional drafting would make an interregnum inevitable when the present Federal Government is disbanded, and until a new government can be formed.

5. During that period a number of regional services would need to be continued. While the character of this interim organisation and the range of its functions will depend on political decisions to be taken at the Conference, we think it should be possible to do much useful planning in advance. It would undoubtedly save much time in London, and smooth the way to agreement on these matters, if reasonably comprehensive plans could be presented to the Conference for consideration. Arrangements are being made at this end for this matter to be studied, and I hope to be able to write in more detail about this when we have formulated some ideas.

6. Even if negotiations for a Federation including Trinidad were to break down, there would still be need for a regional approach to many matters. We think therefore that we should have ready some outline for an organisation which could take over the administration of a number of regional services in such an event and which could preserve some link of political association, and we are therefore also giving thought to a sketch plan for an organisation of this nature.

Annex to 168

I saw Dr Williams four times.

September 22

I went to see him to persuade him to declare in favour of a strong Eastern Caribbean Federation. He was full of venom and insisted that he wanted the whole Federation to

“mash up”.² Only then would he consider starting a new federation, on Trinidad’s terms. I then switched to persuading him not to say anything at all, and he said he would propose to his party that it keep federation out of the election.

Trinidad’s terms would be a strong federation, on the lines of the *Economics of Nationhood*.

He welcomed the proposal that I sound out the other Governments.

He repudiated any immediate intention of declaring for the independence of Trinidad.

October 6

I reported that Mr Bird of Antigua was willing to accept the main features of a strong federation, provided no attempt was made at a unitary state. He was pleased with my report that a reasonable settlement could be made.

He informed me that Ellis Clarke had advised that the Federation would end in March, and I tried vainly to argue him out of this.

He thought he might be ready for a meeting in January.

He undertook to read and comment on my report.

November 3

We had lunch in his house for two hours. He had previously read a first draft of my report, addressed to him.

There was a marked shift in his thinking, towards a unitary state, but his mind still seemed to be open on this subject.

The alarming shift was in his attitude to a conference. He could not have his party convention till mid-January. This would have to be followed by educating the public. Clearly he was thinking in terms of months.

By now he had also publicly committed himself to the ending of the Federation in March.

I gained the impression that destroying the Federation had become an obsession, and that his desire to bring off this coup was his main reason for elaborating a programme of public “education” which would prevent him reaching the conference table until after March.

He would circulate my report to his friends and officials, and invited me to return for further comment after my visit to B.G.

November 8

He had not yet received comments on my report. His mind was still toying with a unitary state, and seemed a little less open. But he argued in a friendly way.

His attitude to a conference was much worse. He now objected even to the presence of the Federal Government at a conference, though when pressed he gave the impression that he might yield on this. It was clear that he would not come to a conference summoned by the Federal Government, which in any case would not exist for him after March.

² Earlier, on 6 Nov, Hailes, had written to Thomas about Williams’s insistence on ‘smashing’ the present federation: ‘Arthur Lewis tells me that he [Williams] is just as bitter about Manley, and also Mr. Macleod. He intends he says to smash both their reputations—and in the latter case, the Colonial Office and even Her Majesty’s Government are not necessarily going to be immune!’ (CO 1031/3278, no 142, Hailes to Thomas, 6 Nov 1961).

Asked where we go from here; was he prepared to summon his own unofficial parley of Chief Ministers? He replied that the Colonial Office had got us into this mess, and had a duty to take the initiative in getting us out. There ought soon to be discussion on practical arrangements for continuing common services when the Federation came to an end. He had received a nice letter from Mr Maudling. He would attend a conference if it was clear that the Federal Government would not keep interfering in the discussion.

He insisted that he was anxious to come to terms with the other islands, and we spent some time on steps he might take to make friends. I pointed out that he was creating an image of himself as the big bad wolf waiting to devour the little islands. He promised to mend his ways.

169 CO 852/2065, no 1

11 Nov 1961

[EEC]: letter from Dr Williams to Mr Maudling expressing concern over trade and immigration

The commencement in Brussels this week of the formal negotiations over Britain's entry into the European Common Market provides me with an early opportunity not merely to thank you for your very helpful letter of the 2nd November but also to take advantage of your kind offer of personal assistance in a matter of vital importance to Trinidad and Tobago.

You will, I am sure, be aware of the concern with which we in Trinidad and Tobago have viewed the acceleration during the past two years of the movement towards economic integration in Europe and the grave apprehensions we feel about the future of the United Kingdom and European markets for our major exports. Recognising, as I know you do, the serious economic and social dislocation that would result from the loss of any part of our overseas markets, you will understand our anxiety to be assured beyond all reasonable doubt that our trading position will not in any way be jeopardised by Britain's entry into the Common Market.

Our fears about the future have, however, been aggravated by two recent developments. One bears directly on the Common Market negotiations and the other, in our view, is indirectly related to them. I refer to your Government's decision to restrict immigration into Britain and to the reported opposition of the French Government to the association of the Netherlands Antilles with the Common Market except on terms acceptable to France.

You will already have received some indication of the strength of feeling in the West Indies against your Government's determination to close the door against West Indians and other Commonwealth immigrants. This feeling has been heightened by the realisation that this measure cannot be unconnected with the provisions of Article 48(3) of the Treaty of Rome dealing with the freedom of movement of workers. Our understanding of this Article is that, if Britain signs the Rome Treaty, workers from European Economic Community Countries will be able to move freely into Britain in search of jobs. And I believe that we are not alone in ascribing that interpretation to it.

In the circumstances, you will appreciate how difficult it is to avoid reaching the conclusion that the exclusion of West Indian and other Commonwealth workers from Britain may be a necessary preliminary to the admission of workers from EEC countries, in accordance with Article 48(3) of the Treaty. I think you will agree that it would be unfortunate in the extreme if that view were to gain greater currency.

Even more unfortunate, however, will be the effect on the economies of the West Indian Territories of the denial to their peoples of the opportunity to fill some, at least, of the many vacant jobs in Britain. It is no secret that, notwithstanding their efforts to promote industrial development, every West Indian territory faces the serious problem of massive unemployment. And, while no Government would regard migration as the solution to its territory's economic problems, it is clear that migration has in the past prevented the aggravation of these problems.

If, in addition to the exclusion of their peoples from Britain, West Indian Territories are also to face the possibility of the exclusion of some of their export products, their economic future will certainly appear to them even more hopeless than it seems at present. Yet, if the French attitude towards the Netherlands Antilles is a reliable indication of the treatment which Trinidad and Tobago may expect from the European Economic Community when Britain becomes a Member, it is clear that our petroleum products will be practically completely excluded not merely from Britain but from the other EEC countries.

It is because of considerations such as these, and also because of the evident unawareness by the Community of the special problems of the West Indies—in contrast with the great solicitude shown for the interests of the African territories—that my Government has agreed that Mr. O'Neil Lewis, the Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Industry, Commerce, Tourism and External Communications, should, after attending the forthcoming session of the GATT in Geneva, be given the opportunity of discussing with the appropriate officials in London and in Brussels the special problems of Trinidad and Tobago in relation to the Common Market. Mr. Lewis is fully familiar with the views of my Government on these problems and he will be authorised, as the Special Representative of the Government, to take whatever decisions he may consider necessary in order to give effect to those views.

I would, accordingly, much appreciate your personal assistance in securing for him both the necessary accreditation and the opportunity to discuss our problems with British and Common Market officials. Perhaps you would be good enough to let me know whether Letters of Credence from this Government will be needed in order to effect his introduction to the Common Market Commission.

I fear that I have devoted practically the whole of this letter to the problems of the Common Market although there are certain other questions arising out of your letter to which I would have wished to refer. It may, however, be more appropriate to write to you separately about those, but you may wish to take advantage of Mr. Lewis's presence in London, after the GATT meeting, to arrange for him to discuss with your officials some of the implications, as they appear to us, of the results of the Jamaican Referendum.

It only remains for me now to say what a pleasure it was to hear from you. I shall write to you shortly about the other points you raise. I share your hope that we shall be able to make closer contact.

170 PREM 11/3238

17 Nov 1961

[Immigration]: message from Sir G Adams to Mr Macmillan protesting about the proposed UK legislation to control immigration from the Commonwealth

The apparent determination of Her Majesty's Government to proceed with legislation to curb migration from the Commonwealth seems to be flagrant disregard of every liberal principle on which Britain has based its customs and traditions since Lord Mansfield's famous judgement of 1772.¹ West Indians are firmly convinced that by this action Britain has begun to take steps which are no different in kind to the basis on which the system of apartheid in South Africa is based.

It is inconceivable that West Indians who form less than one half percent of the population of Great Britain can constitute any threat to Britain's economy or health. There has been no evidence to indicate that West Indians are less law-abiding or moral than the people of Britain whose beliefs in law, freedom and justice they share.

It is particularly disturbing that although still legally described as Citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies the people of The West Indies should even before the final attainment of Independence be subjected to hostile and discriminatory legislation to deprive them of their historic rights to move freely into Britain.

Other Commonwealth countries will be as alarmed as we are at this dark day in the history of Britain. It will not pass unnoticed that while the Citizens of Ghana are giving Her Majesty a royal welcome in West Africa Her Majesty's Ministers are with undue haste further diminishing the freedom of people of the same stock for whom they have a historic responsibility as a result of the forceful severance which the British occasioned and of the rich trade in bodies and goods on which much of Britain's prosperity has been founded.

It will in future be difficult for any person from the Commonwealth to accept unreflectingly the oft-repeated assertion of multi-racial partnership. The Government of the United Kingdom is therefore jeopardising not only the future of an association for which high hopes have been entertained but Britain's own reputation for justice, tolerance and fair play.

My ministers join me in an urgent appeal to the British Cabinet not to proceed with legislation which can only result in a deterioration of social conditions in the West Indies to the situation in which Lord Moyne found them in 1938. You will understand that in these special circumstances the fullest possible publicity is being given to this protest.²

¹ In 1772 Lord Mansfield, chief justice of England, gave a judgement that slaves in England could not be forcibly removed from the country. This was falsely interpreted at the time, and by many since, that the decree had emancipated black slaves in England and Wales.

² Macmillan replied on 25 Nov, appreciating the anxiety and concern which the proposed legislation had aroused but denying that it would have the 'drastic consequence' envisaged in Adams's message. Macmillan continued: 'The Bill is intended as a means of regulating the total volume of immigration from all parts of the Commonwealth to a rate at which they can be assimilated. I am sure you will appreciate that a Bill which is intended to apply to the whole Commonwealth without discrimination of any kind could not discriminate in favour of persons from territories not yet independent as against persons from independent Commonwealth countries'. The prime minister had no objection to his reply being published (PREM 11/3238, outward tel no 338, Macmillan to Adams (through Hailes), 25 Nov 1961). The Commonwealth Immigrants Act received the Royal Assent in Apr 1962.

171 CO 1031/3278, no 147

22 Nov 1961

[UK interests]: minute by Lord Perth on 'our basic interests in the Caribbean'

[Perth wrote this minute in the middle of an exchange of correspondence beginning with Hailes's letter to Maudling of 10 Nov (see 168) in which the governor-general subsequently suggested that a conference should be held in London early in 1962 to resolve the issues of the dissolution of the existing federation, the maintenance of common services and the creation of a new federation based upon the Lewis or any other proposals. In his reply Maudling emphasised the problem of timing. The CO was committed in the new year to having a conference in London on Kenya. This was going to be one of 'extraordinary difficulty' and it was impossible to predict when it would begin or how long it would last. There was also the question of an independence conference in London with Jamaica to consider. This was scheduled for Feb 1962 but if, beforehand, an East Caribbean conference had failed to reach agreement, it was difficult to see how the problem of maintaining common services could be resolved. Equally, the Jamaica conference would be fixing a secession date. Eric Williams was insisting that the dates for Jamaican secession and dissolution of the existing federation should be one and the same. What would happen if the 'eight' disagreed? HMG would either have to make provision for Trinidad to secede on the same day as Jamaica or unilaterally decide that the federation had to be dissolved. The CO did not accept the argument that with Jamaica's secession the federation would automatically be dissolved. It would be 'ridiculous' to abolish the federation altogether and then to reconstruct it with amendments to suit the nine or eight. The CO was anxious to avoid having to go before parliament with a succession of West Indian bills and much preferred a scenario in which an order-in-council would include enabling provision to cover all eventualities.¹ Maudling therefore suggested, as an alternative to an East Caribbean conference in London, that he should visit the West Indies in Jan 1962 and hold informal discussions which would provide him with an opportunity to assess attitudes and possibilities. A formal conference could be held in London later and be based on a fairly clear understanding of what was likely to emerge (CO 1031/3728, no 145B, Maudling to Hailes, 20 Nov 1961). To all this Hailes responded that the existing federal government had to disappear. Federal representatives and senators were of 'poor quality' and with one or two exceptions ministers had 'failed miserably' to rise to their responsibilities or to provide real leadership. The crux of the matter, according to Hailes, was the date for Jamaica's secession. Although no specific date had been mentioned at the talks in London with Manley (see 165), it was now assumed, certainly in Jamaica itself, that the target date was 31 Mar 1962. To adhere to this timetable Hailes insisted that an East Caribbean conference would have to be held first. The alternative, and the one he now favoured, was to defer Jamaica's secession and independence until, say, 1 Aug 1962. This would provide time to settle the future of the East Caribbean. Hailes welcomed a visit by Maudling in Jan 1962 if its purpose was to work to this agenda (*ibid* no 158, Hailes to Maudling, 1 Dec 1961). In the minute reproduced here Perth considers the issue of West Indian conferences and legislation in the context of the purpose to which he thought UK policy should be working.]

I have read through West Indian Department 'A's paper on conferences and legislation concerned with the West Indies in 1962. As it says, it is in the main confined to timetables based on various half pledges and guesses about, for example, what Williams of Trinidad is going to do. It proposes a ministerial visit to see how local politicians react to Jamaica's leaving the Federation and generally to explore the future.

But are we clear ourselves where we want to go?

¹ Maudling put the case for an enabling bill before the Colonial Policy Committee in Dec 1961 (CAB 134/1560, CPC(61)36, 'Timing of West Indian legislation', memo by Maudling, 18 Dec 1961). In giving its approval, the committee recommended that care should be taken to ensure that the bill did not exceed the UK's powers and thus cause resentment. The point was also raised in discussion that that part of the bill dealing with secession might be seized upon by African leaders in Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia who opposed the Central African Federation (*ibid*, CP 13(61)2, 20 Dec 1961).

I suppose the first question is what are our basic interests in the Caribbean—and I use the term Caribbean to include British Honduras and British Guiana.

Strategically, as I see it they are nil. Of course we don't want to see them in unfriendly hands, but the U.S.A. and Canada must ensure this does not come about, although as friends and allies we should be prepared to help by influence and money.

Economically, to the Government the whole area is a constant and considerable drain whether by disguised subsidy or direct help. On the other hand there is a large (how large) private investment (real estate and oil) which may or may not bring in a handsome return. Clearly we do not want to jeopardise such investment, but is there danger of this?

Morally, there is of course a strong sentimental tie which must have some weight. The Immigration Bill will be straining the West Indian side of the sentiment.

I suggest we need now to review the whole of the West Indian position. The grand concept of Federation, perhaps ultimately to embrace British Honduras and British Guiana, is in ruins, Jamaica is out and other groups of islands, for example Bermuda and the Bahamas, were never in. Is it wise to try and salvage the rest of the federation? In that event is it reasonable to expect Trinidad to carry the burden of the smaller islands? Surely she won't without the promise of continuing and substantial aid. What do we want to do about British Guiana? Jagan is pressing for its independence. Geographically it is of course within sight of Trinidad. And then there is British Honduras with the prospect of tens of millions being spent for a new capital and for what purpose? There are of course lots of other questions which will need thought.

I can think of all sorts of other constitutional solutions than those which we are at present more or less drifting into, especially if we are prepared to be tough about the giving of aid and attaching strings to it.

Strategically and probably economically we can afford to be tough and only sentimentally have we reason not to be. At a time, and I think sooner rather than later, we ought to consult with the Americans and Canadians, but before this we should know our own minds.

172 CO 852/2065, no 7

23 Nov 1961

[EEC]: letter (reply) from Mr Maudling to Dr Williams on trade and immigration

Thank you very much indeed for your letter of the 11th November¹ about the European Common Market negotiations, which I was very pleased to receive.

On the general issues raised in your second paragraph you will recall the discussion you had with Lord Perth when he was in Trinidad in July.² As Lord Perth then explained, it is H.M.C.'s intention in the negotiations with the Six to preserve the vital interests of Commonwealth countries and territories. So far as our territories and other under-developed Commonwealth countries are concerned we have proposed to the six that they should all enjoy the same Associated Overseas

¹ See 169.

² See 154.

Territories status as is enjoyed by their own associated countries. This is, we believe, the best way of safeguarding the vital interests of dependent overseas territories.

As regards the particular point you raise on immigration and the Common Market, I agree with you that it would be most unfortunate—and indeed it would be without foundation—if the view were to gain greater currency that the exclusion of Commonwealth workers from Britain was a necessary preliminary to the admission of workers from E.E.C. countries. I would like to assure you in the most categorical terms that the Government's decision to introduce the Immigration Bill had no connection whatever with the negotiations we are engaged on to enter the Community. I hope, therefore, that you will support us in scotching that particular rumour.

As regards immigration under Articles 48 and 49 of the Treaty of Rome these articles are in fact open to various interpretations and it may conceivably be necessary eventually to refer the question of interpretation of them to the Court of Justice. In June of this year however, the Council of Ministers approved regulations valid for not more than two years which recognise, subject to certain exceptions, the principle that priority of consideration should be given to indigenous labour. It is quite unreal to suppose that Britain could be compelled suddenly to accept a flood of cheap labour from E.E.C. countries, and it would certainly appear from reading these Articles of the Treaty that control of such labour is possible. What the final position will be we cannot of course yet say and much will depend upon the course of our present negotiations with the Six. I have of course explained to you in my recent communication the real reasons which lay behind the Government's proposed Immigration Bill.

As regards the other Common Market point you raise—the treatment of Netherlands Antilles—recent developments have in fact been encouraging. You have probably now heard that the Six have agreed to extend Associated Overseas Territories status to the Netherlands Antilles, which means that the whole of their indigenous production will receive free entry into the Six. This would seem to be a good omen for the treatment which the Six should be prepared to extend to Trinidad and other West Indian territories. The only trouble which has arisen with the Netherlands Antilles has been the question of their exports to Europe of refined petroleum products made from Venezulean crude. The Six, particularly the French, were afraid of establishing the precedent that any Associated Overseas Territory could set up a refinery, import foreign crude oil (perhaps from Russia) and sell the refined products throughout the Community. This could be bad for established refinery operators within the Community and I am sure that Trinidad would itself appreciate this argument. It has, therefore, been agreed that the Netherlands Antilles should be given a duty free quota in the Community markets for exports of petroleum products which is in effect double their present exports to those markets.

I have already replied to you by telegram about the visit of Mr. O'Neil Lewis to Europe. We shall be very glad to arrange for him to discuss the special problems of Trinidad with appropriate officials in London and Brussels: and we will take all the necessary steps to arrange suitable introductions for him. His formal accrediting to the Commission in the full diplomatic sense is unfortunately not possible since such accrediting is only open to independent Governments, but such diplomatic status should not be necessary for him in making all the contacts he wants. There is some difficulty in deciding the best time for Lewis' visit in relation to the many

preoccupations of the Commission, but our negotiators in Brussels are looking in to this and we will get into direct communication with Mr. Lewis on the detailed arrangements.

I look forward to hearing from you again when I get back from Kenya and when you will have your elections behind you.

173 CO 1031/3278, no 160

6 Dec 1961

[Small states]: letter from Lord Hailes to Mr Maudling on the need to take a firm line with the Leeward and Windward Islands

I should like to expand a point made in paragraph 11 of my letter of 1st December to which this could be regarded as an addendum, about the necessity for taking a line of stern realism with the Leewards and Windwards representatives in any talks or negotiations in the near future. The point gains importance from the results of the Trinidad Elections in which Eric Williams won a resounding victory for his party.¹ It is too soon to say how the remarkable DLP victory in Barbados² will affect Trinidad-Barbados relations; but still the first condition of Trinidad's continued participation in a political community in the Eastern Caribbean has been fulfilled.

2. Williams now knows that his electoral strength in Trinidad gives him room to negotiate for a strong central government (whether on the basis of Lewis's plan or otherwise) which he can be expected to control. But he will need encouragement from every source if he is to be persuaded to make a bid, and if the negotiations are to have any chance of success. There can be little hope of his making a start in this direction unless Trinidad's position of superiority is recognised from the outset, and the Leewards and Windwards in particular are made to recognise that they can no longer hope to bargain from a position of constitutional parity.

3. I feel that the sooner the leaders in the small Units are made to realise this the better, and that the primary responsibility for telling them so, tactfully of course, but firmly, rests with H.M.G. If Williams gets in first with his habitual thunders on the same point, that will elicit nothing but bitterness and obstruction. This is just what the saboteurs who are aiming at some Federal association of Eight would want. What I suggest as essential is that H.M.G. should make clear to the small units in advance of any serious bargaining that the indefinite maintenance of the status quo in their internal constitutional arrangements, and of a Colonial and grant-in-aid relationship with the United Kingdom, is not something which they can, even in the last resort, fall back upon in refusing to work out a sound political association for the Eastern Caribbean.

4. So far as their constitutions are concerned, there already exists the qualification firmly enunciated (though by no means assented to) at the Leeward Islands and Windward Islands Constitutional Conference in June of this year, viz. that the advances recommended at that meeting were contingent on the

¹ The elections in Trinidad were held on 4 Dec 1961 and won by the PNM with 58 per cent of the popular vote.

² A reference to the defeat of Adams's Barbados Party by E A Barrow's Democratic Labour Party in Dec 1961.

continuation of the present Federation and its achievement of Independence on 31st May, 1962.³ However, one realises that as these small islands have already been allowed to go far along the road to full internal self-government, there are limitations as to how far we can go into reverse without eroding the general policy of advancing Colonial territories to Independence at the earliest. To subsidise a colonial status is however the negation of this policy, and those islands that now rely on grants-in-aid to finance their administrations can be told with firmness, and without fear of the inevitable charge of coercion, that they cannot be allowed to get the best of all possible worlds—to clamour for Independence while refusing to make the sacrifices necessary for its achievement; to demand freedom from external control while rejecting all practical measures for achieving a viable economy through political association, while at the same time seeking to maintain a right to annual instalments of grants-in-aid from the U.K. Treasury.

5. It seems to me that one of the most valuable aspects of your visit in January could be to clear the air in these respects in preparation for future negotiations for an Eastern Caribbean federal arrangement. It could be an opportunity to make the political leaders of the smaller islands understand that they cannot expect special efforts to be made to prop up local administrations, and maintain pockets of political authority under the cover of a colonial relationship, which can be criticized by nations determined to misunderstand the position, when another way is available towards our common goal of political Independence and economic self-sufficiency. Success in putting over this theme at an early stage would not only I think enhance the chances of a proper Federation of Nine but would also, should Trinidad unfortunately decide to go it alone, encourage those who harbour the idea of an association of Eight to begin their thinking on a realistic basis.

6. I fear you will think that I am laying down the law in a big way, but I expect you would rather I should express my thoughts frankly. Some may well need amendment!

³ See 156, note 2.

174 CO 1031/3506, no 125

15 Dec 1961

‘The West Indies Federation’: CO brief for Mr Macmillan’s meeting with President Kennedy at Bermuda, December 1961, on the question of US aid to the Caribbean

Small though they are, our Caribbean colonies have been growing steadily more expensive in recent years. At the same time our future commitments elsewhere (especially Africa) will not make it possible for the United Kingdom alone to provide sufficient development assistance to satisfy West Indian expectations (which are not modest) or even, in some cases, simply cope with their population explosions. We have therefore over the last two years made an increasing effort to persuade the Americans (and also the Canadians) to accept a share of the financial burden of these territories, in particular the West Indies Federation. This policy has until recently shown some success, largely because strategic factors have ensured that the Americans have an interest in maintaining the stability of the area.

2. The Americans have shown their sensitivity to the Federation in the following ways:—

- (a) they took West Indian dissatisfaction with the 1941 Bases for Destroyers Agreement extremely seriously and were clearly very glad at being able to agree a revision of the Agreement earlier this year with the West Indian Governments;
- (b) in mid-1961 they appointed a Special Representative to the Federation, Mr. Ivan White. He was to become their Ambassador at independence and, until then, exercise supervision over all United States military and civil activities in the area;
- (c) they readily agreed to participate in the Joint Canada/United States/United Kingdom Economic Mission¹ to the Leeward and Windward Islands which was one of the results of the West Indies Constitutional Conference in London in June, 1961;
- (d) they gave us to understand that the assistance to the Federation for the first few years after independence would match £ for £ what the United Kingdom provided.

3. Since the Jamaican referendum on 19th September they have shown in several ways that they are either re-appraising or are uncertain about their future policy to the West Indies. They have told us they are reluctant to implement their part of the Leewards and Windwards Joint Economic Mission until the political future of the area clarifies. They have also hinted that, partly because of Congressional cuts in their aid programme, they may not perhaps be able to treat the areas so generously as they had earlier envisaged and that, in any case, their policy is now to concentrate aid on areas which can play a constructive and influential role, and they are inclined to doubt if the Eastern Caribbean is such an area.

4. It is unlikely that the Americans will take any re-appraisal to the point of deciding to write off the West Indies altogether. But even a decision that the West Indies was no longer to be a priority American aid target could be a serious blow to our interests if it resulted in the United Kingdom having to bear increased financial responsibilities or in the total financial bait being inadequate to induce the West Indians to adopt the political solutions we prefer. *It is therefore important to catch American policy-making before it gets to the point of a firm re-appraisal of policy towards the West Indies. An opportunity may be given if the President asks the Prime Minister to say what he thinks of the future of the Federation.*²

5. In the present confused situation the only firm fact is that Jamaica has irrevocably pulled out, and will become independent in 1962, the precise date to be determined at a conference opening in London in early February.

6. Jamaica comprised half the Federation both in terms of land area and population and contributed about 40% of the federal revenue. It is uncertain whether the remaining nine members of the Federation will be able to agree to carry on together without her. Trinidad is much richer than Barbados and the seven Leeward and Windward territories, and fears they would be a drag on her own prosperity. She may decide to “go it alone” to separate independence. Barbados and the small islands, on the other hand, are afraid of domination by Trinidad and a loss of their identity. These fears are heightened by the probability that Trinidad will insist that the

¹ On the outcome of which see 193.

² Emphasis throughout in original.

present Federation must be scrapped and replaced if there is to be another federation, by a much more centralised constitution or possibly even a unitary state. The Premier of Trinidad (Dr. Eric Williams) refused to declare himself one way or the other before his general election. This took place on 4th December and gave him an easy victory, but he has not yet made a firm declaration of his intentions. Such statements as he has made have not been reassuring but we cannot yet be certain that these are not designed to soften up the other territories before serious negotiation starts. The Colonial Secretary is visiting the Federation between 16th and 27th January to try to discover what chance there is of keeping the Federation together. Overtly, it will be necessary for him to say during his visit that this is something the West Indians must decide themselves. Behind the scenes, he will, of course, do all he can to keep the Federation intact (though without committing himself to a policy that would certainly involve more financial aid than we are able to afford). He will aim at persuading all the Eastern Caribbean territories to attend a conference in London (probably about April) to work out the form of political association suited to the new position caused by Jamaica's withdrawal.

7. If the negotiations succeed, the Federation may still be able to go to independence in 1962, though not by the date of 31st May agreed at Lancaster House last June. If the negotiations do not succeed, Trinidad is likely to demand separate independence in the course of 1962 and we will not be able to refuse this. One or two small territories may agree to Trinidad's terms, and by going in with her achieve simultaneous independence.

8. If Trinidad with or without satellites "goes it alone", we will be left with Barbados and most, if not all, of the Leeward and Windward Islands on our hands. They may still wish to be linked in a Federation, but their lack of resources is such that they are unlikely to be able to support more than a rudimentary federal machine. We have not, frankly determined what, in these circumstances, the ultimate political future of these territories would be. On the one hand, neither separately nor collectively are they likely to be viable for many years to come. On the other hand, it is difficult to foresee them remaining as colonies in perpetuity. It might, therefore, be that we should have to consider allowing them (indeed, possibly prodding them) to achieve independence in a few years with a guarantee of tapering budgetary support for a period of years.

9. All the West Indians now want of us is massive financial aid. But, however much we recognise the urgency of their needs, we are faced with so many competing priorities (especially Africa) that we are simply not able to envisage any increase in our volume of aid to the area. The Americans (and Canadians) have already shown themselves willing to help. *We very much hope the President will not feel that current political uncertainties make the fundamental problems of the area less pressing.* In fact, the West Indians at present feel very threatened. Their own population pressures, the gradual closing of doors to migration, the European Common Market (though we hope to safeguard many of their vital interests), the nearness of Cuba and the unsettling influence of Fidelismo, and a recent re-emergence of racial tensions (particularly in Jamaica); they all add up to a sombre background to the solution of their political problem.

10. We therefore hope that the United States, so far from diminishing their assistance towards the territories which comprise the present Federation, will on the contrary step it up. We also hope that Canada may be persuaded to extend further

economic assistance to the area. The happiest solution for all would be the emergency [sic] of an Eastern Caribbean Federation including Trinidad. But as the price of agreeing to this Trinidad is certain to demand massive external aid in the shape of development grants and loans to enable it to sustain the burden of association with the smaller islands all of which are poor and nearly all grant-aided. Her terms are certain to be much too stiff for the United Kingdom with its stretched resources and commitments elsewhere, to meet to any considerable extent. *American willingness to come in with an imaginative offer of large-scale aid may be the key to the establishment of an Eastern Caribbean Federation.*

175 CAB 134/1560, CPC(61)32

15 Dec 1961

'British Guiana independence': memorandum by Mr Maudling for Cabinet Colonial Policy Committee on the arguments for and against moving more quickly to independence

The British Guiana Constitutional Conference, 1960,¹ agreed on a formula that an Independence Conference would not be called until a minimum of two years had elapsed after the General Election of August, 1961,² unless a decision had in the meantime been taken to grant independence to the Federation of The West Indies; in the latter event, the two year minimum would be reduced to one year. A decision was taken to grant independence to The West Indies on the 31st May, 1962, and although that has been upset by Jamaica's decision to secede, it would be impracticable to argue that the minimum of one year does not now apply. The earliest date for an Independence Conference in accordance with the above formula would be August, 1962 and on this basis, allowing for the necessary legal and other preparations, independence could take effect by mid-1963 or a little earlier.

2. Both houses of the local Legislature recently adopted a Resolution asking me to fix a date during 1962 for independence and Dr. Jagan in the course of discussions I had with him on the 13th December has pressed me to implement the Resolution. Publicly he has expressed the desire that British Guiana should attain its independence on the 31st May next.

3. The main argument for adhering to the formula is that we are under certain obligations to the Americans, who take a great interest in the affairs of British Guiana. In their eyes, the problem is of tremendous importance and in view of hostile public and congressional opinion towards any softening by the U.S. Government towards a "communist" country, it is a hypersensitive spot for the

¹ See 135, note.

² At the election in British Guiana in Aug 1961, the PPP won 20 seats with 42.6 per cent of the vote; the PNC won 11 seats with 41 per cent of the vote; and the UF (United Force), a conservative party formed in 1961 by Peter D'Aguiar, a Portuguese businessman, won 4 seats with 16.3 per cent of the vote. All 20 of the PPP's seats were in rural constituencies where East Indians formed large majorities. All 11 of the PNP's seats were in urban areas with large African majorities. 3 of the UF's seats were in Georgetown where the Portuguese population was concentrated, the fourth being in the interiors in the Amerindian constituency.

Administration. What happens in British Guiana is, therefore, not merely a matter of British colonial policy, but has a bearing on general Anglo/U.S. relations.

4. Shortly after the introduction of the present British Guiana constitution, an informal U.K./U.S. Working Party of officials reviewed the situation in the Colony and worked out an agreed approach to its problems. The U.S. representatives expressed the hope that the period prior to independence could be prolonged and that arrangements for another election as one of the steps towards independence could be made. In their view a longer period of internal self-government would provide needed additional time to show Dr. Jagan that the West meant well by him, and would also provide a better opportunity to evaluate the results of working with him. It was impressed on the Americans that developments in the Colony would have to be judged in the light of circumstances, and it was agreed with them that there should be further consultations as the situation developed. The report of the Working Party, which has been endorsed by Foreign Secretary, Commonwealth Secretary, and by me, set out *inter alia* that the United Kingdom would "endeavour to adhere to the London formula which would provide for a conference on British Guiana independence not earlier than August, 1962".

5. Although there is no firm commitment to the U.S.A. to adhere to the formula, there is a strong moral obligation to do our best to do so, and there is a clear obligation to consult with the U.S. authorities. To depart from the formula so shortly after the Anglo/U.S. discussions and so soon after the Americans have begun (however haltingly) to carry out their side of the bargain by inviting Dr. Jagan to meet the President and discussing future aid, would be contrary to the spirit of our many mutual dealings over British Guiana.

6. A subsidiary point is that the more time we have to settle the future relation of an independent British Guiana with the Commonwealth the better. Moreover, the Government of British Guiana so far have declined to agree to satisfactory compensation terms for certain categories of overseas officers for whom I have a special responsibility.

Argument for departing from the formula

7. On the other hand I can see good reasons for moving more quickly to independence:—

- (a) The Legislature has passed the independence resolution referred to above by a very substantial majority. Both Dr. Jagan's party and the main opposition party, which together polled some 85% of the votes cast at the August elections, supported it.
- (b) We have no strategic or economic reasons for delaying independence. Nor is the internal situation such as to provide a cogent argument for the retention of U.K. sovereignty in the interests of preventing communal disturbances.
- (c) We should gain nothing politically from delaying; in fact to do so would be more likely to lead to souring relations between H.M.G. and Dr. Jagan's Government.
- (d) Economically, so long as British Guiana remains under British sovereignty the tendency in the U.S. and elsewhere seems likely to be to regard this country as primarily responsible for aid to British Guiana. The aid is sought on a scale which is beyond U.K. resources, having regard to our other commitments. The sooner British Guiana is put in a position in which she can in her own right tap other

sources of financial assistance, and in which the Americans have to recognise that British Guiana is more vital to their interests than ours, the better.

8. The Governor's considered advice is that we should accelerate the pace towards independence. The representative of the Security Services in the West Indies is of like view. Having regard to the circumstances in British Guiana and to the advice which I have received, I am of the opinion that there would be no real advantage in refusing to agree to an earlier date for British Guiana's independence. It seems to me that the best course to follow, taking into account my other commitments, would be for the independence conference to be held in May of next year (i.e., about three months sooner than the earliest date possible under the Lancaster House formula), and that we should be prepared to grant independence by the end of 1962 if, as I hope, this leaves time for the necessary legal drafting. I should be grateful for my colleagues' agreement to this proposal.

9. While I should like to inform Dr. Jagan of the above as soon as possible, it is clear I cannot do so until we have consulted the Americans and, if possible, carried them with us. I hope to start consultations with the Americans soon, and if it appears clear that my proposal will create difficulties with them, I shall, of course, consult with my colleagues again. Otherwise, if the Americans accept our views, I propose to inform Dr. Jagan that I should be pleased to call a Conference in May, 1962 to discuss independence, but I may have to make it a condition that before the Conference is held the Government of British Guiana have agreed satisfactory compensation terms for certain categories of overseas officers for whom I have a special responsibility.

176 CO 1031/3911, no 3 29 Dec 1961 'United States–Trinidad relations': letter from S J G Fingland¹ to D Williams on a strained political and economic relationship

Relations between the United States and the present Trinidad Government, under Dr. Williams, have been very much a love-hate affair. When I first arrived, some four months ago, the comparative sweetness and light which had been generated by the successful talks about the U.S. Bases—particularly Chaguaramas—had evaporated and the Americans, like ourselves, were being regarded by Dr. Williams with considerable bitterness. This was particularly shown in his attitude towards Ivan White, the United States "Head of Mission with the personal rank of Ambassador", on whose head Williams particularly directed his wrath at what he regarded as the United States' resiling from what had been agreed on economic aid to Trinidad at the Tobago talks.

2. The situation was not improved by the Trinidad attitude following the Jamaican referendum, when Ivan White's previous policy of stressing his position viz-à-viz the *Federal* Government, and his "Ambassadorial" status, recoiled on him because of Dr. Williams' refusal to have anything to do with the Federal Government or any of its works. Fortunately for the United States themselves, Christensen²

¹ Adviser on Commonwealth affairs to governor-general, West Indies Federation, 1960–1961, and to governor of Trinidad, 1962; deputy UK high commissioner, Trinidad, 1962–1963.

² W H Christensen, US consul-general, Trinidad, 1961; counsellor, US embassy, Trinidad, from 1962.

had just arrived in Port of Spain as deputy to White, and he has been able, by placing emphasis on his status as U.S. Consul-General in Trinidad, to put the United States' relationship with the Trinidad authorities on a much sounder footing. In this, Christensen was very much helped by the fact that he had had previous dealings with Dr. Williams when they were both concerned with the activities of the Caribbean Commission; and he has been able to expand on this connection to the extent that, unlike many of us, he has fairly frequent access to Dr. Williams, and close contacts with him. I thought that you might be interested to have the information in the following paragraphs about U.S.-Trinidad relations in various fields, most of which has been obtained from Christensen, with whom I keep in close touch.

Political

3. Ivan White himself told me that, as a result of the Jamaican referendum, they had decided not to build up the U.S. Mission in Port of Spain to the extent originally envisaged, which would have meant the addition of four Political Officers to the normal staff of the Consulate General. They were now distributing their resources more evenly between Port of Spain and Jamaica by sending two of the Political Officers to add to the strength of the present Consulate General in Kingston. The two Officers have, in fact, just left. White has implied on one or two occasions that he himself may not be staying here very long. His position is still very difficult viz-à-viz the Trinidad Government and I gather that he has still little or no contact with Dr. Williams, the latter carrying out all his dealings through Christensen. Christensen himself told me in confidence that it was likely that White would move to Jamaica about March in order to take over from the present U.S. Consul General (Macgregor—who is due to leave about February next) with a view to becoming the first U.S. Ambassador in Jamaica on independence. I think that it is most likely that Christensen will become the Head of Mission in Port of Spain on White's departure. Christensen told me that he thought that, as soon as the future constitutional position was slightly clearer, the Americans would probably revert to calling their Mission in Port of Spain a Consulate General, in the normal way, until independence here.

4. Christensen, incidentally, shares my view that one of the most disturbing of recent political events in Trinidad has been Dr. Williams' refusal to display any magnanimity towards the Opposition, after winning the elections by a handsome majority. There has been no evidence of any appeal to the nation as a whole to forget the bitterness of the political campaign and settle down together to work out the many problems facing Trinidad in the near future. Indeed, in the course of his election victory speech, Dr. Williams categorically rejected the suggestion of a previous speaker (Montano, then Minister of Local Government and Housing) that there should be an attempt to get away from the intense partisanship of the elections; and the Premier himself referred on that occasion, and on other occasions since, in the most vindictive terms to the Opposition and all its supporters.

Economic

5. Trinidad's main contacts with the United States are, of course, in the field of economic aid. Here, Dr. Williams is showing himself insatiable. His main difficulties with Ivan White arose out of a disagreement over the interpretation of the U.S.-Trinidad economic memorandum produced at the time of the Bases talks, in which

the U.S. agreed to give economic aid to Trinidad for certain projects.³ (I have, incidentally, not seen a copy of this economic agreement and would be grateful to receive one). The main point at issue has been the American Government's insistence that their "participation" in the Trinidad economic projects in question means that they will put up 60% of the agreed cost, mainly in U.S. goods and services, leaving the Trinidad Government to finance the other 40% from its own resources. Dr. Williams, on the other hand, argues that he was led to believe that U.S. participation meant that they would pay 100% of the cost; and the strength of his feeling on this issue is indicated by the inclusion of the following paragraph in the Trinidad Governor's speech delivered today on the opening of the new Trinidad Parliament:—

"My Government expresses its profound regret that its high expectations, and those of the people of Trinidad and Tobago, of the Chaguaramas Agreement negotiated with the United States of America in Tobago a year ago, have not been translated into the practical cooperation which was then confidently anticipated".

The U.S. authorities must take some of the blame themselves for their deterioration in relations, having by all accounts been guilty of, at least, a dangerous imprecision in what they promised in the economic field at Tobago.

6. These difficulties having not yet been resolved, the U.S. authorities have not yet received a decision from the Trinidad Government on their offer to make available the sum of \$US 6.6 million to Trinidad, under the Special Aid Scheme resulting from the Bases agreement, during the current fiscal year. This sum is intended to cover an amount of \$US 1.6 million for the development of the U.C.W.I. in Trinidad, about which there have already been detailed discussions between the U.S. and Trinidad Governments, and an additional sum of \$US 5 million in respect of further grant assistance to U.C.W.I.; for port development; and for a projected new highway from Port of Spain to Chaguaramas.

7. This proposed Special Aid, which is all in the form of grants, does not by any means represent the total of United States economic assistance to Trinidad. During the current financial year the U.S. Government have, in addition, given the Trinidad authorities two marine tugs and a revolving-crane barge for port development, out of U.S. surplus stock, the total value of which is estimated as \$US 1.7 million. They have also agreed to give a \$US 9 million loan from the Export/Import Bank for the Trinidad Government sewerage scheme. Christensen commented that the total involved in all these loans or grants represented a value of \$US 20 per head of the population of Trinidad and Tobago—a *per capita* rate far exceeding that which applied to U.S. aid anywhere in Latin America. The total would be even larger if the value of normal U.S. developmental assistance under AID (formerly ICA) were to be included, together with the value of certain assets at the Chaguaramas Base which the U.S. had agreed to turn over to the Trinidad Government, although not strictly required to do so under the terms of the Bases Agreement. (In October 1961 the Trinidad Government was informed that it could acquire title to 35 buildings and structures on Chaguaramas for use in billeting troops; and Dr. Williams was also informed that the United States Government were agreeable to making available 29 acres—including two piers and 9 buildings—at

³ See 141, note 1.

Chaguaramas for a commercial dry dock facility, the value of this area being estimated as \$US 5 million).⁴

8. Despite the fact that he has not yet accepted the U.S. Special Aid referred to above, on the terms proposed, Dr. Williams has not been slow to indicate that he looks to the United States for large amounts of assistance in other fields. Immediately after the recent heavy flooding in the Diego Martin area outside Port of Spain, the Premier indicated that he would be asking the U.S. Government to give emergency assistance with regard to the re-development of the flooded area; and he referred on another occasion to the fact that the Trinidad Government would seek a loan of \$WI 50 million, interest free, from the U.S. Government to implement a crash programme of housing. Christensen told me that the U.S. Consulate General had in fact had various requests put to them for additional aid totalling an estimated \$US 20 million. In the middle of all this, moreover, Dr. Williams has stated publicly that the present Agreement on U.S. Bases "died" with the Federal Government following the Jamaica Referendum. No-one thinks that this means that he is thinking of driving the Americans out of Chaguaramas, but it is clearly intended as a means of putting more pressure on the Americans for granting economic aid on Trinidad's terms.

9. Thus, the Americans are clearly finding Dr. Williams a very difficult man to deal with. Much of this results from the Premier's personal handling of negotiations of this type. Christensen said they had been surprised to learn recently, when challenged about their aid by a Trinidad Minister, that the latter—and the Trinidad Cabinet—had not been informed about the U.S. Government's offer of Special Aid on the lines described above. There is a lesson for us as well as the Americans. If there is any chance of Trinidad taking on the leadership of an Eastern Caribbean federation, Dr. Williams will clearly try to drive the hardest possible bargain with the United Kingdom in relation to grants for the development of the smaller units, so that no additional burden falls on the Trinidad economy. As Christensen commented, the Americans have now fully realised that Dr. Williams is a most difficult man to deal with, and one who can be a great force for both good and evil. He has apparently made it clear to the Americans that he intends to keep his dealings with them and his relations with the United Kingdom in entirely separate compartments, and in any negotiations it will obviously be essential not to appear to be ganging up with the Americans. On the other hand it is equally apparent that we must keep in the closest touch with the United States (and, of course, the Canadian) authorities so that one side is not played off against the other.

⁴ A US account of the economic agreement with Trinidad is in CO 1031/3911, no 1, 'Record of United States compliance in Trinidad with defense areas agreement and related documents', enclosed with F J Galbraith (US embassy, London) to Fraser, 30 Nov 1961.

177 CO 1031/3374, no 3 8 Jan 1962
 'The Lewis Report': CO brief no 8 for Mr Maudling's visit to the West Indies on Professor A Lewis's view that the best option is now an independent Trinidad and a Federation of the Eight. *Annex*: letter from Lewis to Mr Fraser, 2 Jan 1962

Professor Arthur Lewis is a 47 year-old St. Lucia [sic], educated at L.S.E., who is now Principal of the University College of the West Indies. He is an eminent man. He has

been Professor of Economics at Manchester. Later he was Dr. Nkrumah's Economic Adviser. He was for a time Deputy Director of the United Nations Special Fund.

2. When the result of the Jamaican Referendum was declared on 20th September, Professor Lewis flew down to Trinidad completely on his own initiative and offered his services to the Federal Prime Minister. He was given the appointment of Special Adviser to the Prime Minister at a salary of a dollar a year and it was agreed he should tour the Federation on the Prime Minister's behalf to investigate what were the chances of keeping the Federation intact after the withdrawal of Jamaica. Professor Lewis was probably the only man who could do this. He is universally respected, is known to have no political bias, and, above all, is liked by Dr. Williams and can get access to him, which is not easy except for the favoured few.

3. Dr. Lewis submitted his report on 9th November.¹ He argued that, contrary to expectations, there was now a strong possibility that the remaining territories would be willing to form a new Federation, which would be much more centralised than either the 1958 Constitution or that under which the Federation of the Ten would have become independent. Dr. Lewis claimed that this would even be acceptable to Trinidad if there were a drastic reduction of the governmental super-structures in the small islands.

4. Dr. Lewis argued that, whereas it would be necessary to retain somewhat truncated separate governments in the small islands, it would in fact be possible to approach the condition of a unitary state provided one major requirement was met. This was that the outward forms and institutions of a Federation were maintained. Dr. Lewis in a significant passage wrote "the language one uses is important because words have not only meaning, but also an intense significance as symbols, which relates only tenuously to their meaning. A constitution which all may accept if it is called federal may equally be rejected by all if it is called unitary."

5. Elated though the department was by this document, which was the first indication of any possibility of our being able to keep the Nine together at all, we soon began to have doubts as to whether it would, in fact, be possible to reach agreement on the basis of elaborate constitutional double talk, and a conspiracy of silence as to the real meaning of whatever new political arrangements were to be made.

6. Since writing his report, Professor Lewis has apparently had similar misgivings. He has now written to Mr. Fraser (copy of his letter attached). He now says that a Federation of the Nine is no longer practical politics and that even though one or two Windward Islands might accept complete absorption by Trinidad, it would be preferable instead to concentrate on forming the Eight into a workmanlike Federation and aim at a "sort of East African High Commission" running the common services for British Guiana, Jamaica, Trinidad and the Eight. The logic of the present situation (surprises apart, and we may yet have these) supports this later analysis and it now seems that Dr. Lewis' first report was considerably over-optimistic in relation to political realities.

Annex to 177

Thank you for your letter of 14th December. I shall be in Trinidad from January 13 to 24. I shall see Bird and Barrow on my way down.

¹ See 168.

I have not seen Dr. Williams since the beginning of November. However, from studying his speeches, and from what he said then, I conclude the following:—

- (1) He would prefer “association” with other territories to going alone, but will go alone if he does not get his terms.
- (2) “Association” does not mean federation. It means a unitary state, with the other territories having the same status as Tobago.
- (3) He knows that this will not be acceptable to all the other territories. He would be content to have Grenada and St. Vincent come in alone; St. Lucia and Dominica too if they so desire.
- (4) He will probably ask for a dowry as the price of taking any of the smaller islands into association; and will probably refuse if there is no dowry.

My reaction to this would be to let Trinidad go it alone, and establish the other islands as a federation centred on Barbados. There could then be organised a sort of East Africa High Commission, whose membership would be British Guiana, Trinidad, Eastern Caribbean and Jamaica. This Commission would take over the air line, shipping, meteorology, university etc. External representation could be joint in some places, e.g. Ottawa, while having to be separate in others, e.g. London and the U.N. My reasons for this are:—

- (1) Association on Dr. Williams’s terms may be acceptable to two or three of the islands, but is not acceptable to all—and even those two or three would probably prefer federation with Barbados, since the prospect of dictatorship by Dr. Williams is not relished. If two or three go with Trinidad, what happens to the rest? It would be better to keep them all together in a compact federation.
- (2) It is not desirable to reduce all the other islands to the status of Tobagos. The history of Tobagos in the West Indies (including Nevis, the Grenadines, Anguilla, Turks and Caicos, Caymans) is one of neglect. I agree strongly with V.C. Bird that any island without a government of its own is doomed to neglect. What we have to do is not to abolish the island governments, but to trim them to proper scale.

However, the possibility of a federation centred on Barbados depends partly on Mr. Errol Barrow and partly on the Secretary of State.

When I met Mr. Barrow on December 9/10 he had not yet read any of the documents, or given serious thought to the problems. It was, however, clear to him that a unitary state was neither feasible nor desirable. He stated his position as being the same as that of V.C. Bird, with whom he has also close personal relations. He was willing to go along with a federation centred on Barbados; but he was worried about its cost. His attitude to Dr. Williams was one of suspicion, and it took all my persuasive powers to get him to take the initiative in seeking an interview. I have not seen him since, and do not know what his attitude now is.

If my analysis is right, the Secretary of State will have a choice between:—

- (1) offering a dowry to Trinidad, and coercing as many of the small islands as possible into a unitary state; or
- (2) offering a dowry to Barbados, to be the centre of an Eastern Caribbean federation.

I hope that if it comes to this he will without hesitation chose the latter.

You will notice that both solutions involve a dowry. Neither Trinidad nor Barbados

will take on the other islands without a dowry. The third alternative, which is for the Colonial Office to keep the Windward and Leeward Islands, costs money too. So there is no costless solution.

If the Secretary of State considers Trinidad's terms to be unacceptable he should say so as soon as he has heard them; should say so both to Dr. Williams, in the hope of getting him to be more reasonable, and also to Barrow and to Bird, so that they can have some basis for putting up an alternative. Barrow, Bird and Williams are the only three who matter. Anything that the Secretary of State works out with these three will hold.

I do not know whether the enclosed appendix² to my report has reached you yet.

² Not printed.

178 CO 1031/3278, no 187

11 Jan 1962

'The "legality" of Jamaican secession': CO brief no 23 for Mr Maudling's visit to the West Indies

The Secretary of State may be asked why, after the Jamaican referendum, he unilaterally agreed that Jamaica could secede from the Federation without discussing the matter with the Federal and remaining Territorial Governments. The Premier of Barbados has said he wishes to discuss this. Others, including the Federal Government, may also raise it.

2. The result of the referendum was in many ways a surprise both to us and in the West Indies. In fact, relatively little thought had been given to the complex and difficult problems that would have to be faced should Mr. Manley's appeal to the electorate fail. Consequently, the period immediately after 19th September was one of confusion and uncertainty.

3. The Federal Prime Minister brought a delegation to London within a few days of the referendum. Immediately on his heels came Mr. Manley with a Jamaican delegation to demand more or less immediate secession and very early independence.¹ It should be noted that the Federal delegation left London before the Secretary of State saw Mr. Manley's delegation, though Sir Grantley himself stayed over for a few days to talk to Mr. Manley.

4. In an ideal world the timing and circumstances of Jamaica's withdrawal would indeed have properly been decided in consultation with other West Indian Governments concerned. We realised this at the time. It was, however, just not politically possible to insist to Mr. Manley that this was the way we should proceed without provoking a major row with him. He was already on the political defensive in Jamaica, and under the closest scrutiny by Sir Alexander Bustamante for any signs of faltering in withdrawing Jamaica without delay. It was clearly just as important to please Jamaica, which anyway was shortly going to be an independent Commonwealth country, as it was to satisfy the Eastern Caribbean whose political future had so darkened that no man knew what, if anything, their political future would be.

¹ See 165.

5. The commitment finally given to Mr. Manley was that Her Majesty's Government accepted the withdrawal of Jamaica from the Federation and would introduce legislation early in the forthcoming session of Parliament, and would make every effort to ensure that this became law by 31st March, 1962. It was also agreed that Jamaica should proceed to independence in 1962, the date of this to be determined at a Jamaican Constitutional Conference which would take place early in the new year (now beginning 1st February, 1962).

6. It should be noted that this commitment contained an element of possible misunderstanding. Mr. Manley has tended to interpret it as meaning that Jamaican secession will take place before 31st March. We, however, have interpreted it as meaning only that the necessary enabling legislation permitting this to be done will have been passed into law by this date. This difficulty is unlikely to cause any friction, as Mr. Manley now appears to accept that secession will not be possible by 31st March, although he clearly still expects that we will honour the commitment to have the legislation enacted by this date.

7. Our first formal communication to the Federal and Territorial Governments following the referendum was Despatch No.992 of 24th October (Annex A).² The main purpose of this was to inform West Indian Governments that the Secretary of State considered that it was an "inevitable consequence . . . that it is no longer probable that the Federation will be able to proceed to independence on 31st May, 1962."

8. This despatch crossed in the post with the Governor-General's despatch of 17th October (Annex B) containing the Federal Government's protest against the Secretary of State's commitment to Jamaica. This argued "that it would be highly impolitic for the act and timing of Jamaica's secession to be negotiated and decided solely between Her Majesty's Government and the Government of Jamaica without consultation at all stages with the Federal Government and the Governments of the other territories of the Federation."

9. Our reply in Despatch No.1035 of 13th November (Annex C) rejected this protest, but did nevertheless agree that "as far as is practicable" further action in regard to this "should be taken only after consultation with the Federal Government and the nine Territorial Governments". The despatch, however, went on to say that it would not be possible to give an unqualified assurance on this subject, but that the terms of the Bill would in due course be sent to the Federal Government.

10. A further despatch dated 22nd December has now come in (Annex D) which somewhat grudgingly accepts this position, and goes on to say that the Federal Government "would appreciate an assurance that all proposals giving effect to the secession of Jamaica will be communicated to the Federal Government for consideration and, where appropriate, consultation with Eastern Caribbean territorial governments *before* final decisions are agreed between Her Majesty's Government and the Government of Jamaica". We have not yet replied, but there is no reason why an assurance of the kind requested cannot be given.³

² Annexes not printed.

³ Maudling arrived in the West Indies for discussions with the federal and unit governments other than Jamaica on 13 Jan 1962. The day after his arrival the General Council of the PNM in Trinidad approved a resolution rejecting participation in any new East Caribbean Federation and urging that Trinidad and Tobago should proceed to independence forthwith. On 19 Jan the premier of Barbados and the chief ministers of the Leeward and Windward Islands met Maudling and submitted proposals for the dissolution of the existing federation and the formation of a new Federation of the Eight based on the Lewis proposals

(see 177). The S of S reported these developments to the Cabinet Colonial Policy Committee on his return to London and advised that the existing federation should be dissolved as soon as possible. It no longer commanded any substantial support and had long since ceased to be held in respect. Maudling therefore proposed to introduce legislation to provide for dissolution and the creation of an interim organisation (to be based in Barbados under the direction of the governor) to provide for common services. As soon as Trinidad submitted a formal request for independence, a conference would be arranged in London and held in May. It would be necessary to look more closely at the scheme for the Federation of the Eight to ensure that it had a strong central government (CAB 134/1561, CPC(62)5, memo by Maudling, 'Federation of the West Indies', 31 Jan 1962). In discussion, the Colonial Policy Committee agreed that while it would not be practical to withhold the grant of independence to Trinidad, the aim of policy should be to ensure that as many as possible of the smaller islands were grouped with Trinidad in a unitary state. This might bring advantages to Trinidad (the accession of the small islands would counter the growth of Trinidad's Indian population), and to the UK (a unitary state might be financially viable and reduce to some extent the subsidy required to maintain the small territories). A separate Federation of the Eight should not be ruled out but the scheme proposed would require careful examination. There was no question of automatic membership of the Commonwealth for territories in the West Indies, although it had already been decided to support Jamaica's application. The committee recommended that CO and Treasury officials should now study the whole question of financial support for the West Indies in the broader context of persuading the governments of both the US and Canada to accept greater responsibility for a region which was now strategically more important to them than it was to the UK. The committee also considered granting independence to all territories as well as Trinidad and leaving them to decide their own future. This option was ruled out; the UK had a 'moral obligation' to avert the chaos and bankruptcy which might well ensue. It would not be possible to make Trinidad's independence conditional upon Trinidad accepting responsibility for the smaller territories because for all practical purposes Trinidad was independent already. Finally, the committee considered the position of British Honduras, the victim of a recent hurricane. It was no longer possible to think in terms of British Honduras in a federation and there was no prospect of the territory attaining a viable independence. In the longer-term it might be to the advantage of the UK to accept a merger of British Honduras and Guatemala. Present at this meeting were Macmillan (chair), Maudling, Duncan Sandys (CRO), Lord Kilmuir (lord chancellor), Henry Brooke (chief secretary to Treasury, 1961–1962) and Sir Burke Trend (second secretary, Treasury and Cabinet secretary from 1963) (CAB 134/1561, CPC 3(62)1, 2 Feb 1962).

179 CO 1031/4269, no 42

31 Jan 1962

[Jamaican referendum]: letter from Lord Hailes to Mr Maudling on why the referendum was allowed to proceed

I have been thinking of the announcement you will make in the House next week about the future of the Federation.

There are signs that the question of why the Referendum was ever allowed or why thereafter Manley was allowed to proceed with secession may come to be taken up more insistently both here and at home. Gomes, La Corbiniere [sic], and Co., who are boasting about their contacts in the House of Commons, are more than likely to inspire questions, either on your announcement of dissolution—if allowed—on or another occasion. The general object of course is to try and pass the blame.

I think that the line taken about the Referendum has so far been covered under the general umbrella of "It is for West Indians to decide their future for themselves". This is really not quite enough in the face of the more searching questions which may now be asked. After all, West Indians, apart from Jamaicans, were not given any opportunity to express an opinion on something which vitally affected the future of the whole Federation, and which has led to its collapse.

Be that as it may, I myself have always felt that it was not realistic to try and stop

the Referendum once Manley, on 31st May, 1960, announced his intention to hold one.¹ For instance, if any action had been attempted, Busta would have made common cause with Manley on the lines of gross interference in the affairs of a territory enjoying internal self-government. There would have been a great row, but in the result the Referendum would have been held just the same, and Manley's chances might have been impaired.

However, what I think has never been made clear is that H.M.G. was not in fact consulted in any way beforehand. When I inadvertently met Gomes just after his interview with you, it was clear that he believed, or affected to believe, that H.M.G. knew about the idea of a Referendum and, advised by its "representatives" here, decided that it would be a winner and allowed it to go ahead. Gomes appeared to be genuinely surprised when I said that the first I knew about it was from the newspapers. It may well be that the time has come to dissipate an idea which is so far from the truth.

For in fact the monstrous part of it all was Manley's announcement without any prior consultation or even notice to H.M.G., to the Federal Government, or the Governments of any of the territories, about a subject vital to the Federation, apparently on the excuse that this was a domestic matter for Jamaica alone to decide. The first anyone knew of the decision was a headline in the Gleaner on 1st June and a telegram from Jamaica, No. 199 of 31st May to the Secretary of State, repeated to me as No.193, received by Macleod just as he was leaving for Jamaica, giving the text of Manley's announcement to the House of Representatives. (I remember ringing up Blackburne immediately to ask for an explanation of what I said was on any view a reckless gamble with the whole future of Federation. I was assured that "it was all right"—although I was equally told when I next visited Jamaica that it was now far from all right!)

I am wondering whether the time has not come to make the factual position clear, but of course without recrimination. This may well make things easier when our House meets on 12th February, quite apart from the House of Commons, which it is not for me to advise about.

¹ See 126, note.

180 PREM 11/3666

20 Feb 1962

[British Guiana]: letter from Mr Rusk¹ to Lord Home asserting that it is not possible for the US 'to put up with an independent British Guiana under Jagan'. *Minute* by Mr Macmillan

You know from our correspondence in August of last year of my acute concern over the prospects of an independent British Guiana under the leadership of Cheddi Jagan. Subsequent to his victory in the August elections we agreed to try your policy of fostering an effective association between British Guiana and the West, and an Anglo-American working party developed an appropriate program. At our request, safeguards, including consultations about new elections, were included in case

¹ Dean Rusk, US secretary of state, 1961–1969.

matters went awry. In pursuance of this program the President received Jagan on his visit to this country in October. I must tell you now that I have reached the conclusion that it is not possible for us to put up with an independent British Guiana under Jagan. We have had no real success in establishing a basis for understanding with him due in part to his grandiose expectations of economic aid. We have continued to receive disturbing reports of Communist connections on the part of Jagan and persons closely associated with him. Partly reflective of ever growing concern over Cuba, public and congressional opinion here is incensed at the thought of our dealing with Jagan. The Marxist-Leninist policy he professes parallels that of Castro which the OAS at the Punta del Este Conference declared incompatible with the inter-American system. Current happenings in British Guiana indicate Jagan is not master of the situation at home without your support.² There is some resemblance to the events of 1953. Thus, the continuation of Jagan in power is leading us to disaster in terms of the colony itself, strains on Anglo-American relations and difficulties for the inter-American system.

These considerations, I believe, make it mandatory that we concert on remedial steps. I am anxious to have your thoughts on what should be done in the immediate future. In the past your people have held, with considerable conviction, that there was no reasonable alternative to working with Jagan. I am convinced our experience so far, and now the disorders in Georgetown, makes it necessary to re-examine this premise. It seems to me clear that new elections should now be scheduled, and I hope we can agree that Jagan should not accede to power again.

Minute on 180

Foreign Secretary

I have just received a copy of a message to you from Mr. Rusk about British Guiana. I am bound to say I have read it with amazement. One or two phrases are incredible, for instance, "I must tell you now that I have reached the conclusion that it is not possible for us to put up with an independent British Guiana under Jagan" or "It seems to me clear that new elections should now be scheduled and I hope that we can agree that Jagan should not accede to power again". I hope Sir Patrick Dean³ will be given these sentences.

How can the Americans continue to attack us in the United Nations on colonialism and then use expressions like these which are not colonialism but pure Machiavellianism. Of course, it is nice to feel that they are partners with us and have such confidence in you as to send you a letter of this kind but it does show a degree of cynicism which I would have thought Dean Rusk could hardly put his pen to. He, after all, is not an Irishman, nor a politician, nor a millionaire; he has the reputation of being an honourable and somewhat academic figure.

H.M.
21.2.62

² Disturbances had broken out in Georgetown in Feb 1962 after the introduction by the Jagan government of an austerity budget at the end of January, see 185.

³ Permanent UK representative to the UN, 1960–1964; ambassador in Washington, 1965–1969.

181 PREM 11/3666

26 Feb 1962

**[British Guiana]: letter (reply) from Lord Home to Mr Rusk
challenging US policy over British Guiana**

Thank you for your letter on British Guiana.¹ From our past discussions we have known your pre-occupations and you have known the efforts which we have made despite setbacks to provide for the orderly development of this territory. We are studying what best to do now to discharge our responsibilities and when we have decided, we shall be glad to see in a more official way what can be done to concert our action and yours.

Meanwhile there are some general thoughts which I should like to put to you privately and with the same frankness with which you wrote. I do so not only because I think this is right between us, but because you have often shown in the conversations which the two of us have had, that you recognise the sustained efforts over long periods that we have made in our dependent territories to try to ensure that they have a reasonable chance of using and not abusing freedom when they get it. This must depend to a large extent on the progress of each different territory and its readiness to run its own affairs. But once this process has gone as far as it now has, there is bound to be an added risk over timing in the remaining dependent territories which are still either backward or have peculiar racial or other difficulties. This was inherent in the problem from the beginning.

Now it was your historic role to have been for long years the first crusader and the prime mover in urging colonial emancipation. The communists are now in the van. Why? Amongst other things because premature independencies is a gift for them.

What I do not think possible is to beat them by cancelling the ticket for independence and particularly if this is only to be done in the single instance of British Guiana. You say that it is not possible for you "to put up with an independent British Guiana under Jagan" and that "Jagan should not accede to power again". How would you suggest that this can be done in a democracy? And even if a device could be found, it would almost certainly be transparent and in such circumstances if democratic processes are to be allowed, it will be extremely hard to provide a reasonable prospect that any successor regime will be more stable and more mature.

So I would say to you that we cannot now go back on the course we have set ourselves of bringing these dependent territories to self-government. Nor is it any good deluding ourselves that we can now set aside a single territory such as British Guiana for some sort of special treatment.

This of course does not mean that we should not try to mitigate the dangers in British Guiana as elsewhere in the areas of the Americas and elsewhere. You will know our present concern over Kenya, the [Central African] Federation and other territories in East Africa. I take comfort from your letter to think that you will be ready to understand and support us in solving these problems. I do not want to go into them further here. But I should like to draw your attention to another territory in the area of the Americas, British Honduras. It will be difficult enough to provide for the future well-being of this territory. We now have in addition the President of

¹ See 180.

Guatemala using language reminiscent of Hitler to press his claim. "The Guatemalans", he said publicly on February 20, "would maintain their unshakeable determination to regain Belize." As the present regime in Guatemala would hardly have come into being without your support in 1954 and since, I shall be asking you to use your good offices at the right time to prevent another possible misadventure on your doorstep.

Let us by all means try and do what is possible to prevent the communists and others from perverting our common aim of doing our best to assure a timely and orderly development of independence in the remaining dependent territories. But we must do this across the board and you will realise that while territories like British Guiana may be of special concern to you in your hemisphere, there are others of at least equal importance to us elsewhere.

182 PREM 11/3666

12 Mar 1962

[British Guiana]: record by Lord Home of his conversation with Mr Rusk in Geneva

Mr. Rusk said the President had wondered whether the Foreign Secretaries' correspondence¹ had not been a bit "sharp" in tone. I said it was lucky I had not sent my first reply but I hoped he would never hesitate to write to me as frankly and forcefully as he liked and I would do the same. He could reassure the President that this was the normal practice as between Oxford men.

He said the United States were really terrified of another Cuba on their continent. All the South American states joined with the United States in hoping that we could find ways and means of stopping Dr. Jagan from taking his country into the Communist orbit. How could the United States and others help to prevent this [?]

I said I thought that the first thing was for Hugh Fraser to see the President. The second for us to consider Fraser's report² and in the light of that to decide a line on the politics of independence. I did not see how we could delay it all that long.

I added that British Guiana and British Honduras were likely to be embarrassments to us. Could they not be integrated somehow into the O.A.S.

If Dr. Jagan was very poor perhaps there might be a price. I said we would keep in touch with them on these matters in Washington.

¹ See 180 and 181.

² After his visit to British Guiana, see 184.

183 CO 1031/3509, no 12B

19 Mar 1962

[Federal finance]: minute by Sir H Poynton to Mr Maudling on whether the UK should contribute forty per cent of the federal deficit in dissolving the federation

[The Treasury had rejected this proposal on the grounds that it represented an 'open-ended commitment'. Federal assets and liabilities were as yet unknown quantities and it was, according to Brooke, chief secretary to the Treasury, 'most undesirable to make a financial undertaking where the size of our commitment is to some extent at the mercy of

those who will benefit from it' (CO 1031/3509, no 12D, Brooke to Maudling, 15 Mar 1962). Within the CO, Thomas calculated federal assets at £1 million, and federal liabilities at £1 million for compensation (less if federal officials were absorbed in unit services) and a pensions liability of £42,000 per annum or £500,000 if funded. Thomas based the CO's case for a UK contribution to the federal deficit on the grounds (a) that it would not be possible to dissolve the federation without making satisfactory arrangements for compensation and pensions, and (b) that it would equally not be possible to establish an interim organisation to manage common services (*ibid*, no 12C, minute by Thomas, 16 Mar 1962). This was an issue over which the Treasury eventually relented.]

Secretary of State

You may like to have my comments on Mr. Thomas's minute to me about the Treasury's rejection of the proposal that H.M.G. should contribute 40% of any West Indian Federal deficit involved in the winding up of the Federation. (A copy of Mr. Thomas's minute has been sent direct to Mr. Howard-Drake.) I find myself in some difficulty in dealing with this matter because, as I think you know, I am not really convinced that we have a strong case at all here. My view has always been that we ought not to accept any liability simply because the West Indies are unwilling to pay but that we should limit ourselves to being prepared to rally round with grants-in-aid in any case where a Unit Government is unable to pay. I cannot help asking myself how far it really matters to the United Kingdom if (a) local officers of the Federal Service go uncompensated, and (b) if unification of the Common Services broke down. The former is definitely a West Indian responsibility and is somewhat analogous to the position of the non-designated officers in East Africa. As to the latter the continuation or non-continuation of the Common Services is really one which affects the West Indies themselves. If they do not want to keep this service together is there any reason why the British taxpayer should bribe them into doing so? Moreover I am not myself entirely convinced that these consequences would necessarily follow from our taking a tough line. This matter is following the very common West Indian pattern of negotiation.

First they invent an assumption for which there is no justification, secondly they say they were misled by H.M.G. into that assumption, next there is a commitment on H.M.G. and finally a breach of faith by H.M.G.

However, assuming that it is your decision that we should try and help then we must consider the relative importance of this particular proposal in relation to a number of other financial propositions that we have to negotiate with the Treasury. In particular I would list:—

- (1) The proposed loan of £7¼ million for the local share for the E.A.C.S.O. compensation scheme.
- (2) Approximately £1 million for the Delamere recommendations in Kenya.¹
- (3) The Kenya lands proposals which may well run into between £35 million and £40 million over some ten years.²

¹ Money allocated to guarantee the price of land in Kenya which had plummeted following the decision to advance Kenya's independence.

² A reference to that part of the pre-independence negotiations in Kenya which opened up the white-held 'large farm sector' to African farmers, the largest being the 'million acre' scheme of 1962 with HMC compensating white farmers.

(4) An almost certain increase for Malta to offset the consequences of the Defence White Paper.

(5) Always in the background lurks the horrors of Central Africa. At this very moment we are about to start financial talks with Nyasaland on their development plan; we are likely to be asked for about £10 million or more. If Federation has to be dissolved, Nyasaland will in addition need a grant-in-aid from the United Kingdom which would probably have to be of the order of £3 to 4 million a year.

Against this distasteful menu I am bound to say the West Indian proposal does not seem to me to rank very high. I realise there is not much money involved but I do feel that to press it in the teeth of Treasury opposition would prejudice our success with other far more important negotiations.

184 PREM 11/3666

20 Mar 1962

[British Guiana]: note by Mr Fraser to Mr Maudling on his conversations with President Kennedy and US officials in Washington

I had formal meetings with the President, Alexis Johnson¹ and officials of the State Department and informal conversations with Mr. McCone, Head of the C.I.A.,² Bobby Kennedy,³ the Attorney-General and Governor Stevenson,⁴ the U.S. Ambassador at the U.N. The conversations were of course exploratory in so far as H.M.G.'s policy has not yet been decided and I pointed out to all that naturally H.M.G. could not be committed by a somewhat mysterious exercise in which I talked to them before I talked to my own Secretary of State.

2. The fact that the President gave me more than two hours of his time and that the others showed such a keen interest makes it clear that the problem of B.G. in American eyes is regarded as one of critical importance. The object of my talks were:—

- (i) to tone down any excitement caused by the Rusk/Home exchange of letters;⁵
- (ii) to get the Americans to accept our policy of a fairly swift withdrawal from B.G. as the best; and
- (iii) to endeavour to change the American attitude in two fashions:—
 - (a) to damp down the importance of British Guiana, and
 - (b) to abandon their present policy of boycotting the Jagan Government and reneging on the various pledges of aid which the Americans made to Jagan during his visit to Washington.

3. Quite apart from the problem with Congress who are now using B.G. as a crowbar with which to attack the foreign aid programme, Washington opinion is deeply divided on the issue of help to B.G. (It is interesting to note however that McCone, not a brilliant but an entirely honest man, assured me the C.I.A. were

¹ US deputy under-secretary of state for political affairs.

² J A McCone, head of CIA.

³ Robert Kennedy, US attorney general, brother of President J F Kennedy.

⁴ Adlai E Stevenson, US permanent representative to UN.

⁵ See 180 and 181.

taking no convert action in the Territory.)⁶ The "soft" school is led by the President, Arthur Schlesinger⁷ and, needless to say, Adlai Stevenson, with the Attorney and some of the State Department in a half-way position. What matters, however, is the President's attitude and on my second meeting with him and on leaving him he said he felt that the Aid Mission should go down and Schlesinger, whom I saw later in the day, was of the opinion that the State Department should look very seriously at the project of offering immediate aid or at least some financial facilities towards the reconstruction of Georgetown.⁸

4. I think therefore it would be best to describe how this shift or partial shift in the American attitude to make them offer assistance to a man whom they regard not as a communist so much as the Castro-type surrounded by communists, has been achieved. Perhaps for this purpose I should stress the various changes in British policy which I believe the situation calls for.

5. In my opinion the problems of British Guiana are dangerous in the following order:—

- (i) Racial.
- (ii) Economic.
- (iii) The threat of communist penetration.

I believe that to proceed to independence with the present Constitution and with only 42% of the voters being behind Jagan and without new safeguards would not be morally acceptable. These new safeguards must be of a constitutional character. I think we will find both D'Aguiar and Burnham will press resolutely for a system of proportional representation and I think further that any safeguard which is written in, whether it be P.R. or a Senate, must have an electoral validation of its own. Therefore, I believe that fresh elections in British Guiana are inevitable. This of course I have not put authoritatively to the Americans, but I have said that the Constitutional Conference is almost certain to break down and that we will be faced with imposing or negotiating a constitution which will entail safeguards which will almost certainly mean some new electoral provision whether in the Senate or in the Lower House. This, I hope I have made clear to them, must flow not from us but from the demands of the British Guianese themselves.

6. Until now I think the Americans have been toying with the idea that somehow Burnham and D'Aguiar could oust the Jagan Government. I think also they have believed in some mysterious way that time was on the side of Burnham and D'Aguiar. I think I have made it clear to them that over the next ten years the Portuguese will remain a minority and the Africans will become one, and that therefore their policy must be whilst helping minorities to look to the Indians as the centre of power to concentrate on weening Jagan and the moderates away from the communist apparat. This is run, I think, by Mrs. Jagan, and I hope I have made it clear that a line can be drawn between these types of international communists and what I would call the anti-colonial type of communist which as I pointed out to them Jefferson⁹ might well have been if the communist manifesto had been written in 1748 instead of 100 years later.

⁶ cf 185, note 4, para 2.

⁷ Arthur Schlesinger Jnr, professor of history, Harvard University, 1954–1961; special assistant to President Kennedy, 1961–1963.

⁸ After the Feb 1962 disturbances, see 185.

⁹ Thomas Jefferson (1743–1826), premier philosopher of US democracy: US president, 1801–1809.

7. Having, I think, sold the ideas to the Americans that British Guiana was really now more their responsibility than ours and would increasingly become more so, I agreed with the State Department that we should keep in the closest touch. The following points of policy I think should therefore be decided:—

(i) We should consult with the Governor as to when the American Mission should come down to have the maximum effect recognising that aid money may not be forthcoming until the end of June or July. To balance this probability we should like his recommendations as to what form a more immediate U.S. assistance to the rebuilding of Georgetown should take.

(ii) We should send out a Constitutional Adviser to assist the Governor in his talks with the leaders of the Political Parties as to the form of independence Constitution which would offer adequate safeguards. I think this is most important to keep the talks in being. This Constitutional Adviser should also for our part consider what sort of independence Constitution we should aim at achieving.

(iii) We should I think keep to the May date for the opening of a Constitutional Conference. But this, because of deadlock in the Governor's Committee and the report of the Commission of Enquiry, could reasonably be degraded to preliminary Constitutional talks and these could probably be done locally by me.

(iv) This having broken down, we would summon a further Constitutional Conference in London in July. At this stage we would make proposals to safeguard minority interests.

(v) From this would flow some form of election whether to a Senate or on the basis of proportional representations. Following the elections there might have to be a further conference if the electoral safeguards had to be imposed to decide a date for independence early next year, a financial settlement, etc.

(vi) Having decided our general line of policy, we should have discussions at Ambassadorial level, and inform the United States Government of our broad lines of policy and the most propitious time for the action they may be or are contemplating.

8. I have discussed this minute with the Department who agree with the general line I have taken.

185 CAB 134/1561, CPC(62)13

3 Apr 1962

**'Recent developments in British Guiana': memorandum by
Mr Maudling for Cabinet Colonial Policy Committee on disturbances
in Georgetown and the appointment of commission of inquiry¹**

[Just before the disturbances one company of the Royal Hampshire Regiment in British Guiana had been brought up to strength. A sister company from the same regiment stationed in Jamaica was moved to British Guiana in February and three more companies, two of the 1st East Anglia Regiment and one of the 1st Duke of Edinburgh Regiment, were flown in from the UK. The British naval presence consisted of five frigates, one of

¹ From this point until independence in 1966, the future of British Guiana was seldom off the agenda of the Colonial Policy Committee or of its successors, the Oversea Policy Committee (from the end of June 1962) and the Defence and Oversea Policy Committee (from 22 Oct 1963).

which, HMS *Trowbridge*, provided a communications link with London because Cable and Wireless in Georgetown ceased to function when the heat from surrounding burning buildings forced staff to evacuate the central telegraph office. The February disturbances took their toll of Governor Grey. He confessed himself 'depressed' about his inability to suggest a way forward. Jagan, he said, saw no need for a political solution. He was in power with an elected majority and with British troops to give him practical security. 'All he needs now is money and he expects the rest of the world to give it to him'. The opposition parties in the colony had committed themselves to 'unlawful attempts' to bring him down. 'We thus have the absurdity that Jagan, though incompetent, is legally right and the Opposition are legally wrong and British troops are here to uphold the law' (CO 1031/4028, no 35, inward tel no 54, Grey to CO, via Admiralty, 21 Feb 1962). The outbreak of the disturbances occasioned Rusks's letter to Home (see 180). Within the CO, R W Piper concluded that Rusk was probably right in saying that Jagan's continuation in power was leading to disaster for British Guiana, a strain on Anglo-American relations and difficulties for the inter-American system. However, Piper continued: 'Having said that, I think it is also true that the Americans bear a load of responsibility for what has happened in British Guiana. The cause of the trouble stems from Dr. Jagan's budget proposals. Dr. Jagan's Government was faced with a deficit in 1962 on the recurrent account of about \$7 million, and on their development expenditure there was an even greater shortage. The Compulsory Savings Scheme was introduced specifically to raise funds for development and it seems to me that had the Americans come forward with any moderate measure of financial aid following Dr. Jagan's visit to Washington last year that particular unpopular proposal in the budget might not have been put forward. The Americans have, in fact, done nothing concrete to help British Guiana since Jagan's Government came in last September' (*ibid*, minute by Piper, 21 Feb 1962).]

In C.P.C. (61)32 I proposed to hold an Independence Conference in May of this year to discuss the date and arrangements for British Guiana's independence.² I so informed Dr. Jagan on the 12th January. On the 16th February, following a week of demonstrations and a general strike, serious disturbances broke out in Georgetown, the capital, resulting in the loss of four lives, many injuries, and substantial material damage. Part of the business area of Georgetown was burnt to the ground, and estimates of the damage caused by fire and looting run as high as £7 million. The proximate cause of the riots was the introduction of a budget on the 31st January, which imposed considerable taxation increases and introduced a scheme under which anybody earning over £20 a month would have had to contribute 5% (rising to 10% in the higher income brackets) in compulsory savings.

2. The disturbances were such as to make necessary the appointment of a Commission of Enquiry into their causes and the events leading up to them. This Commission's report will be relevant to the consideration of British Guiana's future, with particular reference to British Guiana Government's capacity to maintain law and order without outside assistance. The disturbances have also left a legacy of bitterness and non-co-operation between the three political leaders which threatens to jeopardise the territory's orderly progress to independence. With my colleagues' agreement I therefore sent the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies to British Guiana to investigate the position.

3. During his visit the Parliamentary Under-Secretary persuaded the British Guiana Government not to seek the appointment of a Commission of Enquiry through the United Nations, but to invite Her Majesty's Government to appoint one whose membership would be drawn from the Commonwealth. Her Majesty has since been pleased to make the British Guiana (Commissions of Enquiry) Order in Council 1962, empowering me to appoint such a Commission of Enquiry. The Governments

² See 175.

of India and Ghana have agreed to nominate members to this Commission and await the nomination of the United Kingdom Chairman before submitting the names of their nominees. I hope that it will be possible for the Commission to begin its work soon after the middle of April. It is unlikely that the Commission could present its report in less than a month i.e. before towards the end of May.

4. The Parliamentary Under-Secretary also succeeded in persuading the three political leaders to form a working party under the Governor's chairmanship, to work out as far as possible agreed proposals for British Guiana's Independence Constitution, and to delimit their areas of disagreement. This working party has already held one meeting and I hope that sufficient progress will be made by it during the next six weeks to indicate how much agreement exists on the future form of British Guiana's Constitution. It is, however, very doubtful whether the fundamental differences will have been resolved by May.

5. It is important to allow sufficient time for the local talks between the political leaders. I shall also need adequate time to consider what emerges from them. We certainly do not want an abortive Conference. In any case it seems essential to me that the Commission of Enquiry should present its report before the Independence Conference opens, so that it may be available to the Conference. I therefore consider that it will be necessary to put back the holding of the substantive independence talks. The first opportunity after May will arise in July. The British Guiana Government is aware of this possibility but no public mention has been made of it at this stage. Dr. Jagan's Government has so committed itself to achieving independence by the end of this year that it would politically be very difficult for it to accept a straight postponement. Nor would it be to our advantage simply to announce a postponement from May without specifying a new date, given the close United Nations' interest in British Guiana. I would propose, therefore, that the Parliamentary Under-Secretary should again visit British Guiana in May for further constitutional discussions with the three political leaders. The main purpose of these would be to take stock of the progress made up to that time and to avoid having to say that we are altogether postponing a May conference. After these discussions, during which progress should be made in settling outstanding differences, any further meeting would be adjourned until about the middle of July, by which time the report of the Commission of Enquiry should have been received and digested, and detailed constitutional proposals worked out. I do not however envisage that there should be any substantial postponement of independence for British Guiana, which might be expected in the new circumstances to follow in early or mid-1963. I should like my colleagues' agreement to this course proposed in this paragraph.

6. During his stay the Parliamentary Under-Secretary also discussed with the Governor and the military Commander the reduction of the garrison in the Colony, which at the time of his visit stood at five rifle companies. He reached agreement that the garrison could be reduced forthwith by two rifle companies, and these have since been moved. A further company will leave British Guiana when the 1st Battalion of the Royal Hampshire Regiment, which is at present stationed in Jamaica, and provides part of the British Guiana garrison, leaves the Caribbean for BAOR.

7. After leaving British Guiana, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary paid an informal visit to Washington, where he had the opportunity of meeting the President, and emphasising both the dangers of over-estimating the importance of what happens in British Guiana, and the need for the Americans to make a real

contribution to British Guiana's economic development.³ I think that these discussions served a useful purpose in putting British Guiana into perspective in American eyes; it now remains to be seen whether the Americans will be more forthcoming as regards aid to British Guiana.

8. The Americans are still very exercised about the political complexion of Dr. Jagan's Government. Moreover the recent disturbances in Georgetown may have begun a shift in political loyalties in British Guiana. There is local unease about Dr. Jagan's future policy, which finds expression in demands for entrenched safeguards (for which there is a strong case for the interests of minority races) and a move to alter the present electoral system to one based on proportional representation as likely the more accurately to reflect the strengths of the political parties. At the last elections Dr. Jagan's party polled only 42% of the votes cast. Although in normal circumstances it would hardly be appropriate to press for fresh elections, seeing that the last ones were held as recently as August 1961, I am coming to the view that, taking all the above factors into consideration, it would be desirable to hold fresh elections in the Colony before it finally becomes independent. This would of course be welcome to the Americans. How to achieve this objective with local agreement remains to be worked out, but I should like to know that I have my colleagues support in this policy.

9. To sum up, I should be grateful for my colleagues' agreement that:—

(a) the substantive Independence Conference should not take place before the report of the Commission of Enquiry into the Georgetown disturbances is available, and progress has been made in removing the differences between the three Guianese political leaders on the form of the independence constitution; but the Parliamentary Under-Secretary should hold constitutional discussions locally in May;

(b) we should continue to press the Americans to make a material contribution to British Guiana's economic development; and

(c) I should aim at securing general agreement on the part of the Guianese political leaders to the holding of fresh elections before independence.⁴

³ See 184.

⁴ In July 1962 Maudling reported back to the Oversea Policy Committee that an independence conference would have to be delayed because the report of the commission of inquiry into the February disturbances would not be available until August. Maudling's memo also considered the question of whether the UK should support an application by British Guiana for Commonwealth membership. The arguments against were (a) the country was too small; (b) it would be dependent on aid for many years to come; (c) it was unstable because of the racial conflict; (d) Jagan and the PPP had communist leanings; (e) instability might lead to an embarrassing request for British troops after independence. The arguments in favour were (a) the UK had never yet failed to sponsor a territory for membership; (b) some of the more recent admissions rendered the argument about size redundant; (c) to 'cold-shoulder' Jagan would be to drive him into the arms of Castro or Khrushchev—'my impression is that Dr. Jagan is an unpractical idealistic nationalist devoted to Marxist economics rather than a dedicated Communist'; (d) as a member of the Commonwealth the country would be more likely to look west than east for aid; (e) there seemed to be a genuine attachment to the Crown in the population at large; (f) India and Ghana would oppose any attempt to keep British Guiana out; (g) the US was anxious that the Commonwealth connection should be maintained. On balance, therefore, Maudling recommended that an application should be supported (CAB 134/2370, OP(62)8, 'British Guiana', memo by Maudling, 12 July 1962). The report of the commission of inquiry, chaired by Sir H Parry, was released in Oct 1962. It found that the January budget was not a threat to the economy of the country, or to capital investment, and that 'the real origin of the riots lay in political rivalries and jealousies which had finally found expression in the criminal acts of a few groups of

hooligans' (*Report of a Commission of Inquiry into Disturbances in British Guiana in February 1962*, Col 354, 1962, p 50).

On the same day that Maudling circulated his views to the Oversea Policy Committee about British Guiana and the Commonwealth, Dean Rusk sent a memo to President Kennedy on US policy towards the territory which concluded: 'In the light of all the evidence that has now accumulated, I believe we are obliged to base our policy on the premise that, once independent, Cheddi Jagan will establish a "Marxist" regime in British Guiana and associate his country with the Soviet Bloc to a degree unacceptable to us for a state in the Western Hemisphere. Such a development would have severe adverse affects in the foreign relations field and obvious undesirable repercussions in this country' (*Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963*, vol XII, *American Republics* (Washington, 1996) pp 575–576.) McGeorge Bundy, Kennedy's special assistant for national security affairs, commented that Rusk's analysis in favour of getting rid of Jagan had 'more energy than most State Department papers'. He agreed that Jagan would 'go the way of Castro'; he was weaker than Castro because he was more inefficient but this would make it easier for Moscow to control him. But while the case against supporting Jagan, or even trying to sustain peaceful co-existence with him, was clear, 'the case for the proposed tactics to be used in opposing him is not so clear. In particular, I think it is unproven that the CIA knows how to manipulate an election in British Guiana without backfire' (*ibid*, p 577, Bundy memo to Kennedy, 13 July 1962).

186 CAB 134/1561, CPC(62)12

4 Apr 1962

'The future of British Honduras': joint memorandum for Cabinet
Colonial Policy Committee by Lord Home and Mr Maudling. *Annex*

[Extract]

Anglo–Guatemalan talks, to discuss practical measures for a reduction of the tensions which have recently prejudiced relations between the two countries, are due to be held in San Juan, Puerto Rico on April 16, 1962. A meeting of this kind was first proposed by the Guatemalan Foreign Minister during his visit to London in May 1961. The background to these talks is as follows. It had been hoped that the ultimate future of British Honduras lay within the West Indian Federation. The Federation having collapsed, there are now only the following courses open to British Honduras:—

(a) *An indefinite continuation of the status quo*. This is not practical politics in the long run, if only for the following reasons. Politically, it is anachronistic to maintain a colony on the American continent in the 1960's: its existence complicates Her Majesty's Government's relations with all the Latin American States (who are passionately anti-colonial), and particularly with those in Central America. Indirectly, this also has repercussions on our relations with the United States. Militarily, the maintenance of a garrison in British Honduras is a commitment which we ought to shed as soon as possible. Financially, British Honduras costs Her Majesty's Government half a million pounds per annum simply to balance the budget. Added to these general disadvantages is our long-standing dispute with Guatemala, which is costing us about £1 million per annum in lost trade already and, if the Guatemalan Government decides to break relations with us, could lead to the loss of substantial British assets as well.

(b) *A merger with Guatemala*. The great majority of the population of British Honduras are believed to be opposed to union with Guatemala. Only among the so called "Ladinos" is there believed to be support for union with Guatemala. Mr. Price (leader of the Peoples' [sic] United Party and First Minister) abandoned this

cause because it no longer seemed to command majority support. Moreover Guatemala is an inefficiently administered and poverty stricken state dependent on the United States for budgetary as well as development aid: it is also governed at present by an unstable and highly "personalist" form of Government which could hardly be called democratic. Her Majesty's Government could not follow a course which led to the unfortunate British Hondurans being linked indissolubly with such a country against the will of a majority of them. The Mexicans maintain that their claim is superior to that of the Guatemalans, although they do not press it with us, and they have always made clear that they could not accept anything like a merger between British Honduras and Guatemala.

(c) *Some form of independence.* There are virtually no visible prospects of the territory becoming economically viable, unless incorporated within some larger economic framework. Nevertheless, it is tacitly accepted in British Honduras that in fact independence is our goal, and if other Latin Americans do not give Guatemala more support it is because they have come to believe this too. The Guatemalans themselves probably believe that we have conceded the principle of independence.

2. What is needed is a formula which fulfils the following requirements:—

(a) Her Majesty's Government are relieved as soon as practicable of their commitment to defend and give full financial support to British Honduras;

(b) Guatemala's aspirations to see British Honduras associated closely with Central America and so with her are satisfied far enough to enable our relations to return to normal.

(c) An alternative source for British Honduras financial needs is provided;

(d) British Honduras is given adequate protection against Guatemala's old ambition to annex the territory.

(e) Mexican susceptibilities are satisfied.

3. *The proposed solution*

These requirements could, be met as follows:—

(a) The time is not far distant when we should be considering a further constitutional advance in British Honduras. It is proposed that talks should be held in 1963 between Her Majesty's Government and British Honduras leaders with a view to settling the next stage of advance. It is possible that the present British Honduras Government will be in no hurry thereafter to press for full internal self-government (if that is not granted as a result of the 1963 talks) or independence. But it will appear to all in the Americas that these are likely to follow. Further Guatemalan efforts to continue to treat British Honduras as a lost province will therefore carry less conviction.

(b) On the assumption that British Honduras would eventually attain independence she should at that stage, if it were the wish of the people, be admitted on to:—

(i) ODECA (The Organisation of Central American States) and to the parallel economic grouping, which is an embryonic Common Market set up by a series of treaties culminating in the General Treaty for Central American Economic Integration of December, 1960. If the British Hondurans agreed, we should also support any proposal for British Honduras to be admitted if possible as an associate member of ODECA prior to independence.

(ii) The Organisation of American States, in which as an independent, even if small, Latin American state, British Honduras would naturally qualify for aid under the Alliance for Progress programme.

4. By providing for the territory's association with the growing movement for economic and political integration in Central America and by visualising an end to its colonial status these proposals would remove most of the driving force from Guatemala's efforts to annex it. If these nevertheless persisted, membership of the O.A.S. would give the territory the guarantees against aggression which are enjoyed by all other members and which have proved effective, particularly in Central America. Financially, the current budgetary deficit and development requirements would best be covered by aid received within the general framework of the Alliance for Progress. The source for this aid would of course be the United States. Although there is strong congressional feeling against using Alliance for Progress funds for shoring up Latin American deficits, the fact remains that the United States are still, as they have for many years past, providing budgetary aid for many Latin American Governments, including that of Guatemala itself. Aid for British Honduras would not be an obligation which either the O.A.S. or the United States in particular could easily avoid: all members of the O.A.S. including the United States (*pace* their views on British Guiana) have never left any doubt about what they feel on the subject of the continued existence of colonies, particularly on the American continent, and all are wedded to the principle of self-determination on which the whole scheme would rest.

5. There are other reasons why the United States Government may be expected to welcome a solution to the British Honduras dispute, even if it increased (slightly in relation to the total) their existing commitments under the Alliance for Progress programme. The dispute is embarrassing to them since they owe loyalties both to Guatemala as an O.A.S. partner and to us. If the Guatemalans went to desperate lengths as they have threatened to do and Her Majesty's Government had to defend the colony by force, or if the Guatemalans created a situation which enabled them to appeal to the United Nations, both parties would appeal to the United States who would then be in an impossible position, both at the United Nations and in the O.A.S. The United States would almost certainly prefer to provide the necessary aid through the Alliance for Progress to British Honduras as an additional member of the O.A.S. than direct in response to an appeal from us; the latter course could raise insuperable constitutional and political obstacles and would in any case imply a direct transfer to the United States of our status as the Colonial power.

6. These proposals do not prejudice, one way or the other, the question of future membership in the Commonwealth for British Honduras. The Working Party on the Future of the Commonwealth has reported that British Honduras is one territory for which a solution other than full independence within the Commonwealth may be possible. But the proposals do not make impossible future membership of the Commonwealth if this was the wish of the British Honduras.

7. It is proposed that at the talks with the Guatemalan Government the United Kingdom Delegation should be guided by a brief on the lines of the attached draft, particularly in regard to paragraphs 7 to 10 thereof. Subject to the agreement of our colleagues we therefore recommend that:—

(a) The leader of the British delegation at the forthcoming talks should have authority to outline proposals for constitutional advances in British Honduras as

indicated in paragraph 3 above, and to speak in general terms about the future of the territory along the lines indicated in paragraphs 7–10 of the attached draft brief.

(b) The United States Government should be informed (but not consulted) about the proposals outlined in this memorandum and in the draft brief for the possible future association of British Honduras with the states of Central America and with the O.A.S.

(c) A similar communication should be made to the Mexican government.

Annex to 186: Paragraphs 7–10 of the brief for the UK delegation at the Anglo-Guatemalan talks

...

U.K. proposals

7. At this stage, the United Kingdom Delegation, after rebutting unacceptable Guatemalan claims and proposals, should say that for the information of the Guatemalan Government, Her Majesty's Government see the future of British Honduras as follows. It is, as stated, impossible to pre-judge the future of the Colony. However, assuming that the orderly process of constitutional evolution continues, it is Her Majesty's Government's hope that, if British Honduras Ministers agree, talks will be held in 1963 with a view to settling the next stage of constitutional advance. As regards a final political settlement, it will of course be for the people of British Honduras to consider the form of settlement they desire. It would be pointless to try to predict now what that will be. The inhabitants of British Honduras may very well choose to seek full independence; it is well known that Her Majesty's Government regard such requests as the natural fulfilment of their colonial policy. If in these circumstances British Honduras does seek independence, the overriding problem against which the decision will have to be made will be that of economic viability. In bringing forward Colonial territories to independence, Her Majesty's Government seek to ensure that their economies are viable or can be made so in a relatively short time. This poses a particular problem in relation to British Honduras. For not only is that country entirely dependent on external aid for its development expenditure, but it is also dependent on grant assistance from the United Kingdom in order to balance its annual recurrent budget. It will obviously be unable to make ends meet on recurrent account without external aid for some years to come. Before embarking on independence, British Honduras would want to be assured that it would be able to count on satisfactory and thoroughly dependable arrangements for the provision of this special assistance for as long as it were necessary.

8. If proposals were advanced which would lead to replacing British Honduras' present financial relationship with Her Majesty's Government by financial dependence on some other country, this could not be regarded among the opponents of colonialism as any improvement on the present practice. British Honduras has historic links with Britain. It may be that after a final constitutional settlement, British Honduras will always wish to maintain some special relationship with the U.K. Correspondingly, Her Majesty's Government believes that an independent British Honduras situated on the mainland of Latin America should be able to turn

with confidence to the Latin American countries and particularly to her other American neighbours for support.

9. Her Majesty's Government would think it appropriate if both the O.A.S. and the Organisation of Central American States (O.D.E.C.A.) could give consideration to the future relationship of British Honduras with themselves. This need surely not await the attaining of full independence of British Honduras? Her Majesty's Government understand that the Charters of neither the O.A.S. nor O.D.E.C.A. provide for associate membership; but Her Majesty's Government would be glad, assuming that British Honduras Ministers so wish, if those bodies were to examine ways in which British Honduras might be associated with them, preparatory to full memberships in the period prior to a final constitutional settlement. Collective help, provided through such organs in the O.A.S. as the Inter-American Development Bank or through such United Nations agencies as the International Development Authority would be the surest way to avoid the danger mentioned in paragraph 8. Her Majesty's Government would also think it appropriate that the O.A.S. should consider ways in which they might in due time be able to help the government of an independent British Honduras to overcome its financial difficulties both on development account and in the matter of its annual recurrent deficit.

Proposals for a modus vivendi

10. A declaration on these lines would enable the Delegation effectively to counter any Guatemalan offer (however spurious) of substantial aid to British Honduras. But since an *ex parte* statement on these lines cannot easily be discussed with the Guatemalans there may at this point be a danger that the talks would break down. The Guatemalans are for their part, also likely to repeat proposals which the Delegation could not entertain. They are indeed bound to do their best to keep discussion alive on this subject for as long as possible, if only for the sake of the record. We should do what we can to meet them in this understandable aim. However, a point will sooner or later be reached at which the delegation will have to state that further progress on these lines does not appear at this stage to be possible; and urge that further study should be made of the relations between an independent British Honduras and Latin American states. At this point the Delegation might submit that the E.C.L.A. Secretariat be invited to put into effect the resolutions passed at the Ninth Session in 1961 requesting the Secretariat to explore ways of associating British Honduras with the Central American Committee on Economic Integration. The Delegation should then suggest that the parties should now consider ways of achieving a *modus vivendi* in the period up to a final constitutional settlement in British Honduras. . . .¹

¹ At the talks in Puerto Rico the UK delegation was led by Lord Dundee, minister of state at the FO. British Honduras was represented by Price and W H Courtenay, a lawyer and speaker of the Legislative Assembly. The Guatemalan delegation was led by Senor Viteri, president of the Guatemalan Congress Foreign Affairs Committee. At the outset Dundee stated that the UK would not hinder British Honduras deciding its own future or uniting with Guatemala if it so desired. Realising that British Honduras would not opt for union with Guatemala, Viteri, in Dundee's account of the talks, refused to agree to any communiqué mentioning either self-government or independence. Instead he fell back on the argument that British Honduras could never be economically viable and that self-determination for a territory with a population of only 90,000 had no meaning. Viteri proposed that British Honduras should eventually become part of a Central American Federation and that as a first step there should be a transitional regime in which British Honduras and Guatemala would be politically associated while preparing to join the federation together (CAB 21/5296, report by Dundee, nd, c 25 Apr 1962).

187 CAB 134/1561, CPC(62)14

6 Apr 1962

'Federation of the Eight': memorandum by Mr Maudling for Cabinet Colonial Policy Committee. *Annex*

I attach a background paper, putting forward detailed proposals for handling the report of the recent Conference of Ministers from Barbados and the Leeward and Windward Islands, in which they have recommended the setting up of a "Federation of the Eight."

2. The arrangements which the West Indian Ministers propose for a Federation are basically similar to those for the present Federation. There would be a Governor-General, a Senate, a Federal House of Representatives (of about 20 members, of whom 6 would be from Barbados), and a Federal Supreme Court. There would be Queen's Representatives in each of the units, and each unit would have a legislature and a ministerial form of government as at present, though the number of Ministers might be slightly reduced. The units would have full internal self-government. The new Federal Government, however, would have greater powers than the present one by having its own sources of revenue, derived in the first instance from customs and excise duties, currency profits and postal services, and (after five years) from income tax. It would also have concurrent powers, with Federal law prevailing, over loans, banking, labour and industrial development. There would be freedom of movement of persons within the Federation. The Conference appear to envisage the early grant of independence to this Federation shortly after it has been set up. The most unusual feature of their proposals is that on the strength of some calculations put forward by Professor Arthur Lewis, they appear to envisage making do with external aid of only £1.76 million a year as compared with the present level of external aid from the United Kingdom which is in the region of £3 million per annum, (though appearances in this respect may be deceptive, and, once they have got us to accept their plans for Federation, they may well come back to us with more ambitious plans for assistance.) They recommend that grant in aid should taper by 15% per annum over the next five years and should, in effect, cease in 1968.

3. The attached paper suggests that there are three courses open to Her Majesty's Government:—

(a) The first is that we should reject any possibility of setting up a Federation of the Eight. It is suggested that such a course could have only two possible consequences. The first is that we should be saddled with eight separate little island units for an indefinite period into the future. The second possibility is that the units might seriously consider accepting Trinidad's offer to join Trinidad in a unitary state. If the units remain under our direct control I fear that, in view of their being grant-aided and of the accumulating evidence of the way they are mismanaging their own affairs, I shall have to take back some of the constitutional powers which have been granted to these islands in recent years. This is likely to be an unpopular course which may lead to trouble. On the other hand, I do not think the idea of these territories joining with Trinidad in a unitary state in the immediate future has much chance of success. Trinidad is facing serious internal difficulties of its own, both political and financial, and it would take over some of the Leeward and Windward Islands from us now only at a price which we should

not be prepared to pay. I am not therefore in favour of rejecting the proposals of the Federation of the Eight out of hand.

(b) The second course is that we should accept the proposals put forward to us by the Conference as a basis of discussion. The attractions of this course are first that it should be easy to secure agreement, secondly that we could move ahead fairly rapidly, and thirdly that the Governments *appear* to be ready to settle for external assistance from the United Kingdom on a scale lower than that which we are giving at present. I suggest that if we accept this course, we should agree to the Federation moving to independence as quickly as possible and almost as soon as it is set up, despite the fact that they will have to remain for some time in receipt of grant in aid. My reason for making this suggestion is that under these proposals I shall have no power whatever to put to rights the maladministration which is taking place in the small islands and, having no power, I might as well be rid of the responsibility. In my view, however, the financial irresponsibility and administrative incompetence of most of the units is such that to accept the kind of Federation proposed by the Little Eight, together with their other terms, would mean that they would go rapidly downhill both politically and economically in a comparatively short time.

(c) The third possibility is that we should put forward counter-proposals of our own for a Federation in which the Federal Government would be very much stronger than that proposed in the Conference Report. Indeed it would in all but name be a unitary state. To take this course would be a departure from the attitude we have taken in recent years, when we have generally adopted the line that it was for the West Indians to come forward to us with proposals showing what they wanted. It would be necessary to make our proposals public before the Chief Ministers came to a conference, so that there could be as much public discussion of them as possible.

4. I am in favour of adopting the third course, since I consider that it offers the opportunity of producing a greater measure of political stability in the West Indies at less expense to us than either of the other two. It would reduce the trappings of government considerably and should not only produce more efficient administration but also, by reducing the numbers of people holding electoral office, it should lessen the opportunities for corruption. In consequence there would be a better prospect that the British grant-in-aid would be spent honestly and efficiently. In view of the parochialism of these small islands, however, it will not be an easy course to carry through successfully and we shall probably have to exert considerable pressure on the Little Eight to get them to accept. For this reason I would suggest that our proposals should be set out in a despatch or published, and that we take our proposals as the basis of discussion.

Annex to 187

Introduction

The Chief Ministers of the Leeward and Windward Islands and the Premier of Barbados held a Conference in Barbados from the 26th February-3rd March to consider the possibility of establishing a Federation of their eight territories. A copy

of the Summary of Decisions of this Conference together with a copy of a Memorandum addressed to me by the Premier of Barbados, who was chairman of the Conference, is attached to this paper.¹

2. The genesis of this proposal was described in paragraphs 2 and 3 of my memorandum C.P.C. (62) 5.² In my statement to the House of Commons on February 6th, I welcomed the proposal for a Federation of these eight territories as a promising development but one requiring a great deal of careful study here and in The West Indies before any final decision could be taken.

3. When the Governments concerned announced their intention of holding a Conference on 26th February, I sent them a message welcoming their decision and saying that I looked forward to receiving the results of their deliberations as soon as possible. After the Conference had started, I arranged for them to be given a document setting out my preliminary views of the kind of criteria which a Federation of the Eight ought to satisfy if it is to stand a chance of success and of rendering a genuine service to the territories of Barbados and the Leeward and Windward Islands. Briefly, the first criterion I suggested was that such a Federation should be marked by a strong central government with consequentially diminished powers in the individual islands. In particular I suggested that the federal government should be able to exercise general financial control and be effectively responsible for economic development. Secondly, I suggested that the forms of government in a federation of such small territories should be greatly simplified as compared with those existing at present. Thirdly, I expressed the view that as most of the territories of the Eight are heavily grant-aided, a serious examination would be required to be undertaken of what is necessary to ensure their viability.

The main features of the present proposals

4. The main features of the proposals put forward by the Conference can be quickly summarised. In general form the new Federation would be similar to the present one. It would have the same name—The West Indies—and would have a Governor-General as Queen's Representative; a Senate (consisting of one representative from each island); a House of Representatives (elected on a formula which would give Barbados about 6 members and each of the other islands 2 members—except Montserrat, which would have 1). There would also be a Federal Supreme Court. In addition the Unit constitutions would give the Units full internal self-government in their own sphere; each Unit would have a Legislature and a Cabinet under a Premier (though the Conference itself appears to envisage some reduction in the number of Ministers), and each Unit would have a Queen's Representative (to be styled "Commissioner" instead of "Governor" or "Administrator" as at present). The main differences from the present Federation are, first, that this new federal government would have its own sources of revenue, derived in the first instance from customs and excise duties, currency profits and postal services. After five years the new Federation would also have powers of income tax. It would therefore not be dependent, as is the present Federation, on subventions from the Units. Furthermore the Conference has proposed certain additions to both the exclusive and the concurrent legislative lists, which would undoubtedly give the new Federation greater powers, particularly in the field of economic development,

¹ Not printed.

² cf 178, note 3.

than has the present Federation. In particular they propose that industrial development, labour legislation, loans and commercial banking should be concurrent subjects (with Federal law prevailing). On the question of independence for this Federation, they appear to propose that it should be granted independence very shortly after it is set up.

5. Particularly important are the proposals concerning finance and economic development. What the Conference would appear to have in mind is not adequately set out in the Summary of Conclusions attached to this paper. They are described more fully in a report which was made to the Conference by Professor Arthur Lewis. His proposals are designed to reduce the dependence of the Leeward and Windward Islands on external aid. They are based on three main assumptions:—

- (a) that the output of commodities over the next decade can increase by 30% in the Leeward Islands, 35% in the Windward Islands, and 36% in Barbados;
- (b) that there is roughly a threefold increase in the value of receipts from tourism, and
- (c) that Civil Service salaries remain at their present level and are not allowed to rise with any increases which might occur in other incomes and prices.

Given these assumptions, Professor Lewis estimates that the islands could balance their recurrent budgets by 1967. The United Kingdom Government, however, should contribute towards their capital expenditure. In terms of figures, this means (according to Professor Lewis) that grant-in-aid would be tapered down from BWI \$9 million to BWI \$2 million over the next five years and then be stabilised at this level. Simultaneously a capital fund would require to be established for the Leeward and Windward Islands, guaranteed for the next five years at a rate of BWI \$7 million a year. On the strength of these proposals the Conference have recommended that grants-in-aid towards the recurrent expenditure in the Leeward and Windward Islands should continue, tapering down by 15% per annum until 1968. They further recommend:—

- (a) that the amount of grant-in-aid to each territory should be fixed in advance and not be subject to annual negotiation or bargaining, and
- (b) that it should be paid direct to the Unit Government and not through the Federal Government (as at present).

They further request a grant of BWI \$4 million towards the initial cost of establishing the Federal capital (in Barbados), and that there should be an early meeting with the U.K. Government to determine what is needed to secure the rapid economic development of the islands.

H.M.G.'s attitude to closer association between the Eight

6. In my view it is desirable that we should make up our minds on the merits of these proposals, particularly on whether we are prepared to use them as a basis of discussion, fairly quickly. The Governments of the Eight in fact put forward a resolution that we should summon a conference to discuss their proposals before the existing Federation is dissolved, with a view to making arrangements for the establishment of the new Federation. Before considering the merits of these particular proposals (which I do in paragraphs 7–9 below), I should say that my general conclusion is that some kind of association between the eight territories would be preferable to their continuing to exist as eight separate Administrations. It

would afford a better opportunity of providing certain common services for them more economically. It would offer a better hope of their achieving some degree of viability through an integrated economic development plan and of their sustaining independence sooner or later. The only alternative possibility would be that individually they should accept the offer of the Premier of Trinidad to join him in a unitary state. This was the course which seemed to find most favour when the matter was discussed by the C.P.C. on 2nd February³ and it clearly has many attractions. It may well be that if we accept a Federation of the Eight, we shall be left with two countries in the Eastern Caribbean, each with less than a million people: the one Trinidad (politically unstable), and the other (the Eight) economically unviable. It is possible to argue that the union of even some of the Eight with Trinidad would, by increasing the Negro majority over the Indians, help to promote political stability, while access to Trinidad's resources would help to remedy some, at least, of the economic weaknesses of the Eight. Nevertheless, despite the attractions of absorbing even some of the Eight into a unitary state with Trinidad, I am now very doubtful whether there is much prospect of its happening—at any rate within any period ahead that we can foresee. The Premier of Trinidad has a talent for making enemies and his behaviour during my visit appears to have alienated the Governments of the Little Eight. Their recent Conference has, for the time being at least, given them a feeling of solidarity and strengthened their antipathy to Trinidad. Furthermore, in view of the internal situation in Trinidad itself, where bitter opposition appears to be developing to the Government and where the Government itself may be heading for serious financial trouble as a result of its extravagances, there is every indication that Dr. Williams is not now keen on the immediate absorption of any of the Little Eight. He would like Her Majesty's Government to hang on to them for two or three years until he is in a stronger position, and then take them over. Even then, he would, as a price for relieving the British Government of this responsibility, demand assistance on a scale which we should not be prepared to pay. (From his public statements he would probably ask for £71 million over a ten-year period). There would also be absolutely no guarantee when the time came that, even if Trinidad were willing to take them, all of the Eight would be willing to go, and we might be left with more bits of debris (like the Virgin Islands and the Turks and Caicos), with even less prospect of fitting them into any working scheme of association with other territories. I am therefore in favour of some kind of closer association among the Eight in preference to the other possible courses immediately open to us; and I would not rule out the possibility that if we can devise such an association and make it work, it might be possible within the not too distant future for it to enter into some kind of union with Trinidad.

Weaknesses of the present proposals

7. Turning now, against this general background, to the merits of these particular proposals, an examination of them has shown that they have serious weaknesses. In the first place this set of constitutional proposals is closely bound up with the financial and economic plans of Professor Arthur Lewis and the assumptions on which they are based, which I have described in paragraph 5 above. It is in my view extremely doubtful whether these assumptions are realistic. To be

³ See *ibid.*

certain on the point would require an examination which would probably take an expert a month or six weeks to perform; but I am advised that the increase in the output of the commodities envisaged by Professor Lewis does in fact appear to be considerably higher than has been achieved over the past decade. Of all the major commodities produced in the area, only bananas have shown a substantial increase, and the output of most other commodities is not only not rising but in some cases has fallen substantially. Secondly, there is in Professor Lewis's projections a hidden assumption that any increase in the volume of production will not be counteracted by a fall in price. In fact, however, the principal commodities on which the area is dependent—sugar and bananas—are facing highly uncertain market conditions and prices may well fall over the next few years. Thirdly, Professor Lewis maintains that Civil Service salaries will have to be kept at their present level even though other prices rise. In the smaller islands it is already difficult enough to get civil servants of decent calibre and, as a result, much of the assistance we have given to them has been misspent. In my view, if Professor Lewis's recommendation is implemented, the Civil Services in their higher levels at any rate would be in danger of running down completely. On the other hand, his assumption that there might be a threefold increase in incomes derived from tourism may not be out of the question.

8. In view of the exorbitant demands for aid put forward by The West Indies in the past, it is surprising that they now appear to be contemplating independence in a Federation, with assistance from us of only some £1.76 million per annum as compared with the present level of aid which is running at something like £3 million per annum. There is a temptation to accept such an offer at such a bargain price. Appearances here, however, are likely to be deceptive; and it is probable that, having first persuaded us to accept their Federation in principle, the Governments of the Little Eight will then conduct a detailed exercise to prove that £1.76 million is far from adequate to their needs. We should also consider whether we have any interest or responsibility in ensuring that Professor Lewis's proposals are based upon reasonable and realistic assumptions.

9. The second major weakness of these proposals is political and constitutional. Although they envisage the new Federal Government having greater powers than the present one, particularly in finance and economic development, they still leave very considerable powers in the hands of the Units. In form, the new Federation is a replica of the old, with all the paraphernalia of 9 "Queen's Representatives" and about 35 "Ministers" to handle the affairs of less than 700,000 people. This is altogether too much harness for so small a horse. Indeed, it is clear to me that the Unit Ministers, although claiming to support the idea of a stronger federation, have in fact been at pains to keep a good deal of power in the hands of the Units. This is serious. Information which has come to light in the past few months has shown a grave situation developing in the administration of most of the Leeward and Windward Islands. The constitutional changes introduced in 1959,⁴ although they fall short of full internal self-government, give Unit Ministers a very considerable degree of control over their own affairs, especially over their own finances. This step was no doubt justified when it seemed fairly certain that the Federation would proceed rapidly to independence and it was desired to raise all the Units constitutionally to the status of Jamaica, Trinidad and Barbados. In practice, however, in most cases the

⁴ See 98, note 1.

results have been unfortunate. The small island Ministers have shown themselves financially irresponsible and administratively incompetent. Antigua is virtually bankrupt. In Montserrat it would seem that most of the United Kingdom assistance funds have been utterly misspent. In Grenada the new Chief Minister—a ruthless demagogic gangster—appears to have incurred considerable sums of unauthorised expenditure and is using all the means which the courts provide to resist any proper inquiry. In most cases the Unit Chief Ministers regard any form of political opposition as downright subversion. They take the same view of any advice submitted by civil servants which runs contrary to their views; and most of them have been guilty of interfering improperly with the Civil Service and of making threats against any civil servant who did not appear thoroughly loyal to their party. If the proposals embodied in this report are accepted, they will perpetuate this state of affairs beyond remedy and these small islands will degenerate into little paradises for political boss rule. I should make it plain that Barbados itself is an exception to these strictures. There, there is a healthy party system and, by West Indian standards, a reasonably competent Civil Service not unduly subject to political interference.

Courses open to H.M.G.

10. There appear to me to be three courses open to us. The first is that we should reject any possibility of setting up a Federation of the Eight. This course I do not recommend. The idea of some kind of a federation among these Units has caught on and for us not to give it some serious consideration will be regarded as a sharp rebuff by the governments concerned. They might, under these circumstances, open negotiations with Trinidad with a view to joining Trinidad as a unitary state. In view of Trinidad's own internal difficulties, however, I do not think that this is an idea which Trinidad itself will pursue very seriously in the immediate future or that it would promote the general stability of the area if they did. The result would most probably be that we should have these eight separate Units on our hands for an indefinite period. They would have to continue to be heavily grant-aided and, in view of the way in which most of them have been mismanaging their affairs, I should under these circumstances have to assume a greater control over their affairs than any which we have had in the past three years. This, although it might be good for the islands, would be a serious reversal of policy and one which would expose us in some quarters to a good deal of criticism. It might also face us with a good deal of unrest in the territories concerned and prove expensive.

11. The second alternative is that, basically, we should accept the proposals which have been put to us by the Conference, subject to working out the details. The attractions of this course are:—

- (a) that it should be easy to secure agreement on this basis with the governments concerned;
- (b) we could move ahead with it fairly rapidly;
- (c) we might be able to settle at once as part of the bargain for external assistance from the United Kingdom on a scale no higher than that envisaged by Professor Arthur Lewis.

I suggest, however, that if we accept this course we also agree that the Federation should move to independence as rapidly as possible and almost as soon as it is established, despite the fact that we shall be supplying it with grant-in-aid. My

reasons for making this recommendation are that under the scheme proposed in this report, we shall have no power whatsoever to put to rights the state of affairs in the smaller islands. If we kept this proposed Federation as a dependency under the arrangements they propose, we should still have a theoretical responsibility for their affairs with absolutely no power (short of the ultimate power to amend or suspend the constitutional arrangements) to put anything right if things went wrong. It would therefore be to our advantage to get rid of our responsibility under these circumstances completely. I should however warn my colleagues that in my view, for the reasons described in paragraph 9 above there is a grave risk that the whole area will go rapidly downhill both politically and economically within a comparatively short time. I must also point out that this course would create a precedent for granting bilateral budgetary aid to an independent country, and for granting political independence to a country which had no hope of financial independence.

12. The third possibility is that we should put forward counter-proposals of our own and invite the Governments to a conference here to discuss them at an early date. These counter-proposals would be designed to increase considerably the powers of the Federal Government and to reduce the administrative trappings of the Units accordingly. In fact, though we would not admit as much, they would be designed to make the Federation much more like a unitary state. If we could publish these counter-proposals in advance of a conference, I believe we should find considerable support for them not only in The West Indies but also in this country on both sides of the House.

13. The main features of the counter-proposals which we might put forward are as follows:—

(a) We should add to the concurrent powers of the Federation a provision whereby the Federal Legislature could by simple majority declare any subject to be concurrent, and add by way of explanation that in our view all services should be run on a federal basis unless there were strong reasons why this should not be the case (e.g. as in education because of religious difficulties).

(b) Federal powers should be so constructed as to ensure a flow of funds to the centre. For this purpose income tax should become an exclusive Federal subject from the beginning, but there should be a fiscal inquiry into the way in which the Federation would be financed and the division of revenues between the Federal Government and the Units. One of my reasons for making this proposal is that, if political and financial power is concentrated at the centre in this way, the political leaders from the islands will go to the Federal Government, and Unit politics (with all the corruption and chicanery that goes with them) will have much less importance.

(c) The Conference has itself proposed that the Federal Government shall have the power to set up "Commissions of Enquiry in respect of any matter tending to undermine good government or financial stability in any part of the Federation." I would accept this proposal but further suggest that there should be a further provision (on the lines of that in the Nigerian Constitution) whereby the Federal Government could take over the administration of any island in the event of the collapse of the administration in an individual unit.

(d) As for Unit constitutions, I would propose that in the place of the present Ministerial system they should be governed by elected Councils in which the

legislative and executive functions were fused and which should be presided over by an elected Commissioner acting as chairman. If the Federation still wished to preserve a Senate, we might provide that these elected Commissioners should in addition sit as an Upper House, with certain revisionary functions. Otherwise I propose that the Federal Senate should be abolished.

(e) I think it will probably be necessary that grants-in-aid should be given to the Federal and not the Unit Governments. Subject to this and to discussions of this proposal with the Treasury, I would be prepared to settle for a tapering block grant over a fixed period of years with no detailed financial control by H.M.G., on the understanding (as in Aden) that it is immutable except under exceptional circumstances.

14. I think it would be necessary to offer to such a Federation the prospect of early independence and, further, that it would be to our advantage to do so, because even under this much more centralised system I should still not have the power to ensure directly that proper standards of administration were maintained or that United Kingdom moneys were properly spent. I should also point out to my colleagues that to adopt the positive line envisaged in this third course would be a considerable departure from the line we have taken in recent years in dealing with The West Indies, when we have adopted the attitude that it was for them to come forward to us with proposals showing what they wished to achieve. I nevertheless feel that if we press this third course with sufficient energy and state our case for it clearly to the public both here and in The West Indies, there would be a good prospect of our carrying it through. Furthermore, I believe it would offer better prospects of securing a measure of political stability and making progress in this area at less expense to Her Majesty's Government than any other course.

188 CO 1031/3375, no 92

6 Apr 1962

'Federation of the Eight': CO brief for Mr Maudling on questions raised by the CRO and Treasury

The draft of this paper¹ was submitted to the Treasury and to the Commonwealth Relations Office before being circulated. They agreed to its circulation but have given notice that they will probably brief their Ministers to raise certain points during discussion. These points are listed below, together with suggestions for dealing with them.

1. *Why are the Caymans, the Turks and Caicos and the Virgin Islands not included in these proposals?*

The Conference of the Chief Ministers related only to those of the Leeward and Windward Islands which are included in the present Federation. The British Virgin Islands, although they were formerly part of the Federation of the Leeward Islands, have never been part of the Federation of The West Indies.² They declined to come in when the Federation was formed. Economically they tend to look much more towards the United States Virgin Islands and it may well be that eventually their

¹ See 187.

² cf 145.

political destiny lies in the same direction. The Department, however, hope to put forward in the fairly near future certain proposals for the economic development of the Virgin Islands. If they showed an interest in coming into a Federation of the Eight, we have the power under the new Bill to bring them in and we could, at the appropriate time, consider the desirability of exerting pressure upon them to take this course. It would however be advisable to consider their future as a separate problem.

The Caymans and the Turks and Caicos Islands have never formed part of a federation with either the Leeward or the Windward Islands.³ Although territorially they have been a part of the Federation of The West Indies, administratively they have come under the Governor of Jamaica. We have not seriously considered linking them with a Federation of the Eight for the following reasons:—

(a) The Caymans are 1,200 miles from the nearest of the Leeward Islands and the Caicos Islands are about 800 miles away.

(b) The Caymans have expressed a desire for direct dependence upon the United Kingdom and the Turks and Caicos, if they do not agree to go in with Jamaica, will probably express the same wish. If, however, in connection with the Federation of the Eight, we set up some United Kingdom organisation (such as the old Development and Welfare Organisation), it might be given some functions in relation to the Caymans and the Turks and Caicos Islands. The possibility, however, of establishing some special machinery of this kind has not yet been considered.

2. *Are we prepared to see political independence given to an area which appears to have such small hope of financial independence?*⁴

This problem is no doubt raising its head in other areas besides the West Indies. The Little Eight themselves, at their Conference, drew particular attention to the fact that from 1942 to 1958 the British Government gave Libya a total of £27½ million as budgetary support in addition to some £6 million in development grants and loans. They claim that the British Government is still supporting Libya to the tune of some £3 million a year. This, of course, is all perfectly true: the difference being that Libya offers us something in return, namely a military base. Attention is drawn to the problem in paragraph 11 of the paper.

3. *If the Federal Government were given the sources of revenue proposed in paragraph 4 of the paper, what effect would this have on territorial revenues?*

This is a question which it would require a fiscal commissioner to decide. Such a fiscal commissioner would be required to make estimates of both Federal and territorial expenditure and make recommendations for relating these to possible sources of revenue.

4. *How would Britain's entry into the Common Market be likely to affect Professor Lewis's estimates of future production quoted in paragraph 5?*

As far as sugar is concerned, entry into the Common Market is not likely to make any difference. As regards the other main products, bananas and citrus, it is possible that

³ cf 150.

⁴ This was the point raised by the Treasury in particular: 'This would perhaps be the first case in which we have openly granted political independence to a dependent country while recognising that there is no hope of economic independence (I realise that Kenya may be first in this particular rat race)' (CO 1031/3375, no 85, Treasury letter from C J Hayes to D Williams, 3 Apr 1962).

the West Indies' position might be marginally improved by Britain's entry into the Common Market, but not enough to make any significant difference.

5. *Assuming a Federation of the Eight were set up, what steps do the Colonial Office propose to take in the interim period to deal with the financial scandals that have arisen?*

Before we can answer this question, we really need to know how long is likely to elapse before the new Federation can come into existence. We are already trying to set on foot a financial inquiry in Grenada; we have had preliminary inquiries in both Montserrat and Antigua; and we have addressed some stern inquiries to St. Lucia about some of their shortcomings. To what extent we press these matters home will depend upon the amount of time we have at our disposal and upon the tactics which politically it proves desirable to adopt.

6. *Why are we in favour of a Federation of the Eight rather than of pushing the territories in with Trinidad?*

Paragraph 6 of the main paper attempts to deal with this question, but C.R.O. do not accept these arguments and are strongly in favour of our trying to push the Little Eight into a unitary state with Trinidad.⁵ They consider that this course is preferable to our allowing two small states to spring up, neither of which will have a population of more than three quarters of a million. While not questioning our judgment that there is little prospect at the moment of persuading the Eight to throw in their lot with Dr. Williams, they would prefer us to look forward to this solution eventually and to conduct for the moment a holding operation until Dr. Williams is ready to absorb the Eight.

This is certainly a serious dilemma. The recent telegrams received from Dr. Williams on the one hand and the Chief Ministers of the Little Eight on the other show that, while Dr. Williams is afraid that we shall proceed with a Federation of the Eight and thereby foil his plans for a greater Trinidad, the Little Eight are equally afraid that we are going to drive them into the arms of Dr. Williams. If one felt more confident about the political future in Trinidad, then the right course would probably be to push the Little Eight into the arms of Trinidad (always assuming, of course, that H.M.G. were prepared to foot the bill for persuading Trinidad to relieve them of this responsibility). Our estimate of the political future of Trinidad being what it is, however, it hardly seems right that Her Majesty's Government should incur all the political odium which would face them if they tried to drive the Little Eight into the arms of Trinidad.

⁵ CRO views are recorded in DO 200/111, no 2, brief by L B Walsh Atkins for Duncan Sandys, 10 Apr 1962.

189 CO 1031/4321, no 18

27 Apr 1962

[British Guiana]: letter from Sir R Grey to N B J Huijsman¹ on a proposal to raise a local army

Council of Ministers memorandum CP(62)187, about "Defence and Security: Training of local Forces", a copy of which I send with this,² reached me at 6 p.m.

¹ Principal, CO, West Indian Dept 'B'.

² Not printed.

yesterday, together with an agenda showing that the matter was to be discussed at 10 a.m. this morning. As I read the Memorandum (and another paper about arrangements for Independence, about which I shall write separately), I seriously wondered whether Jagan and those advising him are sane. Two and a half weary years had not really led me to expect these terrible depths of idiocy. I therefore arranged to see Jagan first thing this morning, with the intention of telling him very bluntly that the time had come for him to get down out of the clouds, to face facts and to deal in realities. In the event, the impact was somewhat lessened by reason of the fact that he brought with him Ramsahoye³ in order to discuss the ridiculous fix in which the Government now finds itself through its own incompetence in letting the Opposition defeat the motion for the Third Reading of the Appropriation Bill last night, about which I have telegraphed today. Jagan admitted the Party's parliamentary incompetence and I took the opportunity to say in front of Ramsahoye that although it was painfully obvious that Minister of Finance Jacob⁴ did not know whether he was on his head or his feet, it behoved Benn,⁵ as Leader of the House, with some experience in the Legislature, to do better—but he had not even been there himself to vote. Later, when Ramsahoye was gone, I improved the shining hour by telling Jagan that most people who called on me were worried lest he should be a Communist, that I had (largely to the detriment of my own reputation) stuck to the view that he was not, but that I had always expressed the fear that we should come to much the same end because he and his Government were incompetent. He rather pathetically said that he knew many of those about him were not competent but they were what he had, he had to work through them and he had no others. He was less ready to admit his own faults!

2. I had intended to write a tongue-in-cheek non-Personal Despatch forwarding the Memorandum, saying that I had received it only last night (without being consulted on the drafting, despite my constitutional responsibilities), that it was to be discussed in Council today but the system would not yield confirmation of the decision for some time and that as the Secretary of State was to be asked for constitutional change (para. 1(iv)), it was well to let him know the Ministers' proposals without waiting for the formal conclusion, and adding that I had told the Premier some time ago that if he kept to his view that internal security must, despite all the professional advice to the contrary, be entrusted to an Army rather than to an enlarged Police Force, he must seek provision from the Legislature and must show how he proposed to economize on existing commitments in order to produce the money for the Army without unbalancing the Budget. However, Jagan told me today that in view of the unhappy course of events in the Legislature last night, the meeting of the Council of Ministers was cancelled. I therefore concentrated on trying to get him to see the gross defects in his paper.

3. I said that I was not this morning going to argue about the merits of an Army as against an enlarged Police Force; I was just stating the bald fact that this Government can not, without sacrificing some existing recurrent commitments not yet identified, produce even the least amount of money required under any of the schemes set out in the Memorandum. It is futile to say, as is said in (7) on p. 4:—

³ Dr F H W Ramsahoye, attorney-general.

⁴ Dr C Jacob, minister of finance.

⁵ Mr B H Benn, minister of natural resources.

"It is expected that the expense or the major part of it will be carried by loan or grant from the United Kingdom."

The United Kingdom Government will not spend its taxpayers' money on a project that it has repeatedly told the Premier who proposes it is not the economical and effective way of doing what is wanted. Nor will the Canadian Government. It is equally futile to write a Memorandum and end up, as this one does, with a gap of half-a-million dollars and give no indication of where it is to come from. It may be that Chairman Khrushchev will produce \$413 million (or whatever is Jack Kelshall's⁶ latest figure), but he will not produce it for budget-balancing purposes. And anyone that does produce money for budget-balance exercises (if anyone does) will insist on the usual prerogative of the grant-aider, namely, control of the finances of the territory grant-aided. Jagan took this point.

4. I said that the proper line along which he should seek a solution was the political line. He wanted an Army because the Opposition were (he said) seeking to overthrow the Government by unlawful means; he could not have an Army because he could not pay for it; he could not pay for it because he could not get his Budget through the Legislature; he could not get the Budget through because it was unacceptable to so many people, including some of his own followers; because the Budget was unacceptable strength was given to the Opposition moves against him. This vicious circle would be broken if inter-community harmony could be restored; there would still be need for a good internal security force, but certainly no need for an Army; and if the Opposition could be made to share in the responsibility for running the country, then many of the Government projects that were now held up because of Opposition activities might be able to get going. I also sought to get him to see the complete folly of basing his thinking on the rapid creation of "an Army" of the kind that he was proposing; it would not in fact enable the Government to govern and it might well be far more nuisance than it was worth.

5. I said frankly that before I assumed office here I was told that the worst fate that could overtake this country and its neighbours would be for Jagan and Burnham to form a coalition; now it seemed to me that there was little hope of progress unless this happened. Jagan said that it was much in his mind but Burnham was so difficult, etc. He claimed to have carried "some in my own party" with him and to have made approaches through John Carter⁷ and Bissember, but "Burnham wants my place and will not be happy till he gets it—I do not want it so much, but I do not want him to be in it." I said that time was against him—we were getting more and more into the mire, no progress was being made with anything; Burnham was on the point of going off to U.S.A. for three weeks (Jagan says it is private litigation over an ill-fated diamond deal that is now taking Burnham there) and unless Jagan made some forthright attempt at a political solution now, I could see nothing but unhappiness ahead.

6. Knowing that Kelshall was the author of the ridiculous Memorandum, I told Jagan of my original conversation with this man—"I know you do not want me; I

⁶ Said by the British to be a communist (CO 1031/4404, no 29, para 7), Kelshall was a Trinidadian and Jagan's private secretary.

⁷ Leader of United Democratic Party, an offshoot of the National Democratic Party which contested the 1953 election (see 17, note 2), who led a merger with the Burnhamite PNC in 1961.

know you think I am a Communist, though I am not; but you and I can work together because I am a practical man and, dearly as I love Jagan, I know that he is not practical." I said that I still did not know whether Jack was a Communist or not but it was abundantly plain to me and to every other person who had dealings with him outside the Party that he is not a practical man. "He is a bigger dreamer than you are, Premier, and that is competing in open company." He smiled sweetly and said that maybe he was a dreamer—but not all that of a one!

7. I also sought to show him the folly of winding up the B.G.V.F., merely to start afresh with a Home Guard. Why not enlarge the B.G.V.F. if and when money was available. Jagan seemed to see little difference. Tradition and all that mean nothing to him.

8. Where we go next with this frightful paper I know not. I shall send it to the Garrison Commander for his comments on matters of detail. But I sincerely hope that somehow or other we can kill it dead. Meantime, of course, we are training with the East Anglians only those who are already enlisted in the Police.

190 CO 1031/3376, no 187A

21 May 1962

[Federation of the Eight]: letter from D Williams to F G Burrett¹ on
UK financial assistance

[Extract]

We now expect the final session of the East Caribbean Federation Conference to take place on Thursday, and our Ministers consider that it will be necessary for them then to say something about financial assistance to the new Federation. The proposals have got to be put to the legislatures of the Little Eight and it is hardly to be expected that they will be willing to consider them without having any idea of their financial prospects.

2. When we had our discussions on 17th May it was on the basis that we should indicate our acceptance of the Lewis proposals. On further reflection we no longer wish to go as far as that at present. I enclose a formula² which we should like to suggest that our Secretary of State should announce to the Conference on Thursday and which they will probably press to have written into the Conference Report, which will be published as a White Paper. The object of this formula is to give a general indication that we will see the new Federation right, without going into any detail at all as to the nature or amount of our assistance. On our present thinking we would

¹ FO from 1946; transferred to Treasury, 1960.

² The formula proposed was discussed at a CO-Treasury meeting on 22 May as a result of which it was amended to read: 'The U.K. Government recognise that a Federation of Barbados and the Leeward and Windward Islands would stand in need of external assistance for a period after it is established, both as regards capital and budgetary assistance. Her Majesty's Government would be willing to provide assistance within the limits of the resources which they would be able to make available, but its amount and nature would require further consideration. In this connection H.M. Government have noted with interest proposals put forward by Dr. Lewis. Under these budgetary assistance would be continued for a limited period after the establishment of the Federation but on a tapering basis from its present level. At the same time Dr. Lewis proposes that U.K. capital assistance should be fixed at a given annual level for an initial period of 5 years after the setting up of the Federation. This approach merits further study in the light of a more detailed survey of the economic needs and potential development of the area which the U.K. proposed to put in train' (CO 1031/3376, no 188, enclosure).

arrange for a study of the possible needs of the area to be carried out by an economist under our auspices, and in the light of this Her Majesty's Government itself would have to decide before the Constitutional Conference next year what its offer should be. We think that this would be better than setting up an economic commission whose findings would be unpredictable.

3. The objection which you might see in this formula is that, although no figures are involved, we should be accepting a long term financial commitment which would be bound to extend after Federal independence. We concede that something of a gamble is involved. There is no certainty that assistance on the scale we might contemplate will make the area viable by the end of five years and I can see that it might be embarrassing if the Federal Government came back for more, either during the five years or thereafter, with a plea that economic collapse was imminent. If this happened after independence the Commonwealth Secretary would have an awkward choice between giving way to such a plea or turning it down and thereby leaving the United Kingdom Government saddled in the eyes of the world with the responsibility for keeping the area in poverty.

4. However, it seems to me that whatever we do in this area is in fact a choice of evils. If there were no Federation of the Eight, we should have to meet indefinitely the same needs in the individual territories without the economic advantages of federation but with the political embarrassment of being unable to show the world that we were advancing the area towards independence. These islands can never achieve independence except as a Federation; and if we miss the chance of federating them now I doubt if it will ever come again.

5. Looking only at financial considerations it might perhaps be said that we could better resist demands for additional assistance if we were dealing with individual and dependent territories and that in that case we should be able to put back into their constitutions provisions which would give us effective control over their finances and so ensure that our assistance was efficiently administered. But we doubt whether nowadays it is a tenable policy to put the clock back in this way; nor whether, if it is put back, it can be kept back indefinitely. Nor do we think that it would be any harder for H.M.G. to resist further financial demands from a federal government, dependent or independent, than from individual dependent islands.

6. Finally, if it is accepted that we can hold assistance at the level proposed, it ought not to be overlooked that the Lewis proposals would be a bargain even if we accepted them as they stand. They would involve grant-in-aid tapering from \$7.2 million to nothing, and a total of \$35 million capital assistance (some of which might be in loans) over the five years. The present Federal block grant leaves \$15.9 million for these islands for 1962 and 1963, and if we tapered down on the lines which we had already envisaged, the figure would not come out very differently from the Lewis proposals on recurrent account. As regards development assistance, however, the C.D. & W. allocations to the Little Eight for the present quinquennium total £7.37 million (over \$35 million) including the carry-over from the last Act. In other words, we should be getting away over the next five years with total assistance rather less than we have provided over the past five. I cannot see that we could do it any cheaper on any other basis, whether within a Federation or dealing with individual units.

7. We hope to be able to discuss the draft formula with you tomorrow and I trust that you and the C.R.O. will be able to agree that these arguments justify the Secretary of State's putting it to the Conference. . . .

191 CO 1031/4236, no 301

23 May 1962

**'United Kingdom military requirements in the West Indies': report by
COS (COS(62)221, annex)****[Extract]***Introduction*

1. In June, 1961, we approved a report¹ on our long-term military requirements in the West Indies outside the Federation. This report was based, inter alia, on the understanding that the West Indies Federation, consisting principally of Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, the Leeward Islands, the Windward Islands, and Barbados, would achieve independence in 1962 and would exercise a stabilizing influence in the Caribbean area. Our military commitments in the area would thereafter be the defence and internal security of our remaining colonial territories. Since the report was approved, however, there have been certain political developments, including withdrawal by Jamaica and Trinidad from the Federation in April, 1962, and their intention to seek full independence later this year. There have also been disturbances in British Guiana which have necessitated the stationing there of a larger UK force.

2. We have already taken certain decisions concerning deployment and transfer of responsibilities in the Caribbean area; these are referred to, where appropriate, below. In addition, the Chief of the Defence Staff has recently toured the West Indies and has issued his report, on which we have had a preliminary discussion.

Aim

3. To re-examine United Kingdom military requirements in the West Indies.

*The political situation**General*

4. We are advised that the British West Indies territories can be divided politically into three broad categories:—

- (a) Territories whose independence is imminent.
- (b) Territories whose eventual independence is an accepted aim of policy.
- (c) Territories for which independence is not ultimately foreseen.

More detailed advice is set out below.

Territories whose independence is imminent

5. *Jamaica.* Jamaica, already enjoying internal self-government, will become fully independent on 6th August, 1962.

6. *Trinidad and Tobago.* Following Jamaica's example, Trinidad having withdrawn from the Federation will become fully independent in the autumn of 1962.

Territories whose eventual independence is an accepted aim of policy

7. *"Federation of the Eight".* The possibility of establishing a "Federation of the Eight" comprising Barbados, Antigua, Montserrat, St. Kitts, Dominica, Grenada, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent is now under examination. These territories have expressed

¹ Dated 26 June 1961, copy in CO 1031/4235, no 184.

the wish to federate and have made proposals which are being considered by HM Government. It is unlikely that such a Federation could be established before the end of 1962 and that it could be given independence for some years to come.

8. *British Guiana.* British Guiana has achieved internal self-government and, prior to the recent riots, was expected to achieve full independence in the autumn of 1962. It is too soon to forecast how this programme may be affected but it appears probable that whatever political proposals are made to meet the present situation they will not be generally accepted locally and that British troops will be required in the territory until it becomes independent.

9. *British Honduras.* Both Mexico and Guatemala lay claim to British Honduras. Although as a result of the recent discussions² we hope to achieve a modus vivendi with Guatemala, which alone poses any military threat to British Honduras, the Guatemalan Government is so unreliable that we cannot discount the possibility of irresponsible acts directed against the colony. Within British Honduras it has so far been announced that talks will be held in 1963 to discuss internal self-government which could follow soon after and lead eventually to independence. However, it is not possible to set a date for full independence and British Honduras must be regarded as a UK responsibility for the foreseeable future.

Territories for which independence is not ultimately foreseen

10. *Bermuda, the Bahamas, the British Virgin Islands, the Turks and Caicos Islands, and the Cayman Islands.* There is no probability that the above islands will ever become independent.

The threat

11. We are advised that the assessment of the threat made by the JIC in our previous paper remains unchanged. In the immediate future British Guiana remains the most likely internal trouble spot. The only identifiable external threat is a small-scale incursion from Guatemala into British Honduras.

Military commitments and requirements

External defence

12. United Kingdom commitments for external defence in the area will consist of responsibility for remaining colonial or dependent territories and the possible need to come to the aid of ex-dependent territories which are members of the Commonwealth. These territories could and, we are advised, may be encouraged to join the Organization of American States and would in any case derive a certain sense of security from the presence of substantial United States forces in the area. We have no global war commitments in the Caribbean except for certain NATO maritime arrangements.

Jamaica

13. The Jamaica Defence Force, consisting of the Jamaica Regiment and the Volunteer Territorial Battalion, will, we consider, be capable of meeting any internal security problems after 1st June, 1962, when the British battalion stationed there

² cf 186.

will become non-operational. The Jamaican Government has been advised that they should have a small local naval or coastguard force after independence.

14. Although we have agreed that the British battalion should start withdrawing on 1st June, 1962, and that Headquarters Caribbean Area should close down on 1st July, 1962, there will be a requirement for British officers to be seconded to the Defence Force for a few years. The exact requirements cannot be determined until the new Jamaican Government has decided on its future policy.

Trinidad and Tobago

15. Since the dissolution of the Federation in April it is no longer possible to use the West India Regiment for internal security duties in Trinidad. We understand that Trinidad intends to form its own "National Guard" (of two regular and two Volunteer companies), partly out of Trinidadians withdrawn from the West India Regiment. The Police Force may also be extended to form a Marine Coastguard Force. Although there is a possibility that trouble may arise when the political parties start considering details of the Trinidad independence constitution, it is considered unlikely that the Governor would need to call on British troops for internal security purposes. There will, however, be a requirement for British Officers to act as military advisers and to train and command the defence forces.

British Guiana

16. Although we originally planned to withdraw forces from British Guiana sometime after the achievement of internal self-government, there can now be no question of withdrawal before independence. In addition a serious internal security situation could develop after the date for independence has been announced. We have therefore agreed that a battalion should remain until independence. In addition to reinforcement by Royal Marine detachments and landing parties from the West Indies frigates, the garrison could be reinforced from the United Kingdom by a company within 48 hours and the balance of a battalion in just over 3 days.

17. We understand that local Ministers have discussed the formation either of a form of "Garde Mobile", some 200 strong, or of a local Military Force.³ Despite the advice he has received Dr. Jagan is considering a Military Force separate from the Police of 350 regulars and at least 150 National Service men. British assistance may be sought for training such forces. Should it be decided for political reasons that this assistance should be afforded, the conditions would have to be carefully considered in order to safeguard the position of the British officers and men involved.

British Honduras

18. To meet the external threat we have previously agreed that a small headquarters and one infantry company should be stationed in British Honduras. For internal purposes we consider that to raise a local regular military force would be an unwarranted expense and that the Government should concentrate on expanding and improving the efficiency of the civil police force in order to maintain law and order. The assistance of additional British police officers will probably be required to improve the standard of the local force and we understand that the Colonial Office are investigating this. The present Volunteer Force should be maintained but its efficiency should be increased. The Garrison can assist in this.

³ See 189.

19. *Reinforcement.* After withdrawal of the UK area reserve from Jamaica in June, 1962, land force reinforcements for British Honduras if required in addition or alternatively to those provided by the West Indies frigates would be flown from the United Kingdom. Because the existing runways at Belize (Stanley Field) are too short for RAF strategic aircraft, reinforcements from the United Kingdom would have to change to MRT aircraft at Nassau if the quickest route were to be used. Although suitable aircraft can sometimes be chartered locally for onward transit to Belize, delays in making the necessary arrangements are unpredictable and could have serious operational consequences. Although arrangements could be made to preposition RAF MRT aircraft in Nassau when the situation in British Honduras required it, reinforcement in this way would take so much longer than it would if strategic aircraft could fly direct to Stanley Field that the extension of this airfield is of considerable military importance.

Remaining dependent territories

20. In our previous study we envisaged retaining responsibility for Bermuda, the Bahamas, the British Virgin Islands, British Honduras, and possibly the Cayman Islands. To this list will now have to be added at least for the time being Barbados, the British islands in the Leeward and Windward groups; and also the Turks and Caicos Islands.

21. *Islands in the prospective "Federation of the Eight".* We understand that a police mutual aid scheme may be introduced enabling the transfer of police at short notice between these islands and that the frigates stationed in the West Indies might be called upon to assist in moving them. One frigate will normally be available in the area of the Eastern Caribbean and will also be able to provide a landing party if required. Airfields suitable for use by strategic aircraft exist in Antigua and Barbados.

22. *The other islands.* These will continue to be separately administered, to be self-contained for police forces, and will normally be able to call for assistance on a frigate in the area although usually at Bermuda. Strategic airfields exist in Bermuda and at Nassau.

23. We consider that these arrangements will obviate the need to station UK forces permanently in any of the remaining dependent territories. If necessary, additional land forces could be flown from the United Kingdom.

Naval forces

24. With the withdrawal of the Army reserve from Jamaica our permanent land force garrisons in the Caribbean will be reduced to those maintained in British Guiana (until independence) and British Honduras. Coverage of the remainder of the area, and in particular the provision of initial military assistance in the islands of the Eastern Caribbean, will then fall principally to naval forces. In addition to this commitment and the need to give assistance in British Guiana and British Honduras if required, the naval forces under the command of the Senior Naval Officer West Indies are responsible for maintaining contact over a much wider area extending roughly from Charleston and Bermuda to Cayenne in the Atlantic and from San Diego to Lima in the Pacific.

25. In order to undertake these responsibilities three frigates are required. However, as this number of ships could only be provided permanently at the expense of commitments on another station we consider that the following alternative naval deployment will be acceptable:—

- (a) Two frigates with Royal Marine detachments (20 to 30 strong) embarked to be stationed in the West Indies, based on Bermuda. One ship would usually be available in the Eastern Caribbean area, using Barbados as an advanced base.
- (b) A third frigate to be detached from the Home Fleet when necessary. Where possible a ship with a Royal Marine detachment embarked would be used.

26. The first ship with a Royal Marine detachment embarked will arrive on station in July, 1962, and the second in late 1962 or early 1963. These detachments, together with Seamen landing parties, will provide up to a company in strength for limited internal security duties.

27. *Shore facilities required in the area.* Admiralty are examining whether a worthwhile improvement in the availability of a frigate in the Eastern Caribbean could be made by improving the existing self-maintenance facilities at Barbados. Existing naval facilities in Bermuda would still be required in the normal cycle of maintenance of the frigates and for NATO and Commonwealth purposes. Fuelling facilities for HM Ships in the Western Caribbean are at present provided by commercial arrangements in Jamaica. In case an independent Jamaica should withhold these facilities, similar arrangements in Belize are required and Admiralty are investigating this.

Access

28. Although staging facilities and overflying rights cannot be guaranteed in emergency, they are useful in routine trooping and movement. We therefore confirm the conclusion of our previous study that they should be negotiated, if possible, with the newly independent territories. . . .

192 CO 1031/3492, no 67

25 May 1962

[Financial responsibility]: minute by J D Higham¹ to Sir H Poynton on financial irregularities in Antigua and Montserrat

The Secretary of State has arranged to see Mr. Bird at 9.45 on Monday morning, and Mr. Bramble at 10.15. Separate briefs, prepared jointly by Finance Department and West Indian Department, are attached.² Copies of these have been sent to the Treasury for clearance, as these are grant-aided territories, but I am sending them forward, in view of the shortness of time, and I will report if there are any Treasury comments.

2. I am quite sure that we must take a very tough line with these two territories as well as with Grenada, and that we must make every endeavour to restore a sense of financial responsibility. Although public reaction to the Grenada report (to judge from casual talks with members of the public) has been rather lighthearted, the P.A.C. can be expected to take the affairs of all three territories much more seriously, and you would be in an indefensible position if vigorous action were not taken. A separate submission will be made on Grenada, and here I would only record the view that if Mr. Gairy is allowed to continue in office the effect on actual and potential misdemeanance elsewhere will be similar to that of the Salan verdict.³

¹ Assistant secretary, CO, head of Finance Dept.

² Not printed.

³ A reference to the French general, Raoul Salan, recently sentenced to life imprisonment for mutiny and treason.

3. You will recall that the East Caribbean Conference yesterday agreed to our proposal that one of the functions of the preparatory commission would be to work out the details of financial control. We should I think endeavour to find a U.K. body for this and to ensure that his task is not confined to working out an academic exercise, but that he is given facilities to travel to the various territories and look into the operation of their systems of control. It is important that he should deal with the individual units as well as with the Federal control system. In his talk with both Chief Ministers the Secretary of State might mention that he was pleased to see from their agreement to this proposal that they recognised the importance, from the point of view of the reputation of the Federation and the territories, of placing emphasis on the importance of financial control, and that he trusted they would give every help within their power to see that satisfactory proposals were evolved.

4. I am sure that the idea of getting Financial Secretaries (preferably expatriates) in the two territories is the only sound way of proceeding. Now that we are likely to have at least two years before there is an independent Caribbean Federation we can start looking round for candidates. I am afraid it is not going to be easy to find suitable people, but if no serving or retired H.M.O.C.S. officer can be found, we should consider seconding from the Office an experienced S.E.O. or H.E.O.

5. In the long term the crux of the problem is I think to ensure the freedom of the civil service from irresponsible interference by Ministers; we shall never achieve this until there is a unified civil service and a central P.S.C.

6. The brief on Montserrat does not refer to secret information we have received about Mr. Bramble's suspected personal interest in some of the C.D. & W. transactions. Briefly Mr. Bramble appears to have been selling land in his private capacity to the Chief Minister in his official capacity and making quite sure that the value of the land was rather more than it would have fetched on the open market. The Secretary of State should not, of course, refer to this but he may wish to know of it.

193 CO 1031/3382, no 8

May 1962

'The Joint Economic Mission to the Leeward and Windward Islands': CO brief no 7 for the UK delegation to the East Caribbean conference

[Briefing the UK delegation to the conference on the financial and economic implications of a Federation of the Eight, the CO commented on the tactics anticipated from West Indian ministers: 'They will try to persuade the British Government to agree to a Federation of the Eight first, and only proceed to work out the cost at a later stage. Having worked out the cost, they will then ask the British Government to foot the bill. From previous experience we know that their demands for outside assistance (whatever Dr. Lewis may say) are likely to be exorbitant. West Indian governments are among the most unabashed mendicants in the whole Commonwealth. (The Times described their opening speeches at the last Lancaster House Conference as a "chorus from The Beggar's Opera".) They also remain singularly unimpressed by the arguments that we have used in the despatch, that there are other areas in the world for which we are responsible, where the needs are even greater. They like to pretend that they have a special claim upon our purses and that Britain has a great moral responsibility to help them out of any financial difficulties and guarantee them a reasonable standard of living as just recompense for the evils which their ancestors suffered as a result of the Slave trade' (CO 1031/3382, no 6, 'Financial and economic implications of Federation of the Eight', CO brief, 5 May 1962).]

During the course of the West Indian Constitutional Conference in London last June it became clear that the success of the Conference could only be assured by some

kind of financial "sweetener". The Federal Government had submitted a demand on behalf of the Leeward and Windward Islands that the United Kingdom should agree to a ten year programme of economic development of the Leeward and Windward Islands designed to make their economies and finances viable and raise their general standards closer to those of the larger territories of the Federation. Although they accepted that this proposal could only be considered in the subsequent conference on the financial and economic settlement with the Federation, they strongly pressed the United Kingdom to agree there and then to provide an initial instalment on this programme of approximately £6,000,000 for a one year interim development programme.

2. It was clearly impossible to provide any sum approaching this figure. On the other hand it was also clear that if the delegations returned completely empty-handed it would gravely endanger the chances of achieving the endorsement of their legislatures to the proposals of the Conference which were in several respects repugnant to many of them, particularly because of Trinidad's refusal to agree to Freedom of Movement within the first ten years after independence.

3. To get round this difficulty Mr. Macleod finally proposed, and it was agreed by the Conference, that an economic mission should visit the Leewards and Windwards. The relevant paragraphs of the report read as follows:—

"40. In deference, however, to the representations made during the Conference on behalf of the smaller Territories concerning the urgency of their need for development, Her Majesty's Government stated their readiness to send a small official Mission to The West Indies as soon as this could be mounted (say within 3 or 4 weeks from the holding of the Conference) with the object of considering, in consultation with the Unit Governments of the Windward and Leeward Islands and the Federal Government, any particular short term projects which were of special urgency or importance to the smaller islands but which for one reason or another had not found a place within the existing approved development programme. Her Majesty's Government were able to state that the United States Government had agreed to be associated with this Mission, and Her Majesty's Government and the United States authorities (subject to the availability of Congressional appropriations) would respectively consider the provision of finance for such projects as the Mission might recommend. In the case of the United Kingdom contribution this finance would be additional to the existing Colonial Development and Welfare allocations. In making its examination the Mission would of course have to limit its scope to a relatively small number of short term projects, i.e. those which could be completed within a year or so. Her Majesty's Government stated that they were glad to be able to this extent to respond to the representations which had been put forward and particularly appreciated the willingness of the United States authorities to associate themselves with the proposed investigation.

41. These arrangements represent a special approach to a specific problem and do not in any way prejudice or prejudice the total amount of assistance which Her Majesty's Government may be able to accord The West Indies in the light of the discussions of the Conference of 8th January."

Subsequently the Canadian Government also agreed to be associated with the Mission.

4. The United Kingdom contribution was fixed at a maximum of £500,000 of C.D. & W. money and £250,000 in Exchequer loans. The Americans agreed to participate up to a similar ceiling. The Canadian contribution was not quantified but was clearly to be a lesser sum (we learnt later that it would be up \$1.3 millions); it was, furthermore, to come out of their existing \$10 million aid programme, so it did not, like our and the American's [sic] contributions, represent additional aid. It was agreed that these ceilings should not be revealed to the West Indies, and they are indeed still in ignorance of them. Mr. Selwyn¹ (Senior Economic Adviser) was the U.K. representative on the Mission which assembled in Trinidad on 21st July, toured all the territories concerned and completed its report on 18th August.

5. During the progress of the Mission around the islands a difficulty arose with the Canadians. The attitude of their representatives on the Mission was that in accordance with normal Canadian policy governing overseas aid they were obliged to ensure that Canadian-financed projects should cover mainly imports, and that these should come from Canada, the local costs of all such projects being borne by the territory concerned. As the Leeward and Windward Islands are grant-aided the net result would be that not only would Canada secure a disproportionate share of the export opportunities likely to arise from the Mission, but that these Canadian exports would be enjoying an indirect U.K. subsidy as the local costs would ultimately have to be borne by the U.K. The question of "tied aid" has come up before, and we have always resisted it, as our own aid has not been tied (but see para. 10(a)). Because of this, and because we already knew that British business interests (in particular Lord Rootes, Chairman of the Western Hemisphere Exports Council) were keenly interested in the export possibilities likely to result from the Mission, Mr. Selwyn was instructed to press his Canadian colleagues to modify their attitude. They were unable to do this and it was therefore not possible to reach any final agreement on the precise division of projects before they dispersed. Their report, therefore, simply enumerated a list of schemes which the Mission considered to be "eligible for further consideration by one or other of the participating governments". Statements by representatives of the three participating governments were appended to the report. The Canadian statement staked out claims on certain particular projects; the United States did the same but much less greedily for export opportunities than that of the Canadians; the U.K. statement expressed a general recommendation of the projects in the main report and suggested that the three participating governments should have early discussions "in order that a mutually satisfactory co-ordination of schemes between them might be arrived at".

6. Following the receipt of the Mission's report and discussion with other interested Whitehall departments (Treasury, Foreign Office, Commonwealth Relations Office, Board of Trade, Department of Technical Co-operation) it was decided that it was essential to try and persuade the Canadians that they should accept a rather more equitable division of projects with high export potentialities and that they should agree to finance at least some part of the local cost of their schemes. It was clear that if this were not done there would be serious danger of an outcry by business interests in the U.K. which could result in parliamentary embarrassment

¹ P Selwyn, senior economic adviser, CO.

and, possibly, increased pressure to [?]on] Her Majesty's Government to abandon its present policy of untied aid. The Canadian reply was that they felt unable to alter their present policy and that were they to agree to meet local costs in the West Indies they would have to make similar concessions elsewhere. They made no comment on our request that they consider a more equitable sub-division of the high import content projects.

7. In the middle of all this the Jamaican Referendum took place which resulted in Jamaica's decision to leave the Federation. Clearly this placed the whole future of the Federation in doubt and in view of the Premier of Trinidad's decision not to commit himself on remaining in the Federation before his general election (4th December) and possibly not for sometime after, doubts were of course raised as to whether we should go ahead with the whole project.

8. The view of the Treasury was that while there could be no withdrawal of "this promised assistance" the timing of any announcement or undertaking should be considered in the light of whether Trinidad would continue in the Federation, especially as the whole objective of the Mission was to provide employment for the small islands and make other decisions of the June Conference more tolerable to both Trinidad and the small islands. The Treasury agreed we could tell Canada and the United States that we would go ahead if they would but suggested we should withhold overt action until the prospects of the Federation surviving became clearer.

9. On the 17th November West Indian Governments were informed in a circular telegram that "consultations with the other Governments concerned have not yet been concluded. I regret that some time may elapse before decisions can be made known." (The subject had been raised by Sir Grantley Adams when he saw Mr. Macleod in September. Mr. Macleod told him that the matter was being sympathetically considered, but he would have to discuss the question with the Chancellor of the Exchequer who had already agreed to make funds available in the context of the Lancaster House decisions. This conversation took place before the views of the American Government (see below) were known.)

10. By the end of 1961 the follow-up to the Mission's report had been put into cold storage as a result of four principal factors:—

(a) The dispute between ourselves and the Canadians over the insistence of the latter in appropriating for their own aid those schemes which would result in an appreciable gain to Canadian industry and their refusal to bear local costs as part of their aid (which would result in an indirect U.K. subsidy, as local costs would ultimately have to be borne by the U.K. through grant in aid) (see paragraphs 5 and 6). (The question of "tying" U.K. aid has recently been the subject of discussion in the Development Policy Committee. Ministers have now agreed that dependent territories should be told that purchases on a significant scale from non-U.K. sources out of U.K. C.D. and W. assistance will have to be cleared with H.M.G. first to enable the Board of Trade to consider whether comparable British material could be offered. A communication to territories is under preparation.)

(b) The desire of the United States to reconsider their aid programme to the area following the appointment of Mr. Fowler Hamilton as Administrator of A.I.D. and Congressional reduction in the President's requested aid programme. The State Department said that they could not be sure whether the \$U.S. 2.1 m. earmarked for the Mission would survive in the revised programme though they were

“generally confident” it would; they also said that even if the money were available they would probably not want to commit it “until the constitutional outlook of the Eastern Caribbean is clarified”. Even though the United States may still be prepared to consider aid to the area, she will probably wish to concentrate on those islands where she has defence interests (Antigua, Barbados and St. Lucia). Their general attitude seems to be that “if Federation is off, then the June commitment is off”. In any case, their appropriation will lapse at the end of June.

(c) The general political uncertainty in the area following Jamaica’s decision to secede from the Federation and the doubts as to the future intentions of Dr. Williams. The Mission had been a financial lever to help pull off the Lancaster House settlement. Now that the settlement had broken apart, it seemed likely that the money might well be needed as a “sweetener” at some future date.

(d) The fact that a whole string of financial misdemeanours had been unearthed in Grenada, Montserrat and Antigua. Until these situations had been sorted out it seemed difficult to justify to Parliament any new assistance at least to these three territories.

11. Therefore at the time of the Secretary of State’s visit to Trinidad in January we were not eager to take up the implementation of the full Report. At the same time it was recognised that complete inaction was not possible. It was therefore suggested that the Secretary of State might like to indicate during his visit that there were three projects recommended in the Mission’s report which could be considered for Exchequer loans (if loans were unobtainable from other sources). These projects were:—

(a) A cotton ginnery in St. Vincent to replace one destroyed by fire in 1959. The Mission’s estimated cost of the ginnery is \$BWI 525,000 (£115,000).

(b) An electricity supply scheme in St. Vincent in conjunction with the Colonial Development Corporation, for which \$BWI 190,000 (£35,000) is required to provide capital for expansion.

(c) An electricity supply scheme in Dominica for which \$BWI 350,000 (£75,000) is required. The electricity company is owned and operated by the Colonial Development Corporation which has agreed to double the capacity of the hydro-electricity plant and has asked Dominica to purchase an interest. Dominica has large potential sources of hydro-electric power and this might make a substantial contribution to its development.

The Secretary of State during his visit informed the Governments concerned that applications for Exchequer loans could be considered. No formal applications have yet been received and savingsgrams have recently been despatched informing the territories that detailed applications will be necessary before any consideration can be given to the provision of Exchequer loans (and that they must satisfy us that other sources of loans have been tried without success). In the case of Dominica there is a sawmill project, allied to the electricity project, in which the Canadians showed an interest during the Mission. It is understood that they are still interested and this will be taken up with them as a separate individual item apart from any question of implementation of the full Report. Until full applications have been received from the territories and have been examined it is not intended to approach the Americans and Canadians about a possible start by them on implementation of some projects on

their lists. We may, however, have to make some approach to the American and Canadian Governments to discuss the position on the Mission Report, as the political position in the West Indies begins to clarify.

12. The general question of the Mission was raised at the meeting which the Secretary of State had in Port of Spain in January with the leaders of the "Eight". The Secretary of State explained that the failure of the Lancaster House agreement to be ratified had necessitated re-examination of the question of the Mission's Report and he explained that there were a number of points which were still under consideration with the other Governments.

13. It is almost certain that the question will be raised again during the Conference. It is suggested that the Secretary of State might say:—

(a) That it has not yet been possible to resolve the difficulties surrounding the implementation of the Report which have in large measure stemmed from the uncertain political situation; and that it will be necessary for H.M.G. to discuss the position with the other Governments when the political situation is clearer;

(b) That the Mission was mounted in the context of the Lancaster House settlement and independence for the Federation this May. The changed situation has caused all the Governments concerned to re-examine the position.

(c) That no indication can, therefore, be given at present of whether it will be possible to implement the proposals in the Mission's Report.

(d) That if the two other Governments were not to wish to continue with the proposals it would be necessary as far as H.M.G. was concerned to consider the projects discussed in the Report in the light of the general development plans of the territories and the overall resources available to meet them (including the total assistance which H.M.G. can make available under the Colonial Development and Welfare Act). The Governments of Dominica and St. Vincent have already been informed that certain of their projects can be considered for Exchequer loans if other finance is not available.

194 CAB 134/1561, CPC(62)20

18 June 1962

'East Caribbean Federation conference': memorandum by Mr Maudling for Cabinet Colonial Policy Committee on proposals to establish a Federation of the Eight¹

I am circulating for the information of my colleagues this note on the outcome of the East Caribbean Federation Conference.

2. In my memorandum C.P.C. (62)14² which discussed the proposals put forward by the Governments of Barbados and the Leeward Islands (other than the British Virgin Islands) and the Windward Islands for a federation of their eight territories, I recommended that I should be authorised to put forward counter proposals which would suggest that the central government in any federation of these territories should be much stronger than would be the result if their own proposals were implemented. This course of action was approved at our meeting on 11th April

¹ The conference was held at Marlborough House between 9 and 24 May 1962.

² See 187.

(C.P.C. (62) 8th Meeting). I embodied my suggestions in a despatch to the eight Governments and invited them to join in discussions in Barbados early in May but the West Indian Governments requested that these discussions should be held in London. A conference opened in Marlborough House on 9th May and concluded its work on 24th May: its report has been published as a White Paper (Cmnd 1746) and a copy is attached.

3. The Conference recommended that there should be a Federation of the eight territories of Barbados and the Leeward Islands and the Windward Islands and set out the steps to be taken to implement this recommendation. First, the report is to be considered by the Legislatures of the territories concerned; and Fiscal and Civil Service Commissions are to be appointed to examine various problems connected with the establishment of a Federation. When these Commissions have reported, and assuming that the report of the recent Conference has been approved by Unit Legislatures, there will then be a further Conference (to which representatives of opposition parties in the eight territories would be invited) to reach final decisions about the form of the new Federation. (I have made the stipulation about opposition representation because I have received in recent weeks a considerable number of representations from opposition parties on the question of federation. Some have been representations against any form of federation and some have been in favour of a near unitary state). Assuming general agreement at this second Conference, the Federation would then be set up and Federal elections held. I have said that if and when a new Federation is established I will be ready to enter into discussions concerning independence and that these discussions would include a review of the provisions of the Federal Constitution.

4. The recent Conference agreed that an advisory Regional Council of Ministers should be established consisting of representatives of each Unit under the chairmanship of the Governor of Barbados to consider problems of common interest to the territories and to make preparations for the establishment of a Federation. There will thus be a forum for discussion of common problems and the preliminary work which will be done under the direction of this Council, coupled with the reports of the two Commissions, should provide a reasonable basis for the next round of discussions. I do not expect that it will be possible to hold this further Conference much before early 1963 so that if events run smoothly we might expect the new Federation to come into being in about a year's time.

5. The recent Conference went some way in determining the framework of the new Federation. We did not achieve all our objectives. In particular we did not succeed in securing any radical re-shaping of the Unit Constitutions. There were two main obstacles to this: first, the position of Barbados, which at present enjoys full internal self-government. There was no apparent disposition on the part of the Barbados delegation to make a grand gesture and surrender some part of their constitutional apparatus. I suspect the present Government would view this as a dangerous move so far as their internal political position was concerned. Secondly, in the last Federation the smaller territories demanded parity of status with the larger ones. Though the Federation broke up before the Leeward and Windward Islands received full internal self-government, they had already secured a ministerial system with considerable control over their internal affairs. These two difficulties proved insuperable at this stage though I do not rule out the possibility of returning to this point at the next conference when, if the proposals for a Federation have

survived, there will have been time for a lessening of parochial feeling as the Regional Council of Ministers begins to look on itself as a future Federal Government. We secured agreement, however, that there should be a reduction in the number of Ministers in most of the Units after the first general elections following the establishment of the federation.

6. We did secure a strengthening of the central government and in particular in the all important fields of economics and finance. The territories had already agreed to form a customs union within the framework of the federation. We obtained their further agreement that all external aid should be made available through the Federal Government and not direct to Unit Governments. It is also proposed to create a Federal Loans Council, a Federal Economic Development Council and a Federal Industrial Development Board. There will also be freedom of personal movement within the area. The Federal Government will have available to it the proceeds of import duties, postal services, court fees and currency profits. A formula was devised under which the Federal Government will administer the collection of income tax and will lay down uniform legislation and rates (except the rates of tax and allowances in respect of personal income tax). The Federal Government will return the collected revenue to the Unit Governments but provision is made for this to be reviewed within five years. I think that these proposals should provide a reasonably firm basis for central control and initiative in economic and financial matters should the will be there to exercise it.

7. The earlier Conference in Barbados between the Premier of Barbados and the seven Chief Ministers had proposed that the Federal Government should have the power to appoint a Commission of Enquiry to investigate any matter tending to undermine financial stability and good government in any part of the Federation. In addition, we secured agreement that following an adverse report by such a Commission, in certain circumstances the Governor General could dissolve the Legislature of a Unit and arrange for fresh elections. The Federal Government will also have concurrent powers for maintaining and securing public safety and public order and the legislative lists which were drawn up by the Conference also enable the Federal Government to take action over a wide range of subjects. The Police will become a Federal responsibility.

8. One of the most satisfying results of the Conference was an agreement that the aim of the eight territories should be to introduce a unified public service which would staff posts in both Unit and Federal Governments. This will necessarily have to be introduced on a phased basis but it should do much to improve the efficiency and morale of the public service.

9. Taken as a whole I would describe the results of the Conference as quite promising. There are, however, difficult problems inherent in the situation in the area which might prevent the successful establishment of a Federation of these territories. Though the economic gulf between Barbados and the smaller islands is not as wide as it was between Jamaica and Trinidad and the other territories of the last Federation, and Barbados has severe economic problems of her own, she will be the largest and most developed unit of the eight. The advantages to her of joining with her smaller neighbours are no more than marginal at the best, (though the location of the Federal capital in Barbados should be of some economic benefit) and she will be in danger of being outvoted, possibly to her detriment by a combination of her fellows. If her partners indulge in irresponsible behaviour, Barbados might well

begin to question the value of any association with them. At the moment, the political leaders in Barbados consider that it is up to them to provide leadership in the area and there has also been a gratifying change of attitude on the part of the politicians from the smaller territories. They seem to be in a somewhat chastened mood as a result of the failure of the last Federation and to be more likely to make a realistic and sensible approach to their problems. There is, however, always the danger of dissension between the eight territories breaking out before the Federation gets into its stride.

10. There is also the question of the economic viability of the area. At the Conference we put on record our recognition that the area would stand in need of external assistance for some time to come and undertook to set in train a survey of these requirements, bearing in mind the recommendations made by Professor Arthur Lewis to which I referred in my earlier memorandum.³ When the findings of this survey are available, I hope that both the United States and Canada will be ready to join in providing economic assistance for these islands but even so the economic foundations of the area are not likely to say the least, to be very secure.

11. Though the proposals contained in the report of the recent Conference could produce a strong Federal Government, the emergence of such a government cannot be guaranteed. The tools will be there but the will to use them, if necessary in the face of Unit opposition, must be there also. A great deal will depend on how far the leading politicians of the area will be prepared to enter the Federal political arena.

12. The next few months should provide some indication of the likelihood of establishing this Federation on a reasonable basis. In particular the attitude of the various leading Ministers will be demonstrated by the manner in which they tackle the problems discussed in the forum of the Regional Council of Ministers. I am not unhopeful of preventing further fragmentation in this area and of securing a central government which, whilst not as strong as we might hope, can none the less do more for the area than would be possible if the eight territories were to remain apart; but there are many problems to be solved before this goal can be reached.

³ Carleen O'Loughlin, an economist from the University College of the West India, visited the CO in June 1962 and left details of an economic survey which the Institute of Social and Economic Research at UCWI was hoping to mount. The CO asked her to enlarge the project for official use. While, as planned, she would conduct studies of individual islands, she was asked to broaden the project's scope to cover a Federation of the Eight in relation to the following questions which she herself had put:—

- (a) could a territory achieve a level of economic activity necessary to secure a rising standard of living for its growing population, and independence from recurrent external aid?
- (b) what measures for increasing public utilities, developing industry and agriculture, attracting foreign investment and obtaining trained manpower and other basic needs would be needed to achieve the object in (a) above?
- (c) how could these measures best be implemented?
- (d) how long would it take for the objective to be achieved?

She was expected to produce an interim report by Mar 1963. E G Donohoe of the CO minuted: 'She knows well enough what we want. Her preliminary views are that given a framework of objects to work to, these little islands could get out of grant in aid in ten years—with the exceptions of Montserrat & Dominica, who could be expected to rely on help from the area as a whole, rather than on us—after ten years' (CO 1031/3370, minute by Donohoe, 7 June 1962).

195 CO 1031/3974, no 22C

June 1962

[Maladministration in Grenada]: CO note on the background to and provisions of the Grenada (Constitution) Order-in-Council, 1962

This Order in Council makes provision for two things:—

- (i) the virtual suspension of the existing Constitution of Grenada as from the day when the Order is brought into operation and reversion then to direct rule by the Administrator; and
- (ii) the re-introduction of the existing Grenada Constitution after the next general election in the territory, with a few but important changes which will give the Administrator enhanced powers.

The background is set out below.

2. Following the Leeward and Windward Islands Constitutional Conference in London in June, 1959, a new constitution was introduced in Grenada with effect from 1st January, 1960. This provided for a substantial measure of internal self-government. In the exercise of most of his functions the Administrator is required to act on the advice of his Ministers except where he considers it necessary to do otherwise in the interests of maintaining law and order in the West Indies or in order to maintain the efficiency of the Judiciary or Public Service. He has no reserved legislative power.

3. Things went smoothly under the Government which was in power when the new Constitution was introduced. It had, however, been agreed at the 1959 Constitutional Conference that those parts of the new Constitution relating to the Legislature would come into effect only after new general elections had been held in the territory: and that these would be held within a reasonable time after new constituencies had been demarcated. In accordance with this agreement general elections were held in Grenada towards the end of March, 1961 and were won by the Opposition, the Grenada United Labour Party led by Mr. E. M. Gairy.

4. Mr. Gairy had been a leading politician in Grenada for many years. During the general elections in August 1957 he committed an electoral offence of which he was convicted by the Courts in December, 1957. The penalty under the Elections Ordinance for such an offence was disqualification from membership of the Legislative Council for five years. Accordingly, when Mr. Gairy's party won the elections in March, 1961, he himself could not stand for election. A few months later the Legislative Council amended the Elections Ordinance in such a way as to reduce the disqualification for the offence of which Mr. Gairy had been found guilty to one of three years. Mr. Gairy was thereupon elected to the Legislative Council and became Chief Minister towards the end of August, 1961.

5. The Administrator of Grenada had become increasingly concerned during the months since the Gairyites achieved power about the apparent misuse of public funds by the Government of the day, and in September he asked the Principal Auditor to prepare a special report on the control of public expenditure during August, 1961. This report became available early in November, 1961 and confirmed that serious irregularities had occurred in the use of public funds. Both the Secretary of State for the Colonies and the then Federal Government of The West Indies decided that the position was sufficiently serious to warrant the appointment of an independent

Commission of Enquiry to investigate the facts and to establish where the responsibility lay. A three man Commission under the chairmanship of a Barbadian Judge was appointed early in February, 1962. Their proceedings were interrupted by legal action taken by the Chief Minister of Grenada who sought an injunction from the Courts to prevent the Commission from proceeding. The injunction was refused on the 7th April and the Commission resumed their work on the 16th April. Their report (Cmnd. 1735) was published on the 22nd May.

6. The Commission of Enquiry reached the following general conclusions:—

- (i) the Minister of Finance (who was also the Chief Minister) had disregarded and contravened the laws and regulations governing the control of expenditure;
- (ii) expenditure had been incurred wastefully or unnecessarily through failure by Ministers to seek or refusal to accept the advice of the civil servants;
- (iii) the Executive had deliberately destroyed the morale of the Civil Service by undesirable interference with administrative duties and by improper threats against security of office;
- (iv) the Civil Service had been induced by this interference and these threats to commit or condone improprieties or irregularities in the expenditure of public funds.

In general the report was a most damning indictment of the Government of the day and in particular of the Chief Minister and Minister of Finance, Mr. Gairy.

7. The Secretary of State for the Colonies does not consider it possible to allow Ministers against whom such grave charges have been made by an independent Commission of Enquiry to remain in office under a constitution which places very few restraints on their power, in a territory for whose good government he is still ultimately responsible, particularly since Grenada receives substantial amounts of United Kingdom funds, both as grants in aid of administration and for development and welfare purposes, for the use of which the Secretary of State for the Colonies is accountable to Parliament. It is not, however, possible under the existing Constitution for the Administrator to dismiss the Chief Minister. On the contrary, the Administrator is constitutionally required to appoint as Chief Minister the elected member of the Legislative Council who is most likely to command the confidence of a majority of the elected members of the Legislative Council: and he can be removed from office only if a vote of no confidence in him is passed in the Legislative Council by a majority of the votes of the elected members. Mr. Gairy's party hold eight of the ten elected seats in the Legislative Council and it is out of the question to expect a vote of no confidence to receive the support necessary to ensure his dismissal. (In any case, even if he himself chose to resign, this would not solve the problem because the Administrator would have no choice but to invite another member of the Gairy party to become Chief Minister and to form a new Government: and as in the period between March and August, 1961, Mr. Gairy would effectively control the new Government from the sidelines where he would be even more dangerous through the exercise of power without responsibility.)

8. Under the existing Constitution the only way in which to get rid of the present Government of Grenada would be to dissolve the Legislative Council (the Administrator has discretionary power to do this) and to arrange for new general elections. Although Mr. Gairy's party probably command considerably less support today than in March, 1961, it is not possible to assume that they would lose such general elections. If, despite the publication of this damaging report, the Gairyites

were to win a fresh general election within the next two months and thus to receive a fresh mandate from the electorate to continue in power, it would then be politically very difficult indeed for H.M.G. to amend the Constitution. Therefore, in view of the risk that the Gairiyites might win the new elections, it is necessary to amend the Constitution *before* the general election takes place in such a way as to provide the Administrator with sufficient powers to ensure that there can be no recurrence of the malpractices revealed by the Commission of Enquiry, whichever party is returned at the next general election. The necessary amendments to achieve this objective are contained in the Schedule to this Order, which will come into effect after the next general election.

9. This step in itself is not however sufficient to deal with the present situation because, even if the Legislative Council were to be dissolved tomorrow, the existing Government would remain in office until a new Chief Minister was appointed following the new general election. For the reasons set out above the Secretary of State for the Colonies does not consider it possible to countenance the continuance of the present Government in office for even a short further period. In addition, therefore, to dissolving the Legislative Council, the Order will dissolve the existing Executive Council and suspend the provisions of the existing constitution relating to the Executive Council and the functions of Ministers with effect from a very early date. The Administrator will then run the territory by "direct rule" until a general election is held in about two months' time, at which stage, as explained above, a modified form of the existing Constitution will be re-introduced.

10. The main changes in the Constitution which will take effect after the general election are as follows:—

- (i) the Administrator will have a wider reserved executive power i.e. he will be empowered to act contrary to the advice of his Ministers if he considers it necessary to do so in the interests of public order, public faith or good government;
- (ii) the Administrator will be given a reserved power enabling him to ensure the enactment of legislation (including legislation appropriating public money) which the Legislative Council has failed to pass, if he considers that its enactment is necessary in the interests of public order, public faith or good government;
- (iii) the Administrator will be empowered to decide, in his discretion, to appoint an official Minister of Finance (so that if the Gairiyites win the next general election, it will be possible to ensure that no single elected member controls the purse-strings).

11. The Additional Instructions, which are consequential on the dissolution of the Executive Council, will have the effect of requiring the Administrator to consult an *ad hoc* committee should he have to consider whether to exercise the prerogative of mercy in a capital case during the period when there is no Executive Council.

196 CO 852/2064, no 5

29 June 1962

'Jamaica and the Common Market': CO note for CRO. *Annex*

Introduction

Jamaica's considerable interest in our negotiations to enter the E.E.C. stems primarily from the fact that Britain is her biggest export market and that a number

of the more important products she exports to us benefit from valuable preferences and other special arrangements such as the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement. If we entered the E.E.C. without any special arrangements being made to protect her vital interests Jamaica would not only lose these benefits but would be liable to pay the Common tariff and face reverse preferences in favour of the Six and their existing associates. This would be disastrous for her trade and could lead to a severe fall in her standard of living. It is for this reason that the special arrangements described below which we are proposing to protect her interests are vital for her.

2. The special arrangements we have proposed for Jamaica consist essentially of a request for association under Part IV of the Treaty of Rome. In paragraph 35 of his statement at the opening of the negotiations the Lord Privy Seal¹ said that "we should like to see the less developed members of the Commonwealth and our Dependent Territories given the opportunity, if they so wish, to enter into Association with the Community on the same terms as those which will in future be available to the present Associated Overseas Countries and Territories." As far as The West Indies are concerned our Delegation in Brussels have since maintained this position strongly and they will continue to do so. Up to the present there has been no indication from the Six that they would not be prepared to concede association to Jamaica and the rest of the West Indies.

3. If we are successful in achieving association for Jamaica it will provide her with eventual free entry into the whole of the enlarged Community for a number of her important exports with, in some cases, significant tariff protection against competition from third countries. In addition she will also be eligible to receive assistance from the Overseas Development Fund of the E.E.C. As against this she will have to face additional competition in the British market from similar products (e.g. citrus and bananas) produced in other E.E.C. countries and the existing Associates, but this should not be serious. She will also have to be prepared to accord to other Community countries and Associates any preferences which she at present grants to Britain and other Commonwealth countries but she should still be able to retain tariffs on her imports to meet the needs of her development or for fiscal purposes.

4. If an offer of association is obtained for and accepted by Jamaica her position will then depend on the degree of protection and other arrangements for her exports in the Community market as a whole. The position on the main commodities of interest to her is set out in the Annex. She might also be affected by any arrangements finally agreed by the Community with regard to the free movement of labour and the position on this aspect is explained in paragraphs 7 and 8 below.

Previous consultations with Jamaica

5. In July, 1961, as part of the round of visits to various Commonwealth countries previous to Britain's decision to apply for entry to the Common Market, Lord Perth, the then Minister of State for Colonial Affairs, visited The West Indies to obtain the reactions of West Indian Governments to the possibility of Britain applying for membership of the E.E.C.² In the course of this visit he held consultations in Trinidad with the then Federal Government and with representatives of Unit Governments including Jamaica. The immediate reaction of West Indian Ministers in general was to express apprehension at the possibility of

¹ Mr Edward Heath.

² See 154.

Britain entering Europe, as they were afraid that this would entail her giving up the Commonwealth and sacrificing the West Indies. Lord Perth took great pains to show the West Indians that this was not the case, that it was not a simple matter for the U.K. of choosing the Commonwealth or Europe and that in any negotiations we would do our utmost to protect vital West Indian interests (in this connection he explained the possibility of Association). As a result the fears of the West Indians were somewhat mollified but, as they have a habit of mind of clinging tenaciously to what they have got (i.e. a privileged position in the British market) and of fearing the unknown or unfamiliar they have retained a certain suspicion. Their reaction was, however, to demand association on the most favourable possible terms with continued protection for all their exports.

6. Since then there have been consultations in London with West Indian officials and three West Indians (including a Jamaican official) visited Brussels in December to confer with the U.K. Delegation and to meet the E.E.C. Commission. In addition regular circulars describing the progress of the negotiations have been sent to all Colonial governments, including the Jamaica Government, ad hoc communications are sent to individual governments on points of special interest to them and there are arrangements to consult the embryo Jamaica High Commissioner's Office (formerly the West Indies Commission) in London when the occasion arises. The Prime Minister³ of Jamaica, who is visiting London at the beginning of July to discuss financial questions, will take the opportunity to discuss Common Market questions at the same time.

Free movement of labour

7. The position on the main commodities of interest to Jamaica is set out in the Annex. One other subject which may be raised in Jamaica, however, concerns the provisions in the Treaty of Rome for the free movement of labour within the Community. It might be argued that, following the passing of the U.K. Commonwealth Immigrants Act, intending immigrants from the Community will be treated more favourably in the U.K. than will Commonwealth immigrants. It has also been alleged in the West Indies that this Act was passed primarily in order to facilitate Britain's entry into the Common Market; and, although the Colonial Secretary has emphatically denied this in correspondence⁴ with the Prime Minister of Trinidad it may still require once again to be firmly denied. The charge of more favourable treatment for Community labour cannot, however, be denied so emphatically. The relevant articles of the Treaty of Rome (Articles 48–51) are not clear on how the obligation to accord free movement of labour is to be interpreted in practice in the Common Market period (i.e. is it to mean freedom to accept employment if offered, which involves some degree of administrative control, or freedom to move to another country to *seek* employment). The regulations in force at the moment retain the principle of administrative control and there have been indications that the Six do not intend to permit complete freedom of movement (which they call "vagabondage"). On the other hand they may well in the end accept only the minimum degree of administrative control. Provided, however, that

³ Now Sir A Bustamante who defeated Manley at the general election in Jamaica on 10 Apr 1962. Percentage of votes: JLP 50.04, PNP 48.60, others 1.36.

⁴ See 169 and 172.

reasonable administrative control is retained Community labour will in fact be treated no better than Commonwealth immigrants who are controlled by the voucher system (vouchers being granted to intending immigrants who have been offered jobs and to a fixed quota of others on a first come first served basis).

8. As to the possibility of West Indians seeking to move to other E.E.C. countries it is again not known what treatment will be accorded them for the purposes of immigration. Article 135 of the Treaty provides that movement of workers in Member States from associated countries and territories and vice versa shall be governed by agreements to be concluded subsequently; but so far no such agreements have been negotiated.

Annex to 196: Position of main commodities of interest to Jamaica

(1) *Sugar*

Sugar accounts for over a quarter of Jamaica's total exports. Almost two thirds of her exports are sold in the U.K. market under the special terms of the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement which gives her a negotiated price more than twice the present level of the world price for a fixed quota. Most of the rest is sold in Canada at world price plus Canadian preference (over £7 a ton). There are also valuable sales to the United States. The Commonwealth Sugar Agreement (C.S.A.) at present runs until 1969 (it is agreed for eight years ahead and has so far been extended each year) and it is our intention if we enter the Common Market to continue the Agreement for this period. Thereafter in the Common Market period we hope to negotiate either the continuance of the C.S.A. within the framework of a Community Policy on sugar or arrangements which will have an equivalent effect. It is not known to what extent we will succeed in this objective but in any case it should be possible to negotiate favourable terms for territories which are offered association.

(2) *Jamaica* [sic: Bananas]

Although of considerably less importance than before the War bananas still account for about 11% of Jamaica's total exports. They are all sold in the U.K. where they receive the benefit of a Commonwealth preference of 7/6 d per cwt. (about 13%) as well as protection against competition from Central and South American bananas by quantitative restrictions on dollar imports. As a result Jamaica receives prices for her bananas as much as 40% above world prices. If we join the Common Market the Common external tariff and preference for the associates is likely to be 20% but, if at the same time the dollar restrictions were removed, this would still mean a fall in prices for Jamaica. The same position arises for Franc Area bananas in France and for Somali bananas in Italy, both of which receive very much higher than world prices in their metropolitan markets. Our proposals in the negotiations on this product involved the imposition of a levy on all bananas into the enlarged Community, the proceeds being paid over as subsidies to the Associated countries and territories (including Jamaica). This would have given the associates returns greater than they would have received with a tariff of even 20%. However, it is unlikely that this proposal will now be adopted, at least immediately, if only because of German and Benelux opposition. Instead, it is likely that the British, French and Italian markets will be isolated for the time being which would mean that we could retain our quantitative restrictions if we so wish. As to that, H.M.G. are committed to reviewing

the operation of dollar q.rs with the West Indies in 1963, but no undertaking to retain the q.rs indefinitely has been given.

(3) *Fresh citrus and citrus products*

In the field of citrus Jamaica exports fresh grapefruit, a small quantity of fresh oranges and ortaniques, canned grapefruit, orange and lime juice. Well over 90% of her citrus exports are sold in the U.K. As we have only a relatively low tariff (5/- per cwt. or about 7%) on fresh grapefruit and no tariffs at all on canned grapefruit segments and orange and grapefruit juice, the West Indies are protected against U.S. competition in the U.K. market for these products by quantitative restrictions on dollar imports. E.E.C. tariffs are, however, high especially on citrus products (where they range from 21–27% and 42% on highly concentrated juice). Despite these high tariffs, however, it is now proposed that we accept them *pro tem* for the purposes of the negotiations and allow pressures from third countries (especially the U.S. and Israel) in the G.A.T.T. to obtain reasonable reductions later. Provided Jamaica and the other West Indian citrus producers are associated they will thus receive considerable preferences on these products and we will be able to consider favourably the removal of our dollar restrictions. On one product, fresh grapefruit, we are asking for an increase in the Common tariff from 12% to 15% in the West Indies season to enable us to remove dollar restrictions.

(4) *Spices*

The main spices exported by Jamaica are pimento and ginger. In the case of pimento she has virtually a monopoly of world exports and a tariff would be of no benefit to her. With ginger the U.K. preference at present provides no price advantage because the greater part of the world's supplies come from the Commonwealth (especially India). In this case, as India will not be associated, it is felt that a zero duty will be to the best overall advantage of the Commonwealth and will not harm Jamaica. We have therefore asked for zero duties in the enlarged Community on both these spices and also zero duties on all minor spices on *de minimus* grounds.

(5) *Essential oils*

Jamaica's main essential oil exports are citrus oils (mainly orange and lime) and pimento oil. In general we have proposed accepting the Common tariff of 5–10% on non-citrus oils and of 12% on citrus oils. On lime oil, however, we have asked for an increase to 20% to protect the West Indies against competition from Mexico and the U.S.A. (The U.K. tariff was increased from 10% to 25% for this purpose in 1956, using the G.A.T.T. Colonial waiver, after dollar imports were liberalised).

(6) *Cocoa*

Jamaica exports small quantities of cocoa, but it is not as important for her as for Trinidad and Grenada. The Common tariff has been 9% and we have asked for this to be reduced to zero. It is, however, unlikely that we will succeed in obtaining this and the Six are proposing in negotiations with their existing associates a reduction of 40% in all to 5.4%. If she is associated Jamaica is thus likely to receive a preference at this level in the enlarged Community.

(7) *Coffee*

Again Jamaica exports only relatively small quantities of high grade coffee. The present Common tariff is 16% and we have asked for a reduction to 5%. The Six are,

however, again proposing to their existing Associates a reduction of 40% to 9.6% and it is likely we will accept this. Once again as an associate Jamaica would receive the benefit of whatever preference is eventually agreed.

(8) *Rum and molasses*

Over two thirds of Jamaica's rum exports are sold in Britain and the Six but a much smaller proportion of her molasses exports. The Common tariff in each case is considerably higher than the present U.K. tariff (our own duty on rum is essentially an excise duty with a tiny Commonwealth preference) and would *prima facie* confer advantages on Jamaica if she is associated. Jamaica does, however, receive some protection in the U.K. market from q.rs on dollar imports on rum and these would presumably be removed when the higher preference came into effect.

(9) *Cigars*

Jamaican cigars mainly compete with the more expensive varieties from Cuba., the U.S.A. and the Philippines and she is protected at present in the U.K. market by q.rs on dollar imports. As with rum the U.K. duty on cigars is mainly an excise duty with a very small Commonwealth preference. The Common tariff on cigars, on the other hand is again a high one (80%) and, if applied on imports from third countries with free entry for Jamaica as an associate, would provide Jamaica with very considerable protection against competition from Cuba and other dollar sources. If protection on this generous scale is obtained for Jamaica there would be no grounds for continuing the U.K. restrictions on dollar imports.

(10) *Bauxite and alumina*

Bauxite and alumina together constitute Jamaica's most important export (about 45% of her total exports). She is heavily dependent on this industry for her revenue and also after independence, for her foreign exchange earnings although it is less important than sugar and the other agricultural industries for employment. All Jamaica's bauxite is sold in Canada and the U.S.A. and alumina (the product of the first stage of processing) to Canada and Norway. As, however, a large part of Canadian exports of aluminium are sold in the U.K. and the E.E.C. she will be affected by the level of tariff on aluminium applied in the U.K. and the enlarged Community; and the state of the Canadian industry will indirectly affect Jamaica's sales of bauxite and alumina. The present common tariff on aluminium is 9% but we have asked for a zero duty. Although the Six are unlikely to agree to this it is hoped that either a low rate of duty or duty free quotas in the U.K. market will be obtained which will not seriously affect Canada's sales. As French interests are involved, however, the battle will be a hard one. Norway has applied for full membership and, if she obtains it and Jamaica is associated, Jamaican duty free sales of alumina to Norway will be maintained, as will Norway's exports of aluminium to the Community no matter what the level of the Common tariff. Jamaica should not therefore have anything to fear as regards her sales to Norway.

(11) *Minor manufactured goods*

Jamaica is encouraging the establishment of new industries in the Island and she now exports small quantities of cotton yarn and fabrics, travel goods, clothing and footwear etc., partly to neighbouring Caribbean territories and the U.S., but also in a small way to the U.K. If she becomes an associated state she should continue to benefit from free entry for these goods in the U.K. and also eventually in the rest of

the Community. It seems likely, however, that the Six will insert a "disruption clause" in the new Part IV Implementing Convention which will provide for protective action in the Community (by applying the Common tariff in whole or in part) if sales of this type of goods from the associates threaten disruption. It is unlikely that the clause would in fact be invoked, but it would be wise, if Jamaica begins to develop her exports of these types of goods to Europe, to spread them over a range of goods rather than concentrate on one type.

197 CO 1031/3489, no 44

2 July 1962

'Financial and defence discussions with Jamaica government delegation': CO note of a meeting between Mr Maudling and a delegation led by Sir A Bustamante

[A financial settlement with Jamaica had been under CO consideration since the end of 1961. J E Whitelegg, a principal in the West Indian Dept 'B', argued that as Jamaica constituted just over half the population of the former federation, a case could be made for allocating to the territory half of the assistance previously contemplated for the federation as a whole, excluding the grant-in-aid element (CO 1031/3489, minute by Whitelegg, 18 Dec 1961). D J Kirkness, a principal in the Finance Dept, contested this. To apply the same criterion throughout the Caribbean, Trinidad would receive three times as much as Barbados which would be 'absurd'. The test ought to be based on need and, in Kirkness's view, 'I do not rate Jamaica very high on that'. Jamaica's national income per head was twice that of the Leewards and Windwards, one and a half times that of Barbados and seven times that of East Africa generally: 'They have little claim on us, & our object should be to give them the least we can. . . . We can get away with a good deal with Jamaica on a "take it or leave it" basis; if they want independence, let them have it on our financial terms'. In view of the recent ministerial decision that new or increased overseas commitments could be accepted only if they were of exceptional importance to UK interests, Kirkness maintained that no case could be made for the future of Jamaica falling within that category (*ibid*, minute by Kirkness, 19 Dec 1961). As preparations were made to receive Bustamante (see 196, note 2) and his delegation in London, J D Higham reminded colleagues of the statement made by Selwyn Lloyd, the chancellor, in July 1961 that an overseas aid budget of £180 million was the maximum the UK economy could sustain (*ibid*, minute by Higham, 22 June 1962). At the London talks in July 1962 the Jamaican delegation submitted a request for grants of over £2 million and loans of £11 million for the period up to the beginning of a new ten-year development plan in 1963, with assistance thereafter bringing the total to about £14.5 million. D Williams described this as 'preposterous' (*ibid*, minute by Williams, 27 June 1962).

Invited by the Secretary of State to explain their case for seeking financial assistance from H.M.G., the Jamaica Government delegation said that Jamaica's needs fell into two broad categories. First, there was the problem of immediate requirements. On assuming office the new Government had found that they had inherited a liability of £6.1 million for the period up to 31st March, 1962, with the result that no reserve funds were available for emergency purposes. There was also a deficit of about £4½ million for the current year which could be met only by external loans. The new Government had also inherited a heavy commitment for the purchase of railway stock and the Industrial Development Corporation had borrowed from the Banks over £1 million for the construction of factory buildings. Secondly, there was the need to secure low interest bearing loans for the proposed 10-year development plan which represented the minimum rate of growth possible which was satisfactory given the political and economic circumstances in Jamaica. Credit restrictions during the past two years had forced back the rate of development and there would be serious

difficulties if development could not take place at the rate proposed in the plan; expectations had been heightened by the advent of a new Government and the movement into independence. There were however increasing difficulties in the way of expanding the economy further; all available internal resources had been earmarked for the plan (no more money could be raised for the time being by Treasury Bills); the private sector (e.g. bauxite, hotels, etc.) could not be called upon for additional funds which would in future have to be found from the public sector; there were no untapped natural resources which could be developed, only marginal expansion could be made; the prospects of raising a London loan were not encouraging while Jamaica's stock was examined as part of the Colonial group and a year had been lost in seeking to get on to the market; and it seemed unlikely that the I.B.R.D. would be able to assist as it appeared there were no schemes planned in Jamaica which would be suitable for financing from its sources.

2. *Sir Alexander Bustamante* said that Jamaica stood alone "among a sea of discontent" in the Caribbean. The overall increase in Jamaica's wealth in recent years had hardly touched the small man; 18% of the working forces still remained unemployed. Developing the Premier's point, *Mr. Seaga* said the fact that the gross domestic product had been increasing at an average rate of 7½% over the past six years (it had fallen about 3½% from 1958 onwards) was misleading since there was no correlation between incomes and the level of unemployment. Industrial development had resulted in only 8,000 jobs being found whereas 18,000 were required; about 10,000 persons were being added annually to the number of unemployed. The problem had previously been partially eased by immigration into the United Kingdom but the Commonwealth Immigrants Act had created a new problem. It was essential that economic growth should proceed at a faster rate than the increase in population. Much was made of Jamaica's wealth in comparison with other newly independent countries; but there were, for example, secondary school places for only 7½% of children of school age and the house building programme was meeting about only one-tenth of what was needed.

3. *The Secretary of State* said that he had been very surprised at the extent of the financial assistance sought by Jamaica which was completely out of line with what had been expected, with what H.M.G. might be able to afford, and with what other newly independent countries had sought. He had been surprised to learn that there was a deficit of £6 million for 1961-62. The Colonial Office had been aware that the previous Government required assistance to meet immediate difficulties; but they had not known the problem was anywhere near as large as was now stated. It seemed to him unreasonable to expect that because Jamaica was becoming independent there would be a higher inflow of external funds to meet this deficit. The proposed development plan appeared to be based on the assumption that external assistance would be available at three times the level at which it had been previously which again seemed to be unreasonable. H.M.G. could only provide assistance where the need for it could be clearly shown; otherwise, the unqualified release of funds could damage the position of sterling. The amount of overseas assistance which could be provided was strictly limited and regard had therefore to be paid to such criteria as levels of income per head in the various countries seeking assistance. On that basis Jamaica was very wealthy as compared, for example, to East Africa.

4. There was also some discussion of the following matters:—

(a) *Continuation of C.D. and W. schemes.* The Jamaica delegation asked whether some financial arrangement could be made whereby existing schemes could be continued after independence. The U.K. delegation indicated that it should be possible to make such an arrangement.

(b) *Subscriptions for membership of various international organisations.* The Jamaica delegation said that they wished to join various organisations, including the World Bank and I.M.F., but that the costs of doing so were high. The U.K. delegation suggested that rather than consider such a request in isolation it would be better to discuss the overall level [of] assistance from which the cost of such subscriptions might be met.

(c) *Capital costs of the U.W.I.* The Jamaica delegation said that H.M.G. had previously recognised the need to finance the development of the University and hoped that Jamaica's independence would not lead to any change in this attitude.

(d) *War Department lands.* The Jamaica delegation said that it would not be possible for the Jamaica Government to pay for the lands and that, following tradition, they should be handed over to Jamaica.

(e) *Defence equipment.* The Jamaica delegation said that they would like H.M.G. to help in meeting the cost of equipment for the Jamaica Regiment, including the refund of moneys which the Jamaica Government had already spent on acquiring equipment from the British garrison.

(f) *Common Market.* The Jamaica delegation said that they were not clear whether, if Britain's application to join the Common Market were successful, it would be open to Jamaica to enjoy Associate Membership.

4. It was agreed that discussions would be held at official level on the general financial questions and the questions listed in paragraph 6, after which a further meeting would be arranged at ministerial level.

198 CO 1031/3489, no 41A

6 July 1962

[Financial settlement with Jamaica]: letter from Mr Fraser to Mr Brooke¹

I think you have seen Edward Boyle's² letter to me of to-day. I am sorry to have to come back to you in Reggie Maudling's absence but I have to see the Jamaican delegation at 4 o'clock this afternoon when they are expecting to hear our final decision. I realise that the Treasury have gone quite a long way in an effort to help us and I hope you will not think that I am ungracious therefore when I say that quite frankly I do not believe that the authority Boyle has given me in this letter represents a settlement which we can reasonably put before the Jamaican Delegation as our last word.

The particular point on which I regard the Treasury proposal as vulnerable is the suggestion that the development loan should be limited to £500,000.

I have not in the time available been able to carry out an exhaustive analysis of Jamaica's bid which adds up to some £11 million in loans up to the end of the

¹ See 178, note 3.

² Financial secretary to Treasury, 1959–1962.

current financial year together with over £2 million grants but we are satisfied having regard to the resources otherwise available to them that to offer as little as £500,000 would enforce on them a cut in development expenditure which would be quite unacceptable to them. They have been averaging over £10 million a year and while we may consider this to be more than they can afford we cannot I think ask them to come down at once to the kind of figure which a development loan of no more than £500,000 would necessitate. As far as I can see their current year's programme would on this basis have to be limited to something like £7 million. Not only have they a great many continuing commitments to be met within this but the political effect cannot be left out of account. Unemployment is already a serious problem and we cannot ignore the practical as well as the political effects of the Commonwealth Immigration Act.

Any development loan would count against the £100 million ceiling in the Colonial Development and Welfare Act for Exchequer loans. We in the Colonial Office, as the Treasury know, had always regarded it as appropriate, on the basis of competing priorities, to earmark £5¼ million for the Caribbean area (excluding British Guiana) and of this we have always contemplated that at least £1½ million would be an appropriate sum for Jamaica. We are not therefore asking the Treasury for any provision for which we have not already allowed and which is not already covered in the Aid Programme forecasts.

I am trying to arrange to have a word with you about this matter before I see the Delegation at 4 o'clock but I thought it as well to give you this advance notice of the point which I shall want to raise with you.

If you can meet me on this then I would be prepared to tell the Jamaican Delegation this afternoon that this is a final settlement even though they do not get the warships and even though the value of the War Department's lands is included at a figure which the Government of Jamaica would certainly regard as an over-valuation. Frankly I could not put your present proposals to them as a final settlement.³

³ The final settlement reached with Jamaica consisted of (a) grants equivalent to the amount of Jamaica's CD&W allocation remaining unspent upon independence—£600,000; (b) grants to make good the shortfall in the current capital programmes of the University of the West Indies Teaching Hospital resulting from the reduction of CD&W schemes for these purposes upon independence—£300,000, together with grants of about £100,000 towards Jamaica's expenditure which would otherwise have been met from existing CD&W schemes for regional services, should Jamaica wish to participate in them; (c) a special grant of £112,000 towards the cost of completing the Institute of Arts, Science and Technology; (d) War Office lands and buildings to the value of £2.5 million; (e) a loan of £1¼ million in respect of Jamaica's 1962–1963 development programme, the territory's ten-year development plan being regarded as a separate question for which Commonwealth Assistance Loans would be made available if need was shown (CO 1031/3489).

199 CO 852/2065, no 75

13 Aug 1962

'Trinidad and the Common Market': CO note for CRO. *Annex I*

Introduction

Trinidad and Tobago are the southernmost of the West Indian Islands and are situated off the coast of Venezuela. Their population is about 850,000 (the second

largest in the West Indies after Jamaica) and their main exports are petroleum and petroleum products (about 80% of total exports), sugar, cocoa, coffee, citrus and rum. The territory was a part of a Federation of The West Indies but, after the break up of the Federation, it applied for independence on its own. This has been granted and Trinidad will become independent on the 31st August (i.e. before the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference).

Interest in the Common Market negotiations

2. Trinidad's main interests in the Common Market negotiations are:—

- (a) Association;
- (b) the treatment of her petroleum products;
- (c) sugar;
- (d) the free movement of labour.

These are all dealt with seriatim below and notes on Trinidad's main export commodities are included in Annex I. It should be noted that Dr. Eric Williams, the Prime Minister of Trinidad, is an able economist who is well aware of Trinidad's economic interests in the negotiations and how these might best be met. After the Trinidad Independence Conference earlier this summer, he visited a number of capitals of the Six and he also discussed Trinidad's problems with the Lord Privy Seal.

Previous consultations with Trinidad

3. In July, 1961, as part of the round of visits to Commonwealth countries previous to Britain's decision to apply for entry to the Common Market, Lord Perth, the then Minister of State for Colonial Affairs, visited the West Indies to obtain the reactions of West Indian Governments to the possibility of Britain applying for membership of the E.E.C.¹ In the course of this visit he held consultations in Trinidad with the then Federal Government and with representatives of unit Governments, including the Government of Trinidad. The immediate reaction of West Indian ministers in general was to express apprehension at the possibility of Britain entering Europe as they were afraid this would entail her giving up the Commonwealth and sacrificing the West Indies. (To some extent Dr. Williams did not share this rather emotional attitude and took a more calculating line, but even he was apprehensive about such factors as the future of Trinidad's petroleum exports, the free movement of labour and the future of the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement). Lord Perth took great pains to show the West Indians that their fears were unfounded, that it was not a simple matter for the U.K. of choosing the Commonwealth or Europe and that in any negotiations we would do our utmost to protect the vital interests of the West Indies. (In this connexion he explained the possibility of association). As a result the fears of the West Indians were somewhat mollified but, as most of them have a habit of mind of clinging tenaciously to what they have got (i.e. a privileged position in the British market) and a fear of the unknown or unfamiliar, they have retained a certain suspicion. Their reaction was however to demand Association for the West Indies on the most favourable possible terms with continued protection for all their exports.

¹ See 154.

4. In the late autumn of 1961 Dr. Williams wrote to the Secretary of State for the Colonies expressing apprehension about certain aspects of the Common Market (i.e. those mentioned above in paragraph 3) and suggesting that one of his officials should visit the U.K. and Brussels to make Trinidad's case better known.² This was accepted and consultations were held in London with Trinidad and other West Indian officials in December, during which the whole field was gone over. The officials concerned also visited Brussels to confer with the U.K. delegation and to meet the E.E.C. Commission. Following these consultations Dr. Williams expressed himself as satisfied with the assurances given to his representative. In addition to this special mission regular circulars describing the progress of the negotiations have been sent to all Colonial Governments (including the Trinidad Government), ad hoc communications are sent to individual Governments on points of special interest to them and there are special arrangements to consult the Trinidad Office in London when the occasion arises. Occasional meetings of representatives of Colonial Governments in London are also held to keep them in the picture about the progress of negotiations.

5. During the Trinidad independence Conference earlier this summer further meetings were held with the Trinidad officials concerned to discuss Common Market matters, especially petroleum. Following his visit to the continent after the Conference (during which he conferred with the German and French Governments among others) Dr. Williams had meetings in London with the Lord Privy Seal and with officials to raise further points regarding Trinidad's possible relationship with the enlarged Common Market; (copies of the records of these meetings are attached at Annex II).³ He made requests for a considerable amount of information which has since been sent to him.

Trinidad's particular interests

(a) Association

6. The Trinidad Government is fully aware that if Britain joins the E.E.C. the best means of safeguarding her economic interests would be association with the enlarged Community. Britain is her biggest market, especially for sugar and citrus, and an important market for petroleum products. From the beginning of the negotiations H.M.G. has therefore maintained for Trinidad, as for other dependent territories, a demand for association under Part IV of the Treaty of Rome on the same terms as are available to the existing associated countries and territories. It was for a long period difficult to get to grips with this aspect of the negotiations because the Six were discussing the renewal of the association arrangements with their existing associates. But now that the broad outline of the terms on which association is likely to be renewed is known it has been possible to make progress in Brussels during the last month or two with discussions on association for Commonwealth countries and territories. As a result it has been agreed that most of our dependent territories would be accepted for association if Britain so wishes and that independent Commonwealth countries in Africa and the Caribbean would also in principle be considered suitable for association if they so wish. For this purpose, Trinidad, because she has a date for independence, has been included in the independent countries.

² See 169.

³ Annexes II and III not printed.

7. Association would be of benefit to Trinidad because it would enable her to continue to sell some of her most important exports free of duty in the British market and indeed eventually to have these privileges extended to the markets of the whole Community on preferential terms. On the other hand, if the U.K. entered the E.E.C. without any special arrangements being made to protect her vital interests, Trinidad would not only lose the benefits she has already in the British market but would be liable to pay the Common tariff and face reverse preferences in favour of the Six and their existing associates. This would be a severe blow to her trade and could lead to a sharp fall in her standard of living. It is for this reason that the achievement of association, which is the most suitable special arrangement available in Trinidad's circumstances, is vital to protect her essential economic interests.

8. If Trinidad is successful in achieving association it would provide her with eventual free entry in the whole of the enlarged Community for a number of her important exports (but see below for petroleum products) in some cases with significant tariff protection against third countries. As against this she will have to face additional competition in the British market from similar products (e.g. citrus, cocoa and rum) produced in other E.E.C. countries and the existing associates, but this should not be serious. She will also have to be prepared to accord to other Community countries and associates any preferences which she at present grants to Britain and other Commonwealth countries but she should still be able to retain tariffs on her imports to meet the needs of her development and for fiscal purposes.

9. If Trinidad is offered and accepts association her position will then depend on the degree of protection and other arrangements for her exports in the Community market as a whole. Her position on the main commodities of interest to her is set out in the Annex I.

(b) *Petroleum*

10. Crude petroleum and petroleum products account for over 80% of Trinidad's exports. About half her production comes from indigenous crude and the other half from imported, mainly Venezuelan crude. She exports about 11 million tons of refined products and 1 million tons of crude of which about 2½ million tons of refined products and ½ million tons of crude come to the U.K. Only small quantities are exported to the Six, mainly the Netherlands, and the rest finds markets in the Western Hemisphere and Africa.

11. Her position on petroleum is complicated by the fact that the Six have not yet decided what the Common tariff should be on petroleum products and by the fact that a decision on this is almost certain to be taken only in the context of the formulation of a common energy policy for the Community as a whole. As an interim measure the Six have agreed that the Netherlands Antilles, (whose exports consist almost entirely of refined petroleum) can only be associated with the Community if they agree to their duty free exports of petroleum being limited to a given quota, divided up within the markets of the Six. Any exports above these quotas both to the Six as a whole and to individual member countries might have to pay the Common tariff or be subjected to other limitations agreed upon by the Community. This protocol on Netherlands Antilles oil is clearly of vital importance for Trinidad as the Six will almost certainly insist on some similar arrangements being agreed for her before she can be associated.

12. As far as the U.K. is concerned our interests and those of Trinidad are identical, namely the maximum freedom of trade in petroleum products with, if possible, a zero tariff in the enlarged Community. But it is unlikely that the Six when they agree a tariff on refined petroleum (the tariff on crude oil is zero) would agree that this should be zero, and indeed as explained above, the whole matter is mixed up with the negotiation of a Common energy policy. This is a most complex field in which it is unlikely that early agreement will be reached, but one of the factors to be taken into account is the French desire to protect oil refined from Saharan crude. It is this interest which led the Dutch in the end to accept the quota for duty free imports from the Antilles and it is highly unlikely that Trinidad will be able to escape with anything less. We will naturally do our best to avoid this but, if the Six insist, it may be necessary to negotiate the best quota possible as part of the terms of a settlement. One of the factors that should be taken into account is that on the surface at least the Antilles quota is not ungenerous. It is approximately double their present exports to the Six and if Trinidad could get similar terms she should not be too badly placed. The exact basis of calculation of the Antilles protocol is, however, disputed and efforts are being made to obtain further information on this vital point before deciding on the exact tactics to be adopted in Trinidad's case. One of the arguments the Trinidadians want to make use of is that a large part (about a half) of Trinidad's petroleum exports are refined from her own indigenous production of crude oil (as compared with the Dutch Antilles which have to rely entirely on imported, mainly Venezuelan, crude), and they argue that this would justify more generous treatment. The difficulty we see in making too much of this argument is that we do not want to appear to concede to the French any arguments in favour of discriminating against oil produced from imported crude. In our opinion it is perhaps best at this stage to be clear about our objectives in negotiating about oil and to leave the tactics to be decided nearer the time in the light of the situation as it develops. We will in any case keep closely in touch with the Trinidad Government on all aspects of this matter (it may be that in the end they will insist on trying to negotiate their own terms of association although we shall no doubt wish to liaise closely with them).

(c) *Sugar*

13. The Commonwealth Sugar Agreement has been one of the mainstays of the West Indian economy in the post-war years. It is one of our main objectives in the negotiations to retain the substance of this agreement and, indeed, we have contractual obligations to keep it running until 1969. In retaining the substance, however, we shall if necessary be willing to accommodate the form to whatever common policy for sugar is eventually agreed by the Community (indeed the Six may insist in the Common Market stage that the arrangements in the C.S.A. should be changed to fit them more closely into the Community framework) but it is our aim to retain the substance. We have emphasised to the Six the very heavy dependence of the West Indies and certain other territories on exports of sugar and now feel that they understand the position. It was, however, not possible to have any substantive discussion on sugar with the Six before the Conference adjourned for the Summer holidays and we shall have to take it up again in the Autumn.

(d) *Free movement of labour*

14. This is a subject which Dr. Williams has raised in the past. He has alleged that the Commonwealth Immigrants Act was introduced to help ease Britain's passage into the Common Market to enable us to discriminate in favour of Community labour and against the Commonwealth. The Colonial Secretary has emphatically denied this in correspondence with Dr. Williams.⁴ The fact is that the present E.E.C. regulations on this subject provide for individual member countries to continue to give special treatment to labour from countries with which they have special associations and it is not our intention in this regard to discriminate in favour of the Community and against the Commonwealth. It might also be said that, although we do not know how this part of the Treaty will eventually be interpreted, it is likely that, even in the Common Market Stage, the Community will retain some form of administrative regulation over the free movement of labour and will not allow people to wander from country to country in search of jobs. It will certainly be our policy if we become a Member to press for the retention of minimum controls. Finally, it might be said that we do not expect to receive any large numbers of workers from the Continent if we join. There is now virtual full employment in almost all countries of the Community and an acute labour shortage in some (e.g. Germany). Even in Italy unemployment is falling fast and there is a shortage of skilled workers; and the Italian Government are trying to induce some Italians in other countries to return to Italy to work.

15. As to the possibility of West Indians seeking to move to other E.E.C. countries it is again not known what treatment will be accorded them for the purposes of immigration. Article 135 of the Treaty provides that movement of workers in Member States from Associated countries and territories and *vice versa* shall be governed by agreements to be concluded subsequently; but so far no such agreements have been negotiated.

Martinique and Guadeloupe

16. One of the ideas which has interested Dr. Williams recently is the possibility of an Eastern Caribbean Common Market to include not only the British territories in the region but also the French Overseas Departments of Martinique and Guadeloupe and the Dutch Antilles (naturally under Trinidad leadership). He clearly realises that the possibility of bringing this about would be strengthened if Trinidad were to become associated with the E.E.C. This is one of the matters which he raised with the French Government when he visited Paris last month (although, on the advice of Sir Pierson Dixon, the British Ambassador in Paris, presumably in guarded terms, although we have had no reports of what transpired). An extract from Sir Pierson Dixon's record of his meeting with Dr. Williams is attached at Annex III.

Annex I to 199: Position on main commodities of interest to Trinidad

1. *Oil and petroleum*

Crude oil accounts for about 3% of Trinidad's total exports and refined petroleum products for 81%. About half her relatively small exports of orude oil and about 30% of her exports of refined petroleum come to the U.K. The Six (mainly the

⁴ See 169 and 172.

Netherlands) take about 4% of her exports of refined products. The E.E.C. Common tariff on crude oil is zero and no difficulties should therefore arise in that field. The much more complicated position in the field of refined petroleum products is explained in the main part of the brief (paragraphs 10–12). (For a more detailed account i.e. C.M.N. (O) (62)295—Negotiating Brief on exports of Oil Products from Commonwealth Territories into the Common Market).

2. *Sugar*

Sugar accounts for about 7% of Trinidad's total exports (over a third of her non-petroleum exports). Getting on for nine tenths of her sugar is sold in the U.K. under the special terms of the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement which gives her a negotiated price for a fixed quota more than twice the present level of the world price. Most of the rest is sold in Canada at the world price plus Canadian preference (over £7 a ton). The Commonwealth Sugar Agreement (C.S.A.) at present runs until 1969 (it is agreed for eight years ahead and has so far been extended each year for one more year) and it is our intention if we enter the E.E.C. to continue the Agreement for this period. Thereafter in the Common Market period we hope to negotiate either the continuance of the C.S.A. within the framework of whatever Community policy on sugar is eventually decided or arrangements which will have an equivalent effect. It is not known to what extent we will succeed in this objective but in any case it should be possible to negotiate favourable terms for territories which are offered association.

3. *Cocoa*

Trinidad's cocoa exports are not large by world standards (e.g. Ghana or Nigeria) but she is with Grenada the biggest cocoa exporter in the West Indies, cocoa accounting for about 2½% of her total exports (13% of her exports other than petroleum). The Common tariff for cocoa is at present 9% but the Six have agreed a reduction or 40% (including a 15% suspension) to 5.4% in the context of their negotiations with the existing associates on the renewal of the Association Convention (the reduced rate would come into force immediately on 1/1/63). We have asked in our own negotiations for the tariff to be reduced to zero but it is unlikely that the Six will agree on any further reductions. If she is associated Trinidad is thus likely to receive free entry for her cocoa into the enlarged Community together with a preference of somewhat over 5% against third country suppliers.

4. *Citrus and citrus products*

In the field of citrus Trinidad exports fresh grapefruit, orange juice and grapefruit juice, most of which are sold in the U.K. market (she is also just beginning to export canned grapefruit segments). Although all her citrus exports only account for about 1% of her total exports they are important politically and from the point of view of employment and Trinidad is in fact the largest supplier of grapefruit juice and of sweetened orange juice to the U.K. market and the largest exporter of fresh grapefruit in the West Indies. As the U.K. has only a relatively low tariff (5/- per cwt. or about 7%) on fresh grapefruit and no tariffs at all on canned grapefruit segments and orange and grapefruit juice, the West Indies are protected against U.S. competition in the U.K. market for these products by quantitative restrictions on dollar imports. E.E.C. tariffs are, however, high especially on citrus products (where they range from 21–27% and 42% on highly concentrated juice). Despite these high

tariffs, however, it is now proposed that we accept them *pro tem* for the purposes of the negotiations and allow pressures from third countries (especially the U.S. and Israel) in the G.A.T.T. to obtain reasonable reductions later. Provided Trinidad and the other West Indian citrus producers are associated they will thus receive considerable preferences on these products and we will be able to consider favourably the removal of our dollar restrictions. On one product, fresh grapefruit, we are asking for an increase in the Common tariff from 12% to 15% in the West Indies season to enable us to remove dollar restrictions.

5. *Coffee*

Trinidad exports only small quantities of coffee (0.5% of her total exports) and most of [?it] is sold in markets other than the U.K. and E.E.C. The present Common tariff is 16% but the Six are agreeing to a reduction of 40% to 9.6% in the context of their negotiations with the existing associates, the revised tariff to come into effect at one stroke on 1.1.63. We have asked for a further reduction to 5% but will probably in the end have to accept the rate proposed by the Six. If Trinidad is associated her small exports of coffee to the enlarged Community would receive the benefit of whatever preference is eventually agreed.

6. *Rum and molasses*

Trinidad's exports of rum and molasses, although not negligible, are less important than Jamaica's. The Common tariff in each case is considerably higher than the present U.K. tariff (our own duty on rum is really a revenue duty with a tiny Commonwealth preference) and would *prima facie* confer advantages on Trinidad if she is associated. At present Trinidad does receive some protection in the U.K. market from q.rs on dollar imports of rum and these would presumably be removed if and when the higher preference came into effect.

7. *Natural asphalt*

This is a peculiar export of Trinidad (Trinidad Lake Asphalt). The E.E.C. Common tariff is, however, zero and, although Trinidad will thus lose some Commonwealth preference in the U.K. market, this should not affect her sales.

8. *Minor manufactured goods*

The Trinidad Government is encouraging the establishment of new industries and in recent years there has been a considerable development of manufacturing industry, notably bricks and tiles, paint, cement, clothing, boots and shoes, furniture, soap, matches, cigarettes, beer, biscuits, chocolate, confectionary, glass, drugs and industrial gasses. Among these products Trinidad exports cement, cotton fabrics, shirts and other clothing, shoes and glass bottles mainly to neighbouring territories. There is no known export to the U.K. or E.E.C. of any of these products. If Trinidad is associated she will eventually benefit from free entry into the whole of the enlarged Community for any exports of manufactured goods. It seems likely, however, that the Six will insert a "disruption clause" in the new Part IV Implementating Convention which will provide for protective action in the Community (by applying the Common tariff in whole or in part) if sales of this type of goods from the associates threaten disruption. It is unlikely that the clause would in fact be invoked, but it would be wise, if Trinidad begins to develop her exports of these types of goods to Europe, to spread them over a range of goods rather than concentrate on one type.

200 CO 1031/3494, no 37

31 Aug 1962

[Trinidad]: letter from N E Costar¹ to Sir S Garner² reporting a conversation with Dr Williams on Trinidad's relations with the UK and the US and his view of the Common Market [Extract]

I paid my first call on the Prime Minister, Dr. Eric Williams, on 31st August. . . . He went out of his way to be charming and informally affable. . . . The bulk of the time was taken up by a very frank, if somewhat one-sided, discussion by the Prime Minister of various political matters, almost all of which were raised by him. The main points are summarised below.

(I) *Relations with Britain*

Trinidad and Tobago was now independent and would brook interference from no outside power. But this did not mean that the Trinidad Government wanted Britain to take less interest in her affairs than in the past. I would no doubt find that he would be giving Britain a few "knocks" from time to time but this would not be to discourage us from a continuing concern with Trinidad. On the contrary, I would find that Dr. Williams wanted Commonwealth links of the right kind to be strengthened not weakened. It soon appeared that he had in mind, in the main, three things:—

(a) Trinidad did not wish to be abandoned by Britain to the Americans either politically or economically. A report had circulated in Trinidad that Mr. Macmillan and the U.S. President (I am not clear whether President Eisenhower or President Kennedy was meant) had agreed at Bermuda that Trinidad should be recognised by Britain as being the concern of the United States. This had been denied in London but the fact was that many in Trinidad believed it. (He did not say that he did, nor did he demur when I protested that he would know that that was not the way we behaved in relation to Commonwealth territory.) Even if it were true, he would for his part not stand for any American attempt to run or interfere in Trinidad affairs. But his point was that he would welcome continuing British political interest in Trinidad as a counterpoise to American attempts at domination which he professes to fear. I think Dr. Williams sees Commonwealth institutions as a means of helping in this context.

(b) Trinidad wanted Britain to take a continuing interest in the Caribbean generally. We had made mistakes in the past. We (with others) for instance were to blame for the break up of the Federation. The switch from Mr. Lennox Boyd's to Mr. MacLeod's policies—though right in itself—had been somewhat too sudden and had not been fully understood by the people of Trinidad. We should have been firmer in ensuring that Federation succeeded and continued. (I think he meant that we paid too much attention to the views of the smaller islands.)³ But our

¹ CO from 1932; DO, 1935–1936; deputy UK high commissioner in the following locations: Wellington, Apr-Dec 1947; Colombo, 1953–1957; Canberra, 1960–1962; mission to Maldives Islands, Dec 1956; assistant under-secretary of state, CRO, 1958; UK high commissioner to Trinidad, 1962–1966; KCMG 1963.

² Permanent under-secretary of state, CRO.

³ It is equally plausible that Williams was referring to MacLeod's reversal of Lennox-Boyd's insistence that continued financial dependence was incompatible with political independence.

present policy in the Caribbean, and here he was referring particularly to British Guiana, was right and that of the Americans wrong. Our main fault now was not so much the pursuing of wrong policies as the absence of any positive policy. Here he referred to the need for a Caribbean Treaty Organisation.

(c) Trinidad wanted Britain to help her economically. Now was the time for more, not less, investment and loans. He wanted the money to give Trinidad independence a good start. When he asked the Americans or the Germans for money for the same purpose, they asked what the British were doing. I mentioned the many other claims on our limited resources. He replied that the argument that Trinidad should go to the bottom of the list because she was better off than the others was wrong. We should invest the money in Trinidad to make it a show place of successful British decolonisation.

(II) *Relations with the United States*

Most of the early part of our discussion was taken up with a long diatribe by Dr. Williams against the Americans. He professes to fear attempts by the Americans to interfere and to dominate. Inconsistently, he complained that the United States also neglected Trinidad, and instanced as an example the fact that their representative in Port of Spain was of junior rank.

(III) *Common Market*

He thought Britain right to join the Common Market. This was not on economic grounds but because the world needed a strong third force in Europe. He would, of course, fight to prevent any damage to Trinidad's economic interests.

201 CO 1031/3376, no 216

13 Sept 1962

[Barbados]: minute by D Williams to A R Thomas on the delaying tactics of Mr Barrow with regard to a Federation of the Eight

I have just had an extremely interesting conversation with Mr. Barrow.

2. He stressed that the information he was giving me was under no circumstances to be allowed to leak to anybody in the West Indies. He wished me to know however that with regard to federation, the longer it could be delayed the happier he would be. He hopes indeed that we shall be able to make a radically different approach to the whole problem from anything we had been contemplating up till now. What Mr. Barrow wants is that before any political federation is set up we should first create a series of common services working up to a Common Services Organisation and then later to a full political federation. He would like us to start with a Customs Union and then proceed to the setting up of other common services such as the Audit and the Courts. At all costs he said, we must avoid having any federal elections within the next twelve months. He personally would not participate in any such elections if they were held within that time. He was not going to be diverted from dealing with what he regarded as the more urgent problems of Barbados.

3. I thanked Mr. Barrow for explaining his attitude to me so clearly and promised to respect his confidence. I pointed out to him, however, that we were at present proceeding with our preparations for the federation on a very different basis from the

one that he had outlined to me. We had not contemplated the establishment of any common services (with the exception of the Courts) in advance of the final decisions being taken to set up a federation. We should also be under a very considerable pressure from the Leeward and Windward Island Governments if it appeared that we were being dilatory in our preparations for the federation. We were proceeding with the establishment of the Fiscal and Civil Service Commissions and we hoped they would have finished their work by about the 1st January. Similarly we were putting in hand the economic survey¹ which we hoped would be sufficiently complete for our purposes by about February. If these commissions had thus completed their work early in the New Year there would on the face of it, be little excuse for delaying the next conference beyond, say, March or April. Mr. Barrow said this was too early for him. He would want to delay things beyond this date and would not like to have a conference before June. He would do his best to delay things by such tactics as being dilatory in replying to our correspondence and by prolonging the discussions of items affecting the federation in the Regional Council of Ministers. If the worst came to the worst he would be prepared to come out in public and say that Barbados was not going to be rushed.

4. He concluded by laying great stress on one point, namely that Barbados would want to see the Customs Union established before she came into federation. This is clearly going to be awkward because I think that if Barbados has its Customs Union it may well lose interest in other aspects of federation.

5. The other surprising titbit to come out of the conversation was that Mr. Barrow understood that Mr. Southwell had enrolled as a student in Lincoln's Inn. Mr. Barrow had no idea whether this meant that Mr. Southwell was retiring from politics in St. Kitts.

6. I am sending a copy of this minute to Mr. E. L. Sykes in C.R.O., who has recently been enquiring about the prospects of The Eight.

¹ See 194, note 3.

202 CO 1031/4321

20–21 Sept 1962

'British Guiana: proposed army': minutes by Sir H Poynton and Mr Duncan Sandys

Secretary of State

The February disturbances showed that British Guiana before it becomes independent, should build up its Internal Security Forces. For this purpose, the Government of British Guiana wish to raise a small army.¹ Professional advice is that it would be quicker, cheaper and more suited to the conditions of the country if the existing riot squad of the police force were enlarged. But Dr. Jagan's Government cannot be persuaded to accept this advice, and wish to have an army. Most emerging colonial territories have either "inherited" or established armies: in principle there seems no reason why British Guiana should not too.

2. Dr. Jagan has been flirting with the Government of Israel with a view to

¹ cf 189.

getting Israel's help in training and running an army on "NAHAL"² lines but he has rather cooled off this and is now keen that the British Government should assist the British Guiana Government in the training of a small army and in the provision of officers. He hopes that H.M.G. would be prepared to provide finance for the purpose—British Guiana certainly cannot afford any money for an army this year and it is doubtful whether they can next year. If H.M.G. were unable or unwilling to provide assistance Dr. Jagan would explore the possibility of getting technical assistance in training an army through United Nations sources.

3. H.M.G. has provided assistance by way of officers and N.C.Os. and financial help where need was shown, to help other emerging territories build up a national army. Provided the army were a national force and recruitment was not restricted to supporters of Dr. Jagan's party there would seem to be advantage in H.M.G. helping British Guiana to build up an orthodox force on sound British lines. Since the Governor is constitutionally responsible in his discretion for "Defence", he would be responsible for the raising of the army and this should ensure, especially if the enlistment and training of recruits is in British Army hands, that the force is established on acceptable lines.

4. If you agree in principle that H.M.G. should help British Guiana in this way, we can work out proposals in greater detail, which will have to be cleared with various other Departments. Those directly concerned are the Ministry of Defence, the Service Departments and the Treasury, but the C.R.O. and F.O. are also, less directly, interested. We may need your personal intervention with other Ministers to clinch this.

A.H.P.
20.9.62

Sir H. Poynton

Please speak. I agree in principle that BG must be capable of maintaining law and order. But I am inclined to agree that what they need is police rather than soldiers. The Treasury will never agree to raise an army in a country which has such need for other more urgent assistance.

D.S.
21.9.62

² NAHAL: Home Defence Force in Israel.

203 CO 1031/3376, no 250

16 Oct 1962

'UK policy towards a Federation of the Eight and Grenada's proposal to enter negotiations for a unitary state with Trinidad': CO memorandum for Mr Duncan Sandys

1. The problem is to decide U.K. Government policy towards

- (a) a Federation of Barbados and the Leeward and Windward Islands and
- (b) the Government of Grenada's proposal that it should enter into negotiations for a unitary state with Trinidad.

2. Relevant statistics of revenue, expenditure, United Kingdom aid, area and population for Barbados and the Leewards and Windwards are given at Appendix A.¹

3. On Federation generally, it should be noted that it represents the closest form of political association which most of these Governments will contemplate; they have firmly resisted the idea they should joint [sic] together in a unitary state. This being so, there are four possible courses open to the U.K. Government viz.:—

- (a) to encourage the territories to federate on suitable terms;
- (b) to work instead for a looser form of closer association (i.e. a Common Services Organisation);
- (c) to keep the territories separate;
- (d) to work for their piecemeal absorption by Trinidad.

4. On the Government of Grenada's proposal to enter into negotiations with Trinidad for a unitary state there are only two possible courses, viz.:—

- (a) to permit them or
- (b) to prevent them.

5. The *advantages* of allowing Federation to proceed are:—

- (a) It appears to offer the best prospect of advancing all these islands to independence and of securing some measure of economic viability for them.
- (b) H.M.G. is on record as considering that "provided the constitution is such as to provide adequate powers to the Federal Government and to offer a reasonable prospect of economic and financial stability," Federation "appears to offer the best solution to the problems of the area." Substantial reasons will have to be found if this view is to be changed.
- (c) A Conference has been held under the last Secretary of State's Chairmanship at which the Governments concerned "agreed to recommend that there should be a federation," (paragraph 8, Cmnd. 1746 attached) and drew up outline proposals which are *ad referendum* the Legislatures concerned.² Only two of them have so far formally approved the report but others are considering it and it would be difficult to stop the process.
- (d) If they federate, and particularly if we then allow them to proceed to independence, they can be expected to attract aid from other sources than the United Kingdom (e.g. United States and Canada), thereby lessening the burden on us.
- (e) Provided the proposed powers of the central government can be made strong enough, federation offers the best prospect of cutting the small island political bosses down to size.

6. The *disadvantages* of allowing Federation to proceed are:—

- (a) Even if they federate, they will still require substantial sums of outside aid, much of which they will expect to come from the United Kingdom and some of which for some years to come may have to be in the form of grants in aid to meet Government deficits. The smaller islands have shown themselves to be financially irresponsible and administratively incompetent. Once they are federated, we shall

¹ Not printed.

² See 194.

have even less control over the way they spend our money than we have now. If thereafter they proceed rapidly to independence, financial control will present new problems involving new techniques.

(b) Even if we allow the preparations for federation to proceed, there is no guarantee that the territories will be able to bring it off. The Premier of Barbados is known to have doubts and reservations. Others may be tempted to follow Grenada's example and seek union with Trinidad. They lack any united national spirit.

(c) Even if they do federate, a widely scattered population of under 700,000 with their limited resources is a weak and uncertain basis on which to support the paraphernalia of Federation, and the burdens of independence.

7. The only *advantages* of a looser form of association running Common Services are that the Premier of Barbados is believed secretly to favour this course as a prelude to ultimate Federation³ and that it might enable the territories to enjoy some of the advantages of Federation without incurring all the costs of running a Federal Government machine. The *disadvantages* are that we could hardly grant political independence to a Common Services Organisation and that it would leave the small island political bosses dominant in their own territories.

8. The *advantages* of keeping them separate are that since we may have to go on supporting them financially anyhow, we shall thereby have greater control over the way they run their affairs. The *disadvantages* are first that such a course would virtually preclude the possibility that any of them, with the possible exception of Barbados, could attain independence. We should thus be stuck with them indefinitely and we could expect growing political frustration in the islands, which might lead to trouble. Secondly, to secure any effective control over the way they ran their affairs, we should have to take back some of the self-government they have already obtained. This might also lead to trouble. Thirdly, if they continue separate and dependent, they are clearly our responsibility. No other power in these circumstances could be expected to provide any substantial help with their development. Fourthly we might meet growing criticism in international circles that we were keeping the islands separate just so that they could not stand on their own feet and must remain dependent on us.

9. The *advantages* of encouraging their absorption by Trinidad are that we thereby get rid of all responsibility. They become absorbed into a unitary independent state as counties under the authority of the central Government in Port-of-Spain. It also appears to meet the wishes of at least one of them (i.e. Grenada). Others (i.e. Montserrat and St. Vincent) may be content to follow suit. The *disadvantages* are first that some of them at least (i.e. St. Kitts, Antigua and Barbados) are never likely to be willing to accept absorption into Trinidad, which (since Dr. Williams is unlikely to accept anything less than absorption such as a Northern Ireland relationship) therefore offers only a partial solution to the problem of the future of these territories. Secondly Dr. Williams is likely to demand very considerable sums of U.K. financial aid as his price for taking any of them on. (£71 million over ten years is believed to be his asking price for taking on the lot, which is more than twice the rate of our assistance to them at present.)

³ See 201.

10. The Grenada Government, however, has now requested the Secretary of State's permission to enter into negotiations with Trinidad to join that country as a unitary state, stressing that the negotiations at this stage would be purely exploratory and that the Grenada Government would not commit itself without the Secretary of State's approval. The *advantage* of allowing them to proceed is that the Grenada Government having just fought and won an election on this very issue, to do otherwise would lead to trouble and would risk offending the Government of Trinidad. The *disadvantages* are first that the defection of Grenada will diminish the already meagre resources of the Eight—though not fatally: a Federation of the remaining Seven would not be appreciably more difficult to contemplate. Secondly, it may start a rot and other territories, particularly Montserrat, may wish to follow Grenada's lead, thus jeopardising any prospect of a federation of the rest. Thirdly, there can be no guarantee that the negotiations will succeed. Not only will Dr. Williams demand substantial sums of United Kingdom aid as his price for taking on Grenada, but to permit the union to come about he will have to amend some of the specially entrenched provisions in the Trinidad constitution. For this he will require a three-quarters majority in his own House of Representatives which there can be no guarantee that he will get. (It should be noted, in passing, that an Act of the U.K. Parliament will also be required.) Finally, once the terms of the union were known, H.M.G. might feel bound to insist that there should be a further reference to the people of Grenada, and there can be no guarantee that they would vote next time as they did last.

Conclusions and recommendations

11. It is suggested that the conclusion to which the previous paragraphs point is that Federation, provided it can be brought about on suitable terms—particularly with a strong central Government—offers the best solution to the problems of the area. Preparations for it that are now going on should therefore be allowed to proceed. (These preparations take the form of enquiries into the fiscal, economic and civil service implications of the proposals in Cmnd. 1746 and discussions of the Regional Council of Ministers of the Governments concerned, as well as debates in the Legislatures.) At a suitable moment after they are complete, the Conference envisaged in paragraph 63 (iii) of Cmnd. 1746 should take place.

12. At the same time, however, the negotiations between Trinidad and Grenada should be permitted to proceed on the basis proposed by the Government of Grenada (i.e. that they are purely exploratory at this stage.) It will also be important to emphasise that the initiative for them comes from Grenada and not from H.M.G.; and there should be no H.M.G. representative present at them in the early stages. This approach should strengthen our position when we have to be brought in on the question of United Kingdom aid and will also make it clear to the rest of the Eight that H.M.G. is not trying to wreck their schemes for Federation by pushing one of their number in with Trinidad. The question of timing also requires to be considered. The Secretary of State has said that he wishes to keep the situation regarding Grenada uncrystallised until he himself can visit the West Indies; and Dr. Williams for his part appears to be in no hurry to tackle the problem. This would seem to point to our using our influence to delay the talks. On the other hand, once the enquiries into the civil service, financial and economic problems of a Federation of the Eight are concluded—as they should be by early New Year—we can expect pressure from

most of the Eight for an early resumption of talks about federation. Before these can realistically be undertaken, we ought to know whether we are considering a federation of the Seven or of the Eight. This points to the talks starting fairly soon. It is suggested that a reasonable compromise would be for the talks to start early in the New Year. We should not have too much difficulty in postponing a further conference about federation until May or June, and by then the talks between Trinidad and Grenada ought to have advanced at least to the point where we could know whether union between them was practicable or not.

204 CO 1031/3376, no 258

24 Oct 1962

'Financial implications of a Federation of the Eight': CO note for CRO

Present level of U.K. financial assistance

1. The present combined recurrent annual expenditure of the eight territories totals about £17 million. All the territories with the exception of Barbados are currently in receipt of grant-in-aid from Her Majesty's Government to enable them to balance their budgets and the financial position of Barbados itself is deteriorating. Over the last five years these territories have received from U.K. funds an average of £1.87 million per annum (including hurricane relief assistance) in grants-in-aid and a little over £1 million per annum in capital aid.

Forecast of future aid requirements

2. An attempt to estimate future economic and financial trends in the area was made earlier this year. This suggested that if present trends continued, the eight territories might require a total of £70 million in external aid over the next decade. (This must not be regarded as an accurate forecast: insufficient economic data is available at present to enable one to be made).

3. Against this background, it was a surprise that Dr. Lewis, in papers drawn up for the political leaders of the Eight earlier this year, suggested that these territories could manage with about £1.46 million per annum of external capital aid and at the same time succeed in balancing their recurrent budgets within a period of five years (thus ceasing to need grant-in-aid funds). These calculations, however, were based on extremely optimistic and rather shaky economic suppositions.¹

H.M.G.'s attitude

4. Before the May Conference on federation and during the course of the Conference itself, the Colonial Office had discussions with both the Commonwealth Relations Office and the Treasury on the effect of federation on H.M.G.'s financial commitments. The Treasury insisted that it must remain open to H.M.G. to refuse independence at any given time if the likely cost to U.K. funds was judged excessive. If there was to be any question of independence for the new Federation before it became economically viable, it was recognised that this would pose special problems for control of any U.K. funds made available to it. Even so, it was agreed that Federation might do much to strengthen the area economically and that the area would appear to have rather better chances for economic growth if the territories

¹ See 187, annex, paras 5 and 7–8.

were federated than if they were not. It was considered that the United States and Canada should be invited to assist the U.K. in meeting a new federation's external aid requirements.

East Caribbean Federation Conference

5. At the Marlborough House Conference the U.K. delegation made a statement (included in the Conference Report) recording the U.K. Government's recognition that a Federation of the Eight "would stand in need of external assistance for a period after it was established, both on capital and on budgetary account. The U.K. Government would be willing to help within the limits of the resources which we were able to make available, but the amount and nature of such help would require further consideration".² The statement referred to the proposals which had been put forward by Dr. Lewis and stated that these "merited further study in the light of a more detailed survey of the economic needs and financial development of the area which the U.K. Government proposed to put in train".

6. Work on this economic survey, which is being undertaken by Dr. Carleen O'Loughlin of the University of the West Indies, has already begun.³ This survey, together with report of the Fiscal Commission, (being undertaken by Mrs. Hicks⁴ of Oxford University), which is to report on the financial aspects of the establishment of a Federation of the Eight, should provide a firm and factual basis for a detailed examination of the economic prospects in the area and of how far it can hope to decrease its dependence on external aid both on capital and recurrent account. There seems little hope, however, that its economic dependence can be ended entirely within the foreseeable future.

² See 190.

³ See 194, note 3.

⁴ Ursula Kathleen Hicks (Lady Hicks), university lecturer in public finance, Oxford, 1947–1965; publications include *Report of Fiscal Commission East Caribbean* (Cmnd 1991, 1963).

205 CO 1031/3492, no 98

[31 Oct 1962]

'The appointment of a financial secretary in Antigua and related matters': CO note for ministers

The problem is whether to proceed with the appointment of an expatriate Financial Secretary in Antigua and with the implementation of certain measures agreed to between Mr. Maudling and the Chief Minister of Antigua in June, 1962, providing for greater supervision over Antigua's finances.

2. Late in 1961, it became apparent that the Antigua Government was unable to meet a commitment which it had entered into to make available \$750,000 to the Royal Bank of Canada as part of a special arrangement for salvaging the sugar industry in Antigua. An investigation showed that the Antigua Government was "in the red" to the tune of about \$1½ million and that in order to meet a cash deficiency it had used up the Sugar Special Funds—funds which should have been held in trust to meet special purposes connected with the sugar industry. Mr. Maudling sent out a special fact-finding Mission in February, 1962 (Report at (42)). The Mission confirmed the seriousness of the situation and stated that it had been caused by imprudent policies, such as unauthorised budget deficits being incurred for several

years—bad administration of various peasant loan schemes—excessive and irregular authorizing of supplementary expenditure and allowing arrears of revenue to mount up. The Mission considered that the main blame rested upon the Ministers, but that officials had also been weak and had closed their eyes to the consequences of Ministerial policy when their warnings were disregarded. The main Ministerial culprit was the Chief Minister himself (Mr. Bird) who, since 1960 when under the constitutional changes an unofficial took over the Finance portfolio, has also been Minister of Finance. Mr. Bird had pressed on with expenditure regardless of the rules which he only imperfectly understood. Mr. Maudling saw Mr. Bird at the end of May, 1962 and told him of his serious concern. He also gave him an edited version of the Mission's Report. He insisted that to remedy the situation he would have to appoint an able Financial Secretary who would have to attend all Executive Council meetings and countersign all warrants. Mr. Maudling confirmed this in writing in his letter of the 1st June ((68) on file). Mr. Bird wrote back on the 18th June ((75) on file) saying that he was prepared to acquiesce in these arrangements.

3. Since that date we have been prevented from implementing these arrangements by difficulty in recruiting a suitable Financial Secretary. A candidate has now been found, however, whose name is Mr. Booth,¹ formerly the Auditor in the Leeward Islands and just released from Tanganyika. He would appear to be suitable for the job. Owing to the time which has elapsed however since Mr. Bird's meeting with Mr. Maudling in June, he has recovered his courage, and the savingram from the Administrator at (92) reports that he is no longer prepared to appoint an expatriate Financial Secretary, nor does he see the need for him to attend meetings of Executive Council. He argues that since the previous Financial Secretary (who was to be dismissed or transferred elsewhere) was given permission to return to the territory (a journey in the course of which he met his death), this implied that the Secretary of State had cancelled the previous arrangement. It is clear, however, that it implied nothing of the kind. The former Financial Secretary would have to return to the territory before his removal elsewhere could be arranged.

4. Another complicating factor now is that Mr. Bird is apparently about to produce financial proposals for 1963 which will keep him out of grant-in-aid. He may, therefore, try to argue that the serious situation obtaining at the time of Mr. Maudling's letter of the 1st June has now ceased to exist. The temptation to take him at his word and merely say that he must sink or swim on the strength of his own proposals is strong. The fact is, however, that from what we know of his proposals some of them are of doubtful effectiveness, and if Mr. Bird really got into financial difficulties in 1963, would Ministers in fact be prepared to let him drown? Furthermore, a good deal of the mess from previous years still remains to be cleared up, and unless steps are clearly taken directed to this end there is likely to be trouble with Parliament and the Public Accounts Committee.

5. A question also connected with this issue is that raised in the Acting Administrator's despatch No. 46. The permanent Administrator of Antigua, Mr. Turbott, is now on leave. The Antigua Trades and Labour Union (from which Mr. Bird derives most of his support and in which one of his Ministers, Mr. George,² is the

¹ J F Booth, principal auditor, Tanganyika, 1958–1962; financial secretary, Antigua, 1962–1964.

² Mr McC B George, member without portfolio, Antigua.

moving spirit) has been conducting a campaign against the return of Mr. Turbott. This campaign is related in part to certain financial measures which we had to insist should be taken when we resumed responsibility for grant-in-aid and which reduced the amount available for expenditure in Antigua. They were necessary partly because grant-in-aid money had been spent on development projects which should have been financed out of C.D. and W. and partly by the need to make good the deficits of previous years. Mr. George and the Labour Union have been trying to represent that these cuts in the Antigua budget are due to slanders made against them by the Administrator in correspondence to the Secretary of State. One of our difficulties in answering these charges is that we have been at pains not to make Mr. Bird's shortcomings public, partly in order not to damage the credit of Antigua and partly in order to save his face. If, however, Mr. Bird either resists the appointment of a Financial Secretary or fails to restrain the agitation of his followers against Mr. Turbott, it is suggested that we have no alternative but to hold over him the threat of public exposure. If, however, we press ahead with our proposals, then we must expect trouble first from Mr. Bird and his colleagues and later possibly on the streets.

6. The arguments in favour of taking a strong line with Mr. Bird over the appointment of a Financial Secretary are

(a) That a good deal still needs to be done to put Antigua's financial house in order. The only effective means of doing it that we can see—unless we want to resort to the drastic action of altering the constitution—is to carry out the arrangements agreed between Mr. Maudling and Mr. Bird in June. The time which has elapsed since those arrangements were entered into has not altered the basic situation.

(b) From what we have seen of Mr. Bird's financial proposals for 1963, we are not satisfied that they will be adequate to take him out of grant-in-aid, particularly without stricter financial practices being brought into operation. We could, of course, take them at their face value and say that provided Mr. Bird does not in any circumstances come running to us in 1963 for grant-in-aid, we will not insist on the appointment of a Financial Secretary. But in practice, if Antigua got into financial difficulties, it would be very difficult to refuse to bail them out.

(c) Although we have no wish publicly to humiliate Mr. Bird, in the way we did Mr. Gairy,³ it is nevertheless in the interests of the area as a whole that sounder financial practices should be introduced everywhere. Antigua is one of the more prosperous territories and is a good place to start.

7. The arguments against proceeding with the appointment of a Financial Secretary are

(a) That it will meet with opposition from Mr. Bird and his Ministers and may cause trouble;

(b) In order to cover up their own shortcomings, they may resort to agitation through the Labour Union which could lead to violence on the streets;

(c) The man appointed to the post may have to face a great deal of unpleasantness and unless he is a very robust character may not be able to stand it.

8. The arguments in favour of permitting Mr. Turbott to return as Administrator are (a) that he has been a very effective Administrator and is generally well regarded;

³ See 195.

and (b) to remove him following pressure by Mr. Bird's Labour Union would in fact be to abdicate our responsibility entirely. The argument against allowing his return is simply that it may lead to trouble.

9. In order to make sure of getting Mr. Booth as Financial Secretary we now have to proceed swiftly and bring these matters to a head. Four draft telegrams are attached which would have the effect of telling Mr. Bird that the Secretary of State is satisfied the arrangements entered into by his predecessor must proceed and an expatriate Financial Secretary, viz. Mr. Booth, should be appointed. A further telegram also rejects the Labour Union's criticisms of Mr. Turbott and their suggestion that the financial measures insisted upon by the Colonial Office are unjustified.⁴

⁴ Minuting Duncan Sandys on this issue, Poynton commented that to proceed with the appointment would almost certainly lead to trouble with Antigua ministers and possibly to street demonstrations. It was therefore tempting to reverse the decision, on the strict understanding that Antigua made no request whatever for grant-in-aid in 1963. It was doubtful, however, whether Antigua's proposals for getting out of grant-in-aid would be effective and if in fact they failed it would be extremely difficult for the UK, which carried the ultimate responsibility, 'to bail the Antigua Government out'. The CO would then be in difficulty with the Treasury and ultimately with the Public Accounts Committee and Parliament, 'because we should have to come to Antigua's assistance with less prospect than ever of ensuring that our money was properly spent or that Antigua would put its finances in order'. Poynton urged that Booth should be appointed and that there could be no question of removing Turbott from his post as administrator. Duncan Sandys agreed (CO 1031/3492, minutes by Poynton and Duncan Sandys, 1 and 4 Nov 1962).

206 CO 1031/3494, no 61

5 Nov 1962

[Financial settlement with Trinidad]: telegram from Dr Williams to Mr Macmillan proposing to reject the UK offer

[Williams was in London when he sent this telegram. The terms of the UK offer to Trinidad had been the subject of a dispute between the CO and the Treasury. Originally the Treasury rejected the CO proposal to give Trinidad a loan of £1 million. From the viewpoints both of need and the political considerations involved, which included comparison with the aid given to Jamaica (see 198), Treasury ministers saw no reason to give additional aid to Trinidad beyond the £500,000 loan which they were proposing. Reinforcing their conclusion was the difficulty of meeting far more urgent demands from other overseas territories. Nor originally did the Treasury accept the CO suggestion that the Viscount aircraft should be handed over as a gift. This would constitute a new type of independence aid for which there was no justification and the Treasury saw no reason why the Trinidad government or BWIA should not pay themselves (CO 1031/3494, no 29, F G Burrett to D Williams, 17 Aug 1962). From the purely financial point of view the CO agreed with the Treasury analysis. Higham of the Finance Dept argued that with half the population of Jamaica, Trinidad was now aspiring to maintain a development programme as large as that of Jamaica. Trinidad was the wealthiest per head of the British West Indies and its unemployment and population problems were not as serious as those of Jamaica. Trinidad's total CD&W allocations had been £1½ million as compared with Jamaica's £9 million. Its revenue was slightly higher than that of Jamaica owing largely to oil. And yet, as Higham acknowledged, Trinidad had hitherto financed development almost entirely from its budget and other local sources. This would no longer be possible to the same extent; without external help Trinidad would be able to cover only fifty per cent of its next five-year plan. The gap on the 1962 development budget was £5.6 million and the short-fall over five years would be £23 million. 'Clearly', Higham argued, 'Trinidad will have to cut back'. But a loan of £500,000 would be regarded as 'derisory'; the CO's proposal to provide a loan of £1 million would be acceptable when compared with the £1½ million loan given to Jamaica (*ibid*, minute by Higham, 22 Aug 1962). Duncan Sandys emphasised the importance of political considerations in his appeal to J A

Boyd-Carpenter, chief secretary to the Treasury, 1962–1964. Trinidad had been ‘imprudent’ in boosting its development programme but a loan of £500,000 would be regarded as ‘little better than a calculated snub’ and relations with Trinidad would be seriously affected after independence (*ibid*, no 30, Duncan Sandys to Boyd-Carpenter, 22 Aug 1962). At first the Treasury proposed an either or compromise, either the four Viscounts or a £1 million loan but not both. A further CO appeal persuaded the Treasury to accept the original CO package but only on the strict condition that Trinidad paid the money which the UK insisted it still owed to the former federation in respect of a housing loan (£600,000) and the costs of defence expansion (£75,750). Any default on these obligations would be recovered from the grant and loan now offered to Trinidad (*ibid*, no 46, Boyd-Carpenter to Duncan Sandys, 18 Sept 1962). The offer made to Trinidad consisted of (a) a grant representing the balance of the territorial and regional CD&W allocations relating to Trinidad and Tobago—£250,000 approx; (b) the purchase and handing over of four Viscount aircraft to BWIA—£800,000; (c) a Commonwealth Assistance Loan of £1 million. When Williams formally rejected the offer (see 207) Trinidad stood to lose the CD&W grant which in turn affected the receipts of the University of the West Indies. For a subsequent UK assessment of why the offer was rejected and the eventual outcome, see 209.]

1. You will be aware that, until quite recently, your Government had apparently been unable to reach a decision on the proposals, which I had the honour to submit to the then Secretary of State for the Colonies as far back as July this year, for United Kingdom financial assistance to Trinidad and Tobago on the occasion of the achievement of its independence.

2. Our proposals were clearly set out in two documents, with which you are no doubt fully familiar, and I had the assurance that they would receive the early and careful consideration of your Government. In the event, we have enjoyed the doubtful distinction of being the only Commonwealth country to assume the responsibilities of independence with nothing more from the United Kingdom than the good wishes of Her Majesty’s Government.

3. Within the past week, I have received through our High Commissioner in London an Aide Memoire from the Commonwealth Relations Secretary containing a statement of the nature and scope of the financial assistance which your Government proposed to offer to the people of Trinidad and Tobago to mark the attainment of their new status as an independent member of the Commonwealth.

4. I think you will agree that the proposals in the Commonwealth Relations Secretary’s Aide Memoire do not bear any significant relation to the proposals contained in the official memoranda from my Government. These, in substance, sought the provision of a low-interest (or no interest) loan of £5 million for large-scale low cost housing, together with certain other sums in respect of naval and military equipment, the re-development of the town of Scarborough in the island of Tobago, the writing-off of certain sums still owing to B.O.A.C. by B.W.I.A. in connection with the lease-purchase of Viscount aircraft to maintain air services vital to the Eastern Caribbean, and the restoration to the University of the West Indies of that portion of the C.D. & W. allocation to the West Indies that might properly have been regarded as falling due to Trinidad and Tobago.

5. Apart from the B.W.I.A. aircraft “write-off”, the proposals in the Commonwealth Secretary’s Aide Memoire appear to have been drawn up with little reference, if any, to our proposals as outlined above; and, in fact, are substantially the same as were outlined to me in informal discussions in June of this year, before our proposals were submitted in writing. You will readily understand, therefore, my inability to give them serious consideration.

6. Paragraph (a) of that document amounts to an offer of a loan of £1 million,

with strings attached and at a rate of interest of approximately 6 per cent. Paragraph (b) is, in effect, an offer to do that which Britain has always done for any independent territory and what in fact it was assumed would be done when Trinidad and Tobago undertook to share in certain common services with the other units of the former federation. Paragraph (c) represents a concession which B.W.I.A. has been seeking for some time having regard to (a) its primary function as a means of linking the Caribbean and maintaining the contacts between the units of the former Federation and (b) its factual position as a feeder service of B.O.A.C.

7. Whatever positive merits these proposals may appear to contain are completely offset by the unfortunate implication that they are conditional upon the assumption by Trinidad and Tobago of "certain outstanding obligations" which we have already firmly refuted, as far back as March 1961, in respect of defence arrangements for the former West Indies Federation. I do not propose to revive the discussions on this particular subject.

8. I note the regret which your Government feels at being unable to meet our request for short term accommodation in connection with the repayment of the sum of £600,000 made available by your Government to finance certain items of capital expenditure by the late Federal Government and devoted instead to the construction of housing in Trinidad for Federal officials. The refusal to grant our request is, in effect, a demand for the immediate refund to your Government of money which, it had seemed, was originally intended as a gift to the people of the West Indies, including those of Trinidad and Tobago. My Government will naturally refund the entire sum now claimed, including, of course, that portion that might ordinarily have been regarded as representing the share of Trinidad and Tobago.

9. As I have repeatedly indicated to various members of your Cabinet and their advisers, the very special problem of Trinidad and Tobago is unemployment. You are very perturbed, quite rightly, at a 4% rate in the United Kingdom, rising to 6% in special areas; you will, I am sure, readily understand our position, faced as we are with a 15% normal rate. The people of the United Kingdom, especially the labour movement, are deeply concerned over the question of redundancy, with particular emphasis on the railways; you will, I am sure, readily understand our position, faced as we are with a steady decline over the past five years of employment in the basic industries of oil and sugar, a decline which shows every sign of continuing.

10. It was in order to deal firmly with the unemployment, and to forestall the inevitable concomitant threat of political instability, that I took up with your Secretary of State for Colonies, in January of this year, the question of an Exchequer loan of £5 million. I repeated this request to three other prominent personalities since that date. Up to the present I have received no formal reply to this request. If the Aide Memoire is the answer, it would then become a very serious matter if the question of economic aid to a former colony should end merely in the old-fashioned colonial policy of providing a colonial market for British industry and employment for British workers.

11. I am forwarding copies of the Aide Memoire and this letter to the Cabinet in Port of Spain with a recommendation that the offer contained in the Aide Memoire be rejected as being not, in fact, economic aid. As soon as I have had a reply I shall communicate with you—possibly through our High Commissioner here, as I leave London today for Rome and Cairo, and do not expect to be back before November 15.

207 CO 1031/3495, no 80

[Nov 1962]

'Trinidad financial settlement': draft CO intelligence telegram for circulation to UK high commissioners. *Annex*

As has become customary when a country approaches independence nowadays, Trinidad put in a list of the forms of assistance which they wanted from us at independence. The wording was slightly novel. Trinidad's paper was headed "Equipment for Independence" and opened with the following words:—

'The concept of a "parting gift" to "departing Colonies" has no place in the thinking of the Government and people of Trinidad and Tobago in respect of economic assistance from the United Kingdom. What we seek, and regard as not unreasonable to expect, is to be adequately equipped for the journey on which we embark when we join the Commonwealth Caravan.'

Trinidad's request amounted to three items—a grant based on the unspent allocation of C.D. & W. funds plus other grants totalling just over £1 million; a loan for development, interest-free, worth £7½ million plus interest-bearing loans totalling £2½ million; and the transfer to their Government airline, British West Indian Airways, of four Viscount aircraft at present hired by B.W.I.A. from B.O.A.C. at a rate of £200,000 a year for the next four years.

2. After full consideration with other Departments authority was obtained to offer the customary grant based on the balance unspent of C.D. and W. allocations (about £250,000); a Commonwealth Assistance Loan of £1 million; and the transfer of the aircraft. It proved impossible to finalise the British offer by the time of Trinidad's independence. This was due partly to the fact that only 12 weeks elapsed between the holding of the Conference and Independence and partly to the practical difficulty that all the officials in Whitehall concerned with the subject were also heavily involved with the corresponding negotiations about Jamaica. Jamaica became independent on 6th August, and Trinidad followed 25 days later. Immediately after, there was the Prime Ministers' Conference and the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations had hoped to be able to inform Dr. Williams of our offer shortly after the end of that Conference. (Dr. Williams had had a warning from Mr. Hugh Fraser, the then Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, in July that our offer would hardly reach £2 million, if that; and it may be recalled that this conversation was followed by an outburst by Dr. Williams in Trinidad in which he said that the British Government had had no policy for the West Indies for the last 20 years). Dr. Williams persistently evaded opportunities for discussing the subject, so ultimately our offer was conveyed by means of an Aide Memoire handed by the Minister of State to the Trinidad High Commissioner in London on the 30th October. This was followed by a letter from Dr. Williams to Mr. Macmillan in most discourteous terms, threatening to reject the offer.¹ Finally, on 25th November, Dr. Williams addressed a group of West Indian students in London and told them that his Government had rejected the British offer. On the following morning, 26th November, since an official reply from the Trinidad Government was still awaited, the Minister of State sent for the High Commissioner who, when he arrived,

¹ See 206.

produced a brief letter from Dr. Williams to Mr. Macmillan dated 26th November, cursorily rejecting the offer.

3. It remains our view that the offer made to Trinidad was a reasonable one and in line with the offers made to Jamaica and to various African countries recently. It is, of course, relevant (though not always remembered) that Ghana and the three older Asian Commonwealth countries received no "golden handshake" at the time of independence. Figures can be made to prove anything, but the attached table will give some idea of how the offer looks in relation to what we did for other countries. We do not want to base our case too heavily on the population of the territory since such an argument could have embarrassing consequences in, e.g., Kenya. Our position was described in the following words in Mr. Macmillan's reply to Dr. Williams:—

"This offer, like those we have made to other countries in connection with their attainment of independence, represents what we believe we can do to help them, having regard to our resources and to the other demands upon us. . . . You will understand that we in Britain cannot undertake to meet all or even a major proportion of the estimated needs of each newly independent Commonwealth country. We consider each case separately and we strain ourselves to give as much help as we are able".

This wording gives the best line to take though the statistics could be used if pressed. They are based on the "Quarterly Digest of Statistics" published by H.M. Stationary Office.

4. Reference should also be made to the statement made by Mr. Fisher (in the absence of the Secretary of State) in the House of Commons on the 27th November. (Hansard Cols. 39 and 40).

Annex to 207: Financial assistance to various Commonwealth countries

<i>Country</i>	<i>Amount of grant or development loan</i>	<i>Population in thousands</i>	<i>Expressed as shillings per head of population</i>	<i>National income per capita income</i>
Nigeria	£12 m	35,000	6/10d	£30
Cyprus*	£15 m (grant)	578	—	£139
Sierra Leone	£3.5 m plus £3 m (grant)	2,400	29/2d plus 25/-	£25
Tanganyika	£4 m plus £4 m (grant)	8,788	9/1d plus 9/-	£21
Jamaica	£1.25 m	1,613	15/7d	£157
Uganda	£1.5 m (grant)	6,682	4/6d	£24
Trinidad	£1 m	819	25/-	£229

*The high figure to Cyprus took account, of course, of the fact that this territory had suffered from something approaching civil war for several years.

208 CO 1031/3574, no 18

22 Nov 1962

[Canadian aid programme]: CO record of a meeting with Canadian officials

1. *Mr. Thomas* in welcoming *Mr. Towe*¹ and *Mr. Reynolds*² said how useful it was to maintain contact over projects in progress, or under consideration, within the Canadian aid programme to the Caribbean. He asked what progress was being made with the scheme of a quay installation in St. Vincent.

St. Vincent Quay

2. *Mr. Towe* said that this contract had now been let at a tender price of Canadian \$1,194, 481.66. Within the \$ (Canadian) 1 million allocation for this project a sum of \$(Canadian) 916,999 remained unspent. This left a balance of \$(Canadian) 278,481.66 and he understood that St. Vincent could make available \$(Canadian) 216,000 (£75,000). There were possible savings in the scheme which could be made, mainly on the paring of reclaimed areas and truck-scale, and it was possible that savings on the contract might be sufficient to complete the full scheme from the sums at present available from Canadian and St. Vincent sources. It was not impossible that an additional amount of Canadian aid might be made available but this would require Cabinet approval which would be very difficult. He suggested that the question of a short-fall on present estimates should be shelved until the contract was nearer completion, when a more accurate picture would be available. He realised that any idea of an open ended commitment by the St. Vincent Government (or by the U.K. Government as their backers) was out of the question. *Mr. Towe* mentioned also that the same engineering firm which was responsible for the harbour project had examined a scheme for improving the water supply in St. Vincent. Very tentative plans had been drawn up for a limited scheme costing \$(Canadian) 24,000. The aim was to increase the water supply by 50% by laying 3-inch pipe, and it was hoped that work could be completed during the current financial year. This was not expected to involve any local contribution apart from the wages of local labour.

3. *Miss Terry* said that she welcomed the suggestion that the problem of a short-fall on the St. Vincent project should be shelved for the time being, and hoped that St. Vincent would not now be pressed to sign any agreement involving undefined commitments.

Canadian aid to the Caribbean

5. [sic] *Mr. Towe* then described the present position in regard to the Canadian aid programme in the Caribbean. \$(Canadian) 2.452 million had been included for it in the 1962/63 Canadian Estimates but it was expected that only Canadian \$1.895 million would in fact be spent: this would involve liabilities for expenditure amounting to \$(Canadian) 1.1 million in 1963/64, though sums had yet to be appropriated by Parliament for that period. His Department, at official level, was hoping for a 1963/64 Vote of at least \$(Canadian) 2.1 million for the Caribbean programme (including British Honduras and British Guiana). However, there was a general reluctance on the part of the Canadian Government, given the present political and economic climate, to seek increased foreign aid funds from Parliament.

¹ Deputy director general, Canadian External Aid Office.

² Of Canada House, London.

He said that he would be interested in Colonial Office views on how the Caribbean allocation, whatever it might be, could best be allocated.

6. *Mr. Thomas* said that the "Eight", the British Virgin Islands, the Turks and Caicos Islands, British Guiana, and British Honduras were all deserving of aid on grounds of economic need. Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago were, of course, no longer a Colonial Office responsibility. He knew that these two territories had not been pleased with the offers the U.K. had been able to make in the context of independence settlements but the U.K. had felt that other territories to which it had obligations had more compelling needs. He imagined that both countries would be likely to seek aid from Canada. He outlined the political and economic position of the various territories, and made particular reference to the present economic survey of "the Eight" being carried out by Dr. O'Loughlin of the University of The West Indies.³ When the results of her survey were available, the U.K. hoped to secure the co-operation of the Canadian and United States Governments in making development aid available to these territories.

7. *Mr. Towe* said he thought the Canadians would welcome a Commonwealth programme for the Caribbean area rather than one under the auspices of the International Bank or of the D.A.C. They would like to see the programme include British Honduras and British Guiana. A Commonwealth venture would not preclude American participation, perhaps on the Colombo Plan pattern, and might encourage countries such as India and Australia to come in. *Mr. Thomas* said that there was perhaps too great a political distinction between the territories to make it easy to lump them together in one programme. He was not sure how much aid would be likely to come from other Commonwealth countries. He thought it more likely that any programme would be limited to aid from Canada, the U.K. and the United States, but he welcomed *Mr. Towe's* interest in the proposals and said that there were no detailed or firm plans for an internationally concerted programme at present. He explained the particular problems of British Honduras in the context of their programme of recovery from the effects of the 1961 hurricane and referred also to the importance of the West providing aid in reasonable quantities for British Guiana.

8. In reply to questions *Mr. Towe* said that the Canadians were experiencing difficulty in finding outlets for their aid programme, partly because of its smallness. This tendency to underspend was attributable only partly to the stringent tying of Canadian aid, which in turn was forced on them by their economic difficulties and by the fact that so many Canadian goods themselves contained a high proportion of imported materials. Other reasons for under-spending were the understaffing of the aid office and consequent administrative bottle-necks; understaffing in recipient countries and consequent delays in preparing applications; and the lack of sound projects suitable for Canadian assistance. Thus although Canada had a big commercial stake in British Guiana they had not been able to find suitable outlets for aid there. Canada could not contemplate making long-term, low-interest loans to developing countries because the Federal Government did not make such loans available to the Provinces, which received only grants.

9. It was agreed that while direct contact between the Canadian Government and United Kingdom colonial territories in receipt of their aid was useful, especially on matters of detail affecting projects, it was also most helpful to use the Ottawa/London

³ See 194, note 3.

channel in the first instance because of the direct financial involvement of the U.K. in many of these territories.

10. Both *Mr. Thomas* and *Mr. Towe* said how useful they had found this exchange of information and of views on current aid problems in the Caribbean area.

209 CO 1031/3495, no 108

13 Dec 1962

[Financial settlement with Trinidad]: letter from N E Costar to Mr Duncan Sandys on why Dr Williams rejected the UK offer [Extract]

...

Dr. Williams's reasons for rejecting British offer

9. From this public speech and subsequent statements since his return, it is possible to see the reasons behind the rejection of the British offer.¹ I hope that it will be forgiven if, in the interests of trying to set out the often involved motives of Dr. Williams, I appear for the moment to take the role of Devil's Advocate.

10. On the question of C.D. & W. balances Dr. Williams' feeling is clearly that this part of the offer is a means of restoring certain sums promised under C.D. & W. schemes, mainly to the University of the West Indies, which ceased to be payable directly because of the independence of Trinidad and Tobago i.e., this was not new money: its continuance was in accordance with usual practice when colonies emerge into independence and in any case the major beneficiary was not specifically Trinidad and Tobago but a regional University in which Britain herself was interested through the Little Eight. Dr. Williams' line on the Viscounts—despite the fact that his Government had specifically asked for this gift for B.W.I.A., to all intents and purposes a national airline in which they hold 90 per cent of the shares—is that they represent a gift to an airline which serves the region, including the Little Eight, as well as Trinidad; and that the gift is, in any event, grossly over-valued since the true worth of the aircraft is nearer £300,000. (On the last point he is supported by all in Trinidad who know about civil aviation matters.)

11. But there seems little doubt that it was the £1 million Commonwealth Assistance Loan that was the main aspect of the offer which Dr. Williams regarded as inadequate. He clearly wanted more money, and he equally clearly wanted a loan which was not tied to the purchase of overseas goods and service but could be expended, without question, on meeting local costs in Trinidad. For this reason he has referred to the loan offered as having "strings" and as being a contribution towards development in Britain rather than in Trinidad and Tobago. He has emphasised the growing problem of unemployment, and under-employment, here, to which I made reference in my despatch No. 3; and he has made it clear that his main aim at present is to raise a sum of approximately £5 million, interest free or on low interest terms, to finance a rehousing project involving the building of a minimum of 40,000 houses and at the same time the development of local industries employing local labour to produce all the ancillary fittings and furnishings that will be required for this housing project.

12. Dr. Williams has also shown resentment at what he regards as an attempt to interfere with Trinidad's development plans by insistence that agreement be reached

¹ See 206 and 207.

on the projects on which the Commonwealth Assistance Loan should be spent. The impression he got in this respect was no doubt due in part, at least, to Dr. Williams' unfamiliarity with the processes of E.C.G.D. Loans and perhaps to the emphasis that may have been laid on this aspect of disbursing Commonwealth Assistance Loans because of the desire to ensure that outstanding amounts owed by the Trinidad Government were repaid before disbursements were finally made under the loan. If it could have been made clear to Dr. Williams that, in the case of a country such as Trinidad which is already importing large amounts of British capital goods, a loan tied to British goods and services represents in fact a very flexible form of support for the Trinidad and Tobago economy, he might well have reacted more favourably. But I cannot avoid the feeling that the main trouble in this respect has arisen because Trinidad, unlike Jamaica, was offered a Commonwealth Assistance Loan in place of the normal Independence Exchequer Loan, owing to the failure, for which Dr. Williams does not feel himself in any way responsible, to conclude the financial settlement before Independence. I believe that an earlier offer of an Exchequer Loan, of the same amount of £1 million, which was clearly available for local expenditure in Trinidad, would have been accepted by Dr. Williams, even although he would undoubtedly have complained in private, and perhaps in public, about its size.

13. Finally, I should be failing to indicate the complete picture if I did not report that much of Dr. Williams' present critical attitude towards Britain appears to arise from his feeling that he was better treated, and found Ministers more accessible, on the Continent than in Britain. Whatever basis there may be for this,—the feeling may be due to no more than the V.I.P. treatment accorded by European governments to a head of government new to them, although, unfortunately, all too well known in the United Kingdom—it is nevertheless a real factor in Dr. Williams' present state of mind which has to be taken into account. So, also, are two other feelings. First that he received no formal reply to his request for aid until 4½ months after he submitted his first memorandum; and even then there was no attempt to deal with his specific requests e.g. for help with his housing development plan. Secondly, Dr. Williams, whose skin is so thin as to be almost non-existent, feels that he was personally slighted because, after all this delay, discussion of the aid proposals so near to his heart was not undertaken at as high a level as he thinks his due as a Commonwealth Prime Minister. This petty point, I fear, looms as large in his mind as his failure to secure the substance of his requests.

The future

14. Dr. Williams appears to regard the offered settlement as a complete package which he was required to accept or reject entirely. If he were to show any signs of being prepared to accept the parts of the offer represented by the C.D. & W. balances and the Viscount gift, which I admit seems unlikely in his present state of mind, I should recommend that, in our own interests, this be given careful consideration. I feel that there is considerable truth in what he says about C.D. & W. balances. I understand that the total figure involved is made up roughly of £163,000 that would have been payable for the financing of the University of the West Indies; of £20,000 that would have been payable as the balances of certain unexpired regional C.D. & W. schemes; and of £66,000 that would have been payable as the balance of various unexpired territorial C.D. & W. schemes. The dilemma is that the withholding of these sums may do as much harm to our own interests (e.g. in the maintenance of

the University and regional projects) as to Trinidad and Tobago's. Similarly, the non-acceptance of the gift of Viscounts is likely to increase the subsidy which may have to be given to B.W.I.A. to enable that airline to continue to provide services for the other British Territories in the region.

15. But I am not suggesting that we should be in any way lenient towards Trinidad and Tobago in this respect. On the contrary, I think that it would be fatal to confirm Dr. Williams in his belief, based on his experiences with the Americans and others in the past, that he has only to shout loudly enough and to be sufficiently unpleasant in public as well as in private in order to get what he wants. We should deal with him on an entirely realistic basis. For example, if it is in our interests that the outstanding C.D. & W. payments should be made to the various institutions concerned, it is perhaps in retrospect a pity that we made so much of the C.D. & W. monies as part of the independence gift to Trinidad and Tobago. But, having done so, if we now find that for our own reasons we still want to make the payments, I consider that it is important to try to make them through the front door on the request of Trinidad and Tobago, rather than making them through the back door, without acknowledgment, by finding other means of financing the institutions concerned. I have no doubt that Dr. Williams relies on getting the value of the C.D. & W. balances and the Viscount gift by the back door in this way; and if he does, it will be all the more difficult to bring him back to reason. Moreover he is only too likely to claim credit for his achievement publicly.

16. I am under no illusion that our relations with Dr. Williams generally, and mine here in particular, will be difficult for the next few months. We are likely to be put in the deep freeze, as the Americans were during the period when Dr. Williams was exercising pressure on them over their aid offer. Temperamentally, Dr. Williams must always have someone to attack at any particular time; and I am afraid that we are the present target. This is likely to last for several months. Eventually Dr. Williams' mood will change, and this might be hastened if he finds, as I suspect he will, that his much publicised tour of Europe has produced little or nothing in the way of real aid from there. During this phase I recommend that our attitude should be to continue to deal with the Trinidad and Tobago Government as correctly as possible but to give them nothing in place of the aid they have rejected. At the same time we must recognise that the corollary of this is that we shall not be able to ask them for anything during this phase; and that for this reason our ability to influence them on any subject, for example, in relation to registering votes in the United Nations where they do not see their own interests to be engaged, will be negligible.

17. In the meantime it must be the object of our policy to keep the question of the independence financial settlement as much as possible out of the public eye.² Dr. Williams, for his part, since his return has said much less against us than might have been expected, possibly because his Cabinet colleagues, whilst feeling it necessary to support their Prime Minister's rejection of our offer, are not altogether happy about the way in which he did it. On the other hand Dr. Williams is turning the situation to

² The issue of Trinidad's financial settlement was one of protracted controversy which was not finally resolved until Dec 1963. By that time Trinidad had been given the aircraft and part of the CD&W balances. In the final settlement, in order to qualify for the remainder of the CD&W balances—£138,000—Trinidad agreed to pay the defence debt of £75,075 and accepted, in place of the £1 million Commonwealth Assistance Loan a short-term Exchequer loan of £600,000 (DO 200/89).

his political benefit by using it as the basis for urging his own people to greater efforts on their own behalf. If we are to keep the temperature down, as we must hope to do, we need to refrain as far as possible from directly challenging Dr. Williams' decision in public. At the same time we ought to redouble our efforts to bring home to the people of Trinidad and Tobago, and perhaps of Britain too, just how much we are constantly doing to help and subsidise the West Indies in general, including Trinidad and Tobago. This is best done not as part of a justificatory exercise when what we say is partially discounted as propaganda, but as suitable occasions present themselves. One such was recently missed. When the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement was renewed, it should have been presented at any rate in publicity directed to the West Indies as a direct subsidy worth £x million by the British taxpayer annually to individual West Indian countries separately listed with amounts. Similar treatment should also be accorded to other cases where we in effect support Trinidad and Tobago. Possibly bananas and grapefruit are examples.

18. I am sending copies of this despatch to the British High Commissioners in other Commonwealth countries, to the British Ambassadors in Dublin and Caracas and, on a personal basis, to the Governor of Barbados.

210 CAB 134/2153, LAC(62)14

20 Dec 1962

'Future prospects for Jamaica and for Trinidad and Tobago': CRO note for Cabinet (Official) Committee on Latin America and the Caribbean

[This note circulated two despatches, both to Duncan Sandys, which are reproduced here. The first, no 3 dated 23 Oct 1962, was from Sir A Morley,¹ UK high commissioner to Jamaica. The second, also no 3 dated 21 Nov 1962, was from N E Costar, UK high commissioner in Trinidad (see 200, note 1). Both despatches are prefaced by CRO summaries of their contents.]

The outlook for Jamaica

SUMMARY

Is Jamaica just one more addition to the non-committed Commonwealth countries? The length and depth of the British association, the absence of any native race, and her relative maturity at independence, makes it probable that Jamaicans will see their problems through British or, at least, Western spectacles (paragraphs 2–6). The only neighbours of much interest to Jamaica are the United States, Canada and Cuba, and scarcely seem to include even Trinidad (paragraph 7).

2. The two political parties present an extreme example of political unionism (paragraph 8) and their activities over the past 25 years have left Jamaica with a formidable wage/cost problem (paragraph 9).

3. The effect of the Commonwealth Immigration Act on her high and unrestrained birthrate will affect the quantum of external aid (paragraph 10).

¹ KCMG, 1959, Sir Alexander Morley; India Office from 1930; on loan to Ministry of Aircraft Production, 1940–1942; assistant secretary, Burma Office, 1945–1947; on loan to Treasury, 1947; CRO from 1949; deputy UK high commissioner, Wellington, 1950–1953; assistant under-secretary of state, CRO, 1954; UK deputy high commissioner, Calcutta, 1956; UK high commissioner, Ceylon, 1957–1962; UK high commissioner, Jamaica, from 1962.

4. On the other hand, the Jamaican economy has acquired momentum during the last decade, is entirely open and is free from the distortions of "economic nationalism". Just at present it shows signs of stagnation, and a less exuberant policy is now, in any case, desirable (paragraphs 11 and 12).

5. If the Jamaicans can make their moderate and perhaps even "committed" voice effectively heard on External Affairs, it will be good for them and good for us (paragraph 13).

6. Sir Alexander Bustamante's personal authority offers the prospect of stability and a breathing space; but there is doubt whether he can impart the necessary drive and energy needed for the Government to emerge as an effective supporter of the West and to get the economy moving forward again. It would be unwise of us to neglect any opportunity to foster what may prove to be a Commonwealth partner of a new kind (paragraphs 14 and 15).

After some two months in this new post, it seems timely to attempt to set down some of the features of the Jamaican scene which have especially struck me, and to seek to identify the main problems confronting the Jamaican Government in the immediate future. What follows is necessarily generalised and superficial; but since Jamaica is situated in a new area of Commonwealth relations it may be helpful to hazard opinions now, even if future experience necessitates corrections.

2. Until Jamaica's accession to independence, it has been justifiable to regard the "old" Commonwealth countries, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, as firmly aligned with the West, and the remainder (with the possible exception of Pakistan) as, in varying degrees, "uncommitted" and neutralist. The natural assumption may therefore be that Jamaica will be, for practical purposes, just one more addition to the "uncommitted" Commonwealth and likely to display before long all their familiar attitudes. Would such an assumption be warranted?

3. The Jamaicans we see around in Britain are of more or less pure African stock, as is the great mass of the population here. But they have almost wholly forgotten their African origins and have no folk memories to complicate their attitudes, except those of slavery. Nationalism in the Commonwealth countries of Asia and Africa, expressing itself as it is apt to do in neutralism, is often fomented by internal conflicts arising where the structure of society is strongly influenced by an archaic caste or tribal structure out of tune with 20th century political institutions or by sentimental nostalgia for an imagined pre-colonial Golden Age. There is virtually nothing of this in Jamaica. Not only has Jamaica known three centuries of British rule but, for practical purposes, Jamaican history may be said to begin with the arrival of Cromwell's soldiers in 1655. Indeed the ancestors of the present inhabitants were not here when British rule began. There are in Jamaica only some 28,000 persons classified as East Indian and some 10,000 as Chinese. Jamaican history is, for practical purposes, a history of the relations of two main groups of immigrants, those from Britain and those brought as slaves from Africa. The latter have no distinctive background; their cultural and economic aspirations are essentially the same as those of the former and their enthusiastic Christianity—much of it of Nonconformist inspiration—has only a gentle undercurrent of African practices. What is more, British political institutions in this country go back a very long way and, although a fresh start on orthodox Crown Colony lines was made after

the abortive revolt of 1865, under the ruling "plantocracy" Jamaica had already for two centuries enjoyed democratic institutions in the same sense at least as did Athens—on a foundation of slavery. The continuity of British institutions in Jamaica is still marked by vestigial traces of the 17th century in such venerable institutions as the Jamaican Privy Council, the Parish Custodes and the Broad Seal.

4. To a considerable extent, therefore, the whole population of Jamaica starts off at independence with a British orientation of a depth unknown in any other new Commonwealth country. Moreover, relatively few "top people", whether in politics or other organised public life, have a high proportion of African blood. If we ignore the small Jewish community who came to Jamaica from Spain and Portugal in the 18th century and the Levantines who came in the 19th century, though these are important driving forces in the Jamaican body politic, Jamaica is largely ruled at the present time by people with a substantial proportion of British blood in their veins and, in some cases, by people of virtually pure white extraction with an outlook very similar to the people of New Zealand. This fact is a source of internal tensions overtly arising from colour, but essentially stemming from the natural desire of the "have nots" to displace the "haves". Thus, while the outlook for Jamaica obviously depends on the way in which these tensions will be resolved over the coming years, it is at the present time a fact in our dealings with Jamaica, which we must bear constantly in mind, that we are confronting people who, in many ways, display the characteristics rather of the old Commonwealth countries than of the new, and with a society that, for all its internal tensions and the widely varying aptitudes and industry of its members (according to their racial origins) has a certain homogeneity of outlook and probably much more so than many Latin American countries. Although the frequent proclamation by the Jamaican ruling class of the absence of any racial problem in Jamaica, might, in some sense, be cynically regarded as whistling to keep up their courage, it does from another standpoint contain a measure of truth. Furthermore, Jamaica has been, for more than a century, essentially a country of smallholders with all the stability, as well as the economic inefficiency, to be expected in such a society. It is by no means inevitable that, given wise leadership, the needs and discontents of the non-privileged will erupt in the same revolutionary way (even though the revolution has sometimes been non-violent) as we have known in other new Commonwealth countries.

5. In assessing the prospects for the orderly and rational evolution of Jamaican society, we must also bear in mind that independence has come to Jamaica at a relatively late stage. Jamaica has had an advanced constitution for a number of years, with universal franchise since 1944, and has enjoyed the advantages of a two-party system, even though the parties may have grown up to an unhealthy degree round the contrasting personalities of two outstanding politicians. It would be rash to assume that Westminster democracy is fully understood and deeply rooted in Jamaica—the fact that Sir Alexander Bustamante could even toy with the thought of making himself Governor-General and that without severance of his party and trade union links, is evidence to the contrary—but certainly the chance that it may become so looks more promising here than elsewhere. The Jamaican Constitution was worked out in full agreement between the two parties and required no dramatic Independence Conference in London to secure its acceptance. For what it may be worth, it is a remarkably sane and moderate document with, for instance, built-in provisions for consultation with the Leader of the Opposition on certain key matters,

scope for the Leader of the Opposition to nominate a quota of Senators, and full civic rights (including eligibility for Parliament) for citizens of other Commonwealth countries after a year's residence. There is, of course, no constitutional bar on any Jamaican citizen holding any office and, although it would have been disingenuous, even in so cursory a survey as this, to avoid all mention of the obsessive problem of colour, there is no lack of opportunity for those born black to rise to the highest offices of state, if endowed with the necessary ability; and some have. The appointment of the new Governor-General is being hailed on this ground.² (Colour in Jamaica may perhaps be likened to accent in Britain. It tends to proclaim a humble origin but it is not a formal bar or, even in practice, always a disadvantage.) As further evidence of moderation of outlook, one might point to the deep constitutional entrenchment of the British monarchy, which appears to reflect the attitude of the great majority of Jamaicans, though there are pockets of republicanism especially among the young and the intelligentsia.

6. All this combines to make it probable that Jamaicans will see their problems, as they arise, through distinctly British, or perhaps it would be more prudent to say, through Western spectacles. For although, as is notorious, the outlook of Jamaicans, like that of other British Caribbean islands, is parochial and they have had surprisingly little contact with their neighbours, it must, of course, be remembered that they are embedded in the Western hemisphere and, as such, are inevitably subject to American influence. This, with the withdrawal of the British, may be expected rapidly to increase. Miami lies only 500 miles away and with Cuba only 90 miles away, a cautious and realistic approach towards Leftism would be natural, quite apart from any deliberate pressures which the United States may exert, and from the sobering reflection that British power in this region is now virtually limited (apart from small garrisons in British Honduras and British Guiana) to two frigates. Unless there should be some sudden break through of the under-privileged, it seems likely that the facts of geography will greatly influence the Jamaican outlook. This view is also reinforced by the economic facts. A considerable proportion of Jamaican trade and investment is already American; the Jamaican tourist trade is largely dependent on Americans; and Jamaican hopes for, though not perhaps prospects, of massive American aid are high. Whether or not the United States Government follows up the delegation of the Vice-President to the independence celebrations with a major attempt to "takeover" Jamaica, it seems almost inevitable that the material pull of the United States, even though often in conflict with Jamaican instincts, will be strongly felt here, and may give rise to some of the same attitudes as have characterised Canada. This, in its turn, may present problems for ourselves. But even though there may be problems reflecting Anglo-American differences, we shall, it may be hoped, be dealing, initially at least, with differences of relative nuance of a kind familiar among the Western countries, and not with the basic differences of outlook that obtain between the West and most of the countries of Asia and Africa. And we may perhaps look for Canadian assistance in resolving them, though thus far signs of Canadian interest have not even extended to the nomination of a High Commissioner.

² Blackburne served as Jamaica's first governor-general from 1 Aug 1962 and was succeeded by Sir Clifford Campbell from 1 Dec 1962.

7. In discussing the facts of geography, I have deliberately referred only to the United States, Canada and Cuba. One's first impression is that these are the only neighbours of any real consequence to Jamaica. She may be seeking membership of O.A.S. in the belief that her prospects of security and aid may thereby be increased; but Latin America means very little in this country where English is the only language spoken and where there are very few persons of Spanish or even French descent. Inevitably the British Caribbean territories mean rather more, if only because there has been a certain amount of mixing up especially in recent years and because of the university and one or two other common services. One's first impression is, however, of considerable surprise that the West Indies Federation should even have got as far as it did and the links with Trinidad seem, from Kingston, surprisingly weak and perhaps likely to grow still weaker. Trinidad is further from Jamaica in flying time (and air fares) than New York and almost as far as Australia from New Zealand; and the attitude of the Jamaicans towards Trinidad, although they belong to the larger country, displays a detachment even stronger than that of New Zealanders towards Australians, combined with a similar half-scandalised, half-admiring wonder at what so unpredictable and so unsound a Commonwealth partner may be up to next. But, seen from Kingston, Federation is not only dead but almost forgotten; and the Jamaicans have not yet even decided whether they need a High Commission in Port of Spain.

8. Political life in this predominantly agricultural, geographically isolated community revolves round two parties, the Jamaica Labour Party and the People's National Party. As I have said above, leadership of these parties is largely "coloured"; but, since there is universal franchise, both must look for support from "blacks". There is little else by way of political organisations, apart from a small, and at present, insignificant fringe of groups taking either a strongly racist, or quasi-Communist, line. None of them is represented in the present Parliament. Both the two main parties derive from the depression of the '30s and the unrest which led, just before the war, to the Moyne Report, from which it is customary in Jamaica to date both the independence struggle, such as it was, and the accompanying cultural awakening. Both parties have been associated with pressure for constitutional progress and, although both are now essentially moderate, their principal platform has traditionally been for improved conditions for organised workers, who form a relatively small, though increasing, section of the working population. Each party has a strong and undisguised trade union base and this is especially true of the Jamaica Labour Party. Not only is Sir Alexander Bustamante founder member and Life President of the trade union which bears his name, but he has included two of the principal officers of his union in his Cabinet, one of them as Minister of Labour. The membership of the respective unions is not, in form at least, geared to, but cuts right across, particular trades. Jamaica thus presents an extreme example of political unionism. The cohesive force in each party is essentially loyalty to the leader and to his own union following and such differences as there are between the parties are largely differences flowing from the personalities of the two leaders. Mr. Norman Manley, as is well-known, is an intellectual and a rational politician who, although once a follower of Sir Stafford Cripps,³ has now largely shed his Socialism. He has a good knowledge of the outside world and was a supporter, albeit an over-cautious

³ Chancellor of Exchequer, 1947–1950.

one, of Federation. He is interested in the arts and the cultural side of life; and his appeal is essentially to the educated classes and the relatively sophisticated inhabitants of greater Kingston, which contains something like 30 per cent. of the total population of Jamaica. By contrast, Sir Alexander Bustamante is a politician guided by instinct. In his seventy-ninth year at least, he is scarcely capable of discursive thought or even of coherent oratory, but has, in a marked degree, the born politician's flair for the right decision and for sensing the line which is in tune with the mood of his followers, to many of whom his word (brief and obscure though it frequently is) is law. His paternalistic appeal is essentially to the "quashies" (as the small farmers are known) and to the rural labourers who find Mr. Manley somewhat remote and over their heads. Although Sir Alexander Bustamante is somewhat of an opportunist and a demagogue—the final destruction of Federation was essentially his doing—his political position in most matters is to the right of Mr. Manley and is even more uncompromisingly anti-Communist.

9. The party struggle over the last 25 years has thus essentially been a struggle to demonstrate which party is better at securing improved conditions for organised workers and both parties appear to have been only too successful, the more so as the last decade has seen the introduction of a fair measure of secondary industry protected by the usual quantitative restrictions. It has seen, too, the introduction of substantial operations by Canadian and American companies for the winning of bauxite and the manufacture of alumina, which now account for half Jamaica's export income. These North American companies have been somewhat reckless about their wage rates and, although the employment which they themselves give is limited, they have tended to set the pattern of earnings. The result of all this is that Jamaica now faces a formidable wage-cost problem and a policy of wage restraint is no less desirable than it is in Britain. It is, however, something of a paradox that this should be so in a country where unemployment is rife, the social services by no means highly developed, and where each rise of wages (which, in monetary terms, now sometimes approach or even exceed those in Britain) tends to cause employers to reduce their payroll or to turn to greater mechanisation. Moreover, although the Jamaica Balance of Payments is still heavily dependent on the export of certain primary agricultural products, especially sugar, in regard to which there is keen world competition and, although the fortunes of a large part of the population are bound up with these products, she has become something of a high cost producer of them. These tendencies have, perhaps, been accentuated by the inevitable British tenderness towards Jamaica in commercial matters so long as she remained a colony, with the result that, to borrow the phrase of Mr. J. H. A. Watson,⁴ in his farewell despatch on the ex-French territories in Africa, Jamaica displays some of the features of a "greenhouse" economy. The working of the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement, for instance, has ensured that we amply cover the producers' cost even though, in recent years, it has involved us in paying something like double the world price; and there have been special arrangements designed to ensure a market in Britain for Jamaican citrus and bananas however uncompetitive their price. The importunate attitude of Jamaican Ministers regarding sales of their concentrated orange juice to the Ministry of Health might be regarded as a symptom of a "greenhouse" mentality.

⁴ Head of African Dept, FO, 1956–1959; British ambassador to Mali Federation, 1960–1961, to Senegal, Mauritania and Togo, 1960–1962.

It seems to me that the central economic problem which confronts the present Jamaican Government is that of bringing wage increases under some form of restraint and relating them better to the individual's output (which by and large is well below that of workers in Europe), and generally of getting costs under better control, especially where it is practicable—in this day and age—to do so in a way which takes advantage of the abundance of unskilled manpower and does not drive employers to more mechanisation. It is to be feared that, on the industrial side, the present Jamaican Government are not well situated for tackling this problem and will find great difficulty in considering the long-term interests of the community as a whole rather than the short-term interests of the section represented by the trades unions. On the other hand, they may be relatively well placed to tackle the resistance of smallholders to elimination of some of their inefficient methods of cultivation. As ex-slaves, the smallholders are perhaps even more passionate individualists than their kind elsewhere. While this has the advantage of making them anti-Marxist it has the disadvantage of making them particularly resistant [sic] to any form of interference designed to modernise their methods. But if anyone can bring them along the path of agricultural progress, Sir Alexander Bustamante, if only he can be convinced of the need, seems the man to do it.

10. Jamaica's other main economic liability is her high birthrate, amounting to 3½ per cent. natural annual increase and accentuated by the outlook of an ex-slave population in which, broadly speaking, maternity is rated above matrimony. (Only 30 per cent. of births are legitimate.) Birth control, which at best could only be a long-term palliative, appears still to be a subject almost taboo in Jamaica. The fact that the Prime Minister is a Roman Catholic presumably has something to do with the archaic attitudes on this question; and it is obvious that in Jamaican conditions it would be difficult to present birth control as family planning. In these circumstances, Jamaica needs to export a proportion—some say as much as half—of her population increase if all plans for development are not to be frustrated. There is in fact a long tradition of Jamaican emigration—going back for instance to the construction of the Panama Canal. Any emotional reaction there may originally have been to the Commonwealth Immigration Act has long since evaporated but the practical working of the Act is being keenly watched to see how great is the outflow of Jamaican immigrants who still succeed in getting into Britain. By and large, this is seen here as what it is—a vital factor in the Jamaican economic outlook. The greater the migration the less, broadly speaking, the aid which Jamaica will require and, if this migratory flow is heavily damped down, we may expect to hear a good deal of this argument. At the same time, it must be recorded that Jamaican migrants tend (or are thought) to include an undue proportion of such relatively skilled labour as exists, since those most skilled are the people with the greatest initiative and desire to improve their skills abroad. Unfortunately, though they may intend a relatively short sojourn in Britain for this purpose, they often become permanently lost to the Jamaican economy.

11. To balance these economic liabilities, there is a great deal on the credit side. As is well known, the Jamaican economy in the last decade has acquired considerable momentum and, as a leading Jamaican official has been heard to put it is now some way up the greasy pole leading to self-generating growth, even if there is some danger of her slipping back. This has been achieved through a combination of the development of the bauxite industry (which, as mentioned in paragraph 9, has

brought its own problems), and of the tourist industry, and of a conscious policy of deficit financing and credit expansion. The economy is wholly open, apart from such quantitative restrictions as have been imposed to protect nascent industry and for such vestigial exchange control against non-sterling currencies as is still enjoined from London. In these circumstances a good deal of private investment has been directed to Jamaica in recent years, and the flow continues, though recent political changes have, in the last year or so, induced much greater caution among potential investors. But, broadly speaking, Jamaica's payments are only balanced by the tourist industry, and by migrants' remittances, which will tend to fall away, in so far as the volume of migration falls and those who have already emigrated are joined by their dependants. The tourist industry looks somewhat precarious and in danger of pricing itself out of the market, and is, in any case, at the mercy of factors outside Jamaican control. The policy of deficit financing and rapid expansion had probably in any case gone on as long as was healthy if it were not to have a dangerous effect on the balance of payments. The J.L.P. will now have the task of working out a less exuberant policy which will yet enable development to go forward. They have also set themselves the more strictly political task of devising a new development plan to replace that of Mr. Manley, though they do not differ significantly from his Government in their outlook. It is being currently said that more emphasis will be placed on agricultural welfare and on housing, particularly in rural areas, though it remains to be seen what this will mean in practice, or how far the plan will look like bringing about a change in the maldistribution of wealth which exists in Jamaica. (The average annual income per head is as high as £131 but the serious poverty in the Kingston slums and the countryside are patent for all to see.) In seeking external aid, the Jamaican Government will be faced with the fact that, while it will take time to establish their credit as an independent country, their need is less great than that of many new countries; and need (together with nuisance value) tends to weigh more heavily than merit or achievement in the minds of donor Governments in their allocation of bounty.

12. But it can be said that the prospects that Jamaican Governments will act rationally, even if mistakenly, and free from the blind emotion of "economic nationalism" are fairly bright. There appear few signs of any problem of "Jamaicanisation". British and other overseas firms appear long since to have been operating largely through Jamaican personnel and in many cases have admitted a share of Jamaican equity. The small expatriate British community seems well mixed up with the Jamaican community (which includes domiciled citizens of the United Kingdom) in the manner familiar in the old Commonwealth countries. This should help to avert the pressures and resulting distortions so familiar to us in most other new Commonwealth countries.

13. These strike me as the principal domestic problems confronting the Jamaican Government. They must also build up their external affairs machinery and shape some sort of course in foreign policy. This is not merely a matter of self-respect or the casting of votes in the United Nations; it impinges on the domestic situation because the outside world—the world of potentially aid-giving Governments and private investors—is waiting to see where Jamaica stands and the absence of policy thus contributes to the current economic stagnation. It is in our own interest to encourage and assist Jamaica towards making her voice effectively heard because, initially at least (and with good management of internal affairs, perhaps for some

time), it is likely to be a moderate voice and perhaps even a voice openly committed in essentials to the West. Though neutralism is not unknown in Jamaica, it tends to receive the reception habitually reserved for views that are eccentric or put forward with the motive of “épater les bourgeois”⁵ and seems unlikely, in the present climate of opinion, to carry much influence.

14. But thus far hardly any glimpse of the views of Sir Alexander Bustamante’s Government on any subject has been vouchsafed to the public and independent Jamaica has been existing in something of a policy vacuum. Excuses for this can readily be made. The J.L.P. took office only at the end of April and only one, or at most, two Ministers besides the Prime Minister had held office previously and that with circumscribed responsibilities. Much of their energies in the first months went to the organisation of the independence celebrations, which were followed at only a few weeks’ interval by the visit of Sir Alexander Bustamante, together with some of his principal colleagues, to London for the Prime Ministers’ Meeting. Sir Alexander Bustamante has only just made up his mind that he does not wish to become Governor-General when Sir Kenneth Blackburne leaves Jamaica at the end of next month and that he is prepared to carry on for the time being, despite his advanced years, as Prime Minister. There is something in all this and it is perhaps sufficient justification for their reluctance to meet Parliament (apart from a couple of days’ debate on the Common Market issue before the Prime Minister’s departure for London), even though Mr. Manley and his colleagues appear no less justified in beginning to draw public attention to the absence of decisions from the Government. Sir Alexander Bustamante’s continued presence as Prime Minister carries with it the prospect of stability—his conservative outlook is well known. His authority within his own party is unquestioned and, despite his tendency to arrogate to himself a position going a little beyond that normally accorded to a democratic Prime Minister, it is generally conceded, even outside his own party faithful, his continued presence will not only give a breathing space to Jamaica to find out where she stands as an independent nation, and to his own party to sort out rivalries for succession to himself, but postpones the day when the withdrawal of one of the two local giants will transform the political scene as Jamaica has known it for a quarter of a century. There is, however, a price to be paid. Sir Alexander’s age and limited intellectual capacity would be of less account if he had the capacity to impart drive and energy to the Government machine. I fear, however, that I can find little trace of this. His Ministerial colleagues appear to feel inhibited from taking their own decisions but unable to obtain from him the swift and clear guidance which they need. Senior officials speak ruefully of the necessary period of education of their new political masters as still incomplete. There is a real danger that, even if Sir Alexander Bustamante shows himself capable of the statesmanship to throw off his past as a trade union boss and give Jamaica the leadership it needs, all might yet come to naught through plain inefficiency, too slow a tempo of work, and the lethargy which is the curse of the West Indian islands. It may however prove to be a case of *reculer pour mieux sauter*⁶ and there is a fair chance that the J.L.P. Government may emerge both as an effective supporter of the West, and as a Government able to get the Jamaican economy once more moving forward. If they can achieve the latter, it

⁵ To impress the middle classes.

⁶ Move back in order to move forward.

may fairly be hoped that adjustments of Jamaican society will take an evolutionary form and that she may escape the violent internal convulsions, leading to sharp changes of external course, which we have known in some other new Commonwealth countries. It seems, therefore, worthwhile to exert ourselves to give the Jamaican Government whatever assistance may be in our power. For a substantial part of the British connexion, we tended to neglect the West Indies. Trollope wrote a century ago "If we could, we would fain forget Jamaica altogether". I hope that this is not true to-day. Though small and situated in a part of the world where British influence has for long been limited, it would surely be unwise to neglect any opportunity to foster the emergence of a new Commonwealth partner of a very different kind from most of those in Asia and Africa.

15. I am sending copies of this despatch to the High Commissioners at Ottawa and Port of Spain, Her Majesty's Ambassadors at Washington and Havana, the United Kingdom Delegate to the United Nations in New York and (on a personal basis) to the Governor of Barbados.

The prospects for Trinidad and Tobago

SUMMARY

Dr. Williams' long absence since independence has not affected his personal position, but while he is away the country is standing still, and there is some criticism of the Government (paragraph 2).

2. The political parties reflect the main racial division of the country in which the Negroes just outnumber the East Indians (paragraph 4).

3. Dr. Williams' party, the P.N.M., has a solid parliamentary majority and there seems to be no political reason why it should not continue in power until the next election. The Opposition, D.L.P., is ineffective (paragraphs 4-8).

4. But the country faces serious economic problems due to unemployment accentuated by population growth; and to the distortions arising from the juxtaposition of a rich man's industry (oil) and a poor man's industry (agriculture) (paragraphs 10 and 11).

5. Government efforts to deal with economic problems are hampered by over-enthusiastic planning and ineffective administration. "Crash" programmes have distorted the labour situation and had a bad effect on agriculture (paragraphs 12 and 13).

6. There has been great emphasis on new industrial development but it has already become "high cost", and it cannot make much impact on the growing unemployment. The comparative wealth of the oil industry has led to inflated wage rates which threaten other sectors of the economy. Strikes are prevalent (paragraphs 14-16).

7. The Government have recently been trying to increase revenue; to raise more capital from abroad; and to change their priorities in development. Agriculture should, however, be given even more attention (paragraphs 17-19).

8. Dr. Williams has been right in laying such stress on association with the E.C.M. But he is likely to be disappointed in his search for aid in Europe. He and his Ministers need to concentrate on using better the resources already available and on tackling the country's problems—mainly labour unrest, unemployment and the strangling growth of population (paragraphs 20 and 21).

In the hope that they may usefully supplement the detailed briefing for your forthcoming visit to Trinidad and Tobago, I have the honour to submit some broadly drawn comments on the prospects for Trinidad and Tobago, and in particular the strength and weaknesses of the economy.

2. This is, perhaps, not the best time to try to take a long view of the internal politics of the newly independent State of Trinidad and Tobago. A few days after independence Dr. Williams left the country for the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Meeting; and he has found it possible to stay away for nearly three months on an extensive tour mainly of Western Europe. This is in itself evidence of the strength of Dr. Williams' personal position, and that of his party in the Trinidad political scene. But meanwhile there is a notable lack of progress in any political or economic matter in Trinidad which, added to the simultaneous growth of unemployment which I deal with below, is weakening the position of the Government in the country. Only the absence of an effective Opposition makes this a less serious matter for the Government than it has so far been. Nevertheless, among those who can see the shoals ahead, there is a growing feeling that the ship of State is at the moment rudderless. For the same reason too, the Trinidad and Tobago Government have since independence taken no steps not forced on them by circumstances to define their position in international affairs.

3. Despite these present uncertainties, it is possible, and indeed not very difficult, to see the main features of the local scene and, in particular, some of the major problems which will face Dr. Williams on his return.

The internal political situation

4. It may be trite, but it is none the less necessary, to repeat the comment that Trinidad and Tobago is a country formed mainly of two racial groups—the negro descendants of the slaves brought here from West Africa; and the “East Indian” descendants of the indentured labourers who were brought in from the Indian sub-continent when the slaves were emancipated and deserted the fields and plantations for the towns. The percentage of the population represented by these racial groups is 43 per cent. and 36 per cent. respectively, the rest of the population being made up mainly of people of mixed (but predominantly African) descent with a small proportion of Europeans and Chinese. This racial division is a fact of political, as well as social, life.

5. The Government party, the Peoples' National Movement (P.N.M.) is an intellectual conception which in 1956 sprang, Minerva-like, fully armed from the head of Dr. Williams, into the almost complete national political vacuum at that time. Within months it came into power, drawing its strength from the urban negro voters. As a result of the elections of December 1961 it increased its majority to the present figure of 20 out of a total of 30 seats in the House of Representatives.

6. Trades unionism played no part in the origins of the party; but some of the main urban unions came out in its support at the last elections and the unions may in future play an increasing part in party politics. Basically, however, the P.N.M. is not a radical party. Its strength lies in organisation and in Dr. Williams' appeal—calculated but none the less real—to the negro masses. If of course Dr. Williams were to retire from politics—there are constant rumours to this effect, recently given a fillip by a report that he would like to accept appointment to the Vice-Chancellorship of the University of the West Indies which will fall vacant next year—

the scene could be radically changed since no other P.N.M. politician enjoys anything like his prestige in the country.

7. The Democratic Labour Party (D.L.P.) holding all the remaining 10 seats in the House of Representatives is by comparison a collection of amateurs. Badly led by Dr. Rudranath Capildeo ("the Mad Scientist") it draws its support mainly from the rural East Indian community and from some "White Trinidadians" and others who prefer it to the P.N.M. for a mixture of reasons—because it is more capitalist; because they fear a one-party State; or more simply because they find the Indian politician more congenial than the Negro.

8. In day-to-day politics, the rapprochement reached at the last Constitutional Conference between the Government and Opposition continues. Both major parties had seen how close racial tensions had taken the country to open racial violence and both seem to be prepared to co-operate genuinely in measures to reduce racial tensions. The British Guiana rioting in February no doubt also left its mark. The improved atmosphere seems likely to continue although one gets the feeling of a fairly uneasy truce; and the situation will remain potentially dangerous, particularly if political passions flare up, so long as the two parties draw their main support from racial groups. While the rapprochement continues it clearly helps the Government more than the Opposition.

9. In terms of present political strength, therefore, there is no challenge to the position of the Government, and no reason why they should not continue in power for the four remaining years before another election must be held. There seems also to be no political reason why racial disturbances should interfere with their programme, provided that they do not enter into a trial of strength with the Opposition on matters touching on the strongly entrenched provisions of the Constitution. One such matter could conceivably be union with Grenada, which is likely to be increasingly opposed by the D.L.P. and the East Indian community because the addition of the negro population of Grenada to the local political scene would reduce the proportionate strength of the East Indians and also postpone the time when, because of their greater fecundity, they overtake the Negro population.

The economic situation

10. But while politically, despite the current stagnation, the Government ride comfortably in the saddle, it is in the social and economic fields that they are faced with most difficult problems. At the core of both social and economic troubles is the rapid, uninhibited growth of population. On the one hand, the Government's commendable desire to improve social conditions is rendered so much greater a burden on the Exchequer; on the other hand, the Government's considerable efforts to create new employment can make no headway against the rising tide of people. Also facing the Government are the problems arising from the juxtaposition, in a small island, of a rich man's industry employing relatively few (oil) and a poor man's industry employing many more (agriculture).

11. The population now numbers 828,000; it has risen by 265,000 in the 14 years since the previous census and, for reasons of religious belief or racial practice, there is unlikely to be any control on its continued growth. 350,000 are under 15; this number exceeds the present working population of Trinidad and Tobago. In the next five years alone, 100,000 people will newly enter the labour force, by contrast with only 16,000 who are in the age group 60–65. There exists already in the territory

serious unemployment, estimated at as much as 20 per cent. out of work and another 14 per cent. working only part-time. The problem is to provide employment for these people plus the flood of newcomers to the labour force. But it can be said at once that the problem is insoluble in terms of creating new jobs to match the population growth and appears soluble only by a reduction of the growth itself. There is no outlet in emigration.

12. In the past five years the Government saw its priorities as being:—

- (a) the improvement of social conditions, and
- (b) the attraction of new industry.

Its Development Plan for the period 1958–62 included new roads and bridges, hospitals, airport runways, schools and housing; much improvement has been made in all these socially desirable spheres. In the process employment was created, though much of it only temporary employment. In 1961 (and suspiciously close to election time) the Government found some W.I.\$6 million for a “Crash Programme” of works to provide employment. But the funds were badly administered, and the programme amounted to nothing more than a “dole” to a few thousand workers for a few weeks. This same inefficiency of administration was evident throughout the whole Development Programme; it stems from an acute shortage of competent staff in Government, at both administrative and technical levels. Projects are “planned”, but incompletely; a new technical college is built with C.D.W. funds but stands empty, having neither teaching staff nor equipment; a new airport terminal is built and remains unoccupied for months while neglected details are rectified; the proposed project to build 5,000 low-cost houses results in the building of 200 high-cost houses. Millions are spent on a splendid new road to open up a beach, while over-crowded hospitals and slums fester. The Government is full of ideas and ideals but lacks the talent, the know-how and the drive to implement them. In part, this lacuna stems from the Prime Minister himself, an intellectual who does not encourage his Ministers to take independent decisions and who has held the reins of Government so tightly in his own hands that the efforts of other Ministers and the Civil Service (neither of whom in any case is of high calibre) have been stultified.

13. The island of Tobago received the Government's special attention in the Development Programme—new schools, a new road, improved shipping, &c. This devotion to Tobago is of course of political rather than economic significance. In the first place Dr. Williams headed off the movement in Tobago to secede from Trinidad and join the West Indies Federation. “The development of Tobago initiated by the present Government”, said Dr. Williams, “affords an example and an inspiration to all the smaller and under-developed islands of the Federation.” Secondly, he was rewarded by winning both the Tobago seats in the 1961 Election. But in the process of so-called development, Tobago's Civil Service establishment rose from 360 to 442, hundreds of workers were employed on road making, at higher wages than the agricultural estates were able or willing to pay, and the island's agricultural production (its major asset) declined at a more rapid pace than before.

14. The Government's second priority in these five years was the attraction of new industry by means of incentive legislation and the creation of an Industrial Development Corporation. It sought to achieve additional employment and a diversification of its industrial activity. But neither of these objectives was achieved. The main expansion took place in the oil industry so that the territory's dependence

on its main industry became still more marked; at the same time the emphasis swung to refining of imported oil and away from the production of indigenous crude which in Trinidad is, for technical reasons, high cost; the industry became more capital intensive and the numbers employed actually fell. Simultaneously the sugar industry, fighting the constant squeeze of increasing costs upon more or less fixed returns, was reducing its labour force. Some new manufacturing industries were established, but the number of new jobs created totalled only about 4,000. Thus, with employment in oil and sugar declining, with employment in manufacturing industry increasing only slowly, and with the population increasing rapidly, there were more people unemployed at the end of the Five-year Development Programme than at the beginning. It may be counted as a minor credit that people are now reported to be applying for work in the less palatable jobs such as the cocoa and coconut estates.

15. The very high rate of capital expenditure in the public sector (\$240 million in five years) and the very high rate of capital inflow in the private sector, so desirable in many ways, and so transforming of the local scene, nevertheless had some adverse effects. The Government, launched irrevocably on a social programme they can no longer maintain from internal resources, find themselves in the position of paupers, anxiously begging for aid from every possible external source. The people of Trinidad and Tobago have, thanks to the period of expanding money circulation, come to demand a higher standard of living, and to accustom themselves to the luxury symbols of refrigerators, automobiles and television. The Trinidadian now sees himself as entitled to a North American standard of living though making no effort (because of the serious unemployment and his inborn—or perhaps his slave ancestor-cultivated—indolence) to achieve comparable productivity in his daily work. But this is a standard of living the economy cannot support.

16. And these very factors of high public sector spending and high private sector capital inflow which produced the expansion are now recoiling on the Government and the people. Because Government revenues have been so seriously strained by, *inter alia*, the Development Programme, Government spending has virtually ground to a halt, while the consumer boom, financed largely by the over-enthusiastic activities of hire-purchase companies, has collapsed. The expansion of the oil industry has reached a plateau; existing manufacturing industries have been hampered by the failure of the West Indies Customs Union and the growth of competing plants in the Caribbean; one can point to two existing companies at present expanding (significantly, both are capital-intensive projects) but there is little evidence of interest in establishing further manufacturing industries. The economy has ceased its advance. Another serious, and longer-term effect, can be seen; the territory has become a high-cost producer, and is in danger of forfeiting what claim it had to offering cheap labour as an incentive to local manufacture. The labour unions, with (until recently) the implicit approval of the Government, have emerged as militant, but irresponsible, groups, demanding more and more money for less and less work. Their first target has naturally been the oil industry, which is, at one and the same time, both the pillar of the economy and a major threat to it. The pace of wage increase in the territory is set by Texaco who, as the largest oil company in Trinidad, are the first target for the unions, and who, thanks to profits from their huge refinery employing relatively little labour, can afford higher wages. In the labour negotiations now proceeding between Texaco and the Oil Workers' Trades Union, the company have offered—at an early stage of the negotiations when no

intolerable pressure had been put upon them—wage increases totalling an estimated 20 per cent. over the next three years. But the remainder of Trinidad's economy consists of high-cost sugar production, inefficient citrus, banana, cocoa and coffee production, and marginally efficient secondary manufacturing sheltering in varying degrees behind tariff protection. These other industries cannot afford to follow the lead of the oil industry in granting wage increases, but the unions will not permit them to lag far behind. The territory meantime is beset by strikes.

17. The question is "Whither Bound"? In the past year the Government have shown some appreciation of the problems (though they would hotly deny that any of them were self-created). They have changed their priorities; recurrent revenue must be increased to match expenditure; development must be channelled into productive enterprise and especially into agriculture, in order to reduce imports, to stabilise the rising cost of living and to provide more jobs. The Government, ever aware of the territory's dependence for its economic expansion on capital inflow, has been assiduous in its own efforts to preserve a favourable investment climate.

18. Useful progress has already been made on increasing revenue, in which task the Government have moved on sound and sensible lines, without arousing undue anxiety in Trinidad itself or externally. Customs and Excise duties have been increased, loopholes in tax collection have been stopped, and Treasury Bills have been successfully introduced. Even so, Government expenditure has been increasing rapidly (the result in large measure of unnecessary expenditure, *e.g.*, their takeover of the Telephone Company, their purchase of British West Indian Airways, independence celebrations, opening of diplomatic offices overseas, &c.), so that, even with the increase in local revenue, the Government is still desperately short of cash to meet its recurrent commitments. In the quest for capital for future development, Government have sought contributions from major companies in the territory, and so far have received firm promises of WI.\$26 million; the allocation of these funds no doubt awaits the publication of the next Five-year Development Plan. It has also today (21st November) been announced that the United States Government has agreed to give Trinidad WI.\$51 million in economic aid over five years, one-third of it before 30th June next.

19. As to channelling resources into agriculture, this seems to me the correct priority. But the Government as yet have shown no evidence of producing a dynamic policy of agricultural development. Indeed their inactivity has stirred the usually lackadaisical Opposition to challenge the Government on this subject. Nothing short of a national campaign of "Back to the Land" can hope to make an impression on the serious unemployment, and this will take great courage from a Government whose principal support is the urban Negro.

20. The Government's immediate preoccupations on the economic front are first, the preservation of the United Kingdom market for their exports and, second, the raising of finance for continued development. As to the first, the Prime Minister has, I think, been right in making his grand tour of Europe to present the Trinidad and Tobago case to the Six. Without some arrangement for Trinidad's refined petroleum products and for continued protection for sugar and citrus, Trinidad's economy must suffer severely. The Prime Minister has, at the same time, made wide-ranging requests for aid; the publicity on this has been such that his followers will undoubtedly expect him to return weighted down with European money bags. I fear, however, that the Prime Minister himself may have had to learn the unpleasant truth

that there are no vast sums waiting to flow, for long-term and at low interest, into public sector developments.

21. Trinidad and Tobago is a territory which has an enormous economic advantage over other Caribbean territories, viz. an indigenous oil industry on which has been erected a yet bigger refining structure. This in turn gives the people a higher *per capita* income than anywhere else in the Caribbean. But these advantages have led to inflated ideas and inflated ambitions. It would be in the territory's interests to recognise its limitations, to set itself more realistic targets and to aim at achieving a few limited objectives. The Prime Minister, because of his immense intellectual capacity, has become a juggler, manipulating vast numbers of balls in the air at the same time; when these balls are projects, some inevitably fall and others remain permanently in orbit. Projects which are virtually on the point of being clinched are suddenly cast back while yet more offers are examined. Thus the telephone expansion is again postponed while the Prime Minister personally negotiates with Philips; again, existing housing projects about which endless preparations have been made stand still while the Prime Minister invites a German firm to Trinidad to build 40,000 houses and the supply-industries to go with them. While the Prime Minister dreams of aid in the hundreds of millions, and derides the genuine but more modest efforts of the United Kingdom and the United States to help, worthwhile projects stand still. On past evidence, it is, I fear, too much to hope that complete economic realism will prevail. But much will depend on the frame of mind in which Dr. Williams returns from Europe. He will return to many domestic problems, most prominent of them that of quieting labour unrest and dealing with rising unemployment. If he can move forward on limited development aims, while preserving the prospect of gaining a share of the European Development Fund and of American Aid to Latin America, then the economy might resume its advance, though at a gentler pace. But whatever external finance is forthcoming, and however capably the Government and Administration perform, nothing in sight will enable them to escape from the stranglehold imposed by the uninhibited growth of population.

22. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the British High Commissioners in other Commonwealth countries, the British Ambassadors in Dublin, Caracas and Washington and, on a secret and personal basis, to the Governor of Barbados.

211 CAB 134/1777, EER(63)78 **14 June 1963** **'Jamaica and the European Free Trade Association': CRO note for Cabinet (Official) External Economic Relations Committee on a proposal that Jamaica should join EFTA**

In April, 1963, before coming to the Commonwealth Economic Consultative Council meeting of Trade Ministers in London, the Jamaican Minister of Trade and Industry (Mr. Lightbourne) requested the Jamaican High Commissioner in London to explore with British Ministers the possibility of association of Jamaica with the European Free Trade Association (Kingston telegrams Nos. 165 and 168 to the Commonwealth Relations Office).

2. Little progress was made at that stage. The brief on this subject prepared for British Ministers in case Mr. Lightbourne should raise the matter with them at the

time of the C.E.C.C. meeting (C.E. (U.K.) (63) 32 Annex B) recommended that he should be told that we had not as yet been able to reach any definite view on his suggestion, but that, though it was certainly an interesting one, it seemed to involve a good many serious difficulties; it further recommended that, if Mr. Lightbourne should ask us to seek the views of our E.F.T.A. partners, it would be best to stall, e.g. on the grounds that we should prefer not to commit ourselves to doing this until we had had time to evaluate the outcome of the Lisbon meeting.

3. In fact, Mr. Lightbourne barely referred to the matter at the time of the C.E.C.C. meeting. He did, however, discuss it at some length with the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations on 23rd May. A record of this meeting is attached as Annex A to this paper.¹ Mr. Lightbourne is now again in this country, for medical treatment, and had a further talk with Mr. Tilney on 13th June; the record of this meeting is attached as Annex B.

4. It will be noted from the record of these meetings that:—

(a) Mr. Lightbourne is not primarily concerned with commercial or economic advantages for Jamaica, but with the political or psychological value of being associated with a European group, partly as a counter to pressures on Jamaica to join the Organisation of American States, though some of his colleagues are known to think that it would be an advantage if Jamaica joined the O.A.S., and this is also the British view;

(b) he also hopes that association with E.F.T.A. would help to ensure a satisfactory position for Jamaica if Britain later joined the European Economic Community;

(c) he would regard it as essential that Jamaica should remain free to retain protection for domestic industries against manufactures from the member countries of E.F.T.A;

(d) Mr. Lightbourne's proposal is not an official one from the Jamaican Government as a whole, but is primarily a personal idea of his own for which he wishes British support before putting it to his colleagues in the Jamaican Cabinet—however, we understand that at least one of the other Jamaican Ministers is aware of Mr. Lightbourne's ideas and is in sympathy with them, and Mr. Lightbourne apparently intends to put his proposal to his colleagues as soon as he gets a favourable response in principle from us.

5. At the meeting on 23rd May Mr. Tilney undertook that the British Government would give Mr. Lightbourne's suggestion careful consideration and would find out what the other E.F.T.A. Governments thought about it, and let Mr. Lightbourne know. It is awkward to consult other Governments formally about an idea that has not so far been sponsored by the Jamaican Government as a whole, but, in the circumstances, it seems well to take some informal soundings before replying to Mr. Lightbourne.

¹ Annexes not printed. The record of Tilney's meeting with Lightbourne on 23 May opens: 'Mr. Lightbourne explained that the reason why he would like to see Jamaica associated with E.F.T.A. was that Jamaica badly needed to feel that it "belonged" to a group of countries. The essential thing for Jamaica was stability. Jamaica was stable but the Latin American countries on the mainland were not. There were pressures being exerted to bring Jamaica into membership of bodies like the Organization of American States and the Central American Free Trade Area. He thought that any such move would be a very bad thing and therefore wanted his country to join some group outside the Caribbean-American region'.

6. If the other E.F.T.A. Governments considered that, irrespective of the terms of Article 41.2 of the Stockholm Convention, they were not prepared to agree to extend association with E.F.T.A. to a country so far away from Europe and with an economy so different from their own, we should have a fairly simple answer to give Mr. Lightbourne, and the rejection of his suggestion on these grounds should not cause political difficulty between ourselves and Jamaica.

7. If the view of the other E.F.T.A. Governments were that they might be prepared to agree to the association of Jamaica, but only on condition that Jamaica accepted a timetable for the eventual removal of protection of domestic industries against E.F.T.A. manufacturers (e.g. on the lines of Annex G (Portugal) of the Stockholm Convention), then the Jamaicans would have to decide whether they were prepared to accept such a timetable. If they were, then we should have to decide whether we were prepared to agree to have them associated with E.F.T.A.

8. It is not clear that there would be strong economic arguments one way or the other so far as we were concerned. We should lose preference in Jamaica as against the other E.F.T.A. countries; but, provided that Jamaican duties on E.F.T.A. manufactures were eventually removed, we should then secure a better position for our own manufactures *vis-à-vis* both domestic Jamaican industry and the manufactures of non-E.F.T.A. countries (United States, E.E.C., Canada, etc.)

9. It would be politically undesirable for the British Government to be responsible for the rejection of this proposal if the other E.F.T.A. Governments were prepared to agree to it on reasonable conditions. On the other hand, it may be argued that it would not be in British interests to extend the E.F.T.A. complex in this way, and that we should not therefore press this proposal on our E.F.T.A. partners. In any case, we cannot at this stage tell them that the proposal has our support, since it has not yet been officially endorsed by the Jamaican Government.

10. Our attitude towards this proposal must depend in large measure on our view of the future development of E.F.T.A. The association of Jamaica might possibly lead to applications from other countries, whether in Europe or outside, and in this way help to improve the standing of E.F.T.A. on the world stage. The more desirable that this is considered to be, the more support we should presumably give to Mr. Lightbourne's suggestion; and *vice versa*.

11. We should avoid giving Mr. Lightbourne any statement of our views until we have taken soundings of our E.F.T.A. partners. It is accordingly suggested that, as a first step, H.M. Representatives in the other E.F.T.A. capitals should be instructed to explain informally to the Governments to which they are accredited the nature of Mr. Lightbourne's proposal as indicated at the meeting on 23rd May,² making it clear that this is not at present a formal move by the Jamaican Government and asking that it should be treated as entirely confidential; and then to go on to explain the British Government's tentative views as follows:—

² A draft note prepared in the CRO for use by UK representatives should they discuss Jamaica's admission with EFTA governments included the following: 'In order to understand the context of this approach, it must be realised that Jamaicans do not look upon themselves as Americans or Caribbeans, still less as expatriate Africans and Indians. Jamaica has been a British island for 300 years with no surviving indigenous race or culture, and the sympathies and outlook of Jamaicans are accordingly overwhelmingly conditioned by and directed towards their European connections' (CAB 134/1777, EER(63)78 (Addendum), 18 June 1963).

(a) although Article 41.2 of the Stockholm Convention contains no limitation on the countries which may be associated with E.F.T.A., we had previously regarded E.F.T.A. as of concern to European countries only; however, we consider that this is not in itself a conclusive argument against considering Mr. Lightbourne's suggestion;

(b) the pattern of Jamaican trade is such that association with E.F.T.A. would not at first sight appear to carry any substantial advantage for Jamaica; however, Mr. Lightbourne seems to realise this, and to be concerned rather with more general aspects;

(c) we have noted his desire to retain unimpaired the right to protect Jamaican domestic industry, and his argument from the precedent of association with the E.E.C. The question would arise whether a timetable for reducing and eventually eliminating duties on E.F.T.A. manufactures should be a condition of any agreement of association between Jamaica and E.F.T.A.;

(d) if other E.F.T.A. Governments were prepared to agree that the fact that Jamaica is not in Europe was not in itself a sufficient reason for refusing to consider the possibility of association with E.F.T.A., we for our part would be glad to join with the Jamaican Government and the other E.F.T.A. Governments in an examination of the possible terms of an association agreement; the first step towards such an examination would presumably be for us to inform Mr. Lightbourne that, if the Jamaica Government so wished, the possible terms of an agreement could be discussed with them.

212 CAB 134/1775, EER 10(63)1 20 June 1963 **'Jamaica and the European Free Trade Association': Cabinet (Official)** **External Economic Relations Committee minutes advising against the** **proposal that Jamaica should join EFTA¹**

The Committee had before them a note by the Commonwealth Relations Office (E.E.R. (63) 78)² covering a memorandum about a proposal for Jamaican association with the European Free Trade Association, which had been put to the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations by the Jamaican Minister of Trade and Industry (Mr. Lightbourne).

*Mr. Shannon*³ said that it was necessary to consider what the United Kingdom's attitude to this proposal ought to be and, secondly, how the suggested approach to member governments of the European Free Trade Association should be handled. The proposition was not one which would have suggested itself to us, but now that the idea had been introduced it should be recognised that it would have some advantages. In particular the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State believed that a step which would strengthen the ties between a newly independent Commonwealth country and the United Kingdom would have political advantages in this country. It was recognised that it was awkward to make an approach to the other members of

¹ The meeting was chaired by A W France (3rd secretary, Treasury) and attended by officials from the CO, CRO, FO, Board of Trade, Board of Customs and Excise, Treasury, Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, and the Bank of England.

² See 211.

³ G E B Shannon, CRO.

the Association on the basis of a proposal which had not been put to us formally by the Jamaican Government, but the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State had agreed to seek the views of the other Association members.

The Committee first considered whether it would be in the United Kingdom's interest to support Jamaican association, and various serious objections were put forward. The inclusion of countries outside Europe would go beyond the original purpose of the Association and would substantially aggravate the difficulty of a future negotiation for accession to the European Economic Community. Although the association of Commonwealth countries might be limited to the West Indies with the possible exception of Southern Rhodesia, it would nevertheless set a dangerous precedent and, for example, make it more difficult to resist the association of Portuguese African territories, which would be an even more serious encumbrance in a future negotiation with the Community. It might also lead to difficulty with the Colonies: Hong Kong and Singapore had sought association when the Stockholm Convention was negotiated, but we had declined to put their proposal forward on the ground that the other members would be unwilling to face the competition from their low cost manufactures. They could be expected to reopen this question if Jamaica were granted association, especially as Jamaica also produced textiles and cheap clothing. There might also be tariff complications: we might for instance be pressed to extend free entry for agricultural products on Annex D of the Convention to other Association members as well as Jamaica and the Association might see some risk of diversion of trade through Jamaica from other Commonwealth countries. Finally the creation of another preferential bloc including under-developed countries would be inconsistent with our approach to the problems of the trade of the less-developed countries in the current discussions under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.

There was doubt too whether the proposal for association with the European Free Trade Association was in Jamaica's own interest. Her long-term political interest lay more in membership of the Organisation of American States and in closer links with Latin America. Association might not be technically inconsistent with membership of the Organisation of American States, but it would make it unlikely that Jamaica would be admitted. Mr. Lightbourne seemed to be holding out the possibility of association in order to turn other members of his government away from the Organisation. There might also be trade disadvantages both for us and for Jamaica: we should be likely to lose the benefit of preferences on our exports to Jamaica, and Jamaica would lose preferences in other Commonwealth countries and might in particular jeopardise her special relations with Canada.

As regards the suggested approach to the other members of the European Free Trade Association, it was agreed that, having regard to the force of the arguments against association, it would be inappropriate and unwise for us to seek the views of other members without ourselves giving an indication of our own. There was a risk that the proposal would be supported by Portugal, while other members might raise no objection to pursuing it further, in which case we should be committed to embarrassing discussions. If there were to be a discussion on the general principle of extending the membership we could not avoid giving our opinion and we should then be open to criticism for having tabled a proposal which we could not ourselves support. It would also be embarrassing if our opposition reached the ears of Mr. Lightbourne. In addition, since the proposal had been made by only one Minister

without the authority of his government, it would be inappropriate to make a formal approach to member governments of the Association and the most that we could consider undertaking was informal discussion between Ministers during the course of a Council meeting. The next opportunity for this would be in September.

Summing up, *The Chairman* said that in the light of the discussion the best course would be to explain to Mr. Lightbourne the objections that we saw to his proposal, and to warn him that if we took soundings among the other member governments of the Association we should have to reveal our own views, and moreover that we could not undertake to approach them before September. He might then realise that the idea was not worth pursuing, or, if he insisted that we should approach the Association on this basis, he would then have no grounds for complaint if in doing so we ourselves opposed the suggestion. It would be best for the Commonwealth Relations Office and the Foreign Office to prepare a joint report analysing the objections to the proposal, which the Commonwealth Relations Office might then submit to the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State with the advice that he should reply to Mr. Lightbourne on these lines. The Foreign Office should submit it to the Lord Privy Seal at the same time so that he might discuss it with the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State.

The Committee:—

Invited the Foreign Office and the Commonwealth Relations Office, in consultation with the Colonial Office and the Board of Trade, to prepare a report on the objections to Jamaican association with the European Free Trade Association and to submit it to their Ministers individually with a recommendation for action on the lines indicated by the Chairman.⁴

⁴ Tilney saw Lightbourne again on 24 July. The latter had been 'disappointed' by the decision 'but had taken it in good part'. No further approach was anticipated from the Jamaican government (DO 200/39, no 26, record of meeting between Tilney and H C Lindo, Jamaican high commissioner in the UK, 1 Aug 1963).

213 CO 1031/4402, no 40

24 June 1963

[British Guiana]: CO briefing note for the Anglo-American official talks on the current situation and the options for UK policy

At the constitutional conference in March 1960 the principle of independence was conceded.¹ A constitution was agreed providing for full internal self-government, including responsibility for internal security and the police. It was visualised that independence would follow some two years after the introduction of the new constitution. This constitution took effect in August 1961 and in September Dr. Jagan's "Peoples Progressive Party" (P.P.P.) formed the government having, in a general election, won 20 of the 35 seats in the Assembly against Mr. Burnham's Peoples National Congress Party's 11 (P.N.C.) and Mr. D'Aguiar's United Force Party's 4 (U.F.P.). The percentage of votes polled by the three parties were P.P.P. 43%; P.N.C. 41%; U.F.P. 16%. The election of one P.P.P. member was subsequently declared invalid: a by-election has not yet been held. With the expulsion of one

¹ See 135, note.

member of the Assembly from the P.P.P., the votes commanded by Dr. Jagan in the Assembly number 18 against the opposition parties 16.

2. In 1961, Anglo-American official talks were held. A joint programme was agreed based on the principle that the right policy was to give Jagan aid from the West and to work with him and that the wrong policy was to treat him as a pariah and deny him aid. Under the former policy there was a prospect of getting him neutralist if not actually favourable to the West, while under the latter policy he was bound to turn increasingly to the Soviet bloc. The report was approved by the President.²

Following a visit by Dr. Jagan to Washington in the autumn of 1961, it began to be clear that the Americans were finding it difficult—because of congressional and press hostility to Jagan—to give aid, and, in the event, did not feel able to proceed with this proposal. The British Guiana Government became increasingly resentful and frustrated as they realised that American aid was not forthcoming.

3. At the end of 1961 Jagan's Government, with the support of the opposition party (P.N.C.) asked H.M. Government to fix a date for independence. With the acquiescence of the Americans, an independence conference was planned for May 1962. In January 1962, the British Guiana Government introduced a budget aimed at increasing revenue to provide money for development. It contained unpopular tax measures and led to a strike and disorders involving extensive damage by fire to Georgetown. The British garrison (one Company) had to be reinforced by a battalion. It has since remained one battalion. The independence conference had to be postponed until November, 1962.

4. In the interval, in agreement with the Americans, our aim in British Guiana had altered from that of "making the best of Jagan" to that of exploring ways of granting independence under a government not led by Jagan.

5. The November conference had to be adjourned for the reason that the parties could not reach agreement on the electoral system.³ Dr. Jagan pressed for the transfer of residual powers to his Government without fresh elections, whereas the opposition parties wanted fresh elections—held on the basis of proportional representation. The conference was adjourned to allow for further discussions between the parties in British Guiana. The White Paper reporting the outcome of the Conference contains a statement that "if after an interval no agreed solution could be found, the British Government may have to consider imposing a settlement on their own authority so as to enable British Guiana to go forward to independence". Despite face-saving meetings between the political leaders, no progress has been made since the conference towards finding a solution.

² The document reproduced here is a copy. The original is not in the file, having been retained in the department (the FCO) under section 3(4) of the Public Records Act, 1958. A section of the text from the original in the middle of paragraph two of the copy reproduced here has been blanked out.

³ The November 1962 conference broke down on three issues: (a) whether elections should be held on the basis of the existing system of single-member constituencies or on a form of proportional representation; (b) whether the voting age should be 21, as then existed, or 18; (c) whether there should be new elections before independence. Jagan wanted single-member constituencies, voting at 18, and no elections. The opposition led by Burnham and D'Aguiar wanted proportional representation, voting at 21, and new elections (CAB 134/2370, OP(62)11, 'British Guiana independence conference, 1962', 19 Nov 1962; also *Report of the British Guiana Constitutional Conference, 1962*, Cmnd 1870).

6. In April 1963 the British Guiana Government introduced into the Assembly a "Labour Relations Bill". The Trade Unions regarded this as a threat to their independence. The Government's motive was to enable it to take under its control the main Sugar Workers' Union. A general strike was called on 20th April, in which the vast majority of the unions, including the Civil Service Unions, have participated. The strike has been running for 9 weeks. There have been negotiations on the Bill and agreement has been reported between the T.U.C. and the Government on the major points. On the 28th May, Jagan and three colleagues were suspended from the Assembly. On the 18th June the Governor, on the advice of Jagan, which he was constitutionally bound to accept, prorogued the Legislature. This ended the suspensions but also killed the Labour Relations Bill which had not passed through the Upper House. The cause of the strike was thus removed, but the British Guiana T.U.C. appear determined to continue it with the aim of bringing Dr. Jagan's Government down. That the strike has gone on for 9 weeks is due to financial assistance to the strikers from outside British Guiana;⁴ that it had done so without serious disturbances is no doubt due to the presence of a battalion of the Coldstream Guards.

7. The Jagan Government has been inefficient and under their rule the economy of the country has deteriorated. The disturbances in February 1962 resulted in a loss of confidence, which has never been regained. The 1963 budget was barely balanced and developed [sic] expenditure had to be severely curtailed. The strike is costing the Government \$2-3 million a month and the aftermath will be serious. The Government will need \$6 million at the end of June to meet their commitments. This will rise to \$11 million by the end of July. The territory relies on bauxite, sugar, rice; the first two have been at a standstill during the strike and it is doubtful whether the bauxite industry can regain its lost markets. The rice industry, owing to mismanagement by the statutory Rice Marketing Board, is expected to face a crisis at the start of the next crop year August/September.

8. In the absence of economic aid from the West, other than that which was already being provided by Britain, the British Guiana Government has been forced to turn increasingly to Cuba, Russia and other bloc countries.

9. There appear to be only three courses:—

(1) to let things drift but hope and work for a change of Government. In this case there would be a coalition of Burnham and D'Aguiar. This would be at least as incompetent as the present Government, and it is doubtful if it could last long. Jagan would be more effective in opposition in stirring up trouble than he is in Government;

(2) to make British Guiana independent as early as possible under Jagan;

(3) for us to resume direct government. This would be attacked in the United Nations, and by both the main local parties. Jagan's popularity might increase

⁴ By American trade unionists like Serafino Romualdi and through such organisations as the American Institute for Free Labour Development and AFL-CIO, the American Federation of Labour-Congress of Industrial Organisations. Their activities, which were bitterly resented by the Jagan government, are described in a number of secondary accounts, including James G Rose, *British colonial policy and the transfer of power in British Guiana, 1945-1964*, (unpublished University of London PhD thesis, 1992, chapter VII). Rose draws extensively on the official UK records but his analysis ends in 1964 because the records to independence in 1966 were not then available. See also CO 1031/4928, 4929.

since popular discontent could be switched to Britain as a target. It would cost a great deal of money. To be of any value it would have to be continued for a period of years during which it would be necessary to build up the economy; establish political stability; and (if this is possible) find better leaders. It would offer no permanent solution unless over a sustained period alternative leaders were to emerge. Indians are multiplying faster than Africans and in a few years more than half the electorate will be Indian. If Jagan maintains his hold over the Indians, his Government will then be returned to power under any electoral system.⁵

10. We have no strategic or other interests in British Guiana. The present development plan was estimated to cost BWI \$135 million (approximately U.S. \$85 million) over 5 years. A plan at least as ambitious will be required over the next 5 years if there is to be any prospect of political stability.

⁵ These three options had been discussed by the Oversea Policy Committee on 14 June. They were stated in a message from Macmillan to President Kennedy (CAB 134/2371, CP(63)12, 14 June 1963, 'British Guiana', note by the secretaries).

214 PREM 11/4586, ff 31–33

28 June 1963

[British Guiana]: FO record of a meeting between Lord Home, Mr Duncan Sandys and Mr Rusk at 1 Carlton Gardens in London on the current situation in British Guiana¹

Mr. Rusk explained that the prospect of a Jagan Government taking British Guiana into independence was very distasteful to the United States Government. They considered it extremely serious to have another Marxist régime in the Western Hemisphere. He was certain that most of the Member States of the Organisation of American States would also object. If the British Government insisted on granting independence considerable difficulties might arise. He himself would prefer Britain to delay granting independence until there was no risk of British Guiana going Communist. He did not know whether the present Constitution offered any scope for achieving this aim.

Mr. Sandys explained that Britain still had formal responsibility for external affairs and defence, but that this did not get us very far. It would be possible to keep out undesirable foreigners and, so long as the British garrison remained in the territory, to restore order in the event of serious internal trouble. Otherwise, effective power was in the hands of the British Guiana Government. The present situation offered little prospect of improvement in the territory. The nine weeks old strike might now be settled, but would leave British Guiana financially ruined.

If Britain left British Guiana now Jagan would have a parliamentary majority, but with strong negro opposition to him in the main towns. The outcome would be riots

¹ Also present: from the UK, Mr Fisher, Sir D Ormsby-Gore, Sir H Caccia, Sir H Poynton, A R Thomas; from the US, W Bruce, W Burdett. This meeting was preceded by preparatory discussions between UK and US officials which were held in London between 25 and 27 June 1963. For the record of these, see CO 1031/4402, no 42.

and bloodshed which Jagan could not control, leading to a Congo situation. If, on the other hand, British Guiana became independent under a Burnham/D'Aguiar coalition, the result would be equally negative since such a coalition would soon break up. Furthermore, Jagan, though an incompetent minister, would be much more formidable in opposition than in office. The outcome would be a situation in which the coalition Government would not be in control of large areas of the country.

There was a third alternative of suspending the Constitution and reimposing direct rule. This would be particularly objectionable in that it would arouse the strongest opposition inside and outside British Guiana. It seemed most undesirable for Britain to expose herself in this way for the sake of a territory in which she had no profound interest. He would be very reluctant to contemplate embarking on a course which would have very considerable long-term political, military and financial implications. *Mr. Rusk* said that he differed from the Commonwealth Secretary's assessment of British interest in British Guiana; he was certain that Britain had a very large interest in British Guiana in the context of wider Anglo-American relations.

Mr. Sandys asked whether, if it were possible to give independence to British Guiana under a non-Jagan Government, the United States Government would feel able to enter into defence and economic aid agreements with this Government which would give the United States a *locus standi* for intervention, should Jagan return to power or if there should be a fresh Communist threat.

Mr. Rusk said this was not an attractive solution. The United States preferred a solution which enabled the British Government to exercise the essential powers in British Guiana. Would it not be possible to reach an accommodation with the Labour Party on a resumption of direct rule? *Lord Home* said that there was no prospect of reaching an accommodation with the Labour Party. Moreover, reversion to direct rule in British Guiana would destroy Britain's image as a decolonising Power and would create the greatest possible difficulties for the British Government in dealing with its remaining problems in Africa, particularly Southern Rhodesia. *Mr. Rusk* asked whether the British Government would be interested in imposing direct rule. *Mr. Sandys* said that without committing himself to the political desirability or practicability of this course, he thought it might be possible to make direct rule work provided the United States gave generous financial and economic aid. Direct rule was not a short-term solution. It would have to operate for a number of years to enable the economy to be built up and to enable new leaders to come forward. Eventually a non-Communist Government might emerge, which could be given independence linked to a defence agreement, and technical assistance and economic aid agreements, with the United States. *Mr. Rusk* asked whether a successor Government would be obliged to take over such commitments. If one did have a non-Jagan Government, it might be possible to work out a joint United States-British development plan, a defence plan, and also to impose proportional representation. *Mr. Fisher* pointed out that proportional representation did not necessarily provide even a short term solution.

After discussing various alternatives *Mr. Rusk* said that it seemed that a reversion to direct rule provided the only really satisfactory solution.

He thought that the whole question would have to be considered by the Prime Minister and the President. There were three possible courses of action; independence under Jagan, independence under a Burnham/D'Aguiar coalition and

direct rule. The United States did not wish British Guiana to become independent under Jagan. This left the alternatives of a Burnham/D'Aguiar coalition or direct rule; of these the United States preferred the latter. *Mr. Sandys* said that he would not yet exclude the possibility of giving independence to Jagan. Until fairly recently both Governments had agreed to work with Jagan's Government, but the American attitude had changed. What were the alternatives? Direct rule would only be practicable if Britain knew that the United States would be prepared to carry the financial baby—which might turn out to be a substantial long-term commitment. Furthermore, there might be domestic obstacles to substantial American aid being given to a British colony. Direct rule also implied a serious military commitment, for the garrison might have to be increased to three battalions to maintain law and order. The position would be different if British Guiana were independent. The United States could then give aid to an independent Government, and the United States could have any number of troops it wished on its base, and intervene if the internal situation should deteriorate. It was easy to go into direct rule but difficult to foresee how it would develop. It also provided no opportunity for new political leaders to emerge, while the existing political leaders would be able to consolidate their position by opposition. *Mr. Rusk* said it might be possible to work out an O.A.S. underpinning of an alternative Government.

Mr. Rusk reiterated the serious view the United States took of any independence for British Guiana under a Jagan Government. *Sir Hilton Poynton* said that in the discussions between British and United States officials, it was agreed that Jagan would try to establish a Castro-type Communist Government; but that whereas the United States officials thought he was bound to seek Communist assistance the British thought the local opposition would be strong enough to stop him. *Mr. Rusk* said that this might be true so long as the Russians did not aid Jagan, which they were bound to do. *Mr. Sandys* asked how far the United States would be able to help Britain in the general colonial field if Britain had to reimpose direct rule on British Guiana. Would it be possible to bring the O.A.S. solidly behind Britain in support on other colonial issues? *Mr. Rusk* said that it was the Communist threat that made British Guiana different from all other colonial issues for the Western Hemisphere countries. He did not doubt that anti-colonial pressures could be held back on British Guiana. *Mr. Sandys* said that this did not help Britain, as there was at present no anti-colonial pressure over British Guiana; the pressures were elsewhere. It seemed reasonable to ask for help in other directions if Britain was to assist the United States in this one.

Lord Home said that if the internal situation in British Guiana really collapsed then it might in any case be necessary for Britain to resume control, but in that event financial assistance would be absolutely essential. He asked what the prospects were of producing a Zürich-type agreement for British Guiana. *Mr. Sandys* reiterated that unless Britain felt virtually certain that practically the whole economic bill was being paid by someone else Britain could not take the political risks involved in suspending the Constitution. There was also the question of timing. If it should be decided to reimpose colonial rule a suitable and respectable opportunity would have to be awaited. *Mr. Rusk* thought that both sides would have to do some more thinking on this problem before the talks at Birch Grove.

215 PREM 11/4586, ff 33–36

30 June 1963

[British Guiana]: FO record of a meeting between Mr Macmillan and President Kennedy at Birch Grove House on the current situation in British Guiana¹

Mr. Rusk said that in view of the acute danger of Dr. Jagan establishing another Cuban régime in British Guiana, he felt that there were only two possible solutions. The first was for Britain to resume direct rule until a better situation developed. The second was somehow to work towards a Coalition Government in British Guiana composed of the supporters of Mr. Burnham and Mr. d'Aguiar and to give independence under this Government. The danger of a Castro-type régime was very real.

Mr. Sandys said that normally the United Kingdom would now move rapidly towards giving British Guiana independence. However, they recognised the dangers of handing over the country to a Communist régime of the Castro type or leaving British Guiana in a state of civil war. There were various theoretical possibilities. One was a coalition between Burnham and d'Aguiar: but Burnham would no doubt want Proportional Representation before independence, and Mr. Sandys was not certain that even elections held under Proportional Representation would produce a satisfactory result. Jagan of course had asked for independence without new elections and this was what probably would have to be given to Burnham.

Another possibility was for the British Government to say that it was clearly impossible for the parties in British Guiana to agree among themselves, and to impose a referendum on the questions of introducing a system of Proportional Representation. Probably the country would vote for Proportional Representation unless the imposition of this solution by the British Government had an adverse effect. It was difficult to gauge the reactions of the electorate. Even if the referendum went all right there would then have to be elections under the new Proportional Representation system and the result of these would be very uncertain. Because the Indians were increasing in numbers more rapidly than the Africans, Dr. Jagan would be likely to get more votes at any future elections. If however a Burnham Government did come into existence and was given independence, then perhaps they could quickly make a defence agreement with the United States. *Mr. Rusk* said that the United States could then certainly move rapidly in the fields of economic and social aid. They could possibly also reactivate the base in Guiana.² *Mr. Sandys* suggested that it might be not a bad thing if the United States showed some interest in their base anyway. It was derelict at the moment but the United States had the right to use it at any time. *President Kennedy* said that this was a most interesting account of the situation. As he understood it there was a good chance of getting a favourable vote for Proportional Representation at a referendum. What would happen at elections? Would a good result emerge from elections under a new system? *Mr. Sandys* said that a referendum would give a better result. But if a Burnham-d'Aguiar coalition did win an election held under Proportional

¹ The meeting, at Macmillan's home in Sussex, was also attended by Home, Duncan Sandys and Ormsby-Gore from the UK and by Rusk and McGeorge Bundy from the US.

² Under the 1941 bases agreement, the US acquired sites in British Guiana on the bank of the Demarara river about twenty-five miles from the sea and at the mouth of the Essequibo.

Representation it might then be possible to give immediate independence. *Mr. Macmillan* asked whether an independent Government of British Guiana would claim that the base agreement no longer applied. *Mr. Rusk* said that Dr. Jagan would certainly denounce the agreement. *President Kennedy* enquired how long matters could be kept going as they were. *Mr. Sandys* explained that it was impossible to be certain. Anything might happen. He did not feel that the situation could drift on very long. For one thing there would be a financial crisis in the near future. *Mr. Macmillan* asked if Dr. Jagan would refuse to co-operate in a referendum. *Mr. Sandys* said that a referendum could be imposed by Order in Council although an Act of Parliament would be needed to alter the Constitution. The trouble was that under the Constitution the Governor was a figurehead except in matters of foreign affairs and defence. If a state of emergency were to be declared the powers would go to the Government, *i.e.*, to Jagan. Another alternative was to revert to direct British rule. He did not worry about the pretext for doing this. It was clear that if the British troops were withdrawn now there would be riots and a general breakdown of law and order. It would be possible to show conclusively that neither Jagan nor Burnham could control the situation. There were tremendous problems of which the financial one was perhaps the most serious. It would be possible to say that Britain had resumed direct rule in order to give the country time to rebuild its economy and to develop a more stable political life. The trouble was that in five years the position might be no better. The most serious worry however was that after Britain had resumed direct rule, Dr. Jagan might resort to brigandage and a long drawn-out campaign on the Malaya model might begin. In such a situation Burnham might find it impossible to support the British Government and so the whole country would be hostile. *Mr. Rusk* said that he thought that Burnham could be persuaded to act sensibly. He wondered if it might be possible to say that direct rule was being resumed in order to make stable arrangements to enable independence to be given. It might be a mistake to mention any period of years. *Lord Home* said that to resume direct rule would run counter to the whole of present British policy. The Committee of 24 [at the UN] had just voted for Britain to leave at once. Also if Britain resumed direct rule in British Guiana the question would be asked why the same could not be done in Southern Rhodesia. This might be embarrassing.

President Kennedy said that Mr. Sandys had made a very fair presentation of a most difficult problem. From his point of view he was worried that Jagan would take Guiana into the Communist camp. This would be very difficult for the United States. The Russians would certainly move in technicians quickly and many Cubans as well. In his view Latin America was the most dangerous part of the world because many countries in it might go Communist at any minute. Next year there were elections in the United States. If Guiana had gone Communist meanwhile then the pressure for the United States to take some action against Cuba would rise and would be impossible for any administration to resist. He did not believe that if Britain resumed direct rule there would be great difficulties with the Latin Americans or with the Africans, but the grounds for such action should be stated as the need to avert a race-war. At any rate he asked the British Government not to give British Guiana independence under present conditions. *Mr. Rusk* felt that the possibility of a Burnham-d'Aguiar coalition should be examined again. *Mr. Sandys* said that even assuming a Burnham-d'Aguiar Government the problem was not at an end. For one thing it was unlikely that the Coalition would last because Burnham and d'Aguiar really had nothing in common. Also Burnham was, if anything, more incompetent

than Jagan. Finally, Jagan would no doubt try to break up the Government by violence. A situation might arise in which the Government held the cities and the Opposition the countryside; it would be rather like the Yemen. He felt that the United States would have to be prepared in such circumstances to move in military forces in order to support the lawful Government. It would not be just a question of reactivating the United States base, but of the United States policing the country. *President Kennedy* said that he thought that in these circumstances there might be almost as bad a situation for the United States. Could the Jagan Government be propped up for a further period? *Mr. Sandys* pointed out that Dr. Jagan would not be prepared to play on this basis for long.

He expected independence very soon, and if he did not get it he would demand a dissolution. At an election he would probably get a bigger majority if only on the grounds that Britain was refusing independence. *Mr. Rusk* suggested that in such circumstances the British Government might impose a referendum on the issue of Proportional Representation. *Mr. Sandys* agreed that this was a possibility but pointed out that this would be about the worst possible situation in which to hold a referendum. *Mr. Rusk* said that he supposed that the British Government could exile or imprison Jagan. *Mr. Sandys* agreed that this might be necessary. If he was turned out of office he would have nothing to do except to organise revolution. *President Kennedy* said that he saw the difficulties of any possible solution but he thought that these were less than the dangers of Guiana going Communist. He was prepared to put up with a great deal to prevent such a result. *Mr. Sandys* said that he thought the best solution would be to find a way of giving independence under Burnham.

The discussion was adjourned at about 11.45 a.m.³

President Kennedy said that he still felt that the best solution would be to make every effort for a coalition between Burnham and D'Aguiar. *Mr. Sandys* agreed. The situation could perhaps be looked at again within a month. *Mr. Macmillan* asked if *Mr. Sandys* would want to take further powers in British Guiana before the end of July. *Mr. Sandys* said that he was not too worried about the constitutional position. There might be some possibilities of action which would not involve a new Act of Parliament. It was impossible to suspend the Constitution by Order in Council, but it might be possible for the British Government to take the executive powers while not doing away with the legislature. He was reluctant to put forward a Bill in Parliament for increased powers without actually taking the powers and of course once the Bill was before the House it would bring to Jagan's notice the fact that the British Government were preparing to move. *President Kennedy* asked what could be done if the coalition proved impossible to achieve and Britain did not want to resume direct rule because of the complications with Southern Rhodesia. Could the British hang on? *Mr. Sandys* said that it was possible to envisage this situation but he imagined that there would be serious rioting and looting. *Mr. Rusk* asked if Dr. Jagan could be arrested if there was clear evidence that he had broken the law. For example, the Americans believed that they could prove that he had intimidated the Speaker by threatening to murder him. *Mr. Sandys* said that if no coalition were formed he thought the aim should be to prolong the present situation for two or three months. His fear was that Jagan would ask for a dissolution. He was of course faced with a

³ The discussion then continued at 3.30 pm when Sir H Caccia from the UK and Mr McGeorge Bundy from the US also attended.

serious financial crisis when the rice crop was harvested in August. The corporation which he had formed was not working and there was a danger that the Russians might buy the rice, thereby saving Jagan's position. *Mr. Rusk* suggested that the British Government could prevent such an arrangement under their powers to control foreign policy. *Mr. Sandys* said that this would certainly be possible but scarcely popular. Indeed, it would unite the whole country against Britain. The sum of money involved was not very large and the Russians could easily find it. *Mr. Rusk* asked if the British Government could stop the ratification of any trade agreement with Czechoslovakia. *Mr. Sandys* said that this could certainly be done. The difficulty was to avoid providing Jagan with a good issue on which to demand new elections. *President Kennedy* said that it would be very important to play down any stories of British and American discussions about British Guiana. The only concern to which the United States Administration should admit would be about the possibilities of racial strife. In answer to questions by the Press, it should be said only that British Guiana had been briefly discussed by Mr. Rusk and Mr. Sandys.

Mr. Macmillan asked about the position in the Organisation of American States. *Mr. Bundy* said that Brazil and Mexico would not be helpful but might not vote against. *Mr. Sandys* suggested that the Americans should begin to activate their base a little. *President Kennedy* asked if this would not be a help to Jagan. *Mr. Sandys* did not think that American activity in their base would give Jagan a handle if such activity were on a very small scale; perhaps a few transport flights would be best. He hoped that the base would not remain entirely dormant. *Mr. Rusk* said that the United States Consul in Georgetown could certainly go and inspect the base and perhaps arrange some maintenance of it.⁴

⁴ In the published US record of this meeting, Kennedy observed that Latin America was the most dangerous area in the world. The president repeated twice his view that if, by 1964, in addition to Cuba, a communist state had been established in British Guiana, this would tip the scales in the US presidential election with the result that a candidate would be elected who would take military action against Cuba. There would be considerable resentment in the US if the UK pulled out of British Guiana. The president was therefore looking for a way 'to drag the thing out' by delaying the new elections under the option preferred by the US of proportional representation. Instead of saying that they could not pull out because of the danger of British Guiana going communist, Kennedy advised the British to say that they were staying to avoid a racial war. Home insisted that if the UK resumed direct rule in British Guiana, people would ask why the same could not be done in Southern Rhodesia. Asked by Duncan Sandys if the US would give the UK 'real support' at the UN if direct rule were reinstated, Kennedy replied that it would be a 'pleasure'—'we would go all out to the extent necessary'. Home intervened with a comment about the lack of US support over Southern Rhodesia at which point the US record of the meeting continues: "Well, for that matter", said the President, in a lighter tone, "you haven't given us that much support on the MLF" ' (*Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963*, vol XII, *American Republics* (Washington, 1996), pp 607–609, record of conversation, 30 June 1963).

216 CO 1031/4415, no 2

16 Oct 1963

'Austrian State Treaty and British Guiana': minute by Sir H Poynton to Mr Duncan Sandys on whether the treaty forms a suitable precedent for British Guiana

[Jagan, ahead of the Nov conference (see 217), suggested that once settled, the constitution of British Guiana might be guaranteed on the Austrian model. Duncan

Sandys asked officials to study the Austrian precedent and to work out the arguments against it (CO 1031/4403, no 69, minute by R W Piper, 8 Oct 1963).]

You asked the Department to study the Austrian State Treaty and show why it would not form a suitable precedent for British Guiana.

2. I attach the Treaty and a note by the Foreign Office.¹

3. The Treaty, which was signed in Vienna on the 15th May, 1955, is in nine parts of which, however, only Parts I and IX seem relevant to our problem. Part I contains the political and territorial clauses and Part IX contains the clause dealing with the interpretation of the Treaty.

4. In Part I Austria is recognised as re-established as a sovereign, independent and democratic state. She undertakes to secure human rights and fundamental freedoms to all its peoples and the rights of the Slovene and Croat minorities are protected. She undertakes also to have democratic government based on elections by secret ballot and to guarantee free, equal and universal suffrage without discrimination as to race, sex, language, religion or political opinion. She undertakes to destroy the National Socialist Party and related organisations and to dissolve all Fascist-type organisations.

5. Article 35, Part IX, provides that any dispute concerning the interpretation or execution of the Treaty which is not settled by direct diplomatic negotiation is to be referred to the four Heads of Mission (British, French, American and Russian). Any such dispute which is not resolved by them within two months is to be referred to arbitration by a commission composed of one representative of each party and a third selected by mutual agreement from nationals of a third country (if they cannot agree on the third member, the United Nations Secretary General is to make the appointment) and the decision of the commission is to be accepted by both parties as definitive and binding.

6. The fundamental weakness of a treaty of this sort is the absence of any effective sanction. Subject to the general principles voiced in the Treaty regarding human rights and democratic institutions, the constitution is for the territory itself to devise and amend as it sees fit. If the Government or Parliament decided on action inconsistent with the Treaty, the only sanction, short of invasion by one or more of the signatory Powers, would be that of public opinion. It is highly doubtful whether in British Guiana this would be sufficient. The alternative of invasion after independence is surely unthinkable. In any case it is doubtful whether any major Power would wish to risk the international crisis which would arise if one such power proposed to step in against the wishes of another. In short, it does not provide a recipe for healing the racial and ideological divisions which harass British Guiana. These must be solved internally by British Guianese; not by a continuing *deus ex machina* from outside.

7. There are other objections which cannot be expressed in the Conference viz. it is inconceivable that the U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. could agree on the terms of a treaty. It might be difficult to select suitable guarantor-states. Jagan's choice would not be ours. But if there is to be a guarantee of neutrality (as for Austria) it would be reasonable to expect (as in the Austrian Treaty) the removal of all foreign bases; this the Americans are unlikely to agree to, whether the U.S.A. were a guarantor-state or

¹ Not printed.

not. There is also no provision—and it would scarcely be possible to have any workable provision—to prevent infiltration by communist agents and advisers.²

² Coinciding with consideration of a neutral British Guiana was the issue of UN or Commonwealth mediation in the colony. The CO opposed a Visiting Mission from the UN on the grounds that it was doubtful if it would succeed, that the UK would be blamed for the failure, and that it would set an unwelcome precedent (DO 181/34, no 130, 'British Guiana and the Committee of Twenty-Four', CO brief for Duncan Sandys, 3 July 1963). Some in the CRO took a different view: '... we cannot see any particular virtue in excluding a Delegation from the Committee of Twenty-Four from British Guiana. The country itself is of marginal importance to us; we should gain nothing by having a public quarrel with the Committee at a time when our own African problems are under fire at the United Nations generally. All we should do through exclusion, whether with the aid of troops or otherwise, would be to ensure that further coals of fire were heaped on our heads. To let a Delegation in—whether or not it consisted solely of Commonwealth representatives in order to overcome the legalistic snag about admitting aliens—would at least offer the hope of their eyes being opened to the real facts in the colony. Whatever Dr. Jagan might say to the Delegation would be cancelled out by the vitriol which the Opposition Parties and the Trade Unions would pour into their ears. There is, therefore, some hope that the blame for the existing situation would not for once be put on the British alone' (*ibid*, minute by G StJ Chadwick, 5 July 1963). Duncan Sandys, who was responsible for both departments, thought that a UN Visiting Mission might lead to unrest in British Guiana. In the CO Poynton was also opposed to the proposal that a group of Commonwealth lawyers might visit the colony under UN auspices. The reasoning was much the same as before: it would set a precedent and there was little reason to believe that outsiders would be any more successful in resolving British Guiana's difficulties (*ibid*, no 171, minute by Poynton, 25 Sept 1963). CRO officials again disagreed, pointing out that this would be the fourth refusal in almost as many months to suggestions for Commonwealth conciliation of colonial problems. It would create a bad impression of Commonwealth co-operation, especially for new members (*ibid*, minute by J D B Shaw, 24 Sept 1963). However, on the question of Commonwealth countries acting independently of the UN in British Guiana, Whitehall as a whole was more forthcoming. The Foreign Office especially viewed Commonwealth involvement as a useful 'buffer' between the UK and direct UN intervention (*ibid*, minute by M M Minogue, 30 Sept 1963).

217 CAB 133/157, BG 4(63)2 & 3

5 Nov 1963

'British Guiana conference, 1963': record of the 4th plenary session on 31 Oct on decisions by Mr Duncan Sandys and his closing statement.

Annex

[Jagan was in London at the end of Sept 1963 and met Poynton at the CO. When the discussion turned to the question of how politics might be divorced from race in British Guiana, Jagan argued that politics were not in fact racial and illustrated his point by drawing a contrast with East Africa. He suggested that racial distinctions in East Africa were also social and economic distinctions. The large immigrant Asian population in East Africa conducted business and the retail trade and provided the middle ranks of the civil service while the Africans were, for the most part, the 'basic working classes'. This was not the case in British Guiana where the two main races could be found at all social and economic levels—in the civil service, the professions ('he [Jagan] had to remind himself that the Police were almost wholly "negro"'), business and agriculture, although in this latter respect East Indians were predominant. Society in British Guiana, according to Jagan, was divided horizontally into social and economic levels irrespective of race rather than vertically with the races occupying different social and economic positions. Politics therefore cut across race. Poynton found Jagan's analysis 'ingenious' and not without an element of truth but he was still not convinced: '... I am afraid it does not point to the conclusion which Dr. Jagan claimed, namely that politics does not follow the line of racial cleavage, for it obviously does' (CO 1031/4402, no 64, note by Poynton, 27 Sept 1963). At the same meeting Jagan raised the question of external mediation in British Guiana, either by the UN or by a Commonwealth commission consisting of neutral countries. He realised that the UK would object to UN mediation and offered to conclude a neutrality

treaty at independence (see 216); Poynton assumed he meant a treaty with the US. Poynton questioned why outsiders should be any more successful in resolving British Guiana's problems (see *ibid*, note 2) but he did not reveal that the UK had already decided to impose a solution which had been agreed with the US. The aim was to remove Jagan from office and the plan involved Duncan Sandys summoning all three political leaders to London in Oct 1963. Anticipating that yet again there would be no agreement, the secretary of state would declare in favour of a new electoral system to counteract racism. Jagan would protest and would either resign and ask the governor to dissolve the legislature and hold elections under the existing system, or sit tight and obstruct. In either event the UK might be forced to suspend the constitution and resume the administration. In the unlikely event that Jagan co-operated, his removal would have to wait until he showed signs of deliberate obstruction. The UK was still working towards a goal of independence but could not say when this would happen. Troops and new administrators would be sent in at the right moment if necessary. It would be important to have US support at the UN. That Jagan and Burnham might reach agreement before the London meeting was seen as the only danger of the plan going 'seriously awry'. Burnham was said to be showing signs of supporting a UN commission. The UK looked to the US to discourage joint moves either for a coalition in British Guiana or for an outside inquiry as this would upset the plan to remove Jagan (CO 1031/4402, no 63, Macmillan to Kennedy, sent as outward FO tel no 9662 to Washington, 27 Sept 1963). British and American officials met in London between 14 and 16 Oct to consider the plan to remove Jagan. It was agreed that in any statements on action against Jagan, the UK would emphasise (i) the failure of repeated efforts to find a compromise between the political leaders; (ii) the manner in which the protracted nature of the dispute had impeded independence, damaged the economy and produced an atmosphere of fear and uncertainty in the colony; (iii) that the new electoral system was the best means to combat racism; (iv) that the UK was still committed to independence and that any period of direct rule would be a temporary measure only. The UK would avoid any reference to Jagan's 'communist sympathies'; this was important because critics would inevitably say that Britain had acted under US pressure. It was recognised that it would not be possible to avoid references to communism in any US statements on the situation but UK officials urged that the US should do everything possible to dampen charges of collusion and to refrain from presenting British action in British Guiana as a counter-stroke against Cuban or Soviet plans in the Caribbean (CO 1031/4403, no 66, record of discussions, 14-16 Oct 1963).]

2. *Decisions by the Secretary of State*

The Secretary of State informed the Conference of his Decisions on the outstanding constitutional issues. The text of his statement is annexed to these minutes.

The leaders of the three delegations expressed their regret that the Secretary of State had not fixed a precise date for British Guiana to become independent. *Dr. Jagan* said that when he had asked the Secretary of State to settle the outstanding issues he had assumed that a date for independence would be fixed. He said he did not know what would be the attitude of the People's Progressive Party to these decisions. *Mr. Burnham* said that, while regretting that no date had been fixed for independence, the People's National Congress adhered to their undertaking to accept the decisions.

The Secretary of State said that he had given no undertaking to fix a date for independence when he had agreed to arbitrate. However, he wished to make it clear that the British Government had no wish to delay British Guiana's independence. They would however have been failing in their responsibilities if they had not first taken steps to reduce the dangerous tension between the races. The decisions which he had made were directed to this end. As he had indicated, the British Government would convene a conference after elections had been held under the new electoral system, to settle any remaining constitutional issues, and to fix a date for independence.

3. *Closing statement*

The Secretary of State said that the Conference had been a difficult one. But he hoped that all the parties would now do their best to make a success of the decisions which he had announced. He thanked the Governor, the Delegates and the Secretary-General for their help.

Annex to 217: Closing statement by the secretary of state

I had hoped that after a year's adjournment the political leaders of British Guiana could have succeeded in reaching agreement. But since that had proved impossible there was clearly no advantage in the further postponement of decisions. Therefore, although it was for me an unenviable task, I am sure that in all the circumstances you were right to ask the British Government to settle on your behalf your unresolved constitutional differences.

British Guiana faces many difficulties, but all that you have told me at this Conference, and all that I saw during my visit to your country last July, have convinced me that there is one problem which transcends all others, namely the growth of racialism. That is the curse of British Guiana today. The whole life of the country is poisoned and weakened by mutual suspicion and fear between the two predominant racial groups, the Indians and the Africans. This state of tension has become acute in the last few years and has led to racial murder, arson and violence. Last summer it reached the point where law and order could not be maintained without the assistance of two battalions of British soldiers. In fact, the Premier told me that, if the British troops were withdrawn, the situation would get completely out of control.

Before British Guiana can safely assume the responsibilities of sovereign independence, it is clear that by one means or another harmony and confidence must be restored.

This need not necessarily take long. There is no deep-rooted or historical enmity between the races; nor is there any basic clash of interests between them; nor is there animosity between the religious groups, Christian, Hindu and Muslim.

The root of the trouble lies almost entirely in the development of party politics along racial lines. In its present acute form, this can be traced to the split in the country's main political party in 1955. It was then that the People's Progressive Party, which had previously drawn its support from both the main races, broke into two bitterly opposed political groups, the one predominantly Indian, led by Dr. Jagan, and the other predominantly African, led by Mr. Burnham. Both parties have, for their political ends, fanned the racial emotions of their followers, with the result that each has come to be regarded as the champion of one race and the enemy of the other.

In this atmosphere of mutual suspicion objectivity has entirely disappeared. Every political act is, or is alleged to be, dictated by racial prejudice. The Africans accuse the Government party of governing in the interests only of the Indians, and demand a share in political decisions. On the other side, the Indians accuse the Police, which is mainly African, of partiality towards the Africans and demand the creation of a separate defence force, recruited more extensively from the Indian community, to counterbalance the Police.

This state of general distrust has had a profoundly demoralising effect throughout the country. It has not only undermined political stability, but gravely threatens economic progress. It has led to such financial difficulties that the Government is unable, despite severe economies, to balance its budget and will be obliged to seek outside assistance.

British Guiana is thus faced with an acute crisis of confidence. While this manifests itself primarily in a racial form, the cause is basically political. It is therefore a political solution which must be sought.

The aim of any such solution must be to create a reasonable degree of mutual trust and co-operation between the races. In the grave situation which has developed, no single remedy will be sufficient. The problem must be tackled from all possible angles.

In the first place, the Constitution must provide the strongest safeguards to protect minorities, to preserve basic human rights, to ensure the impartiality of the Police, and to insulate the Judiciary and the Public Service from party political influences. On constitutional issues there should be a right of Appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. The Constitutions of a number of new Commonwealth countries contain provisions designed to achieve these objectives, and, with necessary adaptations, I propose to apply them to British Guiana.

In view of the racial character of the problem, I consider that there should in addition be some special provisions to penalise those who seek to promote antagonism between the races.

At the same time, every possible step must be taken to improve the relationship between the Government and the Opposition, of whatever political complexions they may be. Under a democratic system, minorities must accept the decisions of the majority. But there are limits beyond which it is neither right nor safe for a Government to disregard the feelings and wishes of large sections of the people. In a country with a small population and slender resources, it is more than ever important that the Government should endeavour to rule with the general consent of the population. Bi-partisan policies may not be possible, but the political temperature can be greatly reduced by sincere and effective consultation. Of this there has been all too little in British Guiana, due to the intransigent and uncompromising attitude of both sides. The need for improvement in the methods and practice of consultation is recognised in all quarters, and all three political leaders have put forward a variety of proposals to this end. These will be studied and will where appropriate be adopted.

It is also necessary to strengthen the forces available to maintain law and order. A country should only in the most rare and exceptional circumstances have to call upon troops to assist the civil power; and after independence it would of course be most undesirable for British Guiana to have to rely upon the army of another country to preserve internal security. It is arguable whether the additional forces required for this purpose should be regarded as an army or as an extension of the police. But whatever may be decided on this point, these should be constituted before independence by the Governor, who would endeavour to ensure that recruits were not drawn predominantly from any one racial group.

The measures I have indicated should to some extent help to reduce the present tensions and fears. But, if confidence and co-operation are to be restored, more positive steps must be taken to encourage the healthy development of political life

along non-racial lines. The opposition parties have insisted that, in order to achieve this, a change in the electoral system is essential. On the other hand, this view has been strongly contested by the Government delegation.

I have listened carefully to the arguments advanced in favour of single member constituencies ("first past the post") and those advanced in favour of various types of proportional representation. I must, however, say that I got the impression that the advocates of the different solutions, while propounding impeccable principles, were more concerned with their own electoral prospects than with the furtherance of racial harmony in British Guiana.

After taking into account all that has been said, I have tried to examine this problem with complete objectivity and with one aim only, namely, to assess what electoral system would be most likely to give to your country peace and good government.

A powerful case was made for the retention of the system of "first past the post". It was pointed out that this is the standard practice in almost every country where the British Parliamentary system has been introduced; that it tends to produce clear Parliamentary majorities, thereby helping the winning party to provide effective government; and that it gives constituents direct contact with a member of Parliament who has a special responsibility for looking after their interests.

The main arguments advanced in favour of proportional representation are, first, that it is absolutely fair in that the proportion of seats exactly reflects the proportion of votes cast for each party and, secondly, that it would be likely to compel the formation of coalitions between parties and races which, in the circumstances of British Guiana, would be most desirable.

In addition, I considered a variety of electoral devices, specially designed to encourage cross voting between races and parties. These included a proposal that votes cast by one race which were matched with votes by other races should be given increased value, thereby rewarding parties which secured a multi-racial following. Although this scheme was at first sight attractive, I felt obliged to reject it, since it involved registering voters on separate racial rolls, which might in practice have the effect of accentuating rather than diminishing racial consciousness.

I also examined a proposal that electors should be required to cast first and second preference votes, the latter counting a half or a quarter. The object was to encourage middle-of-the-road parties, acceptable to the two main races. However, I discarded this idea on the grounds that it might give a very unfair advantage to the opposition parties if they were to make an electoral pact, and that it could be frustrated by the formation of dummy parties.

I considered a number of other ingenious proposals, but in every case I found that the disadvantages outweighed the advantages. I was thus forced to the conclusion that the choice lay between the existing system of "first past the post" or some straightforward form of proportional representation. In deciding between these two alternatives, I felt it right not only to weigh the theoretical arguments for and against each system, but above all to take into account the actual conditions and practical problems in British Guiana.

The system of "first past the post" has undoubtedly fulfilled the principal claim of its supporters, in that it has in successive elections given to the winning party a substantial parliamentary majority. In 1953 the P.P.P., with 51 per cent of the votes, obtained 75 per cent of the seats. In 1957, with 47 per cent of the votes, it secured 64

per cent of the seats. In 1961 the P.P.P. polled 43 per cent of the votes and obtained 57 per cent of the seats, as compared with the P.N.C. party, which polled only 2 per cent fewer votes but obtained only 31 per cent of the seats.

The wide disparity between votes and seats which this system has consistently produced in British Guiana has not unnaturally engendered a sense of frustration and grievance among the opposition parties, which together polled a majority of the votes at the last two elections. On the other hand, it is argued that a certain measure of over-representation should be accepted as the price of strong government.

Unfortunately, in British Guiana this electoral system, while providing clear parliamentary majorities, has not provided strong government. The fact is that the administration of the country has been largely paralysed, the Government is insolvent, and law and order can be maintained only with the help of outside troops. Without attempting to apportion blame, the reason for this state of affairs is that the ruling party has alienated the confidence of the non-Indian communities, while they on their side have obstructed and resisted the Government at every turn.

Against this background, I have had to consider whether the situation would be improved by the introduction of proportional representation. The supporters of this system claim that, since no one race constitutes a majority of the electorate, all parties will have to appeal for support to all races. In practice I doubt whether either the Indian or the African party could, under its present leadership, hope to increase appreciably its following among the other racial groups. On the other hand, I am satisfied that there is validity in the argument that in present circumstances where no party commands an overall majority of votes, proportional representation would be likely to result in the formation of a coalition government of parties supported by different races, and that this would go some way towards reducing the present tension.

But the creation of temporary alliances in Parliament between the representatives of rival groups, though a step in the right direction, is not enough. Normal conditions will not be restored until the present racial alignments are replaced by genuinely political alignments based upon a common belief in political and economic objectives.

So long as the whole political field is occupied by three parties, each identified with a different racial group, it is hard to see how non-racial politics can develop. It would seem therefore that the best hope of altering the present rigid pattern may well lie in the formation of new parties which are not handicapped by past animosities. It must, however, be recognised that under a system based upon single member constituencies, new parties would have little hope of winning any seats and would probably never be formed.

In the light of these various considerations, I concluded that it must be our deliberate aim to stimulate a radical change in the present pattern of racial alignments. It was therefore my duty to choose the electoral system which would be most likely to encourage inter-party coalitions and multi-racial groupings and which would make it easy for new parties to form. Having thus defined the objective, the answer was clear. British Guiana must change over to a system of proportional representation.

It remained for me to consider which form of proportional representation should be adopted. Of the various systems which have been advocated at this conference, I am satisfied that the simplest and fairest is that under which the whole country

forms a single constituency, and seats are allocated in proportion to the votes cast for each party. I am furthermore convinced that this is the system best suited to the present circumstances of British Guiana.

It remains to be decided whether, in order to obtain seats, a party should be required to poll a qualifying minimum percentage of the total national vote. During our discussions the figures of 2, 5 and 10 per cent were mentioned. In normal circumstances, it would be desirable to discourage splinter parties. But, in view of the overriding importance of reshaping the political pattern, there would be no advantage at present in restricting the creation of new parties, which at first will inevitably be small.

However, once these new parties, some of which may still have racial connections, have been brought into being, it is to be hoped that some may amalgamate into larger multi-racial groupings and contest subsequent elections together. To encourage this process of fusion, it may well be desirable, after the first election, to introduce a minimum qualifying percentage. The level at which this should be fixed need not be determined now.

No case has been made to show that a lowering of the voting age would help to solve the problems which face British Guiana. I do not therefore propose to make any change.

In order to prevent personation and other forms of cheating, about which complaints have been made, there should be a fresh registration of electors who should be issued with reliable identity cards. The work of registration and the responsibility for preparing and conducting the first elections under the new system should be entrusted to a special commissioner appointed by the British Government from outside British Guiana. Subsequent elections should be conducted by an independent commission to be set up under the constitution.

Another question I was asked to decide was whether there should be fresh elections before independence. If it were proposed to retain the existing electoral system, there would be no justification for holding further elections. However, since the system is to be changed, it is clearly right that fresh elections under the new system should be held before independence. Preparations for them should be put in hand as soon as practicable.

After the elections are over, the British Government will convene a conference to settle any remaining constitutional issues, and to fix a date for independence.

The constitutional documents which are required to give effect to the decisions which I have outlined will be drafted without delay. Before giving my approval, I will arrange for the three Delegations to have an opportunity to study them and comment upon them.

It is not yet necessary to take a final decision on the question of whether, after independence, British Guiana should be a Monarchy or a Republic. Some differences were expressed on this subject at the Conference a year ago; but there was general agreement that the Parliamentary system as distinct from the American Presidential system should be adopted. The constitution will therefore be drafted on the assumption that, on independence, the Governor will be replaced either by a Governor-General with the powers of a constitutional monarch, or by a President exercising similar functions.

As you know, I would much have preferred that you had decided these matters by agreement between yourselves. It was only when I was convinced that agreement was

impossible that I accepted the task of arbitration. In deciding the difficult and controversial issues which you referred to me, I have been concerned only to do what I believe to be in the best interests of British Guiana and all her peoples. From the start it was inevitable that my conclusions, whatever they might be, would disappoint some or all of you. But you were good enough to assure me that you would accept them; and I know that you will honour your undertaking.

However, I wish to ask you to do something more. Now that these issues have been settled and that British Guiana is firmly set upon the path to independence, I appeal to you to bury the fears and suspicions of the past and to work together for the unity and happiness of this new nation, of which you are the leaders and founders.

218 DO 200/102, no 21

18 Dec 1963

'Trinidad's foreign policy': despatch no 9 from Sir N Costar to Mr Duncan Sandys

There is free speech, a free Press and a Parliamentary Opposition in Trinidad and Tobago and a brand of democracy which is recognisably British. But more than in most well-established democracies, though perhaps not more than in some other new members of the Commonwealth with an acknowledged father of the people, the country's foreign policy is the personal policy of its Prime Minister, Dr. Eric Williams, who is also Foreign Minister. In this despatch I have the honour to submit some reflections on his aims and his record in the foreign field.

The Caribbean

2. Dr. Williams who has led this very small country since 1956 has wider horizons than Trinidad and Tobago. As a historian with a deep knowledge of his subject and considerable intellectual attainments, he has formed the view that the fragmentation of the Caribbean area as a result of the historic rivalries of European Powers, Spain, Holland, France and Britain, is out of date in the modern world of larger and more viable units. He believes that social progress in the West Indies depends upon economic and political co-operation within the area, and his prime aim is Caribbean unity, starting with the old British West Indies, but later taking in Dutch, French and Spanish-speaking territories. For this reason, Dr. Williams has assiduously cultivated Jamaica since independence and he said recently that relations with Jamaica were Trinidad's first concern in the external field. He has also done his best to maintain through various surviving "common services" certain of the links, such as the University of the West Indies (of which he is Pro-Chancellor), British West Indian Airways, and the West Indies Shipping Service, which bound together the islands of the old Federation of the West Indies.

3. It is of course true that Dr. Williams' critics frequently accuse him of contributing to the collapse of the old Federation of the West Indies. But *his* aim was an altogether tighter Federation, no doubt with him at the top! Not without some justification, he regarded the old Federation as merely an expensive and ineffective superstructure on top of existing island Governments run by Ministers with parochial outlooks, over whom the Federation's control was far too limited. In his view experience had shown that this unsatisfactory system needed to be cleared away in order to rebuild from the base upwards. "Unitary statehood" whether in the West

Indies as a whole, or in the more recently mooted union between Trinidad and Grenada, is Dr. Williams' preference. His temperament is such that, during the time of Federation, he could not agree that half a loaf was better than no bread. But since Trinidad has become independent he has shown signs of becoming more flexible, and in the future this tendency may perhaps develop further. In his new mood he has not been without his successes. It was as a result of his initiative that a Summit Conference of Commonwealth West Indian leaders was held in Port of Spain in July this year, and a second similar conference is due to take place in Jamaica next month. This represents progress in a sound and sensible policy. It is in Britain's interests that it should be continued and that it should succeed.

Wider horizons

4. As part of his drive to promote Caribbean unity, Dr. Williams also exhibits the lively interest to be expected of an able and restless if politically orientated historian in the world outside his area. He has definite views on most current international issues, which he does not hesitate to express publicly, though his interest is perhaps less intrinsic than in the repercussions of these issues in or on his beloved Caribbean. He early showed his qualities over Britain's approach to join the European Economic Community. He was the first and almost the only Caribbean statesman to grasp its significance for the future of the countries in the area. He was the only new Commonwealth leader to accept this development as one which could benefit not only Britain but also the under-developed nations of the Commonwealth, and to proclaim his acceptance in public. He was also the only Commonwealth Prime Minister to undertake a tour of Europe at the time the negotiations were in progress to familiarise himself with the issues and personalities and to press Trinidad's point of view on those concerned. All this contrasts with Sir Alexander Bustamante's "dagger pointed at the heart of the Commonwealth".

5. In public statements on external affairs which I feel sure reflect his true thinking, Dr. Williams gives pride of place to the authority of the United Nations and the rights of the smaller countries and the "have nots" against the rich industrialised nations. But in general, his presentation of these views is moderate by current world standards, except perhaps in Woodford Square, the local equivalent of Trafalgar Square, where for internal political reasons from time to time he lets off steam. But above all, in his practical handling of Trinidad's attitude towards most of the major international issues on which Trinidad has been required to take a position since independence, Dr. Williams' approach has been fair and objective. The rest of this despatch will summarise the evidence which supports this statement.

United Nations groupings

6. Dr. Williams' objectivity may be first illustrated by his United Nations policy. Trinidad has connections at the United Nations with the Commonwealth Group, the Latin American Group and the Afro-Asian Group, and until recently it has not been clear which of the two geographical groups would be Trinidad's first choice. The largely Afro-Asian composition of the Trinidad population, and an element of emotion (almost certainly felt by Dr. Williams) weighted the scales on one side; the country's comparative wealth and Westernisation and its geographical position on the other. In the event, and probably with an eye on development assistance from the United States and the Alliance for Progress, Dr. Williams has now opted for Latin America and hopes in due course to follow Jamaica into the Organisation of

American States. But if for any reason he is rejected by Latin America (and in his view if this happens a principal motivation would be colour prejudice), he is likely to be resentful and it is improbable that he would knock at their door a second time.

Subversion

7. Dr. Williams, who by British political standards would belong to the Middle or Middle Right of the Labour Party, has also made it very clear that he stands firmly against subversion, whether straightforward Communism or à la Castro. He has made it plain that this opposition applies both to attempts to conduct subversive activity in Trinidad itself, and attempts to use Trinidad as a basis for subverting her neighbours. Within Trinidad he has recently set up a Commission of Enquiry into Subversion in the Trade Unions, Youth Movements, and so on. In the external field, during November of this year, he showed his resolution in practical terms in his treatment of a group of teenage terrorists from Venezuela who arrived in Trinidad expecting asylum after they had hijacked a Venezuelan aircraft. Despite the fact that Dr. Williams has a long-standing grievance against Venezuela for refusing to remove the "colonialist" 30 per cent Antilles surtax on Trinidad exports, the group were very quickly returned under military escort whence they had come. As a result of this action Dr. Williams is now openly and perhaps (for him) dangerously, marked as an enemy of Communism and Castro-type terrorism. He has followed this up by rejecting an approach from a Cuban emissary who came with proposals for opening up trade and diplomatic relations. In this matter he is not prepared to follow the Jamaican example.

British Guiana

8. Similarly, his actions even more than his statements over British Guiana, show his attitude towards the prospect of a Communist or near-Communist State as a neighbour. During the long drawn out British Guiana strike earlier this year he was neutral against Dr. Jagan and, in particular, unhelpful to the British Guiana Premier over oil supplies and air transport facilities. Since then Dr. Williams' public statements on British Guiana, following your recent decision on that country's constitutional future,¹ have been extremely helpful to British policy and critical of Dr. Jagan's obduracy, and the Trinidad representative at the United Nations has on instructions taken the same line. Indeed, Trinidad alone of the Afro-Asian States, abstained with Britain on the Ghana motion urging that a date be fixed for British Guiana's independence. Trinidad's representative went further and spoke out publicly against the motion. Here, again, Dr. Williams' record compares favourably with Jamaica's, despite the latter's closeness to the United States.

9. Dr. Williams naturally has no sympathy towards colonialism. On the other hand, he is prepared to be objective over British Guiana, and has publicly recognised that the normal textbook solution for a colonial situation does not apply there. His helpful action at the time of the establishment of Malaysia (again in contrast to that of Jamaica) also revealed a willingness to look fairly at the aims of an old colonial Power and to accept them if they stood up to examination.

10. Dr. Williams had earlier showed his mettle at the time of the Cuban crisis. Dr. Solomon, Acting Prime Minister in his absence, had wavered slightly in the face

¹ See 217.

of President Kennedy's quarantine decision but Dr. Williams, then in Brussels, was definite and wholehearted in his support of the American action, and under his instructions Trinidad came quickly into line. Indeed, since her independence, Trinidad has been extremely firm against Russia. Dr. Williams has for example adopted delaying tactics over a tentative Russian approach to establish an Embassy in Port of Spain.

Africa

11. Admittedly on matters where the colour issue is uppermost, as in the problems of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, Dr. Williams' views are more in line with those of his new Commonwealth colleagues. He has said that if the African countries want South Africa out of the United Nations, then Trinidad is with the African States. Moreover, he has put this statement into practical effect in the instructions given to Trinidad representatives at international gatherings. The Trinidad Minister of Labour, for example, was directed by Dr. Williams to follow the lead of the African States at this year's I.L.O. Conference. His attitude on Southern Rhodesia is similarly staunchly pro-African though many of his statements (and those authorised by him) on that country seem to have a lesser content of invective than those of other new Commonwealth leaders. His attitude is one of assumed puzzlement that Britain can genuinely regard Southern Rhodesia as self-governing in the British sense of the word. To some extent he recognises the particular difficulties which face Britain there, and his support for President Nyerere's² initiatives on Southern Rhodesia has in it an element of seeking a *quid pro quo* for support of his own unorthodox views (by new Commonwealth standards) in relation to British Guiana. He professes to see a parallel between his desire to see the British withhold independence in present circumstances from British Guiana and the Africans' desire to see us withhold it from Southern Rhodesia.

The Commonwealth

12. As the leader of a small country with a considerable racial mixture, Dr. Williams is attracted by the Commonwealth idea as he interprets it. He also has good practical reasons for friendship with Britain. Trinidad and Britain are still very substantial trading partners and the British influence is a balance against excessive American influence which is unattractive to Dr. Williams personally. In addition, Dr. Williams is in the market for large-scale aid for his second Five-year Development Plan, and he certainly hopes for substantial help from Britain. Against this have to be set deep-rooted feelings of wishing to show that the colonial connection is over and done with, and that Trinidad has a policy of her own overseas as well as at home.

International trade

13. On balance, Dr. Williams, like the island he leads, is probably still intellectually and emotionally closer to a moderate and racially tolerant Britain (his image) which gives at any rate some help and some trading chance to the under-developed, than to any other non-Caribbean country. For example, his daughter, like

² J K Nyerere, president of Tanganyika, 1962–1964, of United Republic of Tanzania, 1964–1985.

many other Trinidad children, is being educated in Britain. Even so Dr. Williams will be very carefully watching Britain's attitude at the forthcoming World Trade Conference for any sign that Britain may be insufficiently forthcoming in pursuing policies helpful to the interests of small and under-developed countries like Trinidad. He for his part will be seeking, probably through personal participation, to promote the view that small under-developed countries are entitled to two-way preferential treatment. They should be helped to export through international commodity agreements like the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement which Dr. Williams publicly praises as a model: they should not be prevented from developing new industries at home by means of local incentives such as pioneer industry status, import licensing, perhaps tariffs.

Dr. Williams' good record

14. I have previously reported that Dr. Williams is an exceptionally prickly personality, not easily led and resistant to direct and obvious attempts to influence him. He is also ready to see insult and injury where none is intended, and his sunny moods can quickly fade. When they do, his words even if not his actions lose restraint, and argument degenerates into invective. We have had a bitter experience of how this can happen in our dealings with him over the abortive financial settlement on independence.³ But even there Dr. Williams refrained from going beyond hostile words to hostile action, and the final arrangement now made is both fair and mutually satisfactory. However unpleasant this somewhat prolonged difference between Britain and Trinidad may have been, on world issues that mattered Dr. Williams has continued to pursue sensible policies generally parallel to those of Britain. His recent actions, where they impinge on British interests and policies, compare favourably with those of most of his new Commonwealth colleagues, including even his Caribbean colleague Sir Alexander Bustamante. I hope that this record will be given full weight in our dealings with Dr. Williams if he seeks our help over the Development Plan. I hope, too, that it will be recalled if at some future date, in one of his blacker moods, he should again appear to belie his wise actions with intemperate words.

15. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the British High Commissioner in Jamaica, the British Ambassadors in Caracas and Washington, to the Head of the British Mission to the United Nations, and on a secret and personal basis to the Governors of Barbados and British Guiana.

³ See 206, 207 and 209.

219 CO 1031/4411, no 11

19 Dec 1963

[British Guiana]: CO record of a discussion in London between
Mr Duncan Sandys and Mr Rusk on the current situation

Mr. Rusk said that he would like to have Mr. Sandys' appreciation of the situation in British Guiana, and possibly exchange a few words on Indo-Pakistan relations. *The Secretary of State* suggested that they might also exchange views on Southern Rhodesia and Ghana.

British Guiana

2. *The Secretary of State* said that the last conference¹ had achieved its purpose. It had been possible to steer it in the right direction and the presentation of the outcome had been satisfactory. There had been virtually no international criticism and Jamaica and Trinidad, in particular, had reacted well. He was especially pleased with Dr. Williams' attitude, given his dislike of proportional representation. Had Jamaica and Trinidad not supported the British Government's decision, the outcome might have been awkward.

3. Throughout the Conference he had not know [sic] whether Dr. Jagan would resign and indeed the latter had stayed on in London for a week after the Conference trying to make up his mind on this point. However, Dr. Jagan's reactions had not worried him once the political leaders had signed a piece of paper asking him to arbitrate. Dr. Jagan of course now tried to make out that his signature had been conditional, but his explanations were not convincing.

4. The Secretary of State's main concern had been not to make a martyr or a hero of Dr. Jagan. It would have been very easy to have suspended the Constitution, or to have squeezed Dr. Jagan out of office. It had, however, to be borne in mind that Dr. Jagan was an able agitator, and that one ought not to put him in a position whereby he could gain popularity in opposition. The dangerous period had been immediately after the end of the Conference; but the longer Dr. Jagan delayed his resignation, the less he could hope to derive popularity from it, and the more prospect there was that he would offer Her Majesty's Government justifiable cause for dealing with him in the wider interests of good government in British Guiana. If occasion offered, H.M.G. would not hesitate to act.

5. At present there was a lull. There had been no violent reaction—only violent language—following the Conference. The Secretary of State was now proceeding with the drawing up of the Constitution, in accordance with his mandate from the party leaders, and it was his intention to make it as watertight as possible. The next step was to hold an election, which he thought Dr. Jagan might lose, even if nothing was done to discredit him.

6. It was, however, not certain that this result would be achieved. It was therefore most important that everything should be done between now and the election to encourage the formation of new parties. He thought it would be a good thing if the American and British agencies concerned were to get together on this point. The pity was that there was such a lack of leadership in British Guiana.

7. *Mr. Rusk* asked whether *Mr. Rai*² could be eliminated as a potential leader. *The Secretary of State* considered him to be feeble, but he thought the dearth of talent to be such that nobody should be excluded as a possible leader. The main thing was to encourage the emergence of one or more parties, which would help to draw support off Dr. Jagan. The electoral system he had devised ought to encourage the growth of small parties.

¹ See 217.

² B S Rai, minister of home affairs in the Jagan government who was dismissed from the PPP and resigned his portfolio. He formed the Justice Party but was defeated at the 1964 election.

8. He had hoped that British Guiana's budgetary situation would have enabled him to take action. However, the British Guiana financial turnout appeared, on the face of it, less serious than had been expected. Dr. Jagan would now have to present a budget for 1964, and this might provide an opportunity to turn on the screw.

9. *Mr. Rusk* said that his officials had been in favour of Britain resuming direct rule in British Guiana. He thought, however, that some of the problems of concern to the United States could be resolved without putting Dr. Jagan out of office. For example, the Organisation of American States would meet shortly to discuss the question of Castroist penetration and subversion. It was likely that the meeting would adopt resolutions facilitating control over the movement of Cubans, Russian-backed Cuban funds, etc. It was likely that the Jamaican and Trinidad Governments would support these resolutions. His general preference was to explore with H.M.G. what steps possible under direct rule could be taken without resorting to direct rule.

10. *Mr. Rusk* asked whether Mr. Sandys had any evidence of arms shipments to or through British Guiana. *The Secretary of State* said that none had so far reached him. There had been many rumours, but no hard evidence. *Mr. Rusk* said that American experience had been the same. The recent discovery of the Venezuelan cache of arms, which had been traced back directly to Cuba, was the first evidence to hand of arms traffic.

11. *The Secretary of State* said that while there was no evidence of arms traffic, it was clear that Dr. Jagan was getting Cuban—or more probably Russian—funds through his phoney trading organisation GIMPEX. *Mr. Rusk* asked if Mr. Sandys had heard of the latest financial deal, whereby the Cuban Government would provide GIMPEX with a further "loan" of one million dollars. *The Secretary of State* said he had not, and it was agreed that the American officials concerned would let their British counterparts have the relevant information. *Sir Hilton Poynton* explained the latest Guianese moves to give GIMPEX the monopoly for importing Russian oil. This might provide an opportunity to take suitable action.

12. *Mr. Rusk* asked whether it would be possible to associate British Guiana with the OAS resolutions. *The Secretary of State* said that if Jamaica and Trinidad gave a lead by co-operating with the OAS, it would be helpful, and he thought that it might be possible to do something if British Guiana became, in effect, the odd man out. However, everything had to be subordinated to the aim of securing Dr. Jagan's removal from office through the new elections. To do this one might have to put up with a number of things which one didn't like. The important thing was not to do anything which Dr. Jagan could use to boost his popularity. Subject to this, he was certainly willing to examine any proposals for co-operation with the OAS.

13. *Mr. Rusk* asked whether it was possible to do anything about Dr. Jagan's control of internal security, especially with regard to such points as intimidation, entry of Cubans into, or movement of Cubans through, British Guiana. *The Secretary of State* explained that the British authorities would be running the elections and that everything possible would be done to prevent intimidation at the elections.³

³ The meeting then proceeded to discuss Southern Rhodesia.

220 FO 371/173580, no 2

7 Jan 1964

[US policy in the Caribbean]: letter from I J M Sutherland¹ to A R Thomas on the concerns of the State Department

I made a record of the conversation with Bill Burdett² and other members of the State Department on December 13 when the Anglo-Guatemalan talks and British Honduras were discussed (forwarded with my letter of December 16 to Miss Hutchinson, Foreign Office, which was copied to Jerrom) but we have not reported the subsequent talk on other Caribbean territories. Burdett, Knox³ and Tepper⁴ stayed on for this meeting and we were joined by Mr. Thickpen of the Office of Inter-American Affairs. Nothing very significant was said about the Caribbean Organisation and the other subjects mentioned briefly on that occasion, but I think it is worth recording the expression of concern voiced by Burdett at the prospect of early independence for the Little Seven.

2. You will recall that after you had given an account of events since the breakup of the West Indies Federation, of the probable merger of Grenada with Trinidad and of what we hoped to achieve at the forthcoming Constitutional Conference on the Little Seven, Burdett made it clear that although the U.S. Government had not taken up any position on the subject, the creation of a new economically and politically weak state was something which he could not welcome. Indeed he went so far as to say that he did not like the idea of independence for the proposed Federation *per se* and that it was something which the State Department would not wish to see happen. Only grudgingly did he concede that an independent Federation might be less unfortunate than fragmentation which, as you explained, seemed to be the most likely alternative to early arrangements for an independent group. When you spoke of the continuing economic burdens to the U.K., making it clear that you had not intended to bring up the subject of possible U.S. aid, Burdett took the occasion to say that in his view the prospects of U.S. assistance were "quite slim" and referred to the current unfavourable attitude towards foreign aid in Congress. He took note of your remark that if we come to the conclusion that Federation might stand or fall on the availability of aid, the British Government might come forward with proposals for tripartite assistance, bringing in the Canadians.

3. Burdett concluded by saying that the U.S. Administration would be watching the situation in the Lesser Antilles very closely in the New Year and they would wish to consult the course of events in the British territories at some future date. He was clearly very concerned when you said it was H.M.G.'s policy to try to hasten the timetable for the grant of independence to a Little Seven Federation despite the lack of any great enthusiasm for the idea in the territories concerned, and it came as a shock to him to hear that if the Federal plan broke down, we would probably not object to

¹ UK embassy, Washington, 1962–1965.

² W C Burdett, deputy assistant secretary of state for European affairs, US State Dept, from 1962.

³ Marion Gordon Knox, Bureau of European Affairs, US State Dept; deputy director, Office of British Commonwealth and North European Affairs.

⁴ R Tepper, officer in charge of Caribbean Dependencies' Affairs, US State Dept.

Barbados "going it alone" and might even agree to a separate independent Antigua or a Federation of what was left.

4. I do not think that the Americans had hitherto focused much attention in the political future of the island Caribbean territories, and they have rested content in the belief that the status quo was likely to remain unchanged for some time. However the introduction of the new Constitutions in the Bahamas and in British Honduras⁵ this month have also given them cause to consider more closely what the future U.S. relationship should be to those territories, and I gather from a remark made to me this week by Tepper, that the State Department are now engaged in one of their periodic appraisals of U.S. policy in the area. What the conclusion will be I do not know. There are probably divided counsels within the Administration and within the State Department itself. So far your conversation with Burdett about the Little Seven has not been followed up here. But I am inclined to think that we shall come under increasing pressure from the Americans to go slow on constitutional changes in the Caribbean. Certainly this is the way in which the Bureau of European Affairs in the State Department appears to be thinking and they are likely to be supported by the Department of Defense.

5. As Burdett stated, one of the U.S. Government's primary concerns is the possibility of communist and particularly Cuban penetration and influence on the pattern of British Guiana; they are also most anxious to preserve and protect the security of the bases and other military facilities which they have in the British islands; they have, of course, the general interest of maintaining and improving political stability in an area very close to the U.S. which is already disturbed not only by the presence of a hostile regime in Cuba, but by unstable governments in Haiti and in the Dominican Republic and difficulties in Venezuela. They also have their own worries over Puerto Rico. Whatever may be said about the virtues of the principle of self determination, and however the Americans may view our colonial policies in other parts of the world, they regard the British presence in the Caribbean as an important stabilising influence which they would be reluctant to see diminish, and as a guarantee of our continuing interest in the southern part of this Hemisphere. In the course of the last two years, the Americans have been exhorting us (and other European countries) to take a greater share of responsibility and interest in Latin America and they have, on the whole, been gratified at the increased interest which we have shown, but they are likely to consider that their and our efforts have been in vain if this process is accompanied by a corresponding diminution in our stake in that part of the area where our historical interests are of longest standing and which lies closest to the U.S.

6. I should be grateful if you would let us know if there are any indications from the U.S. Embassy in London that the Americans are thinking on these lines. We also consider it important that we should continue to keep the Americans closely informed both here and in London of our thinking on the Little Seven and of developments in the other island territories.

7. I am copying this letter to Dick Slater in the Foreign Office, to Moynihan in Port of Spain, Diggines in Kingston and Edmonds in Caracas. I enclose three extra copies in case you wish to send it to the Governor in Bridgetown or elsewhere.

⁵ Effectively conferring internal self-government on these two territories, with the British governors retaining responsibility for defence, external affairs, internal security and the Public Service.

221 CO 1031/4411, no 14

26 May 1964

[British Guiana]: outward telegram no 211 from Sir H Poynton to Sir R Luyt on the declaration of a state of emergency and the possible detention of all three political leaders

[Violence peaked in British Guiana during the first half of 1964, the numbers killed between January and July being estimated at 136 and those injured at 778. Janet Jagan resigned her position as minister for home affairs on 2 June and the governor took over her department. Two days later a state of emergency was declared.]

Begins. Special meeting of Privy Council is being held this week probably Thursday for other urgent business. Secretary of State thinks it would be wise to take this opportunity of making British Guiana (Emergency Provisions) Order 1964 so as to authorise you to exercise, in your discretion, the powers conferred on you by the Emergency Provisions Order in Council 1939. This would give you discretionary power to make emergency regulations (including regulations amending or revoking those that you have already made on ministerial advice) and would also give you discretionary power to terminate emergency, i.e. to direct that Part II of the Emergency Powers Order shall cease to have effect. (Premier would thus be unable to advise termination of emergency if he were to dislike any regulation made by you). You have already seen draft of above Order, but it is being amended on Secretary of State's instructions and revised text will be telegraphed to you. Order could, if you felt it desirable, be kept secret until it was necessary to make use of it. Please let us know your view by 12.00 hours G.M.T. tomorrow (Wednesday).

2. Secretary of State would like your views as soon as possible but not necessarily within above time limit on the risk that the giving of such powers to you would cause Jagan to resign or, if he did not resign, to wash his hands of the running of the emergency. Latter might be no bad thing. What do you think?

3. Secretary of State would also like your views whether it would be wise to detain all three political leaders and remove all Ministers from office and even if need be exile them or some of them. He had in mind possibility of forming a temporary nominated "national" government drawn from any section of the community who would respond and carry on until general election.

4. We should have to consider what legal instruments would be required to make it possible to establish such temporary government, but before we give further thought to this, do you consider such policy would be effective or wise? *Ends.*

222 CO 1031/4411, no 15

28 May 1964

[British Guiana]: inward telegram (reply) no 258 from Sir R Luyt to Sir H Poynton. *Minute* by Poynton

Your telegram Personal No. 211.¹

Upon my return to Georgetown yesterday I saw your telegram No. 211 and the reply sent by Rose in his telegram No. 254. I support his view that the British Guiana (Emergency Provisions) Order 1964 should be made now and be kept on secret use.

¹ See 221.

2. With reference to paragraph 2 of your telegram No. 211 I think Jagan might indeed resign or more probably wash his hands of the running of the emergency. I am not particularly keen that he should as yet take either of these steps and be able to point to the Order in Council as justification. This would retain for him most of his local support and perhaps enlarge rather than diminish his image as the unfairly frustrated Indian and P.P.P. leader. However, if I find that the effective restoration and maintenance of peace and order are being seriously and patently impeded by unwillingness of the Jagan administration to do their duty, I would not only want to use the powers of the Order in Council but would be in a position to tell the people the clear and impressive truth and thus either counter or minimise reactions.

3. If I am to take over responsibility for running the emergency, I would much prefer to acquire this duty because Jagan voluntarily hands it over. The "Daily Chronicle" is about to launch a campaign calling upon Jagan as a national duty at this time to ask me to run the emergency. The Chronicle was in touch with me yesterday and emphasised that it is also their view that a voluntary surrender by Jagan of control over internal security would be much better than dispossession.

4. I am not particularly optimistic as to the likelihood of a voluntary surrender but would like to give it a chance to occur. If, however, developments require bringing the Order in Council into operation at any time for important security reasons, I will not delay because of the preference expressed in paragraph 3 above.

5. With regard to your paragraph 3 I would not recommend detaining all three political leaders. Burnham and D'Aguiar may be a nuisance on occasions but they are not current security threats. Indeed Burnham has been positively helpful on occasions as regards Georgetown. They both want elections soon and do not want to rock the boat unduly. I reserve judgement on Jagan. He is possibly not personally promoting violence but he seemingly does nothing to keep his colleagues in the P.P.P., P.Y.O. and G.A.W.U. in order.

6. If the three leaders were removed from the scene I doubt whether I could form a temporary nominated national government of much worth or influence. No ambitious politician would touch it and with independence in the offing local people generally would not wish to be tainted with service for the Imperialists.

7. Furthermore, merely knocking the head off the P.P.P. would not be likely to achieve stability. There are more extreme men than Jagan in the party. The chances of holding a 1964 election would probably also be destroyed as a campaign without Jagan, Burnham and D'Aguiar would be unreal and popularly unacceptable. Thus on present form I do not support the proposition in your third paragraph.

Minute on 222

Secretary of State

We now have the Governor's views (telegram attached) on wider issues of policy, including the idea that there might be advantage in locking up the three political leaders and setting up a nominated "National" Government until the elections are held.

2. The pros and cons appear to be as follows:—

Cons

(1) The Governor would not recommend detaining the three political leaders. He points out that Burnham and D'Aguiar are both anxious to have elections soon, do not want to rock the boat unduly and have been positively helpful on occasions as regards Georgetown.

(2) To lock up the three political leaders would probably inflame feeling against the British from not only the Indian but the African and Portuguese communities. It might well necessitate a postponement of elections.

(3) Such action would give the United Nations, and others critical of us, material with which to attack us again. At present our critics are handicapped by not knowing whether to support Jagan or Burnham.

(4) The Governor doubts whether he could form a temporary nominated "National" Government of much worth or influence. With independence in the offing, local people generally would not wish to be tainted with service for the imperialists.

Pros

(1) Removal of the three political leaders and the setting up of a "National" Government (but see (4). above) would give the Governor a free hand in containing the violence. (But this might be intensified with both Africans and Indians against us).

3. The Governor does not favour the idea and with respect I agree with him. The best way of getting rid of Jagan is, I am sure, for him to be defeated "democratically" at an election.

4. The Governor agrees that an Order in Council should be made today to enable him to exercise his powers under the Emergency Powers Order in Council, 1939, in his discretion. If it is brought into operation, there is a risk that Jagan might resign or more probably wash his hands of the running of the emergency, i.e. remain in office, non-co-operative but not positively obstructive. Sir R. Luyt is not keen that either of these should happen, but if important security reasons require bringing the Order into operation, he says that he will not delay for fear of the consequences. It seems to me that if Jagan washed his hands of the running of the emergency that might be no bad thing. If he were to resign (and I think this is unlikely) I see no alternative but Governor's rule until the elections are held.

A.H.P.
29.5.64

223 *H of C Debs*, vol 699, cols 252–261 21 July 1964 [British Guiana]: questions and answers in the House of Commons on the conduct of the emergency

United Nations mission

6. *Mr. Brockway*¹ asked the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations and the Colonies what action is to be taken by Her Majesty's Government on the proposal of the United Nations Special Committee on Colonialism that a three-member committee of good offices should visit British Guiana to assist in restoring harmony and peaceful conditions.

¹ Fenner Brockway, MP (Lab) for Eton and Slough; veteran campaigner for colonial emancipation.

Mr. Sandys: We have taken note of it.

Mr. Brockway: Is the right hon. Gentleman content to allow the present critical situation in British Guiana to continue, with emergencies, with arrests, and with killings? What is his constructive proposal for a settlement of this problem? As he has refused a Commonwealth mission of good will, why refuse a United Nations mission of good will?

Mr. Sandys: I agree that a little more good will in British Guiana would be a nice thing, but I do not think that further missions are likely to create it. As regards the proposal for a Commonwealth mission, in which I know some hon. Members have some interest, as the communiqué showed, this was discussed at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers Meeting, but there were widely differing views about the wisdom of such action.

Police and security forces

8. *Mrs. Hart*² asked the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations and the Colonies if he is aware that there is a lack of confidence in the political and racial impartiality of the police and security forces in British Guiana; and what steps he is taking to increase public confidence.

Mr. Fisher: I know that the Police have been accused of partiality, but these accusations are quite unjustified. On the contrary, the British Guiana Police have done and are doing a fine job in very difficult circumstances. In recruitment to the Police Force and to the new Special Service Unit care is being taken to ensure that recruits are not drawn predominantly from any one racial group.

Mrs. Hart: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that his whole Department is being exposed to charges of the gravest arrogance and deliberate unwillingness to see what is happening in British Guiana when he gives an Answer like that? Is he aware that many persons have been imprisoned without any charges being made against them, and that at the same time there are people who are not in prison but who are known by the public in British Guiana to have committed many of the outrages? Will he look at the way in which recruitment is carried out so that it is of such a kind that there can be greater confidence by that section in British Guiana which does not have any at the moment?

Mr. Fisher: The racial imbalance is due to the fact that in the past there have been insufficient Indian recruits because they do not particularly like the disciplined way of life and are often not of the right physique. Over the last two years recruitment has been on a strict basis of parity between the two main races. If the hon. Lady talks about increasing public confidence in British Guiana, I think that that might be helped if hon. Members refrained from making quite unjustifiable assertions of this kind in the House of Commons.

Mr. Clark Hutchison:³ Is my hon. Friend aware that the police and the security forces in British Guiana are behaving excellently and have an admirable record? Will he back them to the limit of his ability and do his best to counteract the misrepresentations from hon. Members opposite?

Mr. Fisher: My hon. Friend is right, and we shall certainly back them to the full.

² Judith Hart, MP (Lab) for Lanark; minister of state, Commonwealth Office, 1966–1967; minister for overseas development, 1969–1970, 1974–1975, 1977–1979.

³ MP (Con) for Edinburgh South.

Detained persons

9. *Mrs. Hart* asked the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations and the Colonies if he will arrange that the 13 African and 20 non-African members of the P.P.P. of British Guiana, who are among 34 individuals at present imprisoned there, shall be either charged and tried, or released at once.

15. *Mr. R. Edwards*⁴ asked the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations and the Colonies why the Deputy Premier of British Guiana, Mr. Brindley Benn, and other elected representatives who have been arrested were not brought before the courts immediately and indicted under the Criminal Law so that they might be given an opportunity to defend themselves.

28. *Mr. Fernyhough*⁵ asked the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations and the Colonies how many persons are now detained in British Guiana; for how long they have been detained; when they will be charged; and when they are likely to be tried.

35. *Mr. Loughlin*⁶ asked the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations and the Colonies how many persons are now detained without trial in British Guiana.

Mr. Sandys: Thirty-six persons are detained under emergency regulations. The period of their detention varies between four and five weeks. Three are being charged with sedition. No charges have yet been brought against the remainder.

Mrs. Hart: Why is this so? How can it be justified that a British Governor, with emergency powers, can retain in prison people who are well known to have tried their best to serve the interests of their country—whatever may be the opinion of the Minister—without making charges against them? Is not this the most gross form of old-fashioned colonialism? How can the right hon. Gentleman expect to have a possible solution in British Guiana unless he shows some understanding of what is expected in standards of behaviour and standards of conduct from the British Government themselves?

Mr. Sandys: I do not think the hon. Lady quite understands what emergency regulations are for.

*Mr. S. Silverman:*⁷ What are they for?

Mr. Sandys: For the public safety. It would be unusual to bring to trial people detained under emergency regulations. In cases where it is possible to make a charge and to produce witnesses who are not afraid to give evidence, those people would, of course, be arrested and charged under the normal criminal code. The reason why they are not so charged is because those circumstances do not exist.

Mr. Edwards: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the detention of the Deputy Premier and four Elected Members of the Legislative Assembly has destroyed the majority of the Government of British Guiana? Is it not vital that these men and women should be charged so that they can defend themselves, otherwise the whole democratic system will be in ruins if the majority is destroyed by arbitrary arrests of this description?

Mr. Sandys: I think that I have explained the situation. I understand the hon. Gentleman's feelings on these matters. He is correct in saying that the majority of the Government in the Legislature has been upset by this situation, but I would point

⁴ MP (Lab) for Bilston.

⁶ C W Loughlin, MP (Lab) for Gloucestershire West.

⁵ E Fernyhough, MP (Lab) for Jarrow.

⁷ J Silverman, MP (Lab) for Birmingham, Aston.

out that the right to detain without trial was included in the emergency powers assumed by Dr. Jagan's Government—the hon. Gentleman is referring to Dr. Jagan's majority—in the emergency both in 1962 and in 1963.

Mr. Fernyhough: Does the right hon. Gentleman agree that so long as policies of this kind are pursued our protests about what happens under dictatorships become hypocritical? Is it not time that Her Majesty's Government began to learn a little from history? Will not they have a look at what happened in Ireland, Nyasaland, Kenya and Cyprus and realise that sooner or later they will have to go back on those policies, as they had to do in the case of every territory that I have mentioned?

Mr. Sandys: The hon. Member would do well to look at his history a little. There is no resemblance whatever between the struggles against colonial Powers in certain other territories and what is going on in British Guiana, where two sections of the population are killing each other, night by night. I consider that the Governor, with the full support of the British Government, should do everything in his power to protect innocent people from being murdered.

*Mr. F. M. Bennett:*⁸ Is it not a fact that these charges of colonialism are entirely inaccurate in this context, and also that every emerging Commonwealth country on becoming independent has immediately reintroduced arrangements for emergency arrest and detention without trial—in every case more severe than the arrangements of the outgoing British administration?

*Mr. Bottomley:*⁹ I recognise that exceptional measures are necessary in Southern Rhodesia, but does not the right hon. Gentleman agree that we should be seen to administer justice fairly? In the circumstances, will not he speedily submit the cases of those detained to a tribunal for investigation?

Mr. Sandys: There is a tribunal, and it is operating.

*Sir S. McAdden:*¹⁰ I should like to tell my right hon. Friend that there is great concern on both sides of the House about a situation in which people are imprisoned without trial, but can my right hon. Friend clear up one doubt in my mind? Do the figures to which his attention has been drawn refer to British Guiana—or to Ghana?

Mr. Bottomley: Can the right hon. Gentleman say how many cases have been before the tribunal?

Mr. Sandys: Not without notice.

16. *Mr. Milne*¹¹ asked the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations and the Colonies what arrangements have been made to assist families in British Guiana who are suffering hardship as the result of relatives being detained without trial.

Mr. Fisher: The salaries of detainees paid from Government funds are continuing. The Social Assistance Department are investigating whether the families of other detainees are in need.

Mr. Milne: Is the Minister aware that, whatever may be the logic of the argument for detention without trial, the suffering of this must not be visited upon the relatives of the people who are detained and that we are glad to see that steps have been taken to alleviate any suffering? Will the Minister, however, make every effort to ensure that the investigation is speeded up and that the suffering is alleviated as soon as possible?

⁸ MP (Con) for Torquay.

⁹ MP (Lab) for Middlesbrough East; S of S Commonwealth relations/affairs, 1964–1966.

¹⁰ MP (Con) for Southend East.

¹¹ E J Milne, MP (Lab) for Blyth.

Mr. Fisher: Yes. Recommendations to the Governor from the Assistance Department are expected very soon and the Governor has power to charge expenditure connected with the regulations against the resources of British Guiana.

Situation

14. *Mr. R. Edwards* asked the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations and the Colonies whether he will make a further statement on the situation in British Guiana.

31. *Mr. Loughlin* asked the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations and the Colonies if he will make a statement on the present situation in British Guiana.

Mr. Sandys: Since my statement a month ago there have been a series of further acts of inter-racial violence. The Governor has made new regulations and some additional troops have been sent to reinforce the garrison.

Mr. Edwards: Is the Secretary of State aware that there seems to be overwhelming evidence of massive American intervention in British Guiana? Will he investigate the activities of the American Central Intelligence Agency, whose agents seem to be able to move in and out of British Guiana without any difficulty? Does he agree that since the emergency has been imposed 150 people have been killed, and that there never was such a situation in British Guiana until democracy was completely eliminated from this area?

Mr. Sandys: Is the hon. Member really suggesting that American agents are killing people in British Guiana?

Mr. Edwards: Yes, I do.

Mr. Sandys: That is a monstrous suggestion.

An Hon. Member: The Government are creating another Cuba.

Mr. Brockway: What is the Secretary of State's constructive proposal to deal with the situation in British Guiana? He cannot possibly be content with it as it is. Is he not now prepared to consider a United Nations mission of good will? If he is not prepared to accept either a Commonwealth or a United Nations mission of good will, what is the right hon. Gentleman's proposal to deal with the situation in British Guiana, which is the result of his own administration and is resulting in the killing of human beings?

Mr. Sandys: The hon. Member asked exactly the same supplementary question on Question No. 6 and I answered it then. [HON. MEMBERS: "The Minister did not answer it."]

*Mr. M. Foot:*¹² Does not the Minister realise that there could be nothing more provocative than his reiterating that he does not propose to lift his finger to try to influence the desperate situation in British Guiana? Even if he rejects the proposals from Dr. Eric Williams and others, has he no single proposal of his own to try to deal with the situation? Is that what he is telling the House of Commons at the end of his whole period of dealing with the problem?

Mr. Sandys: I explained fully my policy and my views about how we should deal with the situation when we had a half day's debate on the subject. Nobody from the

¹² Michael Foot, MP (Lab) for Ebbw Vale; S of S employment, 1974–1976; lord president of the Council and leader of the house, 1976–1979; deputy leader, Labour Party, 1976–1980, leader, 1980–1983.

benches opposite suggested—[HON. MEMBERS: "What are your suggestions?"]—any alternative policy:—

Mr. Brockway: Yes, we did.

Mr. Sandys: — which stood any chance of solving this problem.

Mr. Bottomley: If the suggestion is that we suggested anything other than that law and order should prevail, the Secretary of State is quite right. We did, however, suggest ways in which he could tackle the problem. One suggestion was to send out a Commonwealth team, which at that time, I think, could have done some good.

Mr. Sandys: We go on having this suggestion about a Commonwealth team. We have had a team from Ghana and efforts have been made by the Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago, the Prime Minister of Jamaica and the Premier of Barbados. They have all tried their hand at this, and the Commonwealth Prime Ministers collectively discussed it but were unable to produce any suggestions about how we could handle the matter which would stand a better chance of securing good results. I am sure that what we must do is try to maintain law and order and proceed to the elections, the preparations for which are going ahead. There has been registration on a considerable scale and I hope that we shall be able to preserve law and order sufficiently to hold the elections in the autumn as planned.

Households (searches)

17. *Mr. Milne* asked the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations and the Colonies if he is aware that household equipment is being removed from homes searched by troops during the present emergency in British Guiana; and what steps he will take to relieve the hardship thus caused.

Mr. Fisher: I assume that the Question refers to iron piping used for blowing domestic fires. Iron piping has been used to make firearms and pipe grenades and any of this piping found during searches is therefore confiscated. This should not cause hardship as bamboo and other hollow stems are readily available and can be used instead.

Mr. Milne: Is the Minister aware that we are glad that investigations have been made into this matter and to receive his assurance that alternative methods have been produced by the authorities to alleviate this suffering?

Emergency Regulations (Flogging)

25. *Mr. M. Foot:* asked the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations and the Colonies if he will make a statement on the recent orders issued by the Governor of British Guiana about penalties to be imposed on those convicted of possessing illegal arms and ammunition.

27. *Mr. Wade*¹³ asked the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations and the Colonies what instructions he has given to the Governor of British Guiana regarding the reintroduction of flogging as a punishment in the Colony.

Mr. Sandys: The emergency regulations made on 23rd May on the advice of Guianese Ministers provided a variety of penalties for looting and kindred offences. On 7th July the Governor added the illegal possession of arms, ammunition and explosives to the list of offences covered by the earlier regulations. No change was made in the nature of the penalties prescribed.

¹³ D W W Wade, MP (Lib) for Huddersfield West.

Mr. Foot: Whoever may have supported proposals of this kind in the past, will the Secretary of State tell us whether he was asked to approve these methods of barbarism? Does he think that it can assist in establishing democracy in British Guiana for the British Government and Governor to be a party to the imposition of flogging and life imprisonment, punishments which are more reminiscent of the slave trade than anything to do with democracy?

Mr. Sandys: First, as to the question of the Governor being associated with this, I should like to point out that these penalties are included in the normal criminal code of British Guiana. My second point is that the application of these penalties to offences under the Emergency Regulations was introduced by the locally-elected Ministers of British Guiana and that the Governor was merely introducing that in accordance with constitutional practice. It was his duty to make whatever regulations the elected Ministers ask for. What he has done is to add—I should have thought, reasonably—to the list of offences which carry these penalties, and which previously included looting, the illegal possession of arms, ammunition and explosives.

Mr. Wade: Does the Minister really think that the use of flogging can in any way help to resolve the conflict? Does it not play into the hands of these who are trying to blame Britain and who are suggesting that Britain is adopting reactionary measures? Surely, the introduction of flogging is about the worst thing to do.

Mr. Sandys: The kind of murder and violence that is going on there is very reactionary. I believe that whatever measures are necessary to save life, to prevent murder and to bring to an end this reign of fear and terror are justified. As I have said, these penalties are already included in the criminal code of the country and have been proposed by the elected representatives of the people in British Guiana.

Mr. Bottomley: Is not Her Majesty's Government's name involved in this, too? The Secretary of State takes upon himself many responsibilities for British Guiana, and I should have thought that in this case he could have called for the end of flogging. Is he aware that at the independence celebrations in Malawi when Britain's stock was very high, this news was received and shocked every African there present?

Mr. Sandys: I hope that the right hon. Gentleman did his best to explain the true facts.

Mr. Bottomley: I did. I was ashamed.

Mr. Sandys: I hardly think that at a time when racial murders are taking place night after night it is the right moment to reduce penalties for violence.

Mr. F. M. Bennett: We ought to get this matter into proper perspective. Would my right hon. Friend care to give the House, by one method or another, a list of the independent countries which have reintroduced flogging since independence, including flogging for simple offences such as larceny?

Mr. M. Foot: Is it the Secretary of State's desire, as it has been the desire of some previous Secretaries of State, to abolish flogging throughout British territories? Why does he try to shelter behind somebody else's decision? Would he tell us whether he is in favour of flogging as a penalty in British Guiana and, if he is, does he recognise that he convicts himself of barbarism out of his own mouth?

Mr. Sandys: I have made my position perfectly clear, and I have nothing to add.

224 PREM 13/137, pp 159–165

29 Oct 1964

[British Guiana]: record by J O Wright¹ of a conversation between Mr Wilson and Dr Jagan on the conditions under which the UK would be prepared to grant independence to British Guiana

After an exchange of courtesies, the *Prime Minister* enquired whether Dr. Jagan was going to see the Minister for Overseas Development about the British Guiana development plan. *Dr. Jagan* replied that it was rather a waste of time for him to try to draw up a plan if there was going to be another Government after the December elections. He went on to say that he had been shocked to learn from the Colonial Secretary that Her Majesty's Government intended to allow the Constitutional arrangements for elections in December to go ahead as planned.

The Prime Minister said that he had criticised the present Constitution in the House of Commons when it was drawn up; at the same time he had said that he could not give an assurance that the Constitution would be changed when Labour returned to power. Her Majesty's Government had now to deal with the facts as they found them. The Prime Minister enquired which way Dr. Jagan thought the election would go.

Dr. Jagan replied that it was very difficult to say, it was a matter of a few thousand votes. One thing was certain: if his Party won a majority of seats and obtained more votes than any other party and were still not called upon to form a Government, a very serious situation would arise.

The Prime Minister said that in many talks which they had had together, they had discussed a system in which Dr. Jagan and Mr. Burnham would work together; either with Dr. Jagan as President and Mr. Burnham as Prime Minister or the other way round. *Dr. Jagan* said that a Government of this sort was not acceptable to Mr. Burnham doubtless because it was not acceptable to the United States Government.

The Prime Minister said that with the major parties so evenly balanced what hopes of peace were there in British Guiana unless Mr. Burnham and Dr. Jagan could work together. *Dr. Jagan* said that was why he supported co-operation on a basis of parity, but from the public statement only the day before, Mr. Burnham had said he would not co-operate with Dr. Jagan's party whether he won or lost.

The Prime Minister asked whether Mr. Burnham wanted independence. *Dr. Jagan* said he did; but the difficulty here was that independence under Burnham could very easily lead to the sort of right wing dictatorship which was familiar in Latin America.

The Prime Minister said that although he could not at present speak for the British Government, because the Cabinet had not yet considered the situation, he thought there would be a very strong opposition here in London against granting independence to British Guiana unless both sides had given some proof that they could work together. Britain could not with responsibility grant independence if it was likely to lead either to a blood-bath or to a right wing dictatorship. This meant that after the elections, all parties in British Guiana would have to demonstrate over a period that they could work together.

The Prime Minister went on to say that there were a number of problems. First there was the problem of imbalance in the police; that was a matter which could be

¹ Private secretary to Mr Wilson.

dealt with without too great difficulty. Then there was the question of observers at the forthcoming elections. Finally there was the longer term problem of the future of British Guiana. Speaking quite personally the Prime Minister said that he had been thinking of the possibility of a visit to British Guiana of a group of Privy Counsellors to look at the broader problems and report back. *Dr. Jagan* enquired what would be the purpose of their enquiry. *The Prime Minister* answered that it would be to report back on the basis on which independence could be granted.

Dr. Jagan said that in his view the Constitutional problem was the most urgent one. Would it not be better, even at this late stage, to re-examine the whole thing in order to bring about a situation in which there could be a Government of both major parties. *The Prime Minister* replied that he would have no objection to such a Government if one were formed after the elections. If the Labour Party had come to power in June it might have been possible to do something different; now it was too late and H.M.G. saw no alternative but to let the elections go forward. *Dr. Jagan* said that when the Labour Party came to power he had assumed that something would be done; the *Prime Minister* replied that H.M.G. had to take the position as they found it. But he would repeat: he could see no question of granting independence to British Guiana until both sides had shown that they could work together.

Dr. Jagan thought that if no attempt was made now to postpone the elections, the Constitution would be more difficult to work after the elections. *Mrs. White* said that that was precisely the difference between them. *Dr. Jagan* thought that the elections were the end of the road; we thought that they could be the beginning of a new arrangement. Had *Dr. Jagan* thought of the consequences of postponing elections? There would be great trouble and his own safety would be in jeopardy. *Dr. Jagan* said that the British Government had demonstrated its ability to control crowds.

The Prime Minister said that if *Dr. Jagan* won with an overall majority of seats and votes, the Governor would doubtless call upon him to form a Government. If he failed, was it his guess that Mr. Burnham would not get a majority. *Sir Hilton Poynton* said that Mr. Burnham and Mr. d'Aguiar and the small splinter parties could probably form a majority in the House together.

Dr. Jagan said that if his party contested, under protest, the elections and won, as they expected, twenty of the 35 seats and 50% of the votes or more, the position was fairly clear. But if they did not obtain a majority of the votes despite winning a majority of seats, and the Governor did not call upon them to form a Government, there would be grave dissatisfaction because under the old system they would have won and they would consider that they had been deprived of victory by the new Constitution. Moreover if Mr. Burnham was unable to form a Government, either in coalition or alone, the United States would bring their influence to bear to force the splinter parties to support Burnham. The United States would do anything to keep *Dr. Jagan's* party out of power.

The Prime Minister, again emphasising that the matter had not been before the Cabinet, felt fairly sure that there would be no support for independence for British Guiana unless there was proof in this country that *Dr. Jagan* and Mr. Burnham and their supporters could live together and that there was a prospect that the country had a viable economic future. He had thought this was true regardless of what Government was formed under the new Constitution; it would have been equally true even if *Dr. Jagan* had formed a Government under the previous Constitution. It was absolutely necessary for the two communities in British Guiana to learn to work

together. After the history of the past few years, no responsible Government could grant independence to British Guiana unless they were satisfied on this point.

The Prime Minister said that we should look into the problem of the imbalance in the police force. Then there was the question of observers at the forthcoming elections. Finally there was the question of taking a fresh look at the whole problem when the elections were over. *Mrs. White* added that this would be the time to take up certain of Dr. Jagan's very interesting proposals which really had not received very much attention up to date.

The Prime Minister repeated, for the third time, that there could be no question of independence, either for a Government run by Dr. Jagan or one run by Mr. Burnham, until the British Government was satisfied that British Guiana was ready for it. *Dr. Jagan* should not assume that whoever won the next elections would be invited to a simple constitutional conference at Marlborough House. He did not know what the Government would decide; but he thought that it would wish, after the elections, to take a fresh look at the whole situation in British Guiana and that they would probably wish to take the advice of a group of wise statesmen, possibly an all-Party group of Privy Counsellors. It would be utterly irresponsible of the United Kingdom to grant independence while inter-community warfare was still a possibility and while there was little prospect of an economical [sic] viable future for the country. The British Government would ensure when independence came, so far as was possible, that there would be no dictatorship in British Guiana either of the right or the left; there would be proper safeguards for that sort of thing.

Dr. Jagan said that as far as observers in the elections was [sic] concerned, he would rather have a United Nations observer than Commonwealth observers. He had lost all confidence in British officials. Even though his was now the Government that was running the country, the police, the judiciary and the Civil Service were all against him. On the question of the imbalance in the police forces, it was not merely a question of numbers; it was a question of the way the whole police and judicial system was functioning.

The Prime Minister closed the meeting by saying that we should want to look into all these problems after the elections.

Dr. Jagan left at 7.00 p.m.

In the short conversation afterwards with *Mrs. White* and Sir Hilton Poynton, it was agreed that Commonwealth Observers at the elections were to be preferred to United Nations observers, since they would be appointed by the Prime Minister and would report back to him.

225 FO 371/173580, no 99

11 Nov 1964

'Jamaica-Trinidad relations': memorandum by Sir A Morley on a growing rift between Jamaica and Trinidad¹

When the Federation of the West Indies broke up, it was generally recognised that measures of continuing regional co-operation on the part of the independent British Caribbean countries and the existing colonies would be desirable and, indeed, in

¹ Memo enclosed with a letter of the same date from Morley to Sykes at the CRO.

some matters—of which the chief were the shipping and meteorological services and the University—positive regional co-operation was accepted as a necessity. The lead in subsequent attempts to strengthen regional co-operation was taken by Trinidad, with Jamaica appearing to be quite content to amble along in Dr. Williams' wake; but the degree of success of such aims obviously depended largely upon the maintenance of reasonable relations between the two principal countries concerned—Trinidad and Jamaica.

2. During the earlier part of 1964, signs began to appear that Jamaica was not so content as she had at first appeared to be to let Trinidad make the running and that, in particular the period of Jamaica's apparently docile acceptance of Dr. Williams' tendency to speak for Jamaica as well as for Trinidad and in some respects to appear to be running Jamaica's external policy, was coming to an end. In recent months, Jamaica's reluctance to continue to be led by the nose has become explicit.

3. The first signs of an access of spirit on Jamaica's part were perhaps contained in Sir Alexander Bustamante's sudden attack, on the last day of the second Caribbean "Summit" Conference in January 1964, on Dr. Jagan and his policies and his call for an abandonment of these as the price to be paid for Jamaica's and Trinidad's intercession with the British Government for a stay on the new electoral procedures imposed by the Secretary of State. The effect of this was to prejudice an initiative which had been taken by Dr. Williams in an attempt to bring forth "a Caribbean solution for a Caribbean problem". While the Jamaican Prime Minister probably did not say anything with which Dr. Williams disagreed, his manner and timing of saying it could not have been to Dr. Williams' liking and it at all events put a stop to Dr. Williams' attempts to find a regional solution to British Guiana's problems and did harm to his ambitions to be regarded as the leader of the Caribbean region.

4. The next ripple on the surface appeared in May, when Dr. Williams was passing through Jamaica on his way back to Trinidad after his travels in Africa, Europe, Canada and the United States. Dr. Williams was travelling in his own privately chartered aeroplane, but had so arranged matters that he would only have a short stop in Jamaica, allowing insufficient time even for him to leave the airport. He nevertheless expected Mr. Sangster, who was then Acting Jamaican Prime Minister, to be prepared to agree there and then to matters of important concern to both countries. He wanted Mr. Sangster to present himself at the airport, with his Cabinet colleagues in attendance, ready to endorse various plans and proposals which he had formulated during his travels. Mr. Sangster declined to comply. He came himself to the airport, however, with officials; but some acerbity was shown on both sides. Although Dr. Williams vented his irritation at not getting his own way by later referring to the ineptitude of the Jamaican Government in being unable to participate in discussions of this nature merely because Sir Alexander Bustamante was away, it is at least as likely that Mr. Sangster's reluctance to meet Dr. Williams' wishes on this occasion sprang from resentment at the latter's tactlessness and from a not unjustified sense that the time and place were not appropriate for decisions.

5. It seems that the most important matters upon which Dr. Williams wished Mr. Sangster to commit himself were that the third Caribbean "Summit" meeting, which had been scheduled to take place in Barbados in late July, should be advanced so that it could take place before the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Meeting, and that the "Summit" Conference should include in its agenda the discussion of a proposal (which he had mooted in Ottawa) that there should be a conference between Canada

and the West Indian territories to take place in the autumn at which Canadian relations with and aid to the West Indies would be considered; that it should receive a report from him on his African and North American tours; and that it should discuss a common line to be taken by Trinidad and Jamaica at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Meeting. (There may have been other serious bones of contention; it has been suggested that Dr. Williams proposed that the Emperor of Ethiopia should be invited to Jamaica as well as to Trinidad and Mr. Sangster may well have baulked at such a proposal, as, apart from any other consideration, such a visit might have embarrassing repercussions on Jamaica's Rastafarian problem. According to Mr. Sangster, he had understood Dr. Williams to say that the Emperor would only come to the West Indies if he were invited by both Trinidad and Jamaica, and no such invitation had been extended by the latter.)

6. In the event, Jamaica subsequently proposed a date in August for the third Caribbean "Summit"; this was rejected by Trinidad, and the "Summit" is now unlikely to take place before January 1965, if at all. An opportunity had thereby been lost for the two countries to mend their fences. Meanwhile, the situation had further deteriorated as a result of the antipathy which, as we understand, emerged quite openly between Dr. Williams and Mr. Sangster at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Meeting. Moreover, Jamaicans generally took grave exception to Dr. Williams' television broadcast in London in which he appeared to be speaking for the whole of the British Caribbean when he said that the Commonwealth meant little for this part of the world. At the same time, Jamaica incurred the wrath of Trinidad by Mr. Sangster's failure to support Dr. Williams' proposals, at the Conference, in respect of British Guiana. (In this, although Mr. Sangster was attacked by Mr. Manley for the Jamaican Opposition, he was quickly supported by Sir Alexander Bustamante and the general opinion in Jamaica was that Mr. Sangster had every right to express his own Government's views and had in any case said the right thing.)

7. Since the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Meeting, matters have hardly improved, with Jamaica taking a very poor view of Dr. Williams' reversal of his own Government's representative's acceptance of the Regional Shipping Council's decision in April to dispose of the two Canadian ships operated by the Regional Shipping Service; with Dr. Williams' public attack on Sir Alexander Bustamante for not implementing his part of an agreed (but confidential and half-baked) arrangement under which Jamaica and Trinidad were to have shared representation in Africa and Latin American countries (Trinidad's responsibility being for Africa and Jamaica's for Latin America); with Mr. Lightbourne, the Jamaican Minister of Trade and Industry, having publicly to deny press reports originating in Trinidad that there had been an agreement between Jamaica and Trinidad, which had been broken by the former, to meet in Barbados before the United Nations Trade and Development Conference in Geneva, with a view to determining a joint policy to be adopted at the conference; with the same Minister declaring that Jamaica had been unable at Geneva to agree with Trinidad to forego preferences for certain goods entering Britain; with Dr. Williams' criticism of Jamaica's handling of the application for both countries to be admitted to the O.A.S.; and with the assault by a burglar on Mr. Hector Wynter, Jamaica's High Commissioner in Trinidad—an essentially minor matter in itself, which was blown up to become, for a few days, a matter of serious concern, mainly by a flurry of largely unnecessary telegrams initiated by Sir

Alexander Bustamante and by the despatch to Trinidad of the Permanent Secretary for External Affairs accompanied by "Investigating Officers".

8. The result of all this is that Jamaica/Trinidad relations are now in disarray; and while Mr. Ramcharan, the Trinidad High Commissioner in Jamaica, is always anxious to assure everyone that relations between the two countries are excellent, Dr. Williams, as reported by Sir Norman Costar, believes them to be non-existent. This is presumably to be interpreted to mean that, since Dr. Williams cannot get Jamaica's agreement to his various plans and to his outlook generally, he has written off Jamaica, at least for the time being, as is consistent with his usual reaction to opposition from any quarter.

9. Thus, on his way back to Trinidad after the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Meeting, Dr. Williams embarked, without further reference to Jamaica, on a new initiative for Caribbean co-operation based on Trinidad, Puerto Rico and the Netherlands Antilles. In his talks with Mr. Munoz Marin² in Puerto Rico, at which five joint Puerto Rican/Trinidad study groups were set up to examine the possibilities of the establishment of such regional schemes as shipping and air services, a Regional Industrial Development Bank and Regional Hurricane Insurance, Dr. Williams pointedly left Jamaica out of account, leaving it to Puerto Rico to make an approach to Jamaica at official level.

10. It has been noted that one of what might be called the Federal remnants—namely, the Regional Shipping Service—has figured among the areas in which friction between the two countries has developed. The University of the West Indies, the largest and most important of all the existing manifestations of the former Federation, is potentially the focus of an even more serious dispute. The Jamaicans (and at any rate Jamaican University officers), are understood to be increasingly disillusioned with Dr. Williams' performance as pro-Chancellor of the University and it would seem that, so far from Sir Arthur Lewis' creation of the post of pro-Chancellor for Dr. Williams being the master stroke which it at first appeared to be, he might prove to have admitted the Trojan horse. The immediate point of dispute is the site of the proposed law faculty. This is a matter on which the Jamaica Government feel it politically impossible to give way. The purely academic arguments appear to be in favour of having the faculty at Mona so that it could be alongside the arts and social science faculties; but it appears that Dr. Williams is determined to get the law faculty for Trinidad, and the Jamaicans fear that he will improperly use his position as pro-Chancellor to this end. There is a danger that the dispute over this, if brought into the open, might escalate.

11. In all these circumstances, are we to look for an eventual improvement in the relations between Jamaica and Trinidad, or will they continue to be unsatisfactory or deteriorate even further? The outlook does not appear to be very bright. Is there however any particular reason why Jamaica's relations with Trinidad should be close? It often appears to be assumed in London and elsewhere that because they are both former British Caribbean colonies with both attaining Independence at about the same time, they should have identity of interests and purpose. But it could be argued that the dissimilarities between the two countries are much more extensive and go deeper than any similarities. For instance, Trinidad's economy is dominated by oil, while Jamaica's is still essentially an agricultural

² Governor of Puerto Rico.

economy. Jamaica's roots as a British colonial territory are much deeper than Trinidad's and carry with them to a much greater extent, all the connotations of an original slave society. Jamaica's present Government, dominated though it may be by one old man with an emotional and irrational approach to things, is much more broadly representative of the informed and intelligent man of affairs, than is Trinidad's which appears virtually to be a one-man Government; and in Jamaica there is a Parliamentary Opposition which commands respect; this does not seem to be the case in Trinidad. Jamaica's ethnic structure is not nearly so diversified as Trinidad's; in particular the population is not divided by a large and growing East Indian minority and there is virtually no admixture of French or Spanish blood. Both countries subscribe to the ideals of multi-racial society but the possible emergence of racial tension in either country cannot be discounted; if this were to happen, it would be likely to take differing forms in the two countries, arising from the essential difference in their racial structures. Finally, Jamaica is nearer geographically and in flying time to the United States than it is to Trinidad and the Eastern Caribbean. The Caribbean may be a convenient geographical regional designation for certain purposes; but all the indications are that Jamaica regards her political and economical ties with North America as being closer than those with the Caribbean.

12. In all these circumstances it would on the whole be surprising if, with such "difficult" men at the head of their affairs as Dr. Williams and Sir Alexander Bustamante, these two countries found it particularly easy to get along with each other.

226 PREM 11/137, pp 136–139

25 Nov 1964

[British Guiana]: record by J O Wright of a ministerial meeting on the line to be taken in discussions with the US

The Meeting considered the line to be taken when the Prime Minister visited President Johnson in Washington at the beginning of December.

The Prime Minister recalled that when Dr. Jagan had called on him on October 29² he had informed Dr. Jagan that no British Government could grant independence to British Guiana unless there was proof that Dr. Jagan and Mr. Burnham and their supporters, and indeed the Indian and African communities in British Guiana, could live together in conditions of peace and stability, and that there was a prospect that the country had a viable economic future.

The first thing that the Prime Minister would therefore have to tell President Johnson was that whoever won the forthcoming election in British Guiana there could be no progress towards independence until these conditions had been fulfilled. He himself thought that once the result of the elections were known and a government formed, the next step might be to send to British Guiana a group of Commonwealth elder statesmen who would take a completely fresh look at the situation on the ground and make recommendations.

¹ Ministers attending were Mr Wilson, Mr Gordon Walker, Mr D Healey (S of S defence, 1964–1970) and Mr Greenwood.

² See 224.

[Fourth paragraph deleted and retained under section 3(4) of the Public Records Act, 1958]

In discussion the following points were made:—

- (i) A coalition between Jagan and Burnham was the pre-requisite of stability in British Guiana. Whichever party won the forthcoming elections, both Dr. Jagan and Mr. Burnham would have to be told that they must get together: perhaps the United States could be induced to help the attainment of a coalition.
- (ii) If there were a coalition it was very doubtful whether the United States Congress would sanction any aid to British Guiana: the United States Congress would simply not provide money for any government of which Jagan was a member. It was therefore better to work not for a coalition but for conciliation.

[Sub paragraph (iii) deleted and retained under section 3(4)]

- (iv) While the United States would find it difficult to live with another Cuban situation in the Western hemisphere there was a danger that British Guiana might become a second Congo as a result of great power rivalries there.

[Sub paragraphs (v) and (vi) deleted and retained under section 3(4)]

Summing up, *the Prime Minister* said that he would be guided in his discussions with President Johnson by the foregoing considerations. He would emphasise that the British government had no intention of granting independence to British Guiana, whoever won the election, until they were satisfied that there was a prospect of a stable political and viable economic future for the country. He would also say that Her Majesty's Government were examining the possibility of sending a Mission of senior Commonwealth statesmen to British Guiana to make recommendations about the country's future.

[Sentences deleted and retained under section 3(4)]

227 FO 371/173580, no 99

27 Nov 1964

[Jamaica–Trinidad relations]: letter from Sir N Costar to E L Sykes on the growing rift between Jamaica and Trinidad and its implications for UK policy in the Caribbean

I was very interested to read Alec Morley's letter to you dated 11th November¹ about the differences between Jamaica and Trinidad, which have come to the surface this year. Let me say at once that I am in very broad agreement with Morley's account and by and large also with his views. But there are one or two points which I should perhaps pick up.

2. First of all I think it worthwhile to stress that the antipathy exists only at the top. I think I speak fairly for *people* here when I say they are not cross with Jamaica. They are just not very interested. This is despite their connection through the University of the West Indies, British West Indian Airways and the Federal Shipping

¹ See 225.

Service, to name just three of the remaining links which span the thousand miles or so from Kingston to Port of Spain.

3. Moreover, as a gloss on the antipathy at the top, it is Dr. Williams' view that until the succession to Bustamante is settled there would be little point in high level talks between Trinidad and Jamaica. Dr. Williams sees this succession as a tussle between Sangster and Shearer;² and he thinks their struggle is the cause of the reluctance of the Jamaican Government to be active in foreign affairs. Dr. Williams' antipathy is to Sangster in particular. Ellis Clarke, who was present at the meeting in Jamaica between Dr. Williams' and Sangster when the row developed, told me that Sangster was as much to blame as Dr. Williams, if not more.

4. Another point which I think is important, is that we should avoid getting into a position where we might get involved in the present quarrel at the top. There is some risk of this happening if we try to mediate or in other ways be helpful. On the other hand, it is certainly a pity that the two Commonwealth countries in the Caribbean seem to be drifting apart, the more so as Britain is involved with them both, in the University, the Shipping Service (for sometime a headache to me personally) and in British West Indian Airways, etc.

5. In the long term Britain will no doubt be disengaged from these particular involvements. But in the short term one of the difficulties which I foresee is that we may from time to time have to take positions which may or may not appeal to this side or that. To take just one example, the British attitude to Air Jamaica has already run us into some difficulty with Trinidad, the 90% owner of British West Indian Airways, and could potentially run us into substantial difficulty. Similarly any financial support to the University for the siting of the Faculty of Law could land us in trouble at one end or the other. Our problems over the Federal Shipping Service are well known in London.

6. There is also the prospective West Indies Federation to consider. On personal grounds, the leaders of the smaller Eastern Caribbean islands share Mr. Sangster's view of Dr. Williams and have little affection for him. But these islands do have a much more substantial connection with Trinidad than with Jamaica, which is so much further off. There is also British Guiana where I think Dr. Williams's personal relations with all party leaders are as bad as elsewhere. Even so I would hope that we might, at some time, without seeming to meddle, be able to do something to keep the Eastern Caribbean Commonwealth on mutual speaking terms.

7. So far in this letter I think I have followed Alec Morley's view that the Caribbean is just "a convenient geographical regional designation for certain purposes". But Dr. Williams would not agree with this definition, and his efforts to create some sort of union in the Caribbean are likely to continue. Perhaps too, he has some case when he dreams of a Caribbean Economic Community. The economic and social development of the area probably *is* hampered by the artificial as well as the natural barriers between the islands.

8. But as I have said more than once, Dr. Williams is not the man to achieve their union. He woos too ardently and courts rebuff. When he gets it his love is apt to turn to hostility. All his affairs must proceed exactly as *he* wishes. In the two years since

² H L Shearer, Jamaican trade unionist; vice-president, Bustamante Industrial Trade Union from 1960; leader of government business in Senate, 1962–1967; prime minister and minister of defence and external affairs, 1967–1972; leader of Opposition, 1972–1974.

independence, he has blown hot, blown cold, with Jamaica, Barbados, British Guiana, Surinam, Puerto Rico and the Netherlands Antilles.

9. On the other hand, Dr. Williams is not the man to blame himself. In his mind, colonialism is the cause of most of the troubles of the Caribbean; indeed, of most of the troubles of the world. The theme of his book "Capitalism and Slavery" recently re-issued, was that Britain gave up slavery, not on humanitarian grounds, but just because it no longer paid. Likewise, he says that today we give up our colonies because they too no longer pay, and that the ex-colonial power still maintains a position of economic advantage.

10. It is true that in recent years Dr. Williams has frequently condemned Britain for a lack (in his eyes) of a Caribbean policy.³ But this really means to him, the lack of a policy to bring the British Caribbean under his sway, and to help it on its way with a large endowment.

11. Yet, as I have suggested, it is such a pity that this should be so when the best interests of the Caribbean, at any rate of the Eastern Caribbean, Trinidad, the Little Eight and British Guiana, probably would be served by some sort of union. Unfortunately it is most unlikely that Dr. Williams' methods will ever achieve this end, and although our relations with Dr. Williams may suffer if we fail to back his Caribbean initiatives, it is difficult to foresee what real British or even Caribbean interest would at present be served by involving ourselves too much in the cross currents of the Caribbean. American interests are, of course, of a different order.

12. To sum up, I would at present advise against any avoidable involvement in the domesticities of the West Indies. Indeed our best interests might be served by further withdrawal as occasion permits. But when some of today's leading West Indian personalities move off the stage, more positive British encouragement of Caribbean co-operation might be generally welcome. This will be the time to help.

13. I am copying this letter to Morley (Kingston), Lintott (Ottawa), Killick (Washington), and secret and personal to Stow (Barbados) and Luyt (British Guiana).

³ Reporting a conversation with the prime minister of Trinidad in July 1964, Costar explained that Eric Williams was of the opinion that the UK should abandon its policy of 'drift' in the Caribbean and that it should 'do something' for the small islands, using the lever of aid to force them together: 'Surely we could afford to spend some money in the West Indies, and not put it only into places where we had a strategic interest, like Kenya and Malta. He is clearly irked at our £50m. independence settlements for these two countries' (FO 371/173580, no 57, Costar to Sykes, 29 July 1964, enclosing a record of talks with Williams, 27–28 July 1964).

228 CO 1031/4706, no 37

Dec 1964

'US aid proposals for the Caribbean': CO note on a new American initiative

[I J M Sutherland of the UK embassy in Washington reported to the FO in Oct 1964 that State Dept officials (H Shullaw, director of the Office of British Commonwealth Affairs and R Tepper, see 220, note 4) had raised the question of the US modifying its policy of not giving aid to dependent territories in the Caribbean. Shullaw emphasised that the approach was informal but also explained that the State Dept recognised that political stability in the area depended on economic growth. The problem was one of how to persuade Congress to reverse its stand on aid policy. One answer lay in Canada's recent decision to increase its own aid programme to the Caribbean from 2 to 10 million dollars.

The US might match this, and Congressional objections would be overcome if the UK followed suit (CO 1031/4706, no 27, Sutherland to FO, 13 Oct 1964, copied to CO). Within the CO, D Williams stressed how important it was that the US initiative should be followed up and that British territories should benefit: 'The aid we are giving them does not begin to compare with what the Dutch, the French and the Americans have done for their territories. Moreover, if it ever got out (as it would) that we had turned down the American initiative, our name would be mud in the British Caribbean' (*ibid*, minute by Williams, 30 Oct 1964). Internal inquiries in the CO revealed that in 1963 the French had given nearly 95 million dollars (in aid and loans) to Martinique, Guadeloupe and French Guiana. After a visit to the Windward Islands, Kirkness minuted: 'there is a need for a higher level of development assistance if we accept, as we have done tacitly for years, that these islands must have a level of services a good deal above what we would think necessary in Africa or Asia. The condition of the schools and hospitals . . . is in most cases deplorable, because such aid as we have been able to provide has had to go to more important economic priorities. At the same time, we should have to watch carefully the effect on their recurrent budgets of any substantial increase in capital aid. The budgets are already showing signs of strain under the steady increase in recurrent costs arising out of capital development. The real problem . . . is to keep the national income moving up at a rate sufficient to cover the increased cost of their social services. This has been done so far by the dramatic expansion of banana exports from the Windwards and of tourism in Antigua, and to some extent Montserrat. But there are serious fears about the future of the banana industry and also of the other main export crops, such as cocoa. The biggest contribution the Americans could make would be to stop pressing us to remove our quantitative restrictions on dollar bananas' (*ibid*, minute by Kirkness, 16 Oct 1964).]

Increase of U.K. assistance

The main feature of the United States proposals outlined in the letter from the Embassy to the Foreign Office of 13th October, 1964, is that the United Kingdom should provide additional aid funds to the Caribbean which the Americans would then match. It is not altogether clear how much additional money the Americans would envisage the British should make available. The proposal, however, has arisen out of the expansion of Canadian aid to the Caribbean from \$2 million to \$10 million per annum, and it is therefore reasonable to assume that the Americans are suggesting that we should make an additional sum of aid of between \$8 m. and \$10 m. (i.e. between £2.9 m. and £3.5 m.) available annually to the Caribbean (including Trinidad, Jamaica and British Honduras as well as the territories of the Eastern Caribbean, but not British Guiana).

2. Over the past ten years Britain has disbursed in aid to the Caribbean area, including British Guiana, and Trinidad and Jamaica before independence, a sum of about £88 m. British aid to British Honduras and the territories of the Eastern Caribbean in Colonial Development and Welfare money and grant-in-aid is now running at about the rate of £4¼ m. a year. Despite the fact that the Americans feel that the British aid effort to the Caribbean compares poorly with that of the other metropolitan powers, our aid effort in the area is very considerable in relation to our other responsibilities elsewhere in the world and the relative economic levels of the different areas. It is therefore felt that our starting point in any discussions with the Americans about their proposal should be to point out that they are already a long way behind us in their present aid effort to this area. The same is also true of the Canadians. On paper, the Canadian effort in making \$10m. available for expenditure in this area looks very good. In view of the fact however that the Canadian aid is so rigidly tied to Canadian exports, it is extremely doubtful whether their actual expenditure on aid will be commensurate with the generosity of their offer. Most of the aid that we make available to the dependent territories is in the form of grants, and the major portion of it in the Caribbean is expended on local costs. This is what

these territories most need; their capacity to use aid tied to imported goods and services is limited.

3. Although, therefore, we might see advantage in making additional aid available to the Caribbean in order to entice into it fresh United States Government money, especially to the dependent territories, it is suggested that our point of departure in negotiating with the Americans should be that it would not be fair to ask us to match their aid by increasing our own on a dollar for dollar basis. If we are able to increase our aid to this area, we cannot tie the increase to the United States level of aid. We have to settle the question of our aid to any particular area in the light of our own total commitments and not those of any other power; and, in turn, we must judge the total commitments we can accept by their effect on our resources, and particularly our overseas payments.

The form of any additional aid that may be made available

4. It is suggested that if Britain does find it possible to make any additional aid available in response to this American initiative, it should be in the form of loan and not of grant. A very considerable proportion of the £4½ m. a year we are now providing in aid to this area is already in the form of grant, and it would not be fair to ask us to increase this burden. Whether the aid should be in the form of hard or soft loans, however, will depend partly upon British aid policies generally and partly upon the aid policies of the other donors. It should however be noted that what West Indian Governments led by Dr. Williams are clamouring for is soft loans or grants not tied to the donor's exports. It would therefore probably be a good gesture politically if we could make some part at any rate of our aid available in the form of soft loans.

Uniformity between the aid policies of the donor countries

5. At present all Canadian aid is rigidly tied to Canadian exports and is not available except in very exceptional circumstances to contribute towards local costs. American policy, it is understood, has also tended in the same direction, though it is not so inflexible. Most of the projects for which the Caribbean Governments need aid include a high local cost element. For this reason it has proved difficult, particularly for the smaller islands, to make any use of the Canadian offers of assistance. If Britain does go into some kind of an aid consortium with the United States and the Canadians, it is highly desirable that the three Governments should work towards establishing a common aid policy, and in particular that the Canadian Government should become less inflexible over this question of local costs. Otherwise the Canadians, in particular, would merely skim off the export cream of any aid projects that were going and leave us to deal with the non-export element.

6. Although this is the ideal to aim at, however, there can be little doubt that if we try to make uniformity in aid policies a pre-condition of instituting joint aid arrangements, no progress will be possible, particularly in view of both Canada's and America's balance of payments difficulties and the need for fresh legislation in Canada before the policy can be changed. Uniformity, therefore, is something that we should have to work towards over a period, not something that could be obtained at once. It would probably depend on the success of a move towards uniformity in the wider field of overall aid policy, such as the D.A.C. has been pursuing.

Machinery for administering joint aid arrangements

7. In the correspondence so far, all the indications are that Canada, the United States and ourselves would prefer the aid to be given under bilateral arrangements but with some form of joint consultation between the donors. The alternative to this method of operation would be to pay over the money to a joint fund or bank and leave it to be administered independently. Such an arrangement would probably be very acceptable to Dr. Williams, who would envisage such a joint fund being under West Indian control. Quite apart from the fact that this kind of arrangement is not likely to be acceptable to the United States Congress, however, it is probable that in West Indian conditions it would be highly inefficient. They are so given to quarrelling among themselves, particularly over anything to do with money, that the chances of their operating a joint fund disbursing aid with any success are extremely remote. There would also be a loss of U.K. control over the administration of our aid which might be unacceptable to Parliament.

8. Alternatively the West Indians might press for some wider international presence (such as the United Nations) to be involved in administering this aid. This is likely to prove equally unacceptable to the Americans and unlikely to produce a more efficient administration of the aid available, and to be open to the same objection from our point of view as the alternative above. This device, therefore, should also be avoided.

9. Probably the most satisfactory device for co-ordinating the policies of the donors would be an annual meeting between the representatives of the donor Governments and representatives of the local Governments seeking assistance. The territorial development plans could be examined by experts in advance of such a conference, and donor countries could then decide upon which projects they were—either severally or jointly—prepared to support, and to what extent. If a British aid mission is established in the area, it might be charged, among its other duties, with exercising a general watching brief over the execution of aid projects under these arrangements on behalf of all three donor countries. The British aid mission could also provide secretarial services for any annual meeting of the donor countries.

229 OD 20/234

8 Feb 1965

[US aid]: minute by Miss M Z Terry¹ on the new American proposals

[Extract]

... 3. As I understand it, the Americans, who withdrew as aid donors to the British Caribbean dependencies after the dissolution of the old Federation, have now come forward with proposals for a joint (Anglo-American-Canadian) aid consortium in this area, primarily if not exclusively for the benefit of the dependent rather than independent territories.² This is an exciting and most welcome initiative. The Eastern Caribbean dependencies are for the most part impoverished agricultural slums. They desperately need substantial injections of capital aid for development if they are to achieve any significant improvement in their economies. Unless something quite unexpected happens to the British economy, the U.K. Government

¹ Terry is listed in the CO list for 1965 but she was working in the ODM.

² See 228.

will continue, as in the recent past, to be unable to do anything substantial to help. We can keep them ticking over at their present low level by means of our grant in aid "dole", and give what extra we can for development through such channels as C.D. & W. and the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement. But unless our development aid can be doubled or trebled (and at present it seems more likely to be cut) we can do nothing really effective to promote reasonably quick and substantial improvements in the economies. Since there is virtually no local capital available to promote development, the only hope is to attract external capital aid from non-U.K. sources.

4. Against this background the American initiative is extraordinarily welcome, particularly at a time when we had given up hope of U.S. aid for these dependencies. Almost certainly, at the outset the Americans would not be able to put in very large sums, but the important thing would be that they would be committed in principle to giving aid in this area. The door would be open, and the way made clear for bigger and better things in the future. Because of the implicit potential in this offer, we should, I believe, firmly grasp the opportunity offered to us and give this initiative our full support.

5. As I understand the position as discussed at the meeting on the 18th December, the U.S. representatives have made it clear that for the purpose of an approach to Congress they will need a further joint economic study of the needs of the area. To those of us who know too well how often in the past this ground has already been covered, this may well seem an irritating and pointless nuisance. Irritating it may be—but not, surely, pointless. We have to accept certain facts of life, one of which is that Congress will not apparently entertain these proposals unless the presentational point can be made that they are being asked to act in response to a "new study". If that is the price we have to pay, then it is surely more than worthwhile in view of the prize to be won (not simply in terms of the actual amount of U.S. aid likely to be forthcoming in 1966 or 1967, but for getting the Americans committed in this area). There is a lot of goodwill towards us on the part of certain State Department officials who are genuinely keen to get U.S. aid for the British Caribbean dependencies, but they cannot move without Congress. They have told us what is needed in order to enable them to approach Congress. It seems to me that because of our concern for the interests of the territories in question, we should respond as positively and quickly as we can.

6. It does therefore seem that we should now follow up the discussion on 18th December by considering the proposal for a joint economic study: that as our starting point we should accept the need for this in principle: and that we should concentrate our efforts on:—

(a) defining the terms of reference in such a way that the end result is not another O'Loughlin.³ We should try to aim at a reasonably modest survey which might pick out a number of priority projects of high development potential, rather than at a comprehensive survey of all the long-term economic and social needs of the area; and

³ A reference to the recommendations of the survey conducted by Dr Carleen O'Loughlin, see 194, note 3 and Carleen O'Loughlin, *A Survey of Economic Potential and Capital Needs of the Leeward Islands, Windward Islands and Barbados*, UK Department of Technical Co-Operation Overseas Research Publication No 5 (London, 1963).

(b) deciding the desirable size and composition of the team and the particular university etc. sources from which it might be drawn.

Both (a) and (b) would need to be discussed first with the Colonial Office, and then, when we had formed some clearer ideas, with U.S. officials from the Embassy. I would recommend that action on these lines should now be started.

7. Although it would be nice to know at the outset how much the Americans are likely to put into a programme of this kind, I do not think that in the circumstances we can reasonably expect them to do so. This initiative has come from U.S. officials, not from Congress. In this country an initiative of this kind would be unlikely to be made without Ministerial backing, and if that was given, Parliamentary approval could be counted upon to follow. The American position is of course quite different, with Congress deeply jealous of its independence of the executive arm. The Americans will not therefore be able to give us any figures which are reliable until they have been to Congress: and to go to Congress they need our co-operation. In short we are being asked to commit an act of faith—but the stakes are high, and the immediate price (our share of a joint economic study) relatively low. (At the very worst, even if U.S. aid failed to materialise in the end, the study could well be useful if the terms of reference and membership were wisely chosen).

8. Nor do I think that we need be unduly disturbed that the Americans have asked for an indication of our own likely aid to the area before committing themselves. These territories are, after all, a strictly British responsibility, (and no one who has seen them can be too complacent about our trusteeship). They are not however an American responsibility, and it is a generous and imaginative gesture they are making in suggesting that they might help to share our burden.

9. Having been concerned with these territories for almost 6 years I no doubt feel particularly strongly about the need to grasp any opportunity to bring them extra help which they badly need and which we can no longer afford to give. In terms of the strictest expediency, however, it cannot be other than helpful to long-term British interests to attract American aid into the area. Without substantial economic development, the U.K. will be forced to go on paying out grant in aid till the end of time, regardless of whether the islands ever achieve political independence.

10. I hope therefore that we can secure agreement to proceeding now on the general lines suggested in paragraph 6.⁴

⁴ Sir A Dudley, deputy secretary, ODM, did not share Terry's enthusiasm for the latest US approach. Commenting on the preliminary discussions with US officials to which Terry refers in para 5 of her minute, Dudley minuted: '... the Americans were really concerned only with the dependent territories, and were not much interested in wider planning in the Caribbean area. I could not help feeling that we were really talking to the wrong people, and that the discussion was pretty pointless ... we might well find ourselves involved in something which would cost a good deal in the dependencies, would take up a lot of time of people in the dependencies, and would only serve to arouse expectations there which the Americans might not after all be prepared to fulfil. This in turn would place us in the embarrassing position of seeming to go back on intentions which perhaps we had never formed ...' (ODM 20/234, minute by Dudley, 23 Dec 1964).

230 CAB 148/20, OPD(65)51

15 Mar 1965

'East Caribbean Federation': memorandum by Mr Greenwood for Cabinet Defence and Oversea Policy Committee on the options for UK policy. *Annex* [Extract]

Introduction

During February I visited Barbados, Montserrat, St. Kitts, Antigua, Dominica, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, and Grenada, to hear views on proposals for a Federation which have been under consideration since January 1962.

2. My conclusion is that important differences of view remain between those Governments who want to see a strong Federation set up and those who prefer a weak one. Further, there appears to be little popular feeling either for or against Federation. Nevertheless it is very much in our interest to bring it about if this can be done. Any other solution to the problem of the constitutional future of these territories is either unlikely to work or will leave the British Government with heavy responsibilities in the area for years to come. Moreover, I believe that with careful negotiation an attempt may succeed.

3. The Annex to this paper, together with its Appendices, gives the historical and factual background to this problem, describes in greater detail the position now reached and explains my reasons for coming to the above conclusions.

Recommendations

4. My recommendations to my colleagues are as follows:—

(a) We should try to set up a Federation of Barbados, Antigua, St. Kitts, Montserrat, Dominica, St. Lucia and St. Vincent (with the hope that Grenada may join later) (*v.* Annex paragraphs 11–14);

(b) We should aim at securing a closely knit Federation with a strong central Government (*v.* Annex paragraph 12);

(c) If Antigua (the proponent of a weak Federal Government) will not accept this type of Federation, then we should persevere with the remaining six (*v.* Annex paragraph 12);

(d) The Federation should become independent within a reasonably short time of its being fully established (this will involve a short Act of Parliament) (*v.* Annex paragraph 9);

(e) For the reasons set out in paragraphs 15–17 of the Annex I should examine with other Ministers concerned the possibility of increasing British and other external aid to the area;

(f) I should communicate my views to the Governments concerned in a despatch on the lines suggested in Appendix A,¹ which should be published, together with their draft Federal Scheme.

¹ Appendix A not printed.

Annex to 230: The constitutional future of the East Caribbean territories

... 5. These preparations² were duly put in hand, but after a general election in Grenada the new Government there took no part in them. With a view to a final conference in June 1963 a preparatory conference was convened in Barbados in May. Shortly before this, however, the Government of Antigua suddenly announced that after careful consideration of the Reports of the Fiscal Commission and the Civil Service Commission they considered it "inadvisable to proceed with a Federation based upon the recommendations of the London Conference Report (Cmnd. 1746)". They proposed instead that a "more modest and realistic approach to a Federation of the East Caribbean territories is necessary". They therefore put forward proposals whereby only a very limited range of services would become Federal. As a result the May conference was extremely confused. The main features of the proposals which emerged, but which were far from unanimous, were that:—

- (i) the proposed Federation should be independent from the outset;
- (ii) there should be a less expensive form of Federation than that proposed in Cmnd. 1746 with the Federal Government having even fewer powers and responsibilities than its predecessor—at any rate for a period of five years from its inception;
- (iii) there should be positive assurances about the amount of British aid for the period of up to 10 years after the Federation was set up.

6. Since then, faced with the stand taken by Antigua, most of the other Governments have been prepared to compromise; but St. Lucia, following a general election in 1964 and a change of Government, has taken a stand at the opposite extreme and favours giving the Federal Government maximum powers in the fields of economic planning and taxation. Meeting as the Regional Council of Ministers in December 1964, the principal Ministers of the seven territories adopted a draft Federal Scheme, subject to reservations by the Governments of Antigua, St. Kitts, Dominica and St. Lucia. The main differences between this scheme and the proposals of the London Conference in 1962 are described in paragraph 7 below. The Council also remitted detailed studies to four Committees for early report. Their intention was to consider the draft scheme further in the light of those reports at a meeting in April and, if they reached agreement then, to suggest a conference with Her Majesty's Government in London to reach final decisions on Federation. They suggested June for this conference if this would be convenient to Her Majesty's Government. The Premier of Barbados has stated that he will not be prepared to attend such a conference unless unanimity has been reached between the seven Governments.

7. The main respects in which the draft Federal Scheme differs from the recommendations of the 1962 London Conference are the following:—

- (a) *The executive authority of the Federal Government.* The London Conference added various subjects to the lists of items on which the Federal Legislature had power to legislate. It did this on the basis that the executive authority of the

² Paras 1–4 of the annex, a brief survey of the history of federation in the Caribbean, are not printed. The 'preparations' mentioned here refer to the plans to implement the federal proposals for the East Caribbean agreed at the Marlborough House conference in London in May 1962, see 194.

Federal Government would cover all matters within Federal Legislative competence. This is the normal provision in Federal Constitutions and was the case under the Constitution of the previous Federation. The result of adding subjects to the legislative lists was thus to increase Federal executive authority correspondingly.

The draft Federal Scheme includes no precise provision about the extent of the Federal Government's executive powers. The omission is known to be due to the unwillingness of Antigua to accept the inclusion of such a provision. If the executive authority of the Federation does not match its legislative powers the Federal Government will not itself be able to administer its own legislation on all matters, and may not have effective power to ensure that such legislation is properly administered by the Unit Governments.

The executive authority of the Federal Government under the draft Federal Scheme will be further reduced because of the omission of police (except for a central training school and a mobile reserve) and postal services from the list of services then administered by the Unit Governments which the London Conference agreed should be transferred to the Federal Government.

(b) *Power to remedy maladministration.* The London Conference agreed that following a Commission of Enquiry the Governor-General should be enabled to dissolve a Unit Legislature if the faults revealed were not remedied. The draft Federal Scheme omits this provision, and offers no alternative.

(c) *Financial controls.* The London Conference agreed that special attention should be paid to the possibility of establishing uniform and effective provisions to ensure proper control and supervision of the expenditure of public funds. Some Unit Governments have resisted acceptance of uniform procedures, and the draft Federal Scheme is not made contingent on their adoption.

(d) *Federal revenues.* The London Conference proposed that the Federal Government should refund to the Units on the basis of derivation any excess which it deemed to exist of revenue from import duties over its needs. Under the new draft Federal Scheme those needs may be smaller, but it proposes that the Federal Government should refund a fixed percentage of this revenue. On this basis the Federal revenues may be inadequate and will be less flexible. The only means of varying the Federal revenue to meet a fall in imports or an increase in expenditure, will be by increasing the rates of import duties.

(e) *Economic planning.* The London Conference agreed that one of the advantages to be gained from the establishment of a Federation would be the opportunity to encourage economic development by the creation of a single market and of machinery for economic co-operation and consultation. It was agreed that external assistance should be made available to the Federal Government and not the Unit Governments individually. These provisions appear to be still acceptable to the Regional Council of Ministers but I have reason to believe they are contemplating administrative arrangements which (contrary to those recommended by the Fiscal Commission) would in practice weaken the Federal Government's powers in economic planning.

(f) *Status of the Federation and procedure for establishment.* The London Conference considered the establishment of a Federation which would have full internal self-government. Independence would be discussed only if that was the wish of an elected Federal Government. The draft Federal Scheme envisages

independence as soon as all Federal institutions have been set up. (In a despatch of 9th August, 1963, my predecessor had agreed that "the next conference should take place on the basis that it will settle the terms of a Constitution for an independent Federation".) There are practical difficulties about the proposals in the draft Federal Scheme, but when those difficulties are fully understood by the other Governments, a compromise will doubtless be accepted under which independence will follow with the least practicable delay.

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8. The situation therefore as I found it during my visit was that all the Governments (with the exception of Grenada) expressed themselves in favour of forming a Federation but there are differences between them over the extent of the Federal Government's powers. Most Governments would prefer to see a Federation established with at least as much power as was proposed in Cmnd. 1746 (*v.* paragraph 4 above). One (St. Lucia) would like to see it even stronger, but another (Antigua) wants to see it a great deal weaker. In an attempt at a compromise, the Governments have worked out among themselves a draft Federal Scheme on which they appear to be broadly agreed, though some of them (notably Antigua) have important reservations upon it. There is moreover an important omission from the scheme—it does not define the extent of the Federal Government's *executive* powers. The scheme does, however, in my view offer a basis on which we can negotiate with the Governments with some prospects of success for a Federation with effective powers in matters of regional concern which could become independent next year.

9. During my visit, the West Indian Governments published their draft Federal Scheme and the reservations attached to it by some of them, together with certain exchanges of correspondence with my predecessor. They are due to meet again in April. I have promised them that I will let them have Her Majesty's Government's views on their proposals to be taken into account at that meeting and that these will be published. A suggested despatch setting out these views is attached at Appendix A. If their further discussions show that there is a sufficient basis of agreement between all parties concerned, then it is my intention that there should be a conference in London in July next at which I would hope final agreement could be reached. A short enabling Act would be required in due course.

10. There appeared to me during my visit to be little popular feeling either for or against Federation. This is confirmed by West Indian Press comment since my departure which shows there has been little or no discussion of the proposals in the draft Federal Scheme. Nevertheless, in my view it is very much in our interest to bring about a Federation if it can be done.

Outline of possible solutions to the problem of the constitutional future of the East Caribbean territories

11. Although these territories no longer have the strategic and commercial importance for Britain that they had in the 18th century, they are located in an internationally sensitive area. Their position on America's doorstep, astride some of the approaches to Central America, makes them a potentially useful prize for interests hostile to the West. At present there are few signs of any danger of internal subversion. In several of the territories, however, the present Governments are not very effective. The economic problems which face them—with their limited resources and a population which, if present trends continue, will increase from

750,000 to 1.5 million in the next 25 years—are very great. The situation is therefore potentially dangerous. Somehow we must devise a constitutional solution for the future of this area which offers a reasonable prospect of securing the political stability of these territories and promoting their economic development.

12. There seem to be four possible constitutional futures for these territories:—

(a) The first is that they should be combined together in a reasonably strong Federation which should become independent as soon as possible. A strong Federation is the only sensible basis on which these territories could all become independent since some of them are too small to sustain independence alone. It should create a measure of political stability in an area which is subject to fairly considerable international pressures; and it should enable the economic development of the territories to be planned regionally and give them access to sources of external aid not otherwise available. The difficulty is, however, that if we insist on the Federal Government having effective powers, Antigua will probably withdraw from the negotiations. This we should be prepared to accept. Even without Antigua, the other six territories combined would have a population of about 600,000 and (if present trends continue) about 1 million in 20 years' time. This should enable them to cut a reasonable figure on the international stage. If at a later date Grenada (present population estimated at 100,000) joins them, the argument is reinforced. Moreover, I think there is a chance that if the Federation is once set up and shows signs of moving to independence Antigua may, despite its misgivings, fall into line. If it does not, then it will have to remain, in some way or other, in direct relationship with the United Kingdom. It is too small to sustain independence on its own.

(b) The second possibility is that we should yield to Antiguan pressure and let the territories combine in a weak Federation. This is not a course that I favour, particularly if the Federation is to move to independence. In the first place, I think it would alienate both Barbados and St. Lucia, and Barbados is by far the wealthiest and most stable in the Federation; indeed, without Barbados it might not be worth pursuing Federation. Moreover, I think the quarrels that would break out between the Unit Governments over which the Federal Government would be unable to exercise any effective control would rapidly destroy a weak Federation. If, in the meantime, the Federation had become independent, we could not remedy the breakdown in the way we did in 1962.

(c) The third possibility is that the three Leeward Island territories of Antigua, Montserrat and St. Kitts should be grouped together, possibly in a unitary State, and that the same should happen to the four Windward Island territories of Grenada, St. Vincent, St. Lucia and Dominica. Thereafter these two groupings should be linked in some way, perhaps in the form of a Federation with Barbados. At first sight this solution has its attractions, not the least of which is that it would make up three Units of a more equal population size (*i.e.*, the Leeward Islands 150,000, Barbados 250,000, the Windward Islands 370,000). Moreover, there are indications that the Windward Islands might be prepared to join together in a single group. The difficulty of this solution, however, is that the antipathy between the Governments of Antigua and St. Kitts is so great that they would probably never be willing to combine in this kind of association. I think, therefore, that this solution, despite its attractions, is not feasible.

(d) The fourth possibility is that Barbados alone should proceed to separate independence and that we should then offer the other territories separately some kind of "free association" with Britain short of full independence. Unless we can reach agreement about Federation on satisfactory terms within the next 12 months, I think Barbados will probably ask for separate independence. If it does it would be very difficult to refuse it. The difficulty, however, about any form of free association is that it would still leave the United Kingdom responsible for the defence and the external affairs of these territories. Unfortunately, owing to their geographical location, their domestic policies frequently impinge upon external affairs. Moreover, for the past five years they have already had a considerable measure of internal self-government. During this period they have shown a tendency to boss rule and financial maladministration. The British Government has been able to prevent or remedy some abuses by the limited constitutional powers of intervention which it still possesses. Under a system of free association the British Government would have only very limited power to intervene if things went wrong. If present tendencies continue, therefore, any form of free association is likely sooner or later to place the British Government in an awkward position.

13. My conclusion, therefore, is that the best course is to go for a reasonably strong Federation and take it to independence as soon as practicable.

Grenada

14. The present Government in power in Grenada wishes to continue to seek union with Trinidad and not to consider the possibility of joining a Federation. The Opposition in Grenada, led by Mr. Gairy, wants to take Grenada into a Federation. I am satisfied that Dr. Williams, the Prime Minister of Trinidad, for reasons of internal politics in Trinidad, could not bring about union with Grenada within the foreseeable future even if satisfactory terms could be negotiated. The best answer for Grenada, therefore, probably lies in its joining in a Federation with the rest of the territories in the Eastern Caribbean. The presence of Mr. Gairy at a conference to discuss Federation, however, would make a difficult negotiation even more difficult. I therefore think the best course is to go ahead with negotiations for a Federation with those territories which are ready to enter on them, leaving it open for Grenada to join the Federation later if it wishes.

British aid

15. One of the questions which will have to be settled at the next conference, if we succeed in convening it, is that of future British aid to the area. At one stage, the Governments concerned declined to come to a conference at all until the British Government had stated how much aid it was prepared to make available to a Federation during the first 10 years of its existence. They tried in fact to get the British Government to guarantee the finance for the full cost of the proposals of the Economic Survey (*v.* paragraph 4 (*j*) above) (estimated at about £59 million over a 10-year period).³ This the British Government declined to do. Instead Her Majesty's Government gave them an assurance in February 1964 "that if Federation can be brought about on satisfactory terms, British aid will continue and that over the first five years of Federation, the amount will be not less than these territories are

³ ie the O'Loughlin survey, see 194, note 3, and 229, note 3.

together receiving from Britain at present". They have again said that they do not regard this assurance as satisfactory; but they are prepared to come to a conference without imposing any preconditions about aid though they will not finally agree about Federation until the question of their external aid is decided.

16. I am satisfied, therefore, that the question of external aid, especially British aid, will play a big part in the conference and that there is little possibility of securing a successful outcome unless satisfactory assurances are forthcoming. The matter will have to be examined further between now and the time of the conference. In my view, however, no matter how successful we may be in inducing other donors to supply aid, we shall have to offer more British aid in the first five years of Federation than the territories obtained from us in the last five years. This is a matter which I propose to pursue separately with the Treasury and the Ministry of Overseas Development.

Other external aid

17. The fact that the area requires so much external economic assistance lends urgency to the need for encouraging other external donors—notably the Americans and Canadians—to be active in this field. Canadian aid to the area has recently been stepped up. The Americans ceased giving aid when the old Federation dissolved. My officials are now working with officials of O.D.M. on a plan which, it is hoped, will succeed in inducing the Americans to renew their aid programme to these territories and will co-ordinate their aid effort with that of the Canadians and ourselves. . . .

Appendix B to Annex: Statistics relating to the East Caribbean territories

	Estimated population, 1965	Recurrent revenue (approximate), 1964	Grant-in-aid (approximate), 1964	C.D.W. funds available, 1963–66
		£	£	£
Barbados . . .	260,000	6 million	Nil	592,000
Montserrat . . .	13,000	240,000	170,000	271,000
St. Kitts . . .	66,000	1 million	200,000	678,000
Antigua . . .	61,000	2.1 million	Nil	666,000
Dominica . . .	70,000	800,000	220,000	738,000
St. Lucia . . .	102,000	1.5 million	Nil	682,000
St. Vincent . . .	96,000	900,000	230,000	674,000
Grenada . . .	106,000	1.4 million	300,000	587,000

231 PREM 11/137, pp 68–74 22 Mar 1965
'British Guiana': note by Mr Greenwood to Mr Wilson on his recent visit to British Guiana and proposing that independence might be granted in 1966. *Enclosure*

[Elections were held in British Guiana in Dec 1964 under a system of proportional representation with the parties submitting a list of candidates in order of preference and the electorate voting for the party, not the individual candidate within the party. Seven

parties contested the election but only three won seats. With 45.84 per cent of the votes, the PPP won 24 seats, 3 short of a majority. The PNC won 40.52 per cent of the votes and 22 seats, the UF 12.41 per cent of the vote and 7 seats. Jagan offered Burnham the premiership but the latter declined, having already been assured of UF support in a new coalition government. An impasse created by Jagan's refusal to resign was resolved by an order-in-council. He was dismissed by the governor who then invited Burnham to form a new government. In Mar 1965 Luyt submitted a fresh appreciation which acknowledged that proportional representation had failed to realise its intended purpose of breaking the mould of racial politics. However, his appraisal suggested that under the conditions prevailing in 1964, no electoral system could have broken down the racial barriers. The violence of 1964 had left its mark. All communities had put racial interests above any others. The extreme right and left within the East Indian community had voted for the same party, and the African community had followed the same principle. At the election party policies had been of little importance compared to racial fears. But at least PR had prevented absolute control of the government by one of the major communities and according to Luyt the need for minority support was already exercising a steady influence on the majority African group (CO 1031/4408, no 383, Luyt to Greenwood, 12 Mar 1965). British Guiana was discussed at the meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers in June 1965. Eric Williams of Trinidad was less amenable than he had been in 1963 (see 219, para 2), and he was critical of the UK for having ignored both his own suggestion that British Guiana should be placed under UN trusteeship with a UN peace-keeping force and Ghana's proposal that the territory should be visited by a Commonwealth Conciliation Mission. According to Williams, the only effect of PR had been to remove the party in power in favour of another. The UK had aggravated racial divisions and outside interference had polarised the situation internationally. Responding, Greenwood admitted that the Labour Party in opposition had not been happy about PR but argued that the Labour government, which taken office only days before nomination day in British Guiana, had not had time to influence events. Had the election been delayed and the voting system changed, the government in London would have been accused of a breach of faith and there might have been violence and bloodshed. Greenwood was also insistent that UN trusteeship was not supported by the political parties in British Guiana (CO 1031/4409, no 495, PMM 9(65)2, 22 June 1965, minutes of meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers on future of dependent territories.)]

Prime Minister

I enclose a minute setting out my present thinking on British Guiana and my proposals for future policy. The points I discussed there have since been the subject of correspondence between the Governor and myself, and, of course of further discussion between the Governor and Burnham.

The main points in the minute are:—

- A. The Burnham/D'Aguiar coalition government have made a good start, particularly in the financial and economic fields. (Paragraphs 1–4).
- B. Their main task is to reassure the East Indian community and if possible secure some East Indian support. They see the need for it and are making sincere efforts to achieve it. (Paragraphs 2, 5, 10).
- C. Jagan was entirely unco-operative and seemed to be under the thumb of his associates. (Paragraphs 5 and 6).
- D. Burnham has suggested a number of amendments to the constitution but I have accepted only those which I believe to be necessary for the effective functioning of the Government. (Paragraphs 9).
- E. If, however, Burnham invites the International Commission of Jurists to study racial imbalance we should revert to the position as it was before June, 1964 when the Governor exercised emergency powers on the advice of Ministers rather than, as now, in his discretion. (Paragraph 10).
- F. Although things are fairly quiet at the moment we cannot rule out the risk of further violence, and our previous policy of saying that, before independence, we

need to have proof that the races can live together, puts a premium upon it. (Paragraphs 7, 8, 12).

G. On the assumption that the races will never co-operate effectively so long as we are there to hold the ring, there is much to be said for a constitutional conference later this year leading, if all goes well, to independence in 1966. (Paragraphs 11–16).

Enclosure to 231

In this minute I outline impressions of the situation in British Guiana gained during my recent visit and the course of action which I think we should follow.

2. The new Burnham/D'Aguiar coalition government is doing well. It has held together much better than was expected. It has re-established business confidence; it has put some heart into the civil service, and it is avowedly following a policy of being a government for *all* Guianese, irrespective of race. It has not yet won the confidence of the East Indians, but it is trying to do this.

3. Responsibility has enhanced Mr. Burnham's stature and he speaks and behaves in public and in private in spite of his somewhat volatile temperament, as a man of integrity, maturity and good judgment. I was favourably impressed in the talks I had with him, both formal and informal.

4. Mr. D'Aguiar (whose political philosophy has little in common with our own) has made a good beginning in handling the economic affairs of the country and has already achieved a good deal. He is, in fact a good business man and a sound administrator. For example, he has made agreements with the two bauxite companies, affecting their payments to government and their security of tenure, which are beneficial to both sides. He has also persuaded the large firms not to demand a repayment of the moneys due to them as a result of the court's decision that the previous government's National Development Savings levy was illegal, but to leave the money with the government in debentures. He has also launched a voluntary savings scheme which has been a success. He is, moreover, putting government finances on a much sounder basis than they were under the previous government.

5. On the other side of the picture, Dr. Jagan's stature has diminished with defeat. He constantly harps on the past and on the injustice of which he feels himself to have been the victim. I tried in vain to persuade him to end his sterile boycott of the House of Assembly and to oppose constructively. I also tried to get him to meet with Mr. Burnham and myself to discuss the setting up a Commission on racial imbalance in the police and other sectors of Guianese life. He refused, though Mr. Burnham was willing. In my discussions with Dr. Jagan he put forward no constructive idea, and I am doubtful whether he has much freedom of decision inside his own party. It is, perhaps, significant that both times I met him he was accompanied by 2 of his colleagues who indicated to him pretty clearly that he must not comply with my suggestions.

6. There is no doubt that at least some leaders of the P.P.P. are deliberately stoking up East Indian fears of the Africans. If left alone, I believe that many East Indians would accept the coalition government—at least as a constitutional government until the next elections—provided it maintains its present non-racial policy and can establish confidence among them by giving them economic security.

7. Sabotage, mainly of communications and water supplies, and of arson on sugar estates continues on a fairly small scale, and some of the incidents may well be caused by other factors. Sabotage, however, could easily be developed into widespread violence if the P.P.P. decided that their interests lay in launching a wholehearted campaign of violence (see paragraph 12 below).

8. The rice trade is a Government monopoly in British Guiana and the rice growers are almost all East Indians. The present Government has inherited unsold stocks from its predecessor—largely because of Cuba's failure to fulfil its obligations to the Jagan Government. These fill the godowns and, unless they can be cleared, will make it impossible for the new crop to be taken in. The P.P.P. propaganda machine is saying that the Government is deliberately trying to hurt the East Indians by not helping with rice. Unless the Rice Marketing Board sells its rice, a very serious security situation could easily build up. For this reason we have done everything we could to help, but not with any spectacular success.

9. I discussed with Mr. Burnham a number of requests which he had made when he was over here. Most of these, if granted, would involve amendments to the constitution. I took as my guiding rule that we ought not to make piecemeal amendments to the constitution between constitutional conferences—especially where amendments were not agreed by the opposition in British Guiana (and Dr. Jagan opposes on principle)—unless it could be shown that they were necessary for the effective functioning of government. On this basis I have agreed to changes to provide for the appointment of an Attorney-General from outside the House of Assembly and for the removing of the age limit for Puisne Judges. Other proposals, for the appointment of a Guianese Deputy Governor, for formal recognition of the Leader of the Opposition with salary, and for changes affecting the Public Service Commission, I did not accept.

10. The most significant of Mr. Burnham's constitutional proposals relates to the exercise of emergency powers. He wants to revert to the pre-June 1964 position of the Governor exercising emergency powers on the advice of Ministers rather than as now, in his discretion. This, of course would be resented by the Indian population and I made clear to him that I could only agree if we had in return some positive move on his part towards dealing with racial imbalance, particularly in the police. I hope he will now go ahead with his idea of inviting the International Commission of Jurists to undertake such a mission. It should be remembered of course that we could always revert to the present situation if Mr. Burnham seemed to be using the emergency powers unfairly, and I believe therefore that at an appropriate time we should agree to this proposal.

11. Mr. Burnham raised with me the question of a constitutional conference. The pledge given by Her Majesty's Government at the last British Guiana constitutional conference in October, 1963, was:—

“After the elections are over, the British Government would convene a conference to settle any remaining constitutional issues, and to fix a date for independence.”

Mr. Burnham sought a conference in British Guiana in early August, or earlier if the conference was to be held in London. I gave no indication whether such a conference would be convened.

12. Mr. Burnham wants a conference to be followed fairly soon by independence and Mr. D'Aguiar who was previously opposed to independence supports him.

Dr. Jagan does not want independence under a Burnham government. Statements that independence depends on the British Government being satisfied about the prospects of stability and inter-racial harmony in British Guiana put a premium on Dr. Jagan's stirring up violence and inter-racial hatred. I think, therefore, it would be wrong to emphasise this line any more, and I myself refrained from doing so during my visit. Mr. Burnham's government hold that an early fixing of a date for independence by the British Government would of itself have a stabilising effect because it would remove at least this premium on violence.

13. There are a number of arguments against convening an early conference. In his present state of mind Dr. Jagan may well refuse to attend or, if he attends, will probably adopt an obstructive attitude towards any proposals supported by Mr. Burnham. The conference in fact will be unrepresentative if Dr. Jagan boycotts it or, if he attends, it will fail to reach agreement on major issues. We shall not be given *carte blanche* to settle issues as my predecessor was; nevertheless, we shall have to reach decisions. To adjourn the conference without doing so would lose us the co-operation of Mr. Burnham's government and put off independence indefinitely. An announcement of an early conference would also carry some risk that the P.P.P. would resort again to violence with a view to securing its postponement and that of the independence which it might lead up to. Finally, since a conference would undoubtedly subject us to strong pressure from the British Guiana Government to set a date for independence within a matter of months, an early conference would leave only a very short period in which to satisfy ourselves that British Guiana can safely be allowed to go to independence.

14. On the other hand, confronted with firm decisions by the British Government, first, to convene a conference and, then, to grant independence on a set date, there is some prospect that the Indian community might recognise the inevitable and make the best of the situation by acquiescing constitutionally in government. This in effect is what happened in Trinidad where, before the question of independence had been settled, the Opposition voiced grave fears about the predominantly African Government's attitude towards the Indian minority, but thereafter swallowed their fears, which they have found largely illusory. So long as we are there to hold the ring politicians on both sides can enjoy the advantages of appealing to racial interests.

15. Provided that Mr. Burnham is prepared to continue in the way he has begun and, in particular, is prepared to take steps in the field of racial imbalance adequate to restore a measure of Indian confidence, the British Guiana Government, with economic help from ourselves and others, should be able to establish a regime under which the East Indians would find themselves faring a good deal better than they did under the inefficient Jagan Government. I am fully convinced that a delay will do no one any good, and that, in spite of the risks and difficulties involved, we ought to proceed to a constitutional conference in the late summer with a view to fixing an early date for independence. The Governor fully shares this view.

16. I propose that we should think in terms of convening a Conference in London in September. Provided that Mr. Burnham could then point to a reasonable record of constructive government, independence might follow in early 1966. If this is agreed I would propose not to tell Mr. Burnham immediately of this decision. We should wait until the Commission on Racial Imbalance has been set up. But I think the announcement of the date of the Conference should be made as early after that as

the Governor advises is compatible with security (see paragraph 13 above). Early announcement of a Conference in September is probably the best chance of dissuading Mr. Burnham from pressing for the actual Conference to take place in August or even earlier and in British Guiana. The Conference itself should not, in my view, take place till the report of the Racial Imbalance Commission is available because the Commission's recommendations, and in particular the attitude of the British Guiana Government to them, will be relevant factors in considering the grant of independence at the Conference.

17. I have not consulted any of my colleagues about these proposals; I thought I should clear them with you first.¹

¹ Minuting Wilson on Greenwood's proposals, Sir Burke Trend observed that to the arguments against an early constitutional conference (para 13) two more should be added. First, an offer of early independence would be a reversal of the UK's previous policy that independence should not be granted until the communities had demonstrated that they could live together in reasonable peace and harmony: 'What is the justification for abandoning this basic stipulation—except the reason (which we cannot publicly avow) that we are sick of trying to hold the balance between these quarrelsome people and want to wash our hands of them as rapidly as we can?' Secondly, the prospect of early independence would be liable to 'excite alarm and suspicion in the United States'. For these reasons 'it might be wiser to play the whole thing in slightly slower time', clearance in advance being gained from both the US and Canada, the latter because of its substantial bauxite interest in British Guiana (PREM 13/137, pp 64–65, Trend to Wilson, 26 Mar 1965).

232 CAB 134/1504, CI(65)19

16 June 1965

[Immigration]: report of Lord Mountbatten's discussions with the governments of Jamaica and Trinidad during the visit of his immigration mission to the West Indies¹

Jamaica

The Mission had an opening meeting with the Acting Prime Minister of Jamaica, Mr. D. B. Sangster. At this meeting Mr. Sangster was accompanied by 25 persons including many Ministers and senior officials. The note of this opening meeting was discussed at a subsequent session which was also attended by several Ministers. The principal points made in the discussions with the representatives of the Jamaican Government were embodied in the agreed note which is reproduced below. There were more detailed discussions with officials of one or two specific problems.

2. The Leader, the Deputy Leader and the Secretary of the Mission also had a brief talk, at the suggestion of the Acting Prime Minister, with the Leader of the Opposition, Mr. Norman Manley.

3. The representatives of the Jamaican Government made it clear that they could not publicly acquiesce in any restriction on the right of their citizens to emigrate to Britain, and they asked that if restrictions were imposed preference should be given to Jamaican citizens in every respect and at every stage.

¹ Formerly supreme allied commander, South-East Asia (1943–1945), viceroy (1947) and governor-general (1947–1948) of India, Mountbatten had recently held the post of chief of the UK defence staff (1959–1965). Discussions were held with Mr Sangster, the acting prime minister of Jamaica and members of the Jamaican Cabinet and officials on 28 May 1965. They were held with Dr Williams and members of the Trinidad Cabinet and officials on 30 May 1965.

Note of meeting

1. After the Acting Prime Minister had made an opening speech of welcome, and Lord Mountbatten had replied explaining the purposes of the Mission, Mr. Sangster stated the Jamaican Government's position in relation to a number of general questions affecting emigration from Jamaica to Britain. He said that Jamaica would deplore any form of restriction which was operated on the grounds of colour. He said that Jamaica had not contributed to Britain's present difficulties in so far as these were caused by evasions of existing controls or the difficulties in social adjustment. Jamaica had more than honoured the requirements of the existing controls, and had made a substantial contribution to the integration of Jamaicans into the British community by her large and efficient Welfare Section at the High Commission in London, which co-operated fully with the British authorities. The Acting Prime Minister stated that Jamaica was not willing to administer any emigration controls on behalf of Britain, and he said that if further restrictions were imposed Jamaica claimed preferential treatment at all stages, in view of her particular needs and the definite contribution which she had made in the past to the British economy. Jamaica would also claim special treatment on the grounds of a common language, common social customs and common standards of behaviour and living. Finally Mr. Sangster said that in any arrangements that were made Jamaica considered that Commonwealth citizens should not in any way be treated worse than aliens.

2. Lord Mountbatten agreed generally with the views expressed by Mr. Sangster, particularly on the question of evasion, and undertook that the claim of the Jamaican Government for special consideration would be fully reported to the British Government. In subsequent discussion the following points were made:

3. In response to a question about the nature of the problem as seen by the British Government, the British representatives said that this was local in character and caused particularly by the fact that immigrants who because they were coloured were easily identifiable had tended to congregate in particular parts of Britain, and this had already given rise to some social problems because of the difficulty of integrating communities which tended to become self-contained. The British representatives described the work being done by local authority and voluntary organisations, and the steps now being taken by the Government to co-ordinate these activities at Ministerial level, and to see to what extent they needed to be intensified.

4. The Jamaican representatives enquired whether any attempt had been made by persuasion and education to disperse the immigrant communities which had grown up more widely over the country as a whole. The British representatives described the powerful attractions, economic as well as social, which drew immigrants to particular areas of the country.

5. The Jamaican representatives asked whether the British Government was looking at the matter from the social or the economic point of view, having regard to the fact that the number of unemployed appeared to be less than the number of vacancies. The British representatives replied that both factors had to be taken into account and that it must be admitted that at some points the two were in conflict. One of the principal tasks which the British Government was undertaking, and which it was one of the purposes of the Mission to contribute to, was the striking of a balance which was fair and reasonable between the economic requirements of

increased manpower and the social need to integrate immigrant workers and their families into the indigenous community. It was also suggested that the problem was in part one of educating the local British population.

6. There was then a discussion about the voucher system now in operation and possible ways in which it might be changed in the future. The Jamaican representatives said that they would like Britain to grant fewer vouchers to those in Category B (those having specified skills), and more in Category A (those having specific jobs to come to) and also in Category C (those coming to Britain to seek for work). The British representatives explained that the issue of Category C vouchers had been suspended throughout the Commonwealth for several months, and that it was unlikely that any would be issued in the foreseeable future. They noted the wish of the Jamaican authorities that the number of those in Category B should be reduced, but they stated that in 1964, 1,504 Category A vouchers had been issued to Jamaicans, and 81 Category B vouchers, and that for the first three months of 1965 the figures were 468 Category A vouchers and 7 Category B vouchers. The Jamaican representatives said that these figures did not correspond to their own figures of emigration from Jamaica, with respect, for example to nurses.

7. The Jamaican representatives enquired whether there would be quantitative restriction on the total number of immigrants, and if so on what principles permission to come to Britain to work would be granted. The British representatives explained that it was likely that whatever qualifications and regulations were prescribed, the British Government would find it necessary to impose a numerical limit on immigration. The principles on which employment vouchers would be issued under those circumstances had not yet been worked out, and indeed the British Government wished to make these decisions in the light of the Report of the Immigration Mission and of such discussions as were held in London during the time of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Meeting.

8. Reference was made to particular cases where a total of 800 applications for Category A vouchers on a properly organised basis had been put in hand, but where only five vouchers had been issued. The British representatives asked for particulars and undertook to have the matter investigated.

9. The Jamaican Government representatives asked whether special arrangements could be made for seasonal workers or those coming to Britain to work for a limited period. The British representatives said that this would certainly be considered sympathetically by the British Government.

10. It was suggested that one method of preventing the loss of trained persons in the field of nursing might be for Britain to accept student nurses rather than qualified nurses. The British representatives pointed out, however, that there was no restriction on the entry of students of all kinds, including student or trainee nurses. They took note of a suggestion that there might be some interchange through the financing in Jamaica of establishments for nursing training.

11. As regards visitors, the British representatives made it clear in reply to questions that entry certificates were a facility available to those who wished to use them, but were not at present a requirement: nor was there any likelihood that the British Government would at any future date make them a requirement. The Jamaican representatives said, however, that the present position tended to be confusing and that it might be better to say openly that any intending visitor to Britain would be well advised to obtain an entry certificate. The mere existence of

entry certificates was bound in a period of more stringent control to lead to very close questioning of those who arrived in Britain without them.

12. Anxiety was also expressed lest a Commonwealth citizen, particularly if he were coloured, who was a genuine visitor to relatives or friends established as immigrants in Britain would tend to be discriminated against at the port of entry on the assumption that because the persons he was visiting were coloured he was not a *bona fide* visitor. The British representatives gave a firm assurance that there was not now any bias against immigrants, students or visitors who happened to be coloured, and that there was no intention of allowing any such prejudice to arise in the future. They did, however, take note of the anxieties which had been expressed.

13. The Jamaican representatives enquired what degree of control was exercised across the land frontier between Eire and Northern Ireland. The British representatives said that it had been explained in Parliament, when the Commonwealth Immigration Bill was before it, that to establish control along this frontier would present great difficulties and cause great hardship, and that so long as there was no evidence of any substantial abuse it was not proposed to set up such controls.

14. There was some discussion of medical examination of intending immigrants. The United Kingdom Government representatives proposed that there should be health checks on immigrants entering the United Kingdom in addition to those provided for in the International Sanitary Regulations. It was stated that there was no intention to use these requirements as a means of controlling the volume of immigration: and it was not proposed to exclude dependants on health grounds but only to ensure their good health on arrival in the United Kingdom. It was also made clear that the responsibility for the administration and control of the health checks would be that of the United Kingdom Government. The Jamaican representatives asked that they should be informed of the nature of the health checks proposed.

15. Reference was made to a particular case of a fiancée who wished to join the man whom she intended to marry but had been refused entry. The British authorities offered to go into the matter with the Jamaican authorities and to furnish them with the particulars.

16. There was also a reference to parts of the insurance and other fields in which it had been reported that discrimination was exercised in Britain against Jamaicans among others. The British representatives undertook to bring these reports to the notice of the appropriate authorities.

17. In the course of the meeting a note was circulated of recommendations made by the Jamaica Council of Churches, and the British representatives undertook that this would be taken into consideration.

18. It was noted that the discussions which had taken place in no way committed either the Jamaica or the British Governments.

Trinidad

The Mission attended a working dinner given by the Governor-General on their arrival in Trinidad. This dinner was attended by the Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago, Dr. Eric Williams.

2. The opening discussions were followed by talks with the Prime Minister, the Minister of External Affairs, the Minister of Industry and Commerce, the Minister of Education and Culture and senior officials.

3. The record of these discussions was agreed at a subsequent meeting presided over by the Minister of Home Affairs. The note of it is reproduced below. The representatives of the Government of Trinidad and Tobago confined themselves in the main to noting what was said by the Mission and seeking clarification of particular points. They were concerned with the problem of immigration into Trinidad from the neighbouring islands, some of which are still British colonial territories, and they indicated that if any additional controls were imposed on immigration into Britain they would seek to make this the opportunity for pressing the British Government to place restrictions on immigration from their dependent territories to Trinidad.

4. The representatives of the Government of Trinidad and Tobago also showed some concern that any arrangements made to establish the *bona fides* of students and to ensure that they were continuing their course should not reflect in any way upon the responsibility of the Government of Trinidad and Tobago for sponsoring and supporting students.

Note of meeting

1. Lord Mountbatten had explained the purposes of his mission at a working dinner the previous evening given by His Excellency the Governor-General and attended by the Prime Minister.

2. The Prime Minister said that there was great pressure from the neighbouring islands, some of which were still British colonial territories, to emigrate to Trinidad. Between 1955 and 1963 the official figures showed that a total of 4,300 people had emigrated to Trinidad from the smaller islands. The true figure could not even be estimated, but it was certainly very large. To the extent that the United Kingdom exercised more stringent control over immigration there would be greater pressure to emigrate to Trinidad. The Government of Trinidad and Tobago asked that this should be taken into account by the British Government in any policy decisions they might make. The British representatives undertook to report these views to their Government.

3. The representatives of the British Government asked what the view of the Government of Trinidad and Tobago would be on a proposal that health checks for immigrant workers, dependants and students should be carried out in the country of origin of the immigrant. They said that the purpose of medically examining dependants was not to exclude them if they were in ill-health, but to make sure that undetected disease was not brought into the country. Similarly, in the case of students the purpose of the medical check would be to ascertain that the prospective student's health would enable him to follow his chosen course of study. The British representatives said, in reply to a question, that they did not wish to duplicate medical examinations where these were already adequate, and if a university or other academic institution required a medical examination before accepting a student, that certificate would certainly be sufficient for the purposes of control of entry into the country. It was agreed that this question should be discussed in more detail between medical representatives.

4. The Prime Minister enquired whether arrangements for medical checks would be operated on a reciprocal basis, that is whether the British Government would co-operate with the Government of Trinidad and Tobago if they for their part were to require medical checks for persons emigrating to Trinidad, both from the United

Kingdom and from British dependent territories. The British representatives said that the decision as to what medical requirements should be imposed was entirely one for the Government of Trinidad and Tobago, and that any proposals put forward would certainly be considered in a co-operative spirit.

5. The Prime Minister noted with surprise that arrangements had recently been introduced in Britain under which all students were admitted to Britain for a period of 12 months in the first instance, and had to apply for an extension to enable them to continue their studies. The British representatives said that so long as a person remained a *bona fide* student he would have no difficulty in getting an extension. The Prime Minister recognised that some control of this kind was probably necessary in the case of students who had made private arrangements, but in the case of students selected by a Commonwealth Government, supported by them during their studies and supervised by them, he thought that admission to Britain should be for the whole period of the course without any necessity for annual renewal. The British representatives saw no difficulties of principle in the way of making arrangements of this kind (subject to a condition that the student continued with his studies) on a Government-to-Government basis for all Commonwealth countries who wished for it.

6. The British representatives said in reply to a question that there was no objection to *bona fide* students taking employment to enable them to support themselves in their studies. The representatives of the Government of Trinidad and Tobago asked what the position was for a student who ran out of funds, and whether he would be able to take full-time employment until he was in a financial position to resume his studies. The British representatives said that each such case would be considered on its merits, and that the determining factor was whether the person was in intention a *bona fide* student.

7. The British representatives described the existing powers for repatriation of Commonwealth citizens, namely that repatriation, which was on the order of the Home Secretary, could only be carried out provided the person had been living in Britain for less than five years, had been convicted of a criminal offence punishable by a sentence of imprisonment, and had been recommended for deportation by the court. They asked what view the Government of Trinidad and Tobago would take if the British Government sought power to enable the Secretary of State to make a repatriation order in particular cases of breach of conditions of entry or evasion of controls. The representatives of the Government of Trinidad and Tobago thought that there were circumstances in which such a power was probably necessary, but they enquired whether this also would be on a reciprocal basis between Commonwealth countries. The British representatives said that there could be no objection of principle to reciprocity in this field.

8. There was some discussion of the control of persons from Commonwealth countries entering Britain to work, and the comparative treatment extended to aliens. The British representatives said that the majority of aliens who came to Britain to work did not intend to settle permanently in the country, and the statistics therefore showed a frequent turnover. They confirmed that control over alien workers was more stringent than that applied to Commonwealth workers. Aliens were always admitted for a limited period only, were required to register with the police, and could not change the employment for which they were first admitted without the permission of the Ministry of Labour.

9. The representatives of the Government of Trinidad and Tobago asked whether the problems caused by the congregation of large numbers of immigrants in particular areas could not be avoided by admitting immigrants to the country (perhaps on an experimental basis) for work in areas where there were no large immigrant communities already existing. The British representatives said that they thought that the economic and social attractions towards the existing immigrant communities were very strong, but that they would report this proposal to Her Majesty's Government.

10. The representatives of the Government of Trinidad and Tobago, noting that aliens were admitted to Britain to work for a limited period, asked whether some of the vacancies so filled could not be reserved for persons from Commonwealth countries who would then be admitted for a limited period without prejudice to the numbers admitted under Categories A and B. In view of the distance of most Commonwealth countries from Britain it was suggested that the period would need to be of the order of two to three years. It was also proposed that at the end of the specified period, favourable consideration should be given to a request from the individual worker to be allowed to stay permanently. The British representatives said that if such a proposal were accepted it would probably be necessary to require some form of registration, and that a person permitted to stay, notwithstanding that he had been admitted for a limited period, would probably have to be counted against the allocation of vouchers to those coming avowedly to settle in the country. The representatives of the Government of Trinidad and Tobago suggested that it might be possible to exercise control over this class of worker by registration through the offices of the High Commission in London. By this means it would be possible to deal throughout with any such schemes on a Government-to-Government basis.

11. The British representatives said that they would report these proposals to Her Majesty's Government and arrange for them to be considered.

12. The British representatives asked the views of the Government of Trinidad and Tobago as to the types of workers who should be given priority if there had to be a reduction in the number of vouchers issued. The representatives of the Government of Trinidad and Tobago asked whether it was possible to give any indication of the principal kind of employment for which there would be vacancies in future years. The British representatives said that it was not possible to make any accurate forecast but that they would expect there to be a continuing demand for skilled building and engineering craftsmen, and in general in the semi-skilled and unskilled fields in which there were at present shortages. The Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago said that it would be helpful if Governments could be given some indication of the kinds of employment for which their citizens could be given preliminary training.

13. Finally, following an enquiry by the Prime Minister, it was noted that the question of economic assistance to Commonwealth countries, particularly in the Caribbean area as a means of reducing the urge to emigrate, was outside the terms of reference of the Immigration Mission, but Lord Mountbatten undertook to report to the British Government that the matter would be the subject of separate representations by the Government of Trinidad and Tobago.

233 OD 28/80**25–28 June 1965****[British Development Division in the Caribbean]: minutes by D A S Sharp¹ and H C G Hawkins²**

[A British Development Division in the Caribbean was established in Jan 1966 at Barbados. The head of the Division was W L Bell, Colonial Administrative Service, Uganda, 1946–1953. At the time of his secondment to the ODM and his appointment to the Caribbean, he was secretary to the governors, Westfield College, University of London. He served until 1972 and for the last two years he was also UK director, Caribbean Development Bank. The Development Division covered UK dependent territories in the Caribbean, independent Commonwealth countries (Jamaica and Trinidad) and foreign countries in Latin America bordering the Caribbean excluding Cuba. Although it subsequently withdrew its objection, the CRO at first argued for the exclusion of independent Commonwealth countries, especially Trinidad, on the grounds that Eric Williams would identify the Division as an extension of colonial influence.]

The Colonial Office has recommended that the Division should be staffed by people who are able to give specialist advice on the spot to the governments of the dependent territories, of the sort they need for the day-to-day running of their affairs. At the same time these people would know what additional expert advice to ask for from London on particular problems. The Colonial Office therefore suggested the Division should be staffed on the following lines:—

- 1 Head of Division
- 1 Economist
- 2 Financial Advisers
- 1 General Agriculturist
- 1 Public Works Adviser
- 1 General Education Adviser
- 1 Legal Draftsman
- 1 Civil Aviation Adviser

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The Colonial Office thinks that we should concentrate on getting the Head of the Division, the Economist and the two Financial Advisers very soon, with the Agriculturist, Education Adviser and Legal Draftsman to follow as quickly as possible.

2. These comments by the Colonial Office have been copied to the C.R.O. and Foreign Office and we have not yet heard from them. It seems possible that they may think the C.O. is giving the wrong slant to the organisation. They may argue that the need is for specialists able by personal contact and professional ability to win the confidence of those responsible for economic development in independent countries, and therefore the requirement is for men of high technical qualifications, long experience and suitable personality to play a discreet advisory role. (Indeed the C.R.O. may say that staff of the type envisaged by the Colonial Office will lend support to the view that the Development Division represents an extension of colonialism in a very thin disguise.)

3. The Advisers on Agriculture, Technical Education, Engineering, Social Development and Housing have not replied to our request for comments as to

¹ Caribbean and Latin American Dept, ODM.

² Economist, Geographical Division, ODM.

composition of the Division. However, it may be useful to consider at this stage the recommendations made by the Colonial Office.

4. The decision to establish the Division was taken, I think, with three main purposes in view:—

- (a) to make the most effective use of the T.A. and C.D.&W. funds which are allocated to the Region.
- (b) to provide our dependent territories with high-grade assistance in managing their day to day affairs.
- (c) discreet promotion of the British interest in the region.

These might, I suppose, be broadly categorised as the O.D.M. view, the C.O. view and the F.O. view respectively. In principle these purposes are not mutually exclusive, but in practice if the Division is to consist of only about six advisers it is necessary for us to be clear as to the relative order of importance we are going to place these purposes in.

5. To my mind, if the Division is to be established immediately, the C.O. view must carry the most weight. The needs of the dependent territories are the most immediately pressing problem, and indeed we have publicly stated that “one of its first tasks” will be in relation to the dependent territories—which to the ordinary person means the dependencies have first priority at the moment.

6. However, if a federation or a Common Services Organisation is likely to be formed within a year or so of our setting up the Division, I doubt whether we should accept the Colonial Office view so easily. A regional organisation would really be better suited to carry out some of the purposes suggested for the Development Division by the C.O. This would leave more room to meet what I would call the “O.D.M. purposes” of the Division (i.e. following the lines of the M.E.D.D.). I think perhaps we should clarify our views on this before we meet Sir Stephen Luke and C.O. representatives to discuss the future of the Development Division.

D.A.S.
25.6.65

I agree entirely with Mr. Sharp's analysis and suggestions in his minute of 25th June.

2. The O.D.M. has three main purposes in establishing a Development Division:—

- (a) To establish close contact with the recipient territories and enable us to assess what their aid requirements are.
- (b) To supervise the execution of the aid programme and follow up the schemes much more closely.
- (c) The staff of the Division to make available their own technical expertise for the use of the local governments.

3. The C.O. has a rather different set of priorities, their main purpose being to supply various technical experts to form the nucleus of a common services organisation. The efficient use of aid is only a secondary purpose. They would therefore put (c) above as their first priority.

4. These two approaches are clearly not mutually exclusive or even contradictory. The problem is mainly one of priorities. However, when we turn to what Mr. Sharp labels as the F.O. view, there does seem to be an element of

contradiction, particularly with the C.O. requirements. This emerges in Mr. Sharp's paragraph 2. In the dependent countries the members of the Development Division will have something of an executive role. In the independent countries it will be purely advisory. It might be difficult for the staff to maintain this distinction, and as Mr. Sharp suggests the independent countries may feel that a Development Division set up on C.O. lines is an extension of colonialism.

5. If federation of the Little 5, 6, 7 or 8 does not come about it seems essential that a fully-fledged common services organisation be set up. If this happens, the Development Division could revert to its ODM functions and could be less narrowly tied to the needs of the Little Eight. The question of its location would also have to be considered carefully. It would no longer seem so obvious that it should be based in Barbados. In fact there would be strong arguments for it not being based there.

H.C.G.H.

28.6.65

234 FO 371/179142, no 5

28 Sept 1965

[Leeward and Windward Islands]: letter from Sir H Poynton to Sir P Gore Booth¹ on future constitutional arrangements. *Enclosure*: 'The constitutional future of the Leeward and Windward Islands'

[This document marks the point at which the CO finally abandoned its attempts to put in place a federation in the East Caribbean. It should be read in the context of official thinking about the future of smaller colonial territories more generally. In May 1965, Greenwood addressed a minute to the prime minister which was then circulated to the Defence and Overseas Policy Committee. In it he explained that 'at this stage in our Colonial history our main task must be to liquidate Colonialism', either by granting independence or by evolving other forms of government which would secure democratic rights for the people but which would also involve some degree of association with the UK 'without any stigma of Colonialism'. The policy of the CO was therefore (i) to give independence to territories which wanted it and were capable of sustaining it, (ii) to avoid a policy of drift 'which would result in our having to produce *ad hoc* solutions in the most unfavourable circumstances', and (iii) to arrive at solutions acceptable to international opinion (CAB 148/21, OPD(65)89, 31 May 1965, 'Future of the remaining British colonial territories', note by Sir Burke Trend circulating a minute by Greenwood, 26 May). The issue was discussed at the conference of Commonwealth Prime Ministers in June 1965. In the context of the Caribbean it was suggested that the UK should summon an international conference to discuss the future of all smaller dependent territories in the region. Eric Williams of Trinidad argued that political federation in the East Caribbean would not succeed and that the emphasis instead should be on economic aid. He contrasted the British approach with that of the French in Guadeloupe and the Dutch in Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles and suggested that without an international aid effort the basic problem of instability in the region would not be solved. Williams was supported by Donald Sangster, the deputy prime minister and finance minister of Jamaica, who also called for the reformation of the West Indies Regional Economic Committee. Lester Pearson, the Canadian prime minister, had no objection to a conference provided the US agreed. The UK likewise thought a conference worthy of consideration but Greenwood reminded participants that an East Caribbean Federation was still under consideration and that the initiative had come from the islands concerned. This should be given a further chance before a more ambitious scheme was tried. The UK did not intend to hold up economic support until political progress had been made and Greenwood referred to the proposed Development Division (see 233) for the Caribbean (CO 1031/4409, no 495, PMM 9(65)2, 22 June 1965, minutes of meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers on future of dependent territories; also CAB 133/305, PMM (UK) (65) C13 &14, 17 June 1965). In July 1965 a conference of ministers, officials, governors, administrators, academics and other interested parties was held at Oxford under the chairmanship

¹ Permanent under-secretary of state, FO, 1965–1969.

of Greenwood to consider future relations with the smaller territories more generally. The territories concerned were divided into four groups. British Guiana and British Honduras were placed in the first group which consisted of territories said to have a reasonable prospect of individual independence over the next few years. The second group consisted entirely of Caribbean dependencies—the Little Eight (the Little Seven if Barbados joined group one), the British Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands and the Turks and Caicos Islands. Independence for these territories was said to depend on a regional solution. The third group consisted of territories not in receipt of budgetary aid where early independence was thought unlikely. It included the Bahamas and Bermuda. No Caribbean dependencies were placed in the fourth group, consisting of territories receiving budgetary aid and for whom there was no early prospect of independence. For each of the groups a number of solutions were considered, including the idea of association with other countries, either Commonwealth or foreign. The Western Samoa model was explained but rejected because although New Zealand was responsible for Western Samoa's external relations (in the sense that New Zealand acted as the agent of Western Samoa in external affairs when requested by the Western Samoan government), Western Samoa was in fact a fully independent country. More promising as a model were the Cook Islands which had recently opted for full internal self-government in continuing association with New Zealand. UN approval of such an arrangement was still under consideration. For the UK territories free association was neither a colonial relationship nor, by definition, independence. The important principle was that the people should decide for themselves in a manner which would be acceptable to international opinion. Hence provision had to be included for a transition to complete independence if, after a period under free association, the people of the territory wanted it (CAB 21/5296/5, annex, conference at Lady Margaret Hall on colonial policy, 8–11 July 1965). This, in effect, was the proposal which the CO circulated to other departments in a draft white paper in Aug 1965. It met with a sceptical response. The FO doubted that any statement of UK policy would be acceptable to the UK's most trenchant critics at the UN. Moreover, free association as loosely defined in the white paper was, according to the FO, open to objection on several counts. It would encourage countries with territorial claims on UK territories, including those of Guatemala on British Honduras and Venezuela on British Guiana, while territories the CO proposed to exclude altogether from the white paper proposals—which included the Falkland Islands, Gibraltar and Hong Kong—would be seen as a direct challenge by Argentina, Spain and China respectively. It was equally not clear precisely how it would be decided whether any particular territory was capable of sustaining separate independence. In a dispute over this with a UK dependency, the UN would inevitably support the dependency. The FO also warned that the US was still concerned about a rash of tiny independent islands in the Caribbean falling under Cuban influence. Above all, the prospect of dependencies being ultimately able to demand independence posed a potential threat, not only to the strategic interests of the UK but also to those of the UK's allies. Islands in the Atlantic and the Indian and Pacific Oceans were cases in point. From the viewpoint therefore of UK foreign policy interests, the FO advised that the white paper should avoid any references to independence or free association and concentrate instead on the UK's specific achievements and current plans (CAB 21/5296/5, Sir J Nicholls, permanent under-secretary of state, FO, to Eastwood, 25 Aug 1965). The Ministry of Defence shared the concern that the proposed exclusions from the white paper would add to the UK's overseas difficulties (*ibid*, Sir R Melville, 2nd permanent under-secretary of state, MOD, to Eastwood, 25 Aug 1965). The CRO expressed reservations over the implications of the UK having to sponsor many more small states as members of the Commonwealth and argued that it would be unwise to offer free association to every territory. The CRO also believed that whatever policy was adopted for the smaller territories, the UK would not succeed in clearing its international image until the Rhodesian problem had been solved (*ibid*, letter from Sir N Pritchard, deputy under-secretary of state, CRO, to Eastwood, 27 Aug 1965). The Treasury and the Ministry of Overseas Development were concerned over the economic implications, not only in terms of aid but also because the draft white paper had suggested that the CO should be replaced by a new Department of Territories Overseas which would have a joint establishment with the ODM (*ibid*, Sir P Allen, 2nd secretary, Treasury, to D J Mitchell, under-secretary Treasury and principal private secretary to prime minister, 31 Aug 1965, and Sir A Dudley, deputy secretary, ODM, to Eastwood, 25 Aug 1965). The CO withdrew its proposed white paper but still planned to cater for all remaining dependencies by way of an omnibus piece of legislation entitled 'Overseas Territories Bill'. This too encountered both parliamentary and departmental difficulties and the proposed bill was dropped in Aug 1966 when the CO finally merged with the CRO to form the Commonwealth Office. Territories continued therefore to be dealt with on a piecemeal basis

on the merits of each individual case and not, as the CO had hoped, according to generally accepted principles (D J Morgan, *The official history of colonial development*, vol 5, *Guidance towards self-government in British colonies 1941–1971* (London, 1980) pp 218–250, provides the background.)

On the instructions of the Colonial Secretary, I am writing to you and the other recipients of this letter to seek urgent clearance for some despatches to the Leeward and Windward Islands about their constitutional future. The drafts are, he hopes, sufficiently in line with the ideas, recently discussed at O.P.D., about how to deal with territories to whom it would be hard to grant full independence, for it not to be necessary to make a formal reference to O.P.D. on them. If, however, you and the other recipients of this letter think otherwise, I should be grateful if you could let me know quickly so that the necessary machinery can be put into motion.

2. Enclosed with this letter you will find a Memorandum explaining what the Secretary of State has in mind together with two appendices. Appendix I with its two annexes makes certain constitutional proposals to the six Leeward and Windward territories of Antigua, St. Kitts, Dominica, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and Grenada; Appendix II makes a different proposal to Montserrat.²

3. We have been trying for the past three years to combine these territories with Barbados in a federation. For the moment at any rate, these efforts have broken down.³ Most of them are now clamouring for a constitutional advance which would give them full internal self-government on much the same pattern as Barbados or British Guiana. This we should be prepared to contemplate if it were reasonable to assume that thereafter they would proceed to separate independence. The difficulty is that independence is not something which any of them appear to want at present. Nor is it something which, with their small populations and limited resources, any of them would be likely to sustain for long with any kind of political or economic stability. So far as purely British interests are concerned, this might not greatly matter. We have no great commercial or defence interests in these islands any longer; and the ties that we have with them are largely cultural, moral and sentimental. Our principal ally, the United States, is, however, very sensitive about

² Appendices not printed.

³ Sir S Luke toured the East Caribbean in Apr–May 1965 and reported back that the prospects of achieving federation were now very remote. The public was ‘ignorant and apathetic’ and there was a growing recognition of the region’s lack of capable politicians and civil servants. Everywhere there was an ‘extreme insularity of outlook’ and it was therefore essential, in the absence of federation, to put in place a Common Services Organisation (CO 1031/4554, no 4, Luke to Greenwood, 28 May 1965). Luke also reported Mr Bird as being of the opinion that there was now no hope of securing a loose federation in which Antigua would be willing to participate. Bird had therefore decided to withdraw from the negotiations and he was thinking of a ‘Western Samoa type of association with another Commonwealth country’. This might be the UK or another country closer to Antigua. Although Bird did not mention it by name, Luke assumed the other country to be Jamaica (*ibid*, no 2, record by Luke of his talk with Bird, 6 May 1965). Within the CO Elaine White, the parliamentary under-secretary of state, minuted: ‘Continuing “Association” is essential for all save Barbados. Association with another Caribbean country might make good sense, but I cannot believe that we can wait upon such a development’. The problems surrounding the establishment of a Common Services Organisation were, according to White, almost as intractable as those of federation: ‘Once Barbados is out of the way, can we not take a firm line and say “Such and such—or else aid will dry up”? If we do not take a strong initiative now, any hope of fairly good government may pass over for ever’ (*ibid*, no 10, minute by White to Greenwood, 16 June 1965).

anything that happens in these territories and would not welcome a situation developing in which Britain withdrew and left seven potential little Haitis or Cubas on their door-step.

4. The scheme the Colonial Secretary is proposing for these territories is designed to meet this awkward dilemma. It offers them full internal self-government with Britain handling their defence and external affairs, but also gives Britain certain constitutional rights of intervention in their internal affairs to an extent necessary for Britain properly to discharge its defence and external affairs responsibilities. The arrangements likewise offer them an opportunity to proceed to separate independence whenever they wish; but also contain built-in safeguards designed to ensure that they will only take this course after due deliberation and provided an overwhelming majority of both their legislatures and peoples desire it—in other words in circumstances in which it would be extremely difficult for us to refuse it to them anyway, and frankly in circumstances which, on present form at any rate, are not very likely to arise. They would also be given the right to amend their own Constitutions; but the Constitutions would contain provisions (which would not be easily amendable) designed to ensure that these territories remained reasonably respectable members of the international community and not the sort of States whose defence and international relations Britain would find it embarrassing to be responsible for.

5. It is not easy, as the earlier discussions on “free association” showed, to reconcile all these conflicting objectives; but the Colonial Secretary feels that, in the circumstances of the Caribbean, the attached proposals offer the best prospect of doing so—although of course success cannot be guaranteed. He thinks they will satisfy the demands from the territories for a bigger voice in their affairs, safeguard the essential interests of Britain and its allies, leave the door open for some form of closer association between these territories and even with their neighbours in the Caribbean at a later date, and also stand a fair chance of being acceptable to international opinion as an end of Colonial status.

6. There is, however, one special point of difficulty to which I should like to draw attention. It is dealt with in paragraphs 14–16 of the Memorandum and in paragraph 8 of the despatch at Appendix I. It concerns the constitutional power of the British Government over finance in these territories if these arrangements are introduced and of our accountability to Parliament for it. It is not an easy one to resolve. I am inclined to think that, if we adopt the solution under which the British Government retains the constitutional right to intervene in the internal affairs of these territories for financial matters, it will be virtually impossible to present these proposals either to the territories or to international opinion as “post-colonial”. On the other hand, the Governments have shown a fair capacity in recent years for financial mismanagement which it has been difficult to control; and to adopt the alternative solution of having no constitutional powers of financial intervention does leave the British taxpayer with that much less protection.

Enclosure to 234

1. For the past three years the British Government has been in favour of bringing about a federation of Barbados and the Leeward and Windward Islands.

Efforts to this end have proved unsuccessful. The Colonial Secretary, in the face of mounting pressure from the Leeward and Windward Islands individually for full internal self-government, is anxious to put proposals to them in the terms of the attached despatches before the end of October. Barbados will have to be dealt with separately later.

2. The following summarises the present position regarding the requests from each territory for constitutional change.

(a) *Grenada* withdrew from the federal discussions in September 1962, and has since been trying without success to enter a unitary state with Trinidad. It has recently called upon the British Government to take early steps to grant "full internal autonomy" to Grenada.

(b) The *Barbados* Government following the withdrawal of Antigua from the federal discussions last April, has presented a White Paper to its Legislature urging that Barbados should move to separate independence first, and only resume federal discussions after this has been granted. The two Opposition parties in Barbados (who at the last election commanded a majority of the popular vote) have come out against separate independence for the territory and the Barbados Cabinet itself is alleged to be split on the issue. It is not yet clear what is going to happen, and the British Government line on Barbadian independence cannot be decided until a request for it is made by the Barbadian Government. (The question of separate independence for Barbados, however, is only indirectly relevant to the issues discussed in this paper, in that the action of the Barbados Government has made it more difficult to seek a federal solution for the constitutional future of the Leeward and Windward Islands.)

(c) The *Antigua* Government, since last April, has decided to take no further part in any federal discussions and has submitted an urgent request to the Colonial Secretary for full internal self-government by the end of this year. Antiguan Ministers are aware of the solution which New Zealand has adopted in the case of the Cook Islands; and the Chief Minister is making public speeches demanding a similar solution for Antigua. General elections are due in the territory in November; and the Colonial Secretary in discussions with the Chief Minister in August, undertook to give the Antigua Government a reply to their request for constitutional changes before their elections took place in November. This is important because it sets a deadline on the date by which decisions have to be reached and notified to Antigua. Further, we have to recognise that whatever solution is proposed for Antigua will have to be made available to any of the Leeward and Windward Islands (with the exception of Montserrat) who may want it. It therefore sets a deadline to the date by which we have to let the others have a reply to their demands for constitutional changes.

(d) The *St. Kitts* Government has sent a demand to the Secretary of State arguing that, since the federal proposals are now dead, he should make an early grant of full internal self-government to St. Kitts, and urging him to call a conference of all the Leeward and Windward territories for this purpose.

(e) The *Dominica* Government has supported the St. Kitts proposal and demanded similar treatment.

(f) The *St. Lucia* Government has debated the issue in its Legislative Council and

sent a despatch to the Secretary of State demanding the grant of full internal self-government by the 1st January, 1966.

(g) The Chief Minister of *Montserrat* has said that his Government is reluctant to consider constitutional change at the moment. He thinks it should concentrate on economic development.

(h) Only the Government of *St. Vincent* has remained silent.

3. Under the present constitutions of these territories the Administrator is required to act on the advice of his Ministers except when he considers it necessary to act contrary to their advice in the interests of either the defence of the territory or the regulation of international relations or the maintenance of law and order or maintaining the efficiency of the judiciary or the public service. (The constitution of Grenada, following its suspension as a result of the financial scandals of 1962,⁴ for the time being gives the Administrator wider powers, but this is an exception). The constitutions of these territories therefore stop short of full internal self-government in that they give the Administrator certain powers in relation to defence and external affairs and in relation to the maintenance of law and order, the public service and the judiciary, and Britain has the power to disallow any law. They do not give the Administrator any over-riding power in the field of finance; and, in the event of financial scandals, the only remedies open to H.M.G. are either to stop the aid or to suspend the constitution.

4. The constitutional proposals now being put forward by most of the territories are that they should become internally self-governing colonies of Britain. This means in practice that Britain would devolve to the dependencies full powers to manage their internal affairs whilst Britain, as the metropolitan power, would necessarily continue to look after defence and external affairs; power to alter or suspend the constitution would be reserved to the British authorities and Britain would thus have ultimate constitutional powers of control over the conduct of both the external and internal government of the territory and would, both in the eyes of the territory and of the outside world, be regarded as being responsible for the government of the territory. Experience in British Guiana and elsewhere has shown that unless the Colonial Government is very well-behaved, internal self-government on this basis only works satisfactorily as a short interim stage on the road to full independence. Where a Government of an internally self-governing territory starts to behave badly and independence is indefinitely delayed, this situation is the worst possible for Britain; at this stage the British Government has the ultimate responsibility for the government of the territory but no longer has an effective administrative machine in the territory under its control by which its policies can be implemented. The Colonial Secretary's view is that a constitutional relationship should be devised which will be satisfactory to Britain and the people of the territory in the long term, and he therefore considers that full internal self-government should not be granted to any of the Leewards and Windwards. Instead, he is anxious to put to the Governments of

⁴ See 195.

this area, in the course of the next month, proposals described in the attached despatches with their annexes.

5. The proposals in Appendix I would be addressed to Antigua, St. Kitts, Dominica, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and Grenada but NOT to Montserrat (to whom a separate despatch would be sent as in Appendix II). Their main feature is that provided certain conditions were met the British Government would be responsible for defence and external affairs but that, subject to the special arrangements described below, Britain would have no powers or responsibilities in other matters of government; the power to alter the constitution would cease to be in British hands and would pass to the territorial Legislature and electorate; accordingly the territory could, so long as the procedures prescribed by the constitution were observed, amend the constitution to make the territory independent. To enable Britain to carry out its responsibilities for defence and external affairs, however, the British Government would require to have the power:—

- (i) to legislate in the interests of its defence and external affairs responsibilities. These powers would extend to any action in the field of internal government which Britain considered it necessary to take to prevent circumstances arising or continuing in the territory which might prejudice the discharge of Britain's responsibilities;
- (ii) to refer the executive action of any Unit Government to the courts to decide whether it was constitutional;
- (iii) to make orders having the force of law, which would ensure that the authority of the courts would be upheld in cases where the decision of the courts was not being carried out.

Further, the features of the constitution designed to ensure that normal democratic practices were followed would be deeply entrenched and not easily amendable or circumvented. Finally the procedure whereby these territories could proceed unilaterally to independence would also be so deeply entrenched that they could only proceed to independence if an overwhelming majority of the voters were in favour of it and if there had been a fairly long period of public discussion and deliberation.

6. The arguments in favour of proceeding in this way in the Eastern Caribbean seem to the Colonial Secretary to be very strong. The first is that the West Indian Governments are dissatisfied with the present constitutional arrangements because they feel they are not masters in some parts of their own house, viz. over matters concerning the police and the civil service. The new proposals would give them full control of these matters so long as they exercised it in accordance with the constitution and with the rule of law. We should try so to frame the constitutions as to ensure that normal democratic practices were followed in dealing with these important subjects.

7. Secondly, the proposals would constitutionally give the British Government the right to ultimate control over such aspects of the internal affairs of these territories as were necessary to discharge its responsibilities in the field of external affairs and defence. For example, they would give the British Government power to intervene in the event of a breakdown in law and order or of a situation developing which was likely to produce such a breakdown.

8. Thirdly, they would give the courts jurisdiction to decide certain important

constitutional questions, and they would give the British Government the right of intervention in support of the courts and in upholding the constitution. Presentationally, this seems to the Colonial Secretary very much better than if the British Government had nothing to rely on except physical force to make its interventions effective.

9. Fourthly, the alternative to the arrangements proposed in the attached despatches would appear to be either to refuse any constitutional change at all to these territories, which would lead to considerable dissatisfaction and possibly serious unrest; or to grant them full internal self-government on the British Guiana pattern, which would be the worst of all possible worlds.

10. Fifthly, the new proposals not only invite the Governments to consider some new form of regional co-operation in the area in a Common Services Organisation. They also leave the door open for some other form of closer association either in a federation or in a unitary state at a later date. They should therefore not be unwelcome to either the Federationists or Dr. Williams.

11. Sixthly, arrangements on these lines would not only be the best way of giving these territories a full measure of control over their own internal affairs; they should also go some way to satisfy the Americans (who, we are told, would "be alarmed at the prospect of a rash of tiny independent islands in the Caribbean") and give them some assurance both that the islands would not easily go to separate independence and that the British Government will continue to be involved in the area. It should also go some way to satisfy those members of the Commonwealth who are concerned at the prospect of an increasingly large number of very small territories applying for Commonwealth membership. It could, however, not guarantee that at a later date some of them would not opt for independence and (if they did so) would not also apply for membership of the U.N. and full membership of the Commonwealth. The first problem has recently been the subject of separate correspondence between departments; while on the second we might hope that, if the eventuality arises, some member of the Commonwealth (other than Britain) might oppose their entry.

12. The new proposals would also give the British Government the right unilaterally to declare these islands independent any time it wishes to do so. It seems to the Colonial Secretary a necessary safeguard that the British Government, on its side, should have the right to terminate this arrangement if for any reason it is proving too difficult to work, embarrassing to us internationally, or placing too great a strain upon our resources.

13. One point to note is that nothing is said in the attached draft despatches about Citizenship. The position will be that so long as these territories remain in association with us, we would contemplate no change in their present citizenship arrangements. In conjunction with the Home Office, however, we should have to devise some method of ensuring that if a territory moves to independence, the arrangements for citizenship of the territory are satisfactory to us.

14. One other very important point which the attached papers leave undecided is raised by the two alternative versions of paragraph 8, of the draft despatch at Appendix I; namely, is the British Government to be given any constitutional powers of intervention in the field of finance? This is a point on which I should particularly welcome your views. The first version of paragraph 8, which our Ministers very much prefer, would not give Britain this power. The second version of paragraph 8 would

give Britain the power (and would indeed give Britain greater power in this field in relation to these territories than it possesses at the moment).⁵

15. If the first version of paragraph 8 is adopted, then it will be necessary for Ministers when introducing these proposals in Parliament to make it plain that the British Government's responsibility in relation to these territories is limited to certain matters affecting the proper discharge of Britain's responsibilities for their defence and external affairs. The arrangements would not leave us with any residual responsibility for other matters and, in particular, Britain would have no power to intervene in financial matters. In other words, we should deal with the question of budgetary assistance to any of these territories in the same way as we do in the case of an independent Commonwealth country. Once this had been accepted by Parliament, we consider that our Accounting Officer would have a good defence against criticism by the Public Accounts Committee. It would, however, have to be clearly understood as a corollary to this, that under such an arrangement Britain would have no responsibility to under-write expenditure in these territories at whatever level might be accepted as necessary to maintain adequate standards of services. Britain would provide whatever budgetary assistance it thought fit, and if there were still a budgetary deficit thereafter, that would not be our affair. Further, if there were gross financial mismanagement or impropriety, we should have to employ the only sanction we had left, namely the stoppage of aid. This point has not been made clear to the territories in the draft despatch, but is implied by the reference in the first version of paragraph 8 to the fact that assistance would be provided in the same way as it is "to certain independent Commonwealth countries". It would be necessary to make it more explicit at some stage of the negotiations.

16. The alternative paragraph 8 is based on the opposite assumption, i.e. that we must retain some responsibility to intervene in internal affairs for financial reasons. To insert this provision is, we feel, to admit that under these arrangements the territories would fall short of full internal self-government and therefore that some responsibility remained with H.M.G. It also follows, however, that we should thereby admit that we had a responsibility to maintain their public services at a certain level.

17. It will be observed that in the attached drafts no use is made of the phrase "free association". There is no suggestion in the draft despatches that these

⁵ The first version of para 8 suggested that the new arrangements would not affect eligibility for CD&W assistance. Budgetary assistance would be made available 'in the same way as it is provided to certain independent countries'. It would not be necessary to give the representative of the UK government any special powers in relation to finance. It would, however, be necessary to have agreements with the governments concerned covering the conditions under which aid would be made available, whether on budgetary or capital account. The conditions could not at present be specified in detail but they would include the observance of such UK financial requirements as might be laid down, the maintenance of legislation on the lines of the current Finance and Audit Ordinances, and access to the accounts and records relating to the expenditure of funds provided by the UK government. The second version of para 8 deleted the reference to the UK having no special powers in relation to finance. It then suggested that in order to meet the requirements of parliamentary control of expenditure from UK funds, the representative of the UK government should have a special power, in relation to any territory in receipt of budgetary assistance, to intervene 'for the purpose of maintaining or securing the financial and economic stability of the territory or of ensuring that any condition attached to any financial grant or loan made by the U.K. Government was complied with'.

arrangements, if they go through, would be presented by the British Government to the United Nations as a form of "free association" or as arrangements which would be regarded as a full measure of self-government for the purpose of terminating transmissions under Article 73 (e). The Colonial Office feel that provided financial powers were not retained there would be a reasonable case for maintaining at the United Nations that these arrangements amount to "a full measure of self-government" under the Charter, but much would depend on the reception given to the proposals in the territories concerned. This point, however, will require to be considered further once the result of the United Nations debates on the Cook Islands is known. In the meantime, the proposals are put forward as the best possible solution in the circumstances to the constitutional future of these six Leeward and Windward Islands, and the one most likely to conform with the wishes of their Governments while at the same time safeguarding the essential interests of Britain and its allies.

18. As explained in paragraph 5 above, these proposals would be put to six of the territories but not to Montserrat. Montserrat is a poor territory with only 13,000 inhabitants. (The others have between 60,000 and 100,000). Its Government has made it plain that for the moment it does not want "full internal self-government", and may indeed not want any constitutional changes at all. It could not conceivably contemplate independence either now or in the foreseeable future; whereas it is just conceivable (though very undesirable) that the others could. It is considered that proposals on the lines of these put forward in Appendix II should deal with Montserrat adequately.⁶

19. It is important, for reasons explained above, that the Colonial Office should be able to put these proposals to the Leeward and Windward Governments by about the end of October. For this purpose it will be necessary to have the comments of other Whitehall Departments not later than the 8th October, and earlier if possible. If these comments are favourable, it is the Colonial Secretary's wish that the proposals should be explained both to the Americans and the Canadians in time for him to discuss them further with the Americans on his visit to Washington on the 18th and 19th October. (The Americans have already been warned that he may wish to do something of this kind). At what stage anything is said to any other Commonwealth Government (e.g. Australia or New Zealand) should be for the C.R.O. to decide; but the Colonial Secretary is anxious that nothing should be said at this stage to the Government of Jamaica or the Government of Trinidad and Tobago.

20. If the reaction to these proposals in Whitehall and Washington is reasonably favourable, and the despatch can issue by about the end of October, it is the Colonial Secretary's intention then to arrange for Sir Stephen Luke with a Colonial Office legal adviser to visit the Caribbean in November to discuss them with the Governments concerned. At this stage he would probably be willing to inform the

⁶ In Appendix II it was explained that in two respects, associated status might not be appropriate for Montserrat. The proposals under consideration would grant to the territories concerned, not only full control over their own internal affairs but also—subject to special provisions—power to amend their own constitutions and power unilaterally to move to independence. It was considered inappropriate to give such powers to a small territory with insufficient material resources. Subject to the two reservations, the UK would be prepared to discuss similar arrangements for Montserrat but if the government of Montserrat so wished, the present Crown Colony constitution could be retained.

Governments of Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago of what was afoot. Thereafter the proposals would be published (some time before The Queen's visit in February) for the purposes of debate in the legislatures and for public consideration. Then it is the Colonial Secretary's present intention to try to have discussions on them in the Caribbean during the Easter recess with a view to introducing these arrangements in the course of the next twelve months.⁷

⁷ The same letter was sent to the CRO, the Treasury, the MOD, the ODM and the Cabinet Office. The FO replied that it had two main interests—to avoid a situation which would be indefensible at the UN and to prevent the 'emergence of seven little Haitis or Cubas' on the US doorstep. It was vital to consult the US and to have American support. On the two versions of para 8 of Appendix I, the FO appreciated the practical reasons for the second but also recognised that it would 'doubtless be represented by our anti-colonial opponents, and even perhaps by those who were more impartial, as retrogressive' (FO 371/179142, no 5, B A B Burrows to Poynton, 7 Oct 1965).

235 CO 1031/4865, no 225 18 Oct 1965 [Anglo-American discussions]: CO record of a meeting in Washington between Mr Greenwood and Mr Rusk on the future of colonial territories [Extract]

[Greenwood visited Washington between 17 and 21 Oct 1965. The officials accompanying him included assistant under-secretary of state, W I J Wallace. Greenwood's purpose was to explain UK colonial policy. He found the Americans very concerned at the risk of proliferation of what they called 'mini states' in the UN. Their immediate anxieties had been roused by the grant of independence to the Maldives in July 1965 and they had raised this with Mr Stewart, the foreign secretary, on a recent visit. They also told Greenwood that they had 'small territory problems' of their own and that they greatly welcomed the thought already given to the problem by the UK. They had not thought their own problems through in the same way and in this respect they were behind the UK (CO 1031/4865, no 227, report by Greenwood on his visit, 5 Nov 1965).]

Future of the colonial territories

Mr. Rusk said it would be very useful for him to have some indication of the British Government's plans for the future of their remaining Colonial territories.

The Secretary of State said that there were 31 remaining territories, with a total population of about 10 million, about half of which were in Hong Kong or South Arabia, so that 29 territories had between them a population of about 5 million. We were already committed to independence for some of them.

Bechuanaland and Basutoland would become independent next year and also British Guiana; Mauritius with $\frac{3}{4}$ million, by the end of 1966 or very soon after; South Arabia by 1968 and Swaziland perhaps in 1968. Also Barbados with $\frac{1}{4}$ million people might seek independence and it would be difficult to withhold it. British Honduras has been led to expect independence when it is no longer in receipt of grant-in-aid; the protected state of Tonga with some 70,000 people might choose independence and if so, we should find it difficult to prevent it.

Of the remaining territories some were very small and there was no prospect of their seeking independence, for instance the Turks and Caicos Islands, Pitcairn or St. Helena. For them we sought to work out some form of relationship which would carry with it no Colonial stigma. This left about a dozen territories whose future was rather problematical. He thought it very unlikely that the Bahamas and Bermuda

would seek independence; if the Seychelles did so it would not be for a number of years; Fiji with its population of $\frac{1}{2}$ million was not likely to seek independence for some time; indeed the condition on which the Fijians had attended the recent conference had been that independence should not be on the agenda.

Eastern Caribbean

The Secretary of State said that there remained the territories of the Eastern Caribbean and certain proposals were about to be made to them regarding the future. *Mr. Rusk* asked whether there was any chance of their combining for some kind of federation.

The Secretary of State replied that we had been working for this but with no success. There was now a move in Barbados for independence though no proposition had yet been made officially to the British Government and there was a good deal of opposition to the idea in the island. If, however, there was a firm demand for independence we should find it difficult to refuse it. The remaining 7 territories were the real problem. We had no vital interests in them but we recognised a moral responsibility and a responsibility not to prejudice the interests of our friends.

Mr. Rusk asked how far it would be possible to follow the model of Puerto Rico; they had the best of both worlds, with free entry to the American market but no liability to pay American taxes and they could amend their Constitution as they wished.

The Secretary of State said that a despatch was about to be sent to the territories proposing a form of associated status for them.¹ This would give them complete responsibility for their internal affairs. We should remain responsible for defence and foreign policy and would have power to intervene in internal affairs to the extent necessary to allow us properly to discharge these responsibilities and to seek a court judgment as to whether they were acting unconstitutionally. They would be able to change their constitutions unilaterally—even to the extent of choosing independence—but only after a vote of a majority of two-thirds of the members of the legislature and of two-thirds of the voters entitled to vote in a referendum.

Mr. Rusk enquired about sentiment in the territories—were they very pro-British?

The Secretary of State replied that there was no real security problem at the moment. The situation might change if there was a collapse of the sugar price. English was the language and their way of life was essentially British. He believed that they would accept the proposals we were about to make to them. There was no real talk of independence in these territories and it was our belief that the proposals we were making would reduce the likelihood of their ever seeking it.

Mr. Rusk commented that it was a pity that the larger federation in the West Indies had not worked but it sounded as if its re-establishment was just not on.

The Secretary of State agreed that that was so but he would not rule out some coming together as an ultimate possibility.

We intended to work for the development of a common services organisation between the territories in the Eastern Caribbean.

Mr. Wallace said that they had already a common High Court and it was hoped that common services might be developed perhaps even to the extent of having a common establishment for the higher ranks of the police.

¹ See 234.

The Secretary of State said that the Ministry of Overseas Development proposed to set up a regional office and that would help to bind the territories together. The tripartite survey² which was to be undertaken—and we were very grateful for the American willingness to take part in this—would also help. There was a great need for purposeful planning in these Colonies.

Mr. Rusk asked whether we had heard from the Canadians. *The Secretary of State* said that he had just heard from the British Embassy that the Canadians were willing to take part in the Caribbean survey but he was not sure at the moment of their position about British Honduras. He hoped that the Eastern Caribbean survey could be got under way by December.

British Guiana

Mr. Rusk enquired about the position of British Guiana.

The Secretary of State said that a conference was to start on November 2. It was not yet certain whether Dr. Jagan and the P.P.P. would come. He thought they might come if only in order to be able to walk out during the conference.

He was fairly happy about the internal security position and said he thought the chances of a successful outcome to the conference were good. He doubted very much if there would be any change in the present electoral system and he thought agreement would be possible on extensive constitutional safeguards. Mr. Burnham's government was strengthening the security forces. There was already in existence a Special Service Unit which would be valuable but not by itself wholly adequate.

Mr. Rusk asked whether there was any chance of Britain leaving forces behind after independence.

The Secretary of State said that Mr. Burnham would like this but it would be a new departure; the most that we could possibly do would be to tide over a few months until British Guiana had established their own effective forces. They were starting now to build up a military force but it would be at least October 1966 before this was effective. Mr. Burnham, however, wanted independence well before that. He had mentioned February. That was probably not practicable; May, June or July would be a more sensible time. To delay longer than that might be dangerous. If the American Government pressed strongly that we should bridge the gap by leaving forces for a few months he would represent this to his colleagues.

Mr. Rusk indicated that he did feel strongly on this subject. He understood that there could be no question of our leaving troops permanently. He believed Mr. Burnham was being sensible: was the tension with the Indians less than it had been?

The Secretary of State thought this was definitely so. Mr. Burnham had gone out of his way to demonstrate that economic help was fairly allocated to all races. The visit by a team from the International Commission of Jurists on the question of racial imbalance was very helpful. Their report was about to be published and Mr. Burnham was ready to accept all their recommendations; the principal one was that in recruiting for the police during the next five years three Indians should be recruited for every one of other races.

² See 228–229.

Discussion then turned to the question of the Venezuelan claim.³ *The Secretary of State* said that we were convinced that there was nothing in the Venezuelan arguments about the 1899 award. We wondered whether the American Government could bring any influence to bear on the Venezuelan Government to drop their claims. He asked whether the Venezuelans were worried about the political future of British Guiana.

Mr. Rusk said he feared that if the Venezuelan claim remained unresolved it would stand in the way of British Guiana coming into the O.A.S. because at the insistence of the Argentinians it had recently been agreed that no new member should be admitted to the O.A.S. against whom there was a territorial claim. He asked whether there was any question of the International Court of Justice being brought in.

The Secretary of State doubted whether this would be valuable, partly because it might seem to imply that there was something in the Venezuelan claim. We should be very grateful if the American Government could use its influence with the Venezuelans to drop their proposals.

Mr. Rusk wondered whether anything could be done by some re-adjustment of the boundary involving a give and take on both sides.

Mr. Wallace said that any semblance of territorial concession would reck [sic] *Mr. Burnham's* Government. *Mr. Greenwood* added that it would certainly be exploited by *Dr. Jagan*.

Mr. Rusk indicated that he would be seeing the Foreign Minister of Venezuela at Rio.

Mr. Rusk asked whether the tension between the Africans and Indians had sufficiently eased to permit independence to go ahead.

The Secretary of State thought that it had. He thought that once the decision on independence had been taken this would force the people to learn to live together. His impression was that *Dr. Jagan's* position had deteriorated very much. He was still a very popular figure, but there were disagreements in his own party and he had given the impression when he met him in February of having lost something of his old fervour. There had been demonstrations by the Indians when he had been in British Guiana in February. These had been organised by *Dr. Jagan* but in fact they had all been friendly. . . .⁴

Mini-states

From this discussion moved over to the question of mini-states. *Mr. Rusk* said that *Mr. Gromyko*⁵ had appeared interested in this problem and was prepared to talk about it. He was concerned at the large number of new states becoming members of the United Nations.

The Secretary of State said that we were publicly committed to giving independence (implying membership of the U.N.) to the territories he had named. He had already indicated it would be very difficult to offer them "independence minus". Some Commonwealth Prime Ministers were equally concerned about the number of small states which might seek Commonwealth membership. He suggested that he

³ Venezuela's claim to about two-thirds of British Guiana on the western boundary between the two countries was frequently discussed at the UN. The UK argued that the boundary had been settled by the award of an Arbitral Tribunal in Oct 1899. Despite its claim, Venezuela supported British Guiana's bid for independence, which was not the case with regard to the dispute with Guatemala over British Honduras.

⁴ Section on the South Pacific omitted.

⁵ Soviet foreign minister.

should send Mr. Rusk a document setting out our present thinking regarding the future of our territories.

Mr. Rusk welcomed this. He said that in addition to the British territories there were a few American "bits and pieces" in the Pacific and there could be one or two French territories.

The *Ambassador*⁶ suggested that when the Americans had considered the document that we were to give them there might be further discussions at official level, either in Washington or in London, so that we could get a better idea of the size of the problem. The Ministers agreed.

British Honduras

In reply to questions, the *Secretary of State* said that the internal situation of British Honduras was fairly satisfactory. Mr. Price was much the most effective politician. We estimated, not perhaps with great confidence, that they might be self-supporting by 1968. Their sugar industry should by then be one of the most efficient in the West Indian area.

Mr. Rusk said that there was a move among the Central American territories towards closer co-operation. Would British Honduras fit into this?

Mr. Wallace said that this would obviously be desirable but that Commonwealth preferences, especially for sugar, pulled them the other way.

Communism in the Caribbean

Mr. Rusk enquired whether there was any sign of Communist penetration in the Caribbean territories. They had had reports of some efforts in the French islands, but not very recently.

The *Secretary of State* said that the Communists did not seem to cut any ice in the British territories. The population were great individualists and the Caribbean Council of Labour was a stabilising influence. Cuba had caused some embarrassment in the Bahamas but not with Communist infiltration.

The discussion ended with the Ministers agreeing to keep in touch on British Guiana and British Honduras.

⁶ ie the UK ambassador in Washington, Sir P Dean.

236 CO 1031/4617, no 16 20 Oct 1965
[British Guiana]: press release by the Information Department, CO,
on the report of the inquiry into racial imbalance in British Guiana by
the International Commission of Jurists

The International Commission of Jurists publishes today (Thursday, October 21, 1965) the Report of the British Guiana Commission of Inquiry, which was asked to examine the balance between the races in the public services and other areas of governmental responsibility in that country and to make such recommendations as it considered necessary to eliminate imbalance based on racial discrimination. This is the first such inquiry to have been conducted into the problems of public administration in a multi-racial society.

It was at the request of the Government of British Guiana that the International Commission of Jurists agreed to constitute the Commission of Inquiry. The Commission of Inquiry consisted of Mr Justice Seamus Henchy (Ireland), together

with Professor Felix Ermacora (Austria) and Professor Pierre Papadatos (Greece); the International Commission of Jurists provided the Registrar to the Commission of Inquiry, Mr David Sagar, a Legal Officer on its staff.

The racial problems which the Commission of Inquiry was asked to consider arose from complaints, following upon the tragic disturbances in 1964, that there were in the public service, and particularly in the Police Force, a disproportionately large number of Africans in relation to Indians; and that this was both the result and cause of racial discrimination. On the other hand, participation in the land settlement schemes was overwhelmingly Indian.

The Inquiry was conducted in Georgetown, the capital of British Guiana, from August 5 to 22, 1965, and on the basis of the written memoranda and oral evidence and submissions received the Commission of Inquiry in its Report examines each of the sectors of the public service with which it was called upon to deal.

General conclusions

In its general conclusions the Report emphasises that the present racial disharmony is due in no small degree to the uncertainties and tensions of a community passing from colonial tutelage to full independence, and expresses the view that it is only when independence is achieved that the Guiana community will find the national self-reliance, the common purpose and the cohesion of nationhood which are necessary for the successful pursuit of a racially integrated society.

Among the findings and recommendations of the Commission, which deal with all aspects of their Inquiry, attention is drawn to the following:—

- (1) It is only in the Security Forces, and particularly in the Police Force, that the admitted preponderance of Africans can be said to be, in part at least, the result of factors which might encourage or lead to discrimination. This led to widespread complaints against the Police and lack of confidence in it on the part of the Indian community. In view of the importance of ensuring that the Police Force should broadly reflect the different races of the population, in addition to removing the factors which might encourage or lead to discrimination, for a limited period of five years recruitment should be on the basis of 75% Indians and 25% other races.
- (2) Apart from this temporary and exceptional measure, the Report rejects the system of racial quotas in the recruitment of personnel in any part of the public service. It holds that such a system is discriminatory and liable to underline and strengthen the very divisions it is intended to guard against.
- (3) In addition to preserving the provisions as to fundamental rights in the present Constitution, the Report recommends that an Ombudsman, or a suitably constituted committee if it is impossible to find a generally acceptable individual, should be appointed to provide a summary, inexpensive and easily available authority to deal with complaints of racial discrimination in all areas of governmental responsibility.
- (4) In view of the widespread anxiety as to the possibility of further troubles similar to those which occurred in 1964, the Report suggests, as a necessary precaution in case an emergency situation arises, that the possibility be considered of making arrangements, without derogating from the sovereignty of an independent Guiana, for the provision of an adequate military force from outside the country until Guiana has had time to recruit, train and equip an adequate Guianese military force.

In addition, the Report makes further findings and recommendations on: the Volunteer Force; the Civil Service; the Judiciary; Education; Local Government; Land Settlement Schemes; Government Agencies and Undertakings; Anti-Discrimination Legislation; Education in Civics; Co-operation between Parties; and Economic Advancement.

In transmitting the Report of the Commission of Inquiry to the Government of British Guiana, the Secretary-General of the International Commission of Jurists, Mr Sean MacBride, expressed the hope that its recommendations would be of assistance to Guiana in its ultimate political, social and economic development as an independent nation and concluded: "The fact that the Government of British Guiana has taken the constructive initiative of seeking independent advice on the problems which are the subject-matter of this Report will, I trust, inspire confidence among nations and international institutions which could provide technical and financial assistance for the rapid and full development of the Guiana economy."

237 PREM 13/734

26 Oct 1965

[British Guiana]: letter from Mr Greenwood to Mr Bottomley on a proposal that British troops should remain in British Guiana for a limited period after independence

The British Guiana Independence Conference opens on Tuesday 2nd November and there is one point on which I am anxious to have a decision before the Conference opens, namely, the retention of British troops in Guyana (as it will be called) in an internal security role for a limited period after independence. The background to this proposition is as follows.

The People's National Congress (led by Mr. Burnham) and the United Force (led by Mr. D'Aguiar), who together form the present coalition Government, will attend the Conference but it is not yet certain whether the People's Progressive Party (led by Dr. Jagan) will do so. I hope that the threatened boycott by the P.P.P. will not take place but in any case it cannot be allowed to affect the holding of the conference.

The Attorney-General of British Guiana has produced a draft Independence Constitution which the two Government parties, while reserving the right to comment in detail, have agreed provides a useful basis for discussion at the Conference. In principle, the draft Constitution appears to me to be unobjectionable. It contains full provision for the protection of fundamental rights and freedom of the individual; it provides for the continuation of the monarchy with possible change to republican status after a minimum period of 3½ years; it contains adequate safeguards for the independence of the public service and the judiciary; and it retains the existing parliamentary system with a single-chamber legislature elected by proportional representation under universal adult suffrage of those aged 21 and over.

There is unfortunately little prospect of agreement being reached between all the parties on a number of major issues. At the last constitutional conference held under the Conservative Government in October 1963 the three party leaders in British Guiana, being unable to resolve their own differences, asked the then Colonial Secretary to make decisions on their behalf and undertook to abide by them.¹ Dr. Jagan (P.P.P.) has consistently refused to accept these decisions; and when the present (British) Government came into power he came over to London to ask that

¹ See 217.

the General Election (fixed for December 7th 1964) should be postponed.² We decided that arrangements were too far advanced to make this possible though our dislike of the electoral system produced by Mr. Sandys remained. The three points settled by Mr. Sandys in 1963 were:—

- (i) The electoral system (P.R.).
- (ii) The voting age (21 and not 18 as demanded by the P.P.P.).
- (iii) That fresh elections should be held under the new electoral system (these were held in December 1964).

I have no doubt that the P.P.P. if they come to the Conference will attempt to reopen these three questions. While I think it will be politic to allow them to have their say I intend to take the line that these are not “outstanding matters” within the agenda of the conference and that the right course would be for the people of British Guiana, by due constitutional processes, to alter these arrangements after independence if they so wish. (The draft Constitution which will form the basis of discussion at the Conference provides for such changes to be made on a simple majority of the House of Assembly followed by a simple majority in a referendum.) It should be possible to handle the Conference in such a way that the Independence Constitution can be fully justified in public and in Parliament.

It should be possible to fix a date for independence: it is highly desirable that this should not be delayed longer than absolutely essential. But there is a difficulty over the timing of independence which arises from the inadequacy of the Colony's own security forces, and it is on this point that I am seeking an early decision from my colleagues.

The Police Force is an effective body but in 1962, 1963 and 1964 it was necessary to use British troops in aid of the civil power. The present British garrison consists of two infantry battalions and a garrison headquarters. It is there solely for internal security duties. Despite our constant urging to take decisions about the security forces that would be needed after independence, it was not until September last that the British Guiana Government came down in favour of a military rather than an expanded (armed) Police Force.³ The proposed Military Force is ultimately to consist of a three company battalion with a total establishment of 700 all ranks, but initially only two companies will be formed with the strength of 450 to 500 all ranks. There may also ultimately be a coastguard arm and possibly an air wing. The Ministry of Defence has been most co-operative in providing assistance in planning, command and training for the embryo force, by the secondment of British personnel. These arrangements are well in hand, a planning officer has already arrived in the territory, and the commanding officer has been nominated. The best estimate which can be made is that the two company force should be brought to full operational efficiency by October, 1966.

Mr. Burnham, however, is pressing for independence very early in 1966. Setting aside considerations of internal security, I think it might be possible for independence to be achieved by about the mid year. I think that Mr. Burnham would be content with this. Mr. Burnham's Government realize, however, that their own forces will not be adequate by such an early date and they have asked that British troops should be permitted to remain in the territory for a limited period after independence until their own defence force has become fully operational at acceptable strength, say until October 1966.

² See 224.

³ cf 189 and 202.

The Governor of British Guiana strongly supports Mr. Burnham's Government's request that British troops should remain for a limited period after the grant of independence. His reasons for doing so may be summarised as follows:—

- (i) The longer independence is delayed the longer and better opportunity is provided for the opponents of the present Government to plan and promote sabotage in an endeavour to prevent independence under that Government. Once independence is granted the purpose of such sabotage no longer exists. Disruptive elements in British Guiana are likely to have to come to terms with realities under independence and the sooner this happens the better.
- (ii) It is not in the British interest (apart from that of British Guiana) for the period of such potential sabotage to be prolonged by delaying the date for independence. If, as would be likely, the internal security situation were to deteriorate as a result of such delay the British commitment could be indefinitely extended.
- (iii) There is an improved economic atmosphere in British Guiana resulting largely from the purposeful progress of the present Government and the generally improved situation in the country. A loss of momentum in this forward movement, particularly if arising from speculation or anxieties about the security factor *vis à vis* early independence, would be harmful.

In the course of my recent visit to Washington⁴ I was informed by the Americans that, while they would prefer a later independence date, a date in the range May to July would be acceptable to them and that they appreciated that any delay in granting independence might well cause a deterioration in the security situation. Mr. Rusk himself (and also Mr. McGeorge Bundy⁵ who keeps a close watch on British Guiana developments on behalf of the President) urged upon me strongly the desirability of leaving British troops in the territory for a limited period after independence until the Guyanese security forces were stronger.

The recently published report of the Commission of Inquiry appointed by the International Commission of Jurists to enquire into the problems of racial imbalance in the public services in British Guiana included the following recommendation:

"In the course of this Inquiry we found widespread anxiety as to the possible consequences of the country's entering into independence without there being available to the Government an adequate military force should an emergency situation develop. Having regard to the nature and extent of the recent disturbances, and the disruption that has sprung from them, we consider that such anxiety is not unfounded. It is clear that if there is to be an early grant of independence (which the Commission of Inquiry itself favoured), there will not be time to recruit, train and equip an adequate Guianese military force. *Accordingly, we recommend that, until such a force has been recruited, trained and equipped, consideration should be given to the possibility of making arrangements, without derogating from the sovereignty of an independent Guyana, for the provision of an adequate military force from outside the country, that could be called upon to maintain order should the necessity arise.*"⁶

⁴ See 235.

⁵ Historian and political analyst; special assistant to the president for national security affairs, 1961–1966.

⁶ See 236 (emphasis here in original).

I see the force of the arguments against leaving British troops in a territory after independence and I made it clear in my Washington talks that there are real difficulties. Nevertheless, I am quite convinced that in the circumstances of British Guiana the balance of advantage lies in fixing the earliest possible date for independence (within the May-July range) and allowing British troops to stay in the country after independence until the local forces are adequate, say until October, 1966. A delay, at best, would serve only to sour our relations with the Government of Mr. Burnham and Mr. D'Aguiar. At worst, it might lead to circumstances in which independence might have to be delayed indefinitely. I would accordingly propose that arrangements should be made for a phased withdrawal of our troops in such a manner as to leave a rearguard of adequate strength to meet the needs of the internal security situation. Arrangements would, of course, have to be made to ensure that our troops have adequate protection against legal processes arising out of the actions taken in the course of duty. I don't expect any difficulty with the British Guiana Government on this score.

It would seem beyond the means of the government of an independent British Guiana to meet the cost of maintaining a British garrison even for the limited period in view. Acceptance of the necessity for British troops remaining would therefore involve acceptance that the costs should be met from British funds. (If we delayed independence, of course, we should have to meet them anyway).

In the light of the foregoing I trust that you will agree with me:—

- (i) that the date of independence for British Guiana should not be delayed solely for the reason that the local security forces are not yet capable of discharging responsibility for internal security;
- (ii) that arrangements should be made for a phased withdrawal of British troops in such a manner as to leave a rearguard of adequate strength to meet this responsibility in the territory after independence, if necessary until October 1966;
- (iii) that it should be accepted that the cost of maintaining British troops in British Guiana for this period should be met from British funds (the sum involved might be taken into account in the negotiation of any independence financial settlement).

I am writing in similar terms to the Foreign Secretary, the Minister of Defence and the Chancellor of Exchequer.⁷

⁷ Stewart, the foreign secretary, sent a brief reply agreeing with Greenwood's conclusions: 'I am sure it would be wrong to postpone independence solely on account of deficiencies in the local security forces. But a breakdown in law and order in British Guiana could have serious international consequences, and the insurance against this which you propose seems to me to be very necessary. As you know, the Americans attach a great deal of importance to this: and I think they are right' (PREM 13/734, Stewart to Greenwood, 1 Nov 1965). James Callaghan, the chancellor, was equally brief. He had no objections to the proposals, provided Healey, the defence secretary, agreed that they were practicable. The only points made by Callaghan were (i) it should be made clear that the troops would be withdrawn in Oct 1966; (ii) the cost of their maintenance should be taken into account in any financial settlement; (iii) the troops should be adequately safeguarded against legal responsibility arising from whatever actions they might have to take; (iv) if extra costs were involved, these should be met after independence by the CRO, with an appropriate adjustment to CO votes (*ibid*, Callaghan to Greenwood, 1 Nov 1965). More substantial points were raised by the MOD and the CRO and their responses are recorded at 238 and 240.

238 PREM 13/734

29 Oct 1965

[British Guiana]: letter from Mr Healey to Mr Greenwood on the proposal that British troops should remain in British Guiana for a limited period after independence

You wrote to me on 26th October about the problem of security in British Guiana after independence until their own forces are supposedly capable of maintaining order.¹

2. Taking the first of your specific questions, I accept that in the special circumstances of British Guiana there is a case for fixing the date of independence if necessary earlier than the time at which local forces are capable of discharging responsibility for internal security. This is, however, subject to the political point that I make at the end of this letter.

3. If our colleagues argue that political factors are overriding and that British troops should remain after Independence, it would be practicable for one battalion to remain until the end of October 1966. This will involve problems over the timing of the relief of units. I would plan not to replace 3rd Battalion Parachute Regiment when they are due to leave British Guiana in February 1966. The tour of the other battalion, the 1st Battalion King's Regiment, is due to end in June 1966 and cannot be extended. I would prefer to relieve them in April if, as seems likely, independence will be granted between May and June 1966. The relieving battalion could then stay on after Independence, within a normal nine months tour, until October 1966. This battalion could be stationed, if this were thought desirable, at Atkinson Airfield rather than in Georgetown itself. In public we should take the line, I suggest, that the battalion would be remaining for a limited period, perhaps announcing the date of its return, to help in training Guyana's forces and in the defence of the country. We should not make any public reference to internal security. There must, however, be agreement with the independent Government about the tasks which the battalion might be called upon to perform. I should be extremely reluctant to see British troops after Independence being in any way responsible for the sorts of activities that have formed the bulk of the garrison's tasks in recent months, namely patrolling the countryside to deter inter-racial violence. It seems to me that the task of the battalion should be to help in ensuring the survival of the government and the protection of essential utilities. Thus I should recommend that the role of the British troops should be restricted to emergency assistance on the High Commissioner's instructions in guarding the Government and vital installations.

4. Your second question related to cost. I am content, if my colleagues agree, that British funds should pay but I would ask that the normal arrangements for the refunding to the Defence Vote of extra costs should obtain.

5. I am glad to see that you expect no difficulty over indemnification of our troops. It is absolutely essential that there should be no loopholes here. Other questions such as the system of command and the precise instructions to be given to the British Commander will of course have to be worked out.

6. There may very well be difficulties in securing both the recruitment of seconded personnel from the British Army and suitable local Guyanese volunteers for

¹ See 237.

the new Local Force. Therefore, operational readiness may not be achieved by 1st October 1966. If it is accepted that British troops should stay after Independence, I must insist that there is no open-ended commitment and that they come out on the date planned.

7. Apart from these practical points I have, I must confess, serious anxieties. It is not I imagine beyond the bounds of possibility that Jagan might stage a coup while our troops were still there and that he might succeed. In that event I imagine that the United States would expect us to throw out a communist government by force and that, if we did not do so they might wish to take the necessary steps themselves. Are we prepared to contemplate a United States military intervention in an independent Commonwealth country while British troops are present and remain neutral? If not, are we prepared to commit ourselves to use our forces to act against Jagan in such circumstances with or without American help or are we prepared to refuse and if necessary resist such intervention by American troops? If we are not, we must, I imagine, either postpone independence or be prepared to use British troops against the effective Head of an independent Commonwealth country. I believe we should discuss the problem collectively before we reach firm conclusions either on the date of independence or on our willingness to leave British troops in the country after Independence.

8. I also think we should consider whether we are wise to commit ourselves to the Americans on this issue before our general discussion with them about the Defence Review since the continued presence of British troops in Guyana is one of the most valuable things we can offer them and, compared with other requests they may make of us during the Defence Review discussions, one of the least costly.

9. I am sending copies of this letter to the Prime Minister, Foreign Secretary, Chancellor of the Exchequer and Commonwealth Secretary.

239 PREM 13/136, pp 7–8

1 Nov 1965

[British Guiana]: letter from Dr Jagan to Mr Wilson comparing British Guiana to Rhodesia and declining to attend a constitutional conference

In spite of my appeals, the Colonial Secretary persists in holding a Constitutional Conference in circumstances and conditions fully described to him which make our participation impossible and which would also make any decisions reached unacceptable to more than half off the population for which my Party speaks.

I have pointed out to Mr. Greenwood that British Guiana is virtually a police state. Unnecessary emergency powers are being used to harass, detain without trial, and silence political opponents of the coalition government. With the approach of independence, for which my Party has always struggled, it is essential that the Guianese people as a whole should first reach agreement among themselves on the nature of their constitution for complete autonomy in an atmosphere free from the fears that presently exist under arbitrary rule and political despotism.

British Guiana is no different from Rhodesia with respect to the question of independence. You rightly pointed out to the Rhodesian Prime Minister that the detention or restriction over a long period of nationalist leaders, the restriction of a

former Prime Minister, and the banning of a prominent newspaper have suggested to the outside world the pattern that might be adopted in the future. Genuine fears with respect to the arbitrary exercise or misuse of power have now gripped the minds of more than half of the Guianese people because of the coalition government's record thus far.

Former Police Superintendent Lambert provides a case in point of a virtual police state in being in this country. Lambert was suspended from duty pending the hearing of a charge. Although he was acquitted by the Supreme Court and the Police Service Commission recommended his reinstatement, the Governor ordered his compulsory retirement. This has been done no doubt on pressure from the government because this officer with a most creditable record had discharged his duties impartially and with zeal in breaking up the "P.N.C. terrorist organization".

Ultimately, it is your responsibility to ensure that British Guiana goes forward to independence under a constitution acceptable to the majority and in circumstances and with safeguards that would remove existing fears and guarantee the country's social and economic progress. My final appeal is that the British government come to grips now with the Guiana situation with the same will and determination displayed in dealing with that in Rhodesia.¹

¹ Wilson replied to the effect that it was not only desirable but indeed a 'duty' for Jagan to attend and to represent those who voted for him at the last election: 'I cannot accept that present circumstances made it impossible for you to participate in the conference. If your party or their supporters were concerned about the actions of the present British Guiana Government, and had genuine fears for the future, the place to express that concern and those fears was at the constitutional conference, where they could be taken into account before decisions were taken concerning the future of your country. You attempt to draw an analogy between British Guiana and Rhodesia, but the circumstances in the two countries are completely different. I regret very much that your party declined to attend the conference along with representatives of the other two parties' (PREM 13/136, pp 2-3, Wilson to Jagan, 13 Nov 1965).

240 PREM 13/734

2 Nov 1965

[British Guiana]: letter from Mr Cledwyn Hughes¹ to Mr Greenwood on the proposal that British troops should remain in British Guiana for a limited period after independence

Thank you for your letter of 26 October about the retention of British troops in Guyana in an internal security role for a limited period after independence.² I have studied the arguments you have put forward in favour of our proposal and recognise their force. But I feel that I should set out the counter arguments so that we can all be clear about what would be involved for us if we were to agree. As I see them these are as follows:—

- (a) There is no British defence interest justifying the retention of British troops in Guyana.
- (b) Their retention would expose the U.K. and Guyana Governments to attack in the United Nations and elsewhere: we for neo-colonialism and the Guyana Government for permitting it. Such an arrangement might make it more difficult for Guyana to win international recognition as a genuinely independent state.

¹ Minister of state for Commonwealth relations, 1964-1966.

² See 237.

(c) The calling out of British troops in aid of the Guyana Government would have to be ordered by the British Government. Our responsibility could not be concealed and this could bring us into serious trouble with the U.N.

(d) As the present opposition party is almost entirely of East Indian race an internal security situation in British Guiana would almost certainly be racial in character. Any British involvement on behalf of the Burnham administration could be represented as anti-Indian and thus add to our difficulties with India, and could well create ill-feeling towards us elsewhere, notably in Trinidad where there is a similar racial composition of the population.

(e) On the basis of population statistics alone the present opposition party is bound to gain political power eventually—possibly after the next election. Military intervention by us would almost certainly appear to be directed against the present opposition and this could have a disastrous effect upon our future relations with the country.

It seems to me that these counter-arguments are also very cogent and I feel that they merit further consideration. Our position vis-à-vis the United Nations in particular needs careful examination before we commit ourselves.

Basically my difficulty is that a decision by us to intervene in an internal security situation in British Guiana could only be taken at the time and in the light of the prevailing circumstances. We might, when the time comes, well decide that the right course is to call for the despatch of a United Nations peace-keeping force. But if we decide here and now to leave British forces in British Guiana after independence we would in fact be pre-judging that decision: the pressure to use forces already there for that specific purpose would be likely to be irresistible should the occasion arise.

I therefore feel that we should explore other possible means of meeting this problem if you still feel that we must aim at independence in June rather than October. I notice that Sir Richard Luyt suggested in one of his telegrams that if we refuse Mr. Burnham's request he might react by asking for an immediate U.N. peace-keeping force; and mentions that the International Commission of Jurists themselves raised this possibility. I would not regard this as a threat. Indeed the idea has at first sight considerable attractions seeing that the objections to the stationing of British forces in Guyana would not apply to a U.N. force. I suggest therefore that this alternative might be examined.

I am sending copies of this letter to the Foreign Secretary, the Minister of Defence and the Chancellor of the Exchequer.

241 CAB 130/248, MISC 89/1

5 Nov 1965

'Security arrangements in Guyana after independence': memorandum by Mr Greenwood for Cabinet Committee on British Guiana

In previous correspondence¹ I proposed:—

- (i) that the date of independence for British Guiana should not be delayed solely for the reason that the local security forces are not yet capable of discharging responsibility for internal security;

¹ See 237.

- (ii) that arrangements should be made for a phased withdrawal of British troops in such a manner as to leave a rearguard of adequate strength to meet this responsibility in the territory after independence, if necessary until October 1966;
- (iii) that it should be accepted that the cost of maintaining British troops in British Guiana for this period should be met from British funds (the sum involved might be taken into account in the negotiation of any independence financial settlement).

It looks likely that at the present Conference the date for independence in the period May-July 1966 will be decided. Guyanese security forces will be adequate by the end of October.

2. In commenting on my proposals Cledwyn Hughes in his letter of 2nd November² set out certain counter-arguments. I accept that these are cogent; but the longer independence is delayed the longer and better is the opportunity for opponents of the present government to promote sabotage in an attempt to prevent independence under the Burnham Government; and in these circumstances it is not in our interest to prolong the period of such potential sabotage. If we accordingly accept that independence should be granted as early as practicable we must also accept that a breakdown in law and order after independence, before local Guyana forces are ready to discharge their responsibilities, would, as the Foreign Secretary points out,³ have serious international consequences, not least with the Americans, and we should be open to criticism both abroad and in Parliament for failing to make adequate security arrangements. Although the continued presence of British troops after independence might be criticised in the United Nations, it seems inconceivable that objections would be pressed to the point of refusing to admit Guyana to membership. After all, much more valid objection on this score could have been raised over Kenya which was admitted while there was still a British base as well as British troops on Kenya soil. There should be no difficulty in justifying continued, but temporary, presence of British troops at the Guyana Government's request. In my view these considerations out-weigh the arguments against British troops remaining for a short period.

3. Cledwyn Hughes suggests:—

- (a) that a decision to intervene in a post-independence security situation in Guyana could only be taken at the time and that we might then decide to propose a U.N. peace-keeping force;
- (b) that if we decide now to leave British troops we should be pre-judging such a decision;
- (c) that the possibility of asking now for a U.N. peace-keeping force should be examined.

No doubt the Foreign Secretary will wish to comment on these suggestions. I would only say that to defer a decision about a U.N. peace-keeping force until the situation had actually arisen, would be too late, while on the principle of a U.N. peace-keeping force for the purpose we have in mind, British Guiana Ministers and I would see a number of serious objections:—

² See 240.

³ See 237, note 7.

- (i) it would clearly be very difficult to arrange and might cause all sorts of new complications;
- (ii) even if it could be arranged, to replace British forces, who know the country and are known there, by an international force for a short period after independence would have the exact effect which we wish to avoid – it would introduce a most unsettling factor into the country;
- (iii) an international force could not smoothly and speedily complete the intensive training of Guyanese forces which the British troops have begun and which, if allowed to proceed, they estimate they can conclude by the end of October.

4. Both the Foreign Secretary and the Chancellor of the Exchequer concur with my proposals, the latter subject to the agreement of the Defence Secretary and to four points which I readily accept.⁴

5. The Defence Secretary (in his letter of 27th October)⁵ also accepts that there is a case for fixing an early independence date and permitting British troops to remain for a limited period. His acceptance however is subject to clarification of the position of British troops in the event of a coup resulting in the formation of a Jagan Government. In the Governor's view a situation of this kind is so unlikely to arise that it may for practical purposes be disregarded. The existing security forces are pro-Burnham, and Georgetown, the seat of Government, is also pro-Burnham.

6. A further point which the Defence Secretary considers should be taken into account before any commitment is made is whether it is advisable to make it known that we accept that British troops should remain in an independent Guyana before the general British-American discussions on the Defence Review; a continued British presence in Guyana, he argues, is one of the most valuable things we can offer the Americans and, compared with other requests they may make of us in the discussions, one of the least costly. This may well be true (although the period involved would only be a matter of months) but the fact is that we shall have to take a decision on the date of independence, and hence on the future of British troops in Guyana, before the present Conference ends.

7. On the question of the role of the British troops to which the Defence Secretary refers, their mere presence would act as a deterrent and this indeed may prove to be their only internal security role. I agree, and so does the British Guiana Government, that the Guyanese security forces should deal with the local populace and that the role of the British troops would be as reserve. Requests for aid from the British troops would be made only as a last resort and it would then be for the British Government to decide whether to meet them. I am not happy however about the Defence Secretary's suggestion that the troops might be withdrawn to Atkinson Field at independence. The withdrawal of British troops from their present stations should be gradual, so as not to disturb confidence, but as quick as Guyanese forces can be trained to take their place; indeed this process should be begun before independence. It would be a continuous planned operation. Meanwhile, both before and after independence, the British troops would be actively engaged in training the Guyanese forces to take over from them as soon as possible. For the purposes of public presentation the main emphasis could be placed on the training role of the troops.

⁴ See *ibid.*

⁵ Healey's letter was dated 29 Oct, see 236.

8. As regards the other points made by the Defence Secretary I fully accept that if troops were left this would have to be:—

- (a) for a short and definite period;
- (b) subject to satisfactory prior agreement as to their protection against legal responsibility arising from their actions (the Premier of British Guiana has again assured me that there will be no difficulty about this).

9. I therefore seek my colleagues' approval of the proposal that, subject to the conditions in paragraphs 7 and 8 above, and those contained in the Chancellor's letter, we should agree that British troops should be left in Guyana after independence until the end of October 1966.

10. The Governor of British Guiana will be available at our meeting to give us the benefit of his assessment of the situation.

242 CO 1031/4383, no 4

6 Nov 1965

[British Honduras]: letter from Sir P Stallard to Mr Greenwood discussing the prospects for British Honduras after the introduction of internal self-government

You will recall that in the course of your visit to British Honduras¹ you expressed a wish that Governors would record at intervals the progress made by their charges, and would hazard a forecast of what the next period held in store. Your visit, 21 months after the introduction of our self-government Constitution, provides an opportunity for attempting a general assessment of the present plight of this colony. Perhaps "plight" is a strong term to apply but not inappropriate to this relatively poor country. I am, however, optimistic enough to believe that its economic state, while sorry, is not hopeless, and that its political state is healthy.

2. You saw for yourself how, politically, everything turns on the Premier, Mr. George Price, and how anxiously he is trying to build a national consciousness. Circumstances tend to make this an appallingly difficult task: while the hard core of active opposition is fairly small, the real obstacles are natural lethargy and the reluctance of almost the whole country to take the plunge into independence and self-reliance. Most people, including the majority of the Cabinet, would prefer to remain indefinitely on the diving board, basking in the sunshine of United Kingdom grant-in-aid.

3. At the risk of being tedious I feel bound to interpolate a paragraph on Mr. Price and his background. He was at one time being trained for the priesthood by the Jesuits but failed to complete the course because, it is reliably said, he was unable to subscribe to the vow of humility. This Jesuit training made him a devout Catholic (he attends Mass daily at 5.30 a.m.) but, because it was never completed, he failed to reap the full benefit and is apt to be indiscriminate in persuading himself that the end justifies the means. He concentrates on the semantics of independence with a humourless single-mindedness which borders on fanaticism. In vain, at least so far, does one counsel government by consensus rather than coercion. His volatile nature,

¹ Greenwood visited British Honduras in Oct 1965.

wanting to see immediate action taken on all his ideas, and his past experiences make it difficult for him to keep to the path of democracy. As we turned away from watching your aircraft leave, he remarked rather wistfully that the Opposition were being treated very much more kindly than his party had been when in opposition. One tends to forget the effect of several years' persecution by the Colonial Government: thwarted and frustrated at every turn he acquired a bitterness against all things British. I write this in no spirit of criticism of my predecessors but merely to draw attention to the prejudices he inevitably acquired. I have tried to persuade him that provided he behaves constitutionally he may depend on the full support and encouragement of the Governor and the Colonial Office. Nevertheless I realise that he trusts no one, that he approaches each new situation ready to be disillusioned, and that there is unlikely ever to be the mutual trust between us which would help him to relax and take an objective view of the problems of government. In case my experience can be of use to others in a similar predicament, I have found the most effective way of offering unpalatable advice or criticism to be by way of a manuscript note: the fact that there is no personal confrontation and more important, that he knows that no one else is aware of the advice having been given, makes it much easier for him to accept it.

4. As a party leader he is undoubtedly successful but the same cannot be said of his Premiership. Mr. Robert Tepper, recently appointed United States Consul and formerly the desk-officer in the State Department responsible for dealing with British Honduran affairs, told me that when Price visited Washington in 1963 he was uncomfortably tense even at social functions: it was not until he was taken to see the Catholic University that he relaxed. Tepper formed the impression that Price did not understand and actively disliked the administrative side of ministerial responsibility. It is true that he prefers the day-to-day contacts with his supporters throughout the country, touring constantly and, as a sort of ombudsman, concerning himself with the individual problems of the people, which should be dealt with by the District Officers. In fact all too often he is a glorified parish priest.

5. The PUP (People's United Party), of which Price is the leader, won 16 out of 18 seats in the House of Representatives in the general election of last March. They depend for their support on the Indian and Spanish-speaking farmers in the Districts, and on the lower-class Creoles in Belize City. The NIP (National Independence Party) which forms the Opposition comprises the better-off Anglicans and Methodists, some of the educated Roman Catholics, and former members of the PUP who have fallen out with Price. It is the last section which is the most active. By and large the pensionable officers in the Public Service and most of the Police Force support the Opposition, a fact which enrages the Premier but about which he can do very little: despite the accusations of victimisation made by the Public Officers Union, they are in fact well protected by the Public Service Commission of which the Chairman is a die-hard NIP, and in the last resort by the Governor. I know of no case in which the PUP have succeeded in victimising a pensionable civil servant, although the occasional messenger may have been mauled.

6. Although the Premier retains his magnetic hold over the mass of the PUP, there are signs that the Parliamentary party are becoming restive on account of his dictatorial behaviour. Here again he is an extraordinary mixture: on the one hand he tends to get carried away by his own enthusiasms which lead him to interfere in other ministries and to give direct orders to their subordinate staff, yet on the other

hand if consulted as Premier about some matter he usually refuses to commit himself until he has consulted his Cabinet. The refusal of the Parliamentary Party to be steam-rolled does provide a measure of protection against his incipient Nkrumahism.

7. After the Premier the outstanding figure in the Cabinet is C. L. B. Rogers, Minister of Internal Affairs and Health. He approaches nearest to the idea of a Minister because he is prepared to listen to civil service advice and, once convinced of the need for a certain course of action, to pursue it even against the Premier's express wishes. A. A. Hunter² probably has more ability but can never stand up to the Premier and so, too often, his good intentions come to nothing. The remainder of the Ministers are disappointingly ineffective but with the tenacity of the ignorant frequently oppose new ideas unreasonably and thus frustrate the Heads of Department. If any calamity overtook Price it is generally assumed that Rogers would step into his shoes but I have certain doubts which are mentioned below in paragraph 10.

8. The Opposition are rather weak, miss many opportunities especially of making use of their representation in the Legislature, and rely on their newspaper, the *Belize Billboard*, and on public meetings for ventilating their grievances. Although they call themselves the National Independence Party they do not want independence in the foreseeable future—you will recall that at Corozal an NIP sympathiser was carrying a placard proclaiming "No independence". A further example of their ineffectiveness was that they spent nearly the whole time of the interview which you accorded to them, complaining about the present system of registration which to their certain knowledge is currently under review and which the Government inherited from the old Colonial Government and has undertaken to reform. The "symbols" of independence, flag and anthem, were never mentioned. This ineffectiveness, combined with the fact that most of the Opposition strength lies in the relatively well-to-do, reduces the risk of violence which might occur if there were a straight division on racial lines, and which would probably occur if the roles were reversed with the PUP constituting the Opposition.

9. The new internal self-government Constitution was introduced in January last year (1964). It may be said that the executive side of it has worked well: Ministers have, on the whole, been willing to shoulder their new responsibilities and have shown a commendable honesty. The Security Council and the External Affairs Committee have both functioned smoothly, Ministers appearing to appreciate the extent to which they have been consulted. As regards Security credit is due to Rogers, Minister of Internal Affairs, who has not trespassed into the operational sphere, but especially to the Commissioner of Police who has patiently explained to the Minister his plans for maintaining law and order, and for dealing with any extraordinary situation, with the result that he has received the full support of the Minister. Unfortunately the British Honduran officers and NCOs are sometimes still reluctant to implement the spirit as well as the letter of the new Constitution. Most of them are Creoles and patently mistrust the Premier, suspecting him of trying to Latinise the country. They know what the rulers of the Central American Republics feel about negroes and have no wish for the country to have closer links with those countries.

² Minister of natural resources, commerce and industry.

10. If the Cabinet has enjoyed the new Constitution, the same cannot be said of the backbenchers: they have found that there is really no difference in their role. L. S. Sylvestre, who resigned as a Minister in 1963 owing to certain corrupt practices coming partially to light, is the leader of their discontent because not only does he want to return to the Cabinet for financial reasons but he is also genuinely interested in Administration. Since the backbenchers paid an educational visit last summer to the United States to see the United States Central and State Governments at work, the PUP backbenchers have formed themselves into a pressure group with the object of at least sharing some of the responsibilities of their ministerial colleagues. Their minds are working on some sort of organisation like the Congressional Committees: if the Premier is wise he will divert them with a few Parliamentary Committees and will allow them their heads when considering Bills in Committee, but he is an obstinate person, reluctant even to appear to be sharing his power. It is Sylvestre and his clique that I see as the alternative Government here, rather than Rogers or the National Independence Party, but none of them could oust Price at present.

11. For nearly two years Radio Belize, which Price uses quite shamelessly as a propaganda organ for himself and his Government, has proclaimed thrice hourly that it is the voice of the emergent nation of Belize in Central America. Several people who pay periodic visits to us have said that they have found a growing fear among the Caribs and Creoles that after independence they would be dominated by the Spanish-speakers and that the Latin-American way of life would be imposed on the country. One local criticism, they report of the Premier, is that he wants to fill the country with Mexicans and Central Americans while refusing to permit any Creoles from the West Indian islands to immigrate. There is no doubt that in sentiment the British Honduran Creoles, and to a lesser extent the Caribs, are pro-British to the core—not surprisingly when one considers how the negroes have been treated in the surrounding countries. It must have been a big relief to his Creole supporters when, about a year ago, Price declared that he intended to take the country into independence within the Commonwealth. No doubt the approach of a general election and the realisation that economically any other course would be disastrous, helped him to reach this decision—made incidentally without reference to his party. It is, I think this fear of Latinisation which is at the back of the opposition to the blue and white flag. This may be the appropriate place to include an account of Price's difficulties with his "symbols of independence", name, anthem and flag.

12. Until about 100 years ago the territory was referred to as the Belize Settlement (once as British Yucatan), and neighbouring countries always called it, and still call it, Belice. In the days before he became reconciled with the British, Price chose the name Belize as being the one for independence. Nobody but the active members of the NIP really feels very strongly about this point, nor about the "Belizean National Anthem", a popular patriotic song written in the 'thirties and subsequently taken over by the PUP as its party song. The author, now living in the United States, sympathises with the NIP and often threatens to sue Price for breach of copyright but this is no deterrent and the tune is played at every opportunity. I believe that Price is genuine in doing this as part of his campaign to create a national consciousness. However, it is the blue and white flag which causes the real trouble and here personal pride and obstinacy is what now motivates the Premier. The

origins of the flag are obscure but it is known that Goldson,³ then a leading member of the PUP, was one of its first champions in 1951. Opposition to the flag comes first from the NIP who dislike it because it is the party flag of the PUP, and secondly from a much wider section of the public which mistrusts the blue and white of Central America. Those who support it are the older PUP members who recall marching behind it and the Stars and Stripes, in order to annoy my predecessors. (On one occasion when the sentries had been particularly slack, it was found to be flying from the flag staff in Government House garden.) It has now become so much a personal matter with Price that it is impossible to persuade him even to contemplate the fact that he is only hardening the general opposition to himself by forcing the blue and white flag on the country; but he has got himself too far out on a limb to be ready to compromise by holding a competition, and while he may even fear that his blue and white flag would not be the choice of the majority, he probably hopes to get it accepted through habit. As you saw for yourself, the party colours, blue and white, are imposed on every conceivable object and building, and it was only because of the Premier's absence in London last spring that it was possible to use the neutral green and white on the Supreme Court—and, had it not been for the expense, the building would have been repainted on his return. This is all very childish but I am told that the first order given in the Irish Free State in 1922 was that all red letter boxes should immediately be painted green, so there is a precedent.

13. At present the country depends for its defence upon the British Army which provides a garrison of small headquarters staff under a colonel and one company of an infantry regiment which does a tour of nine months. Reinforcements can be flown in but would take about five days from the call for help. However, one company is considered to be sufficient for the tasks in hand, and it is most unlikely that the Guatemalans will attempt a serious incursion so long as the British troops are here. The Government does not wish to have a professional army of its own; Ministers have seen too many examples in Central America of what happens to the politicians when the soldiers take control. Instead it proposes to have a special Police Reserve which general duties constables would take turns to man. This should be adequate for internal security after independence, and for dealing with any small incursion either by land or sea. For the rest I think we must aim at persuading the United States to accept responsibility for ensuring that no large scale aggression is permitted.

14. Up to this point I have been filling in the political background and have not mentioned the country's economy, yet it is the economy and the smallness of its population which are the crucial factors in the advance of British Honduras to independence. The population is around 100,000. Figures of 105,000 are given but are dubious. With a population of this size it would be difficult in any case to find enough talent to provide the leaders for Government and commerce, but this country has an additional handicap in the steady drain of many of the brighter youngsters to the United States. The United States immigration quota is 100 persons a year but many others get round the regulations by going there on a visit and just staying on beyond their appointed time. Provided they do not fall foul of the police they seldom come to light. The most recent Immigration Law has raised the figure to 650 a year which bodes ill for this country as yet more of the ambitious school-

³ P S W Goldson, formerly founder member of PUP and member for Social Service in British Honduras government; leader of National Independence Party.

leavers will seek their fortune in the States. Of those who remain there are many of great ability—any country would be lucky to have a man of the calibre of Fonseca⁴ in its civil service—but the problem is whether the remaining yeast is sufficient to leaven the disproportionately large mass of dough whose favourite phrase is “Take it easy, man”. It is difficult enough to man the Civil Service now: the additional load of independence would put an almost unbearable strain on it. Emigration also has an adverse effect by removing too many of the foreman type, so that labour is often disappointing through lack of management. There have been many suggestions for increasing the population by large-scale immigration: however the money required for an operation like this would never be forthcoming and I shall not weary you with the pros and cons; the Government would oppose it.

15. The economy of the country has never been strong. For two-and-a-half centuries it depended upon exports of forest produce and the first attempt to diversify the economy by introducing banana plantations in the Stann Creek Valley was brought to a dismal end in the 1930s by Panama disease. The United Fruit Company made a survey last year of an area south of Stann Creek and there were high hopes of a large investment but they came to nothing, partly perhaps owing to Guatemalan pressure on the United Fruit Company since the Guatemalans feared that the new development would be at their expense.

16. The banana industry was replaced by citrus. This grows well and with proper cultivation gives excellent yields but the world market prices fluctuate considerably and are now very low. After the Florida freeze in late 1962 the Salada Corporation put in a factory and have increased the groves which they bought from the CDC. This ensures a market for about half the citrus produced.

17. Sugar is now the main export crop. Tate and Lyle took over the Corozal Sugar Factory and plantations in 1964 and are undertaking an enormous expansion. It is intended to mechanise most of the operations and thus to avoid the high costs which the company faces in the Caribbean islands. The small population of British Honduras and the large area of suitable land, at present uncultivated, makes this an ideal place to introduce mechanisation, and creates wonderful opportunities for local mechanics and artisans. Local cane farmers produce two-thirds of the 37,000 tons of sugar made by the factory but their plans for expansion are hampered by labour problems, for the Creoles, who form the bulk of the unemployed, dislike working in the canefields and farmers are dependent upon imported Mexican labour to cut their cane. The United States quota has just been raised from 4,000 to 10,000 short tons and this lasts until 1971.

18. The Cayo district has great potentialities for cattle-raising but the local market is too small to justify any large extension although I believe that if only we could overcome vested interests and local inefficiency there are wonderful possibilities for a dairy industry. The vested interests are the importers and retailers of tinned milk; as regards inefficiency the plain fact is that too often the will to achieve does not match the good intentions. For beef cattle there have been hopes for several years that either CDC or some consortium of businessmen would erect an abattoir. With the apparently insatiable demand for meat, an export industry seems assured of a market but until the abattoir is built local herds have already reached their maximum practicable size.

⁴ R A Fonseca, permanent secretary, Ministry of Finance and Economic Development.

19. The big disappointment of this year was the closing down of the Hercules Powder Company's rosin extraction factory because the operation was not economic and on account of an alleged error in estimating the quantity of pine stumps available for processing. This was a million pound investment which started operating in January 1964 and was giving employment to a good number of artisans in the southern part of the country. Most of those who have been willing to move have found employment in the construction of the new sugar factory at Orange Walk Town but it means that there is a dreary pocket of unemployed in the south.

20. The fishing industry is profitable but relatively small, the main item being lobster tails of which about 450 tons are exported annually to the United States. The Government has been advised by a fisheries expert to keep the exports at that figure for fear of exterminating the lobsters. There could be a significant increase if our fishermen could be persuaded to harvest the deep waters between the Turneffe Islands and Lighthouse Reef. A certain amount of poaching is carried on in the southern waters by fishing vessels from Honduras.

21. Various oil companies have prospected on the mainland without success. Shell are now about to start offshore exploration in the area of the Turneffe Islands due east of Belize City and express optimism although one cannot help but feel that much of this is aimed at ensuring co-operation by the Premier.

22. The economy was undoubtedly boosted as a result of the 1961 hurricane which devastated Belize City, Stann Creek town and the immediate hinterland. First of all came the insurance money and then the grants and loans from Her Majesty's Government, which enabled a large programme of reconstruction and development to be undertaken. In fact this injection of money could have had a far greater effect, had it not been competing with the habitual inefficiency which causes so much money and effort to be wasted. The Premier recently bemoaned to me the fact that "our people have a tendency to treat loans as gifts, and not to pay their rates and taxes". Vested interests also handicap the economy and put obstacles in the way of every plan to achieve self-sufficiency. These interests are the importers who for centuries have lived comfortably on the commission charged on each tin or bag of food without having to take any great pains. Add to this the pauperisation caused by the distribution of free food by CARE for several years after the hurricane, and it will be apparent that many factors militate against the economy becoming viable.

23. Ministers pin many hopes to tourism but here again it is necessary to sound a warning. Tourists in bulk, I am told, expect clean sandy beaches and good hotel service, neither of which are yet to be found in British Honduras although in time both could be available. Stann Creek Town has a nice stretch of sandy beach but for too long it has been used as an alternative for public conveniences. Hotels on the cayes are a possibility if difficulties of title to the land and of providing sufficient fresh water can be overcome. The best prospect for selective tourism probably remains the establishment of a first-class hotel with a properly run casino. If a suitably attractive site can be found there is a good chance of interesting a respectable United States backer.

24. Another financial obstacle to viability will be the award of the Salaries Commissioner, Sir Richard Ramage, who is at work now. He tells me that in view of the salaries currently being paid outside Government he does not see how the award can be less than 15 per cent overall and in some cases, for example, nurses, more. The effect of this will be that even if British Honduras can meet the cost of the

recurrent budget there will be practically nothing left over for development. However, there is a break in the clouds, namely, the proposal for tripartite aid from Great Britain, the United States and Canada.

25. I have purposely omitted any mention of the Guatemalan dispute because the United States Government has recently undertaken to mediate. It seems a pity that they should have chosen an elderly jurist: what I had hoped for was some amiable figure of international repute who would jolly the Guatemalans into giving way gracefully. A legalistic approach may serve to make them more obdurate than ever. One thing is certain and that is that 99 per cent of the local population would oppose any sort of political association with Guatemala: this is the one opinion on which the country really is united.

26. Looking ahead I should say that our primary aim should be to get the United States firmly committed to the general protection and development of this country, and that it will be possible to do this only by indirect methods. Certainly for the past four years the State Department has shown a great reluctance to become involved in our affairs but the decision to undertake mediation may prove to have been the turning point. Logically the Americans should be eager to bring this country into their area defence plan, and they can always prevent the Guatemalans from any stupid military venture.

27. In local politics I predict that Price will remain as Premier for the foreseeable future—many of his colleagues would like to take his place but none of them is likely to be able to consolidate the opposition to Price. In Belize City Rogers is strong: in the districts Sylvestre has a fair following. Both are conscious of the real position and are not prepared to court personal disaster by challenging the leader now. The NIP is unlikely to defeat the PUP, and even if it did, no change of general policy would be likely to follow. The only section of the community which is really disgruntled is the commission-agent type of businessmen who ran the country for so long and organised its government for their own benefit. They have been unwilling to change—perhaps they have not enough energy—and, as they see their members going to the wall, they blame Price and the PUP instead of looking at their own shortcomings.

28. My own summing up would be that a country twice the size of Corsica but with half its population and lacking natural resources cannot really make sense as an independent nation, but since international politics necessitate this, and Mr. Price would never agree to anything less than full independence although he is in no hurry to take the final step, British Honduras is likely to muddle along with its habitual inefficiency and good nature, with much grandiloquence but little real poverty, depending on the charity of Her Majesty's Government and the United States Government, and even if it does not make sense it will make only harmless nonsense of independence.

29. To summarise—the Internal Self-Government Constitution is working well but there is no desire for immediate independence: Mr. Price dominates the political scene but is not altogether successful in leading his parliamentary party. The Opposition party (NIP) is rather ineffective. Opposition to the proposed national flag of an independent Belize is fairly widespread as it involves fears of Guatemala and of Latinisation. The small British Garrison is adequate for the present but the future defence of the country is likely to depend on the United States. Economic prospects are not bright. Emigration of promising youngsters takes away too many potential leaders so that labour is disappointing. The country now depends upon the sugar and

citrus industries but there is hope for a meat industry if an abattoir is established. Even if the country can pay for its recurrent budget next year there will be very little left over for capital expenditure. The country will be financially dependent for as long as one can foresee.

243 PREM 13/734

8 Nov 1965

'Security arrangements in Guyana after independence': minute by Sir B StJ Trend to Mr Wilson on Mr Greenwood's proposals¹

It should be possible to bring British Guiana to independence (as Guyana) within the period May/July, 1966, provided that interim arrangements can be made for maintaining internal security until the Guyanese security forces are able to take over in October. The Committee may feel that the Colonial Secretary's arguments against postponing independence until October 1966 are decisive—particularly the consideration that, if we miss the relatively favourable opportunity which now offers, there might well be a renewal of internal disorder which could compel us to postpone the grant of independence and to continue to carry our invidious responsibility for a further, indefinite, period.

2. There are also strong arguments for allowing British troops to remain after independence in order to cover the interim period until the Guyanese security forces are adequate in about October 1966:—

(a) The British Guiana Government are pressing for this and have given assurances about the status of our forces and their protection against any legal liability arising from their actions. (But are these assurances adequate? This depends largely on the role which the troops would be designed to discharge—on which see paragraphs 3 and 5 below.)

(b) The United States Government have also urged us to agree. If we do so, we shall be better placed to invoke their assistance in dealing with Venezuelan claims against British Guiana territory; and we can also take credit for our decision in the discussions with the United States Government on the Defence Review, although the decision itself could scarcely be deferred until these discussions take place.

(c) The Commission of Enquiry appointed by the International Commission of Jurists recommended the provision of an adequate military force from outside the country until the Guyanese security forces were adequate. The only alternative to British troops would be a United Nations force; and the Commonwealth Relations Office have suggested that this possibility should be examined. But the Colonial Secretary gives strong reasons, in paragraph 3 of MISC. 89/1, for rejecting this as a feasible substitute for British forces. These are practical reasons rather than reasons of principle. But, if we accept that the main argument in favour of retaining British troops after independence is the importance which the United States Government attach to our doing so, the considerations in paragraph 3 of MISC. 89/1, reinforce this factor powerfully.

¹ See 241.

3. But, if British forces remain after independence, it is important that:—

(a) Their role should be as strictly limited as possible—i.e. that, instead of carrying the main responsibility for maintaining law and order, as at present, they should act solely as a reserve for the local Guyanese forces and that, in the event of trouble, their primary task should be restricted to protecting the Government and vital installations. (This was the basis on which we were prepared to send British forces into Kenya earlier this year in order to deal with a threatened coup against President Kenyatta).

(b) They should be as inconspicuous as possible. There is force in the Defence Secretary's suggestion that they should be withdrawn from Georgetown and stationed at Atkinson Airfield.

(c) There should be a firm date for their withdrawal. I suspect that the local security forces will not, in fact, be adequate by October 1966. Nevertheless, on this date the British forces should be withdrawn; and this should preferably be stated publicly in advance, in order both to give the local Government the maximum incentive to press on with training their own security forces and to expose us to the minimum risk of having to intervene in a conflict between Burnham and Jagan, with all the potential embarrassments outlined in paragraph 7 of the Defence Secretary's letter. If we make it clear *now* that we intend to withdraw by October 1966, Jagan (if he has any sense) will wait until then before trying to seize power by force and Burnham will have a few extra months in which to prepare for this risk.

4. On balance, the Committee may feel that, although there are clear risks in leaving British troops in Guiana, they are less serious than the alternative courses, i.e. either to defer independence until October, 1966, or to leave Guyana, during the vital initial months of independence, with no adequate backing for the maintenance of internal security except the dubious prospect of a United Nations force.

5. If so, however, it is essential that our troops should be adequately protected against legal action in the local courts in respect of acts which they may commit in maintaining law and order in support of the civil power, even on the limited basis suggested in paragraph 3(a) above. This seems to be covered by paragraph 8(b) of the memorandum; but our agreement to make troops available will presumably be conditional on any requisite local legislation being passed *before* independence.

6. On a relatively minor point, the Defence Secretary says, in paragraph 3 of his letter, that the battalion in question would be due to be relieved in June; and he proposes that they should in fact be relieved in April (i.e. before independence is granted in May or June) in order that their subsequent stay until October may be encompassed within a normal nine months tour. One can see the force of the argument. But the arrival of a new battalion only a month or so before independence is due to be granted will tend not only to highlight our intention to keep troops in the country after independence but also to create the impression that we mean to keep them there for rather longer than we do. It is a pity that the battalion which is due to be relieved in June cannot simply stay on until October, when they would be overdue for relief and their departure would be to that extent more plausible on strictly military grounds.

244 CAB 130/248, MISC 89/1**8 Nov 1965****'Security arrangements in Guyana after independence': minutes of
Cabinet Committee on British Guiana¹****[Extract]**

[The minutes begin with an opening statement by Greenwood, summarising the arguments in 241, followed by a statement by Healey, reiterating the points made in his letter to Greenwood at 238. They then continue with an appraisal by Sir R Luyt, the governor.]

... *The Governor of British Guiana* said that the situation in British Guiana had greatly improved during the past year and, although the present Government had not won over the bulk of the Indian population, they had the support of a part of it and of a majority in the country as a whole. For the first time in the twelve years since the constitution had been suspended there was a feeling of confidence in the economic and political future. The local security forces consisted of a regular army battalion which was now being recruited and a territorial battalion which was being reorganised and trained. There was also an efficient police force. All these forces were being organised on an inter-racial basis, though the police force would for some time remain predominantly African. A detailed timetable had been worked out for the recruitment and training of these forces and they should be ready to assume responsibility for maintaining internal security by October. His military and police advisers agreed that the internal security position was improving and early independence could be expected to discourage the organisation of large scale subversion. It was not yet safe to agree to a reduction of the British garrison in February, but one battalion could be withdrawn on independence or perhaps even earlier and the local forces could on independence take over the routine maintenance of internal security. The P.P.P. could still create local disturbances but he was satisfied that the Guianese forces could deal with these and the risk of Dr. Jagan being able or even attempting to overthrow the Government was remote. To delay independence beyond about May would mean losing the present momentum and would be interpreted both in British Guiana and elsewhere as a lack of confidence by the United Kingdom Government. This could have serious effects both on the internal situation and on the prospects of obtaining aid and investment from abroad. If the British battalion remained after independence, a date for its withdrawal should be fixed and announced in advance.

In discussion it was suggested that despite these considerations, it would be preferable to delay the grant of independence until October, when British troops could safely be withdrawn. It was however the general view of the meeting that, although there were risks in leaving British troops in Guyana after independence, these were less serious than the risk of deferring independence until October or of leaving a vacuum during the interim period until local forces were adequate to take over. Reliance could not be placed on a United Nations force and any criticism in the United Nations of the retention of British forces would be minimised if Mr. Burnham asked for them to remain in order to assist in training the local forces. It would be important not to suggest that the British forces were needed to defend Guyana

¹ Present: Wilson, Callaghan, Stewart, Healey, Bottomley, Greenwood, Poynton and Luyt. Also present from the secretariat: Trend, P Rogers and D S Laskey.

against external attack since this would encourage Venezuela to press her claim against Guyana. If we agreed to keep British forces we should in return try to secure Mr. Burnham's agreement to the Venezuelan claim being referred to the International Court of Justice.

In further discussion it was suggested that the Canadian Government might be asked to share this responsibility with us and to contribute forces. It was however pointed out that they might be unwilling to have Canadian forces in Guyana after independence and to the extent that Canadian forces replaced British forces this would complicate the training which British forces were giving to the local Guyanese forces and delay their readiness to take over full responsibility for internal security.

Summing up the discussion *The Prime Minister* said that it was generally agreed that the grant of independence should not be delayed until October 1966 and that the suggestion that a United Nations force should provide the necessary backing for the maintenance of internal security was not practicable. On balance, the Meeting agreed that British forces should remain and Mr. Burnham might be informed that we were prepared to have discussions with him on this basis. It must be made clear that our forces would remain at the request of the British Guiana Government in order to assist in the training of the local forces and there must be prior legislation to give them full protection against legal process arising from their actions. The timing of the reduction and final withdrawal of British forces should be decided and announced in advance. The best arrangement might be for the battalion which was due for relief to be replaced in February; the other battalion would be withdrawn on independence and the remaining battalion in October, 1966. We could still take credit for our agreement to leave British forces after independence during the discussions with the United States Government on the Defence Review, though the decision to do so would have to be taken in advance of these discussions and would no doubt become known to the United States Government.

The Meeting:—

Approved MISC. 89/1, subject to the points made by the Prime Minister in his summing up.

245 PREM 13/734

19 Nov 1965

[British Guiana]: CO brief for Mr Wilson's talk with Mr Burnham on the arrangements for independence

1. *The constitutional conference*

The Prime Minister might open by congratulating Mr. Burnham on the outcome. The Conference has resulted in agreement that British Guiana should become independent on . . .¹ with a Constitution adapted from the present one. It will include safeguards for human rights, the rule of law, and democratic government. The system of proportional representation will be maintained but there is provision for some changes later, if the British Guiana Parliament wishes, so that some members will have a connection with constituencies.

¹ Date left blank in the original but see 246.

2. *The Queen and membership of the Commonwealth*

British Guiana is to have a Governor-General at least until 1st January 1969. The Constitution will enable the British Guiana Parliament to substitute a President for the Governor-General after that date (the Queen has approved this arrangement). The Delegates have gone on record as hoping that British Guiana will be accepted as a full Member of the Commonwealth.

3. *British troops*

It has been agreed that British troops will stay in British Guiana until October 1966.² Mr. Burnham has accepted our conditions viz:—

- (a) The public line will be that the troops are staying at the British Guiana Government's request to assist in training their forces;
- (b) Indemnifying legislation for our troops;
- (c) The troops will be used only as a last resort and with our agreement.

4. *Defensive brief*

Mr. Burnham may raise:—

(a) *Independence aid*

He expects a "golden handshake" and is to have a talk about this later with the Colonial Secretary when he will be told that while we shall of course be prepared to discuss continuing developing aid after independence, we are not yet ready for this mainly because we have not yet had time to examine his new developing [sic] plans. Also Mr. Burnham is aiming at an international aid consortium, (U.K./U.S.A./Canada/ West Germany) and if we are to follow this up we ought meanwhile to settle our own aid bilaterally.³

(b) *Defence agreement*

Mr. Burnham is disappointed that we have declined to enter into a defence agreement. We have explained that we did [sic] not do so unless the area is one in which there are direct British defence interests. He has accepted this and is unlikely to return to it. If he does, the most we can say is that if British Guiana appeals to us for help in an emergency we shall be ready to consider their request in the light of the circumstances at the time including the efforts of the Guyanese Government to prevent the emergency from arising. But any understanding on this should remain an oral one.

(c) *Venezuela's claim to two-thirds of British Guiana*

The boundary between British Guiana and Venezuela was established by an arbitral award in 1899 which the Venezuelans now maintain was unjust. There is no substance in the Venezuelan claim and, having consulted the law officers, the Foreign Office would be prepared to offer to refer the dispute to the International Court of Justice. Mr. Burnham will not agree to this. Mr. Burnham is anxious that there should be a defence agreement which *inter alia* would guarantee British Guiana's boundary with Venezuela. (See note (b) above.)

² See 244.

³ Upon independence, Guyana received £3 million in financial aid up to the year 1966–1967 (£1 million budgetary aid, £1.2 million in development grants and £750,000 in technical assistance). A development loan of £416,000 was also provided in the first quarter of 1966 (ODM 28/9, no 32, 'Aid to the Caribbean', ODM survey, 17 Oct 1966).

246 PREM 13/734

19 Nov 1965

'British Guiana conference': outward circular telegram no 465 from FO and CRO to missions abroad on the outcome of the independence conference

In fulfilment of the British Government's undertaking the Colonial Secretary invited all parties in the Legislature to attend a Conference opening in London on 2 November 1965 to settle an independence constitution and to fix the date for independence.¹ The Conference (boycotted by Dr. Jagan's opposition party) concluded 19 November with agreement that British Guiana should become independent, under name of Guyana, on 26 May 1966. Guyana will be a monarchy but there is provision for a change to a republic not earlier than 1969. It is intended to seek membership of Commonwealth.

2. Dr. Jagan, the P.P.P. leader who ceased to be Premier after the December 1964 elections, declined to attend the Conference claiming that the electoral system devised in 1963 was unacceptable to the majority of the B.G. people, pointing out that a state of emergency existed and a number of people were in detention, and concluding that the conference should not be held in such circumstances.² He rejected the Colonial Secretary's appeal that he should not throw away this opportunity to share in the making of vital decisions at the Conference and persisted in his boycott. (As regards detainees, there are at present only 17 and these can apply to have their cases reviewed by a tribunal).

3. Very full discussions, from which no relevant matters were excluded, took place. The Conference agreed on a form of constitution based generally on the existing constitution with adaptations appropriate to an independent state. In view of absence of opposition parties the Conference was especially conscious of its responsibility to take decisions in best interests of all the people of British Guiana whatever their race or creed. Particularly important was the International Commission of Jurists' Report on Racial Problems in Public Service.³ Memoranda from individuals and organisations on draft constitution were all closely examined by Conference. The constitution contains strong safeguards for protection of individuals and minorities, independence of judiciary and impartiality of Public Service.

4. The Conference can (despite absence of P.P.P.) be regarded as satisfactory. Although its reception in British Guiana cannot be predicted with certainty, it is hoped that now the die is cast there will be general cooperation. The solemn declaration of intent at end of Conference Report (which will be sent to some posts) calls for an end to communal divisions and for all Guyanese, on independence, to set aside bitterness and strive together for peace and prosperity.

5. All the above may be freely used.

¹ See CAB 133/158 and *Report of the British Guiana Independence Conference, 1965* (Cmnd 2849, 1965).

² See 239.

³ See 236.

247 PREM 13/734**21 Feb 1966**

[Venezuelan-British Guiana frontier]: outward circular telegram no 63 from FO and CRO to missions abroad on the Geneva agreement

On 17 February the Foreign Secretary, the Venezuelan Foreign Minister and the Prime Minister of British Guiana, signed an agreement the main provisions of which are:—

2. A Mixed Commission, consisting of two Venezuelans and two Guianese, is to be established. If the Commission cannot solve the controversy within four years, it will refer outstanding questions to the Governments of Venezuela and British Guiana, who will then decide which of the means of peaceful settlement provided in Article 33 of the United Nations Charter they will adopt. If unable to agree they will ask an appropriate international organ acceptable to them both, to decide on the means of settlement under Article 33, or failing that, the Secretary General of the United Nations.

3. The Agreement does not prejudice the legal position of either side, which remains unaltered. The United Kingdom and British Guiana continue to regard the 1899 Award as valid, while Venezuela regards it as null and void. During the life of the Commission neither side may assert territorial claims of any kind except in the Mixed Commission. The provisions of the relevant article of the Agreement are modelled on those of Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty of 1959.

4. We regard the Agreement as an honourable compromise between two diametrically opposed points of view. It is also a remarkable achievement in settling a difficult dispute peacefully. You will recall that the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes formed the subject of an initiative which the United Kingdom took at the last session of the United Nations General Assembly. We hope that the Mixed Commission can be set up quickly and that the Agreement will pave the way for a friendly and constructive relationship between British Guiana and Venezuela.

5. The Venezuelan delegation included representatives of all parties represented in Congress, who expressed their support for the Agreement. We therefore hope that the Venezuelan propaganda campaign directed against ourselves will now be brought to an end.

6. All the above may be used freely.

248 CAB 148/27, OPD(66)36**25 Feb 1966**

[Associated status]: memorandum by Lord Longford for Cabinet Defence and Oversea Policy Committee

The first of a series of conferences with most of the Leeward and Windward Islands, designed to give them a new relationship with Britain as "Associated Territories" will open with Antigua on the 28th February. It is planned that two other conferences will follow, first with the four Windward Islands on the 18th April and then with St. Kitts on the 11th May.

2. The purpose of these conferences is to see whether it is possible to reach agreement with these territories on the proposals put to them last year and published as

Cmnd. 2865.¹ The object of the proposals is that the Islands should cease to be colonies and become associated territories: the basis of their association with us being that they should have full internal autonomy while we remain responsible merely for their defence and external affairs. It would be a condition of the creation and continuance of this new relationship that there should be constitutional provisions that would ensure the rule of law and the observance of normal democratic practices and that we should have adequate powers under the constitutions to discharge our external affairs and defence responsibilities in any circumstances that may arise.

3. The main features of the proposals are as follows:—

(a) Except in the interests of external affairs and defence, the British Parliament would no longer have the power to legislate for these territories save with their consent. The local legislatures would have full powers of legislation—even to the extent of taking the territories to independence if they so wished.

(b) The constitutions would contain certain basic clauses enshrining the arrangements for democratic government and for the relationship between Britain and the territory. These clauses could be amended only by a two-thirds majority in the legislature followed by a two-thirds majority of the votes cast in a referendum.

(c) There would be a Superior Court for the region under a President appointed by the Lord Chancellor with special jurisdiction and powers to uphold the constitution. The Court would have the power to issue orders to any authority to ensure that the Constitution is complied with.

(d) The British Government's powers in relation to defence and external affairs would, subject to the constitution, include full power to legislate on any matter as might appear necessary to the British Government to prevent circumstances arising in a territory which might prejudice the discharge of Britain's responsibilities.

4. The proposals have been reasonably well received in all territories. It is, however, expected that the island Chief Ministers will try to restrict the powers of the superior court and also to limit Her Majesty's Government's powers of intervention in the discharge of its external affairs responsibilities. Both these features are fundamental from Her Majesty's Government's point of view and the negotiations may be difficult.

5. I circulate this for the information of my colleagues.

¹ *Constitutional proposals for Antigua, St Kitts/Nevis/Anguilla, Dominica, St Lucia, St Vincent, Grenada* (Cmnd 2865, Dec 1965), elaborating on the proposals discussed in 234.

249 CAB 148/27, OPD(66)48

7 Apr 1966

[Associated status]: memorandum by Mr Lee for Cabinet Defence and Oversea Policy Committee on the Antigua constitutional conference.

Annexes C and D to the report of the conference on the procedures for dealing with defence and external affairs

The Antigua Constitutional Conference referred to in O.P.D. (66) 36 of 25th February¹ concluded successfully on 25th March after a month of difficult negotiation.

¹ See 248.

2. There were two aspects of the proposals put forward in Cmnd. 2865 which gave difficulty. The first was the extent of the British Government's powers in the field of defence and external affairs, and the second was which clauses in the Constitution should be subject to special entrenchment—and as such amendable by the special procedure which would require a referendum carried by a two-thirds majority of votes cast.

3. In the end satisfactory agreement was reached on both points and the results of the Conference are set out in an agreed Report (copy attached)² which has already been made available to the Press and which it is hoped to publish later this month as a Command Paper. The proposals set out in the Report differ from those in Cmnd. 2865 in the following main aspects:—

(a) If Antigua wishes to sever the association with Britain and replace it with an association with an independent Commonwealth country in the Caribbean area, there will be no need for a referendum. The reason which, it was felt, made possible this concession was that one of the main objects of insisting on the referendum procedure is to make it fairly difficult for these small islands to proceed to independence, since neither we nor the Americans are anxious to see a proliferation of "mini-states" in the Caribbean Sea. If, however, a state in association with Britain were to link up instead with another already independent Commonwealth country, there would as a result be no increase in the number of sovereign states in the area.

(b) The court arrangements have been slightly changed, and there will be a Regional Supreme Court consisting of a High Court and a Court of Appeal. Constitutional cases and cases affecting fundamental rights will go to the High Court in the first instance, and not to the Court of Appeal. The President of the Supreme Court will be appointed by The Queen. (This will be done on the advice of the Lord Chancellor, though this is not expressly stated in the Report, so the effect is the same as in the proposals in Cmnd. 2865.)

(c) The British Government Representative in the area will not have the right to refer a matter to the courts.

4. A solution to the difficult problem of Britain's powers in the field of defence and external affairs was arrived at by setting out in an agreement (as outlined in Annex C of the Report) the way in which the British government's powers in this field will be exercised. Britain will also entrust to Antigua responsibility for carrying out certain external affairs functions. This procedure is described in a proposed draft despatch at Annex D of the Report.

Windward Islands constitutional conference

5. The Conference with the Windward Islands of Dominica, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and Grenada on the proposals in Cmnd. 2865 will open in Lancaster House on the 18th April. All four territories have put forward their proposals or comments on Cmnd. 2865. These were prepared before they had seen the Antigua Report. Nevertheless, it is clear that the points which caused difficulty in the case of Antigua will also be the principal points for discussion with the Windward Islands, namely, the extent of Britain's powers in the field of defence and external affairs and the

² Only Annexes C and D are reproduced here.

procedure for amending the basic clauses of the Constitution, particularly the procedure of having a two-thirds majority of the votes cast in a referendum. On the external affairs point, however, it is hoped that when the Windward Governments have studied the arrangements come to in the case of Antigua they will consider them acceptable. The maintenance of a two-thirds majority of the votes cast in a referendum before the basic clauses can be altered—especially the clauses which would take a territory to independence—is a point of great importance to the Foreign Office as well as to the Colonial Office, and it is expected that if the United Kingdom side stand firm on it the Windward Islands Governments will agree.

6. One of the main difficulties in dealing with the next Conference will be negotiating four internal territorial constitutions; but this is not a matter which is likely to raise points of interest to other departments.

Annex C to report of Antigua constitutional conference: The heads of agreement on defence and external affairs

General

1. There will be a preamble referring to the provisions of the Order in Council defining the powers of the United Kingdom Parliament and Her Majesty in Council to Legislate for Antigua.

2. This agreement will have effect as long as the association between the United Kingdom and Antigua lasts, but will be capable of modification by mutual agreement.

Defence

3. The United Kingdom Government will be responsible for the defence of Antigua against external aggression.

4. The Antigua Government will take all steps (including, where necessary, steps to secure the passage of legislation) to provide such facilities as may be required in Antigua by the United Kingdom Government for the fulfilment of their responsibilities or obligations with respect to the defence of Antigua or of the United Kingdom and its associated states and territories or the safety of any other part of the Commonwealth or of any of the allies of the United Kingdom.

5. The Antigua Government will not, without the consent of the United Kingdom, grant access to any part of its territory or territorial waters to, or allow the use of any of its airfields, communications or harbour facilities by, the forces or agents of any other government.

6. An agreement dealing with the exercise of jurisdiction over U.K. visiting forces and other matters normally dealt with in status of forces agreements will be entered into at the same time as this agreement.

7. Any United Kingdom forces introduced into Antigua for defence purposes under this agreement will not be used in aid of the civil power or for any purposes other than defence purposes except at the request of the Antigua Government and with the agreement of the United Kingdom Government.

External affairs

8. The United Kingdom Government undertakes responsibility for the external relations of Antigua.

9. The United Kingdom Government will consult the Antigua Government before entering into international obligations with respect to Antigua.

10. The United Kingdom Government will from time to time by despatch define the extent to which the Antigua Government will have authority to act in the field of external relations.

11. The Antigua Government will take all steps (including, where necessary, steps to secure the passage of legislation) required by the United Kingdom Government:—

- (a) to secure the fulfilment of the Commonwealth or international obligations or responsibilities of the United Kingdom Government; or
- (b) in the interests of good relations between Antigua or the United Kingdom and another country.

12. The Antigua Government will not introduce or support legislation which might affect the discharge of the United Kingdom Government's Commonwealth or international obligations or responsibilities or the maintenance of good relations between Antigua or the United Kingdom and another country without prior reference to and consultation with the United Kingdom Government. The Antigua Government will not proceed with or support legislation if the United Kingdom Government informs them that its passage would be detrimental to the discharge of those obligations or responsibilities or the maintenance of such relations.

13. (1) Where in the opinion of the United Kingdom Government the enactment of legislation for Antigua is required in the interests of the responsibility of the United Kingdom Government for the external affairs or defence of Antigua or of the United Kingdom and its other associated states and territories the United Kingdom Government shall invite the Antigua Government either:—

- (a) to signify its consent to the enactment of the legislation by the Parliament of the United Kingdom or by Her Majesty in Council; or
- (b) to take steps to secure the enactment of the legislation by the Parliament of Antigua or other appropriate authority in Antigua.

(2) If the consent of the Government of Antigua to the enactment of legislation by the Parliament of the United Kingdom or by Her Majesty in Council is signified under paragraph (1) (a) of this clause, the United Kingdom Government may take steps to secure the enactment of the legislation accordingly.

(3) If the Government of Antigua sees difficulty in acceding to a request made to it by the United Kingdom Government under paragraph (1) of this clause, then the fullest consultation that is practicable in the circumstances of the case shall take place between the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of Antigua with a view to resolving the difficulty.

(4) Where after consultation under paragraph (3) of this clause there is failure to reach agreement concerning the enactment of legislation, and the United Kingdom Government remain of the opinion that it is nevertheless necessary for legislation to be enacted in the interests of its responsibility for the external affairs or defence of Antigua or of the United Kingdom and its other associated states and territories, the United Kingdom Government shall give as much notice as possible to the Government of Antigua of its intention to take steps to secure the enactment of the legislation by the Parliament of the United Kingdom or by Her Majesty in

Council; and before taking such steps shall so far as is practicable afford the Government of Antigua the opportunity of considering whether, in all circumstances, it would wish to take steps to secure the termination of the association between the United Kingdom and Antigua.

Annex D to report of Antigua constitutional: Draft despatch on external affairs

1. In carrying out its general responsibility for the external affairs of Antigua the British Government will seek the fullest consultation with the Government of Antigua and will at all times have special regard to the interests of the Government of Antigua and of the association between the two Governments.

2. Subject to the understandings set out in later paragraphs of this despatch Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom hereby delegate executive authority to the Government of Antigua with respect to their external relations with other countries as follows:—

(a) authority to apply for full or associate membership, as may be provided for in the Constitution of the organisation concerned, of those United Nations Specialised Agencies or similar international organisations of which the United Kingdom is itself a member and for membership of which Antigua is eligible;

(b) authority to arrange or permit visits by representatives of or persons in the employ of any organisation under subparagraph (a) above of which Antigua is a full or associate member;

(c) authority to negotiate and conclude trade agreements with other countries, whether bilateral or multilateral relating solely to the treatment of goods. Agreements relating to establishment matters (i.e. those affecting the rights of persons and companies of the contracting parties) will continue to be dealt with in commercial treaties negotiated by the British Government. The British Government will, however, be prepared, in appropriate circumstances to delegate to the Government of Antigua *ad hoc* authority to conclude individual trade agreements in which establishment matters are included. Agreements affecting Antigua relating to civil aviation and shipping will continue to be dealt with in accordance with present practice whereby the British Government engages in the fullest consultation with the Antigua Government and invites their participation in such negotiations as are necessary;

(d) authority to arrange or permit visits of up to thirty days for trade or commercial purposes by representatives or residents of Antigua to any other country, and by representatives or residents of any other country to Antigua (though questions relating to the establishment of permanent or temporary representation of other countries in Antigua or of Antigua in other countries will continue to be determined by the British Government after consultation with the Government of Antigua);

(e) authority to negotiate and sign agreements of purely local concern with any member of the British Commonwealth or any British Colony in the Caribbean area;

(f) authority to negotiate and sign agreements for financial and technical assistance or of a cultural or scientific nature with any member of the British Commonwealth and with the United States of America;

(g) authority to negotiate and sign agreements with other countries whether multilateral or bilateral relating to emigration from Antigua to those countries and to emigrant labour schemes.

3. In addition the British Government will give sympathetic consideration to any request by the Antigua Government for authority to take action on individual questions of external relations not covered by this despatch.

4. In view of the general responsibility of the British Government for the external affairs of Antigua under the terms of the association mutually agreed between them the Government of Antigua have agreed to inform the British Government in advance of any proposal for the exercise of the authority to conduct negotiations delegated to the Government of Antigua in paragraph 2(c), (e), (f) and (g) of this despatch and to keep the British Government informed of the progress of any such negotiations. The British Government will inform the Antigua Government if it shall appear that there is any conflict between the actions or proposals of the Antigua Government in this field and the international commitments, responsibilities or policies of the British Government. The Antigua Government have agreed that after consultation they will accept the decision of Her Majesty's Government in such matters.

250 FO 371/184566, no 54

29 Apr 1966

[Associated status]: letter from Mr Stewart to Mr Rusk explaining the proposed arrangements and requesting US support

[Earlier in the month, the UK embassy in Washington reported that the State Dept was 'still in some confusion' over the exact status of Antigua under the proposed constitutional arrangements. US officials were taking a legalistic view that although Antiguan possessed the right to move to independence unilaterally whenever they chose to do so, pending the exercise of that right they could not formally be regarded as independent. The issue was important because US support for the new arrangements would be needed at the UN; also it would be difficult to obtain US aid if Congress could not be persuaded that, to all intents and purposes, Antigua was independent from a financial point of view. It was therefore suggested that the foreign secretary should write to Rusk to clarify the position 'before the various legal officers in the State Department begin to put possibly unfavourable interpretations on the new constitution' (FO 371/184566, no 36, M N F Stewart (UK embassy, Washington) to H A F Hohler (FO), 7 Apr 1966).]

When Mr. Greenwood was in Washington last autumn¹ (as Colonial Secretary) he mentioned to you, in the course of a general discussion on our colonial problems, the new proposals which had been worked out for a number of our smaller islands in the Eastern Caribbean. We have just completed the first of a series of conferences in London with the local governments and after long and hard discussions the Antigua Government has accepted the framework of our scheme.² Your officials have received copies of the report of this conference. We have just begun a conference with the four Windward Islands (Dominica, Grenada, St. Lucia and St. Vincent) and a conference with St. Kitts is to follow; we shall naturally keep you informed of the outcome.

We hope to secure agreement that each of the territories will become a state in voluntary association with Britain. We shall remain responsible for the defence and

¹ See 235.

² See 249.

external affairs while they will have full autonomy in other respects, with the right to amend their own internal constitutions and even become independent if there is an overwhelming demand for independence confirmed by two-thirds of the votes cast in a referendum. The exception to this is where Antigua may wish to associate with another Commonwealth country in the Caribbean which would assume all our responsibilities for Antigua's external and defence affairs.

We have included this option of independence in order to demonstrate the voluntary character of the new relationship. None of the territories (except Antigua, and they only half-heartedly) has so far shown any interest in separate independence; but if later on there were a demand for independence from any of these islands backed by such a large majority as we have prescribed, it would in practice be impossible to resist it.

An important point we stood out for with Antigua was that, since we retain responsibility for defence and external affairs, we must in the last resort have the power to legislate for the territory in that sphere. Nevertheless we shall of course do everything we can to proceed by agreement. To do otherwise would put the continuance of the association in jeopardy. At the same time we have made it plain that we shall also need to take into account our obligations to any other associated states, to our dependent territories, and to the Commonwealth and our allies. These understandings are to be incorporated in a formal agreement.

In addition, we have promised (as was always our intention), to delegate to the Antigua Government considerable authority to act in the field of external affairs, subject to our own general responsibility in this sphere. It has been a common practice of ours to make formal delegations of this kind to territories not yet independent, but at an advanced stage of constitutional development. In this case the delegation will, among other things, authorise the local government to enter into negotiations, and conclude agreements, with other governments on certain specified subjects (such as trade and technical assistance) and in other cases with specified countries only. The Antigua Government have undertaken to keep us informed of the course of such negotiations and we shall have the power to intervene if they appear to run counter to our international commitments, responsibilities or policies.

They themselves may wish from time to time to have our direct assistance (through our Embassies or otherwise) and this we shall naturally be very ready to accord. Subject to these general considerations we shall wish to encourage them to run their own show as much as possible themselves in regard to the specified subjects, and to be seen to be doing so. They will also be empowered to join international organisations (excluding the United Nations itself) of which we are ourselves a member and for membership of which they are eligible.

Naturally, the value of this kind of delegation turns on how far other governments are ready to recognise the authority we confer on the local governments. This applies in particular to the way the latter are regarded as potential recipients of United States aid. I hope that the United States agencies concerned will be able to deal with the Antiguanans in virtually the same way as an independent country.

I am sure that you will agree that everything possible should be done to make the Antigua Government feel that their new status represents a major step forward and is one with which they can be content. We shall do all we can to ensure that they do not find the relationship unduly restrictive and that they are not tempted to take up the option of complete independence. As you know, they can be exceedingly

difficult. It would help us immensely if you would follow a similar line in dealing with them.

The new status of these territories will be a novel one, although the arrangements are in many respects analogous to those recently introduced in the Cook Islands by New Zealand. But the Eastern Caribbean is internationally more sensitive and the politicians there are more accustomed to contacts with other countries. It is therefore probably [sic] that many of the problems of international law posed by the new status will first arise over these territories. We believe it will be possible to deal with any such problems pragmatically and without embarrassment to the parties involved.

We shall be discussing with your Mission in New York the presentation of these new arrangements in the United Nations as representing in the Charter phrase "a full measure of self-government". This question was mentioned briefly in the talks on United Nations matters which Mr. Goldberg³ had in London earlier this year and I am sure that at the appropriate time we can depend on your support on this point. But the more general point which I have wanted to put to you in this letter is the importance we attach to your fully acknowledging the dignity of the new status of these territories and helping to convince them that it is indeed a worthy alternative to full independence.

³ Arthur J Goldberg, US ambassador to the UN.

251 CAB 148/28, OPD(66)57

12 May 1966

[Associated status]: memorandum by Mr Lee for Cabinet Defence and Oversea Policy Committee on the Windward Islands constitutional conference

[The problem to which Lee refers in para 2 of this memo arose in more acute form at the St Kitts/Nevis/Anguilla conference which was convened between 12 and 26 May 1966. In order to attract private capital for specific tourist development schemes, Mr. Southwell, the chief minister, insisted that he needed assurances of further financial assistance from the UK, particularly for airport facilities to allow direct flights from the American continent. At Southwell's request, the conference set up an economic sub-committee, at a meeting of which on 18 May the chief minister was informed of the extent of the UK balance of payments crisis; the UK had to repay £900 million to its international creditors by 1970 (CAB 133/349, SKCC(ESC)66/1). On development aid, the UK proposed to honour undertakings already given in the Overseas Development and Service Act, 1965 (Cmnd 2865) under which CD&W allocations to each territory had been determined to 31 March 1968. Allocations for the remaining period of the Act, to 31 March 1970, would be considered at an appropriate time. Territories would also be eligible for budgetary aid over three-year cycles (CAB 133/348, SKCC(66)6, 'Budgetary aid and development aid to territories in association with GB', note by B A StJ Hepburn, secretary general to conference, 12 May 1966). Only when he was convinced by Lee and Greenwood, now minister for overseas development, that the UK could not go beyond the limited assurances already given was Southwell persuaded to sign the final conference report (CAB 148/28, OPD(66)67, memo by Lee on St Kitts/Nevis/Anguilla constitutional conference, 9 June 1966).]

As foreshadowed in paragraph 5 of O.P.D. (66) 48 of the 7th April, 1966,¹ the Windward Islands Conference opened on the 18th April: it concluded on the 6th May.

¹ See 249.

Contrary to the forecast in paragraph 6 of O.P.D. (66) 48 the negotiation of the four internal territorial constitutions did not give rise to undue difficulty. The association arrangements themselves, as proposed in our White Paper Cmnd. 2865, were also generally acceptable to all the Governments and the Opposition parties, subject to certain minor modifications. Although there was some opposition to our proposals for a referendum as a safeguard against too easy constitutional amendment and also about external affairs, it was not pressed.

2. The difficulties of the Conference were of a different nature. Very early in the proceedings the delegates made it plain that they suspected that we had put forward the proposals in Cmnd. 2865 largely because we wanted to be rid of them. They therefore pressed me very hard to give them guarantees that under these association arrangements they would enjoy a more favourable position as regards aid, trade with the United Kingdom and immigration into the United Kingdom than they would enjoy either as Colonies or as independent countries. These assurances I was unable to give. I took the line that the constitutional changes proposed did not, as such, affect the islands' position in these matters one way or the other.

3. In the end agreement was reached with all four delegations that they would recommend to their legislatures arrangements for association substantially on the lines of those agreed to with Antigua and set out in Cmnd. 2963. The Conference Report will be published early next month.

St. Kitts constitutional conference

4. The Conference with the Government of St. Kitts–Nevis–Anguilla will open in Lancaster House on the 12th May. It will be the last of the series of conferences to deal with the proposals in Cmnd. 2865. No special difficulties are expected other perhaps than on the use of the referendum for amending the basic clauses of the constitution, to which the St. Kitts delegation have expressed opposition. I am hopeful that I shall be able to convince them that their apprehensions on this point are groundless. It is not one on which we should yield.

252 FO 371/184566, no 76

28 May 1966

[Associated status]: letter (reply) from Mr Rusk to Mr Stewart on the US view of the proposed arrangements

Thank you for your letter of April 29¹ discussing the future status of the British islands in the Eastern Caribbean. We have received the reports of the Antigua and the Windward Islands constitutional conferences. The plan for each of the six territories to "become a state in voluntary association with Great Britain" does seem a clear step in the direction of preventing a fragmentation of small entities in the area. In the light of the reluctance of these islands to form a federation, the new association offers a practical alternative to continued colonial dependence on the one hand and independence on the other.

You can be assured of the cooperation of the United States with regard to your presentation of the new arrangements in the United Nations. You should, however, be aware that the proposal to permit Antigua to join international organizations

¹ See 250.

other than the United Nations may pose some problems to this government since the United States Government is solely responsible for the foreign relations of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. I am confident that the evolving relations of the United States with the area will be consistent with the dignity of the new status of the territories. I am especially pleased to note that the continuing United Kingdom relationship and guidance will insure constitutional and civil order in the islands.

Your request that we regard Antigua and the other islands as independent in connection with their becoming "potential recipients of U.S. aid" raises a question. As you know, there has been increasingly strong pressure from Congress to limit United States economic assistance and the number of recipient countries. As part of our current review of United States relations with the Eastern Caribbean islands, we will be considering the subject of United States participation in the economic development of the islands.

May I again express my thanks for your letter. We would appreciate being informed on a continuing basis of the progress of the constitutional conference not yet concluded, and your general views regarding the constitutional developments taking place in the Eastern Caribbean.

253 CAB 148/28, OPD(66)70

15 June 1966

'Barbados constitutional conference': memorandum by Mr Lee for
Cabinet Defence and Oversea Policy Committee

General background

Barbados is the most easterly of the Caribbean islands, with an area of 166 square miles and a population of about 250,000 (about 90 per cent of African descent, about 4 per cent of European descent, and the remainder mainly of mixed descent). The island, which was first settled early in the seventeenth century and has remained a British possession throughout, is one of our oldest Colonies. For most of this time it has enjoyed a large degree of self-government, although complete internal self-government, with responsibility for defence and external affairs reserved to the Governor, did not come until 1961.

2. Barbados has for long been financially self-supporting and has a tradition of stable government. Commerce is still mainly, but to a decreasing extent, in the hands of the white and mixed elements, whilst the Government consists of persons of African descent (there is universal adult suffrage with the vote given at age 18). There are no racial tensions likely to produce security problems, though at present feeling is running high between the governing party, the Democratic Labour Party, on the one hand and the two Opposition parties—the Barbados National Party and the Barbados Labour Party—on the other. The economy is almost wholly based on sugar and tourism, and the well-being of the sugar industry is directly related to the island's participation in the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement.

Political background

3. After the break-up of the Federation of the West Indies and the grant of independence to Jamaica and Trinidad in 1962, there were extensive but abortive discussions about the possibility of federating the remaining eight dependent

territories. It became clear by 1965 that there was little prospect of early agreement being reached, and in August the Barbados Government proposed to its Legislature that Barbados should proceed to separate independence before considering federation further. We have since agreed with six of the Leeward and Windward Islands that they should enter into the new constitutional relationship, as states in association with Britain (see O.P.D. (66) 48, 57 and 67).¹

4. The Barbados proposals were debated in the local Legislature in January this year, and a resolution was passed requesting me to convene an early conference to discuss independence within the Commonwealth in 1966. But in both cases the voting followed almost exactly the strengths of the Government party on one side and the two Opposition parties combined on the other. The main arguments of the Opposition were that the Government had no mandate to take the island into separate independence, that further efforts should be made to bring about a new Federation, and that the electorate should first be given the opportunity of expressing their wishes in so important a matter.

5. The resolution was transmitted to me at the end of January. It was accepted and arrangements have been made for the Conference to open in London on Monday, 20th June.

Independence and the alternatives

6. Despite its small area and population Barbados is at least as capable of sustaining independence as many of the ex-colonies which have already achieved it. If it can be shown that independence is what the people of Barbados want we should be ready to agree. This would be in line with our general colonial policy and would not prejudice our interests.

7. It is possible that the Opposition parties may ask the British delegation to say whether, if Barbados does not go to independence in the immediate future, the British Government would agree to its remaining a Colony with internal self-government, or whether we would be prepared to see Barbados become an associated state on the lines agreed with the Leeward and Windward Islands. My view is that we should certainly be willing to make Barbados an associated state, if it can be shown that this is what most Barbadians want. Whether we should be prepared to see Barbados remain a Colony with internal self-government is more difficult. From our own point of view this would run contrary to our general colonial policy, and from their point of view I cannot think that Barbados will want to remain a Colony after the neighbouring and smaller islands have advanced to a new non-colonial status. Internal self-government is an appropriate constitutional status for a colony until it has decided what final status it wants, but is not a satisfactory permanent arrangement. I think Barbados is now ready to choose this final status and I would regard any prolongation of internal self-government as an anomaly. I propose that if the question is raised at the Conference, our line should be that if Barbados does not go independent, we should prefer it to have associated status, and would be most reluctant to agree that it should remain a self-governing colony indefinitely. In practice, however, I do not believe that the parties will agree on any solution other than independence.

¹ See 249 and 251.

Timing

8. The issue that is most likely to cause difficulty at the Conference is the timing of independence in relation to the next general election. Under the constitution the present Legislature must be dissolved by the 19th December this year. The indications are that the Premier will ask us to grant independence before that date, but the Opposition will demand that the election should be held first. The Premier can argue that he secured a mandate for independence at the last election (in 1961) in that the matter was mentioned in his party's election manifesto. The most likely prospect then however was that Barbados would become independent as part of a federation. Moreover, although the Government obtained an overwhelming majority in the House, they polled only 37% of the votes in the election. (This analysis of the voting, incidentally, casts some doubt on whether the Resolution in favour of independence passed in January of this year—see paragraph 4 above—can really be taken as a “popular mandate”.) This somewhat odd result is believed to be largely due to the existence at that time of several two member constituencies. A report of a Boundaries Commission since the 1961 election has recommended their abolition. It has been accepted by the Government but not implemented. If new elections are to provide a more accurate reflection of the popular will, they ought to be held on the basis of the new constituencies.

9. In any case we could not, without great inconvenience, get the independence constitution drafted or the necessary legislation through Parliament before November and it would obviously be wrong for a new country to go into independence with a Legislature that had only a bare month of life before it, and the prospect of an early and controversial election.

10. Unless therefore all parties agree that Barbados should proceed to independence without further reference to the electorate I propose to make it a condition of independence that a resolution requesting us to grant it should be passed by the new Legislature after a general election has been held. Further I should have to insist that the elections were held after the report of our Conference had been published (so that the electors knew what they were voting about) and on the basis of the revised constituencies. If on the other hand we should be confronted with a general demand for independence before the election I would hope to secure agreement that the life of the present Legislature should be extended by about six months.

Summary

11. I seek the agreement of my colleagues that the British delegation should take the following line at the Conference:—

(a) We would be prepared to see Barbados go to independence under a suitable Constitution if that can be shown to our satisfaction to be the wish of the majority of Barbadians;

(b) We would be prepared to contemplate associated status for Barbados, if that were shown to be the wish of the majority of the people of Barbados, but we would be reluctant to agree that it should continue as a self-governing Colony;

(c) We should refuse to agree to independence before fresh elections have been held on the basis of the revised constituencies, following the publication of our Conference report, and a resolution in its favour has been passed by the new Legislature, unless there is general support in the Conference (including the Opposition parties) for independence before the forthcoming elections.

254 OD 28/9, no 35

20 Oct 1966

[UK aid publicity in the Caribbean]: letter from W L Bell¹ to K G Fry²
on the need for a new approach to aid publicity [Extract]

Thank you for your letter CLA 201/426/01 of 28 September about aid publicity. I confess now to greater unease than before.

2. As I understand it (and I list here the great and the small, to clear my own mind):—

(a) John Walsh³ wants an article for “British Trade Topics” featuring the Development Division. I have told him I will write it.

(b) Alan Elgar wants a similar article for the Board of Trade Journal; and has asked me to write it.

(c) Barbados Chamber of Commerce have asked me for an article for their Journal. I have written it. Copy attached.⁴

(d) Barbados “Bajan” have asked similarly for copy for their Independence issue. I have written it. Copy attached.

(e) Barbados Rotary Club has asked me to address them. I have accepted. (I have felt unable to refuse these precious gifts of free publicity, even though I still have no answer to my query of 13 June.)

(f) C.O.I./C.R.O. are planning “a distinct campaign this autumn” (it is now nearly November) on which the only action yet taken is, apparently, to invite the Photograph Division to discuss it, and to engage certain authors to write about it.

3. I turn now to (f), and to the minutes of the meeting held at Central Office of Information on the 18th August. They emphasise “considerable difficulties in finding the most effective level to address a Caribbean audience” and list some more:—

(i) Difficult to find new stories.

(ii) Difficult to find “events of even minor importance”.

(iii) Difficult to write up V.S.O. and technical advice—and so on. The issues are apparently so complex and so difficult that sixteen people meeting last August felt unable to grasp, on the eve of Barbados’ Independence and Associated Status elsewhere, a non-recurring, perfect opportunity of publicising what Britain is doing in the Caribbean. Now the opportunity has almost slipped away.

4. I find this defeatist, and depressing. The Caribbean audience is one of the easiest, *not* the most difficult, to reach. English is spoken; each territory is so small that minor events make news; and the grape-vine is splendidly efficient. Canada produces a mini-project, the U.S. a handful of scholarships, and the publicity is deafening. We put 40 V.S.O. in the Little Eight—a large number, relatively; provide hundreds of thousands of pounds for development in all sectors; help to establish radio stations everywhere, all avid for material—and then recite countless reasons why we have nothing to say. Yet this year Britain is putting £4 m. into the Little Eight alone. Surely it can’t *all* be spent on matters of no local interest?

¹ See 233.

² Chief executive officer, Caribbean and Latin American Dept, ODM.

³ UK trade commissioner, East Caribbean.

⁴ Annexes not printed.

5. There is so little about the minutes of the 18 August meeting that seems remotely relevant to the problem on the ground. That problem, in simplest terms, is to keep Britain in the eye of the beholder. Its solution does not involve the provision of articles by West Indians (who may thereby be dubbed Uncle Toms), of documentary films, television features, picture-sets and so on. All these are admirable, and excellent background material; but when do they start, and what are they the background to? To—I suggest—an immediate and continuing publicity programme launched *now* on the following lines:—

(a) A short press release on *every* C. D. and W. project, as soon as it is approved. A £10,000 water project for Dominica is big news—in Dominica. But it must be *promptly* and *accurately* released—right time, right place. And the right place is direct to the appropriate press or radio office; not through the local Government Information Officer, (although he should of course receive a copy), because he is a civil servant who won't distribute it if his Minister happens to be anti-British that morning.

(b) A requirement that the visit of every technical adviser be announced well before hand, with a clear expression of its purpose; and acceptance of the doctrine that each visitor normally offers an interview, broadcast or release before he leaves. All island newspapers and radio won't always bite—but most will. (The Development Division does this with excellent free publicity as a result. We don't all *enjoy* it; but that's not the point).

(c) A cessation of the concept—for publicity purposes—of “The Caribbean” as an area. Every territory is different; each requires different treatment; and by and large each is only interested in what Britain is doing *for him*. Releases such as the 15 page factel (still a draft?) headed “Aid to the Caribbean—General Survey” are, with respect, of very little value—far too long, far too diffuse, far too involved for the news editor who wants to know what St. Lucia got. The same effort put in to a series of territorial pieces could be productive; but even so *not* at the snails pace that has so far characterised the 1966 publicity “drive”. Simple and speedy publicity beamed to a territory about that territory will meet response; the bigger picture should be painted *after* the audience has been secured—for it can't itself secure it.

6. I am sorry if I appear outspoken and impatient, but the slow waltz of the C.O.I. August meeting is so out of tune with local rhythm. This is calypso country; and the most popular and hence most successful calypsos are bluntly phrased, attractively packaged, slap up to date, intensely local, savoured by illiterate and sophisticated alike. I am not suggesting that guitars and steel drums ring out in Hercules Road; but I do urge that someone takes a fresh look at the problem, and ponders the lesson behind the calypso technique. Essentially, the crying need is to tell the people what Britain is doing *for them*. Which means simple, parish-pump stories for the lads of the village. The medium is there—local press, local radio, local grape-vine. The language is common. The facts are readily available—C. D. and W. and the like, projects being approved, implemented, completed week in, week out. The machinery exists—B.I.S., throughout the Caribbean, supported perhaps by the Development Division. The time is right—new political status, new High Commissions, new British Government Representatives. This really is a golden opportunity.

7. The mechanics should not be too difficult to resolve—perhaps along these lines:—

- (a) Three copies of C. D. and W. Treasury submission sent by the O.D.M. desk officer to the Development Division (easier still if and when the Development Division itself prepares the submission).
- (b) Development Division passes one copy to appropriate B.I.S. officer, one to appropriate High Commissioner/B.G.R.
- (c) B.I.S. prepare release, and clear draft with Development Division.
- (d) Desk Officer cables Development Division immediately project is approved, detailing any amendments.
- (e) Development Division gives all clear to B.I.S., who issue release direct to appropriate island press and radio, with copies to the Government Information Officer concerned, to Development Division, and to the appropriate High Commissions/B.G.R.

8. Can we not give this a trial now; and let the films and the television and the distinguished authors and all the other paraphernalia follow along as fill-in? There is a story in every single C.D. and W. release; no-one will tell it unless we do. . . .

255 FO 371/185004, no 10

29 Nov 1966

'United States policy in the English-speaking Caribbean: despatch no 158 from Sir P Dean¹ (Washington) to Mr Brown. *Annex*

In my despatch No. 156 of the 16th of December 1965, I attempted to describe United States policy in the Western Hemisphere, and in paragraphs 10 and 11 I drew attention in particular to the special considerations which affect that policy in the Caribbean area. I now have the honour to report on what appears to be some evolution of American policy towards the English-speaking Caribbean over the last eighteen months. In some respects, particularly as regards the Leeward and Windward Islands, it may be said that a policy is emerging where none existed before.

2. The United States Administration of the day were keen supporters of the Federation of the West Indies and it is a fair assumption that had the Federation survived both the Administration and the Congress would have been ready to develop a close relationship with it. The Americans had already participated in a joint US/UK/Canadian economic mission to the Leeward and Windward Islands in July 1961,² and in the same year had made a grant (which later had to be refunded) towards the establishment of the Federal Loan and Guarantee Fund. Moreover they had told us informally that they were thinking in terms of matching our own programme of economic assistance to the Federation. When therefore the Federation was dissolved in early 1962 there was a corresponding feeling of disappointment, impatience and frustration which coincided with a period of heavy attacks by the Congress on the Administration's world-wide aid policies. It was only natural therefore that if economies had to be made one of the first sufferers should be an area which in American eyes had failed to face the political realities of the modern world and for which the United Kingdom as the metropolitan power could reasonably be held to have the primary responsibility. Accordingly in the period immediately before

¹ See 180, note 3.

² See 193.

and after dissolution the relationship between the United States and the English-speaking Caribbean became rather cooler. No new United States aid funds were made available and the activities of the U.S. aid mission in Trinidad, which had been accredited to the Federation of the West Indies, were run down and eventually terminated in 1964.

3. On the attainment of their independence in August 1962 Trinidad and Jamaica did, however, manage to establish a friendly working relationship with the United States, and American Embassies were set up in both countries. Indeed at one time Jamaica at least seemed to be moving rapidly under American influence. As independent states both Jamaica and Trinidad qualified for American aid which would not have been available to them as dependent territories and Jamaica has since enjoyed a rather limited programme of assistance from the Agency for International Development. Trinidad, apart from an exceptional grant of \$30 million over six years, for which there were special reasons, and minor technical assistance, has been helped only indirectly through the maintenance of the United States base, possibly at a level rather higher than strict United States defence requirements would have dictated. As for the remaining eight territories of the former West Indies Federation, namely the British Windward and Leeward Islands and Barbados, the Americans seem at first to have looked no further ahead than the assumption that they would remain British colonies. Although the State Department soon resigned themselves to living with the prospect of an independent East Caribbean Federation or even, if the worst came to the worst, with an independent Barbados, they made no secret of their preference for the continuance of a straightforward colonial relationship.³ Moreover they soon made it quite clear that there could be no question of United States aid and that it was for the United Kingdom as the metropolitan power to look after the territories' needs.

4. The preceding paragraphs give a necessarily over-simplified picture of the position as it looked by 1964. The United States relationship with the area could not, however, long remain rigid because the situation itself was changing. The danger that a communist-sympathising government would be elected in British Guiana and the potentially ugly situation which had been developing since 1962 between British Guiana and Venezuela helped to bring home to United States officials that they could no longer ignore the non-Latin countries of the Hemisphere. Moreover we had made it clear that if our remaining colonies wished for constitutional advance we would be prepared to grant it: and the islands on their side had shown quite clearly that they would no longer be content with the status of Crown Colonies. An uneasy feeling was therefore abroad in Washington that the British might pull out of the area altogether leaving a dangerous vacuum behind them.

5. In the meantime an inter-departmental battle was taking place within the State Department which, strange though it may sound to those not versed in the ways of the Washington bureaucracy, quickly affected United States policy. Previously all British dependent territories in the Caribbean had fallen within the bailiwick of the Bureau of European Affairs, who had little if any dialogue about them with the Inter-American Bureau since the latter's responsibilities covered the Latin countries of the Hemisphere. Policy towards the English-speaking countries had

³ cf 220.

tended therefore to be evolved by those familiar only with Commonwealth and European problems and to be unrealistically divorced from United States policies in Latin America as a whole or even in the Spanish-speaking Caribbean. On independence responsibility for both Trinidad and Jamaica was transferred to the Inter-American Bureau and this seems to have whetted the latter's appetite. During 1963 and 1964, and increasingly in 1965, the Inter-American Bureau fought hard to obtain responsibility for the whole of the Western Hemisphere except Canada, and the European Bureau for its part resisted tooth and nail. This led to an ambivalence in United States policy towards, for example, the British Guiana/Venezuela dispute, with the Inter-American Bureau concerned above all not to offend Venezuela and the European Bureau generally sympathetic to our own arguments. There was some reason to fear, moreover, that the Inter-American Bureau, used to a free hand in Latin America, would not be much inclined to listen to the British point of view in the Caribbean. That the Inter-American Bureau, the largest and most powerful in the State Department, would get its way was, however, a foregone conclusion and in 1965 (1966 for Guyana) responsibility for all our Caribbean territories was transferred to them. The European Bureau retained responsibility for Bermuda and the Bahamas which were considered to be Atlantic rather than Caribbean islands. The affairs of the English-speaking countries were now therefore being looked at for the first time by an entirely new set of officials, unfamiliar with the region, versed almost exclusively in the ways of the Latin Americans and suspicious of any policy which had been recommended or initiated by the European Bureau. At the same time the Inter-American Bureau, as guardians of the Alliance for Progress, had at their disposal very substantial funds, heavily committed though these might already be, to which the European Bureau could never have aspired.

6. As far as the independent countries of Trinidad and Jamaica are concerned, the main effect of the transfer of policy control to the Inter-American Bureau has been an increased United States interest in persuading them to join the Organisation of American States. This is partly because the whole of the vast Inter-American Bureau machine is geared to the Alliance for Progress, for which most of its funds are voted, and there seems to be some genuine bureaucratic difficulty in dealing with countries who are not part of the Alliance. More important, however, it is hoped that if Trinidad and Jamaica join, Canada will be tempted to follow them into the Organisation. Even if Canada stands aloof the American officials concerned with OAS affairs, not to mention much liberal opinion in Washington generally, would be only too pleased to see two or more English-speaking parliamentary democracies enter this somewhat frustrating "Spanish Club" of which the U.S. are [sic] the only English-speaking member. It is recognised that the entry of a number of new countries brought up in the British tradition might well change the whole character of the Organisation but the State Department clearly feel that this could be a positive advantage. The recent declarations by Mr. Barrow, the Prime Minister of Barbados, which seem to indicate that he will soon apply for membership of the OAS, are therefore genuinely welcomed here; in Washington it is hoped that he will drag in Jamaica and Trinidad after him.

7. Guyana, which had never formed part of the Federation of the West Indies, remains a special case. This is not the place to rehearse the history of increasing American concern with Guyanese affairs, but the Administration have made no secret of the fact that they will do their utmost to prevent the establishment of

another Communist-dominated state in the Hemisphere. In the case of a small and fairly accessible country like Guyana they would not in the last resort shrink from military intervention. In the case of a larger or more remote country like Brazil or Colombia every weapon of psychological and economic warfare together with direct aid to friendly factions would no doubt be brought into play. The policy was set out clearly when in his speech on television on the 2nd of May, 1965 at the height of the Dominican crisis, President Johnson declared: "The American nations cannot, must not and will not permit the establishment of another Communist government in the Western Hemisphere". In the context of Guyanese affairs this has meant that the Americans have been and will continue to be prepared to devote considerable sums of money to helping Mr. Burnham make a success of his government. Fortunately they appear only too anxious to work in collaboration with Her Majesty's Government and not to "go it alone". The forthcoming talks in London between British and American officials in which the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs will take part will be of the greatest importance in this respect. Again, because of the Communist threat the Inter-American Bureau would much prefer to see Guyana in the OAS and thus within the Inter-American defence system and under the protection of the Rio Treaty. Although they have little hope of persuading the Venezuelans to withdraw their virtual veto as long as the present Venezuelan Foreign Minister is in office, the State Department can be expected to try hard for Guyana's eventual membership.

8. As for the Caribbean dependent territories, in late 1964, and before the transfer of responsibility to the Inter-American Bureau, the Bureau of European Affairs had already approached this Embassy to suggest an exchange of views about our remaining Caribbean dependencies. They were becoming increasingly perturbed at the prospect of an independent Eastern Caribbean Federation which they felt would probably be too weak to resist communist and especially Cuban subversion. They told us frankly that they were chiefly concerned to see that the British should not reduce their influence and presence in the area (whether or not the Eastern Caribbean Federation came into being) and they suggested that the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom should see what could be done to tackle the economic problems of the region jointly.⁴ They made it clear that their immediate objective was to use with the Congress the leverage which a tripartite approach would give them so as to bring about the resumption of American aid. This informal approach was followed up by formal talks in London in December, 1964 at which Sir Alan Dudley⁵ of the Ministry of Overseas Development took the chair and it was subsequently agreed that a tripartite economic survey should be carried out. In April 1965 American anxieties increased when Antigua withdrew from the scheme for Eastern Caribbean Federation and Mr. Rusk at once strongly emphasised to us his dislike of the prospect of the emergence of a number of independent but unviable mini-States in the region.⁶ Nevertheless, in spite of this concern over the political prospects and although the suggestion for a Tripartite Survey had originally come from the Americans and had, we were assured, the support of the Inter-American Bureau, it became clear shortly after the transfer of responsibility to them in 1965 that the latter were not particularly enthusiastic about the general concept. It was only after considerable pressure from our side that they finally agreed to American

⁴ See 228 also 229.

⁵ See 234, note.

⁶ See 235.

participation in the Mission and even then they did so only with loud protestations that their participation did not mean that they were committed to giving aid. By the time the Tripartite Economic Survey's Report⁷ finally emerged in the Spring of 1966 the Americans were indeed maintaining that there could be no question of United States aid except for a minor technical assistance programme. As we had foreseen, however, it was almost impossible for them to explain either to us or to the islands (or indeed to themselves—the State Department was the scene of some fairly sharp post-mortem arguments) why they had taken part in the Survey at all if they were not prepared to examine and assist in giving effect to its recommendations.

9. Faced with this vacillating and even unhelpful policy on the part of the Americans our own efforts during 1966 have therefore been concentrated on trying to persuade the Americans to recognise the strategic importance of these islands to them and to evolve a satisfactory relationship with them at this moment of constitutional advance. On the political side there has been no difficulty. We have kept the Americans fully informed of our constitutional proposals and they have been as anxious as ourselves to see the Leeward and Windward Islands content with the status of non-independent "Associated States". They are already doing their best to treat them as adult members of the international community.

10. On the economic side too our repeated representations at both the ministerial and official levels seem gradually to be having some effect, although various provisions of the 1966 Foreign Aid Bill and the general attitude of the Congress towards the granting of aid to additional countries militated against firm decisions being taken. In September this year there was a distinct step forward when we managed to persuade Mr. Lincoln Gordon, the Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs and U.S. Coordinator of the Alliance for Progress, to lead in person the United States delegation to a conference in Antigua at which the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom were to discuss the Tripartite Economic Survey with the Chief Ministers of the Windward and Leeward Islands and representatives of Barbados. This decision by Mr. Gordon to attend made it impossible for the United States to go on stalling. He instituted a series of urgent studies within the State Department designed to see what the United States could do short of giving bi-lateral capital assistance on concessional terms to each island and for the first time the problems of the islands received a full airing at the policy-making level. The result was revealed at the Antigua Conference on which your Department have already

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received a report from the Ministry of Overseas Development. The American position with regard to helping the Associated States is clearly set out in the summary of Mr. Gordon's statement at the Meeting, a copy of which I attach for ease of reference. This statement, which was drafted with great care, probably represents as favourable a position as Mr. Gordon could have been expected to reach at this juncture and he is well aware that he has aroused expectations among the Chief Ministers which it would be unwise for him to disappoint. Nevertheless the Americans are masters of procrastination when it suits them and we shall need to keep up the pressure on them if we are ever to see U.S. aid actually flow.

11. The importance of the Antigua Conference does not, however, lie only in the field of aid. Its primary significance from the point of view of U.S. policy in the area is that the Administration, in the person of the senior policy-making official at the State Department responsible for the region, supported by a strong delegation, visited the area, met the Chief Ministers and assured them of the desire of the United States to have a closer relationship with them in all fields. The Chief Ministers should have come away with the feeling that the United States would give due weight to their forthcoming constitutional advance and would be willing to treat them in future as neighbours to whom due attention should be paid. This is solid gain and the trend should be reinforced once a United States Ambassador has been installed in Barbados with responsibility for all the islands and with a vested interest in building up a closer relationship. This should all help to lessen any temptation the islands may feel to opt for full independence.

12. It would appear therefore that the Americans are evolving a new and satisfactory relationship with the English-speaking Caribbean which should be welcome to us. Although many of our exchanges with the State Department this year, and therefore much of this despatch, may seem to have concentrated disproportionately on the smaller islands, it is for these countries that Her Majesty's Government remain directly responsible. Moreover in focusing attention on part of the English-speaking Caribbean we have inevitably led senior officials to give more thought to their policy to the area as a whole. Much though the Americans would like us to be more active elsewhere in the Hemisphere they would, I am sure, feel that we should give first priority in this Hemisphere, particularly as far as our aid programmes are concerned, to the English-speaking Caribbean. From the point of view of this post I would hope that this proposition might be generally acceptable in London and that in the interests of Anglo-U.S. relations a high priority could be given to aiding the Commonwealth countries in certain sensitive fields such as police training about which we have been in correspondence with your Department.

13. If I may be allowed to end this despatch on a note of warning it seems to me important in the context of Anglo-American relations that we should not fall down on what the Americans regard as our remaining obligations in the area. If the Americans are willing to do their best to help make the concept of "Associated Statehood" work, it is because it not only avoids the entry of more mini-States into the U.N. but lays on us the direct responsibility for defence as well as foreign affairs. The basis for American interest in the area is the national defence of the United States. These islands are too close for comfort. It follows that if we seem unwilling or prove unable to do what is necessary (or what the U.S. deems necessary) to keep the area in the Western camp the United States herself will step in and take any measures which seem to her called for to prevent communism obtaining a foothold. In the

worst case, military intervention by the U.S. in a Commonwealth country could obviously pose very serious problems which lie outside the scope of this despatch.

14. I am sending copies of this despatch with enclosure to the Commonwealth Office, the Ministry of Overseas Development, the Ministry of Defence, H.M. Treasury and the Bank of England; to the British High Commissioners in Ottawa, Georgetown, Port of Spain, Kingston and Bridgetown; to H.M. Ambassadors in all Latin American posts; to the U.K. Permanent Representative to the United Nations; and Personal to the Governors of the Bahamas and British Honduras.

Annex to 255: Tripartite survey conference, Antigua, 2 Nov 1966: summary of remarks made by Mr Lincoln Gordon

After noting that he personally preferred the phrase "cooperating governments" rather than "sponsoring governments", Mr. Gordon stated he and the other members of his delegation had learned a great deal during the morning session from the presentations made by the island delegations.

Turning to the substance of the conference proceedings, he said the United States strongly supports the regional approach. As a matter of fact the United States can scarcely offer aid other than technical assistance on a bilateral basis. There is a legislative problem in the United States since the Congress not only discourages bilateral assistance in favour of regional and multilateral but also has limited the number of countries outside the Alliance for Progress area which can receive bilateral aid. And the trend within the Alliance for Progress area (the Western Hemisphere) to which the islands belong is definitely in the multilateral direction. It also appeared to him that many of the things that needed to be done in the Eastern Caribbean could be done on a better basis regionally.

With respect to the statements made earlier in the day suggesting the possible dangers of regional organizations impinging on island sovereignty he thought, in view of the different ways in which regional organizations could be set up, that this would not be an issue. He discussed briefly the Central American precedent on regionalism.

With respect to any new financial institution or development bank there should be a careful definition of scope and area. He thought the suggestion covered by the Ottawa communique and referred to previously by Mr. Towe⁸ might be very helpful. While a bank covering even a wider area might not be completely viable in economic terms and could well need concessional assistance, certainly the larger the area covered the more chance there was for a workable, useful institution to be developed.

The question was, would the United States contribute to any such bank. Mr. Gordon said he did not know at this stage, when the institution still had to be developed and that he, in any event, could make no commitment. But the United States, if invited, was prepared to join in working on the proposal particularly if it developed along the Ottawa lines. He would also be prepared to talk seriously with members of the Administration and the Congress in trying to get support for the bank. Other systems might be developed but as of this moment the United States dealt with development banks in one of two ways, i.e. with full participating membership as in the Asian Development Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank or with non-membership but making concessional loans as in the Central

⁸ See 208.

American Bank for Economic Integration (CABEI). The United States would seriously consider the possibility of help for a Caribbean Development Bank.

The United States also favoured the idea of a new Regional Development organization for the group of eight islands. Perhaps the word Agency sounded too grandiose and "Commission" might be a better word. But we wanted to see something organized very soon and this entity could count on United States cooperation. It should be a regional group that worked continuously on the technical level and should have a permanent secretariat. It could work in such areas as tourist promotion, food development, processing, and marketing, education, fisheries, specialized industrial activities, etc. It could work out specific methods for operating in specific areas, e.g. a Regional Tourist Promotion Board. It could also help assure that the Caribbean Development Bank gives proper attention to the wide needs of the smaller islands.

The United States was prepared to have a governmental official work with it to whatever extent desired by the islands. After the United States Embassy at Bridgetown was established following independence an officer would be assigned to that embassy to work on such matters. He assumed the islands would not want this officer as a formal member but rather as an associate.

There was also the possibility that revenue-producing projects might be eligible to receive financing from the United States Export-Import Bank for the dollar portion of their capital needs.

Turning to the private sector Mr. Gordon expressed his thought that most economic development in the region would be done through private channels, although he noted there was definitely some necessity for public financed infrastructure projects. He thought that CARINCO, a private investment company already in formation or something similar, could perform a useful function, not as a substitute for a public regional bank but rather as a parallel organization. He mentioned that ADELA appeared to be interested in the CARINCO initiative.

The United States Government has a system of investment guarantees whereby the United States Government guarantees that a U.S. private investor in a foreign country with which the United States has a guarantee agreement is insured against a variety of risks (convertibility, expropriation, war and commercial). This guarantee system in many instances has acted to stimulate United States private investment abroad. The United States has investment guarantee agreements with 74 countries, recently signed agreements with British Honduras, Jamaica, Trinidad, and Guyana and he saw no problem on the United States side to negotiating agreements separately with the eight islands if their governments are so disposed.

Another important area for consideration was that of the identification of investment opportunities. In this field the island "commission" referred to previously could be useful. Along this line the United States had an International Executive Service Corps of retired businessmen who were available for service in foreign countries. These men were alert to investment opportunities, knew how to make contact with the United States investing community, and could also help in the technical management field.

He brought up the IBRD family and said that while he didn't know if it could directly be a source of capital he was encouraged that the Bank had sent an observer to the meeting. The United States as the largest stockholder in the bank could be expected to view sympathetically the prospect of bank operations in the area.

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13. If I may be allowed to end this despatch on a note of warning it seems to me important in the context of Anglo-American relations that we should not fall down on what the Americans regard as our remaining obligations in the area. If the Americans are willing to do their best to help make the concept of "Associated Statehood" work, it is because it not only avoids the entry of more mini-States into the U.N. but lays on us the direct responsibility for defence as well as foreign affairs. The basis for American interest in the area is the national defence of the United States. These islands are too close for comfort. It follows that if we seem unwilling or prove unable to do what is necessary (or what the U.S. deems necessary) to keep the area in the Western camp the United States herself will step in and take any measures which seem to her called for to prevent communism obtaining a foothold. In the

worst case, military intervention by the U.S. in a Commonwealth country could obviously pose very serious problems which lie outside the scope of this despatch.

14. I am sending copies of this despatch with enclosure to the Commonwealth Office, the Ministry of Overseas Development, the Ministry of Defence, H.M. Treasury and the Bank of England; to the British High Commissioners in Ottawa, Georgetown, Port of Spain, Kingston and Bridgetown; to H.M. Ambassadors in all Latin American posts; to the U.K. Permanent Representative to the United Nations; and Personal to the Governors of the Bahamas and British Honduras.

Annex to 255: Tripartite survey conference, Antigua, 2 Nov 1966: summary of remarks made by Mr Lincoln Gordon

After noting that he personally preferred the phrase "cooperating governments" rather than "sponsoring governments", Mr. Gordon stated he and the other members of his delegation had learned a great deal during the morning session from the presentations made by the island delegations.

Turning to the substance of the conference proceedings, he said the United States strongly supports the regional approach. As a matter of fact the United States can scarcely offer aid other than technical assistance on a bilateral basis. There is a legislative problem in the United States since the Congress not only discourages bilateral assistance in favour of regional and multilateral but also has limited the number of countries outside the Alliance for Progress area which can receive bilateral aid. And the trend within the Alliance for Progress area (the Western Hemisphere) to which the islands belong is definitely in the multilateral direction. It also appeared to him that many of the things that needed to be done in the Eastern Caribbean could be done on a better basis regionally.

With respect to the statements made earlier in the day suggesting the possible dangers of regional organizations impinging on island sovereignty he thought, in view of the different ways in which regional organizations could be set up, that this would not be an issue. He discussed briefly the Central American precedent on regionalism.

With respect to any new financial institution or development bank there should be a careful definition of scope and area. He thought the suggestion covered by the Ottawa communique and referred to previously by Mr. Towe⁸ might be very helpful. While a bank covering even a wider area might not be completely viable in economic terms and could well need concessional assistance, certainly the larger the area covered the more chance there was for a workable, useful institution to be developed.

The question was, would the United States contribute to any such bank. Mr. Gordon said he did not know at this stage, when the institution still had to be developed and that he, in any event, could make no commitment. But the United States, if invited, was prepared to join in working on the proposal particularly if it developed along the Ottawa lines. He would also be prepared to talk seriously with members of the Administration and the Congress in trying to get support for the bank. Other systems might be developed but as of this moment the United States dealt with development banks in one of two ways, i.e. with full participating membership as in the Asian Development Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank or with non-membership but making concessional loans as in the Central

⁸ See 208.

American Bank for Economic Integration (CABEI). The United States would seriously consider the possibility of help for a Caribbean Development Bank.

The United States also favoured the idea of a new Regional Development organization for the group of eight islands. Perhaps the word Agency sounded too grandiose and "Commission" might be a better word. But we wanted to see something organized very soon and this entity could count on United States cooperation. It should be a regional group that worked continuously on the technical level and should have a permanent secretariat. It could work in such areas as tourist promotion, food development, processing, and marketing, education, fisheries, specialized industrial activities, etc. It could work out specific methods for operating in specific areas, e.g. a Regional Tourist Promotion Board. It could also help assure that the Caribbean Development Bank gives proper attention to the wide needs of the smaller islands.

The United States was prepared to have a governmental official work with it to whatever extent desired by the islands. After the United States Embassy at Bridgetown was established following independence an officer would be assigned to that embassy to work on such matters. He assumed the islands would not want this officer as a formal member but rather as an associate.

There was also the possibility that revenue-producing projects might be eligible to receive financing from the United States Export-Import Bank for the dollar portion of their capital needs.

Turning to the private sector Mr. Gordon expressed his thought that most economic development in the region would be done through private channels, although he noted there was definitely some necessity for public financed infrastructure projects. He thought that CARINCO, a private investment company already in formation or something similar, could perform a useful function, not as a substitute for a public regional bank but rather as a parallel organization. He mentioned that ADELA appeared to be interested in the CARINCO initiative.

The United States Government has a system of investment guarantees whereby the United States Government guarantees that a U.S. private investor in a foreign country with which the United States has a guarantee agreement is insured against a variety of risks (convertibility, expropriation, war and commercial). This guarantee system in many instances has acted to stimulate United States private investment abroad. The United States has investment guarantee agreements with 74 countries, recently signed agreements with British Honduras, Jamaica, Trinidad, and Guyana and he saw no problem on the United States side to negotiating agreements separately with the eight islands if their governments are so disposed.

Another important area for consideration was that of the identification of investment opportunities. In this field the island "commission" referred to previously could be useful. Along this line the United States had an International Executive Service Corps of retired businessmen who were available for service in foreign countries. These men were alert to investment opportunities, knew how to make contact with the United States investing community, and could also help in the technical management field.

He brought up the IBRD family and said that while he didn't know if it could directly be a source of capital he was encouraged that the Bank had sent an observer to the meeting. The United States as the largest stockholder in the bank could be expected to view sympathetically the prospect of bank operations in the area.

Referring to technical education Mr. Gordon said he has not seen the Gaylor report but would study it with interest. In this connection the IRBD family might be able to help. Also the United States Peace Corps, which is already operating in Barbados and St. Lucia and is interested in expanding throughout the area can be of even greater help in this field.

With respect to trade and markets he mentioned CARIFTA and the idea of a Caribbean customs union and observed that he thought these initiatives were useful and that he hoped they came to pass.

Looking to the future of trade relations he pointed out that the area would develop increasing economic and trade relations with Central and South America.

On the question of assured markets there was little the United States could do formally. The status of Puerto Rico could not be extended to other areas. The preferential sugar quota comes up for review in several years time but the present legislation is inflexible and there is no assurance the same kind of system will be maintained in the future. The United States gives Most Favored Nation treatment generally and is carefully looking at proposals which would give preferential treatment to underdeveloped nations in general, but in any event nothing new in this field will develop until the Kennedy Round negotiations in Geneva are completed, probably late next year.

Apart from formal preferences he wishes to point out that private initiative was often able to develop new marketing opportunities through its own efforts, and wondered for example, about the possibility of the development of light industry, food processing, and an off-season fruit and vegetable export industry.

In conclusion Mr. Gordon said, speaking for all three cooperating governments, they would be most interested in hearing how the eight island governments felt about the proposal for a development bank covering a wider area and for a new flexible technical working group or commission covering the group of eight islands.

And in summary the United States is prepared:—

- (1) to assign a full time officer to its about-to-be-established embassy in Bridgetown to be available to work on development problems in the entire area.
- (2) to provide requested technical assistance for an [sic] be associated with a commission for regional development of the eight islands.
- (3) to join, if invited, any group set up to develop a workable proposal for a Caribbean Development Bank along the lines of the Ottawa communique.
- (4) to consider the possibility of providing financial support for a Caribbean Development Bank of this nature, if and when established.
- (5) to encourage efforts under way for the formation of a private Caribbean investment company.
- (6) to negotiate investment guarantee agreements with the islands.
- (7) to expand Peace Corps assistance in the field of education.
- (8) to assist United States firms in investment surveys.
- (9) to assist in making available highly qualified industrial executive assistance through the International Executive Service Corps.
- (10) to encourage positive interest in the area by international financial and technical assistance agencies, particularly the World Bank family and the United Nations Development Program.

256 FO 371/184567, no 269

5 Dec 1966

[Associated status]: minute by H A F Hohler¹ on the role of the FO in the arrangements for associated status

We had a good deal of discussion with the Colonial Office in regard to the constitutional arrangements of Antigua which, with minor modifications, would be the pattern for the remaining islands referred to in the first paragraph of Mr. Edmonds's minute.²

2. Our first concern was that, in relation to foreign affairs, we should not find ourselves in a position of having responsibility but no control. Annex D³ of the attached report on the St. Kitts Constitutional Conference shows the pattern for the delegation of authority in the external field. I think this is quite satisfactory.

3. Our second concern was to meet the fear of the U.S. Government that these small communities would vote themselves into full independence, thereby at the best setting up mini-states and, at the worst, little Cubas. The arrangement reached, as a result of considerable Foreign Office pressure, is that the association with the United Kingdom can only be terminated by a two-thirds majority in the House of Assembly, followed by a two-thirds majority of votes cast in a referendum (see paragraph 23 of the St. Kitts Report). Here again, I am satisfied that we got the most we could reasonably ask for. If higher majorities than these were in favour of terminating the association, no legal safeguards would be effective. It would be a question of deciding whether or not to use force as far as force is concerned, but it should be noted that, from now on, the British raj will be represented in the Caribbean by one frigate.

4. Our very proper desire to meet any American anxieties on the above score was reinforced by the importance which we attach to the grant of American aid being available to the Caribbean islands. When he was Foreign Secretary, Mr. Michael Stewart wrote personally to Mr. Dean Rusk on this subject.⁴ It was also discussed at a tripartite meeting in Antigua at the beginning of November. These discussions will be continued by Mr. Lincoln Gordon⁵ with the Overseas Development Ministry on 9 December. Under current American legislation, the islands, which will still be dependent territories, cannot receive direct aid. It will, however, be made available to them through the Regional Development Bank.

¹ Assistant under-secretary, FO, 1966–1967

² Referring to the preparation of the West Indies Bill which was presented in the House of Commons on 20 Dec 1966 and which received the Royal Assent as The West Indies Act on 27 Feb 1967.

³ cf 249, annex D.

⁴ See 250 and 252.

⁵ See 255, para 10.

Biographical Notes

Adams, Grantley Herbert, 1898–1971

Kt 1957; Barbados scholar, 1917, called to Bar, 1934; member, Barbados House of Assembly, 1934–1958, 1962–1970; Barbados Progressive League, 1938; founder and president, Barbados Labour Party, 1939–1971; QC Barbados, 1953; premier, Barbados, 1954–1958; first vice-president, West Indies Federal Labour Party, 1956–1961; prime minister of West Indies Federation, 1958–1962

Amery, Julian, 1919–1996

Son of Leopold Amery (S of S for colonies, 1924–1929, for dominion affairs, 1925–1929, for India and Burma, 1940–1945); MP (Con) 1950–1966; parliamentary under-secretary of state and financial secretary, War Office, 1957–1958; parliamentary under-secretary of state, CO, 1958–1960; S of S for air, 1960–1962; minister of aviation, 1962–1964; minister of public building and works, 1970; minister for housing and construction, 1970–1972; minister of state, FCO, 1972–1974

Blackburne, Kenneth William, 1907–1980

KCMG, 1952; Marlborough and Clare College, Cambridge; assistant district officer/commissioner, Nigeria and Palestine, 1930–1938; assistant principal/ principal, CO, 1938–1941; colonial secretary, The Gambia, 1941; administrative secretary to comptroller for development and welfare in West Indies, 1943–1947 (acting comptroller, 1944 and 1946); gov, Leeward Islands, 1950–1956; gov, Jamaica, 1957–1962; gov-gen, Jamaica, 1962; retired, 1963

Bourdillon, Henry Townsend, 1913–1991

Son of Bernard Bourdillon (gov, Nigeria, 1935–1942); Rugby and Corpus Christi, Oxford; CO from 1937; seconded to FO

(1942), Cabinet Office (1943) and Ministry of Production (1944); CO assistant secretary from 1947 (head of Finance Dept, 1949–1954); assistant under-secretary of state, 1954–1959; deputy UK commissioner for Singapore, 1959–1961

Buchan-Hepburn, Patrick George Thomas (1st Baron Hailes cr 1957) 1901–1974

MP (Con) 1931–1950, 1950–1957; parliamentary private secretary to Oliver Stanley, 1931–1939; Conservative deputy chief whip, 1947, chief whip, 1948–1951; parliamentary secretary to Treasury and government chief whip, 1951–1955; minister of works, 1955–1957; gov-gen, West Indies Federation, 1958–1962

Burnham, (Linden) Forbes (Sampson), 1923–1985

BA, London, 1944; president of West Indian Students Union, Britain, 1947–1948; called to Bar, 1948; entered local politics, British Guiana, 1949; co-founder and chairman, PPP, 1949; minister of education, 1953; re-elected to legislature, 1957 and 1961; founder and leader, PNC, 1957; leader of Opposition, 1957–1964; prime minister of British Guiana, 1964–1966, of Guyana, 1966–1970, of Co-operative Republic of Guyana, 1970–1980; first executive president of Co-operative Republic of Guayana from 1980

Bustamante, William Alexander, 1884–1977

Kt 1955; travelled and lived in Spain, Latin America, US and Canada; employment included inspector of police in Havana and dietitian in New York; returned to Jamaica from US, 1934; labour leader and founder of Bustamante Industrial Trade Union, 1938; called general strike, 1939; interned under Defence Regulations, 1940–1942;

formed Jamaica Labour Party, 1943 and won first election under universal suffrage, 1944; leader of government business and minister of communications, Jamaica, 1945–1953; mayor of Kingston, 1947–1948; member of Caribbean Commission, 1950–1955; chief minister, 1953–1955; leader of Opposition, 1955–1962; led opposition to Jamaica remaining in West Indies Federation; won referendum, 1961, and became chief minister after election in Apr 1962; first prime minister and minister of external affairs and defence, Aug 1962–1967

Carstairs, Charles Young, 1910–1993

George Watson's Boys College, Edinburgh and Edinburgh University; Home Civil Service, 1943; transferred to CO from DO, 1935; assistant secretary, West India Royal Commission, 1938–1939; assistant secretary, CO, 1943; secretary, Colonial Research Committee; joint secretary, Colonial Production Research Council, 1944–1947; administrative secretary, Development and Welfare Organisation, British West Indies, 1947–1950; secretary, British Caribbean Standing Closer Association Committee, 1948–1949; director of Information Services, CO, 1951–1953; assistant under-secretary of state, 1953–1962; deputy secretary, Medical Research Council, 1962–1965

Duncan Sandys, Duncan Edwin (Baron, life peer, cr 1974) 1908–1987

Diplomatic Service, 1930; MP (Con) 1935–1945, 1950–1974; parliamentary secretary, Ministry of Supply, 1943–1944; minister of works, 1944–1945; founded European Movement, 1947; minister of supply, 1951–1954; minister of housing and local government, 1954–1957; minister of defence, 1957–1959; minister of aviation, 1959–1960; secretary of state for Commonwealth relations, 1960–1964, and S of S for colonies, 1962–1964

Foot, Hugh Mackintosh (Baron Caradon, life peer, cr 1964) 1907–1990

KCMG 1951; Leighton Park School, Reading and St John's, Cambridge; administrative officer, Palestine Govt, 1929–1937;

CO, 1938–1939; assistant British resident, Transjordan, 1939–1942; British Military Administration, Cyrenaica, 1943; colonial secretary, Cyprus, 1943–1945, and Jamaica, 1945–1947; chief secretary, Nigeria, 1947–1951; gov, Jamaica, 1951–1957, and Cyprus, 1957–1960; ambassador and adviser in UK Mission to UN and UK representative on Trusteeship Council, 1961–1962 (resigned); permanent UK representative at UN, 1964–1970

Fraser, Hugh Charles Patrick Joseph, 1918–1984

MP (Con) from 1950; parliamentary private secretary to secretary of state for colonies, 1951–1954; parliamentary under-secretary of state and financial secretary, War Office, 1958–1960; parliamentary under-secretary of state for colonies, 1960–1962; secretary of state for air, 1962–1964

Gorell Barnes, William Lethbridge, 1909–1987

KCMG 1961; Marlborough and Pembroke, Cambridge; HM Diplomatic Service, 1932–1939; War Cabinet, 1939–1945; personal assistant to lord president of Council, 1942–1945; assistant secretary, Treasury, 1945–1946; personal assistant to prime minister, 1946–1948; assistant under-secretary of state, CO, 1948–1956; joint deputy under-secretary of state, 1959–1963

Greenwood, Arthur William James (Baron Greenwood of Rossendale, life peer, cr 1970) 1911–1982

MP (Lab) 1946–1950, 1950–1970; vice-chairman, Parliamentary Labour Party, 1950, 1951; vice-chairman, National Executive Committee, Labour Party, 1962–1963, chairman, 1963–1964; S of S Colonies, 1964–1965; minister of overseas development, 1965–1966; minister of housing and local government, 1966–1970

Grey, Ralph Francis Alnwick (Grey of Naunton, life peer, cr 1969) b 1910

New Zealander; KCMG 1959; Wellington College, Auckland University College and Pembroke, Cambridge; barrister and solicitor of Supreme Court of New Zealand, 1932; Colonial Administrative Service from

1936; served in Nigeria from 1937; chief secretary, Federation of Nigeria, 1955–1957, deputy gov-gen, 1957–1959; gov, British Guiana, 1959–1964; gov, Bahamas, 1964–1968 and of Turks and Caicos Islands from 1965; gov, Northern Ireland, 1968–1973; chairman, Commonwealth Development Corporation, 1979–1980

Home, Alexander Frederick Douglas- (Baron Home of the Hirsell, life peer, cr 1974) 1903–1995

14th Earl of Home, 1951–1953; Sir Alec Douglas Home, 1963–1974; MP (Unionist) 1931–1945, (Con) 1950–1951, (Unionist) 1963–1974; parliamentary private secretary to prime minister, 1937–1940; joint parliamentary under-secretary of state, FO, 1945; minister of state, Scottish Office, 1951–1955; S of S for Commonwealth relations, 1955–1960; leader of House of Lords, 1957–1960; S of S for foreign affairs, 1960–1963; prime minister, 1963–1964; S of S for foreign and Commonwealth affairs, 1970–1974

Jagan, Cheddi, 1918–1997

Founded Political Affairs Committee, British Guiana, 1947; member of Legislative Council, 1947–1953; adviser, Guiana Industrial Workers' Union, 1950; founded PPP, 1951; minister of agriculture, lands and mines, May–Oct 1953 in PPP Govt (deposed); imprisoned for six months, Feb 1957; minister of trade and industry, 1957–1961; first premier, British Guiana, and minister of development and planning, 1961–1964; leader of Opposition in National Assembly; member, Presidential Committee of World Peace Council; Order of Friendship, USSR, 1978

Jamieson, G W, b 1924

George Heriott's School, Edinburgh and London University; assistant principal, Ministry of Health, 1951, principal, 1954; seconded to Kenya, 1956–1958; transferred to CO, 1958; seconded to Central Africa Office, 1962; seconded to CRO, 1964; assistant secretary, CO, 1964; transferred to Ministry of Defence, 1965

Lennox-Boyd, Alan Tindal (1st Viscount Boyd of Merton cr 1960) 1904–1983

MP (Con) 1931–1960; parliamentary secretary, Ministry of Labour, 1938–1939, Ministry of Home Security, 1939, Ministry of Aircraft Production, 1943–1945; minister of state, CO, 1951–1952; minister of transport and civil aviation, 1952–1954; S of S for colonies, 1954–1959

Lloyd, Alexander David Frederick (2nd Baron of Dolobran) 1912–1985

Member London County Council, 1949–1951; lord in waiting to King George VI, 1951–1952, joint under-secretary of state for Home Dept with responsibility for Welsh affairs, 1952–1954; parliamentary under-secretary of state for colonies, 1954–1957; president, Commonwealth and British Empire Chambers of Commerce, 1957–1961

Lloyd, Thomas Ingram Kynaston, 1896–1968

KCMG 1947; Rossall and Gonville and Caius, Cambridge; assistant principal, Ministry of Health, 1920–1921; assistant principal, CO, 1921–1929; principal, 1929–1930; secretary, Palestine Commission, 1929–1930; secretary, West India Royal Commission, 1938–1939; assistant secretary, CO, 1939–1943; assistant under-secretary of state, 1943–1947; permanent under-secretary of state, 1947–1956

Luke, Stephen Elliot Vyvyan, 1905–1988

KCMG 1953; St George's School, Harpenden and Wadham, Oxford; assistant clerk, House of Commons, 1930; assistant principal, CO, 1930; seconded to Palestine Administration, 1936–1937; secretary, Palestine Partition Commission, 1938; under-secretary, Cabinet Office, 1947–1950; assistant under-secretary of state, CO, 1950–1953; comptroller for development and welfare in West Indies and British co-chairman, Caribbean Commission, 1953–1958; commissioner for preparation of West Indies Federal Organisation, 1956–1958; senior crown agent for overseas governments and administrations, 1959–1968; interim commissioner for West Indies, 1962–1968; member Executive Committee, West India Committee

Luyt, Richard (Edmonds), 1915–1994

KCMG 1964; South African; Diocesan College, Rondebosch, Cape, South Africa and University of Cape Town and Trinity, Oxford; Rhodes Scholar, 1937; entered CO, 1940, and posted to Northern Rhodesia; war service, 1940–1945, in Ethiopia from 1941; returned to Northern Rhodesia, 1945; transferred to Kenya, 1953; labour commissioner, Kenya, 1954–1956; permanent secretary to govt ministries in Kenya, 1957–1960 and secretary to Cabinet, 1960–1961; chief secretary, Northern Rhodesia, 1962–1964; gov, British Guiana, 1964–1966, gov-gen, May-Oct 1966

Macleod, Iain Norman, 1913–1970

Head of Conservative Party Home Affairs Research Dept, 1948–1950; MP (Con) 1950–1970; minister of health, 1952–1955; minister of labour and national service, 1955–1959; S of S for colonies, 1959–1961; chancellor of Duchy of Lancaster and leader of House of Commons, 1961–1963; chairman, Conservative Party Organisation, 1961–1963; editor, *The Spectator*, 1963–1965; chancellor of Exchequer, June 1970

Manley, Norman Washington, 1893–1969

Military service, First World War; Jesus College, Oxford; Rhodes scholar, 1914; called to Bar, 1921; appointed King's Counsel, 1931; founder-president, PNP, Jamaica, 1938; chief minister, Jamaica, 1955–1959; co-founder and president, West Indies Federal Labour Party, 1956–1961; premier, 1959–1962; leader of Opposition, 1962

Maudling, Reginald, 1917–1979

MP (Con) 1950–1974, 1974–1979; parliamentary secretary to minister of civil aviation, 1952; economic secretary to Treasury, 1952–1955; minister of supply, 1955–1957; paymaster-general, 1957–1959; president of Board of Trade, 1959–1961; S of S for colonies, 1961–1962; chancellor of Exchequer, 1962–1964; home secretary, 1970–1972

Perth, John David Drummond, b 1907

17th Earl of Perth, 13th Viscount

Strathallan; War Cabinet, 1942–1943; Ministry of Production, 1944–1945; minister of state for colonial affairs, 1957–1962 (resigned)

Poynton, (Arthur) Hilton, 1905–1998

KCMG 1949; Marlborough and Brasenose, Oxford; assistant principal, Dept of Scientific and Industrial Research, 1927–1929; assistant principal, CO, 1929–1935; private secretary to parliamentary under-secretary of state, 1932–1933; seconded to Sierra Leone administration, 1933–1934; principal, DO, 1935; principal, CO, 1935–1943; on loan as private secretary to minister of supply, 1941–1942, and minister of production, 1942–1943; assistant secretary, CO, 1943–1946; assistant under-secretary of state, 1946–1948; joint deputy under-secretary of state, 1948–1959; permanent under-secretary of state, 1959–1966

Rogers, Philip, 1914–1990

KCB 1970; William Hulme Grammar School, Manchester and Emmanuel, Cambridge; CO from 1936; seconded to be private secretary to governor of Jamaica, Jan-Dec 1939; assistant secretary, CO, 1946–1953 (head of Establishments from 1948, of East Africa Dept from 1951); assistant under-secretary of state, 1953–1961; under-secretary, Dept of Technical Co-operation, 1961–1964; deputy secretary of Cabinet, 1964–1967; 3rd secretary, Treasury, 1967–1968; deputy secretary, Civil Service Dept, 1968–1969, 2nd permanent secretary, 1969–1970; permanent secretary, Department of Health and Social Security, 1970–1975

Savage, Alfred William Lungley, 1903–1980

KCMG 1951; Owen's School, London; Home Civil Service, 1920; assistant treasurer, Northern Rhodesia, 1928; deputy treasurer, Fiji, 1935; deputy treasurer, Palestine, 1939, deputy financial secretary, 1940, under-secretary, 1945; deputy financial secretary, Nigeria, 1946, financial secretary, 1948; gov, Barbados, 1949–1953; gov, British Guiana, 1953–1955

Seel, George Frederick, 1895–1976

KCMG 1950; King's School, Macclesfield and Corpus Christi, Oxford; secretary, Rhodesia-Nyasaland Royal Commission, 1938; assistant under-secretary of state, CO, 1946–1950; comptroller for development and welfare in West Indies, 1950–1953; senior crown agent for overseas governments and administrations, 1953–1959

Stallard, Peter (Hyla Gawne), 1915–1995

KCMG 1961; Bromsgrove School and Corpus Christi, Oxford; Colonial Administrative Service in Nigeria from 1937; military service, Nigeria, Gold Coast and Burma, 1939–1945; secretary to prime minister of Federation of Nigeria, 1958–1961; gov, British Honduras, 1961–1966; Lt-gov, Isle of Man, 1966–1974

Thomas, Ambler Reginald, 1913–1996

Gresham's School, Holt and Corpus Christi, Cambridge; Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, 1935; transferred to CO, 1936; principal, 1939; assistant secretary, 1946; chief secretary to Govt of Aden, 1947–1949; establishment and organisation officer, CO, 1950–1952; assistant under-secretary of state, 1952–1964; under-secretary, Ministry of Overseas Development, and Overseas Development Administration, 1964–1973

Thornley, Colin (Hardwick), 1907–1983

KCMG 1957; Bramcote School, Scarborough and Brasenose, Oxford; Colonial

Administrative Service, Tanganyika Territory, 1930–1939; seconded to CO, 1939–1945; administrative secretary, Kenya, 1945–1947, deputy chief secretary, 1947–1952; chief secretary, Uganda, 1952–1955; gov, British Honduras, 1955–1961; retired 1962

Williams, Douglas, b 1917

Wolverhampton School and Exeter, Oxford; CO, 1947; principal, 1949; colonial attaché, Washington, 1956–1960; assistant secretary, CO, 1961–1966 (head of West Indian Dept 'A'); transferred to Ministry of Overseas Development, and Overseas Development Administration, 1967; under-secretary, 1968–1973, deputy secretary, 1973–1977

Williams, Eric, 1911–1981

Oxford University, BA 1932, DPhil 1938; Howard University, Washington DC; assistant professor of social and political science, 1939; professor, 1947; worked with Caribbean Commission; deputy chairman, Caribbean Research Council, 1948–1955; founder and political leader, PNM, Trinidad, 1956; first chief minister and minister of finance, 1956; first premier from 1961, prime minister from 1962; minister of external affairs, 1961–1964, of finance planning and development, 1967–1971, of national security, 1967–1971, of Tobago affairs, 1967–1971; author of several publications on history and social/political development in West Indies

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Index of Main Subjects and Persons

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The following abbreviations are used:

- A – annex, appendix
- E – enclosure
- N – editor's link note (before main text of document)
- n – footnote

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